ENDNOTES

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ENDNOTES

CHAPTER 1


2. See the last indented paragraph before subsection A in § 7 of Being and Time.

3. Heidegger is probably referring specifically to Johann Heinrich Lambert, a follower of Wolff. Lambert’s Neues Organon (1764) used the term “phenomenology” to mean a theory of deceptive appearance used to distinguish truth from falsity.

4. The term was briefly used by Franz Brentano (see Section 1.2), although its frequent occurrence in completely different circles, e.g., by Ernst Mach in an address of 1894, suggests that the term continued to be in widespread use at the beginning of the 20th century. For further details see Herbert Spiegelberg’s The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction, vol. 1 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978) 7-20.

5. See Kant’s Kritik der reinen Vernunft, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1996) 191 (B183/A143): “The pure schema of quantity however (quantitatis), as a concept of the understanding, is the number, which is a representation that sums up the successive addition of one to one (things of an identical nature).”

7. "German Idealism" is often used as an umbrella term for the philosophies of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, although Kant himself disclaimed any association of his "transcendental idealism" or "critical philosophy" with Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre* or theoretical epistemology, and Hegel's preferred term for his own system was "absolute idealism."


9. This remark occasioned so much indignation among several reviewers of the manuscript of this book that I feel some gentle finger-waving to be in order. There can be absolutely no doubt that the 19th century mainstream—and by "mainstream" I mean the totality of philosophical academia minus those figures we now think of as significant or "great" philosophers—was largely Hegelian. Of course, to a certain degree characterizations of any historical period in philosophy depend on perspective; but if my statement as it stands were false, then why is Analytic philosophy commonly presented as a reaction against the Hegelianism of McTaggart, Bradley, and Green? Russell himself describes his own philosophical development as a process of revolution against the neo-Hegelian atmosphere of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Have the influential neo-Hegelianism of the American philosopher Josiah Royce (in whom Husserl was keenly interested) and the rarefied Hegelian atmosphere of Emerson been so quickly forgotten? Surely Marxism also represents an intellectual reaction against Hegelianism? Surely the various Neo-Kantian schools were also a reaction to something? Why else revive Kant if not to deal with his most famous revisionist? Against whom and what were the logical positivists revolting? What did the whole philosophy of science movement (Mach et al.) oppose? Surely one enemy common to all these last three movements was the Hegelian *Naturphilosophie*! Of course the 19th century movements that we consider our immediate predecessors are not Hegelian as such, but they have to be understood as reactionary movements, and the background against which they were reacting very definitely was Hegelian.

10. Some theorists attempt to deal with this dichotomy by considering Euclidean geometry an approximation of the fundamentally non-Euclidean structure of our universe, which, on this account, is so gradually curved at the medium-sized level that the curvature is unnoticeable.

11. I am referring to the broad stream of idealist logic within British

12. Psychologism can be defined as the position that mathematics, in some non-trivial sense, is wholly or partially reducible to the psychological laws of human thought.

13. The two streams also remained in contact until relatively late in their development. In the preface to the first (1903) edition of his *Principia Ethica*, G. E. Moore refers approvingly to Brentano, in whose *Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis* (translated into English in 1902 as *The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong*) he finds "opinions far more closely resembling my own, than those of any other ethical writer with whom I am acquainted." See also Moore's critical review of this book in the *International Journal of Ethics* 14 (1904): 115-123. Wittgenstein and Ryle are known to have read Heidegger and Husserl, while Spiegelberg reports in his *The Phenomenological Movement* (93, footnote 1) that Bertrand Russell read Husserl's *Logische Untersuchungen* while serving his 1917 prison term for pacifist activities. In turn, Heidegger was at least casually acquainted with Russell's work on Leibniz (see also note 29) while Husserl is known to have studied Wittgenstein's theory of tautology in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. (See the footnote to p. 334 of Husserl's *Formale und Transzendentale Logik*, *Husserliana*, vol. 18, ed. Paul Janssen (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974).) G. E. Moore was the chairman at Husserl's fourth lecture on phenomenology at the University of London, held on June 12, 1922. (See the facsimile of the announcement reproduced facing p. 155 of Spiegelberg's *The Phenomenological Movement*.) Max Scheler is known to have been particularly appreciative of Moore's ethical writings; see Scheler's *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik*, *Gesammelte Werke*, 6th rev. ed., vol. 2 (Bonn: Bouvier-Verlag, 1980) 13. For an accessible overview of the development of "Analytic" philosophy, see John Passmore's *A Hundred Years of Philosophy*. Passmore's account is both eminently readable and for the most part scrupulously accurate. Its main defect is its insistence upon viewing the history of British philosophy as a history of theoretical attitudes towards logic.

14. Logicism can be defined as the position that mathematics, in some non-trivial sense, is wholly or partially reducible to logic.

15. In brief: the British logician and philosopher Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) discovered a disastrous weakness in the logical derivation of the concepts of mathematics put forth by Frege. Russell, working
with his teacher and friend, the mathematician Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947), produced a more robust derivation in the three volumes of *Principia Mathematica*, but the logician Kurt Gödel (1906–1978) in turn discovered an equally disastrous weakness in the system of the *Principia*. Gödel’s arguments suggest that it is categorically impossible to execute a theoretically satisfying reduction of mathematics to logic. Insofar as there can be anything resembling a general consensus in philosophy, at the present time the consensus appears to be that the logicist programme is a definitive failure. The precise conceptual status of mathematics remains indeterminate, though many “analytic” philosophers, in practice, endorse the general ideology and emotional tenor of logicism.

16. A lecture given by Brentano at the University of Vienna in 1888–89 bore the title “Descriptive Psychology” and the subtitle “Descriptive Phenomenology” [Deskriptive Psychologie oder beschreibende Phänomenologie]. Brentano later employed the term “psychognosy.”


18. Some may disagree, but to me at least the first volume of Husserl’s *Logische Untersuchungen* reads like a pastiche of Frege’s style in the *Grundlagen der Arithmetik*. The exact relationship between Frege and Husserl is a matter of much scholarly dispute. A good introductory overview of the known facts can be found in J. N. Mohanty’s “Husserl, Frege and the Overcoming of Psychologism,” in *The Possibility of Transcendental Philosophy* (Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985) 1–11. Note, however, that Mohanty concludes that Frege’s influence was not a decisive factor in Husserl’s rejection of psychologism.
19. For an accessible introduction to this topic as well as to some attempted solutions, see Zeno's Paradoxes, ed. Wesley C. Salmon (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2001).

20. Accessible introductions to both philosophers can be found in Chapters 11 and 12 of Philosophy before Socrates by Richard D. McKirahan Jr. (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1994).


