This glossary focuses on key terms recurring frequently throughout the text whose translation is in some way problematic or uncertain. The commentaries focus on the more influential and more widespread Macquarrie-Robinson translation, though I have included some remarks on Stambaugh's choice of technical terms. On the whole my own translations are far more in agreement with Stambaugh's than with Macquarrie and Robinson's.

It goes without saying that my criticisms are not in any way meant to detract from the considerable achievements of these three translators. As I have learned in the course of writing this book, translating even minute parts of Being and Time is a colossal task. It is further complicated by the need to not only consider internal terminological consistency but also to maintain some sort of consistency throughout the whole of the Heideggerian corpus. For the time being I have been cured of any desire I might have had to attempt a systematic translation of the entire text of Being and Time myself. I can only all the more respect those who have made such an attempt and succeeded.

In the text of the glossary, the English terms I use as translations are in **bold type**. The original German terms used by Heidegger are [*italicized between square brackets*], within which, following the German convention, nouns are capitalized, while other parts of speech are not. Definitions and general remarks are in regular type. Detailed discussions are in small type.
Advent [Zukunft]. One of the three ecstasies of timeliness. Corresponds to the future. The comportment in which Dasein opens itself towards future possibilities of its own existence; Dasein's ability to "let itself come towards" itself (allow future possibilities of its existence to modify its present understanding of existence in the light of its past).

Zukunft is the normal German word for the "future," but Heidegger uses the word in a special terminological sense derived from its etymology. Zu is a preposition meaning "to" or "towards," while -kunft is a noun-forming morpheme derived from the verb kommen, "to come." Zukunft thus literally means "act of coming towards." Heidegger uses the term to designate the comportment of Dasein by means of which future possibilities are enabled to come towards or approach Dasein in its present understanding of existence. Because of the importance of the etymology, it has been thought advisable to translate Zukunft as "advent," from the Latin advenire, literally "to come towards," "to come up to."

Ambiguity [Zweideutigkeit]. The inauthentic mode of interpretation. Characterized by the inability to distinguish genuine understanding from false understanding, i.e., by the inability to understand entities as the entities they in fact are.

Zweideutigkeit literally means "two-meaning-ness." It is usually translated as "ambiguity." German also recognizes the variant Mehrdeutigkeit, "many-meaning-ness."

Angst [Angst]. Authentic sensibility. The sensibility that discloses Dasein authentically as existence in a world.

Macquarrie and Robinson opted for "anxiety," while Stambaugh uses Angst. It seems to me that the word is now current enough in English for it to be written without italics or capitalization.

At-handedness [Vorhandenheit]. The characteristic feature of tools (or, more generally, of entities) that are observed rather than used.

In German, the adjective vorhanden means something like "available," "lying around." Heidegger coins the noun Vorhandenheit by
adding the suffix -heit or "-ness" to the adjective. Macquarrie and Robinson's "presence-at-hand" is misleading because it introduces the term "presence" [Anwesenheit], which Heidegger uses in the context of his analysis of timeliness. For similar reasons I am not fond of Stambaugh's "objective presence."

**Authenticity [Eigentlichkeit].** The mode of evermineness in which Dasein plans its own existence towards itself rather than towards the world.

The adverb eigentlich is normally used in the sense of "actually" or "really"; when used as an adjective it means "actual," "real," or "genuine." Etymologically (but not idiomatically) Eigentlichkeit literally means "own-like-ness," i.e., "the state of resembling that which is one's own." See the detailed explanations in Section 3.1.

**Authorization [Bezeugung].** The comportment through which Dasein both produces and understands the possibility of its own authenticity despite its immersion in the inauthentic one-self; the call of conscience.

The usual meaning of the verb bezeugen is "to attest" or "to testify to," but Heidegger appears to use Bezeugung in a sense derived rather from the literal meaning of its linguistic roots. The verb zeugen has two basic sets of meanings: "to beget," "to generate," or "to produce"; and "to testify" or, with appropriate prepositions, "to witness": zeugen von means "to bear witness to," while zeugen für means "to act as a witness for someone." The Bezeugung of which Heidegger speaks in Being and Time is the comportment by means of which Dasein both produces and witnesses its own possible authenticity, i.e., the call of conscience. In view of the nuanced meaning of the term, it seems more advisable to translate the term as "authorization," whereby one should keep the meaning of the root word "author" in mind. Dasein is both the caller ("author") and the hearer (the one who receives the "authorization") of the call of conscience.
Awaiting [Gewärtigen]. The inauthentic mode of the advent; inauthentic being unto death; the inauthentic comportment towards existentiality.

Gewärtigen is a nominalized form of a verb whose meaning is “to expect” or “to be prepared for.” Following Macquarrie and Robinson, the term is rendered into English here as “awaiting.” The verb is a compound of four morphemes: ge-wärt-ig-en. On the meaning of ge-, see the commentary to Gerede. Compare the commentary on Gegenwart for the meaning of war; the umlaut (ä) is a result of adding the adjectival suffix -ig. The ending -en is the infinitive ending in German. The literal meaning of the verb is thus something along the lines of “to anticipate [be influenced or determined by] the sum total of that which comes towards [one].”

Being [Sein, das Sein]. In Being and Time, the characteristic feature of entities as such in the widest possible sense, including both intramundane entities and Dasein; the standard by means of which we are able to distinguish between the existent and the non-existent.

In German, Sein with a capital S is a noun; with a small s (sein) it is an infinitive. The German use of articles is slightly different than in English; in German one would frequently write das Sein where English would simply have “being.” For the sake of clarity I have capitalized “Being” wherever Heidegger means the general “defining quality” of everything “existent” in the widest sense; when he refers to the “defining quality” of specific types of existent things, e.g., “the being of entities” or the “being of Dasein,” I have written “being” with a lowercase initial letter. I have also used a lowercase initial letter wherever Heidegger uses the infinitive in compounds, e.g., I have rendered In-der-Welt-sein as “being-in-the-world.” Stambaugh prefers to avoid capitalization altogether.

Being-ability [Seinkönnen]. Dasein’s ability or capacity to pursue various courses of action; more technically: to disclose purposes and, in one and the same act, to discover tool-wholes.

Können is an ordinary German verb with the meaning “to be able to.” The compound Seinkönnen accordingly means “ability to be”
or “being-ability.” Macquarrie and Robinson’s “potentiality-for-Being” is misleading, firstly because it should be “potential” rather than “potentiality,” and secondly because it implies the Scholastic technical concepts potentia and potentialitas, typically rendered in German as Potential or Potentialität. While it is true that these nouns are derived from the Latin posse, a direct equivalent of können, the meaning of the English “potential” is based on the Scholastic use of the term and not on its etymological connection with posse.

