Rephrasing Heidegger

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CHAPTER 3
THE TIMING OF TIMELINESS

3.1 THE PROBLEM OF COMPLETENESS AND AUTHENTICITY (§§ 45-46)

After finishing the preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein in Section One of Part One of Being and Time (which consists of §§9-44), Heidegger turns to the question of Dasein and timeliness [Zeitlichkeit] in Section Two (which consists of the remaining part of Being and Time, namely §§ 45-83). In order to make the transition from the theme of Section One to the theme of Section Two, Heidegger introduces a new concern in the metaphilosophical reflections of §45: the problem of the completeness and the authenticity of our analysis of Dasein.

In Section One, we initially characterized Dasein as being-in-the-world. The structural details of being-in-the-world, namely the world, the self, and being-in, turned out to be modifications of the disclosedness of Dasein, whose fundamental structure is concern. Concern is a unity of three primeval structural elements, namely already-in, self-ahead, and being-among. We recall, however, that Heidegger’s ultimate aim in investigating the structural details of Dasein was not to give a coherent account of Dasein as such but rather to answer the question of Being. In what sense can the description and interpretation of Dasein be said to have helped us towards this goal?

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In §45, Heidegger informs his readers that answering the question of Being is equivalent to explaining how it is possible for Dasein to understand Being at all. This is because answering the question of Being means specifying the sense of Being, the framework with reference to which Being is understood. This framework, as we saw in Section 2.10, is a construct of Dasein’s understanding. Accordingly, answering the question of Being simply means explaining how Dasein can come up with a framework for understanding Being. And this in turn simply means giving an adequate account of those comportments of Dasein that are involved in creating and maintaining the framework within which Being is understood.¹

How are we to know when this account is in fact an adequate account? What does “adequate” mean in the sphere of fundamental ontology? According to Heidegger, an adequate account must be a primeval account. A primeval account of Dasein is one in which the fundamental structures of Dasein are clearly apprehended and appropriately interpreted. But how are we to recognize a truly primeval account? What are its identifying features?

In Heidegger’s opinion, a truly primeval account of a phenomenon is characterized by (1) an appropriate hermeneutic situation and (2) its ability to address the entire phenomenon in question. A hermeneutic situation, as we recall from Sections 2.4 and 2.6 b), is the individual combination of prepossession, preview, and preconception employed in a particular interpretation. When, following Heidegger, we say that a primeval account addresses the entire phenomenon of which it is an account, we mean that the phenomenon has been brought into prepossession as a whole and that the preview addresses the unity of the structural features belonging to the phenomenon. If these two conditions have been met, preview and prepossession will then themselves indicate the appropriate preconception of the ontological structures we are to interpret (compare §45, p. 232).

Having worked out the necessary criteria of a primeval account to his satisfaction, Heidegger goes on to ask whether the
interpretation of Dasein undertaken in Section One meets these criteria. Was the hermeneutic situation able to reveal the ultimate primeval structures of Dasein? Was the analysis able to address Dasein in its entirety?

One thing, at any rate, is clear: the analysis of Dasein in Section One concentrated on the indifferent (§§ 29-34) and inauthentic (§§ 35-38) modes of Dasein's being-ability. Since the authentic mode of Dasein has not at all been thematically addressed, the results of the analysis are necessarily incomplete. The structure of authentic existence has not been incorporated into the results of our preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein. This being the case, there can be no doubt that our interpretation is not truly primeval, since its hermeneutic situation is not equal to the task of interpreting authentic existence. It fails to address Dasein in its entirety and is therefore incomplete.

Not only is our analysis obviously lacking in that it has failed to address Dasein's authenticity, but it is also lacking in that it has completely ignored the everydayness of Dasein as existence between birth and death. As long as Dasein continues to exist, there are possibilities that it has not yet seized upon. The existence of Dasein is thus necessarily always incomplete. So long as Dasein can exist, there are always possibilities of existence that Dasein has yet to choose. Is the structure of concern, the most fundamental structure that we have hitherto been able to reveal in Dasein, able to account for the essential incompleteness of Dasein? Heidegger thinks not. Accordingly, the preparatory fundamental analysis of Section One is inadequate in two respects: (1) it has failed to give an account of the authenticity of Dasein, and (2) it does not include an account of the essential incompleteness of Dasein's existence.

There is a further nuance to Heidegger's argument that it is worth taking the time to bring out. In German, the primary meaning of the word eigentlich is "actual" or "real." It can also be used as an adverb, in which case it tends to acquire the meaning of "truly," for example in the question Hat er das eigentlich gemacht? In English, we could render the question in three ways: "Did he
really," "Did he truly," or "Did he actually do that?" Used as an adjective, in some special cases it can even acquire the meaning of "genuine" or "proper," as in Der eigentliche Satz besteht aus Subjekt und Verb, "A genuine sentence consists of subject and verb." "The sentence proper consists of subject and verb." As part of an adverbial phrase eigentlich can also mean something along the lines of "strictly speaking," for example in Eigentlich müßte man das einen Fehler nennen, "One should, strictly speaking, call that a mistake."

Heidegger's neologism Eigentlichkeit, a noun derived from eigentlich by adding the feminine suffix -keit, corresponding to the English "-ness," is usually rendered into English as "authenticity," but strictly speaking this is a translation of Echtheit, "genuineness," since a German speaker would use Echtheit where we would speak of the "authenticity" of a signature or painting, for example. The problem is further compounded by the fact that "actual" and "real," the two primary renderings of eigentlich into English, correspond more naturally to the German word wirklich. How, then, are we to understand the specific terminological sense in which Heidegger uses the word Eigentlichkeit?

For Heidegger, the word Eigentlichkeit, which we will continue to render as "authenticity," has two main meanings when applied to Dasein: (1) the state of being "genuine" and (2) the "true" state of being. Heidegger often expresses the first meaning, which I have termed "being genuine," by means of locutions involving or implying the self: when Dasein exists as itself or understands its own possibilities as such, rather than merely following the existential possibilities that have been assigned to it by the one-self, then Dasein is "genuine" in the sense of existing as itself. This meaning of "authenticity" is closely related to the second, which I have called the "true" state of being. In this sense, Dasein is characterized by authenticity when it exists in conformity with an accurate understanding of the ontological structures of existence. Viewed from this perspective, the everyday inauthentic self is inauthentic precisely because it obscures or ignores the true existential structure of Dasein and
thus does not exist in conformity with Dasein’s nature. Thus
the two senses in which Heidegger uses the term *Eigentlichkeit*
ultimately refer to the same thing seen from two different points
of view. Dasein is truly itself when it exists in conformity with
the nature of Dasein, and when it exists in conformity with
its own nature it is truly itself. The term *Eigentlichkeit* very
deliberately combines—and equates—selfhood with truth. One
clear implication of this position is that inauthenticity is a type of
*ignorance*—hence the importance of a phenomenological account
of authenticity (compare the last paragraph of Section 2.10 a).

How does Heidegger exploit this deliberate equivocation
in the meaning of *Eigentlichkeit* or “authenticity” in § 45? As we
have seen, the analysis of Section One concentrated on Dasein in
the modes of indifference and inauthenticity. As such, it failed
to address the question of Dasein’s “authenticity”—its authentic
selfhood. But since the authentic selfhood of Dasein has been
left out of the analysis, and since authentic selfhood is existence
in conformity with the true nature of Dasein—“authentic”
existence in the sense of “conformity to the facts”—this means
that the analysis has also left some of the facts out. Thus by
failing to account for Dasein’s authentic selfhood, the analysis
of Section One has also necessarily failed to give a complete
account of the structural features of Dasein. In plain English: if we
have neglected to account for an essential possibility of Dasein—
namely authentic existence—we must have also have neglected
to identify the existentials in which this possibility is rooted. If
we omit something Dasein can *do*, we also omit the description
of something Dasein *is*.

There are, accordingly, three senses in which the account
of Section One can be said to be inadequate: (1) it has failed to
give an account of authentic selfhood; (2) it has failed to give
an account of the ontological structures that make authentic
selfhood possible; and (3) it has failed to give an account of the
essential incompleteness of Dasein understood as the continual
availability of possibilities that Dasein has yet to choose (existence
between birth and death). Because our account of Dasein thus
far is incomplete, it has not brought Dasein as a whole into its prepossession. Since our account has failed to do so, it is not yet authentic—not a description of the true or actual structural features of Dasein. The missing structural feature is authenticity in the sense of true selfhood. Only when an adequate account of this authentic selfhood has been given can we be assured that our account is an authentic—accurate and complete—description of the existential structure of Dasein. In formulating an adequate account, we will also be required to explain the essential incompleteness of Dasein (its finitude, as we shall see in the next section) and its connection with Dasein’s authentic selfhood.

Such is the complex and tangled argument in §45 with which Heidegger bridges the gap between the preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein in Section One and the analysis of being unto death in §§46–53, which together make up the first chapter of Section Two. Some readers may find the argument somewhat forced, but is important to keep in mind that an argument along these lines is absolutely necessary for Heidegger to be able to embed the analysis of death into the previously established framework of the fundamental analysis of Dasein. If a phenomenological account of authenticity is not equivalent to an adequate and accurate account of Dasein’s fundamental ontological structures, then Heidegger would be unable to introduce the topic of death via the necessity for a complete account of Dasein.

One of Heidegger’s main ambitions in Being and Time is to demonstrate that a Kierkegaardian-style analysis of the existentiality of Dasein is possible within an objective, Kantian-style philosophical framework. Only in this way can the study of the existence of Dasein be reclaimed from psychology, sociology, and biography; or so Heidegger thinks. Heidegger’s overcoming of psychologism, unlike Husserl’s, does not merely aim at separating psychology—and psychological approaches in the widest sense—from philosophy. Heidegger is not satisfied with showing that the conceptual foundations of philosophy do not require a theoretical justification from psychology.
Rather, Heidegger also wants to liberate the lion's share of the subject matter of psychology from the theoretical framework of psychology. Although it is typically assumed that the existentiality of Dasein is a properly psychological topic properly addressed within the theoretical framework of psychology, Heidegger believes that his hermeneutic phenomenology provides a more suitable theoretical framework within which existentiality can be addressed in an objective manner, that is, without in any way reducing it to a merely psychological phenomenon. Whether Heidegger in fact succeeds in this ambition remains an open question.  

3.2 AUTHENTIC UNDERSTANDING: DEATH  
(§§ 47-53)  

As we saw in Section 2.8, the authentic mode of sensibility is angst. The analyses we undertake in the present section will reveal to us that the authentic mode of understanding is Dasein's comportment towards death. The connection between understanding and death is not immediately obvious and will be made clearer in the course of our further explanations. By way of an introductory clarification, we can say that just as the function of understanding is to disclose Dasein's possibilities of existence, the function of Dasein's comportment towards its own mortality is to disclose one very special possibility of Dasein's existence—namely the possibility of the cessation of existence. Thus the common link between understanding and death is the disclosure of Dasein's possibilities.

The theme of death is important to Heidegger because the unique possibility of one's own death is employed in Being and Time to introduce the discussion of Dasein's wholeness. As we saw in the last section, Heidegger identifies the wholeness of Dasein with its authenticity. Since Dasein's final mode of existence is to die, it appears that the completion of Dasein cannot arise until the moment of death. Since Dasein is essentially incomplete, or lacking in wholeness, until the moment of death, it seems that
authenticity is impossible during life. How is this problem to be dealt with?

Heidegger replies with two distinct lines of investigation. Heidegger will first demonstrate, by means of a more satisfactory understanding of the experience of death, that authentic existence is in fact possible, if only at the ontological level of investigation. That is to say: we can indeed describe authentic Dasein even if authenticity should turn out to be factually impossible. Once the possibility of authenticity has been demonstrated, we also need to show that the practice of authenticity is truly a viable undertaking. Heidegger's second line of investigation is thus meant to demonstrate that authenticity can indeed also appear at the ontic or practical level of existence. It is not just a mere possibility; it is also something Dasein can really do. A discussion of this point will follow in Section 3.3.

The first chapter of Section Two of *Being and Time* is entitled "The Possible Wholeness [Ganzsein] of Dasein and Being unto Death." In this chapter Heidegger undertakes an analysis of the phenomenon of death in order that the philosophical account of Dasein in *Being and Time* should be complete. Being complete, the account of Dasein will also include the phenomenon of Dasein's authenticity. Thus by undertaking the analysis of death, the fundamental analysis of Dasein will finally be able to give an exhaustive account of Dasein's structurally constitutive features.

There is, however, an apparent problem with this undertaking. In the analysis of concern in Section 2.9, we saw that one of the fundamental structures of Dasein is being-self-ahead. The fact that Dasein is characterized at a basic level by being ahead of itself means that it is constantly planning with a view to its own possibilities for existence in the world. As long as Dasein exists, there continue to be possibilities for existence that it has not yet seized upon. Continued existence is characterized by the continual openness to future possibilities. This implies, however, that Dasein, so long as it exists, is characterized by an essential incompleteness because there is always something that Dasein has
not yet become. As long as Dasein exists, there is always something left for Dasein to do.

If Dasein is essentially incomplete, Heidegger argues, Dasein's own fundamental nature appears to frustrate any attempt to give a complete account of Dasein as a whole. Even a state of "hopelessness," as Heidegger points out, does not truly do away with the self-ahead structure of concern. It is simply a modification of the manner in which Dasein comports itself towards future possibilities—a comportment of rejection towards possibilities, which are still disclosed despite the act of rejection. Giving up hope does not mean that there is nothing left for Dasein to do. Giving up hope means abandoning the possibilities that Dasein has left. These possibilities can, of course, be severely curtailed at the factual level of existence, and this may give rise to hopelessness. However, Dasein's possibilities cannot altogether disappear. The state in which they do altogether disappear, the state in which the possibilities of Dasein are finally and utterly exhausted, is death. Thus in order to give a complete account of Dasein as "complete," that is, when it no longer has any remaining possibilities ahead of itself, it seems that we would have to give an account of Dasein's experiences in a dead state. This is, however, obviously impossible.

It is important to emphasize once again, particularly in view of his treatment of hopelessness, that Heidegger is not speaking of possibilities and of death in a psychological or poetic fashion. The point is most definitely not that a human being without a future is as good as dead. The point is that the experience of existence is characterized by the experience of remaining possibilities. This is how we experience being alive at the deepest level. Being alive means being able to understand and grasp future possibilities. When this experience of an open future ceases, then we are also no longer alive—because there is no longer existence at all. The attentive reader might correctly suspect at this point that the experience of possibilities that Dasein has yet to seize is in fact a preliminary way of describing Dasein's experience of the future. We will address this topic at more length in Section 3.5;
however, it is worth mentioning in passing in order to make a more plausible link between death and the loss of possibilities.

From our experience of the deaths of others, we know that death is in some sense a transformation of Dasein from being-in-the-world into the mode of “no-longer-being-in-the-world.” However, it is obvious that our experience of others’ deaths is not the same as actually experiencing death ourselves. The temptation to substitute an analysis of the experience of others’ deaths for an analysis of death itself has to be resisted. Yet this only emphasizes the nature of the problem. A complete analysis of Dasein requires an analysis of all its essential experiences, including the experience of death. But how are we to know what death is like until we are dead? When we are dead, it will be impossible to give an account of death. It seems, so far, that a complete analysis of Dasein is impossible.

As we briefly mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the doctrine of the essential incompleteness of Dasein has interesting consequences for the ontological account of authenticity. If completeness and authenticity are ultimately the same thing, authenticity must be defined as Dasein’s being everything it truly is as Dasein. But if the experience of death is constantly lacking until the end of Dasein, it seems that Dasein’s existence must be characterized by inauthenticity right up until the moment of death. This problem remains in the background in the initial stages of the analysis of death, although Heidegger touches upon it briefly towards the end of § 52, and it is essentially solved before it is explicitly addressed, but the problem of the real possibility of authentic existence will return in Section 3.3, where it plays an important role in Heidegger’s analysis of the conscience.

Nevertheless, we can make the best of the present situation and note an interesting feature of the experience of death. At the everyday inauthentic level of being-in, as we saw in Section 2.7, no strict difference is made between oneself and others. This inauthentic manner in which others are met with is the foundation of another important phenomenon of everyday life, namely the “substitutability” [Vertretbarkeit] of one Dasein for another. (See § 47, p. 239; compare § 26, p. 122, and all of § 27.) This phenomenon
is the foundation of every situation where one person takes over the role of another and the presence of a significant difference between them is denied or suppressed. (Think of the modular structure of perpetually unstable labour markets.) In such a situation, the difference individual characters make as well as the difference between skilled and unskilled labour is widely and deliberately suppressed in favour of the ability to replace one person with another at one's convenience. We can hardly fail to see the inauthentic one-self as the existential foundation of the phenomenon of substitutability (on the part of both the worker and the employer). The one-self makes it possible both for one Dasein to present itself as another's replacement and for that other Dasein to be replaced.

