Ferenczi's Turn in Psychoanalysis

Giampieri-Deutsch, Patrizia, Bokay, Antal, Rudnytsky, Peter L.

Published by NYU Press

Giampieri-Deutsch, Patrizia, et al.
Ferenczi's Turn in Psychoanalysis.
NYU Press, 1996.
Project MUSE. muse.jhu.edu/book/15739.

For additional information about this book
https://muse.jhu.edu/book/15739
Eight

The Tragic Encounter between Freud and Ferenczi and Its Impact on the History of Psychoanalysis

MARTIN S. BERGMANN

As both the recent volume edited by Lewis Aron and Adrienne Harris (1993) and a series of international conferences attest, a revival of interest in the work of Sándor Ferenczi is currently taking place. One reason for this phenomenon is the appearance of hitherto unavailable documents that afford new insights. These include Ferenczi's Clinical Diary (1985), Freud's Phylogenetic Fantasy (1985)—discovered by Ilse Grubrich-Simitis among Ferenczi's papers—and the ongoing publication of the full Freud-Ferenczi correspondence. Beyond the confines of psychoanalysis, there is in popular culture, particularly in the United States, an urgent concern with the sexual abuse of children by adults. Among psychoanalysts Ferenczi was prominent in differentiating between actual seduction and fantasies. His attempt to blur the distinction between analyst and analysand through mutual analysis likewise has a special appeal to postmodernists. The interpersonal school of psychoanalysis, furthermore, represented in New York by the William Alanson White Institute, which is still excluded from the International Psychoanalytic Association, has discovered Ferenczi as its ancestor and through him sought to gain a new legitimacy in the psychoanalytic movement.

This chapter was read in July 1993 at the meeting of the International Psychoanalytic Association in Amsterdam and at the Fourth International Conference of the Sándor Ferenczi Society in Budapest.
In an earlier paper (1993) I have argued that psychoanalysis is in dire need of a better understanding of its own history. A more objective perspective may help to protect psychoanalysis from a “confusion of tongues” between different schools. In that paper I suggested that we need to differentiate between three types of creative psychoanalysts—the extenders, modifiers, and heretics. During Freud’s lifetime there were only the extenders or loyal disciples, and the heretics who left psychoanalysis to establish their own schools. Only after Freud’s death, when Anna Freud in her controversial discussions with Melanie Klein and her followers (King and Steiner 1991) failed to establish the authority of the founder, did the modifier emerge as an acceptable member of the psychoanalytic community. The first self-conscious statement of a modifier was Melanie Klein’s avowal: “I am a Freudian but not an Anna Freudian.” However, from a broader standpoint, Ferenczi deserves to be seen as the first modifier in psychoanalytic history.

The present chapter moves on two levels—the level of the personal relationship between Freud and Ferenczi and the level of psychoanalytic theory and technique. The first appeals to our human interest. We see two outstanding men working closely together and stimulating each other to productive work; then the hostile component of Ferenczi’s relationship to Freud gains the upper hand. The rift could have been mended had Freud not been so deeply injured. We need to acknowledge also that Ferenczi wrote his most original work while he was rebelling against Freud. But the personal story, moving though it is, is not at this temporal distance the most important dimension. The controversy between Freud and Ferenczi touches on key issues of psychoanalysis itself.

No other collaborator, not even Karl Abraham, was as close to Freud as Ferenczi. Freud’s Phylogenetic Fantasy, which he sent to Ferenczi in 1915, and Ferenczi’s Thalassa, published in 1924, are closely related. In a letter written on April 8, 1915, Freud explained to Ferenczi the mechanisms of scientific creativity as a “succession of daringly playful fantasy and relentlessly realistic criticism” (Grubrich-Simitis 1985, 83). If we take this to be an implicit self-description, we might imagine that of Ferenczi as “utmost fascination with clinical details supplying the raw material for daring speculations.” Ferenczi’s flights of fantasy must have liberated Freud from excessive self-criticism, particularly during periods when his correspondence
shows a deepening depression. A shared commitment to Lamarckianism also played a role in cementing their relationship.