**Being-already-in [Schon-sein-in].** The structural feature of concern corresponding to facticity.

**Being-among [Sein-bei].** The structural feature of concern corresponding to falling.

German has several prepositions corresponding to the English “at”: auf (auf dem Markt, “at the market”), an (an der Universität, “at the university”), and bei (bei den Nachbarn, “at the neighbours’ [place]”). Bei can also mean “next to” (Ich stand beim Fenster, “I stood next to the window”), “near to” (Ich blieb beim Auto, “I stayed near the car.”) or even “with” (Ich saß bei ihm im Seminar, literally “I sat with him in the seminar,” i.e., “I took his course”). Its use is highly governed by idiomatic rules. Macquarrie and Robinson’s “being-alongside” is overly literal and idiomatically wrong in English. Strictly speaking, “being-among” would be Sein-unter in German (literally “being-under”), but this rendering seems to be the most understandable and elegant English possibility. Another possible, though perhaps more clumsy, translation of Sein-bei is “being-at.”

**Being-in-the-world [In-der-Welt-sein].** The preliminary conception of the primeval structure of Dasein (later replaced by concern, and then by timeliness). The term expresses the unitary structure of the world, the entity living in the world (Dasein), and the world-Dasein relation (being-in).

Note that in German, all nouns are capitalized; however Heidegger does not capitalize sein in the hyphenated compound In-der-Welt-sein. Accordingly, if we reserve the capitalized English word
"Being" as the translation of Heidegger's *Sein* (i.e., the object of the question of Being), it is misleading to capitalize "being" in "being-in-the-world," as some translators have done. The "being" in "being-in-the-world" simply means *existing* in a world. Heidegger does not mean to imply that Being itself is present in the world in ourselves in the way that Hegel's Spirit or *Geist* takes on finite forms of subjectivity in order to experience itself as Spirit.

**Being-self-ahead** [Sich-vorweg-sein]. The structural feature of concern corresponding to existentiality.

**Being unto** [Sein zu]. A Heideggerian locution meaning "comportment towards."

**Being unto death** [Sein zum Tode]. Dasein's comportment towards its own end, i.e., its mortality or finitude.

Heidegger's use of the preposition *zu* (zum is a contraction of zu dem, dem being the masculine singular dative form of the definite article) in the locution *Sein zum Tode* is not in accord with German idiomatic use and is somewhat awkward. The closest German parallel is in the idiomatic phrase *Liebe zum Nächsten,* "love of one's neighbour." It would be awkward and misleading to render *Sein zum Tode* as "being of death," since the meaning of the phrase is really "attitude" or "comportment towards death." Translating *zum* as "towards" accurately captures the sense of the preposition in the phrase *Sein zum Tode,* but the word "being" tends to be perceived as a noun rather than as a gerund in English, the active sense of the present participle being lost in the process; as a result, the sense of the locution "being towards death" is not immediately evident. The preposition "unto" retains just enough of the sense of "towards" to be used in this context and sounds far more elegant when used together with "being," since it hints at the sense of the present participle.

**Coeval** [gleichursprünglich]. Adjective designating equally fundamental existential structures of Dasein.
The literal meaning of gleichursprünglich is “equally primeval.” Macquarrie and Robinson employ the neologism “equiprimordial.” See the entry on “Primeval” for a detailed criticism.

**Comportment** [Verhaltung]. A general concept referring to all the possible ways in which Dasein can behave or conduct itself towards tools, other people, and itself.

Verhaltung literally means “a particular behaviour”; “behaviour in general” is Verhalten. It is derived from the reflexive verb sich verhalten, meaning “to behave” (Verhaltenstherapie is “behavioural therapy”). In English, the word “behaviour” is too strongly associated with Behaviourism in the popular consciousness for it to translate Heidegger’s actual use of the term Verhaltung; in German, this association does not arise between Verhaltung and Behaviourismus. The translation “comportment” is preferable to “interaction” because it can be used along with “to comport oneself” to translate passages in which Heidegger uses the reflexive verb sich verhalten. “Conduct” is also satisfactory but does not have a convenient plural form.

**Concern** [Sorge]. Dasein conceived as the unity of existentiality, facticity, and falling. Existentiality is grasped as “being-self-ahead,” facticity as “being-already-in-(the-world),” and falling as “being-among-(intramundanely encountered entities).” See Section 2.9 for details.

Macquarrie and Robinson opt for “care”; Stambaugh follows them. For my general remarks see the commentary to “Concernedness.”

**Concernedness** [Besorgen]. The comportment in which entities are manipulated and used.

The verb besorgen has the meaning “to furnish oneself with,” “to obtain.” It is composed of the prefix be-, which usually indicates the formation of a transitive verb (much as the English “be-” in “becalm,” “bedazzle,” “bewitch,” etc.), and the root -sorgen, literally “to care for” (sorgen für) or “to worry about” (sich sorgen machen um). Heidegger uses the etymology of the word to hint that
our manipulation and use of entities is a modification of Sorge or "concern." It is in order to reflect this etymological connection that Sorge is translated here as "concern" and besorgen and das Besorgen as "to concern oneself with" and "concernedness" respectively. Stambaugh renders Besorgen as "taking care," leading to the awkward locution "time taken care of" when speaking of besorgte Zeit. I render besorgte Zeit as "concerned time," i.e., the sort of time involved in concernedness. Unfortunately, the transitive sense of the adjective besorgt cannot be straightforwardly preserved.

**Concernfulness** [Fürsorge]. Comportments directed towards other people (rather than towards entities, which Heidegger calls Besorgen).

As in the case of Besorgen, Heidegger intends the etymology of the word Fürsorge to hint that our comportments towards other people are a modification of Sorge or "concern." The literal meaning of Fürsorge is "for-concern." Its everyday meaning is "organized assistance for those in need"; thus staatliche Fürsorge is "welfare." It can also mean "care for others" in a more general sense. Macquarrie and Robinson translate Fürsorge as "solicitude," while Stambaugh's translation is "concern." For my remarks see the commentary to "Concernedness."

**Connection** [Bewandtnis]. The reference of a tool to its what-for; the defining feature of tools; the defining feature of intramundane entities as such. The being of to-handed entities. 

Bewandtnis and its cognate verb bewenden are difficult to translate into English because they only appear as part of fixed idiomatic phrases. Damit hat es folgende Bewandtnis ... means something on the order of "it's like this ..." whereas the phrase es dabei bewenden lassen means "to leave it at that." The verb bewenden is derived from the Old High German biwenten, meaning "to bring or come to an end." Heidegger is clearly trying to express the relation between tools as means and their purposes as ends, but without using traditional causal terminology (i.e., without referring to final causes). I have tried to express this by the neutral term "connection." Macquarrie
and Robinson opt for "involvement," which is also acceptable, though the Latin etymology is, perhaps, somewhat misleading. Stambaugh prefers "relevance," which is really a translation of Relevanz or Sachbezogenheit. I think it also fails to bring out the link with purpose that Heidegger seems to have in mind.

**Connection-whole** [Bewandtnisganzheit]. The sum total of connections defining the what-for of a particular tool. Understood meaning-wholes.

A Bewandtnisganzheit is closely related to a Zeugganzes ("tool-whole"), but described in terms of the more detailed analyses of references and connections Heidegger undertakes in §§ 17-18. For a more detailed discussion of the relationship between connection-wholes, tool-wholes, and meaning-wholes, see Section 2.6.