23. It should be noted that this is a greatly simplified account of Husserl's methodology. In particular, I have blurred the distinction between the early and late Husserl for the sake of brevity and accessibility.

24. Compare the discussion in § 41 of Husserl's Cartesianische Meditationsen, Husserliana, vol. 1, 2nd ed., ed. S. Strasser (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963). Husserl even goes so far as to say that phenomenology is eo ipso "transcendental idealism," though in a decisively new sense, it is "an idealism which is nothing further than a consistently executed self-analysis, in the form of a systematically egological science, of my Ego as the subject of every possible act of knowledge, and that with respect to every sense of existent things [Seiendem] in which they could possibly have a sense for me, the Ego." Also compare the first sentence of § 30: "Objects exist for us, and are what they are for us, only as objects of real and possible consciousness [...]."

25. The exact nature of the intellectual relationship between Husserl and Heidegger is still largely a matter for scholarly conjecture. It is clear that Heidegger was never a student of Husserl's in any real sense, being, as Spiegelberg points out, "an established scholar in his own right, with a record of several publications, before he had ever met Husserl" in 1916 (The Phenomenological Movement, 276–277). From 1919 to 1923 Heidegger "offered every semester courses and seminars in whose titles the word 'phenomenology' occurred."
This self-characterization ceased only after Heidegger took over Husserl’s chair in the fall of 1928 as Husserl’s designated successor (see The Phenomenological Movement, 275–283).

27. “Neuere Forschungen über Logik.” Reprinted in Frühe Schriften, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 1, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978) 17–43. Heidegger largely surveys the more traditional logical currents of his time, though he does comment on “logicism” and “symbolic logic” on p. 41–43. Unsurprisingly, Heidegger criticizes Russell and Whitehead along Husserlian lines, although his comments are in general very appreciative: “The systematic and comprehensive treatment of the problems of logicism appears to have made the most progress in Bertrand Russell. [...] The ‘calculus of judgements,’ of ‘classes,’ and of ‘relations’ treat of the fundamental logical concepts and functions. Through the proof that these and only these fundamental phenomena support the edifice of mathematics the identity of logic and mathematics is shown. With this theory, a new logical task of distinguishing the two disciplines has arisen. In the course of its solution one must, in my opinion, demonstrate above all that logicism does not at all manage to separate itself from mathematics and is incapable of penetrating to the truly logical problems. I see its limitation in the application of mathematical symbols and concepts (above all the concept of a function), through which the meanings and displacements of meaning of judgements are disguised. The deeper meaning of the principles remains in the dark [...]. Mathematics and the mathematical treatment of logical problems hit upon limits where their concepts and methods fail, namely right where the conditions of their possibility lie.

“The work outlined here is still to be done, and it will not be over and done with as soon as was the overcoming of psychologism.”

28. These two texts are respectively Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus: Ein kritisch-positiver Beitrag zur Logik (1913) and Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungsllehre des Duns Scotus (1915), both published in Frühe Schriften, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 1. A “Habilitationsschrift” is a post-doctoral thesis, a formal prerequisite for teaching at the university level in Germany.

Leibniz, probably the most important work on Leibniz ever. The attempted refutation has not yet succeeded."

30. Note also the brief ontological criticism of functions towards the end of § 18 of Being and Time.


32. Lebensphilosophie is a German catch-all term for turn of the century thinkers with an interest in the irrational, the unpredictable, and the concrete immediacy of human life. Bergson, Dilthey, and Spengler are all frequently characterized as Lebensphilosophen, as are sometimes Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. Schopenhauer is considered a forerunner of the movement.


34. Hermeneutics proper began as a theory of Bible interpretation formulated by the theologian and philosopher Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher (1768–1834). In the course of time it has come to mean the general theory of interpretation.

35. See for example Heidegger’s ”Anmerkungen zu Karl Jaspers Psychologie der Weltanschauungen,” republished in Wegmarken, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 9, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976) 1–44. Compare also the footnote in § 60, p. 301, of Sein und Zeit, where Heidegger gently emphasizes that the themes of Jaspers’s book belong to ”thematic existential anthropology” rather than to Heidegger’s own fundamental ontology.

36. Ronald Hayman reports that in 1926 Sartre was working on a collaborative translation of Jaspers’ Allgemeine Psychopathologie (1913) with Paul-Yves Nizan. See p. 6 of his Sartre: A Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987). Note too that in his Questions de méthode (1957) Sartre selects Jaspers as the representative of “existentialism,” dismissing Heidegger with the comment ”Le cas de Heidegger est trop complexe pour que je puisse l’exposer ici,” and speaking of Jaspers in terms that disguise the extent of Sartre’s own intellectual dependence on Jaspers’ reading of Heidegger: “L’apparition, dans l’entre-deux-guerres, d’une existentialisme allemand correspond certainement—au moins chez Jaspers—à une sournoise volonté de ressusciter le transcendant. [...] Jaspers, lui, joue cartes sur table: il n’a rien fait d’autre que de commenter son maître, son originalité
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consiste surtout à mettre certain thèmes en relief et à en masquer d'autres." Questions de méthode (Paris; Éditions Gallimard, 1960)

23. Note Sartre's inability to distinguish between the very different philosophical approaches of Jaspers and Heidegger.


38. This terminology will be explained at length in Chapter 2.

39. Some scholars have called attention to similarities between Spinoza's approach to Bible interpretation in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus and hermeneutic methodology.


41. It is a curious coincidence that the terms "pragmatism" and "pragmatic" should have suffered a similar fate.

42. It is likely that this ambiguity was purposely introduced by Sartre; see Section 1.4.

43. Spiegelberg reports that he overheard Husserl refer to Scheler's phenomenology as "fool's gold" at an informal student gathering (The Phenomenological Movement, 230).

44. There appears to be some confusion in the secondary literature regarding the supervisor of Heidegger's doctoral thesis. In Passmore's A Hundred Years of Philosophy (476) we read, "Heidegger is quite innocent of science: he was trained, first as a Jesuit seminarian, then in an academic department of philosophy under the supervision of Heinrich Rickert." According to Walter Biemel, the supervisor of Heidegger's doctoral thesis was Arthur Schneider, while Rickert was the co-supervisor. See p. 152 of Biemel's Heidegger, Rororo Bildmonographien 200 (Hamburg: Rohwolt Taschenbuch Verlag, 1991). It was, however, Rickert to whom Heidegger submitted his Habilitationsschrift in 1915. (A Habilitation is an unsupervised post-doctoral thesis, a formal requirement for teaching at a German university.) Also see Rüdiger Safranski, Ein Meister aus Deutschland: Heidegger und seine Zeit (Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1994) 64, 84. According to Safranski (54), Rickert belongs with the neo-Kantians Natorp and Cohen, since all three were concerned with reconciling modern physical science with the critical philosophy of Kant. Though
it is true that Rickert took no particular interest in Heidegger (84),
I fail to see how training as a Jesuit seminarian and an association
with Rickert in an academic department of philosophy necessarily
entail "innocence of science."