In a letter of July 12, 1915, Freud outlined for Ferenczi the main ideas of his Phylogenetic Fantasy. He hypothesized that human life originated in a state of tropical bliss, where nutritional needs were satisfied with little exertion. This early state reappears in the various myths of paradise, often projected onto early childhood. With the advent of the Ice Age, libido was transformed into anxiety, an observation in keeping with Freud's theory of anxiety prior to the shift introduced in 1926 with Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety. “What are now neuroses were once phases in human conditions.” Freud concluded by assuring Ferenczi, “Your priority in all this is evident” (Grubrich-Simitis 1985, 79).

In 1919 Ferenczi wrote a paper, “Technical Difficulties in the Analysis of a Case of Hysteria,” which even today is a model in its dealing with technique. He presented the case of a woman whose symptoms improved while she was in treatment, only to relapse when she left. The patient could not be persuaded that her erotic wishes were based on transference. She refused to search for the unconscious object of her desires. Ferenczi prohibited her from crossing her legs during the hour, thus uncovering what he called a “larval form of onanism” (1919, 191). Further inquiry showed that throughout the day she eroticized every activity by pressing her legs together. Eventually this patient reached the capacity for satisfaction in normal sexual intercourse. Ferenczi was not yet advocating what he would call “indulgence,” but an active technique in which the analyst forbade all masturbatory equivalents.

Freud’s “Lines of Advance in Psychoanalytic Therapy,” read in 1918 at the Fifth Psychoanalytic Congress in Budapest, was a response to Ferenczi’s active technique. Freud divided treatment into two distinct phases. First, the therapist uncovers the analysand’s resistances and makes the unconscious conscious; then he exploits the patient’s transference to convince him that regressive processes adopted in childhood are no longer expedient in adulthood and that it is impossible to conduct life on the pleasure principle: Does the uncovering of these resistances guarantee that they will also be overcome? Certainly not always; but our hope is to achieve this by exploiting the patient’s transference to the person of the physician, so as to induce him to adopt our
conviction of the inexpediency of the repressive process established in childhood and the impossibility of conducting life on the pleasure principle. (1919, 159)

This is an important historical moment. In 1919 Freud believed that psychoanalytic cure comes about as a result of both insight and love expressed in the positive transference. It is evident from this quotation that Freud no longer assumed that merely making the unconscious conscious would bring about cure. Because the patient has to be induced to adopt a healthier attitude at this juncture, the power of suggestion cannot be denied. Both Freud and Ferenczi were convinced that the neurotic has constructed his life according to the pleasure principle. Like a child, the neurotic has refused to accept the reality principle. Neither was aware of the full complexity that a neurotic structure presents to both analysand and analyst.

Ferenczi's influence on Freud is evident in the following passage: "Developments in our therapy, therefore, will no doubt proceed along other lines; first and foremost, along the one which Ferenczi in his paper 'Technical Difficulties in an Analysis of Hysteria' (1919) has lately termed 'activity on the part of the analyst'" (Freud 1919, 161-62).

Clearly, in the realm of technique Freud was willing to follow Ferenczi's lead. There is no evidence of tension between them. Aware of the problem, raised by Ferenczi, that many analysands cling to their therapists, Freud advocated conducting treatment in a state of abstinence. Furthermore, aware that the good achieved in treatment can easily become the enemy of the better, and that many analysands simply substitute an unhappy marriage or a physical illness for the neurosis they were forced to give up, Freud demanded that no basic decisions be made during analysis. He encouraged analysts to be active in preventing such substitute formations. "Cruel though it may sound, we must see to it that the patient's suffering . . . does not come prematurely to an end" (165). Many direct intrusions by psychoanalysts into their analysands' lives were later rationalized under this heading.