**Continuance** [Gewesenheit]. One of the three ecstasies of timeliness. Corresponds to the past. The comportment through which Dasein discloses its thrownness, i.e., the possibilities that it is not (or no longer) able to choose.

Gewesenheit is a term coined by Heidegger from the past participle (gewesen) of the verb sein, meaning "to be," and the suffix -heit. Its literal meaning is "beenness." Heidegger uses the term to designate the existential conception of the past. The usual German word for the "past" is Vergangenheit, literally "gone-by-ness." The neologism Gewesenheit is meant to exclude the literal connotations of Vergangenheit by means of a subtle etymological link. Wesen exists both as a noun meaning "essence" and as part of the conjugated forms of sein in modern German. It is no longer used as a verb. The verb wesen existed in Middle High German and meant "to be," "to reside," or "to happen." In turn, wesen is derived from the Old High German verb wesan, derived in turn from the Gothic wisan, thought to be derived from the Indo-Germanic ues, meaning "to linger," "to live," "to spend the night" (source: Währig's Deutsches Wörterbuch). Heidegger avoids the use of Vergangenheit in order to make the important point is that the "past" does not merely "go by" but continues to affect both the "present" and the "future."
meaning of the term Gewesenheit can accordingly be paraphrased as "the essential feature of the collection of lingering beings." (See the remarks on the meaning of the prefix ge- under the entry for "Crosstalk"). It has accordingly been thought appropriate to translate Gewesenheit as "continuance." Note that Macquarrie and Robinson's translation of the term as "having been" expresses precisely the connotation that Heidegger coins the neologism in order to exclude.

**Crosstalk** [Gerede]. The inauthentic mode of talk. Characterized by an emphasis on what is spoken at the expense of what is discussed by the talk. (See Section 2.6.)

Gerede in everyday German simply means "rumour-bearing talk," or, in some contexts, "gossip" (harmless "gossip" is Klatsch; "gossip" in a strongly negative sense is ein übles Gerede). The prefix ge-, when it does not indicate the formation of the past participle, frequently has a collective meaning, and as such requires the gender of the noun to be neuter. (See the remarks on German collective nouns under "Tools" and "Entity"). Das Gebüsch, for example, literally means "a collection of bushes," i.e., "the bush," "bushes," or "shrubbery" in English. A similar meaning can be seen in the words das Gebäck ("cakes," "cookies"), das Gedränge ("press of people"), das Gefieder ("plumage"), das Geflügel ("poultry"), das Geflüster ("whisperings"), das Gelaber ("utterly ridiculous and impertinent talk"), and so on. The literal meaning of Gerede is thus something along the lines of "a lot of talk," i.e., a lot of nonsense, as in "that's just a lot of talk." Its main structural feature is that it obscures the entity or entitiial state of affairs addressed by the talk. To preserve the etymological connection with Rede it seemed most appropriate to translate Gerede by "crosstalk," i.e., "talk at cross-purposes." "Chatter" is a tempting possibility, but loses the etymological link between Rede ("talk") and Gerede.

**Curiosity** [Neugier]. The inauthentic mode of understanding. Characterized by a disconnection of purview from tool use and a concern with "knowing for the sake of knowing."
Neugier is the usual German word for "curiosity." Literally, it means "the lust [Gier] for new [neu] things."

Dasein [Dasein]. Humans; human existence.
Dasein is an everyday German synonym for "existence," whether human or otherwise. It is a compound of the adverb da, meaning "there," and sein, meaning "being." Etymologically, the word expresses that the "existence" of something is its "being there." In using the word to refer to peculiarly human existence, Heidegger intends the da prefix to refer to what is there before us, i.e., the world, whereas the sein stem refers to "existence" [Existenz] in Heidegger's terminological sense of the word, i.e., the primeval existential structure of Dasein as timeliness. Dasein thus expresses that the fundamental ontological structure characterizing humans as such is the unity of horizontal and ecstatic timeliness (the unity of the world and existence). In the preface to her translation of Being and Time, Joan Stambaugh mentions that it was "Heidegger's express wish that in future translations the word Da-sein should be hyphenated throughout Being and Time" (p. xiv). It seems to me that a reader with a knowledge of German does not require the help of this convention, nor would a reader with no knowledge of German be helped by it. I see no reason why Heidegger's wishes should influence the translation of his works into languages of which he was largely ignorant.

Decidedness [Entschlossenheit]. The structure of factual authenticity insofar as it is authorized by the call of conscience; constituted by the sensibility of angst, by understanding as planning the self towards its ownmost being-guilty, and by talk as quietedness; accordingly the silenced, angst-ready self-planning towards one's ownmost being-guilty. (See Section 3.4.)
Entschlossenheit is usually translated into English as "determination" or "resolution." Entschlossenheit does not, however, mean a determination or a resolution; rather, it indicates the state of being determined or the state of being resolved. Heidegger also intends an etymological parallel to the term Erschlossenheit, which we have
translated as "disclosedness." By contrast, the literal meaning of *Entschlossenheit* is something like "unclosedness." Unfortunately, no English term able to combine the two meanings—"the state of resolution or determination" and "unclosedness"—suggests itself. It has been thought best to translate *Entschlossenheit* by "decidedness," which unambiguously preserves the first meaning, and to rely upon the reader to keep the second meaning in mind whenever he or she encounters the term. Macquarrie and Robinson render *Entschlossenheit* as "resoluteness," which is acceptable but forces the somewhat awkward translation of *Entschluß*, literally "decision," as "resolution," which corresponds to *Beschluß* in German. An *Entschluß* is an act of decidedness.

**Destiny** [*Schicksal*]. Authentic comportment towards inheritance; the authentic acceptance of possibilities that Dasein does not itself choose but that are imposed upon it by the very act of its existence; the acknowledgement of the historical situation, arising from inheritance, in which Dasein is thrown.

The German suffix *-sal* denotes a state; *Trübsal*, for example, derived from the verb *trüben*, "to disturb" or "to muddy," means "misery." *Schicksal* is a similar construction derived from *schicken*, "to send." Accordingly, the literal meaning of *Schicksal* is "the state of being sent." Heidegger intends the etymology as a conceptual link with *Geworfenheit*, "thrownness." Accordingly, *Schicksal* is the acceptance of historical (as opposed to merely personal) thrownness.

**Disclosedness** [*Erschlossenheit*]. The appearing (manifestation) of structures of Dasein as a result of Dasein’s comportments; the emergence or accessibility of existential structures in the act of existing. Used in opposition to discoveredness.

Since Heidegger uses "existence" in a specific technical sense, *Erschlossenheit* is used in phrases such as "the disclosedness of the world" to replace the otherwise misleading locution "the existence of the world." Note that *Erschlossenheit* refers to the "appearing" or "emergence" of structures of Dasein, while the correlative term *Entdecktheit* refers to the "appearing" or "emergence" of entities and
entitil structures in the world. The literal meaning of *Erschlossenheit* is important to Heidegger and can be accurately paralleled by the English “dis-closedness.”