45. For details on Sartre’s connection with Kuki see Stephen Light,
*Shūzō Kuki and Jean-Paul Sartre* (Carbondale and Edwardsville:
Southern Illinois University Press, 1987), particularly the detailed
discussion of Sartre’s relationship to Heidegger via Kuki on p. 27.
Sartre spent time in Germany during the period 1933–39, although
he apparently did not visit Heidegger until 1952. It is reasonably
certain that Kuki spoke of Sartre to Heidegger, though some sources,
including Simone de Beauvoir, have denied the existence of a letter
of introduction.

46. The fictional setting of the dialogue is some years after Kuki’s
death, though it is relatively certain that the dialogue with the
unnamed “Japanese” is based on Heidegger’s conversations with
Kuki. Also see the section on Kuki in the *Sourcebook for Modern
Viglielmo, with Agustin Jacinto Zavala (Westport, CT: Greenwood

47. The Kyoto School is the most influential stream in 20th
century Japanese philosophy. Its three most important members are Nishida
Kitarō (1870–1945), Tanabe Hajime (1885–1962), and Nishitani
Keiji (1900–1990). Broadly speaking, their highly original works
are an attempt to integrate Japanese Zen Buddhism with German
Idealism and phenomenology. The Kyoto School as a whole has, in
my opinion, received far less attention in the West than it deserves.
Much of their work remains unavailable in translation.

48. See Spiegelberg’s *The Phenomenological Movement*, vol. 2, 558: “It is
probably safe to say that without Merleau-Ponty, and particularly
without his *Phénoménologie de la perception*, phenomenology would
have longer remained a mere tool of existentialism, as it has
increasingly become in the hands of Sartre. On a more tangible
level, without Merleau-Ponty and without his academic presence
phenomenology would hardly have achieved so early the prestige
which he has secured for it by his own spectacular career.”

CHAPTER 2

1. Unlike some scholars, I consider the characterization of the
*Contributions to Philosophy* as a second main work a vast exaggeration.
The *Contributions* are obviously a sort of philosophical journal
containing much of the half-thought and unfinished material that Heidegger apparently detested seeing in print. As interesting as they may be, I have failed to find anything of significance in them that is not better expressed in the works Heidegger published during his lifetime. This is perhaps the result of a personal bias, as I am largely unsympathetic to Heidegger's later philosophy; but compare Theodore Kisiel's vitriolic article "Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe: An International Scandal of Scholarship," Philosophy Today 39 (1995): 3-15.

2. It does, however, bear a striking resemblance to the Kantian project of searching for "conditions of the possibility of experience," that is, of identifying fundamental structures or "categories" (in Heideggerian terms: "existentials") that influence and shape all human activity, including and in particular perception.

3. The introduction of our new terminology now permits a more exact rendering of this characteristic of Heidegger's phenomenology.

4. Note that in Being and Time Heidegger uses Dasein in two senses. In the loose sense, Dasein denotes the self, or an entity characterized by selfhood; in the strict sense, Dasein refers to the entire structure of being-in-the-world, that is, the world, the self, and being-in. This is a fundamental point that must be kept in mind throughout the further course of this commentary.

5. Compare the more sophisticated and nuanced characterization in Section 2.10 b).

6. Compare the account of "pure being" in Chapter 2 of Leslie Armour's seminal work Logic and Reality: An Investigation into the Idea of a Dialectical System (Assen, The Netherlands: Van Gorcum & Comp. N.V., 1972). Within the framework of his fundamentally Hegelian undertaking Armour discusses the logical and ontological implications of a similar concept of being in illuminating detail. See especially Section iii.

7. Heidegger's use of the "horizon" metaphor is ultimately derived from Husserl; see for example § 27 of the Ideen. In this section Husserl notes that the consciousness of an object is always associated with a "surrounding ring" [Umring] of other objects. This surrounding ring is "partly shot through, partly surrounded by a vaguely conscious [dunkel bewuβter] horizon of indeterminate reality." It is, in other words, the "fringe" of one's perceptual field into which conscious awareness gradually fades.

8. Compare Being and Time § 43 a), p. 207-208: "It is only because Being is 'in consciousness,' that is, understandable in Dasein, that Dasein can also understand and conceptualize being-characteristics
such as independence, ‘in itselfness,’ and reality in general. Only for this reason are ‘independent’ entities purviewedly [unsichtig] accessible as things happened upon intramundane.’ For the sake of intelligibility I have had to “paint the devil black” in this somewhat oversimplified example. Note that for Heidegger, this particular direction of understanding Being is not characteristic of the physical sciences. Our example merely involves an extreme form of the understanding of Being as constant presence [ständige Anwesenheit], which for Heidegger is precisely the traditional metaphysical understanding of the Being of entities, and thus common to all traditional Western philosophy. For Heidegger, science is simply applied metaphysics.

9. In support of Heidegger’s claim, compare Abraham Maslow’s “Education and Peak Experiences” in The Farther Reaches of Human Nature, Chapter 12 (New York: Penguin Compass, 1993) 171-172: “The picture of the scientist must change, and is giving way to an understanding of the creative scientist, and the creative scientist lives by peak experiences. He lives for the moments of glory when a problem solves itself, when suddenly through a microscope he sees things in a very different way, the moments of revelation, of illumination, insight, understanding, ecstasy. These are vital for him. Scientists are very, very shy and embarrassed about this. They refuse to talk about this in public. It takes a very, very delicate kind of a midwifery to get these things out, but I have gotten them out. They are there, and if one can manage to convince a creative scientist that he is not going to be laughed at for these things, then he will blushingly admit the fact of having a high emotional experience from, for example, the moment in which the crucial correlation comes out right. They just don’t talk about it, and as for the usual textbook on how you do science, it is total nonsense.”

10. Compare Being and Time § 2, p. 6, where Heidegger explains that Being is “that which determines entities as entities, that with a view to which [woraufhin] entities, however they are explained, are already understood. The Being of entities ‘is’ not itself an entity.”