As we have seen, however, death is characterized by the fact that it is a fundamental human experience in which substitutability is impossible. "No one," as Heidegger puts it, "can take another's dying away" [§ 47, p. 240]. Of course, it is possible to die for another person in the sense of giving up one's life to save another's. However, it is not possible to die as another. Every Dasein's experience of death is entirely and uniquely its own and no one else's. In Heidegger's words, "Death is ontologically constituted by evermineness and existence" [§ 47, p. 240]. The experience of death is essentially and necessarily non-substitutable, because no Dasein can substitute itself for another in the actual existential process of dying.

In addressing the subject of death, we have thus far discovered three important facts:

(1) Dasein, as long as it continues to exist, is characterized by a not-yet [Noch-nicht] which it is yet to become, by a constant lack [ständiger Ausstand].
(2) The disappearance of the not-yet, or the "making good" of the lack [die Behebung des Ausstandes], has the character of no-longer-being-Dasein, or death.
(3) Coming-to-end in this manner is an absolutely non-substitutable mode of an individual Dasein's being.5
Our problem, however, remains: if Dasein is existentially and necessarily characterized by a constant lack, how is it possible to give a complete account of Dasein, that is, of a Dasein that is not lacking the firsthand experience of death? According to Heidegger, the problem has its source in a misunderstanding of the nature of Dasein. It is founded in a confusion between a “lack” in the entitical and a “lack” in the existential sense. When applied to intramundane to-handed entities, “lack” indicates the absence of parts. An entitical whole can be reconstructed by gathering and assembling its missing parts. But as we saw in Chapter 2, Dasein has a completely different manner of being than intramundane entities. Dasein is not characterized by to-handedness, or even by at-handedness, but rather by existence. Thus in speaking of a “constant lack” arising from the self-ahead structure of concern, we were wrong in speaking of possibilities that Dasein was missing—at least, if we mean “missing” in the way that entitical parts can be lost to an entitical whole.

While it is true that there are always possibilities Dasein has yet to seize, Dasein is fundamentally characterized by the constant experience of a lack. Dasein’s possibilities, however, are actually present in the not-yet of Dasein’s future. That is to say, Dasein’s future possibilities are not merely lacking; they are experienced by Dasein as possibilities. A possibility is precisely something that can come to pass, something that Dasein can do. If a possibility were simply nothing, it would not be a possibility at all. It follows that Dasein experiences its possibilities in and as the experience of them as presently lacking. Dasein’s possibilities are experienced as future possibilities, but despite their lack of immediacy they are still objects of experience. Dasein does not “lack” future possibilities in the sense that they are totally absent. Rather, our phenomenological analysis has shown that to experience possibilities as lacking means that they are present to us as absent. We are not completely cut off from them. Rather, we are defined both by the possibilities that we have chosen to pursue and by those that are open to us, but that we have not yet chosen to pursue.

Of course, this line of argument has the inconvenient result of complicating matters to a certain extent. Heidegger’s
original reason for the introduction of the topic of death at all was the necessity of considering Dasein as a whole, including the experience of its death. Now, however, it turns out that an experience of death as such is not required for our analysis, because the essential incompleteness of Dasein can be experienced at any moment prior to its actual death. That is to say, it is true that in order to grasp Dasein as a whole, we must also grasp the manner in which it experiences its end (its death). But Dasein's factual experience of its end in death, as it turns out, is not the same as the experience of coming to its end. As phenomenologists, we can substitute the experience of Dasein's coming to its end for the factual experience of our own deaths.

It is probably worth rephrasing this argument in completely non-Heideggerian terms, since its essential sense can be preserved at a much simpler level. In essence, our task is to give a complete and coherent account of every important structural feature of Dasein. One of these structural features is its mortality—the inescapable and inexorable fact that I, as Dasein, will someday come to an end. Our phenomenological methodology, however, limits us to phenomena, to those things we actually discover in experience. We cannot, however, describe a state of death for the simple reason that we are not dead yet, and even if we were, with the end of Dasein there is no longer any experience to describe. How, then, can we give a phenomenological account of death?

The task of our phenomenology is to give a hermeneutic account of Dasein as Dasein, that is, of human existence as such. If there is an end to all existence with death, there can be no more phenomena to describe. If there are no phenomena, our phenomenological methodology is no longer applicable. There is nothing in the state of death that could possibly be described. Despite our inability to experience the actual state of death, however, we can give an account of death insofar as the certain expectation of a future end influences and is experienced by Dasein in the course of its continued existence. This would be an account of the experience of death, of death insofar as it is experienced in the process of dying (in the everyday sense of the word). We do
not need to wait for the actual occurrence of death in order to complete our analysis, because Dasein is subject to a continuous process of dying.

We experience the process of dying not only as a constant expectation of death but as the constant certainty that our possibilities for existence are limited precisely because of the imminent certainty of death. Accordingly, a satisfactory phenomenological account of death, insofar as such an account is at all possible, is equivalent to a satisfactory phenomenological account of the manner in which Dasein comports itself towards its inherent and essential finitude. This interpretation is supported by a passage in § 62, p. 305: “Dasein’s being-at-an-end [Zu-Ende-sein], however, means, in an existential sense: being unto the end [Sein zum Tode].” Existentially speaking, Dasein’s ending can be grasped as its comportment towards its own end.

In short, what is important for a phenomenological analysis of death is not the actual experience of death (which cannot, strictly speaking, be experienced at all) but rather the experience of dying. The experience of dying is Dasein’s comportment towards its own ending, towards its own mortality and finitude, or, in Heidegger’s language, its “being unto death” [Sein zum Tode].

It is owing to this modified conception of death that Heidegger can say at the beginning of § 49 that “death, in the widest sense, is a phenomenon of life” [§ 49, p. 246]. He goes on to distinguish three senses in which one can speak of the end of life:

1. “ending” [Verenden], which is the end of life in a purely biological sense;
2. “passing on” [Ableben], which refers to the inauthentic experience of death; and
3. “dying” [Sterben] in the proper sense, or Dasein’s authentic comportment towards death.

The terminological definitions of these three terms allow Heidegger to make the rather puzzling statement that “Dasein...
never ends. It can, however, only pass on insofar as it dies." This simply means that Dasein does not experience death the way purely biological life that is not characterized by Dasein, for example a plant, does. It always comports itself either authentically or inauthentically towards death, whereas a plant does not have this option. Dasein, however, can only comport itself inauthentically towards death insofar as it flees the authentic experience of death, an authentic experience of which it must already have in order to flee it at all (recall the analysis of falling in Section 2.7).

Heidegger does also include a short disclaimer in § 49 to the effect that his phenomenological analysis of death says nothing about the possibility of life after death. This is, of course, quite in keeping with the limitations of a phenomenological methodology. Heidegger's analysis of death is purely immanent in the sense that "it merely interprets the phenomenon [of death] with respect to the question of how, as a being-possibility of each Dasein, it juts into Dasein [in dieses hereinsteht]" [§ 49, p. 248]. In other words, it is an existential—not a psychological, sociological, theological, moral, or "existentialist"—analysis of the experience of mortality.

In the remainder of the chapter, Heidegger undertakes a preliminary analysis of being unto death in §§ 50–51 followed by a concluding analysis in §§ 52–53. We will proceed to outline the important features of these analyses.

In § 50, Heidegger announces that he will undertake a preliminary sketch [Vorzeichnung] of the phenomenon of death (that is, of being unto death) with respect to the three structural components of concern, to which Heidegger refers as "existence," "facticity," and "falling." A quick glance at Section 2.9 will remind us that, strictly speaking, these three structures should be referred to as existentiality, facticity, and being-fallen. Heidegger is similarly inconsistent throughout Being and Time, which has confused some early commentators. It is therefore incumbent upon us to compensate for Heidegger's inconsistencies by being particularly attentive.
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In § 50, Heidegger begins by discussing the manner in which the phenomenon of death exhibit the structure of existentiality. With respect to its character as a possibility of Dasein, the possibility of death is distinguished by being Dasein's "ownmost" [eigenste], "irrespective" [unbezügliche], and "unattainable" [unüberholbare] possibility. These three distinguishing features of death appear to correspond to the three structural elements of being-in-the-world, namely the self, being-in, and the world, as we shall see later in more detail. According to Heidegger, death is,

(1) Dasein's ownmost possibility because, as we saw previously, death is an absolutely non-substitutable mode of an individual Dasein's being. Death is always necessarily one's own death and no one else's;

(2) an irrespective possibility because all of the "respects" [Bezüge, normally translated "connection," "relation," or "link"] in which it could rely upon others to deal with the threat of its own impending death are ineffectual, Dasein being left utterly alone and isolated—that is, thrown completely back onto its own resources—in the face of its ownmost possibility, namely death; and

(3) an unattainable possibility because, unlike other possibilities, it is impossible for Dasein to "leave death behind" or "get over it" in any conceivable manner. All other possibilities can be pursued, seized, and then abandoned or forgotten when they are no longer desirable or convenient, but death is unique in that it cannot be finished or done with. Once attained, it is permanent.

Continuing with the analysis, how is death related to concern? In what way is the structure of concern exhibited in the existential structure of death?

(1) According to Heidegger, the element of facticity (corresponding to being-already-in) is exhibited by
death insofar as Dasein is thrown into the possibility of death. No Dasein chooses to be mortal; its mortality is an inexorable result of its thrownness into the world. Dasein’s thrownness into the world is thrownness into the inexorable certainty of death. The fact of Dasein’s thrownness into the world, and thus also into being unto death, is primevally and authentically disclosed in the sensibility of angst.

(2) What of existentiality (corresponding to the second feature of concern, being-self-ahead)? In Section 2.8, we saw that angst discloses Dasein in its bare structure of thrown existence. Angst is angst for and of being-in-the-world as such. But since thrownness into existence is equivalent to thrownness into being unto death, angst of being-in-the-world is also essentially angst of death. Angst is the authentic sensibility that discloses Dasein’s finite existence in a finite world.

(3) The remaining element of concern, being-fallen (or falling), is discussed by Heidegger in connection with death in § 51. Here, Heidegger begins by taking a cue from average everyday crosstalk concerning the possibility of death. The prevalent interpretation of death in the one-self’s inauthentic everyday existence is crosstalked, according to Heidegger, in the phrase “One too dies in the end, but for now one is oneself unaffected.” An alternative formulation is offered at the beginning of § 52: “One will also die sometime, but for the moment not yet.”

What essential modification has the existential structure of being unto death undergone in order that such crosstalk be at all possible? To answer this question, Heidegger proceeds to “map” the structure of death onto the structure of turmoil (to which he refers in § 51 as the structure of falling). Turmoil, as we saw in Section 2.7, is characterized by four structural elements: temptation, reassurance, alienation, and entanglement. These
four structures reappear in the inauthentic structure of being unto death that underlies the everyday crosstalk concerning death:

1. Inauthentic being unto death exhibits a temptation because it encourages Dasein to ignore the possibility of death of its own volition. It does so by crosstalking that one dies in the end, that is, the one-self or no one in particular. It disguises the fact that individuals die, including and in particular the individual that one happens to be, and so encourages Dasein to seek an inauthentic safety in the anonymity of the one-self;

2. Simultaneously, inauthentic being unto death exhibits the structure of reassurance by suggesting that the possibility of death can be avoided, for example through an anticipated medical miracle sometime in the perpetually near future. Reassurance also encourages the one-self to disguise the fact that death occurs at all, either by lying to the terminally ill ("everything will be all right") or by reducing the death of others to "a social unpleasantness, if not a downright tactlessness, from which the public should be preserved" [§ 51, p. 254];

3. This inauthentic mode of being unto death is also characterized by the alienation of Dasein from the incontrovertible fact of its own mortality by suppressing the sensibility of angst; and, finally,

4. It exhibits the structure of entanglement because it hurls Dasein into a constant and unceasing flight from authentic being unto death.

With these remarks, the preliminary analysis of being unto death comes to an end. The concluding analysis of being unto death begins in § 52, in which Heidegger introduces two new insights into the existential structure of death. The possibility of death, we are told, is both "certain" [gewiß] and "indefinite"
These two structural features of death appear to correspond respectively to understanding and to sensibility, as we shall later see in more detail.

(1) The possibility of death is *certain* because it is a necessary feature of the disclosedness of Dasein. One may, of course, half-seriously hope that modern medical science will figure out how to suspend the aging process indefinitely, and so do away with death. But we would do well to heed Heidegger’s warning and not confuse *ending* with *passing on*, and still less with *dying*. Even if it were possible to preserve the biological life of the body indefinitely, the very act of doing so would itself be a privative mode of being unto death. Each Dasein must take up a particular comportment towards the incontrovertible fact of its mortality. The indefinite artificial prolongation of life would not be a refutation but rather a confirmation of the certainty that the structure of mortality belongs to Dasein by nature. Death—in Heidegger’s terminological sense of the word, the necessity of a comportment towards mortality—is therefore certain. Everyone must choose some way of dealing with death, and there is no way of avoiding this choice.

(2) In addition to being certain, the possibility of death is also *indefinite*. Death is possible at any time. Not only is it continually possible at every moment of waking life, but the moment of its actual occurrence is quite indefinite. We know *that* we will die, but not *when*. The everyday inauthentic one-self disguises this possibility by encouraging Dasein to immerse itself in the possibilities of comportment towards intramundane entities. The true function of the absorption in the mundane is to offer possible ways in which the indefinite character of death can be hidden from oneself.
We have, then, a total of five essential structural characteristics of death: death is the ownmost, irrespective, unattainable, certain, and indefinite possibility of Dasein. Thus far, we have only examined these characteristics of death in their inauthentic modes. But what of the possibility of an authentic being unto death?

In § 53, entitled “An Existential Plan of an Authentic Being unto Death,” Heidegger attempts to clarify what the structure of a truly authentic being unto death might involve. An authentic being unto death, according to Heidegger, can neither “avoid” [ausweichen] nor “cover over” [verdecken] nor “reinterpret” [umdeuten] the possibility of death. An authentic being unto death has to preserve the possibility of death as a possibility. Thus suicide cannot be an authentic comportment unto death precisely because suicide eradicates death as a possibility—namely, by transforming it from a possibility into a reality. Similarly, authentic being unto death cannot consist in a memento mori attitude. Chewing the cud of death exhibits the same essential weakness as suicide, though in a less drastic form: its aim is to deprive death of its character as a possibility by means of desensitization, rather like dealing with a fear of flying by repeatedly imagining a trip by airplane. A truly authentic comportment towards death must be able to withstand death as a possibility. In authentic existence we would have to accept not that death is some vaguely foreshadowed future event but that death is death-in-life. We must be able to accept that living is dying, and we must reject any and all means of escape from this fact.

Heidegger’s name for the comportment in which the possibility of death is experienced and its character as a possibility is preserved—rather than denied or suppressed—is “forerunning” [vorlaufen]. By forerunning into the possibility of death, Dasein understands itself with respect to its most extreme [äußerste] possibility: its final possibility. The final possibility of Dasein, its death, is its ownmost, irrespective, unattainable, certain, and indefinite possibility. Insofar as Dasein foreruns into the possibility of death in the mode of an authentic being unto death, death appears
(1) as the ownmost possibility of Dasein because it discloses Dasein's being-ability as truly and irrevocably its own. In this way death liberates Dasein from the indeterminate one of the one-self;

(2) death also appears as the irrespective possibility of Dasein because it addresses Dasein as an individual, and as that particular individual that it happens to be. The fact that concernedness and concernfulness fail Dasein as strategies for dealing with the possibility of death does not mean that Dasein abandons its interactions with entities and with others—recall that concernedness and concernfulness are essential constitutive structures of Dasein—but rather that Dasein engages itself in concernedness and concernfulness in a manner guided by its own understanding of itself rather than that of the one-self (compare § 53, p. 263–264);

(3) by forerunning into death, death is experienced as the unattainable possibility of Dasein because Dasein is enabled to understand death as its ultimate, final end, and in so doing to free itself from any entanglement in the one-self and its prescribed manners of interacting with the world and with others;

(4) forerunning into death also allows Dasein to understand death as certain, as a fundamental and essential possibility of Dasein, which necessitates a comportment, some choice, decision, or attitude, whether authentic or inauthentic, as a response from Dasein; and, finally,

(5) an authentic being unto death permits Dasein to experience the possibility of death as indefinite, that is to say, Dasein is able to experience death as a constant "threat" [Bedrohung]. In so doing, it keeps itself open to the threatening character of death from which the inauthentic one-self flees into inauthenticity, that is, it experiences the fundamental authentic sensibility of angst.
Heidegger sums up the structure of authentic being unto death in the following words:

Forerunning reveals its lostness in the one-self to Dasein and brings it before the possibility of being itself, unsupported by concernful concernedness [die besorgende Fürsorge]; itself, however, in passionate freedom unto death, freed from the illusions of the one, factual, certain of itself, and angst-sensing [sich ängstigenden]. [§ 53, p. 256]¹

Thus an authentic being unto death is the comportment making authenticity as such at all possible. The indefinite character of death frees Dasein for the experience of the authentic sensibility of angst, while its certain character emphasizes the primeval disclosure of the mortality of Dasein in understanding. Its unattainable character prevents Dasein from attempting to leave death behind by falling to the world, while its irrespective character prevents Dasein from relying on an inauthentic mode of being-in to allay the angst of death. Finally, death, as Dasein's ownmost possibility, discloses Dasein as an individual self thrown into the world whose task in the world is to exist as itself. With this summary it seems that Heidegger has in fact succeeded in mapping the authentic structure of death onto the structures of sensibility, understanding, and being-in-the-world.