**Discoveredness** [*Entdecktheit*]. The appearing of an entity within the world as a result of Dasein’s comportment towards it; a function of the comportment through which we confer a connection upon the entities we encounter and so allow them to serve us as tools. Used in opposition to disclosedness.

*Entdecktheit* is used in phrases such as “the discoveredness of entities” to replace the usual locution “the existence of entities.” “Existence” being given a particular technical meaning by Heidegger, it would be confusing to preserve the everyday use of the term. Note that *Entdecktheit* refers to the appearing or emergence of entities and entitial structures in the world, while the correlative term *Erschlossenheit* refers to the appearing or emergence of structures of Dasein within the sphere of Dasein’s experience. The literal meaning of *Entdecktheit* or “un-covered-ness” is important to Heidegger and can be accurately paralleled in English by the use of the word “discoveredness.”

**Ecstasy** [*Ekstase*]. One of the three structures of timeliness, namely advent, continuance, and encounter; the structure common to all three in which Dasein “goes beyond itself” and then “returns to itself.” (See Section 3.5.)

The German word *Ekstase* is the normal word for “ecstasy.” However, Heidegger gives it a special terminological meaning derived from the Greek word *ekstasis*. This word is a compound of the prefix *ek*, corresponding to “ex-,” literally “out of,” and *stasis*, “the act or process of remaining, standing, or staying.” Accordingly, *ekstasis* literally means “to stand outside (oneself),” or, in idiomatic usage, “to be beside oneself due to any strong emotion,” for example rage, joy, or fear. It is, however, only with reference to the etymological meaning of the word that Heidegger denotes the three structures of timeliness, the advent, continuance, and the encounter, as “ecstasies” [*Ekstasen*] of timeliness. They are “ecstasies” not because
they in any way resemble or cause ecstasy but because they exhibit the common feature of "beyond itself—return to itself." In order to avoid misunderstanding, Macquarrie and Robinson translate *Ekstase* and *Ekstasen* as "ecstasies" and "ecstasies" rather than "ecstasy" and "ecstasies." Still, since the German word Heidegger uses is laden with the same meaning, and since Macquarrie and Robinson's renditions are somewhat awkward, I have decided to use already existing English words.

**Encounter** [*Gegenwart*]. One of the three ecstasies of timeliness. Corresponds to the present. The comportment by means of which Dasein understands its own existence in a world together with intramundane entities; the comportment by means of which Dasein discovers entities within the overarching framework of the world.

*Gegenwart* is the usual German term for the "present." It is a compound of the preposition *gegen*, meaning "against," and the morpheme -wart, a form of -wärts, a suffix indicating direction and corresponding to the English "-wards"; *vorwärts* means "forwards." The literal meaning of *Gegenwart* is, accordingly, something like "against-wards." It is possible that Heidegger intends a link with the archaic noun *Wart*, meaning "guardian," "protector," or "overseer." (source: Wahrig's *Deutsches Wörterbuch*). It has been thought best to preserve the literal meaning as far as possible by means of the translation "encounter." The word then denotes the comportment of Dasein by means of which it recognizes entities as "counter to" or "in a direction away from" itself.

**Encountering** [*Gegenwärtigen*]. The inauthentic mode of the encounter; inauthentic comportments towards intramundane entities.

*Gegenwärtigen* is a nominalized verb form that Heidegger constructs from *Gegenwart*, the usual German word for the "present." Its literal meaning is thus something like "present-izing." The term is rendered into English here as "encountering" in order to preserve the etymological link with *Gegenwart*, which I have translated as "encounter."
Entitital \([ seiend ]\). Adjective pertaining to intramundane entities viewed in opposition to Being.

\( seiend \) is an adjective derived from the present participle of the verb \( sein \); its usual meaning in German is “existent.” However, the word acquires a special meaning in Heidegger’s vocabulary because he uses the word \( Seiendes \) (“existent things”) to refer specifically to intramundane objects, i.e., objects we encounter within the referential framework of the world. See the entry on “Entity” for more details. Note that the correct form of the adjective derived from “entity” is “entitiative,” but I find this term too inelegant for general philosophical use.

Entity \([ Seiendes ]\). All intramundane things (in the widest sense of “thing”) whether animate or inanimate; the totality of worldly things towards which comportments are possible.

\( Seiendes \) is a common German word which is in fact a nominalized present participle in the neuter singular. In other words, its basic grammatical form resembles that of English words like “jumping,” “running,” “eating,” “playing,” “writing,” “reading,” and so on. It is derived from the infinitive \( Sein \), which means simply “to be.” The addition of the neuter singular ending turns the present participle into a noun, so that \( Seiendes \) could be rendered into English as “beings” in the sense of “things that are.” Note too that in German the use of the neuter singular ending parallels the ancient Greek use of the neuter plural: \( Seiendes \) can denote both a single “thing that is” as well as a plurality of “things that are.” Heidegger in fact intends the word as a literal translation of the Greek \( on \), which has the same grammatical form as \( Seiendes \).

Grammatically speaking, the ideal translation would be “existents,” but this word has the telling disadvantage that it is (1) homonymous with and (2) derived from “existence,” which has a very different technical meaning in Heidegger. Another, less satisfactory, translation is “essents,” which has the further disadvantages that it is (1) almost homonymous with and (2) derived from “essence,” with which the meaning of \( Seiendes \) should not be confused.
Unfortunately for the translator, other parallel grammatical constructions in English (rather than Latin) usually have a passive sense; thus “leavings” are “things that are left” rather than things that themselves leave; “writings” are “things that are written” rather than things that themselves write; and “readings” are “things that are read” rather than things that themselves read.

In light of all these difficulties, it seems best to use a familiar word that in its natural use has more or less the same meaning: “entity.” We will have to use a plural form, “entities,” in sentences referring to many Seiendes, but the word at least preserves the grammatical link between sein and Seiendes via the Latin etymology, ens being the present participle of esse.

**Evermineness** [Jemeinigkeit]. The ontological structure of Dasein that is the basis of selfhood and the self. Evermineness is rooted in the fact that Dasein is able to understand its own existence, that in existing it can and must choose for itself.

Macquarrie and Robinson translate Jemeinigkeit as “in each case mineness”; Stambaugh uses “mineness” or “always-being-mine.” I find the first and the last clumsy; the second is inaccurate.

**Everydayness** [Alltaglichkeit]. The essential quality of our usual and primary comportments towards intramundane entities; inauthentic existence in the world.

(an) **Existential** [Existential]. Noun; a fundamental structural feature of Dasein.

**Existential** [existential]. Adjective; pertaining to fundamental being-structures of Dasein. Used by Heidegger in opposition to existentic; compare “ontological.”

**Existentiality** [Existenzialität]. The quality of having to exist and having existence as the task before oneself, i.e., the defining ability of Dasein to understand its own possibilities for existence.
Existentic [existentiell]. Adjective; pertaining to concrete acts of existence rather than to the analysis of the structure of existence (i.e., the analysis of Dasein). Used by Heidegger in opposition to existential; compare "ontic."