11. From La logique de Leibniz d’après les documents inédits by Louis Couturat (Hildesheim, Germany: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1961), 189: “Leibniz établit entre les définitions nominales et réelles une différence qui n’est guère conforme à l’usage ni à l’étymologie, mais qui a une importance capitale dans sa théorie de la connaissance. Une définition est nominale quand elle indique certains caractères distinctifs de la chose définie, de manière à permettre de la discerner de toute autre [in Aristotelian terms: the specification of a proprium];
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mais une définition n’est réelle que si elle manifeste la possibilité ou l’existence de la chose. C’est cette dernière seule que Leibniz considère comme parfaite et adéquate.”

12. For an explanation of the capitalization of “Being,” see the entries on “Being,” “Being-in-the-world,” and “Entity” in Appendix A.

13. Compare Being and Time § 2, p. 6: “The inquiry [das Gefragte] of the question to be worked out is Being, that which determines entities as entities, that with respect to which [woraufhin] entities, however they are explained, are always already understood. The Being of entities ‘is’ not itself an entity. The first philosophical step in the comprehension of the problem of Being is [...] not to determine entities as entities in their origin by leading them back to another entity, just as if Being had the character of a possible entity.”


15. Heidegger uses the term Diskrimen, a Germanized form of the Latin discrimen, which can mean “dividing line,” “difference,” “distinction,” “decisive moment,” “turning point,” and “danger” or “extreme danger.” The incorporation of these secondary meanings is almost certainly deliberate, particularly in light of Heidegger’s later interpretation of the history of Being. Compare the Macquarrie-Robinson translation: “Aristotle’s essay on time, as providing a way of discriminating the phenomenal basis and the limits of ancient ontology.”

16. For a detailed explanation see the entry on “Timeliness” in Appendix A.


18. See Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie p. 1, Footnote 1: “New working out of the 3rd section of the 1st part of ‘Being and Time.’” The importance of this lecture is confirmed by a marginal note to the article “Vom Wesen des Grundes,” reprinted in Wegmarken, p. 134, Note B.

20. As we shall see, in § 7 Heidegger has yet another surprise in store for us. § 7 is incomplete without the analysis of understanding and interpretation in §§ 31-32 and the scattered remarks on methodology throughout §§ 61-69.

21. Also see the programmatic list of questions given by Heidegger for Section Three of Part One in § 21, p. 100.

22. The term “deconstruction,” corresponding to the German Abbaus, would be an apposite literal rendition of Heidegger’s use of the term “destruction,” had it not already been appropriated by another, quite different, philosophical school.

23. I have had to make an educated guess at the temporal significance of Descartes’ philosophy for Heidegger. In § 6 Heidegger introduces the discussion of Descartes with the remark that Kant dogmatically takes over Descartes’ position with respect to the subjectivity of the subject, and that for Kant the connection between time and the “I think” remains completely obscure. See Sein und Zeit § 6, last indented paragraph, p. 23 (continuing on to p. 24).

24. Some stylists unacquainted with the grammar of languages other than English believe that the “passive” voice should be avoided in good style as it makes one’s writing sound “passive”—clear evidence of the philosophical perils of failing to clearly distinguish between several meanings of the same word.

25. By “thing” I do not necessarily mean “physical object” or an “entity” in the Heideggerian sense. I am using “thing” to avoid repeated uses of the locution “that which,” which sounds particularly clumsy in English (though not in German).

26. See Sein und Zeit § 7 C.

27. Of course, if we want to be completely consistent, they are not yet phenomena until we have actually succeeded in bringing them to light. I am following Heidegger’s way of speaking.

28. § 7 C, p. 37. For a more detailed discussion of these points, and in particular of the manner in which phenomena can be obscured, see my article “The Phenomenon-Concept in Being and Time and Its Meaning for Hermeneutic Phenomenology” (unpublished paper, Department of Philosophy, Dominican University College, Ottawa, n.d.). The limited scope of this chapter makes it impossible to address such fine-grained terminological distinctions here.

29. Compare § 7 B, p. 32: “The logos lets something be seen (phainesthai), namely that being talked about, and that for the talker (middle voice) and/or for those talking with each other.”

30. See Section II d) of my article “The Phenomenon-Concept in Being and Time and Its Meaning for Hermeneutic Phenomenology.”
31. Compare, however, Section 2.6 for more technical details on logos as talk.

32. § 7 B, p. 34: “Und weil die Funktion des logos im schlichten Sehenlassen von etwas liegt, im Vernehmenlassen des Seienden, kann logos Vernunft bedeuten.” (I have abbreviated this quote somewhat in the main text for the sake of stylistic fluidity.) “Vernehmenlassen” has a similar double sense as “Sehenlassen” based on whether its object is a thing or a person. The verb “vernehmen” is notoriously difficult to render in English. Its literal meaning is “to find out by hearing”; in a more general sense, it can also mean “to find out” or “to perceive.”

33. For a more detailed and technical explanation, see Section 2.6 c).

34. Compare as well the discussion of hermeneutics in the dialogue “Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache: Zwischen einem Japaner und einem Fragenden” in Unterwegs zur Sprache, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 12, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1985) 79–146. The remarks on the necessary complementarity of hermeneutics and criticism in connection with an explicit reference to Schleiermacher on p. 92 are particularly worthy of attention.

35. § 7 C, p. 37: “Now insofar as, however, by discovering the sense of Being and of the fundamental structures of Dasein, the horizon is at all set forth [herausgestellt] for every further ontological investigation of non-Dasein-like entities, this hermeneutics is simultaneously ‘hermeneutics’ in the sense of the working out of the conditions of the possibility of any ontological investigation.”

36. Heidegger tells us in § 63, p. 311, that in Being and Time prepossession is the primeval structure of Dasein, that is, its authentic ability to be whole; preview is the idea of existence; and preconception is the existentiality of Dasein.

37. Not two, as early commentators tended to believe.

38. § 9, p. 42–43: “The two being-modes of authenticity and inauthenticity [...] are founded [in the fact] that Dasein is in general determined by evermineness.” § 9, p. 43: “At the beginning of the analysis, Dasein shall not be interpreted in the difference of a particular [act of] existence, but rather brought forth [aufgedeckt] in its indifferent First and Foremost [Zunächst und Zumeist]. [...] We will call this everyday indifference [i.e., non-differentiated mode] of Dasein averageness.” § 12, p. 53: “To existing Dasein belongs evermineness as the condition of the possibility of authenticity and inauthenticity. Dasein always exists in one of these modes [Modi], or in the modal indifference of both.” Also see § 45, p. 232: “As ever mine, however, being-ability is free for authenticity or inauthenticity or their modal
indifference." Heidegger's own note to this sentence refers back to § 9, p. 41 ff.