This existential concept of an authentic being unto death is, as Heidegger concedes towards the end of § 53, factually speaking, a "fantastic imposition" [phantastische Zumutung] upon Dasein. Is it even possible to live out such a complex philosophical construct in the real world? In the next chapter of Being and Time, Heidegger attempts to demonstrate that an authentic being unto death, despite all suspicions we may have to the contrary, is indeed existentially possible—that is, possible in practice. This attempt leads to the fundamental ontological analysis of the phenomenon of the call of conscience.
3.3 AUTHENTIC TALK: THE CALL OF CONSCIENCE
(§§ 54-60)

As we saw in the last section, an authentic being unto death is the basis of the possibility of authenticity as such. Our phenomenological analysis of being unto death has confirmed, according to Heidegger, that authenticity is in fact possible for Dasein. Heidegger feels, however, that we still need to show that this possibility can indeed become a reality. We must show that in everyday life this possibility is within the grasp of everyone who chooses to seize it. In other words, in addition to the ontological possibility of authenticity its ontic possibility must also be demonstrated. What is possible at the existential level must also be livable at the existentic level of our everyday comportments towards intramundane entities and towards others. We must show that the phenomenological possibility of forerunning into death that we constructed in the course of our phenomenological interpretations is in fact “authorized” [bezeugt] by Dasein itself at the ontic level of everyday experience. Only in this manner can we convincingly show that authenticity, whose ontological possibility was demonstrated in the last section, is also unreservedly possible at the ontic level.

Accordingly, the task at this point in Being and Time is to show that Dasein, which is first and foremost lost in the inauthentic one-self, always has the concrete possibility of finding itself. That is to say, we need a demonstration that the one-self never becomes so dominant that it is impossible for Dasein to come back to itself and seize the authentic possibility of truly being itself. Heidegger calls the phenomenon responsible for this constant “self-awareness” even in the midst of inauthentic existence as the one-self an “authorization” [Bezeugung] of authenticity. The usual meaning of the verb bezeugen is “to attest” or “to testify to,” but Heidegger appears to use Bezeugung in a sense derived rather from the literal meaning of its roots. The verb zeugen has two basic sets of meanings: “to beget,” “to generate,” or “to produce”; and “to testify” or, with appropriate prepositions, “to witness”: 
zeugen von means "to bear witness to." The Bezeugung of factual authenticity that we seek will, accordingly, be a comportment by means of which Dasein both produces and witnesses its own possible authenticity. In view of the nuanced meaning of the term in Heidegger's usage, it seems more advisable to translate the term as "authorization," whereby one should keep the literal meaning of the root "author" in mind.

Heidegger begins by introducing the "call" [Ruf] of conscience as a possible authorization of the required kind. Heidegger begins by assuming that there is in fact such a thing as the call of conscience, though he will later go on to explain why one might (falsely) be inclined to doubt its existence. Starting from the everyday concept of the conscience, Heidegger will proceed to phenomenologically excise layer after layer of accrued opinion, until finally the hard phenomenological core of the call of conscience will be revealed. At this point we will (hopefully) recognize the exposed phenomenon as the very authorization of which we were in search.

Heidegger begins with the apparently trivial point that the conscience is indeed a call and that a call is only apprehended by an act of listening. This is, however, not as trivial as it may seem, for the phenomena of calling and listening clearly indicate that the conscience is a function of the phenomenon of talk. Recall that for Heidegger talk is a fundamental comportment of Dasein, a manner in which the understandability, and thus also the disclosedness, of Dasein are articulated. This means, as we have previously seen, that talk does not necessarily require actual vocalization [stimmliche Verlautbarung] in order to occur. Rather, vocalized, audible speech is only possible on the basis of the phenomenon of talk. The two are by no means straightforwardly identical.

The conscience, then, does not talk with a voice in the sense of the production of audible words, or even in the sense of words that one hears in one's head. The conscience—in its primeval form—is not a reproduction of the experience of parental authority. The call of conscience is rather a manner of "giving-
to-understand" [Zu-verstehen-gaben]. The call of conscience, as a mode of talk, gives us to understand that in listening to the one-self—in allowing our disclosedness to be articulated by crosstalk—we have become inauthentic. For Heidegger, at the factual level the difference between authenticity and inauthenticity is a function of the phenomenon of talk.

The everyday level of inauthentic existence dominated by falling to the world is characterized, as we saw in Section 2.7, by the prevalence of crosstalk. Now, Heidegger argues in §55, if the conscience is in fact the sought-for authorization of Dasein's authenticity (and remember that this still remains to be proven) then the manner in which the conscience, as authentic talk, calls us, must be directly opposed to the manner in which crosstalk occurs. How might authentic talk be structured?

Heidegger answers this question in §§56-57, in which he describes the call of conscience in terms of the four basic structures into which he had previously analyzed both talk (see Section 2.6) and crosstalk (see Section 2.7). Beginning in §56, Heidegger's analysis reveals the following:

1. The call of conscience is clearly addressed to Dasein itself, since it is Dasein and no other that is "called upon" [angerufen] by the call. In saying that Dasein and no other is called upon, we mean that the one-self is "bypassed" [übergangen] by the call. The conscience addresses itself to Dasein's own—and therefore authentic—self.

2. What is spoken by the call is in fact nothing. No words are used and no possibilities for the manipulation of entities are disclosed by the call. In contrast to the structure of crosstalk, which is characterized by an emphasis on what is spoken, in the call of conscience what is spoken is completely unimportant. Of cardinal importance to phenomenal structure of the call is that the call be heard, that is, that Dasein be called upon to become the authentic self.
Similarly, the *announcement* of the call of conscience is characterized by “silence” [*Schweigen*]. It has nothing it wishes to communicate to Dasein. In opposition to crosstalk, whose announcement structure enables it to spread in ever-widening circles until it acquires the semblance of authority, the silent call of conscience discloses that the understanding of Dasein cannot expect any concrete communication, no concrete indication as to what is to be done. It is only in this manner that Dasein can be freed by the dominance of the one-self—by awakening to its own individual responsibility.

Finally, the *self-expression* or *proclamation* structure of the call, which Heidegger discusses in § 57, accounts for the “disturbing” emotional quality usually associated with the conscience. The call of conscience is unsettling because it calls from the unsettlement of angst.

It is worth elaborating on this last point for the sake of clarity. *We recall* from Section 2.8 that the fundamental emotional quality associated with angst is unsettlement. In Section 2.9, we saw that inauthenticity, as falling to the world, is characterized by a flight from unsettlement into the types of comportments towards intramundane entities sanctioned by the inauthentic one-self. *If* the call of conscience is indeed the authorization of authenticity that we are seeking, *it makes perfect sense* to expect that its function is to reverse this flight. The call of conscience as the desired authorization will thus be the *call of unsettlement*. In Heidegger’s words, in the call of conscience “unsettlement pursues Dasein and threatens its self-forgetful lostness [*Verlorenheit*]” [§ 57, p. 277].

But what does this mean in concrete terms? Heidegger’s elaborate structural analyses tend to make his concept of the conscience seem more difficult to grasp than it really is. This is how the matter stands in plain English. Dying is something we, and we alone, do as individuals. I am the one who has to die when
my life is over. No one else can do this for me. The knowledge that I have to die—I and no one else in my place—also makes me aware of the fact that my life is my own as well. Just as no one else can die for me, no one else can live for me. This is something that I and I alone can do—indeed must do.

Now in Heidegger's analysis of Dasein there are three basic ways in which we experience any given factual situation: through understanding, sensibility, and talk. Every situation in my life is grasped, felt, and articulated (meaningfully structured). I grasp that my life is my own when I understand that my death is my own. No one else can die for me, and this knowledge throws me back upon myself. The primeval feeling or emotion accompanying this realization is angst. I feel my own responsibility for my choices when I feel angst, which liberates me from the confusion of the one-self. Angst is the feeling of being utterly on my own, utterly left to myself. How is angst articulated? What is its meaning for me? The conscience is just the type of meaningfulness that characterizes angst. This meaningfulness is a function of talk. It is how we "hear" angst as opposed to understanding and sensing it. Talk discloses angst by remaining silent. The source of this silence is the conscience; and the conscience is silent because there is nothing to say. The silencing of crosstalk—the creation of an empty area for authentic existence and authentic talk—is its sole content and its sole message to me. The conscience is the cessation of crosstalk, its absence, and nothing more.

But who is in fact the caller of the call of conscience? Is it an "alien power" [fremde Macht] intruding into the sphere of Dasein's disclosedness? Heidegger believes that a careful phenomenological analysis indicates that the caller is none other than Dasein's authentic self. This should not be taken to mean that there is a second or higher self that attempts to communicate with the inauthentic everyday self. The conscience is not an independent voice that calls out a concrete message to us. Rather like Socrates' daimon, it has an essentially negative function. It turns us away from inauthentic courses of action but never points us in any particular direction. (See Plato's Apology 31d.) It only
points away from inauthenticity. It is the primeval experience of ourselves as meaningful, and therefore the primeval existential unsettlement from which falling flees. As we have seen, the flight from unsettlement never quite succeeds in its effort to fall completely to the world—if it did, the flight would cease. This cannot be, for Heidegger’s analysis of falling indicates that average everydayness is characterized by a continual and never-ending flight from authenticity. The lingering background awareness that the flight is ultimately futile is nothing other than the persistent, never completely extinguished phenomenon of the call of conscience. Dasein cannot fall so far to the world that authenticity becomes impossible.

This analysis is supported by the obvious fact that the call comes “out of me and yet upon me” [aus mir und doch über mich] [§ 57, p. 275]. Surely, Heidegger believes, that is more than strong enough evidence that Dasein itself is both the caller and the called. But why then, we might ask, is there a tendency to experience the conscience as an alien power that interferes with our lives? Heidegger answers that it is perfectly natural that the inauthentic one-self, characterized by a constant flight from unsettlement, should experience authenticity as something that is fundamentally alien to its entire manner of existence. The one-self and the authentic self are not two different selves. They are the same self in two different modes of existence. But what could be stranger to the one-self than the true self, which it is precisely its aim to suppress? In order to maintain its inauthentic state the one-self has to continually disown its own ultimate responsibility for itself. This is taken to such an extreme degree that the authentic mode of existence falsely appears to it to be an entirely different self than it presently is. The one-self’s experience of the conscience as an alien power is really just a result of its own radical alienation from itself.

There is no need to think of the intrusion of the call of conscience into our everyday inauthentic existence as a divine intervention. The conscience is not the voice of God. The flight from authenticity being inherently futile, the very structure of
inauthentic existence itself guarantees that the call will intrude. The more insistent the flight, the more threatening is that before which Dasein flees. The more inauthentic Dasein is, the louder becomes the call of conscience. Whether the call is attended to is, however, another matter entirely. The call itself does not guarantee an appropriate existential response. This is, as always, the prerogative of Dasein. In fact, inauthentic Dasein can exploit the very strangeness of the unsettling call of conscience in order to ignore the call. Which modern person could believe that the conscience is not merely an introjection of parental authority but a primeval and necessary ontological structure of Dasein? Which religious person could admit that the conscience does not require the theological backing of any divine commandment but derives its indisputable authority solely from itself—that is, from the existential structure of Dasein? For Heidegger, doubting the actual existence of the conscience as well as ignoring its call are both only possible in a state of inauthenticity. The conscience is the awareness of responsibility, and it is only through inauthenticity that we can disclaim our own responsibility for what we choose to do.

If Dasein is both the caller and the called in the phenomenon of conscience, this can mean nothing other than that the conscience reveals itself as the call of concern. That is to say, the phenomenon of conscience—authentic talk—is embedded in the fundamental structure of Dasein. For Heidegger, as plainly stated in §57, the conscience permeates the entire structure of Dasein’s disclosedness:

The caller is Dasein, sensing angst [sich angstigend] in thrownness (already-being-in ...) for its being-ability. The one who is called upon is just this Dasein, called to its ownmost being-ability (self-ahead ...). And Dasein is called upon through the call up [Anruf] out of falling into the one (already-being-among the concerned [besorgt] world). The call of conscience, that is, the conscience itself, has its ontological possibility in the fact that Dasein is fundamentally [im Grunde] concern. [§57, p. 277-278]
But surely, we may object, the conscience has something to do with right and wrong in the moral sense? Surely the true function of the conscience is to make us aware of our ethical shortcomings? Do we not speak of having a "guilty" conscience? Is it not, perhaps, even the primary function of the conscience to evaluate the extent of our guilt? The conscience does not call until and unless we have done or are about to do something wrong; and this is its primary function—to ward off wrongdoing and to punish it after it has occurred. What, then, does guilt have to do with authenticity?

Heidegger believes that he can reply to this objection by means of a detailed analysis of the concept of guilt. In following the intricacies of this analysis we are somewhat hampered by the absence of any word in English with the same meanings and nuances as the German word Schuld, the everyday German word for "guilt." In German, as Heidegger points out, the word schuldig, the adjectival form of Schuld, has four basic meanings:

1. indebted, as in the sentence Ich bin ihm 5 Mark schuldig, "I owe him 5 Marks" (this meaning is not reflected in the English word "guilty");
2. responsible for or being the cause of, as in "I am guilty of eating the last candy bar";
3. incurring a penalty or making oneself punishable, as in "He is guilty of breaking the law"; and
4. influencing the actions of another (for the worse), as in "I am guilty of having misled him."

According to Heidegger, all of these senses of the word "guilty" are, strictly speaking, only applicable to situations involving our everyday concernful existence with others. They are entitlal and not existential terms. They are appropriate when we are speaking of entities, but not when we are speaking of Dasein. The call of conscience however does not address entities at all on the one hand, and on the other its announcement is characterized by silence. The call of conscience has nothing to do
with everyday inauthentic comportments towards intramundane entities and towards others. The call is a call back to the authentic individual self and thus to authentic individual responsibility. If we wish to understand the sense in which the call of conscience reveals our guilt, we have to employ the word “guilty” in an entirely different sense — an existential sense instead of an entitical one. Heidegger defines the formal existential sense of “guilty” as “being the ground of a being determined [bestimmt] by a Not— that is, being-the-ground [Grundsein] of a nullity [Nichtigkeit]” [§ 58, p. 283].

Guilt in this sense simply means being the origin of a limitation (nullity). If Dasein is existentially responsible for a limitation, then it is existentially “guilty” of that limitation (responsible for it, its origin or cause). But of which nullity is Dasein the ground or origin? Clearly, if Dasein is both the caller and the called in the phenomenon of the conscience, the nullity in question can only be Dasein’s own nullity. But in what sense can Dasein be said to be the cause of its own nullity? And in what precisely does the nullity of Dasein consist?