In German, existentiell is merely a variant form (not coined by Heidegger) of existential. Both words simply mean "existential." Macquarrie and Robinson translate existentiell by means of the awkward neologism "existentiell."

Facticity [Faktizität]. The quality of being thrown into a world, i.e., the fact that Dasein always exists in concrete (or factual) situations in which it has to make concrete decisions concerning its existence.

I have chosen to render the adjective corresponding to "facticity," faktisch, as "factual" rather than Macquarrie and Robinson's "factually." The normal meaning of faktisch is "factual," and I think that Heidegger's use of the word is close enough to its normal meaning to permit this translation into English.

Falling [Verfallen]. The dominance of the one-self in everyday concernedness [Besorgen] with the world; the immersion in everyday life insofar as it is guided by crosstalk, curiosity, and ambiguity. The inauthentic mode of the being-among structure of concern.

Verfallen in everyday German means the process of "falling" in the sense that one would speak of the decline and "fall" of the Roman Empire—to "decay" or "collapse." However, it can also mean "to succumb" or "to fall prey to," "to fall" to an opponent. Heidegger obviously means Verfallen to echo Stündenfall, the Christian theological term for the "fall from grace" of Adam and Eve. Heidegger probably means to suggest that the same existential constellation he terms Verfallen is re-interpreted in Christian theology as the doctrine of the Fall. Stambaugh renders this word as "entanglement," which would more properly translate Verstricken or Verwickein. It also fails to render the verbal sense of the German noun.
First and foremost [zunächst und zumeist]. A frequently occurring adverbial phrase in Being and Time. Used when referring to the primary, everyday level of Dasein’s existence.

The literal meaning of zunächst und zumeist is “initially and for the most part.” As this phrase is rather clumsy, I have rendered it as “first and foremost.” The reader should keep in mind that the original phrase has a fundamentally temporal sense.

Forerunning [Vorlaufen]. (1) The comportment in which a possible state of affairs is considered without compromising its character as a possibility; (2) specifically, authentic being unto death; (3) the authentic mode of the advent, and as such the authentic comportment towards existentiality. See Section 3.2 for details.

Vorlaufen is a verb meaning “to run ahead” or to “precede.” Its literal meaning is “fore-running.” The noun derived from the verb, Vorläufer, means a “forerunner” or “predecessor.”

Forgottenness [Vergessenheit]. The inauthentic mode of continuance; the inauthentic comportment towards thrownness. Also see “retention.”

For-that [Dazu]. The entity to which the what-for of a tool refers; the entity to which the tool is applied.

Stambaugh translates both Dazu and Wozu as what-for, blurring the distinction between the two.

Inauthenticity [Uneigentlichkeit]. The mode of evermineness in which Dasein plans its own existence with reference the world rather than with reference to itself and its own genuine possibilities.

Indifference [Indifferenz]. The mode of evermineness in which Dasein has taken no explicit decision as to whether its own existence is planned towards itself or towards the world. A state that is neither authentic nor inauthentic.

Indifferenz is used by Heidegger primarily with a view to the sense of the original Latin roots, namely “undifferentiatedness,” “lack
of a distinction." In the state of *Indifferenz*, no difference is made with respect to authenticity or inauthenticity. Of course the usual meaning of "indifference" is also present as an undertone.

**Inheritance** [*Erbe*]. The sum total of thrown possibilities for existence presented to *Dasein* by the world.

The word *Erbe* can mean both "inheritance" and "heritage". Macquarrie and Robinson choose the latter rendition. "Inheritance" is used throughout the present work because in English "heritage," despite its etymology, is essentially a synonym for "culture"; it does not evoke strong enough associations with the *act* of "inheriting," i.e., of receiving thrown possibilities, to serve as an appropriate translation of *Erbe*.

**In-order-to** [*Um-zu*]. The purpose of a tool as specified by a particular reference of the tool to its what-for. Ultimately rooted in the understanding of *Dasein* (more specifically, in its purpose).

**Instant** [*Augenblick*]. The authentic mode of the encounter; authentic comportments towards intramundane entities.

Heidegger's original term for the authentic encounter is *Augenblick*, "instant," "moment," or "blink of an eye." Its literal meaning is "eye-glance." It is meant to refer to the type of purview [*Umsicht*] that guides authentic *Dasein*’s comportments towards intramundane entities. Macquarrie and Robinson's "moment of vision" is misleading; Stambaugh's "moment" is better. I find that the emphatic tone of "instant" more closely reflects the sense of the original German.

**Interpretation** [*Auslegung*]. The act that discovers the connections of tools by understanding them within the framework of connection-wholes.

*Auslegung* literally means "laying out" or "taking apart"; in this respect it resembles the ancient Greek *analysis*, which also means "the act of taking apart," "un-binding." The translation "interpretation" is somewhat unsatisfactory, since the word
Interpretation also exists in German alongside the finer distinction expressed by Deutung ("an attempt to give meaning to something"); however, any other rendering of Auslegung into English is likely to prove too misleading.

Intramundane [innerwellich]. Adjective pertaining to entities discoverable within the world, i.e., anything that appears as part of the meaningfulness structure of the worldliness of the world.

Stambaugh's "innerworldly" is certainly better than Macquarrie and Robinson's "within-the-world"; it is perhaps a touch too literal.

Language [Sprache]. The comportment of Dasein through which meaning-wholes are separated into meanings and furnished with an entitical shape, i.e., words and sentences; the entitical form of talk, talk insofar as it appears as a to-handed intramundane entity.

Lot [Geschick]. The common authentic comportment towards shared thrownness (i.e., a shared past) rooted in the existential structure of Dasein as necessarily characterized by being-with; shared inheritance and destiny.

The German word Geschick has a variety of meanings including "fate," "destiny," "dexterity," "knack," and "light touch." It is a compound word whose root is derived from the verb schicken, "to send," and the prefix ge-, which indicates a collective meaning (see the discussion of this prefix under Gerede). The literal meaning of the word is thus "a collective state of being sent," whereby the notion of "being sent" is meant to refer to thrownness. Heidegger's use of the term Geschick in Being and Time is not compatible with the notion "what a people is (supposedly) meant by providence to accomplish." The Geschick of a people is, technically, its common authentic comportment towards its shared thrownness, i.e., its historical situation. Accordingly, it has seemed prudent to render Geschick by "lot" rather than by "fate" or "destiny."

Meaning [Bedeutung]. A connection insofar as it is structured solely by talk prior to any act of understanding and interpretation.
Meaningfulness [Bedeutsamkeit]. The essential character of the references making up the worldliness of the world insofar as they are conceived as acts of Dasein's understanding; technically (see § 69 c) of Being and Time) the context of the relations in-order-to, what-for, for-that, and purpose.