39. § 40, p. 190: "[...] being-in-the-world according to all its constitutive moments (world, being-in, self)." It may be helpful to briefly contrast being-in with the concept of intentionality. According to Franz Brentano, "intentionality" is the quality of being directed towards an object. Intentionality is a fundamental characteristic of mental states; states that lack this quality of directedness are physical states. Brentano, in selecting this term, was reviving an old Scholastic term derived from the Latin verb intendere, literally meaning "to stretch out towards." He also refers to the presence of an object within an act of perception as its Inexistenz, literally its "in-existence" or "being-in." Heidegger's selection of the term "being-in" is perhaps meant to communicate to the reader, by playing on the literal meaning of the term, that intentionality is an inadequate and incorrect characterization of Dasein. Compare Heidegger's comments on the meaning of in and sein in § 12, p. 54 ff.

40. Macquarrie and Robinson render this term into English as "concern", see the remarks under "Concernedness" in Appendix A.

41. Stambaugh translates both Wozu and Dazu as what-for, blurring the distinction between the two. Heidegger uses the term Dazu relatively infrequently in comparison with Wozu and the distinction is subtle, but I think it is worth preserving. Compare, for example, § 16, p. 74 (fourth indented paragraph): "A tool is unusable—that implies: the constitutive reference of the in-order-to [Um-zu] to a for-that [Dazu] has been disturbed." Also see the first sentence of § 69 c), p. 364: "The [...] understanding of a connection-whole is based on [grundet in] a preliminary understanding of the in-order-to [Um-zu], what-for [Wozu], for-that [Dazu], and purpose [Um-willen] relations."

42. See § 43 c), p. 212, where Heidegger refers to the "dependence of Being, not of entities, from the understanding of Being [Seinsverstândnis], that is, the dependence of reality, not of the real, on concern." Note that Heidegger is using the word "real" in its literal etymological sense, namely "pertaining to a res," a "thing." The point is that the "existence" or "givenness" of Being is indeed dependent on Dasein, whereas the "existence" or "givenness" of things is not. Compare Section 2.10 b) of the present work for a more detailed discussion of this topic.

43. I am here using "conspicuous" in its everyday, non-technical sense.
44. Note that Heidegger thinks this a fundamentally inauthentic comportment; see, for example, § 39, p. 181: “But the self is first and foremost inauthentic, the one-self.” In this connection it is also important to review § 40, for example p. 184: “The dissolution [Aufgehen] in the one and among the concerned [besorgt] ‘world’ reveals something very much like a flight of Dasein from itself as an authentic self-being-ability [Selbst-sein-können].”

45. This is a paraphrase of the definition Heidegger gives at the end of the first indented paragraph on p. 86 of Sein und Zeit, § 18.

46. Rather inconveniently, if typically, Heidegger makes the reader wait until § 68 d), p. 349, for anything resembling a definition of this term: “The full disclosedness of the There [des Da], constituted by understanding, sensibility, and falling, receives articulation through talk.” Also see the discussion of “Talk” in Appendix A.

47. See the last indented paragraph of Sein und Zeit, § 18 p. 87.


49. Great care must be taken to avoid a confusion that is easily suggested by Heidegger’s terminology. The “genus” concept (for lack of a better word) is “entities,” that is, whatever is “in” the world. If an entity is “in” the world in the manner of existence within the world, then it is Dasein. If, however, this entity is “in” the world in the sense that it is discoverable within connection-wholes, then it is an intramundane entity, or a non-Dasein-like [nichtdaseinsmäßig] entity. The distinction is further complicated by the fact that Dasein has a unique relationship to an existent that, strictly speaking, is intramundane, namely its own body, but whose intramundane character does not fully emerge within the meaningfulness-wholes of the worldliness of the world until actual physical death.

50. Refer to Appendix A for a brief discussion and clarification of the meaning of this phrase.

51. Heidegger himself never uses Dasein in the plural, preferring instead to refer to “others” [die Anderen], or “the Other” [der Andere]. Occasionally he will also refer to Mitdasein or use locutions that imply the existence of others who are also Dasein, such as in § 47, where he speaks of die Vertretbarkeit des einen Daseins durch ein anderes. However, since it is unambiguously clear from § 26 that Heidegger believes that there are indeed others who share our world with us, and that these others, like ourselves, all have the character of Dasein, there is no reason not to invent an English plural form of Dasein both in order to emphasize this point and to avoid clumsy locutions such as “the others, who also evince [zeigen] the character
of being-there-with [Mitdasein]." Note, however, that strictly speaking Dasein is the whole of being-in-the-world. The self is only one of the three structures; the world as such is common. Curiously, Heidegger himself uses Dasein in an essentially ambiguous manner: sometimes he means the whole structure of being-in-the-world, of which the self is a constituent phenomenon, and sometimes he uses Dasein loosely as a synonym for the self taken on its own—see, for example, § 47, p. 239, second line of the third indented paragraph.


53. No doubt this would have been the theme of Section Two of Part Two of Being and Time had Heidegger gotten that far; compare Section 2.3 for details on the intended structure of Being and Time as a whole.

54. Note that Heidegger uses the term "being-with" [Mitsein] to refer to the comportment in which others are met with as Dasein and the term Mitdasein to refer to these others. Keeping this in mind helps clear up many initially puzzling locutions in § 26, such as p. 121: "The being-character of concernedness cannot belong to being-with [Mitsein], although this being-manner is a being unto [Sein zu] entities which we happen upon intramundanely, as is concernedness." This simply means "our comportment towards others does not have the character of our comportments towards tools."

55. For a detailed list of the six characteristics of everyday interaction with others see § 27, p. 127-128, in particular the second indented paragraph on p. 128. A detailed examination of these characteristics is largely irrelevant to the present discussion.

56. I have borrowed the adjective "catgoreal" in the sense of "pertaining to categories" from Alfred North Whitehead, who introduces the term in his Process and Reality in order to prevent confusion with "categorical" in the sense of "universally applicable" or "true of all cases." It cannot be stressed enough that the use of the adjective "existential" by Heidegger parallels this use of "catgoreal." "Existential" means "pertaining to inherent and essential structural features of Dasein." It does not mean "pertaining to the human condition."

57. Compare Heidegger's etymological observations concerning the original meanings of in and sein, in § 12, p. 54.

58. Note that sensibility is the structure of the "situation" (in a non-technical sense as such); not a "feeling" that "creates" a state of affairs. This point is discussed in more detail in connection with angst in Section 2.8. Also see § 29, p. 136: "Moods [die Stimmung]
come over us. They come neither from ‘inside’ nor from ‘outside,’ but rather, as a manner of being-in-the-world, ascend out of [being-in-the-world] itself.”

