The record of social scientists in predicting the future is not a reassuring one. The concluding chapter of my book *Deceptive Images* elaborates on the inadequacies of my profession in this regard. Nevertheless, I am led to offer some thoughts about the future, not out of any conviction that what I predict will come to pass but as a way of exploring the present condition of American Jews as it affects the prospects for their survival.

I understand Jewish survival in the United States to mean the continued presence in the United States of a group that defines itself as Jewish and that is recognizably Jewish. I encapsulate Judaism in my definition of Jewish survival. I define Jewish survival as the survival of a group whose Judaism exhibits significant continuity with the Judaism of previous generations and with the Judaism of Jews throughout the world. I would not only exclude Jews for Jesus and Black Jews claiming to be the only true Jews and Christians claiming to be the true Israel; I would also argue that there will be no Jewish survival if American Jews continue to identify themselves as Jews but the ties that bind them to the Jewish tradition and to Jews in the rest of the world become attenuated beyond a certain point. In other words, we have to consider the possibility that a collective group of Jews might retain their identity as Jews—a variety of political or social or economic reasons might encourage
the maintenance of ethnic ties—but become so assimilated that they are culturally unrecognizable as Jews.

In my book *Deceptive Images*, I have suggested that this is the direction in which American Judaism is moving at present, which is not the same as saying that this will finally occur. I now want to suggest that certain contrary tendencies are likely to become evident in the next generation. These tendencies are the outcome of what I fear will be growing antisemitism in the United States and a continued drop in the percentage of Jews within the total population of the United States.

I think that we are likely to see rising levels of antisemitism in the United States over the course of the next decade or two. I hazard this guess on the following basis. First, Blacks are likely to become increasingly antisemitic as their level of resentment and frustration continues to rise. A rise in the level of their frustration is inevitable, given the conviction, reinforced by the media and virtually all political leaders, that the cause of their relative disability stems from prejudice and discrimination in American society at large. Since, as far as I can tell, the basic cause for the relative disability of Blacks comes from an unwillingness or inability to order their own lives, no amount of lessened prejudice and discrimination will resolve their problems. Yet the political facts of life are that few Blacks and even fewer Whites will speak openly about this. Indeed, I gather that, outside the circles of the political Right, the very discussion of the issue is grounds for being charged with racial prejudice. The result is an accumulation of grievances, grievances likely to be directed increasingly at Jews, since they are relatively easy targets for Blacks. Furthermore, I think that Blacks sense, rightly or wrongly, that Jews are hypocritical about the black condition and how it can be ameliorated. Jews pay lip service to the notion that black disability is the result of prejudice, but Jews insist on maintaining independent structures and institutions and in pursuing their own interests even when these interests conflict with those of Blacks. Blacks, therefore, feel that Jews are less eager to accommodate Blacks than they proclaim. I suspect that the success and high status that Jews presently enjoy undermines the convic-
tions of the black community about the prejudiced nature of American society. That Jewish leaders scrupulously avoid calling this to the attention of black leaders, or for that matter to anyone else, is, I suspect, viewed as another instance of Jewish paternalism rather than any appreciation for Jewish sensitivity to the condition of American Blacks.

Black antisemitism is especially significant because Blacks, unlike, for example, Hispanic-Americans or Asian-Americans, occupy the special position that Jews once occupied in that attitudes toward them are deemed to be litmus tests of one's humaneness and morality. Hence, as others have already noted, black antisemitism legitimates hostility toward Jews on the part of other Americans—at least as long as black spokesmen are clever enough to moderate raw expressions of Jew-hatred. This seems to me to have been the lesson that Jesse Jackson learned between 1984 and 1988.

No less important in explaining the projected growth of antisemitism is the breakdown of the center, a characteristic of modern life in general and American life in particular. I am conscious of how often this has been said—not only about American society but also about the modern world since the French Revolution. Historians of the classical world probably find these same sentiments expressed in ancient Greece; I know they are to be heard in the classical literature of ancient Rome. So I must treat my own prophecies of gloom with a touch of skepticism. But I respond to what I see around me, filtered, I readily admit, through my subjective vision. And what I see around me, in my extended visits of a few months in the United States every three or four years, is a society that increasingly lacks a sense of collective purpose, a vision of the future, and even self-conscious roots in the past. The overthrow of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the disappearance of the Soviet Union as a threat to American security will only quicken this process. Anticommunism did provide a focus, a convenient symbol around which one could mobilize energy and effort on behalf of some larger goal. The disappearance of this focus of collective purpose will further enhance centrifugal forces in American society and further undermine images of order that protect us from our baser instincts. I doubt if such domestic threats as drugs, AIDS, or problems of the homeless are adequate substitutes (although the
environment might end up filling the bill) because the definition of the problem and the solutions that have been offered are so divisive. It might be argued against me that the really divisive opinions on AIDS, drugs, and the homeless are effectively silenced in public debate. Whereas this silence reduces the level of divisiveness, it may make solutions more difficult to achieve.