In subsequent papers Ferenczi reported he employed other prohibitions, such as forbidding the patient to use the toilet during the analytic hour. On one occasion he forbade a patient to have sexual intercourse. In 1924 he published a short paper, "On Forced Phantasies," where he recommended
that in certain cases the analyst demand that the analysand produce even against his will aggressive or sexual fantasies about the analyst. All these papers were motivated by a wish to achieve better and faster results than Freud's technique allowed. Together they represent the first modification of psychoanalytic technique, soon to be overshadowed by that of Wilhelm Reich, who extended the analyst's activity even further in his advocacy of character analysis (Bergmann and Hartman 1976).

In 1927 Ferenczi published the first psychoanalytic paper on termination. In retrospect, it is significant that Freud did not include a paper on termination among his early works on technique. Before "Analysis Terminable and Interminable" (1937), his main contribution to the subject followed Ferenczi's idea of "active technique," as in his insistence that the Wolf Man terminate at a given date. Ferenczi states: "A neurotic cannot be regarded as cured if he has not given up pleasure in unconscious fantasy, i.e., unconscious mendacity" (1927, 79). Ferenczi here equates fantasy with mendacity. He advocated leaving the decision to terminate in the hands of the analysand. "The proper ending of an analysis is when neither the physician nor the patient puts an end to it, but when it dies of exhaustion. . . . A truly cured patient frees himself from analysis slowly but surely; so long as he wishes to come to analysis he should continue to do so" (85).

Reading this paper today, it seems to be written chiefly from the point of view of an analysand unpressured by reality considerations and wishing to enjoy an unending analysis. Ferenczi did not foresee the danger of an analysis creating a new equilibrium of forces in which the analyst facilitates an adjustment that makes termination impossible. The paper neglects the point of view of the analyst, who must always take the reality principle into account, and evidently idealizes the analytic process.

Ten years later, Freud was in part motivated to write "Analysis Terminable and Interminable" by the need to reply to Ferenczi's accusations. Without mentioning him by name, Freud quoted Ferenczi's allegations that he (Freud) failed to detect Ferenczi's latent negative transference and to analyze hidden problems in their relationship. Freud maintained that such an analysis would have been needlessly painful, that in fact one cannot analyze problems prematurely. By contrast, Otto Fenichel, in a posthumously published paper (1974), pointed out that latent problems are always
analyzed. It is the analysis itself that actualizes what has previously been only dormant (Bergmann 1993).

A historian of psychoanalysis should not deny that during the period where Ferenczi became critical of Freud he also wrote his most original papers. Ferenczi's paper, "The Unwelcome Child and His Death Instinct" (1929), marked a new departure. In it Ferenczi was the first to apply Freud's death instinct theory to a clinical situation. He anticipated the finding of René Spitz on hospitalism by fifteen years when he wrote, "Children who are received in a harsh and unloving way die easily and willingly" (105). The human infant, unlike most animals, needs love to overcome the death instinct. He laid the foundation for object relations theory by pointing out that it takes an immense expenditure of love, tenderness, and care for a child to forgive his parents for bringing him unasked into the world. For this reason the greatest obstacle to cure in all psychopathologies is the imbalance between libido and aggression. Elsewhere (1992) I have applied this insight to the history of religion.

Ferenczi's last paper, "The Confusion of Tongues between Adults and the Child" (1933), was also revolutionary. He postulated that seductions of children are far more prevalent than has been acknowledged. Incestuous seductions by adults occur when they "mistake the play of children for the desires of a sexually mature person" (161). Seduced children, he maintained, introject the aggressor and attempt to gratify the wishes of these adults, becoming oblivious to their own needs. A dreamlike state develops in which the child is no longer sure whether the seduction actually occurred. This gives way to a traumatic trance that eventually succumbs to the primary-process distortions. Ferenczi stressed that seduced children accept the seducer's denial of reality, adapting to it at the expense of the development of their own sense of reality.