59. § 29, p. 135. Also compare the analysis of Neigung and Geneigtheit (“inclination” and “inclinedness”) in Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles: Einführung in die Phänomenologische Forschung, ed. Walter Bröcker und Käte Bröcker-Oltmanns (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1985) 100-105.

60. This is a superficial example of a superficial sensibility. The example of marriage discussed in Section 2.8 is more satisfactory, I have included this example only for the sake of initial accessibility.

61. § 35, p. 170, first three lines.

62. “Daß es ist und zu sein hat,” Being and Time § 29, p. 134. Literally the phrase means “that it is and has to be,” but the verb haben used with an infinitive has a slightly different meaning in German. Ich habe zu arbeiten means “I have work to do,” not “I have to (i.e., must) work.”

63. In German ist (“is”) can be used as equivalent to “exists.”

64. Compare §68 b), p. 340: “[...] the fundamental existential character of moods is a bringing back to ...”, that is, the discovery of entities within the world as already there and already determined in their possible uses. The connection between sensibility and thrownness will be further clarified in Section 2.8.

65. It is very difficult to give examples of the difference between authentic and inauthentic actions, especially without the guidance of any specific examples given by Heidegger in Being and Time. My own suggestion is that the statement “you should get a university education to get a good job” would probably, if sincerely acted on, be based upon an inauthentic act of understanding, since the emphasis is not on the beneficial effects of education on Dasein as such but on the increased capacity for the manipulation of tools (in Heidegger’s technical sense of the word).

66. Note that for Heidegger a single act of interpretation can be as brief as glancing at a hammer and picking it up or as long and elaborate as writing an exhaustive academic commentary on a major work. It is the structure of the act that determines whether or not it is an instance of interpretation.

67. Compare § 32, p. 150.

68. The idea is that Dasein always understands itself beginning with something “outside” of itself, and returns to itself as something to be understood after it has understood its world. Freud puts it more simply: the infant initially has no self-knowledge, and learns
to understand itself by listening to its parents’ judgement of its behaviour and emotional states.


70. § 34, p. 161, second sentence of first indented paragraph.

71. For further details refer to the entry under “Meaningfulness” in Appendix A; also see the definition towards the end of § 69 c) in Being and Time.

72. Compare § 35, p. 167-168: “Talk, for the most part, expresses itself [spricht sich zumeist aus] and has always already expressed itself. It is language. However, understanding and interpretation then already lie in the expressed [im Ausgesprochenen]. Language as expressedness [Ausgesprochenheit] harbours [birgt] an interpretedness [Ausgelegtheit] of Dasein-understanding [des Daseinsverständnisses] in itself. This interpretedness is as little simply just at-handed as language itself; rather, its being is itself of the nature of Dasein. Dasein is firstly and within certain limits constantly delivered over to it; it regulates and distributes the possibilities of average understanding and the sensibility that belongs to it. Expressedness preserves [verwahrt], in the entirety of its structured meaning-contexts, an understanding of the disclosed world and coevally with this an understanding of the Dasein-with [des Mitdaseins] of others and of the being-in that is in each case one’s own. The understanding that has thus been left behind in expressedness involves [betrifft] both the respectively attained and received [überkommene] discoveredness of entities as well as the respective understanding of being and the available possibilities and horizons for innovative [neuansetzende] interpretation and conceptual articulation.”

73. Note that this leads to the arrangement: tool-wholes (interpretation); connection-wholes (understanding); meaning-wholes (talk). Tool-wholes are thus interpreted connection-wholes; connection-wholes are understood meaning-wholes; and meaning-wholes are references structured by talk. Heidegger works backwards in the world analysis from the most “finished” product to the original existential “ground of its possibility” — a thoroughly Kantian movement.

74. It is this conception of talk that allows Heidegger to say on p. 16 of his Einführung in die Metaphysik, (Gesamtausgabe, vol. 40, ed. Petra Jaeger [Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983]), “It is in the word, in language, that things first come to be and are.”

75. It is, of course, to the conscience that Heidegger is referring when in § 34, p. 163, he mentions “the voice of the friend which each Dasein carries with itself.”
76. § 28, p. 133: “Sensibility and understanding are coevally determined through talk.”

77. I have put “true” and “false” in quotation marks because truth and falsity have a special technical meaning in Being and Time, as we shall see in Section 2.10.

78. § 37, p. 173. “Looks” is being used in a non-technical sense here. The German I have translated as “at bottom” is im Grunde.

79. Heidegger’s comments in § 37 appear to be directed against the contemporary political scene. I am not entirely certain whether a definite political direction is being subjected to criticism or whether Heidegger is merely criticizing political discourse as such. A deeper analysis of the meaning of these remarks is unfortunately beyond the scope of the present work.

80. See § 38, p. 179: “Turmoil also reveals the thrown and moved character [den Wurf- und Bewegtheitscharakter] of thrownness, which can force itself upon Dasein itself in sensibility.” Note that in German, bewegt (moved) has the same literal meaning (change of position) and metaphorical meaning (being emotionally stirred) as in English.

81. Note the use of the term Bewegtheit on p. 178 of Sein und Zeit to refer to the Absturz. Heidegger uses Bewegtheit in § 38 as a synonym for Befindlichkeit (“sensibility”).

82. § 38, p. 179. The reference is to the book Die Tagesansicht gegenüber der Nachtansicht by Gustav Theodor Fechner. The book is an early treatment of the problem of science [die Nachtansicht, “the night-time view”] and the everyday world [die Tagesansicht, “the daytime view”].

83. Two otherwise well-written commentaries that fail, in my view, to properly articulate the line of thought through which Heidegger introduces angst into Being and Time are Michael Gelven’s A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, rev. ed. (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1989) and Stephen Mulhall’s Heidegger and Being and Time (Routledge Philosophy GuideBooks [London: Routledge, 1996]). Gelven introduces the topic of angst with the words, “Within the experience of most reflective and serious people can be found instances of a weird and uncanny feeling, in which the whole familiar world seems to lose its normal significance” (p. 114). Mulhall’s line of argument is that angst merely happens to be a “state-of-mind” that is particularly suited to clearing up the philosophical problems at this juncture of Being and Time: “As a mode of existence, it forces inauthentic everyday Dasein to confront the true structure of its existence; and as an object of
phenomenological analysis, it gives us access to a single unifying articulation of Dasein’s Being” (p. 109).

84. I will use the locution “angst is anxious” as an equivalent for Heidegger’s die Angst ängstet sich.

85. Friends of Eastern philosophy will recognize the similarity of angst in the Heideggerian sense to the concepts of duality and dukkha.

86. Heidegger also uses the term in opposition to being-in; compare § 12, where, with reference to Jakob Grimm, Heidegger points out that the German preposition “in” is derived from a verb originally meaning “to dwell” or “to settle.”