The breakdown of the center is enhanced by increased politicization of subgroups—the assertiveness of various ethnic, racial, religious, professional, environmental, and other groups demanding recognition and affirming their own interests, not only as part of what was once defined as an American national interest but also as alternatives to it. In a model society, an overarching sense of national purpose moderates the demands that subgroups raise. But the very term "national interest" seems to have lost symbolic legitimacy. The decline of a sense of national purpose, therefore, raises the specter of increased political unrest in which Jews provide convenient targets because of their disproportionate presence in the most visible arenas of power and status in the United States.

Social forces of this nature engender their own counterreactions. My fear is not only that the increased loss of a sense of order and moral purpose in American society will occasion antisemitism but also that the effort to recapture a sense of purpose will do so as well. I do not believe that the increased level of antisemitism will endanger Jewish lives or property in more than a marginal sense. It is its effect on the nature of Jewish life and American Judaism about which I will speculate.

Is antisemitism a help or a hindrance to strong Jewish identity? The question is not easily answered. Observers as disparate as Schneur Zalman of Lyady\(^3\) and Jean-Paul Sartre\(^4\) were convinced that antisemitism strengthened Jewish identity and religious sensitivities. The former, commenting on the likely consequences of a French victory over Tsar Alexander, observed that "riches will increase among the Jews . . . but they will be estranged from God," whereas if the Russian tsar won, "the Jews will become impoverished but their heart will be joined with God."\(^5\) Experience in the United States has been that antisemitism abroad strengthens American Jewish identity and a sense of collective Jewish purpose. Antisemi-
tism, or perceived threats of antisemitism within the United States, is an important instrument for mobilizing American Jewry and generating political and financial energies on behalf of Jewish needs and organizations. Thus it can serve as a stimulus for Jewish unity.

On the other hand, Charles Silberman has made the opposite case. He argues that the decline of prejudice and discrimination against Jews in the United States and their acceptance into virtually every stratum of society removed the disabilities to being Jewish and thereby encouraged American Jews to strengthen their Jewish identity, albeit in new forms. He reminds us that many Jews prominent in American life sought to conceal their Jewish identity. It is not far-fetched to attribute the growth and support of classical Reform Judaism in the United States—especially its effort to excise elements of Jewish particularism and to stress the notion of a universal Jewish people lacking ethnopolitical interests, its slavish imitation and acceptance of upper-middle-class liberal Protestant norms and values, and its alienation from the masses of Jewish immigrants to the United States and their traditions—to fears of antisemitism. In accordance with this notion, at least some Reform Jews believed that by disassociating themselves from the Russian Jewish immigrants at the turn of the century they could protect themselves from the force of antisemitism. My view is that the relationship between antisemitism and Jewish commitment has not been satisfactorily resolved and, as I hope to show, may never be.

Assumptions that the relationship between antisemitism and Jewish identity is unidirectional may be too simplistic. I suspect that antisemitism may strengthen Jewish commitment among some Jews and weaken it among others. Levels of expectation with regard to antisemitism, one's prior Jewish identity, and one's social goals could be all keys to the difference. In other words, the consequences of antisemitism on Jewish identity may be a polarization. In a more profound sense, the question about the relationship between antisemitism and Jewish identity is, perhaps, the wrong question to ask. Jewish identity or commitment may be sustained independently of antisemitism, or alternately, the impact of antisemitism on Jewish identity may be indirect rather than direct. Two better questions are the following: Do different forms of anti-
survival, antisemitism, and negotiation

antisemitism (pogroms, mass slaughter, sporadic physical attacks, legal discrimination, economic exclusion, social prejudice, and so forth) affect Jewish identity in different ways? What images of Judaism and the Jewish tradition are reinforced by the presence or absence of antisemitism? I am concerned in particular with the second question.