In order to answer this question, Heidegger once again turns to the triadic structure of concern as a framework for his analysis of the nullity of Dasein. Here, he identifies the three structures in question as “facticity (thrownness), existence (plan), and falling” [§ 58, p. 284]. Accordingly, the analysis of the nullity of Dasein addresses three types of nullity:

(1) Facticity (thrownness). The thrownness of Dasein implies that Dasein does not and cannot itself choose to come into existence. The “ground” or reason for its own existence is permanently outside of the sphere of its volition. However, insofar as Dasein continues to exist, it can be regarded as the ground of its own continued existence. Dasein can and must choose to go on living, even if the fact of its own birth permanently remains something Dasein did not itself choose. In choosing continued existence however, Dasein chooses
to accept and affirm its nature as an individual who did not (the nullity) choose to come into existence as that particular individual with that particular individual background. Dasein, considered as the ground of its own continuing existence, is being-the-ground of a nullity. Dasein is essentially guilty (in our specific terminological sense) because, in choosing to exist in many concrete ways, it can and must choose to accept the fact of its thrownness into an existence it did not itself choose. Choosing to live means choosing to be responsible for the consequences of a birth we did not ourselves choose. But if we choose to be responsible for our lives, the fact that we did not choose to be born becomes irrelevant. In accepting its own limitations Dasein becomes their ground. It plays the hand it was dealt rather than folding and doesn't stop to blame the dealer.

(2) Existence (plan). As we saw in Section 3.2, Dasein’s possibilities of understanding are essentially finite. In planning its own existence with a view to possibilities of existence, there are always possibilities it has not seized—that it has rejected, abandoned, or failed to pursue. In every case where we chose to pursue a particular possibility of existence, there are alternative possibilities we have not chosen. Certain possibilities by nature exclude other possibilities. The fact that we cannot choose every single possibility disclosed in the course of our existence indicates a second nullity in the ontological structure of Dasein. Choosing something means not choosing something else. Every choice is an affirmation of a negation: in choosing we negate all the possibilities that are incompatible with that choice. Thus Dasein is once again seen to exist as being-the-ground of a nullity because the structure of its planning necessarily implies that every concrete choice excludes other alternative possibilities that were not chosen.
Thus in the very act of existence, Dasein is necessarily guilty because it is the reason that certain events did not take place in the course of its existence.

(3) Falling. Finally, as we saw in Section 2.9, falling is an existential belonging to Dasein's own structure. Falling, however, is the ground of Dasein's inauthenticity; it is the reason that Dasein, first and foremost, is not its own authentic self. If, however, the ground of inauthenticity is to be found in the ontological structure of Dasein itself, the implication is clearly that Dasein is ultimately the cause of its own inauthenticity. Here too, then, Dasein is found to exist in the mode of being-the-ground of a nullity, because it is itself the cause of its own prevailing inauthenticity, of the fact that, first and foremost, it is not itself.

From this analysis of the nullity of Dasein, Heidegger draws the conclusion that Dasein is "permeated through and through by nullity" [§ 58, p. 285]. Accordingly, we can re-interpret the structure of concern in the light of our results as "(nullified) being-the-ground of a nullity" [§ 58, p. 285]. By "nullified" [nichtig] Heidegger wishes to indicate the thrownness of Dasein; being-the-ground refers to the structure of existence; and the nullity of which Dasein is the ground or cause is its own inauthentic existence at the level of everyday life, its falling. Our final conclusion, then, can only be that Dasein as such is guilty— is the ground of its own nullity. Guilt is existentially rooted in the structure of concern.

The call of conscience, then, can be equated with Dasein's understanding of its own guilt. That is to say, the call of conscience is the act by which Dasein grasps that its own existence is decisively influenced by factors that it cannot change but must accept (thrownness); that it cannot possibly choose to do everything (planning); and that inauthenticity is a permanent and necessary feature of its own existence for which it alone is ultimately responsible (falling). The existential guilt of which Heidegger speaks in Being and Time is nothing other than the
essential finitude of Dasein. It is this finitude that makes the phenomenon of the conscience in the usual sense possible. The conscience, understood as a sense of moral right and wrong, can only exist on the basis of the disclosure of one's own ultimate responsibility for one's actions. Since we are responsible for choosing the manner of our own existence, we are also responsible for every moral decision taken in the course of this existence. Responsibility is an inherent and essential ontological feature of Dasein. Nothing can obliterate Dasein's responsibility for its own choices. This responsibility cannot even be successfully hidden. The very attempt to flee this responsibility—falling—makes Dasein's responsibility for its own fall all the more evident. The call of conscience cannot be silenced. It is the silence (angst) that Dasein chooses to flee.

Incidentally, it would also be a mistake to assume that the thrownness of Dasein implies that there are some decisions for which Dasein may not itself be responsible. We cannot blame our unfavourable surroundings or a bad upbringing for our own personal errors and shortcomings. Heidegger is quite clear on the point that in continuing to exist, Dasein chooses its own thrownness into the world. It is, of course, never responsible for the manner of its own birth; but it does choose to exist as that thrown Dasein that it is. A card player who chooses not to fold is responsible for his or her conduct in the game—personally responsible for the way he or she plays the cards he or she was dealt. If you choose to stay in the game you cannot blame the dealer for the outcome, whether you win or you lose. The glory and the blame are both yours. From Heidegger's viewpoint, then, one's own background or social milieu can never be used as an excuse for one's actions. Existence implies that Dasein has accepted the responsibility for dealing with the continued influence the decisions it did not make exercise upon the decisions it does make. Despite thrownness, there is no escape in Being and Time from one's own responsibility for one's own actions.\textsuperscript{10}

Heidegger's motive in analyzing the phenomenon of the call of conscience is, we remember, to prove that there is indeed an
authorization of authenticity at the level of factual existence. In other words, Heidegger wants to prove that even in the midst of an inauthentic existence dominated by the inauthentic one-self there is always an awareness of the authentic existence that the one-self is fleeing; and with this awareness, there is necessarily also the possibility of choosing that authentic existence. This has two important implications: Firstly, as we have seen, it means that one is always responsible for one's own inauthenticity. No one else is to blame and no one else has chosen inauthenticity but one's own self. Secondly, it means that there is always the possibility of reversing the decision to fall to the world. If the one-self were to completely dominate one's inauthentic existence, the authentic self would be permanently lost. If, however, there is always an experience of the authentic self in the call of conscience, no matter how suppressed and disguised the call might be, then there is always the possibility of leaving the mode of inauthentic existence. We can never irrevocably lose ourselves.

Has Heidegger in fact succeeded in showing that there is such a permanent inextinguishable disclosure of one's own authentic existence? Has he shown that there is always a call of conscience? Heidegger has two strategies for dealing with this problem. The first is outlined in § 57, p. 276, which I will paraphrase in a somewhat more accessible form. As we have seen, the call of conscience is characterized by its unsettling quality. The call of conscience is the call of unsettlement, which is the essential emotional character of angst. The act of falling to the world has the essential character of a flight from unsettlement. Inauthentic Dasein seeks to flee from its own unsettlement by falling to the world. And in order for Dasein to flee unsettlement at all, it must first experience the unsettlement in order to flee it. However, inauthentic existence is a continual flight from unsettlement. This means that unsettlement must be continually disclosed in order for inauthentic existence to maintain itself as a state. The continual disclosure of unsettlement in the midst of inauthenticity, which Dasein continually flees, is nothing other than what Heidegger terms the call of conscience. Accordingly, the
sought-for authorization of authenticity is in fact part of Dasein's inauthentic everyday experience. In order to be authentic, Dasein merely has to stop fleeing, if only for an instant.

Heidegger's second strategy for dealing with the problem is to explain *why* we might be falsely tempted to doubt the existence of the conscience at all. In so doing, he insists upon the alien character of the call of conscience as the reason that the inauthentic one-self might deny the existence of the call. The call of conscience is experienced as alien by the inauthentic self because it calls Dasein back to its authentic self. What could appear stranger to the inauthentic self than the very authentic self it is continually engaged in fleeing? Additionally, the call of conscience is characterized by silence in contrast to inauthentic crosstalk. The silence of the call—which should not be confused with *muteness*—is informative in a way that crosstalk cannot be. The essential difference of the call from supposedly informative crosstalk can be used as an excuse to deny its very existence:

That one, hearing and understanding only pure crosstalk, cannot "ascertain" any call, is attributed to the conscience with the excuse that it is "mute" and obviously not at hand. With this interpretation the one only covers over [*verdeckt*] its own deafness [*Überhören*] to the call and the curtailed range of its "hearing." [§ 60, p. 296]

Of course, even though the inauthentic one-self may claim not to hear the call, ultimately the call is heard, however distant and suppressed it may be.

But what of Dasein that, hearing the call of conscience, goes on to explicitly acknowledge the call? What happens with a Dasein that hears the call and reacts by wanting to be authentic? How does the conscience authorize authentic existence when Dasein is prepared to listen? Once again, Heidegger answers this question with reference to the structure of the "disclosedness" of Dasein (presumably meaning the structure of concern). In § 60, he identifies the relevant structures as sensibility, understanding,
and talk. How are these three structures modified in Dasein when it chooses to heed the call of conscience? Heidegger addresses this question in § 60, p. 295–296:

(1) **Sensibility.** The heeding of the call discloses one’s own Dasein in the unsettlement of its “isolation” [Vereinzelung]. That is to say, the self is cut off from the inauthentic understanding offered to it by the one-self. The unsettlement disclosed by this existential (not factual) isolation is genuinely disclosed in the sensibility of angst. Accordingly, the heeding of the call of conscience is characterized by the “readiness for angst” [Bereitschaft zur Angst].

(2) **Understanding.** Insofar as Dasein chooses to heed the call, it allows its ownmost self “to act upon itself from out of itself in its own guiltiness.” It proceeds to understand its own existence not in terms of the inauthentic possibilities prescribed by the crosstalk of the one-self, but it plans with a view towards the authentic existence revealed to it in the silence of the call. When heeding the call, Dasein’s understanding is characterized by “wanting-to-have-conscience” [das Gewissen-haben-wollen].

(3) **Talk.** The call brings Dasein back to its own essential guilt and frees its own authentic self from the all-encompassing crosstalk of the one-self. In so doing, the pernicious influence of crosstalk is arrested. Dasein does not need to answer the call in words. The meaning of the call is immediately evident. Any concrete vocalization, even at the mental level, would merely obscure the immediacy of the call:

The conscience only calls silently [schweigend], that is, the call comes out of the soundlessness [Lautlosigkeit] of unsettlement and calls the Dasein which is called upon to become quiet [still] back
into the quietness [Stille] of itself. The wanting-to-have-conscience thus only appropriately understands this silent [schweigende] talk in quietedness [Verschwiegenheit]. It [quietedness] leaves the clever [verständig, literally “understanding-like”] crosstalk of the one wordless [Sie entzieht dem verständigen Gerede des Mann das Wort]. [§ 60, p. 296]

Thus “quietedness” designates the manner in which talk is modified in a Dasein heeding the call of conscience. Quietedness denotes the replacement of the phenomenon of crosstalk by quietness. Dasein hears the quiet voice of its own conscience and in so doing knows itself. This quietness, as the primeval mode of authentic talk, can then serve as the ontological basis of vocalizations characterized by authentic meanings. We can go on to talk about silence and to describe it. In fact, talk is only truly possible against the background of silence. Silence is its ultimate source.

3.4 THE STRUCTURE OF AUTHENTICITY AS DECIDEDNESS (§§ 61–62)

In § 60, which concludes the second chapter of Section Two of Being and Time, Heidegger undertakes a description of the authentic existence authorized by the call of conscience. In order to express the unity of the structural features that his description reveals, Heidegger introduces the concept of “decidedness” [Entschlossenheit]. Decidedness is the characteristic structure of authenticity at the existentic level, at the factual level of everyday life. Heidegger chooses this route because in the third chapter of Section Two, which is comprised of §§ 61–66, he will attempt to combine decidedness with the existential level of authenticity that we investigated in the course of the analysis of being unto death. The combination of decidedness with forerunning, or authentic being unto death, will permit Heidegger to undertake yet another
more primeval analysis in an effort to expose a primeval unity underlying the emergent multiplicity of existential structures. This unity will be the timeliness of Dasein, the primeval sense of concern.

Let us return to the authentic existence authorized by the call of conscience. In what does this authenticity consist? Clearly, in the authentic modes of the three primeval phenomena underlying sensibility, understanding, and talk.11 As we have seen in the course of the preceding analyses, these three primeval phenomena are angst, being unto death, and the call of conscience. We know from Section 2.8 that angst is the authentic and primeval phenomenon underlying sensibility. In Section 3.2, we saw that the authentic mode of being unto death was forerunning.12 Since, however, we are approaching the phenomenon of understanding from the point of view of our analysis of conscience, authentic understanding appears to us, for now, as being-guilty rather than as forerunning. Following the course of Heidegger’s analysis in Being and Time, we will re-introduce the concept of forerunning in the next section. Finally, in Section 3.3, we saw that the authentic mode of the call of conscience, the primeval phenomenon underlying talk, was quietedness. Clearly then,

the disclosedness of Dasein situated in [liegend in] wanting-to-have-a-conscience is, accordingly, constituted by the sensibility of angst, by understanding as planning the self towards its ownmost being-guilty, and by talk as quietedness. This distinguished authentic disclosedness, authorized in Dasein itself through its conscience—the quieted, angst-ready self-planning towards one’s ownmost being-guilty—we will call decidedness. [§ 60, p. 296-297]

Decidedness has a threefold structure corresponding to sensibility, understanding, and talk. Consider the following arrangement, which should clarify the essential points of the passage quoted above:
decidedness is structured according to

1. sensibility       2. understanding       and 3. talk;

which, in the phenomenon of decidedness, take the forms of

4. angst              5. being-guilty       and 6. quietedness;

accordingly, decidedness is the

8. angst-ready,       9. self-planning       7. quieted,
   towards
   being guilty

of Dasein resulting from an authentic response to the call of conscience.

Decidedness is Heidegger's term for the structure of factual authenticity insofar as it is authorized by the call of conscience. The German term that Heidegger uses is Entschlossenheit, usually translated "determination" or "resolution." Entschlossenheit does not, however, mean a determination or a resolution; rather, it indicates the state of being determined or the state of being resolved. Heidegger also intends an etymological parallel to the term Erschlossenheit, which we have translated as "disclosedness." By contrast, the literal meaning of Entschlossenheit is something like "unclosedness." (Entfalten is the German word for "to unfold" and has a similar etymology; also see the commentary on the translation of "plan" in Appendix A.) Unfortunately, no English term able to combine the two meanings—"the state of resolution or determination" and "unclosedness"—suggests itself. Accordingly, it has been thought best to translate Entschlossenheit by "decidedness," which unambiguously preserves the first meaning.

Decidedness, or the quieted, angst-ready, self-planning towards being-guilty, is the primeval truth of Dasein. As the structure of Dasein in its authenticity, it is also the structure of Dasein in truth—the most accurate and complete description of Dasein that we can give at this point in our ongoing phenomenological investigation. Insofar as decidedness emerges
at the factual level as a result of heeding the call of conscience, Heidegger in § 60, p. 297 terms it “authentic decidedness.” This should not be taken to imply the existence of an inauthentic decidedness. Rather, what Heidegger means is that decidedness, being the primeval structure of Dasein, can be understood and expressed at the factual level as authentic existence. It can also be misunderstood and disguised in the course of inauthentic existence—even though it persists as the underlying structure of Dasein. Inauthentic Dasein does not cease to be authentic in the sense of becoming an entirely different being with an entirely different structural constitution. Rather, in existing inauthentically, Dasein misapprehends its own nature and behaves in accordance with this misapprehension. We shall see in Section 3.6 that inauthenticity can be grasped at a still more primeval level as a modification of the “timely” structure of Dasein.

A frequent point of contention for some Heidegger scholars is Heidegger’s affirmation that it is not possible, within the fundamental ontological perspective of Being and Time, to give a concrete answer to the question of what exactly Dasein should decide to do in the existential state of decidedness. “The answer,” Heidegger states, “can only be given by the decision itself” [§ 60, p. 298]. In other words, authenticity is rather more a matter of how one decides than what one decides. Here hostile interpreters have found fulcrum and lever apparently ready-made to topple the philosophical edifice of Being and Time, particularly in the light of Heidegger’s personal biography. It seems almost as if Being and Time were in need of being defended against its own author.

In the first place, it is worth pointing out that this standpoint—that the existential analysis of Dasein can yield no concrete guidelines for factual choice—is entirely consistent with Heidegger’s previous analyses of authenticity and inauthenticity and is also to some extent necessitated by them. Recall that it is a fundamental characteristic of the inauthentic one-self that particular and definite actions are prescribed for and proscribed to the individual. If Heidegger had indeed given concrete
indications as to how an authentic Dasein should behave—that is, if he had worked out a philosophical ethics in the modern sense—he would have been running the grave risk of allowing the one-self to contaminate his concept of authenticity by preventing his readers from understanding their own authenticity with reference to their own individual authentic selves. Any concrete guidelines automatically undermine the independence and therefore the responsibility of the person to whom they are addressed. Even at the level of common sense this attitude is reasonable: surely doing what you are told to do simply because you are told to do it can hardly be characterized as a “right” decision even if your actions are “right” in a strict ethical-moral sense?