87. Even inauthenticity will ultimately turn out to be a choice of Dasein, as we shall see in Section 3.3.

88. Heidegger’s own lack of clarity on this point has led some interpreters to speak of a “disappearance” and “reappearance” of talk from the structure of concern. To my knowledge this error was first made by W. M. Müller-Lauter in Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit bei Martin Heidegger (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1960) p. 54 and further propagated by, among others, Otto Pöggeler in Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers (Pfullingen, Germany: Verlag Günther Neske, 1963) p. 210, Christina Lafont in Sprache und Welterschließung: Zur linguistischen Wende der Hermeneutik Heideggers (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1994) p. 114 and elsewhere, and Georg W. Bertram (“Das Denken der Sprache in Heideggers Sein und Zeit,” Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 26.3 [2001]: 183). Also see the exhaustive list of authors who share this mistake in Tomy S. Kalariparambil’s dissertation Das befindliche Verstehen und die Seinsfrage. Philosophische Schriften Band 29 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1999) p. 304, Footnote 56. For my argument against this position see in particular Footnote 7 in Section 3.2 of the present work.

89. Some of the comments Heidegger makes in passing in §§ 43–44 do tend to give the impression that he believes comportments towards intramundane entities to be necessarily inauthentic, but I think they have to be interpreted in the light of remarks such as the following in § 44 b), p. 223: “The existential-ontological condition for the fact that being-in-the-world is determined by ‘truth’ and ‘untruth’ lies in that being-constitution of Dasein which we characterized as the thrown plan. It is a constitutive feature of the structure of concern.” In other words, truth and untruth are essential and ineradicable features of Dasein. They cannot be completely eliminated from Dasein’s structure. Accordingly, neither can falling to the world, and so neither can comportments towards intramundane entities.
It is worth noting that the expressions “disclosedness” and “discoveredness” are terms that Heidegger uses to avoid the misleading connotations of “existence.” In everyday English we would speak of the “existence” of an object where Heidegger speaks of the “discoveredness” of entities, or the “existence” of a person where Heidegger speaks of the “disclosedness” of Dasein. Heidegger generally avoids the term “existence” altogether, preferring “existentiality” when referring to the ability of Dasein to understand itself as having to choose between various possibilities of comporting itself towards the world. In speaking of the disclosedness of Dasein, Heidegger essentially means, in plain English, “the fact that Dasein ‘exists’ at all, i.e., the fact that it is there, not nothing, able to live, move, understand, and act, etc.” Obviously all other comportments are dependent upon the most basic comportment by virtue of which Dasein can comport itself at all.

In light of these considerations we should note Heidegger’s use of the expression “the fundamental articulation in Being” in the lecture Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, originally held in 1927, the same year in which Being and Time was published. The “fundamental articulation [Grundartikulation] in Being” is Heidegger’s expression for the difference between the “content-filledness” [Sachhaltigkeit] and the “manner of being” [Seinsart] of entities (corresponding to the difference between “essence” and “existence” in the traditional sense). Perhaps the use of the term “articulation” is meant to refer to the activity of talk as it is defined in § 34 of Being and Time. See Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, p. 321.

The question of the link between untruth, error, and disclosedness is too complex to be discussed in a more than cursory fashion within the scope of this chapter.

Compare “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit,” in Wegmarken, p. 185: “If, however, it is only through this openstandingness [Offenständigkeit] of comportment that the correctness (truth) of statements is possible, then that which makes correctness possible in the first place has a more primeval right to count as the essence [Wesen] of truth.”

In the technical meaning of the term; see Section 2.6 b).

It would be interesting, in a different context, to compare the apparently limitless creative powers attributed to “chance” by some contemporary biologists with those formerly attributed to the Greek deities Chaos and Tyche. See, for example, E. R. Dodds' The
Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951) 242: "When the old gods withdraw, the empty thrones cry out for a successor, and with good management, or even without management, almost any perishable bag of bones may be hoisted into the vacant seat. So far as they have religious meaning for the individual, ruler-cult and its analogues, ancient and modern, are primarily, I take it, expressions of helpless dependence [...]. It was, I think, a related sentiment that gave rise to another characteristic feature of the Early Hellenistic Age, the wide diffusion of the cult of Tyche, 'Luck' or 'Fortune.' Such a cult is, as Nilsson has said, 'the last stage in the secularising of religion'; in default of any positive object, the sentiment of dependence attaches itself to the purely negative idea of the unexplained and unpredictable, which is Tyche." (The italics are mine.) Note that I am not criticizing the theory of evolution as such, which may very well be the literal truth. But I am very interested in the role that the theory of evolution plays in the contemporary psychological economy, for lack of a better phrase. It is quite possible to exploit the literal truth for psychological ends that are alien to it qua mere fact.

97. In German, a "thing in itself" is a Ding an sich. Note Heidegger's use of ihm in the phrase Seiendes an ihm selbst (literally something like "in it itself," since Heidegger is using the non-reflexive form of the personal pronoun) in order to distinguish his own concept of "entities in themselves" from the Kantian "things in themselves." The key phrase in the citation is ambiguous in the original German. In my opinion, the sense of the passage is not that Newton's laws provided access to entities as they are in themselves, but that through the discovery of Newton's laws entities, inaccessible in themselves, became accessible through the conceptual framework these laws provided.


99. Heidegger himself appears to have felt a degree of uncertainty with respect to this point. Compare Beiträge zur Philosophie, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 65, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1994) 217: "[...] strictly speaking one cannot speak of a transcendence of Da-sein; within the sphere of this approach the representation of "transcendence" in every sense must disappear."
CHAPTER 3

1. Heidegger makes the same point in a rather more inaccessible fashion in §2 of *Being and Time* and then attempts to buttress his argument in §§3-4 with a variety of observations that do not concern us here. The same essential argument is repeated in several places throughout *Being and Time*. Thus in §2, p. 7, we are told that “working out the question of Being accordingly means: making an entity—the one that asks the question—transparent in its being,” while in §63, p. 316, Heidegger asserts, “But if there is only Being insofar as there is truth [...] then the primeval and authentic [eigentlich] truth must be guaranteed by the understanding of the being of Dasein and of being in general [des Seins überhaupt].”

2. See the very complete discussion of the problem of the transition from Section One to Section Two of *Being and Time* in Gelven’s *A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time*, rev. ed. (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1989) 136-140.

3. I, for one, do not think that he succeeds. Moreover, I think that expecting philosophy to do the work of psychological therapy is unjust to both disciplines. It is also very likely to be hazardous to one’s health.