I believe that American Jews will experience rising levels of hostility as a result of increased polarization within American society. This new antisemitism is rooted in group rivalry rather than an image of the Jew as estranged from the central elements of a dominant American culture or at least peripheral to them. The new antisemitism projects the Jew as competitor rather than outsider. In this respect, the hostility that I foresee is a less dangerous form of antisemitism in two ways. First, it is less likely to insist upon the destruction of Jews or even their removal from American society than might, for example, an antisemitism arising out of fundamentalist Protestantism. Second, this form of antisemitism is more likely to strengthen Jewish identity, at least among a significant number of American Jews. The alternative form, characteristic of Europe, pictured the Jew as alienated from the dominant culture. It not only heaped disabilities on the Jew but also imposed a negative image that many Jews also internalized—the image of the alien, inferior Jew who could overcome his or her disabilities if he or she adopted the dominant culture. It was this antisemitism that tempted individual Jews with assimilation and collective Jewry with self-reform in the image of the dominant culture. Assuming that my prognosis is correct, the new antisemitism reminds the Jew of his or her Jewish origins but holds out little hope for collective acculturation because there is no dominant culture into which to acculturate. In fact, I suspect that one focus of resentment among some American minorities may be that what passes for the dominant American culture has become so Judaized. On the other hand, the possibility of individual assimilation is likely to remain viable, a partial tribute to the impact of Jews on American society. Despite my prognosis of assertive minority groups increasingly hostile to one another, I do not believe that all other types of identity groups will disappear. Jews who wish to avoid the constraints of ethnic
identity will continue to find that many professional societies and certain occupational groups offer an alternative mode of identity. The notion of the "work group as family" may seem absurd to the vast majority of Americans but not to those engaged in highly specialized occupations, especially occupations like the media or the academic world, with their espousal of cosmopolitan moralism and self-expression as the ultimate virtue. In other words, Jews will not be forced to be Jews. But those who do choose to be Jewish are likely to form images of Judaism based on the experience of antisemitism. Among those who retain their Jewish identity, antisemitism will shift their priorities in the matter of private versus public concerns. In the private realm antisemitism is likely to reinforce Jewish particularism, ethnocentrism, and ritualism. I now want to consider both these matters in greater detail, but I must first deal briefly with the falling proportion of Jews in the total population.

I assume that the number of Jews as a percentage of the total American population will continue to decline as a result of relatively low birthrates and high rates of mixed marriage leading to assimilation. The most important consequence of this decline, I suspect, will be that Jews and issues of Jewish concern will play a lessened role in the American public agenda. The most important consequence, for our purposes, is a decreased status for Jews; that is, being Jewish will no longer confer the honorific status that it presently does. Furthermore, decreased attention paid Jews in the media will mean that a major source of Jewish identity in contemporary America will taper off. Media attention reinforces the Jewish identity of many American Jews. Bringing Jewish labels and concerns to their attention reminds American Jews that they are Jewish and that being Jewish is not a trivial matter—after all, even the mass media make note of it.

There are two models or paradigms to explain the Jew's relationship to Judaism in the modern era. I mean to suggest not that these two modes of relationship are mutually exclusive but rather that they are conceptually distinct. Furthermore, I believe that we can identify most Jews by the model or paradigm that best describes their
relationship to Judaism. Elsewhere I have referred to these two models as "public" and "private." By "public" Judaism I mean the Judaism that conceives of the Jew as part of a collective entity—the Jewish people—with obligations and responsibilities toward other Jews and toward the collective interests of the Jewish people. Most nonsectarian Jewish organizations define their Judaism in public terms. Concern for Israel, Soviet Jewry, or the political interests of American Judaism is a reflection of public Judaism. Private Judaism, on the other hand, reflects a regard for the meaning Judaism has for the individual Jew. The Jew who defines his or her Judaism in private terms is concerned with what patterns or answers Judaism provides for stages of life, for calendar events, for personal crises, and for a need to celebrate aspects of life. The Jew who sees his or her Judaism in personal terms is more likely to think of Judaism in religious terms, whereas the Jew who defines his or her Judaism in primarily public terms is more readily categorized as an "ethnic" Jew.