It is also worth pointing out in Heidegger’s defence that authenticity cannot merely be a matter of how one decides rather than what one decides. Authentic action is true action. That is to say: authentic existence must be in conformity with the truth of Dasein. The truth of Dasein—its existential structure—must therefore influence what authentic Dasein factually decides to do. For example, treating Dasein as if it were a thing, a mere object, cannot be an authentic choice, since it is in direct contradiction with the nature of Dasein. The essence of Dasein is existence. The being of entities is connection. Thus using Dasein as though it were a tool rather than an end in itself is straightforwardly and undeniably inauthentic. It seems, then, that Heidegger cannot say the ethical without compromising the reader’s freedom of choice. But like Wittgenstein, he can point to the ethical; and Heidegger’s means of doing so is to keep silent—imitating, and so hopefully awakening, the experience of the call of conscience, and so also awakening the reader’s sense of his or her personal responsibility for his or her life. Wouldn’t shifting the responsibility for your existence onto Heidegger be an inauthentic decision? But isn’t this precisely what the demand for concrete ethical guidelines consists in?

The later Heidegger does, of course, reject “ethics” in the sense of a rigid system of behavioural rules because he believes
that all regulation of this sort belongs to the "technique" characteristic of the forgetfulness of Being. In the language of *Being and Time* we might say that any attempt at regulation is based upon a confusion of Dasein with entities at hand. The latter are the proper objects of theoretical and scientific study, and that is why they can be regulated and systematized at all. But entities as such are characterized not by at-handedness but by to-handedness. Why should a theoretical comportment that is not even adequate to a description of intramundane entities be used to grasp a radically different being, namely Dasein? How can we expect any truly ethical concepts to emerge from an analysis fundamentally unsuited to the being in question?

Finally, Heidegger nowhere says that concrete guidelines concerning ethical or moral actions are impossible or undesirable. Obviously, laws function to some extent as ethical and moral guides, as do religions and personal codes of ethics. We would not want to cease teaching our children the difference between right and wrong simply because of a technical point made in *Being and Time*. But while we do need codifications of ethical and moral systems for organizational, legal, and educational purposes, it would be wrong to assume that these codifications are themselves sufficient for a truly ethical life. Morality is rooted in the individual's free choice to freely make ethical decisions. There is a world of difference between someone who is too weak for vengeance but wants it, someone who forgoes vengeance through fear of retribution, and someone who, while capable of vengeance, decides against taking it because of an authentic understanding of its wrongness. Heidegger's system in *Being and Time* clearly allows both for freedom of choice and for existential responsibility—indispensable requirements for any philosophical ethics. I see no reason that Heidegger should be accused of having neglected moral and ethical considerations, at least in *Being and Time*.

For Heidegger, ethical action in the *authentic* sense of ethical is based on the experience of the essential structure of Dasein—an ontological structure to which being-with-others and concernfulness
for others essentially, necessarily, and ineradicably belong. Anyone who wants to ignore this fact surely can, just as anyone who truly wants to commit murder will never be stopped by the fact that murder is wrong. What, then, is supposed to be the point of a system of ethics that supposedly demonstrates the existence of an ethical compulsion that, in practice, can be ignored at will? Any attempt at a deontological ethics (such as Kant’s) is immediately refuted by the fact that at the existentic level there is no factual compulsion to be ethical. For Heidegger, however, there is always the silent call of conscience: the persistent awareness of one’s own responsibility for one’s own actions. Surely Heidegger’s description is more in line with the obvious facts than the assumptions on which many deontological ethical systems are based?

The fact that no concrete guidelines can be given for authentic existence should not, however, lead us to conclude that nothing whatsoever can be said about authenticity. Heidegger believes that it is quite possible to describe the structure of an authentic action, even if the question as to whether specific actions are authentic has to remain unanswered: “Decidedness is only certain of itself as a decision. But the existentic indeterminacy of decidedness, which is first determined in each respective decision, nonetheless has its existential determinacy” [§ 60, p. 298].

Let us now turn to another vexing question, namely the relationship between authenticity and inauthenticity. If falling, and therefore inauthenticity, is an essential structure of concern, how will an authentically existing Dasein deal with the constant possibility of inauthenticity? Inauthenticity, obviously, cannot on Heidegger’s account be permanently done away with. Heidegger’s answer is, in effect, that inauthenticity remains a constant possibility and a constant threat to Dasein’s authentic existence. As we saw in Section 2.10, Dasein is coevally characterized by both truth and untruth. “Closedness” [Verschlossenheit] and “coveredness” [Verdecktheit] necessarily belong to the facticity of Dasein [§ 44 b), p. 222]. Accordingly,
Truth (discoveredness) must always first be wrested from entities. Entities are torn away from concealedness [Verborgenheit]. The factual discoveredness in each respective case is, so to speak, always a theft [Raub]. Is it a coincidence that the Greeks express themselves concerning the essence of truth in a privative expression (a-létēia)? [§ 44 b), p. 222]16

Authentic existence implies the necessity of a constant struggle to preserve the authentic state in the face of the ineradicable possibility of inauthenticity.17 We can never do away with inauthenticity completely, but we can manage it. Managed inauthenticity, however, is not the same as inauthenticity proper. Managed inauthenticity, or the acceptance of the necessary and unceasing struggle to maintain authenticity, is the only possible authentic comportment towards Dasein's unavoidable and structurally necessary inauthenticity. This is what Heidegger means to express when he says,

[Decidedness] appropriates [eignet sich zu] untruth in an authentic manner. Dasein is always already, and perhaps again soon, in undecidedness. [...] The undecidedness of the One nonetheless remains dominant, only it is unable to impugn [anfechten] decided existence. [...] The decision too remains dependent [angewiesen] upon the One and its world. Understanding this also belongs to what it discloses, insofar as it is decidedness that first provides Dasein with authentic transparency [Durchsichtigkeit]. [...] The decision does not withdraw from "reality," but rather first discovers what is factually possible, in such a manner as to seize it as it is possible as one's ownmost being-ability in the One. [§ 60, p. 299]

It is again important to emphasize what Heidegger says about the dependency of authentic Dasein upon the one-self and its world. By "dependency" Heidegger simply means that the authentic self, in existing factually, still must exist within the
world into which it has been thrown; and that world has been shaped to a greater or lesser degree by the one-self. Authentic Dasein cannot escape its surroundings, though it can modify them in accordance with its authentic understanding. This is made particularly clear by Heidegger’s position concerning authentic Dasein’s relationship to others. We are told that decidedness modifies both the discoveredness of the world and the disclosedness of others in a coeval manner. Of course, the world as such is not changed by the mere act of decidedness, nor is one’s circle of acquaintances exchanged. However, the structure of Dasein’s comportments towards both is decisively influenced. As authentic self-being, Dasein is not “isolated into a free-floating ego” [isoliert auf ein freischwebendes Ich]. Such an existential isolation is impossible—due to the very nature of Dasein itself, to which being-with belongs as an ineradicable existential. And since authenticity simply means being authentically in the world, authenticity necessarily implies that an authentic comportment towards others—in whatever factual form—must be preserved.

In fact, decidedness “thrust [the self] into concernful being-with others” [§ 60, p. 298]. This is because decidedness first brings Dasein before the possibility of meeting with others as the others they truly are. Authenticity—the decidedness to be one’s own self—is the basis of an authentic comportment towards others: “It is from the authentic self-being of decidedness that an authentic with-another can first emerge” [§ 60, p. 298]. But why is authentic being-with-another dependent upon the decision to be one’s self authentically? Might not a hostile critic intimate that this implies a selfish attitude towards others? No more so, we might answer, than conventional morality’s insistence upon taking responsibility for the moral consequences of one’s own actions. No one else can make you moral. If you want to be moral, then the decision must be taken and put into practice by you and by you alone. All morality, therefore, is rooted in an authentic experience of being the self.
One can, of course, go on to ask whether a philosophical language that employs the concepts of authenticity and inauthenticity is really the most suitable in order to express Heidegger's insights. Perhaps there is indeed a certain selfish tinge to the vocabulary of *Being and Time*. Heidegger might even agree with this criticism; certainly the concepts of authenticity and inauthenticity seem to be de-emphasized by the later Heidegger. But insofar as the fundamental intention of *Being and Time* is concerned, I think that it is possible to argue strongly against the view that the fundamental perspective of authenticity is in any way asocial, unsocial, immoral, unethical, self-centered, or selfish.

Finally, we will attempt to reply to a final possible misunderstanding, namely the belief that Heidegger is articulating a theoretical concept of authenticity that has no bearing on actual practice. This interpretation, as attentive readers will have guessed, arises from an inadequate appreciation of Heidegger's concept of understanding. Understanding in Heidegger's sense is not a passive act of observation or contemplation in whatever sense. For Heidegger, understanding is *the fundamental comportment upon the foundation of which we disclose our own possible comportments towards the world*. It is not the case, as some interpreters have claimed, that Heidegger ignores or blurs the distinction between theory and practice, or even that he attempts to redefine theory as a type of practice. Rather, Heidegger conceives understanding as *an essential comportment that is in essence practical*. To use more familiar terminology, Heidegger's understanding is a pragmatic concept referring to the practical manner in which we apprehend or grasp the possible ways of comporting ourselves towards the world and towards others. It is a type of doing rather than a type of knowing. It is for this reason that Heidegger can say, "As decided, Dasein already acts" [§ 60, p. 301]. Authentic understanding entails authentic action. Understanding and practice are inseparable.
3.5 TIMELINESS AS THE SENSE OF CONCERN
(§§ 63–66)

Through the analysis of being unto death Heidegger hopes to gain a phenomenological understanding of the authenticity of Dasein. The analysis of being unto death suggests that authenticity is indeed possible, and the comportment of forerunning is the manner in which the existential possibility of authenticity becomes a concrete reality. By contrast, Heidegger's analysis of the call of conscience suggests that the existential possibility of authenticity is not just a mere possibility. It is a possibility that Dasein can always factually choose. Dasein can always choose decidedness because the call of conscience is embedded in the very structure of Dasein's disclosedness. There is no true escape from the conscience calling Dasein back to its own authentic self.

In the next chapter of Being and Time, which consists of §§ 61–66, Heidegger begins with an attempt to link decidedness, or the existentic authenticity of Dasein understood from the perspective of an authentic response to the call of conscience (Section 3.3), with forerunning, the existential possibility of authenticity as seen from the point of view of the analysis of being unto death (Section 3.2).

Why is this peculiar approach necessary at all? Why does Heidegger begin with a demonstration that authenticity is existentially possible (the analysis of being unto death), turn to a demonstration that authenticity is also factually possible (the analysis of the call of conscience) and then attempt to combine the results of the two analyses? There is an interesting passage in § 62, p. 309 that appears to hint at an answer:

The question of the ability to be whole [Ganzseinkönnen] is a factual-existentic question. Dasein answers it as decided Dasein. The question of Dasein's ability to be whole has now completely shed its originally indicated character, as if it were merely a theoretical, methodological question of the analysis of Dasein,
arising from the attempt to attain a complete "givenness" of Dasein as a whole. The question of the wholeness of Dasein, originally discussed only as an ontological-methodological question, was justified, but only because its foundation goes back to an ontic possibility of Dasein.

We have already encountered these passages in Section 2.8, though in a slightly different context. We can add the following remarks to our previous discussion. Heidegger believes that the existentic authenticity authorized by the call of conscience is the foundation of the existentially possible authenticity conceived as forerunning. The structure of decidedness itself authorizes not only existentic authenticity but also the existential necessity of an authentic being unto death. The ontological legitimacy of forerunning is authorized by decidedness. In other words, it is possible to formalize what we do when we are authentic. This formalization took place in our account of forerunning. Everyone who is authentic accepts the inevitability of death. But how do we know that this formalization is a genuine reflection of practical authenticity? How do we know that all authentic Dasein does indeed forerun into death? We can answer: because Dasein has a inherent existential structure, an essential nature, factual authenticity implies a general pattern of authentic comportment.

What authenticity involves at the concrete individual level is dependent on individual decidedness, but decidedness implies a general pattern common to all concrete authentic acts: the acceptance of death as an essential and necessary limitation of Dasein. Decidedness has the form of forerunning just as a die has the form of a cube.

But how exactly does Heidegger make the connection between decidedness and forerunning? Why does decidedness imply forerunning as its characteristic pattern? Decidedness, as we saw in the last section, is the quieted, angst-ready, self-planning towards one's ownmost being-guilty. In this characterization, whose perspective is that of wanting-to-have-a-conscience, "quieted" corresponds to the authentic mode of talk,
"angst-ready" corresponds to the authentic mode of sensibility, and "self-planning towards being-guilty" corresponds to the authentic mode of understanding. The authentic mode of being unto death, namely forerunning, is conspicuously absent from this description of authenticity. This is, of course, because decidedness is a concept emerging from our analysis of the call of conscience. Its perspective remains within the perspective of the phenomena we brought to light in the last section. From the perspective of concern rather than of decidedness, the authentic modes of sensibility, understanding, and talk are respectively angst, forerunning, and quietedness. Decidedness, however, as a result of its emergence from the perspective of conscience, incorporates self-planning towards being-guilty instead of forerunning into its structure.

Making a connection between self-planning towards being-guilty and forerunning is relatively easy. Dasein's being-guilty is its comportment towards its own nullity, that is, towards its own inherent limitation. From Section 3.3, we know that there are three ways—corresponding to facticity, existentiality, and being-fallen—in which Dasein is characterized by nullity: Dasein is not the cause of its own existence; Dasein cannot choose every possibility, but necessarily rejects some possibilities in the act of pursuing others; and Dasein is, first and foremost, not its own authentic self, but rather the inauthentic one-self. These three nullities are all limitations of Dasein's existence. They all express Dasein's essential finitude. And the primeval and authentic expression of Dasein's finitude, as we saw in Section 3.2, is death.

The fact that Dasein is constantly, at every moment of its existence, coming to its end is primevally disclosed to it in the act of understanding its ownmost, irrespective, and unattainable possibility—the possibility of its own non-existence. Dasein's understanding of itself as limited by death is characterized according to facticity, existentiality, and being-fallen. Dasein's being unto death primevally discloses its thrownness into the
The possibility of death; its angst of death disclosed in thrownness in turn discloses Dasein as finite existence in a finite world. Finally, Dasein's own falling is disclosed as a flight from an authentic understanding of death. Dasein's authentic being unto death, forerunning, discloses the essential limitations of Dasein's existence.

Decidedness, on the other hand, insofar as it incorporates being-guilty into its structure, discloses Dasein's planning towards its own essential limitations—the essential limitations that are primevally and authentically disclosed in forerunning. In being-guilty, Dasein accepts its own nullity; but the possibility of Dasein's absolute nonexistence, its death, is its most essential, most authentic nullity. In planning towards its own being-guilty (its essential finitude) Dasein understands itself with respect to the primary manner in which it is finite—its mortality. Planning towards being-guilty, accepting one's own essential limitations, means understanding oneself as characterized by mortality, by the final and fundamental limitation of not being able to continue indefinitely in existence. In short, decidedness is only a complete and adequate expression of Dasein's authenticity when it is understood as “forerunning decidedness” [vorlaufende Entschlossenheit]. The authentic structure of the conscience must be linked with the authentic structure of being unto death in order to adequately characterize the essential, authentic, and primeval ontological structure of Dasein.

Forerunning decidedness is thus the authentic and primeval structure of Dasein. Accordingly, our fundamental analysis of Dasein has now attained a still more primeval level than the level at which we were able to describe the fundamental structure of Dasein as concern. Again, according to Heidegger, our analyses are faced with a bewildering multiplicity of structural elements. How are we to grasp the unity of these structures despite the constantly emerging multiplicity of ontological features? Clearly, a new manner of describing the structural unity of Dasein is required.
a) The Future: Advent
The analysis leading to this new concept of the primeval structure of Dasein is undertaken by Heidegger in § 65 of Being and Time. There, we are told that forerunning decidedness is Dasein's authentic "being unto its ownmost distinguished being-ability." That is to say, forerunning decidedness is the comportment in which Dasein understands what Dasein actually is. This feature of Dasein was expressed in the structure of concern as being-self-ahead. In being-self-ahead, Dasein understands itself in terms of the possibilities it is still able to pursue. These open possibilities are manners in which Dasein itself can exist. In being-self-ahead, then, Dasein is letting itself (that is, future possibilities of its existence) "come towards" itself (affect its present understanding). This existential structure of Dasein, the comportment in which Dasein opens itself towards possibilities of its own existence, is what Heidegger calls the "advent" [Zukunft] of Dasein.