Bedeutsamkeit is a nominalized form of the adjective bedeutsam, which means something like “laden with significance,” “endowed with deep meaning.” It is related to the verb bedeuten, which corresponds to the English verb “to mean.” Heidegger occasionally hyphenates the verb be-deuten in order to call attention to its literal meaning; the prefix be- often indicates the formation of a transitive verb (though this is obviously not the case with bedeuten), while deuten approximately means “to interpret,” and deuten auf is “to indicate,” “to point at.”

Meaning-whole [Bedeutungsganzes]. A connection-whole insofar as it is structured by talk prior to any further structuring activity undertaken by understanding and interpretation. The references constituting the worldliness of the world insofar as they are structured by talk.

the One [das Man]. See “the One-self.”

the One-self [das Man-selbst]. The form of evermineness (or selfhood) that is predominantly characterized by an understanding of what “one” does and does not do; the absence of a distinction between one’s own and others’ possible comportments.

The German word man simply means “one” (though not in the numerical sense). It parallels the French l’on and is often used in impersonal constructions such as man tut so was einfach nicht, “that’s simply not done.” The word selbst can mean “oneself,” “itself,” “herself,” or “himself”; used as a noun, das Selbst, it means “the self.” The locution man selbst literally means “one oneself,” e.g., man selbst hat das für nicht ratsam gehalten literally means “one did not oneself consider that advisable”; in this example man is used to refer to oneself without explicitly doing so in order to soften the
impact of the criticism or to disclaim explicit responsibility for it.

Macquarrie and Robinson translate \textit{das Man} and \textit{das Man-selbst} as "the they" and "the they-self," which entirely misses the point.

\textbf{Ontic} [\textit{ontisch}]. Adjective pertaining to structures of being prior to any thematic analysis. Used by Heidegger in opposition to ontological; compare "existentic."

\textbf{Ontological} [\textit{ontologisch}]. Adjective pertaining to the thematic analysis of structures of being. Used by Heidegger in opposition to ontic; compare "existential" (adjective).

\textbf{Plan} [\textit{Entwurf}]. The fundamental existential character of understanding; the ability to disclose and pursue Dasein's own possibilities. Used in opposition to thrownness.

\textit{Entwurf} normally means mean "draft," "outline," or "rough sketch." An \textit{Entwurf} is by definition unfinished, something still in the process of being refined and polished into a final version. Literally, the word \textit{Entwurf} means something like "out-throw." Heidegger uses this etymology to underscore his use of \textit{Entwurf} (free choices) in opposition to \textit{Geworfenheit}, "thrownness" (choices that could not have been chosen or are no longer free to be chosen by Dasein).

There are three nuances of the term \textit{Entwurf} as it is used in \textit{Being and Time} that the translator must take into account. (1) The verb \textit{entwerfen}, from which \textit{Entwurf} is derived, means "to draft" or "to mock up." It refers to an outline which is \textit{preliminary}, \textit{incomplete}, and \textit{unfinished}. (2) It can also mean "to project" in the sense of projecting an image upon a screen: \textit{das Bild wurde auf die Leinwand entworfen}. This locution is somewhat dated and would tend to be replaced with the verb \textit{projizieren} in contemporary German. (3) As mentioned above, Heidegger uses the term \textit{Entwurf} for the sake of the etymological link with \textit{Geworfenheit}.

Macquarrie and Robinson attempt to preserve (2) by translating \textit{Entwurf} as "projection" and trusting to the Latin etymology to parallel the German and so preserve (3). I am not, however, entirely satisfied with this decision. Heidegger himself appears to use
Entwurf primarily in the sense of a "draft" or "outline" of Dasein's possibilities for existence, and in any event the term "projection" is laden with undesirable psychological connotations. I have chosen to focus on (1), in my opinion the root meaning of the term, by translating Entwurf as "plan." This preserves the essential sense of the key phrase entwirf auf ... hin by permitting locutions like "planning towards ..." or "planning with a view to ...".

It does not seem possible to preserve the etymological link with Geworfenheit in any straightforward manner in English; translating Geworfenheit by "ejection" in order to complement Macquarrie and Robinson's "projection" would be very inelegant.

Preconception [Vorgriff]. The set of concepts used in order to carry out an interpretation.

The common meaning of the word Vorgriff is "an act by which something is anticipated or decided in advance without waiting for the due process according to which the thing in question would normally occur or be decided." Since Heidegger refers to Vorgriff in his sense as the decision to use a particular "conceptuality" (Begrifflichkeit) in an act of interpretation, I have rendered the word as "preconception." It should, however, be kept in mind that "preconception" is used in a purely terminological sense.

Prepossession [Vorhabe]. An already understood connection-whole that serves as the framework or context of an interpretation.

A neologism of Heidegger's coined from the verb vorhaben, "to intend or plan to do something." Literally the word means "before-having," which Heidegger appears to use in two senses: "that which one has before one" (spatial sense); "that which one has in advance (temporal sense)." For the sake of retaining the Vor- etymology, I have translated Vorhabe as "prepossession," though it should be noted that the word is being used in a purely terminological sense.

Preview [Vorsicht]. The angle or perspective from which an interpretation is carried out.
The word *Vorsicht* means "caution" in ordinary German; Heidegger uses it in its purely literal sense: "before-sight." In order to preserve the Vor- etymology and the connection of *Vorsicht* with *Umsicht* and the various -sicht compounds, I have translated the word as "preview."

**Primeval** [*ursprünglich*]. Ontologically fundamental; pertaining to basic and structurally foundational elements of Dasein.

*Ursprünglich* is translated by Macquarrie and Robinson as "primordial," which literally means "first with regard to number," a definitely wrong connotation in a Heideggerian context. Literally, *ursprünglich* means "pertaining to the origin [Ursprung]," "origin-like." Heidegger uses the term to refer to more "fundamental," more "basic," and more "hidden" ontological structures, i.e., to simpler structures on which other, more complex and elaborate, structures are based. "Primal" is a possible translation, but the emphatic connotations of "primeval" better suit Heidegger's use of the term, and the Latin etymology is particularly apt, as *primaevus* is a compound of *primus*, "first," and *aevum*, "age." The term "primeval" thus reflects Heidegger's use of *ursprünglich* to refer to "earlier," i.e., simpler or more hidden, temporal structures, as well as his later tendency to emphasize the ur- prefix in compounds (ur- means "primeval." An *Urwald* is a "primeval forest" or "jungle"; *Urzeit* means "primeval age"; and *Urgroßmutter* means "great-grandmother"). I will use the word "coeval" as a translation of *gleichursprünglich* ("equally primeval"), rendered as "equiprimordial" by Macquarrie and Robinson.

**Purpose** [*Worum-willen*]. The aim with respect to which Dasein, insofar as it discovers tools in the comportment of connection, assigns them their specific what-fors.