The 1970s and especially the 1980s witnessed the surge of private Judaism at the expense of public Judaism for a number of reasons. First, private Judaism, more concerned with self, is more compatible with the style of modernity in general and American life in particular; second, from an objective point of view the public concerns of the Jewish people in the 1980s (whether of Israel, of Soviet Jews, or within the United States) were less than riveting and the solutions for them by no means clear. The problems that confronted the Jewish people in the 1980s did not compare in magnitude or severity to the problems that confronted other groups about whom American Jews felt at least some responsibility. In addition, assuming one felt a sense of responsibility to the collective Jewish people, and assuming that one wanted to do what is best for that collectivity, it was by no means clear what one ought to do or what position one ought to adopt with respect in the 1980s to the two major issues of Jewish public concern: Israel and Soviet Jewry. I anticipate that the growth (or even a perceived growth) of antisemitism will shift the balance between private and public Judaism again toward the greater importance of the latter. Furthermore, this may have an impact on the intermarriage rate. (I will return to this at the close.)
I suggest not only that the present emphasis on private as contrasted with public Judaism may shift but also that, in a related development, the very nature of Judaism, as it is interpreted in the private realm, is likely to undergo reformulation. In the volume I coauthored with Steven Cohen, Two Worlds of Judaism,¹⁰ I argued that those American Jews who chose to retain their links to the tradition had reinterpreted it in accordance with values of individualism, voluntarism, universalism, and moralism. It was inevitable, Cohen and I asserted, that Jews would reinterpret the tradition, given the markedly different conditions under which American Jews lived in comparison with those under which the tradition emerged. In the concluding chapter of the book, therefore, we were not so concerned that the contemporary interpretation of Judaism in the United States constituted a radical departure from that tradition (although we made no secret of our unhappiness—mine in particular—on this point), but rather that it seemed to set American Judaism on a trajectory that was distancing it from Israeli interpretations of Judaism. I want to return to that point. I bent over backwards, perhaps at the prodding of my coauthor, in distinguishing my preferences from my analysis. In doing so, I conceded a survival capacity to American Judaism of the 1970s and 1980s that it may not merit. I can best explain what I think is likely to occur in the next few decades by elaborating upon my image of American Judaism at the present moment.

Jews relate to or accommodate themselves to or reappropriate the Jewish tradition in one of three ways. The tradition can constitute a kind of museum. Artifacts of the tradition are admired and enjoyed at one's pleasure but without making demands upon one's life. In that case, aspects of the tradition are culled out and relocated in a setting that facilitates a purely object-subject relationship.

A second mode of relationship is best described by the term "submission." According to this relationship the tradition is imagined as a series of commandments as well as customs to which the Jew is required to submit. That not all Jews who relate to the tradition submissively do in fact observe everything the tradition demands of them is immaterial, as long as they assume that submission is the appropriate norm and do not project deviations from this norm as legitimate. The relationship of "submission" raises
questions about the proper interpretation of the tradition and there are differences of opinion on this score. But characteristic of those Jews who relate through the mode of “submission,” that is, mostly Orthodox Jews, is that none believe they can interpret the tradition merely as they see fit. Authoritative interpretation is a matter for those who are masters of sacred texts and are versed in its interpretation.

The third mode of relationship to the tradition is best described as “negotiation.” In this mode of relationship the tradition is conceded as having a certain degree of authority but an authority limited in a number of ways. It is limited, in the first instance, by what the individual or his community members know. For example, most Conservative Jews do not choose to violate laws of family purity; they simply do not know they exist. Second, it is limited by what the individual or his community rejects. Conservative Jews are aware of the roles that the tradition allots exclusively to men but have rejected this gender differentiation. Third, it is limited by the manner in which the individual or his community chooses to interpret those aspects of the tradition that are accepted, especially by perceptions as to who has the right to interpret. Unlike the Orthodox, the “negotiators” do not necessarily pay deference in matters of interpretation to the masters of sacred text.