Zukunft is the normal German word for the "future," but Heidegger uses the word in a special terminological sense derived from its etymology. Zu is a preposition meaning "to" or "towards," while -kunft is a noun-forming morpheme derived from the verb kommen, "to come." (Ankunft, literally "on-coming," is the normal German word for "arrival"). Zukunft, then, designates the primary comportment of Dasein through which future possibilities are enabled to come towards or approach Dasein in its understanding of existence. Heidegger uses the normal German word for "future" to designate this phenomenon because, as we shall shortly see, he believes that it is the ontological basis for what we normally, though wrongly, think of as the future in a chronological sense. Because of the importance of the etymology, it has been thought better to translate Zukunft as "advent," from the Latin advenire, literally "to come towards," "to come up to."

b) The Past: Continuance
Similarly, forerunning decidedness understands Dasein as essentially guilty. In being-guilty, Dasein must accept that it exists as the ground of a nullity (Section 3.3). In so doing, Dasein
is accepting its own essential limitation. Its primary limitation is its thrownness (into death). Accepting its thrownness, however, means that Dasein must authentically be what it always already "was," namely thrown, or determined by possibilities of existence that it did not and could not itself choose because they were "prior" to its own existence. The acceptance of thrownness means that Dasein accepts itself in its "beenness" [Gewesen]. Dasein can only exist authentically when it acknowledges the limitations its thrownness (or "beenness") has imposed upon it. Accordingly, Dasein's authentic advent requires Dasein to come back to its own authentic thrown existence. The existential comportment by which Dasein accomplishes the primeval disclosure of its own thrownness is the "continuance" [Gewesenheit] of Dasein.

**Gewesenheit** is a term coined by Heidegger from the past participle of the verb sein, meaning "to be," and the suffix -heit. Its literal meaning is "beenness." Heidegger uses the term to designate the existential concept of the past. The usual German word for the past is Vergangenheit, literally "gone-by-ness." Clearly, the neologism Gewesenheit is meant as a contrast to Vergangenheit. Wesen, which exists both as a noun meaning "essence" and as part of the conjugated forms of sein in modern German, is derived from the Middle High German verb wesen, meaning "to be," "to reside," or "to happen." The Middle High German verb is in turn derived from the Old High German verb wesan, derived in turn from the Gothic wisan, thought to be derived from the Indo-Germanic ues, meaning "to linger," "to live," "to spend the night." Heidegger avoids the use of Vergangenheit in order to emphasize that the past does not merely go by but continues to affect both the present and the future. Where we are and where we are going is always a function of where we have been. It has accordingly been thought appropriate to translate Gewesenheit as "continuance."

c) The Present: Encounter
Finally, forerunning decidedness discloses the present situation of Dasein as existing in a world in which it comports itself
towards entities in concernedness. Comporting itself towards intramundane entities is only possible for Dasein if these entities be “encountered” [gegenwürdig] on the basis of a primeval comportment of Dasein—the comportment by means of which Dasein discovers entities within the overarching framework of the world. Accordingly, the final primeval structural element of Dasein, which corresponds to the present, is the “encounter” [Gegenwart]: the comportment by means of which Dasein understands its own existence in a world together with intramundane entities.

Gegenwart is the usual German term for the present. It is a compound of the preposition gegen, meaning “against,” and the morpheme -wart, a form of -wärts, a suffix indicating direction and corresponding to the English “-wards”: vorwärts means “forwards.” The literal meaning of Gegenwart is, accordingly, “against-ward-ness.” It is just possible that Heidegger intends there to be a link with the archaic noun Wart meaning “guardian,” “protector,” or “overseer.” It has been thought best to preserve the literal meaning as far as possible by means of the translation “encounter.” The word then denotes the comportment of Dasein by means of which it recognizes entities as “counter to” or “in a direction away from” itself.

d) The Ecstatic Structure of Timeliness

Heidegger calls the unitary structure consisting of advent, continuance, and encounter “timeliness” [Zeitlichkeit]. It is the phenomenon of the “continuing-encountering advent” [gewesend-gegenwürdige Zukunft]. As the most primeval existential structure of Dasein, it is also the sense of authentic concern. Concern, up until now the most primeval structure we had exposed in the analysis of Dasein, is now seen to be dependent on the timeliness of Dasein. Timeliness is still more primeval than concern. In fact, in arriving at timeliness we have reached the ontological bedrock of Dasein. There is no going any deeper. How can we link concern with timeliness? Being-self-ahead is founded in the phenomenon of the advent of Dasein.
Being-already-in, in turn, is a modification of the continuance of timeliness. Finally, being-among is made possible through the phenomenon of the encounter [§ 65, p. 327]. Concern, far from being the primeval structure we originally held it to be, is in fact an existential modification of timeliness.

The three structural features of the timeliness of Dasein, namely advent, continuance, and encounter, are interesting in that they share a similar structure. In the case of the advent, Dasein goes “beyond itself” towards future possibilities (existentiality) in order to “return to itself” and understand its past (thrownness) and its present (being-fallen) in the light of these possibilities. Similarly, in the case of continuance, Dasein goes “beyond itself” towards thrownness in order to “return to itself” and understand its present (being-fallen) and its future (existentiality) in the light of this thrownness. Finally, in the case of the encounter, Dasein goes “beyond itself” towards intramundane entities in order to understand its past (thrownness) and its future (existentiality) in the light of its comportment towards these entities.

In each of the three cases, there is a common existential movement in which Dasein goes “beyond itself” towards one of the three temporal structures of timeliness in order to “return to itself” and understand the other two temporal structures in the light of the structure towards which Dasein initially went “beyond itself.” Heidegger translates this peculiar timely motion of being “beyond oneself” with the help the Greek word ekstasis. This word is a compound of the prefix ek, corresponding to “ex-,” literally “out of,” and stasis, “the act or process of remaining, standing, or staying.” Accordingly, ekstasis literally means “the act of standing outside (oneself),” or, in idiomatic usage, “the act of being beside oneself (due to any strong emotion, for example rage, joy, or fear).” When Heidegger refers to the three structures of timeliness, advent, continuance, and encounter, as “ecstasies” [Ekstasen] of timeliness, he is thinking only of the literal meaning of the Greek word. They are ecstasies not because they in any way resemble or cause “ecstasy,” but because they exhibit the common feature of “beyond itself—return to itself.” The reference to the
Rephrasing Heidegger

literal meaning of the Greek root must be kept in mind when using this term. (Note that it is the apparent resemblance of the ecstatic nature of timeliness to Hegel’s conception of Spirit [Geist] as “returning to itself from otherness” or “identity-in-difference” that leads Heidegger to distance himself from Hegel in § 82.)

For the sake of clarity, it is probably worth pausing to consider the connection between past, present, and future in the usual sense with the highly abstract and technical meanings of continuance, encounter, and advent. Once again, it is important to keep in mind that Heidegger is employing a phenomenological method. The aim of hermeneutic phenomenology is to unearth and interpret the primeval phenomena underlying our usual, phenomenologically naive concepts. In the case of timeliness, Heidegger is attempting to expose the fundamental ontological structures we usually understand as the “passage of time.” In Section 3.8, we shall see how Heidegger explains the origin of the usual or “vulgar” conception of time as a sequence of passing moments. For now, however, it is enough to ask ourselves why Heidegger believes that time is best described as the three ecstasies of advent (future), continuance (past), and encounter (present).

In order to answer this question, it will be helpful to introduce a distinction that Heidegger himself does not explicitly make in Being and Time (although the distinction is clearly implied by his analysis). We will refer to this as the distinction between experienced and constructed time. It is an obvious feature of experienced time that it passes at a variable rate. Thus five minutes spent waiting in a dentist’s office before a scheduled root canal may be experienced as longer than a full hour that just flies by in the process of having fun. By contrast, constructed time always passes at a fixed rate of one second per second. The passage of constructed time is “constructed” or inferred from certain events in experienced time. Thus even though the five minutes of anxiety in the dentist’s office are longer than the hour of fun at the festival in experienced time, I can tell by consulting my watch at opportune moments that the latter period of time lasted twelve times as long as the former in constructed time.
The question arises, however, as to which of the two is to be given priority in a philosophical analysis of time. Heidegger, as a result of his phenomenological approach, clearly decides in favour of experienced time. Experienced time is the pre-theoretical basis of all other experiences of time. It is the time in which we live. Constructed time, as we pointed out, is not actually the time in which our experiences take place; it is an inference from certain events (such as consulting a chronometer). Having inferred, rather than experienced, the passage of constructed time, we then work backwards and impose the framework of constructed time onto real, experienced time: we say, “Waiting in the dentist’s office ‘felt’ like a whole hour, but it was ‘really’ only five minutes.” There is a theoretical re-interpretation of pre-theoretical phenomena in the light of theoretical reflection. But this is, in essence, precisely the sort of theoretical obscuration of the primeval phenomena of existence it is the task of phenomenology to prevent. Having re-interpreted experienced time in terms of constructed time, we no longer realize that there is any experienced time at all to be taken into account in giving a philosophical explanation of time.

How, then, does Heidegger prevent the phenomenon of experienced time from being obscured and hidden by constructed time? In *Being and Time*, Heidegger’s guiding conception of Dasein is that Dasein is an entity that understands its own being. Dasein *exists*; and this means: it makes choices. It is distinguished from all other entities by comporting itself towards its own existence. Let us call to mind the phrase repeated so often throughout *Being and Time* to the effect that the “essence” of Dasein is its “existence.” Heidegger, in *Being and Time*, is attempting to give a philosophical account of Dasein in which existentiality is the basic explanatory concept. All other structural features of Dasein are explained in terms of existentiality. This has nothing to do with a priority of “existence” over “essence” in an Aristotelian-Scholastic sense. It simply means that Dasein *must ultimately be explained in terms of its ability to make choices*. How can Heidegger express the distinction between past, present, and future through Dasein’s ability to choose?
Quite simply, the future for Heidegger is the experience that there are possibilities that are still open to Dasein at any given moment, possibilities that are yet to be pursued, seized, and acted upon. Similarly, the past is the experience of possibilities that are no longer open, either because they have already been chosen and are no longer choosable, having been "put behind oneself [überholt]," or because they never could have been chosen by the individual in question. Finally, there are possibilities Dasein is in the process of choosing, possibilities that are being seized and lived out. These possibilities correspond to the present in the usual sense of the word. Our fundamental experience of time at the pre-theoretical level is, for Heidegger, an experience of a qualitative difference in the possibilities for existence open to existing Dasein. For Heidegger, this is time as we experience it prior to any physicalist theories about the passage of measured or constructed time.

It is because Heidegger, in speaking of timeliness, is always and exclusively speaking of experienced time that he can say that Dasein's finitude is something quite different from a point in time at which Dasein will actually "stop." Rather, finitude—the death of Dasein—is a character of timeliness itself [§ 65, p. 330]. The timeliness of Dasein is finite experienced time—time (in the sense of the three ecstasies) that experiences itself as having a beginning (thrownness) and an end (death). Timeliness has a beginning—a past—because there are possibilities it can no longer and never could choose. Timeliness has an end—a limitation—because it cannot choose every single possibility. It can only choose for so long before it cannot choose anymore. The fundamental and primeval experience of time in Dasein discloses timeliness (experienced time) as finite in contrast to the inauthentic infinite and endless constructed time of which use is made in daily life (at the behest of the one-self) and in scientific and technical undertakings. We would, of course, never be able to dispense with constructed time altogether—being-fallen is, as we have repeatedly seen, an essential and necessary structure of Dasein. We can, however, prevent constructed time from being the framework within which experienced time (timeliness) is under-
stood. It is, here as elsewhere when issues of authenticity are concerned, largely a question of emphasis and nuance.

In the following section, we shall see how Heidegger returns to the structure of concern in order to re-interpret its structure in terms of the primeval and authentic conception of the timeliness of Dasein. His aim in so doing is to demonstrate that the fundamental analysis of Dasein in terms of timeliness has finally attained the deepest level of analysis possible, since it can unfailingly account for all of the existential structures that have emerged in the course of Being and Time.

3.6 TIMELINESS AND ITS MODIFICATIONS
(§§ 67–71)

In the fourth chapter of the second section of Being and Time, which consists of § 67–71, Heidegger undertakes a thoroughgoing re-interpretation of all the previously discussed existential structures of Dasein in terms of timeliness. Accordingly, the chapter is entitled "Timeliness and Everydayness" [Zeitlichkeit und Alltäglichkeit].

In § 67, p. 334–335, Heidegger announces that the analysis will begin with the structures "in which disclosedness is constituted" and identifies these structures as understanding, sensibility, falling, and talk. Somewhat further on in § 68, p. 335, Heidegger refers to these four structures as the "structural moments of concern." A central task of the chapter is, then, to account for concern (disclosedness) in terms of timeliness. But what of the other structures exposed in the course of the fundamental analysis of Dasein?

We remember from Section 2.6 that being-in consists of three structures: sensibility, understanding, and talk. We also saw in Section 2.9 that concern consists of three structures: being-already-in (facticity), being-self-ahead (existentiality), and being-among (being-fallen). At times, Heidegger mentions only these three structural elements; at other times, he speaks of talk
as permeating all three. It is clear, however, that the already-in and self-ahead structures of concern correspond directly to sensibility and understanding. The main difference between concern and being-in is accordingly that the former contains the additional structure of being-fallen:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>being-in (indifferent modes)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sensibility</td>
<td>understanding</td>
<td>talk</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>concern</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>being-already-in (facticity)</td>
<td>being-self-ahead (existentiality)</td>
<td>being-among (being-fallen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sensibility</td>
<td>understanding</td>
<td>talk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(permeates the whole structure of concern)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Since being-in has in effect been incorporated into the structure of concern, Heidegger's reduction of concern to timeliness in §§ 68-69 is simultaneously also a reduction of being-in to timeliness. This leaves two structures of being-in-the-world unaccounted for, namely the self and the world.

If we subject the structure of Being and Time to a careful and critical scrutiny, we note that Heidegger, inconveniently enough, has already undertaken the necessary analysis of the self — in fact he does so in the process of introducing the concept of timeliness before the necessity of reducing the structures of being-in-the-world and of concern to timeliness has even been made plain. The clue is the title of § 64: "Concern and Selfhood." Since we have already discussed the analysis of timeliness in the last section, little need be said about Heidegger's reduction of the self to timeliness other than a few brief explanatory remarks.

In § 64, Heidegger discusses the notion of the "ego" [das Ich, literally "the I"]. The defining quality of the ego, it turns out, is that it is responsible for holding together the many and variegated structural features of consciousness. But what is the
ego? Heidegger rejects the everyday identification of the ego with the “subject” of experience along with the Kantian conception of the ego as the universal form of consciousness (the transcendental unity of apperception). Both these conceptions of the ego are inadequate because they conceive the unity of the self in terms of an at-handed entity. At-handedness, however, is a distinguishing feature of intramundane entities and not of Dasein. In what, then, does the true existential selfhood of Dasein consist?

Dasein is most itself in the phenomenon of forerunning decidedness. Forerunning decidedness discloses the selfhood of Dasein in a truly authentic manner. What, then, is the self in an existential sense? Nothing other than a structural feature of concern insofar as it is authentically disclosed in forerunning decidedness. The self is an existential modification of concern: “The structure of concern, fully conceived, includes the phenomenon of selfhood” [§ 64, p. 323]. The final clarification of the nature of the self, then, “occurs as the interpretation of the sense of concern.” The sense of concern, as we saw in the last section, is timeliness. In the final analysis, the essential nature of the self the process or occurrence of primeval timeliness.