The phrase *worum-willen* is a relative adverb used to introduce a subordinate clause; Heidegger nominalizes and hyphenates it to bring out its literal meaning, which is "for the sake of which" or "for whose sake." Heidegger is both trying to avoid the traditional terminology for describing final causes and to imply that connection
is always undertaken for the sake of a particular person, i.e., Dasein; but it seems preferable to render the term in English by "purpose" than by the clumsy "for-the-sake-of-which" or the more accurate, and still more clumsy, "for the sake of whom." There are a few passages in which Heidegger uses both the locutions Worum-willen and Um-willen, but in my view they can be treated as synonyms for all practical purposes.

Purview [Umsicht]. The view we have of a tool during its actual use; our immersion in the work to be done; our awareness of a tool when we are occupied with the totality of references assigned to the tool by the in-order-to that constitutes its specific tool-whole and that specify its what-for.

The literal meaning of Umsicht is "view around." Macquarrie and Robinson translate "circumspection," a good translation via Latin. "Circumspection" is also the everyday German meaning of Umsicht. In order to preserve the connection of Umsicht with Vorsicht and the various -sicht compounds I have translated the word as "purview."

Retention [Behalten]. Synonym for forgottenness introduced by Heidegger in § 79, p. 406 (see the first four sentences of the second indented paragraph); compare also § 69 a), p. 353-354.

Retrieval [Wiederholung]. The authentic mode of continuance; the authentic comportment towards thrownness.

Wiederholung is the normal German word for "repetition." Its literal meaning, however, is "again-getting." Heidegger uses the word to indicate the existential comportment through which Dasein discloses its own thrownness authentically. Since the connotation of "getting again" or "getting back" is most important for Heidegger, I have rendered the word into English as "retrieval."

Sense [Sinn]. That with reference to which something derives its meaning: "the towards-which of the plan, structured by prepossession, preview, and preconception, hither from which
something becomes understandable as something” (§ 32, p. 151).

Note that the resemblance of “sense” to “sensibility” is an unfortunate artifact of translation.

**Sensibility** [**Befindlichkeit**]. The primeval comportment that discovers connections and connection-wholes and simultaneously also discloses the existential possibilities for comportment towards intramundane entities.

*Befindlichkeit* is a neologism coined by Heidegger. The noun *Befinden* means a person’s “condition” or “state,” the verb *sich befinden* means “to be located” or “to feel,” while the adjective *befindlich* means “located.” Heidegger’s *Befindlichkeit* is meant to express the idea that one’s “emotional state” discloses the meaningfulness structure of the world, one’s “location” or “position,” so to speak. Translating the term into English is problematic because it is difficult to decide which nuance should be emphasized. There seem to be no terms in English that have a similar dual meaning to that of *sich befinden* and *Befinden*. In German, the neologism *Befindlichkeit* would tend to be understood in a spatial sense, though Heidegger appears most often to use the word in the sense of “emotion” or “mood.” With this latter point in mind, I have tried to render the word by the appropriately vague “sensibility,” intending a verbal reference to “sense” in the everyday use of the word (as in “a sense of pleasure or ease,” “a sense of what is appropriate”) and “sensing” (as in “apprehending”). This is probably about as close as one can get to the original in English, though a case could be made for other, more literal, alternatives, such as “stationedness” or “locatedness.” “Statedness” probably best reflects Heidegger’s intention in coining the term but invites confusion with the verb “stating.” “Disposition” is also tempting, but the overt connotations of the word are too psychological, and the association with an “innate subjective tendency” would be harmful to an understanding of Heidegger’s use of the term. In any event, Macquarrie and Robinson’s “state-of-mind” is clearly inappropriate in the context of a work one of whose main ambitions is to show that Dasein is inadequately characterized by the concept “mind.”
Stambaugh too rejects "disposition" but translates Befindlichkeit as "attunement," which is an overly literal translation of Gestimmtheit, literally "the state of being of a mind to do something," "the state of having a mood." "Attunement" could perhaps also at a pinch pass as a translation of Einstellung, "attitude." Admittedly, no one English word can do the job of the German Befindlichkeit.

Why did Heidegger choose such an awkward and peculiar term for moods or emotions? Interestingly, there is another German word with a similar dual aspect: Empfindung. This relatively common word occurs, for example, in the first of Friedrich Schiller's letters in Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen and has been rendered into English by Reginald Snell as "sensibility." The German word combines the meanings of "feeling" and "perception"; it can also be rendered as "sensation," for example a Schmerzempfindung is a "pain-sensation." Interestingly, Empfindung is etymologically related to sich befinden via the common root finden, "to find." Why, then, did Heidegger not use Empfindung in order to combine the meanings of "mood" or "emotion" and "to be located in" in the sense of "to find oneself in a particular situation" (sich in einer bestimmten Situation finden)? The answer is probably that Empfindsamkeit is a German word meaning "sensitivity" or, in some contexts, "hypersensitivity"; it is also the name of an 18th century movement in German literature characterized by an exaggerated emphasis on emotion and feeling. Heidegger probably felt that coining a new word was required in order to avoid confusion.

**Talk [Rede].** The meaningful articulation of understandability; the fundamental comportment by means of which the referential character of the world is structured in order to function as the framework for all particular interactions with intramundane entities; a pre-verbal and pre-linguistic comportment of Dasein by means of which Dasein structures meaning-wholes.

Rede can mean "speech" in ordinary German, both in the sense of "acts of talking" and in the sense of a public speech. The verb reden means "to speak" or "to talk." "Speech" would also be a possible translation, although "speech," to my mind, emphasizes the
“acoustic” rather more than does the German Rede. For this reason the translation “talk” was held to be more suitable.

**Temporality** [Temporalität]. See the discussion under “Timeliness.”

**Thrownness** [Geworfenheit]. The fundamental existential character of sensibility; the existential character of Dasein that involves (1) Dasein’s inability to choose to come into existence; (2) Dasein’s ability to discover connection-wholes as already having been, that is, as independent of Dasein’s own choice. Used in opposition to plan.

*Geworfenheit* is a neologism of Heidegger’s and has no normal German meaning. The word literally means “thrownness.” It is employed in opposition to *entwerfen*, “planning,” which literally means “to throw forth.” Some commentators have tried to draw a connection between *Geworfenheit* and the verb *werfen*, meaning “to throw,” “to give birth to a litter” (*Wurf* can mean “throw” or “litter”), although this interpretation strikes me as fanciful. A possible source of the “thrownness” metaphor is Spinoza’s letter to G. H. Schaller dated October 1674 (numbered LVIII in Van Vloten’s edition), in which Spinoza explains the subjective sense of free will by pointing out that a hurled stone, if it had an intellect, would imagine that it were flying under its own power.

**Timeliness** [Zeitlichkeit]. The most fundamental existential-ontological structure of Dasein; the sense of authentic concern. The structural unity of advent, continuance, and encounter. (See Section 3.5.)