I take “negotiation” to be the mode of relationship worth discussing in greater detail not only because it is the most complex but also because I suspect that it characterizes the way in which the majority of committed Jews in the United States would define their relationship to Judaism. As indicated earlier, I am less interested in the noncommitted, the roughly 25 percent of American Jews who define themselves as “just Jewish” and display no interest in Jewish life, public or private; they may or may not be lost to Judaism, but their behavior has only an indirect effect on the collectivity of Jews in the United States. The same is true of “museum” Jews. They are an important segment of American Jews and include the wealthiest and most successful Jews in the United States. It is not coincidental that Jewish museums enjoy great success in their fundraising efforts, whereas most Jewish organizations, rabbinical schools, and schools of Jewish education are in financial straits. But the category of “museum” Jew is not, I believe, a stable one. To expand the
metaphor, either the “museum” Jew is likely to become obsessed with his collection, in which case it will begin to affect other aspects of his life and he will relate to the tradition either as a negotiator or as submissive, or the “museum” Jew will devote himself to other collections. The “submissives,” at the other end of the continuum, are a numerical minority. I have sympathy for them and I think that their passion and dedication can serve as models for other kinds of Jews. Under proper condition they will inspire twinges of guilt among the rest of us. But I do not believe that their mode of relationship is suitable to the vast majority of American Jews even under conditions of moderate antisemitism and a subtle retreat from the acceptance to which American Jews have become accustomed. Therefore, it is “negotiation” as a mode of relationship to which I turn my attention.

First, Judaism itself, or the tradition that I take as synonymous with Judaism, is not neutral about how one relates to it. Negotiation as a self-conscious mode of relationship automatically redesfines the nature of the tradition. It imposes a flexibility on the tradition, especially on the structure of authority within the tradition and on the centrality of sacred texts, that undermines one of its central pillars. Negotiation assumes that the tradition is negotiable. This posits a very different image from that which the model of submission suggests. The tradition has always been negotiated and the modern era is not unique in this respect; what is unique is that this is happening in a self-conscious manner.

Second, “negotiation” as it has proceeded in the past two decades subverts the tradition by the terms under which it takes place. I would single out three principles (though one can surely find more) by which increasing numbers of American Jews in the seventies and eighties negotiated the tradition. These principles are anchored in the styles and mores that characterize the professional and intellectual strata of America, and they may have a deeper basis in the nature of the modern experience. But they also reflect peculiarly Jewish roots, because they can be understood as a revolt against the patterns of synagogue life and ritual codes that had heretofore dominated American religious life. One finds them in full flourish in the havurah movement, but they have increasingly penetrated Conservative and Reform synagogues (and even some Orthodox
synagogues) as well as their rabbinical seminaries. The principles to which I refer are informality, egalitarianism, and ethicism.

Informality is a style, but it is also a mode of consciousness. It includes the manner in which Jews enter the synagogue, seat themselves, approach the Torah and the ark, and even address the rabbi. Its most obvious reflection is the way in which increasing numbers of Jews dress during synagogue services. This constitutes, I believe, a statement about the meaning of the service within the synagogue: that the Jew has not come to the synagogue to stand before God the King, but to join his or her peers in some shared enterprise. It is consistent with another observation about synagogue services—the increased emphasis on communal singing and the decreased time devoted to silent prayer.

The second principle by which Jews in the United States negotiate the tradition is "egalitarianism," which is related to the principle of informality. Egalitarianism refers to more than the equality, really the interchangeability, of the sexes. Not only are differences between men and women to be ignored for purposes of observing or celebrating the folkways of Judaism but differences between young and old, married and unmarried, knowledgeable and ignorant, pious and impious, observant and nonobservant are also ignored. All these are categories to which the tradition ascribes significance in the assignment of roles but that American Jews disregard.

This in turn relates to the third principle, "ethicism," which is the opposite of ritualism. It matters not whether the folkways of Judaism are or are not observed in the proper manner; what matters is the proper intention. It does not matter whether the individual called upon to lead the congregation in prayer or deliver a homily or read from the Torah knows how to do it properly; all that counts is that the person, male or female, young or old, married or unmarried, indeed, at its most extreme Jew or gentile, wants to participate in the service and wants to play a role in the synagogue.

What I find threatening to Jewish survival in all this is not the deviation from tradition but rather the direction in which the tradition is moving—the terms under which it is being negotiated. Each of these three principles, especially when they are combined, undermines the central pillar of the Jewish tradition, the awesome and authoritative God whom Jews are obliged to obey. They substi-
tute a Judaism focused upon the legitimation of self and the kind of lives American Jews have chosen to lead. They serve to strengthen the nuclear Jewish family and foster small communities of mutual support based on those who have made similar choices. Maintaining family and building community are necessary conditions for Jewish survival but are not substitutes for Judaism. What is emerging is a “religion” suitable for highly educated and materially successful young professionals who are unwilling to compromise their own moral assumptions and political worldview—indeed, who never even consider assessing the validity of these assumptions. This “religion” provides, in a sense, a foundation stone for the construction of American Judaism. But its focus on self-legitimation and its refusal to recognize an authority beyond the self carries within it the seeds of Jewish (Judaic) destruction.