Heidegger’s term for the processual character of timeliness, its occurring, is die Zeitigung der Zeitlichkeit, which we will render as “the timing of timeliness.” The German verb zeitigen normally means “to ripen,” “to move towards fruition,” or “to have as an effect or consequence.” The literal meaning of the verb is “to time.” Note, however, that the verb “to time” in English normally means to measure time. This connotation is excluded from our technical use of the word “timing.” Macquarrie and Robinson prefer “temporalizing,” although this is misleading because Heidegger probably intended to use Temporalität, “temporality,” at a much later stage of analysis. Accordingly, we will employ the locution “the timing of timeliness” to mean the comportment of Dasein that discloses primeval timeliness. It is the process or activity by which timeliness — the essential and authentic self — is generated.
The self can now be understood as the timing of timeliness, while being-in, as we have previously discussed, is re-interpreted as timeliness along with the analysis of concern in § 68. The remaining structure of being-in-the-world, namely the world, is addressed as a mode of timeliness in § 69, which is entitled "The Timeliness of Being-in-the-world and the Problem of the Transcendence of the World." In the course of these analyses, then, Heidegger will reduce all the previously exposed structures of Dasein—being-in-the-world as the self, the world, and being-in, along with concern as being-already-in (facticity), being-self-ahead (existentiality), and being-among (being-fallen)—to the primeval and unitary phenomenon of timeliness.

Let us first turn to the analysis of concern. The goal that Heidegger sets himself at the beginning of the chapter, as we previously mentioned, is to interpret sensibility, understanding, falling, and talk in terms of timeliness. Heidegger undertakes a series of complicated and involved investigations in order to make the connection between timeliness and concern, but we will not enter into these in any detail, as the connection can plausibly be made at a glance by comparing the structure of timeliness with the structure of concern and being-in:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timeliness</th>
<th>Continuance</th>
<th>Advert</th>
<th>Encounter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concern</td>
<td>Being-already-in (facticity)</td>
<td>Being-self-ahead (existentiality)</td>
<td>Being-among (being-fallen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being-in</td>
<td>Sensibility</td>
<td>Understanding</td>
<td>Talk</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the sake of greater comprehensibility, we can supplement this table with the simplified paraphrase of timeliness that we introduced towards the end of Section 3.5:
Just as being-already-in is an existential modification of the timely structure of *continuance*, being-self-ahead is a modification of the *advent*, while being-among is a modification of the *encounter*. One feature of this table is, however, slightly puzzling: the inclusion of *talk* as a modification of the encounter. This would appear to imply that talk is an essentially *inauthentic* phenomenon, since it is thereby correlated with *being-fallen* in the structure of concern.

In order to explain the link between talk and inauthenticity we must first discuss the more elaborate structural arrangement of the various modes of timeliness that Heidegger introduces in §68 a). Here, Heidegger distinguishes an indifferent, an authentic, and an inauthentic mode for each of the three ecstasies of timeliness:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Modes of Timeliness</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ecstasies</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>indifferent mode</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>authentic mode</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>inauthentic mode</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A few remarks on the derivation of this table are in order. The three modes listed as indifferent are, of course, the three structural divisions of concern. Heidegger informs us in §68 a), p. 337, that the "formally indifferent term for the advent can be found in the designation of the first structural moment of concern, in the *self-ahead*." Similarly, though less unambiguously,
Heidegger refers to the being-among structure of the encounter [§ 68 a), p. 337, last line of the page], leaving us, presumably, to infer the identification of the already-in structure of concern with the indifferent mode of timeliness. 27

Similarly, the “forerunning” that Heidegger designates as the authentic mode of the advent is, presumably, identical with the forerunning that we first encountered in Section 3.2, and that is the authentic mode of Dasein’s being unto death. Accordingly, the inauthentic mode of the advent must correspond to an inauthentic being unto death. The noun Heidegger uses to designate this mode, Gewärtigen, is derived from a verb meaning “to expect” or “to be prepared for.” Following Macquarrie and Robinson, the term is rendered into English here as “awaiting.” Although Heidegger does not use this term in the context of his analysis of death, in § 53, p. 261–262, he refers to “expecting” [Erwarten] as a type of “tension” [Gespanntsein] that does not preserve the possible character of future possibilities. “Expecting” is a type of waiting [Warten] because it views the possible with respect to its “actualization” [Verwirklichung] and as such cannot constitute an authentic being unto death. Presumably Heidegger uses Gewärtigen in the present context in order to strengthen the conceptual link of “expecting” with timeliness. 28

Heidegger’s original term for the authentic encounter is Augenblick, “instant,” “moment,” or “blink of an eye.” Its literal meaning is “eye-glance.” It is intended, presumably, to indicate the type of purview (see Section 2.5) guiding authentic Dasein’s comportments towards intramundane entities. By contrast, Heidegger calls the inauthentic encounter Gegenwärtigen, a nominalized verb form Heidegger infers from Gegenwart, the usual German word for the present. Its literal meaning is thus something like “present-izing.” The term is rendered into English here as “encountering” in order to preserve the etymological link with Gegenwart, which we have translated as the encounter.

Finally, the word Heidegger uses to designate the authentic continuance is Wiederholung, the normal German word for
"repetition." Its literal meaning, however, is "again-getting." Heidegger uses the word in order to indicate the existential comportment by means of which Dasein authentically discloses its own thrownness. Since the connotation of "getting again" or "getting back" is most important for Heidegger, I have rendered the word into English as "retrieval." Heidegger uses two different terms to designate inauthentic continuance; in § 68 a), p. 339, he introduces the term Vergessenheit, which simply means "forgottenness," but in § 79, p. 406 (see the first four sentences of the second indented paragraph), he introduces Behalten or "retention" as a synonym.²⁹

To return to our original question: how does Heidegger explain the correlation of talk with the being-among structure of concern and thus with being-fallen? Heidegger tells us in once again in § 68 d) that talk permeates the entire structure of disclosedness, namely "understanding, sensibility, and falling." It follows from this, according to Heidegger, that "talk does not generate itself primarily in one particular ecstasy." However, Heidegger continues,

Because talk at the everyday level factually for the most part expresses itself [sich ausspricht] in language and initially in the manner of concerned-addressing conversation [des besorgend-beredenden Ansprechens] about the "environment" [Umwelt], encountering has a preferred constitutive function. [§ 68 d), p. 349]

In other words, talk in its authentic form does indeed permeate the entire structure of timeliness; this is why Heidegger, a few lines down, speaks of the "timeliness of talk, that is of Dasein as such [überhaupt]." However, in its inauthentic form, namely crosstalk, there is an intimate relation to the inauthentic encounter. This is, of course, because inauthenticity is a flight from authenticity towards the world (of intramundane entities). We can thus emend our previous table to the following:
This topic leads naturally to Heidegger's timely interpretation of falling and inauthenticity. According to Heidegger, the phenomenon of inauthenticity can itself be understood as a peculiar shift of emphasis in the timing of timeliness. When the timely structure of Dasein is characterized by the ecstasies of continuance, advent, and encounter in the modes of forgottenness, awaiting, and encountering, Dasein is inauthentic. In concrete terms, Dasein is then distinguished by an inability to experience its own thrownness (forgottenness), an inauthentic being unto death (awaiting), and a primary emphasis upon comporting itself towards intramundane entities (encountering). Concernedness with intramundane entities displays an essentially inauthentic structure because in order to make use of tools, Dasein must shift itself into a mode in which it forgets everything else in order to concentrate upon the work, awaits the finished product of its work (as something that will be "done and over with" and then "put behind itself"), and encounters the tool in the process of manipulating it in order to get the work done. (Compare § 69 a.)

By contrast, authentic Dasein is characterized by retrieval, forerunning, and the instant. Its own thrownness is authentically disclosed (retrieval), it is characterized by an authentic experience of death (forerunning), and it comports itself towards intramundane entities such that they are understood not as ends in themselves but means towards fulfilling Dasein's own purpose (instant). Heidegger has already described the concrete lived structure of this authenticity as forerunning

### Structural Parallels between Timeliness, Concern, and Being-in

(Reference: § 41 a.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>timeliness</th>
<th>continuance</th>
<th>advent</th>
<th>encounter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>concern</td>
<td>being-already-in (facticity)</td>
<td>being-self-ahead (existentiality)</td>
<td>being-among (being-fallen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>being-in</td>
<td>sensibility</td>
<td>understanding</td>
<td>crosstalk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>talk</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
decidedness. Accordingly, the difference between authenticity and inauthenticity can be adequately and completely described as a difference in the manner in which timeliness occurs.

Finally, the question remains as to the status of the world in Heidegger’s tabulation of the timely structures of Dasein. As we saw in the course of the analysis of being-in-the-world, the world does not exist independently of Dasein. The world, for Heidegger, is an existential structure belonging to Dasein itself. We emphasized in Sections 2.5 and 2.10 that this conclusion does not force Heidegger into an idealist position. In Heideggerian terms, idealism would be the position that the world is ontologically dependent upon the ego. For Heidegger, however, both the world and the self are aspects of the unitary primeval structure that we first understood as being-in-the-world and that we are now in a position to understand as timeliness.

According to Heidegger in § 69 c), if we wish to explain the phenomenon of worldliness in terms of timeliness, we will need to expand upon our previous analysis. As we saw in Section 3.5, timeliness has an ecstatic structure. The three ecstasies of timeliness are manners in which Dasein goes beyond itself towards the continuance, the advent, and the encounter in order to return to itself. In the course of this beyond itself-return to itself process, the ecstatic disclosedness of Dasein is manifested. Dasein can only exist at all because of its ecstatic nature.

But towards what exactly does Dasein go beyond itself? And what is it from which Dasein returns to itself? According to Heidegger, the ecstatic timeliness of Dasein requires a “horizontal” timeliness. This horizontal timeliness is the direction towards which Dasein goes beyond or transcends itself towards a non-self: towards the phenomenon of the world. Accordingly, the three ecstasies of timeliness must be supplemented by three horizontal structures. Heidegger refers to the structural unity of these three structures as the horizontal schema of timeliness.30

The concept of a “schema” is derived from Kant, and the reader interested in the historical details should briefly review the comments on Kant’s schematism of the pure concepts of the
understanding in Section 2.3. For our present purposes, however, it is sufficient to briefly outline and comment upon the three "ecstatic horizons" that Heidegger introduces:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>timeliness</th>
<th>continuance</th>
<th>advent</th>
<th>encounter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>horizontal schema</td>
<td>before-which</td>
<td>sake-of-self</td>
<td>in-order-to</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The terms that Heidegger introduces for the three ecstatic horizons of which the horizontal schema is comprised are reminiscent of terms from the world analysis. Wovor, which I have translated literally as "before-which," recalls the abundance of Wo- compounds (e.g., Wozu) in the original German text. This schema is the one in which Dasein "is disclosed to itself in sensibility as thrown"; it is the "before-which of thrownness" or the particular factual situation into which Dasein has been thrown [§ 69 c), p. 365]. This schema corresponds to continuance in timeliness.

Similarly, the schema corresponding to the advent, Umwillen seiner, which I have rendered as "sake-of-self," is verbally reminiscent of Worum-willen, literally "for-the-sake-of-which," which I have translated as "purpose." It is the name for the schema in which Dasein, whether authentically or inauthentically, "approaches itself in the manner of the advent [zukünftig]" [§ 69 c), p. 365].

Finally, Heidegger calls the schema that corresponds to the encounter Um-zu, a term taken directly from the world analysis. The term, which was previously translated as "in-order-to," is already familiar to us.

The three ecstatic horizons of the horizontal schema of the timeliness of Dasein constitute the primeval structure of the world. As Heidegger puts it,

The horizontal unity of the schemata of the ecstasies makes the primeval connection [Zusammenhang] of the in-order-to-relations with purpose [Um-willen] possible. This implies: upon
The Timing of Timeliness

the basis [Grund] of the horizontal constitution of the ecstatic union of timeliness, such a thing as a disclosed world belongs to [Dasein]. [§ 69 c), p. 365]

The most fundamental and most primeval phenomenon of our entire reality is the timing of timeliness. The world, the self, and being-in as the relation between the two crystallize out of the timing of timeliness. The self is a structural elaboration of ecstatic timeliness (continuance, advent, encounter). The world, by contrast, is a structural modification of horizontal timeliness. The transcendence of the world, or the difference between the world and Dasein, is the primeval phenomenon in which being-in is founded. Dasein and the world are held together within the structure of a wider-reaching phenomenon, namely being-in-the-world, whose essential unity is a function of the ontological unity of the ecstasies and their corresponding horizons in the timing of timeliness.

Dasein, understood as the phenomenal unity of the world and the self, is now seen to be nothing other than the primeval manifestation or timing of timeliness. With this conception of the ontological unity of ecstatic and horizontal timeliness the answer to the question of Being has been found. As Heidegger tells us in § 65, p. 324, "sense" in the strictest meaning of the term is the "towards-which [Worauflhin] of the primary plan of the understanding of Being." In this act of planning Dasein understands both "the being of the entity, which it itself is" as well as "the being of intramundanely discovered entities." The overall sense of Being is, accordingly, that with reference to which we understand the difference between the self and the world. The difference between the self and the world is, however, disclosed in the most primeval fashion in the unity of ecstatic and horizontal timeliness. The act or process by which the difference between the self and the world is generated is, as we have seen, the timing of timeliness. This can then only mean: the overall sense of Being is timeliness. Being is the timing of timeliness.
3.7 THE FOUNDATION OF HISTORICITY (§§ 72-77)

As we saw in Section 3.5, Heidegger, owing to his phenomenological methodology, believes that experienced time must be given priority over constructed time. For Heidegger, experienced time consists of the phenomenon of timeliness: in brief, of the experience of our own possibilities of existence as still open (future), as no longer open (past), and as presently being pursued (present). This ecstatic character of timeliness is able to extend itself to the world owing to the horizontal schema of timeliness. The horizontal schema makes it possible for intramundane entities to be experienced as involved in the pursuit of our own possibilities of existence. In this way, intramundane entities are brought into the domain of timeliness. As such, timeliness is the overarching framework giving meaning not only to the self but also to the world and the self-world relationship.

What, then, of constructed time—the time that is a product of clocks and watches, the time to which we normally refer when we use the word time? What is its origin, and how is it related to timeliness as experienced time?

Heidegger himself refers to what I call “constructed time” as “the vulgar concept of time.” In this phrase, the word “vulgar” is not to be understood in the sense of “offensively crude.” Rather, it should be understood in the original Latin sense of “ordinary” or “everyday.” The vulgar concept of time is our common and usual understanding of what time is. According to this understanding, temporal events “consist of a sequence of experiences ‘in time’ [§ 72, p. 373].” By “consist of” Heidegger means that an event is in fact “assembled” from an infinite number of “now-points” [Jetztpunkte]. Strictly speaking, only the experience contained in the present now-point is truly real, since past now-points no longer exist and future now-points have yet to come into existence.

This vulgar concept of time, as familiar and everyday as it is, necessarily leads to a very peculiar and philosophically very suspicious notion of experience. On this account it
follows that Dasein only truly exists in each successive and instantaneous now-point, while the passage of time occurs as Dasein so to speak "hops through" the sequence of now-points, springing from moment to successive moment [§ 72, p. 373]. This naturally leads to the problem of how to explain the "life-context" [Lebenszusammenhang, literally something along the lines of "manner in which life is held together"] of Dasein. How can Dasein continuously exist if it is composed of a series of instantaneous now-points, only one of which exists at any given time? What "assembles" the infinity of instantaneous points into a coherent, flowing stream of experience? Furthermore, how can Dasein "hop" towards a future now-point that does not yet exist? In what sense can a past now-point be said to be non-existent? If I held up a bank yesterday, surely I am still a robber today, despite the supposed non-existence of the past. The vulgar concept of time leads, it seems, to difficulties in accounting for the continuity and identity of Dasein as an experiencing entity.

The question facing Heidegger in Chapter Five of Section Two of Being and Time, entitled "Timeliness and Historicity," is how to account for the "extension" [Erstreckung] of Dasein between birth and death. Clearly, the vulgar concept of time is problematic. But if we reject the vulgar concept of time, how can we explain the continuity and identity of Dasein in terms of the primeval phenomenon of timeliness?

Heidegger's answer to this question is divided into two approaches. One approach is to demonstrate that the vulgar concept of time is derived from the observation of intramundane entities and is therefore essentially inauthentic. Since it is essentially inauthentic, it necessarily fails to reflect the true timeliness of Dasein and can be ignored within the context of a philosophical investigation of Dasein's extension. Heidegger pursues this approach in Chapter Six, which contains the concluding sections of Being and Time (§§ 78–83). In Chapter Five, which consists of §§ 72–77, Heidegger attempts to explain the extension of Dasein by giving an adequate account of historicity.
The connection between the extension of Dasein and historicity is relatively obvious. In speaking of Dasein's extension, we are in fact referring to its life history, to the connection between individual events and episodes in its biography. Explaining how the extension of Dasein is possible is equivalent to explaining how it is possible for Dasein's experience to make up a coherent personal history. Accordingly, historicity is nothing other than the structure of Dasein making it possible for the past to form a continuous whole with the present and the future. In inquiring into the nature of historicity, we are asking how it can be possible for the past to have a continuing influence on the present and the future. The possibility of this continuing influence constitutes Dasein's extension.