*Zeitlichkeit* is normally translated “temporality,” but this rendering of the term leads to problems. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger also employs the word *Temporalität*. According to Macquarrie and Robinson, *Temporalität* and cognate expressions only occur on pp. 19, 23–26, and 147 of the original German edition; elsewhere, the use of *Zeitlichkeit* and its cognates is predominant. It is, however, not completely certain whether *Temporalität* is meant to be a synonym
for *Zeitlichkeit* or whether it has a truly distinct terminological sense of its own. One fact speaks in favour of the latter position. In the lecture *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (1927), Heidegger's first important project after completing Part One of *Being and Time*, an important distinction is made between *Zeitlichkeit*, or the primeval phenomenon of time, which is the foundation of the structural constitution of Dasein, and *Temporalität*, which refers to primeval time insofar as it is the foundation of the understanding of Being (see pp. 322-324; 388; 429). It is likely that Heidegger intended to introduce this distinction in Part Two of *Being and Time*. The translator is accordingly forced to distinguish between *Zeitlichkeit* and *Temporalität*, if only to prevent confusion with translations of *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*.

Macquarrie and Robinson, claiming that *Zeitlichkeit* should not be translated by "timeliness" since "temporality" comes "much closer to what Heidegger has in mind," chose to render *Zeitlichkeit* as "temporality" and *Temporalität* as "Temporality" with an initial capital letter, an obviously unsatisfactory solution, since whenever *Zeitlichkeit* happens to appear in a title or as the first word in a sentence it will be indistinguishable from *Temporalität*. Furthermore, their proposed convention is unsatisfactory for any English translation of *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, since both terms are used frequently throughout the work, and an initial capital letter is not likely to be enough of a cue for the reader to remember to distinguish occurrences of *Zeitlichkeit* from occurrences of *Temporalität*.

One can, of course, borrow from the Greek, but I find "chronicity" displeasing, and I prefer to reserve it and its cognates for special cases such as *Innerzeitigkeit* ("intrachronicity"), which has a different root (-zeitig-) from both *Zeitlichkeit* and *Temporalität*. In order to preserve "temporality" as a translation of *Temporalität*, *Zeitlichkeit* has been translated literally throughout the present work as "timeliness." Note, however, that "timeliness" in this specific terminological sense excludes the usual meaning of "the quality of having come at the right or appropriate moment."
Timely [zeitlich]. Adjective; pertaining to the primeval timeliness of Dasein.

In this context “timely” is simply an adjective derived from “timeliness”; it does not have the usual meaning of “occurring at the correct or opportune moment.” See the discussion under “Timeliness.”

Timing [Zeitigung]. The disclosure of primeval timeliness; the fundamental comportment of Dasein that accomplishes this disclosure; the process or occurring of timeliness.

Zeitigung is a noun formed from zeitigen by the addition of the suffix -ung, which usually indicates a process or procedure. The German verb zeitigen normally means “to ripen,” “to move towards fruition,” “to bring forth,” or “to have as an effect or consequence.” The literal meaning of the verb is “to time.” Accordingly, I have decided to translate the word as “timing.” It must however be noted that the verb “to time” in English means to measure time, a connotation that zeitigen does not have. Macquarrie and Robinson prefer “temporalizing,” although this is misleading because Heidegger seems to use Temporalität, “temporality,” in an altogether different sense. (See the glossary remarks under “Timeliness”.)

To-handedness [Zuhandenheit]. The characteristic feature of tools encountered within our purview; the peculiarly transparent quality of a tool during successful use.

The German adjective zuhænden means something like “ready to be grasped,” “ready to be used.” Heidegger nominalizes the adjective by adding the -heit (“-ness”) suffix. Macquarrie and Robinson’s “readiness-to-hand” is accurate but clumsy. Stambaugh’s “handiness” is good, but it makes it difficult to think of a corresponding translation for Vorhændenheit, which I have translated as “at-hand-edness.”

Tools [Zeug]. Entities insofar as they are encountered in concernedness; manipulated and used entities.

The German word Zeug is more or less an equivalent of Ding or “thing,” but it can also have a pejorative meaning (dummies Zeug
means “stuff and nonsense”) and a collective meaning (Schreibzeug means “writing implements,” Bettzeug is “bedding”). “Equipment” (which corresponds rather more to the German Ausrüstung) is misleading: another possible translation is “implements,” which, however, is a more sophisticated term than the monosyllabic Zeug.

Heidegger’s use of -zeug compounds such as Schreibzeug (“writing implements”), Nahzeug (“sewing equipment”), Werkzeug (“tools”), Fahrzeug (“vehicles”), Mesfzeug (“measuring instruments”) show that he is thinking primarily of objects used to accomplish a specific purpose, or to “get things done.” Note that all of these compounds can also be used with the definite article, in which case their collective meaning is lost and they denote single objects.

**Tool-wholes** [Zeugganzen]. The sum total of references defining a particular in-order-to within which tools are assigned their particular what-fors. Interpreted connection-wholes.

Like Seiendes, Zeugganzen has a collective meaning, although with the definite article it can also denote a particular individual (see also “Tools”). Heidegger’s own examples of tool-wholes (§ 15, p. 68) include serviceability [Dienlichkeit], conduciveness [Beitragslichkeit], usability [Verwendbarkeit], and manipulability [Handlichkeit]. Heidegger calls these “different manners of in-order-to.”

**Turmoil** [der Wirbel]. The inauthentic mode of sensibility. Characterized by the predominance of the one-self. (See Section 2.7 for details.)

**Understanding** [Verstehen]. The comportment in which tools are discovered within tool-wholes and the possible uses of such tools are grasped. The act of understanding reveals both the structure of the world and the possible ways in which Dasein can exist in the world.

**Unsettlement** [Unheimlichkeit]. The essential emotional quality of angst.
The German word means "uncanniness," but its literal meaning is "unhomeliness." Heidegger uses the etymology of the term to reflect the essentially "unsettled" and "unsettling" feature of angst as a sensibility preventing Dasein from becoming "entangled" (i.e., "settled") in inauthentic concernedness [Besorgen] with entities.

**What-for [Wozu].** The purpose of a tool; the work it accomplishes.

Macquarrie and Robinson translate Wozu as "towards-which," which is misleading; the everyday meaning of the question word wozu? is "what for?" Wozu can also be used to introduce subordinate clauses containing a verb requiring the preposition zu, for example, *Er weiß nicht, wozu er sich entschließen soll, "He doesn't know what he should decide [to do]."* In some of these subordinate clauses wozu can mean "towards-which," but "what-for" seems both more natural and more in line with Heidegger's usage of the term. Stambaugh translates both Wozu and Dazu as what-for, blurring the distinction between the two.

**Worldliness [Weltlichkeit].** The defining characteristic of the world; the sum total of connection-wholes emerging from Dasein's purpose within which tools are assigned their particular what-fors.

The meaning and etymology of the German expression Weltlichkeit exactly parallel the English "worldliness." Literally, the adjective weltlich means "worldly," and Weltlichkeit is formed by simply adding the suffix -keit, just as "worldliness" is formed from "worldly" by the addition of the suffix "-ness." Heidegger of course modifies the everyday meaning of the term, but the English "worldliness" is quite capable of reflecting this change of meaning and its etymological motivation. Accordingly, Weltlichkeit should be translated as "worldliness," though some translators have suggested "worldhood" and "worldishness."