Ferenczi raised another disturbing problem. He postulated a stage of "passive object-love or of tenderness" and reached the conclusion that "if more love or love of a different kind from that which they need, is forced upon the children in the stage of tenderness, it may lead to pathological consequences in the same way as the frustration or withdrawal of love" (163–64). As his Clinical Diary further attests, Ferenczi saw infantile sexuality in a new light:
A large part of children's sexuality is not spontaneous, but is artificially grafted on by adults, through overpassionate tenderness and seduction. It is only when this grafted-on element is reexperienced in analysis, and is thereby emotionally split up, that there develops in the analysis, initially in the transference relationship, that untroubled infantile sexuality from which in the final phase of analysis, the longed for normality will grow. (1985, 75)

In my experience, to let the untroubled infantile sexuality emerge and flourish in the transference is very difficult. It is always complicated by the paranoid suspicions that all analysands who were seduced as children bring into the transference. Nevertheless, Ferenczi's formulation of the analytic task is admirable.

Freud's initial great discovery was his recognition that traumatic events—primarily infantile seductions by adults—were not always facts but all too often fantasies, and that in the unconscious fact and fantasy cannot be distinguished. Ferenczi returned to a traumatic theory of neurosis. He believed that an early blissful phase of the infant is typically interrupted by traumatic events. The task of psychoanalysis is to uncover this early traumatic state and lead the patient back through regression to the prior pretraumatic phase. From this angle Ferenczi defined memory as "a collection of scars of shocks in the ego" (1985, 111). Analysis must go back before the original splitting occurred to a pretraumatic time when the patient was still one with himself (1933, 270–71). To put it in Bálint's (1968) terms, Ferenczi thought, as Winnicott did also, that psychoanalytic cure can take place only in a state of regression. The problem of regression is still with us as an important issue in psychoanalytic technique.

Is this new hypothesis of tender love in conflict with Freud's and Abraham's tables of psychosexual stages? Does it negate the centrality of the Oedipus complex? These are serious questions demanding dispassionate discussion, but Freud saw in Ferenczi's observations only a return to the old seduction theory he had relinquished with so much inner struggle.

On a theoretical level, Ferenczi raised an important problem. Is the aim of psychoanalysis the acquisition of insights, in the sense that the analysand learns to understand why he became the kind of person he is and why he developed the particular neurosis? Or does psychoanalysis, in the person of
the analyst, give the analysand a second chance to rework childhood problems with a new and different loving parental figure? In clinical practice both processes operate simultaneously, but the weight assigned to each differs in the emphasis of different psychoanalytic schools. We are here confronted with another major debate in psychoanalytic technique. Is regression indispensable for psychoanalytic cure? When confronted with seriously depressed, suicidal, or paranoid patients, is it desirable, or even permissible, to let them enter such thoroughgoing regression?

On December 13, 1931, Freud sent Ferenczi the famous “kissing” letter, the best-known document in their exchange:

I see that the difference between us comes to a head in a technical detail which is well worth discussing. You have not made a secret of the fact that you kiss your patients and let them kiss you. . . . You have to choose between two ways: either you relate this or you conceal it. The latter, as you may well think, is dishonorable. What one does in one’s technique one has to defend openly. . . . We have hitherto in our technique held to the conclusion that patients are to be refused erotic gratifications. You know too that where more extensive gratifications are not to be had, milder caresses very easily take over their role, in love affairs, on the stage, etc. (Jones 1957, 163–64)

Freud admonishes Ferenczi that where he allows kissing, a more radical therapist will proceed to genital relationships. Freud may well have been right, but in fairness to Ferenczi we must say that he advocated only the kind of intimacies that take place between parent and child.