4. The point of the identification of existence with the experience of time will be more obvious after the discussion of Heidegger’s theory of timeliness in Section 3.5.

5. Compare Heidegger’s own enumeration of these points, whose terminology I have somewhat simplified, in §48, p. 242.

6. For a partial list see Section 2.9, Footnote 88.

7. Note too that in some sections, for example §54, p. 269, Heidegger refers to the structure of concern as the structure of the disclosedness of Dasein. Here its constitutive elements are given as sensibility, understanding, falling, and talk. Compare §68, p. 335, where he refers to understanding, sensibility, falling, and talk as the “structural moments” [Strukturmomente] of concern. In §67, p. 334-335, Heidegger refers to understanding, sensibility, falling, and talk as the constitutive structures of disclosedness. Just a few paragraphs further on in §68, p. 335, Heidegger calls the same four structures the “structural moments” [Strukturmomente] of concern. In §64, p. 316, Heidegger refers to the constitutive structures of concern as existentiality, facticity, and “fallenness” [Verfallenheit], this time leaving out talk, presumably since it can be taken for granted that it permeates the entire structure of concern. In §74, p. 383, Heidegger refers to thrownness as a “fundamental determination”
[Grundbestimmtheit] of concern. Similar inconsistencies occur throughout Being and Time thanks to Heidegger's rather loose adherence to his own terminological conventions. I hope, however, that I have succeeded in convincing the reader that these terminological inconsistencies are not to be confused with conceptual inconsistencies.

8. The entire sentence is italicized in the original; the phrase I have italicized is both italicized and in spaced type.

9. I have satisfied myself with rendering the essential conceptual distinctions between the four meanings into English. Heidegger's own locutions for the four meanings are, respectively, Schulden haben, schuld sein an, sich schuldig machen or Schuldhaben an, and Schuldigwerden an anderen.

10. This is one of the main reasons I object to Heidegger's later decision to shift the blame for technology away from individual Dasein and onto ancient Greek ontology and even onto Being itself.

11. Presumably talk functions as the authentic mode of being-among in authentic Dasein. Yet Heidegger is not explicit on this point, and I hesitate to put it forth as a definite interpretation of the text. Compare Section 3.6 on timeliness, talk, and authenticity.

12. That forerunning is the authentic mode of being unto death is easy to miss thanks to the baroque complexity of Heidegger's treatment of death. Typically, the point is stated clearly in a context in which one would least expect it: see the second sentence of § 61, p. 301-302.

13. We will use the adjective "timely" as a translation of zeitlich, usually translated "temporal." In Heidegger's usage the term means "pertaining to the structure of timeliness."

14. See, for example, his "Brief über den 'Humanismus,'" in Wegmarken, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 9, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976) 313-364.

15. I am indebted to my doctoral thesis supervisor, Prof. Dr. F.-W. von Herrmann, for this particular line of argument.

16. I have transliterated ἀλήθεια into Roman letters for the sake of accessibility. ἀλήθεια is a Greek compound consisting of the prefix α-, which corresponds to the English "un-," and the root λήθε, "forgetting" or "forgetfulness," followed by the suffix -iα, corresponding to the English "-ness." The literal meaning of the word is thus something along the lines of "unforgottenness," though it is usually translated as "truth." Heidegger typically renders the word into German as Unverborgenheit, literally "unconcealedness."

17. Compare also § 62, p. 307-308, which I have not quoted at length here so as to avoid belaboring the point. In brief: authenticity
implies that one is always ready to withdraw one's decisions in the event that the decision should later turn out to have been motivated by inauthenticity. Authentic decided Dasein must constantly hold itself ready for the possibility of authentically being whole. The possibility of inauthenticity cannot be abolished, but it can be intelligently "managed."


19. To the ultimate detriment of his later philosophy, in my opinion.

20. Compare § 65, p. 325: "Existing, [Dasein] understands itself, but in such a manner that this understanding does not represent a pure grasping [Erfassen], but rather constitutes the existentic being of factual being-ability." *Understanding is Dasein's ability to act within a world.*

21. See Section 3.4, Footnote 12, as well as the end of Section 3.2.

22. For the sake of comprehensibility I have somewhat simplified Heidegger's arguments in § 62 of *Being and Time*.

23. Source: Gerhard Wahrig's *Deutsches Wörterbuch*, various editors and contributors (Munich: Mosaik-Verlag, 1988).


25. See Section 3.2, Footnote 7, for details.

26. This is an extrapolation from the contents of § 8, in which the word *Temporality* is used both in the title of Part Two ("Fundamentals of a Phenomenological Destruction of the History of Ontology Following the Guiding Theme of the Problematic of Temporality") and in the title of its first main subdivision ("Kant's Doctrine of Schematism and of Time as a Preliminary Stage of a Problematic of Temporality"). See Section 2.3 for details.

27. The closest thing to an explicit reference to the being-already-in-structure of concern is in § 68 a), p. 339: "This ecstasy makes it possible for Dasein to accept [übernehmen] in decidedness the entity that it already is."

28. Note also Heidegger's remark in § 68 a), 337: "Expecting [das Erwarten] is a mode of the advent, founded in awaiting, which generates itself authentically as forerunning. Accordingly, a more primeval being unto death lies in forerunning than in the concerned expecting of it." In the original, the first sentence is italicized.

29. *Behalten* is also introduced as a synonym for *Vergessen* in § 69 a), p. 353–354 in the context of the analysis of inauthentic concernedness,
although the link is made less explicitly and less clearly than in the passages referred to above.

30. Note that in *Being and Time* the horizontal schema of timeliness is the foundation of the *transcendence of the world*, that is, of the difference between the self and the world. *This “transcendence” must be strictly and consistently distinguished from the *later* concept of the *transcendence of Dasein.*

31. Heidegger, in *Being and Time,* sometimes speaks of the transcendence of Dasein, but more frequently (and more correctly) of the transcendence of the *world,* that is, of the difference between the self and the world. This is the *only* conception of transcendence in *Being and Time.* Heidegger first begins to speak consistently of the “transcendence of Dasein” in the writings after *Being and Time,* but within the context of a highly modified analysis of understanding and planning.

32. Note that announcement is one of the four structural features of talk.

33. See Section 2.6, Footnote 56, for this distinction.

34. Note that dispersion is one of the structural features of curiosity, which is the inauthentic mode of understanding.

35. This is a reference to the instant as the authentic mode of the present.

36. Note that the Latin *intendere* literally means “to stretch towards,” making a link with Husserl’s concept of *intentionality* possible.

37. Peculiarly enough, this is the same word Heidegger uses to designate the defining characteristic of the world, its “worldliness.”