A rise of antisemitism and a situation where Jews are less than the high-status people that recent years have accustomed them to being may undermine this version of Judaism. First, as I indicated, it will probably shift the focus of Jewish attention (at least among those Jews who continue to identify with Judaism) back to the public realm. Second, it will probably restrain the universalist and ethicist component of Judaism and restore greater sensitivity toward Jewish particularism and ritualism. A worldview that is a product of perceived gentile hostility is no longer a worldview that conceives the cosmos as open ended with unlimited choices. The world is now a place where, at least to some extent, destiny plays a role and ascribed characteristics determine one’s status. This kind of worldview is more sensitive to formality rather than informality, status rather than egalitarianism, ritualism rather than ethicism. I do not for one moment believe that the peculiar formulation of American Judaism in the 1970s and 1980s will be entirely overturned, but I do hold that it will be reformulated in a way more compatible with the thrust of the tradition itself.

Finally, the growth of antisemitism is likely to lessen the desirability of Jews as marriage partners. Part of the impetus for the growth of private Judaism may have been that public Judaism is less meaningful to the intermarried Jew and especially to the non-Jewish partner, whether that partner does or does not convert to Judaism. The shift in emphasis from public to private Judaism and
the reformulation of Judaism in more traditional or particularistic terms will also make Judaism less desirable to the non-Jew and may influence the ability and desirability of the Jewish community to absorb intermarried couples. This will certainly strengthen its capacity for survival.

As indicated at the outset, I am wary of making predictions, but I am very concerned about the state of American Jewish life. I do not believe that anything now taking place forestalls the disappearance of American Jews as a numerically significant and Jewishly identifiable collectivity. I do hold that something important will have to change if Judaism is to survive substantively in the United States. My essay suggests that an increase of antisemitism in the United States might constitute one such change. What other social-cultural fluctuations might reduce the attractiveness of Jews as marriage partners to non-Jews (or vice versa) and might lead American Jews to strengthen their Jewish commitments and reorient their notions about the nature of Judaism? That is a question I have difficulty in answering. If enough Jews were disturbed about the fundamental issues, the situation would be better. I worry about the attitude that a basically sound Jewish community in the United States need only introduce this organizational change or that tactical strategy in order to “reach out” to the intermarried or coopt greater numbers of young Jews. The popularity of such a doctrine signals the continuing decline of Judaism in the United States.

Notes

2. As George Steiner notes, “The image we carry of a lost coherence, of a centre that held, has authority greater than historical truth. . . . This appears to be an almost organic, recursive process. Men of the Roman Empire looked back similarly on utopias of republican virtue; those who had known the ancien régime felt that their later years had fallen on an iron age” (In Bluebeard’s Castle: Some Notes towards the Redefinition of Culture [London: Faber and Faber, 1971], 16–17).
7. Michael Meyer does not say this, but nothing he says would contradict this notion. He observes, “The heyday of classical Reform Judaism was also the period of massive immigration by East European Jews.” Further along he notes, “One reaction of German Jews in the United States was to make their Reform synagogues bastions of Americanism setting them apart from the uncouth un-Americanized greenhorns regularly disgorged from the steerage ships reaching New York” (*Response to Modernity: A History of the Reform Movement in Judaism* [New York: Oxford University Press, 1988], 292).
9. In the case of Jews striving for integration into gentile society and frustrated by a rise in antisemitism, the result may even be apostasy (Todd M. Endelman, introduction to *Jewish Apostasy in the Modern World*, ed. Todd M. Endelman [New York: Holmes and Meir, 1987], 1–19). This was a minority option. On the other hand, although I do not know of any study on the topic, I have heard it said that many Polish Jews who aspired to acceptance in Polish society and were frustrated in this desire by the rising wave of antisemitism in the 1930s joined the ranks of the Revisionists, the most militantly Zionist party.
11. I first heard the term used by Martin Marty in a talk delivered at the Jewish Theological Seminary in November 1989 to describe the relationship of most American Christians to the Christian tradition. I do not know whether Marty invented the term. I find it most apt to describe the behavior of an important segment of American Jews.