According to Ernest Jones, Freud was greatly shocked by Ferenczi’s last paper and did his best to keep Ferenczi from reading it at the 1932 Wiesbaden Congress. In attempting to understand this conflict, it may be helpful to examine Freud’s obituary of Ferenczi, written in 1933. Freud first described their early close friendship, their travels in 1909 to the United States, where he delivered the Clark University lectures, and Ferenczi’s proposal for the formation of the International Psychoanalytic Association. He then recalled how, in 1923, a special number of the International Journal was dedicated to Ferenczi, and he praised above all Ferenczi’s Thalassa. Freud then concluded:

After this summit of achievement, it came about that our friend slowly drifted away from us. On his return from a period of work in America he seemed to withdraw more and more into solitary work, though he had previously taken the liveliest
share in all that happened in analytic circles. We learnt that one single problem had monopolised his interest. The need to cure and to help had become paramount in him. He had probably set himself aims which, with our therapeutic means, are altogether out of reach today. From unexhausted springs of emotion the conviction was borne in upon him that one could effect far more with one’s patients if one gave them enough of the love which they had longed for as children. (1933, 229)

Freud’s sadness at Ferenczi’s last stage of development is obvious, but so is his belief that Ferenczi’s endeavors were essentially motivated by a neurosis, especially in the oblique reference to “unexhausted springs of emotion.” Freud’s analysis of Ferenczi may have been correct, but the history of psychoanalysis shows that all heretics and most modifiers were criticized as being imperfectly analyzed and their innovations ascribed to resistances. Freud believed that Ferenczi’s innovations endangered psychoanalysis, and, like every creative person, his commitment to his creation went deeper than any object relationship.

Ferenczi’s feelings about Freud can be gleaned from his Diary, though we should remember that these remarks were not intended for publication.

He [Freud] could . . . tolerate my being a son only until the moment when I contradicted him for the first time. . . . The advantages of following blindly were: (1) membership in a distinguished group guaranteed by the King, indeed with the rank of field marshal for myself (crown-prince fantasy). (2) One learned from him and from his kind of technique various things that made one’s life and work more comfortable: the calm, unemotional reserve; the unruffled assurance that one knew better; and the theories, the seeking and finding of the causes of failure in the patient instead of partly in ourselves. The dishonesty of reserving the technique for one’s own person; the advice not to let patients learn anything about the technique; and finally the pessimistic view, shared only with a trusted few, that neurotics are a rabble, good only to support us financially and allow us to learn from their cases: psychoanalysis as a therapy may be worthless. (1985, 185–86)

Ferenczi maintained that analysands scrutinized their analysts much more thoroughly than analysts assumed. But when they note the analyst’s weaknesses, they identify with him rather than criticize him. Ferenczi emphasized the hypocrisy inherent in the analytic situation:

We greet the patient with politeness when he enters our room, ask him to start with his associations and promise him faithfully that we will listen attentively to him, give our undivided interest to his well-being and to the work needed for it. In reality, however, it may happen that we can only with difficulty tolerate certain
external or internal features of the patient, or perhaps we feel unpleasantly disturbed in some professional or personal affair by the analytic session. (1933, 158–59)

In his Diary Ferenczi pursued the same idea with less restraint: “While the patient is going through agonies, one sits calmly in the armchair, smoking a cigar and making seemingly conventional and hackneyed remarks in a bored tone. . . . In one or another layer of his mind the patient is well aware of our real thoughts and feelings” (1985, 178). He advocated that in such a situation the analyst should be candid with his patient about his emotions. Eventually this approach led to mutual analysis. The dilemma whether or not the analyst should tell the patient how he feels about him personally is still an important problem that separates psychoanalytic schools.

Freud accused Ferenczi of *furor sanandi*, an excessive zeal to cure, and Ferenczi reciprocated by accusing Freud of educating rather than analyzing. This accusation would surface again in Melanie Klein’s controversy with Anna Freud. As a former patient, Ferenczi was aware of the analysand’s capacity accurately to discern the analyst’s negative feelings expressed by boredom, irritation, or falling asleep when his complexes are stimulated. Reversing the stand he took in 1927, Ferenczi in his Diary accused psychoanalysts of prolonging analysis for financial gain and turning patients into “taxpayers for life” (1985, 199).

Freud stressed the principle of abstinence; Ferenczi, the principle of relaxation. Ferenczi felt that greater responsiveness on the part of the analyst could prevent a lifeless and drawn-out analysis. In his view, all patients who asked for psychoanalytic help should receive it. It is the analyst’s task to discover the specific technique necessary for cure. Ferenczi disregarded Freud’s differentiation between narcissistic and transference neuroses. He did not believe in any criteria of analyzability. The analogy with Moses, with whom Freud was so strongly identified, is appropriate here. Freud offered his analysands a form of secular salvation, provided they could live up to certain requirements: free associations, remembering and not reenacting, and willingness to analyze the transference. Ferenczi, by contrast, offered his analysands unconditional understanding and a right to find their own path to cure. In my view, it is hard enough to be a creative analyst on Freud’s model; it is next to impossible to live up to Ferenczi’s.
Ferenczi maintained that when the analyst ascribes his own shortcomings to transference reactions on the part of the patient, he damages the patient in three ways: (1) he injures the analysand's capacity to test reality; (2) he behaves like the rationalizing parent in the analysand's infancy; and (3) he demonstrates his lack of courage and reinforces the resistances of the analysand by demonstrating that free associations are not really possible, even within the analytic situation. Patients then surmise that the psychoanalytic relationship is no more based on truth than are other human relationships.

**Reflections on the Controversy**

I have included the word *tragic* in the title of this chapter because the break between Freud and Ferenczi was painful to both men. Neither could transcend the role allotted to him by history. For us, the heirs to their controversy, the results have also been tragic. Instead of fostering two complementary lines of research and therapy, in which the differences are permitted to emerge and become clarified, a rigid polarity of either/or set in. Observing the events from a distance, one can see that they mirror many of the later problems in the development of psychoanalysis.

Ferenczi was the first psychoanalyst who also experienced himself as an analysand and who suffered a premature interruption of his treatment. Like many patients in that position, he became hostile toward his former analyst. He yearned for greater mutuality in his analysis with Freud. Once, in 1926, he even offered to go to Vienna and analyze Freud, who at that time had developed psychosomatic symptoms and become depressed. Ferenczi's unmastered yearnings did not find sublimation, and the mutual analysis he could not achieve with Freud he later attempted with some of his patients. In Freud's defense, one can say that even had he been willing to continue analyzing Ferenczi, the intimate relationship between the two and the fact that Ferenczi had knowledge of Freud's personal traits would have made it impossible.

Earlier I alluded to recent biographical material about Freud's childhood. Josef Sajner (1968), Harry Hardin (1987, 1988) and Ilse Grubrich-Simitis (1991) have changed our view of Freud's early years. While Freud presented himself as the golden child, the firstborn to a young mother, these biogra-
I56 MARTIN S. BERGMANN

Phers have pointed out that his early years contained many traumatic events, including the deaths of his brother and uncle, both named Julius. These events must have affected Freud’s mother significantly during a decisive period of his infantile development; his nanny’s arrest for theft and the crowded living conditions in Freiberg, where the whole family shared one room, must have added to the emotional difficulties. It seems that Freud himself, in his self-analysis, could not penetrate back to these years. Instead he created what Ernst Kris (1956) has called a “personal myth.” This defensive structure prevented Freud from returning to his own early years, as his analysis of Ferenczi, who likewise had many siblings and grew up in crowded conditions, demanded.²

It is beyond the scope of this chapter to trace the impact—direct and indirect—of Ferenczi on subsequent developments within psychoanalysis, but I wish to highlight a particular moment. In 1961 Leo Stone delivered a Freud Anniversary Lecture, “The Analytic Situation.” By that time, the idea that love plays a role in the analytic process of cure was anathema within the orbit of the American Psychoanalytic Association. Stone attempted to redress the balance:

I do not believe that any patient can ever, except in a morbid sense, accept even the possibility (not to speak of the fact) that the analyst is not all interested in the course of his personal life or his illness. . . . Whereas purely technical or intellectual errors can, in most instances, be corrected, a failure in a critical juncture to show the reasonable human response which any person inevitably expects from another on whom he deeply depends, can invalidate years of patient and largely skillful work. (1961, 55)

Nevertheless, Stone took pains to disassociate himself from Ferenczi. He accused Ferenczi of disregarding the difference between the traumatized child and the adult undergoing psychoanalysis and assuming that the two were interchangeable (58). He also believed that Ferenczi’s demand that the analyst show love was incompatible with an honest and emotionally healthy attitude. I believe that such disclaimers serve essentially to maintain group cohesion within a given psychoanalytic school. Similar reactions can be found when ego analysts find something useful in the work of Melanie Klein. A kernel of truth can be granted to a modifier, but it has to be followed by massive criticism.
What are the larger implications of this controversy for our understanding of psychoanalysis? Elsewhere (1993) I have suggested that, unlike the discoveries of Darwin and Copernicus, with whom Freud identified himself, there was nothing inevitable in the discovery of psychoanalysis. Had Freud not lived, quite different techniques of coping with hysterical patients and psychoneuroses would have been established. Ferenczi was one of Freud's first pupils to show that the technique Freud devised was not the only one that can be used in helping to ameliorate neurotic suffering.

Thus, Freud's discoveries and Freud's technique of healing are not identical. By stressing how the child is received and valued by the parent, Ferenczi originated the object relations school of psychoanalysis. We may assume that the history of psychoanalysis would have taken another course had Freud feared less for its future and been more open to other investigations. But history cannot be undone. Psychoanalytic technique is so complex that, with hindsight, we can see that both Freud and Ferenczi captured a part of the truth. In retrospect, we can sympathize with both and, I hope, narrow the gap between Freud's focus on intrapsychic conflict and Ferenczi's empathy with the child who did not obtain from his parents what he needed for a happy childhood and productive adulthood. Ferenczi emphasized reliving the past with an understanding and even loving parental substitute. The idea of the analyst as a substitute parent led Ferenczi to permit the usual intimacies that take place between parent and child. Not the sexual intimacies between two adults! Freud did not believe that this line of demarcation could be maintained.

Ferenczi's method demanded a deeper regression to bring about the acceptance of the analyst as a new primary parental figure. Freud's technique relied heavily on the ability of insight to bring about cure. Psychoanalytic experience has shown that, when it is skillfully done, the establishment of new connections between past and present will usually bring relief. There is, however, another aspect that I believe Freud did not fully appreciate. I became aware of its role in my work with Holocaust survivors (Bergmann and Jucovy 1982). Those who have suffered major trauma as children or adults cannot expect to be cured by insight alone. They have to mourn what was taken away from them and will never be replaced. We may paraphrase Freud by saying that, aided by their therapists, such patients
must learn to transform depressive feelings and melancholia into ordinary mourning. Ferenczi's method tends to avoid the need to mourn.

Some psychoanalysts belong to Freud's camp, and others to Ferenczi's. Still others use a mixture of both approaches. I present these reflections on an early chapter in the history of psychoanalysis in the hope that they will help forestall orthodoxy and a premature closure of issues that should remain open until they can be discussed on less partisan lines.

NOTES

1. As I have argued elsewhere (1993), the dangers of eroticized transference haunted early psychoanalytic writings on technique.

2. For a different interpretation, which holds that Freud in his self-analysis did reach preoedipal problems, see Blum (1977).

REFERENCES


The Tragic Encounter between Freud and Ferenczi