Heidegger expresses the same point in a rather more obscure manner:

We will call the specific movedness [Bewegtheit] of extended self-extension [des erstreckten Sicherstreckens] the occurrence [Geschehen] of Dasein. The question of the "context" of Dasein is the ontological problem of its occurrence. The exposing of the occurrence-structure and the existential-timely [existenzial-zeitlichen] conditions of its possibility means gaining an ontological understanding of historicity. [§ 72, p. 375]

Heidegger also makes an attempt at the beginning of the chapter to employ another "completeness" argument similar to the one with which he introduced the analysis of death (see Section 3.1). Briefly, Heidegger claims in § 72, p. 372-373, that thus far in Being and Time we have concentrated on understanding Dasein with respect to its end (being unto death). In so doing, we have remained oriented towards the future (i.e., existentiality). However, in raising the question of the extension of Dasein, we are inquiring what Dasein is as a whole. The inquiry into the wholeness of Dasein thus necessitates the complementary analysis of its being unto its own beginning ("birth"), or its relation to the past in the widest sense (thrownness). Thus a
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comprehensive account of Dasein as a whole requires an account of historicity.

It is worth noting in passing that this argument appears to suggest that the world analysis corresponds to an analysis of Dasein's present, while the existential analysis of Dasein is an analysis of the future. It follows that the planned but unwritten "destruction of the history of ontology" in Part Two of Being and Time would have corresponded to an analysis of Dasein's past. Within the perspective of Being and Time, a truly comprehensive account of Dasein as a whole is dependent upon the successful completion of the destruction of the history of ontology in Part Two. Because this task was never completed, Being and Time remains a textual and philosophical torso.

Heidegger's analysis of historicity, or of the continuity of Dasein, is based on three conceptual elements: "inheritance" [Erbe], "destiny" [Schicksal], and "lot" [Geschick]. The bulk of this analysis is contained in § 74. There we are told that the question of historicity is in essence a question concerning the source of the existential possibilities towards which Dasein plans itself. This question is necessary because

forerunning self-planning towards the unattainable possibility of existence, namely death, only guarantees the wholeness and authenticity of decidedness. The factually disclosed possibilities of existence, however, are not to be derived from death. And that is even less the case to the extent that forerunning into the possibility does not mean any speculation concerning it, but rather a returning to the factual there [Da]. [§ 74, p. 383]

Insofar as Dasein exists authentically, Dasein accepts the inevitable possibility of its own death. In so doing, it experiences the primeval sensibility of angst. Angst, as a sensibility, is the structure of Dasein in which the world as such is authentically disclosed. The world, however, is disclosed not as Dasein's own creation but as a network of existential possibilities (meaning-wholes) not chosen by Dasein itself—that is, into which it has
been thrown. Authentic existence, then, involves the acceptance of thrownness, or the acknowledgement of the finitude of Dasein’s possibilities for existence, since these possibilities, including the final possibility of their coming to an end, are not all chosen by Dasein. They are forced upon Dasein in thrownness.

Accordingly, authentic Dasein must disclose the authentic possibilities of its existence by starting from the “inheritance” that it accepts. The word “inheritance” denotes the sum total of thrown possibilities for existence presented to Dasein by the world. Since decidedness involves the acceptance of thrownness, authenticity can be understood, from our new perspective, as the “transmission of an inheritance” [§ 74, p. 383-384]. Forerunning into death means the acceptance of Dasein’s inheritance—its inheritance of all the possibilities, including the possibility of death, which it did not itself choose.

Insofar as Dasein exists authentically, it chooses to accept its inheritance of possibilities for existence. Its task is to comport itself authentically towards possibilities that it did not itself choose but that are imposed upon it by the very act of its existence. Heidegger terms the authentic comportment towards inheritance Dasein’s “destiny” [Schicksal]. “Destiny” denotes the comportment in which decided Dasein’s authentic existence is disclosed to itself in an inherited but nonetheless chosen possibility [§ 74, p. 384]. In short, it is the acknowledgement of the historical situation, arising from inheritance, in which one happens to find oneself.

In speaking of “acknowledgement,” Heidegger most emphatically does not mean that one simply must go along with one’s cultural and social milieu and find them necessarily good. Heidegger is speaking of “acceptance” in the sense that, firstly, one truly recognizes the possibilities the inheritance offers, rejecting the inauthentic crosstalk obscuring the genuine inheritance of a particular historical era. Secondly, in speaking of an “acceptance,” Heidegger means an authentic comportment towards the true inheritance of one’s own historical situation. This involves neither a denial of this inheritance nor a vain
attempt to escape it, but rather an authentic manner of accepting it that is not determined by the everyday, falling, and inauthentic social milieu.

In this context, Heidegger makes the initially puzzling statement that Dasein “can only be struck by blows of fate [Schicksalsschläge] because in the basis [Grund] of its being it is destiny in the previously characterized sense.” This formulation is somewhat misleading, because it can be taken to suggest that destiny is the result of some mysterious intelligence (i.e., “Being”) that consciously plans future occurrences. Heidegger’s real meaning, however, is somewhat more prosaic. Heidegger simply means that coincidence, whether happy or unhappy, acquires a meaning only within the wider framework of destiny—in the specific terminological sense of an acknowledgement of one’s own historically conditioned situation. It is only when one is aware of the past that one can recognize certain events as necessary consequences of this past and attribute others to mere coincidence. If one is not aware of the past, and such is the case with undecided (inauthentic) Dasein, then no event appears to be a result of the past. Events merely happen, exhibiting no connection with each other and no wider meaning. This is why Heidegger notes that undecided Dasein too “is driven about by [conditions and eventualities], and this even more than the one who has chosen, and nonetheless can ‘have’ no destiny” [§ 74, p. 384].

Finally, because being-with is a fundamental and ineradicable existential structure of Dasein, Dasein’s historical situation, its inheritance and its destiny, are necessarily and inescapably shared with others. This shared relationship to a common past is what Heidegger terms their “lot” [Geschick]:

If, however, destined Dasein as being-in-the-world exists essentially in being-with [Mitsein mit] others, its occurring [Geschehen] is an occurring-with [Mitgeschehen] and determined as a lot. With this we denote the occurring of the community, of the people. The lot is not assembled from
individual destinies [...]. In being-with-one-another in the same world and in the decidedness for particular possibilities destinies are already guided in advance. It is first in announcement [Mitteilung] and in struggling [im Kampf] that the power of the lot is unleashed [frei]. The destined lot [das schicksalhafte Geschick] of Dasein in and with its generation [Generation] constitutes the full, authentic occurring of Dasein. [$74$, p. 384-385]

It is worth pointing out that in Heidegger's use of the term the "lot" of a people does not mean "what it is meant to accomplish and undergo by providence." The "lot" of a people during a particular historical period is the sum total of possibilities not that it has itself chosen but that determine its present historical situation. In other words, the "lot" of a particular people is its own past—the past that influences and shapes its future and with which it necessarily must come to terms. In speaking of the "lot of a people," no more is meant than this.

Finally, it is important to recognize that all three fundamental terms used by Heidegger in his analysis of historicity necessarily involve authenticity. There is no inauthentic inheritance, destiny, or lot. Inauthenticity is characterized by the absence of these three existential structures. Historical inauthenticity, for Heidegger, is historical rootlessness—the simple lack of an authentic comportment towards the past. Whether this lack is an actual and explicit rejection or merely an insincere and superficial affirmation of the past is immaterial. The essential point is that in either case the inheritance has not been acknowledged but simply ignored, broken with, or hushed up—perhaps even to affirm a falsified version of it and trumpet it about all the more loudly in crosstalk.

In order to avoid any misunderstanding, it is worth pointing out the equally clear fact that on Heidegger's terms a rejection of the past can indeed be authentic if it is based on an authentic disclosure of the past (i.e., on the timing of timeliness in the mode of retrieval [$74$, p. 385]). It is quite possible both for an individual and for a people to authentically recoil in horror.
from their own inheritance. It is also quite possible for them to authentically rediscover (retrieve) their own dependence upon their inheritance, and to realize that their supposed historical originality and uniqueness are much more closely tied to the supposedly bygone past, and perhaps even to the inheritance of other nations, than was previously supposed.

Heidegger's discussion of historicity has a dual purpose: it is meant to prepare and justify the anticipated philosophical discussion of the philosophical inheritance of the West in Part Two of Being and Time, and it is meant to deal with the problem of the relationship between primeval timeliness and the vulgar concept of time. In the latter case, we recall that the problem was to account for the unity and the continuity of Dasein's experience when, according to the vulgar concept of time, experience consists of an infinite series of momentary and instantaneous events ("now-points") unable to form any true unity. In the next section we will follow Heidegger in inquiring into the origin of the vulgar concept of time. We will conclude the present section with Heidegger's account of the relationship between timeliness and the vulgar concept of time.

Dasein's experience, as we have hitherto analyzed it, is the continuous and unitary phenomenon of finite timeliness characterized by historicity. It does not consist of a series of instantaneous events. Rather, the timeliness of Dasein is a type of "extending." Dasein's experience of timeliness is "stretched," much closer to the episodic time of a novel or film than to the laboratory time with which physical science operates. Our experience of time as we go about our daily business is clearly quite different from our experience of time when we count off a sequence of individual seconds by observing the motion of the second hand of a watch. The latter experience of time, "clock-watching," clearly is a sequence of instantaneous moments. It is, however, just as clear that the former experience of time, or lived time, is not a sequence, but a historically extended unity.

Why do we have the tendency to confuse lived time with clock-watching (in the technical sense in which these two terms
are used in the preceding paragraph)? It seems that somehow we have the inclination to confuse the time of intramundane entities with Dasein's own time. This confusion is already familiar to us as the tendency to understand Dasein in terms of the world rather than in terms of itself. Our technical term for this comportment is *falling*—the comportment that is the existential foundation of inauthenticity.

How is it possible for there to be two different sorts of time, one for Dasein and another for intramundane entities? In § 75 of *Being and Time*, Heidegger informs us that the historical process is a process occurring in being-in-the-world. Accordingly, the historicity of Dasein is necessarily also the historicity of world [§ 75, p. 388], since both the world and the self are functions of the unitary phenomenon of primeval timeliness. Both the world and the self are modifications of timeliness, manners in which the timing of timeliness occurs. Accordingly, “With the existence of historical being-in-the-world, entities to hand and at hand are already drawn into the history of the world [§ 75, p. 388; this sentence is italicized in the original text].”

Intramundane entities, insofar as they partake of the historical world-process, are "world-historical" entities [*das Welt-Geschichtliche*]. "World-history," according to Heidegger, has two meanings. On the one hand it is the "occurring of world in its essential, existent unity with Dasein." On the other hand it is the "intramundane 'occurrence' of to-handed and at-handed entities," that is, the discoveredness of entities as tools in one of two manners, namely as to-handed or as at-handed [§ 75, p. 389].

Dasein, rooted in the timing of timeliness, is a coherent, unitary, and finite stream of experience with an essentially historical character. The question as to how the unity of Dasein is to be "assembled" from an infinite series of instantaneous now-points can only arise when the temporal character of at-handed entities, exhibited in a theoretical comportment of Dasein towards them, is confused with the primeval and pre-theoretical timeliness of Dasein, whose ontological structures are existential rather than categorical. In other words, the question can only be asked when, owing to the
inauthenticity resulting from falling, Dasein is understood with reference to entities discovered as at-handed tools rather than in terms of its own primeval timely structure. When Dasein is understood inauthentically—with reference to intramundane entities—it is understood falsely. (See Sections 2.9, 3.1, 3.3, and 3.4 on Heidegger's identification of authenticity, wholeness, and truth.) It follows that, for Heidegger, any and all questions derived from the vulgar and inauthentic concept of time, insofar as they are raised within the context of the fundamental analysis of Dasein, are completely misguided.

The true question, then, according to Heidegger, is not "How do we account for the unity of experience given that time is an infinite series of infinitesimally small temporal points?" but rather "In which manner of being itself does [Dasein] lose itself such that it so to speak must retroactively pull itself together from dispersion and think up an all-embracing unity for togetherness [das Zusammen]?” [§ 75, p. 390] By contrast with this inauthentic situation, authentic historicity is the decided “retrieval of the inheritance of possibilities” [§ 75, p. 390]. It is apparent that Dasein’s comportment towards time is intimately linked with its own authenticity and inauthenticity. Heidegger describes the somewhat complex connection in the following words:

The decidedness of the self against the inconstancy [Unständigkeit] of dispersion is in its self [in sich selbst] the extended constancy [erstreckte Ständigkeit] in which Dasein as destiny keeps birth and death and their “in-between” “drawn into” its existence, such that in this constancy it is instantiated [augenblicklich] for the world-historical [features] of its particular situation. […]

Constancy does not first assemble itself through and out of the mutual connection of “instants” [in the usual sense of the word] rather these emerge from the already extended timeliness of continuing retrieval in the manner of the advent. [§ 75, p. 390-391]
The "fragmentation" of Dasein arising as a result of the vulgar concept of time is an expression of dispersion, which is an existential consequence of inauthenticity. As a result of falling, the primeval, already extended timeliness of Dasein becomes obscured and forgotten. Thus the phenomenon of inauthenticity in the mode of dispersion is itself the reason for the experience of time as a succession of instantaneous now-points. Further light will be shed on this connection in the following section, which discusses the closing section of *Being and Time*.

### 3.8 THE VULGAR CONCEPT OF TIME (§§ 78–83)

In the final chapter of *Being and Time*, Heidegger attempts to clarify the relationship between primeval timeliness and the vulgar concept of time by studying "concerned time" [*besorgte Zeit*]. "Concerned time," or the form of time characterizing Dasein's manipulation of tools in concernedness (see Section 2.5 a), is an intermediate form of time between primeval timeliness and the vulgar concept of time. While not, strictly speaking, inauthentic as such, concerned time is the basis of a further modification, which in turn gives rise to the properly inauthentic vulgar concept of time. By studying this modification of concerned time, Heidegger attempts to trace the origin of inauthentic time back to timeliness, its primeval and authentic origin.

It is important to keep in mind that despite its inauthenticity, Heidegger does not wish to do away with the vulgar concept of time. As he points out later on in the chapter, within very specific limits the use of the vulgar concept of time is quite justified and even necessary:

The vulgar characterization of time as an endless, expiring, irreversible now-sequence arises from the timeliness of falling Dasein. *The vulgar notion of time has a natural justification* [ihr natürliches Recht]. It belongs to the everyday manner of being of Dasein and to the understanding of being that is initially dominant. [...] This interpretation of time only loses
its exclusive and especial justification when it claims to yield the "true" concept of time and to indicate [vorzeichnen] the sole possible horizon for the interpretation of time. [§ 81, p. 426]

It is impossible to do away with the vulgar concept of time, because it is the time characterizing Dasein in its average everydayness. Without this conception of time it would be impossible to manage our time in any way— to measure elapsed time, to agree to meet at the same time, and to arrange our time so as to get everything done. As we have repeatedly seen in the course of our interpretation of Being and Time, falling and therefore inauthenticity are both anchored in the very structure of Dasein itself. Authenticity, therefore, cannot consist in excising inauthenticity from the sphere of human experience. Rather, authenticity consists both in the acknowledgement that inauthenticity is an ineradicable part of human experience and in an authentic response to this inescapable fact.

In the course of his analysis, Heidegger identifies four fundamental characteristics of concerned time. These structural characteristics belong properly to the timeliness of concern, that is, to the specific modification of timeliness that appears in Dasein's use of tools. We could say that concerned time is neither primeval timeliness nor the time characteristic of the world as such (the vulgar concept of time), but rather the form of time that is exhibited in the everyday world-self relationship.

Heidegger's analysis of these four fundamental characteristics of concerned time is spread out between two sections, § 79 and § 80, and matters are complicated still further by Heidegger's use of several different technical terms to refer to the same characteristics. In order to simplify the presentation of the core ideas, we will adhere strictly to the terminology that Heidegger introduces in § 80, p. 416: "datability" [Datierbarkeit], "stretchedness" [Gespanntheit], "publicity" [öffentlichkeit], and "worldliness" [Weltlichkeit]. The analysis of datability occurs in § 79, p. 407-409, that of stretchedness takes place in § 79, p. 409-410, while the analysis of publicity takes up the last paragraph.
of §79 and the first four paragraphs of §80; the analysis of worldliness runs from the fifth paragraph of §80 in §80, p. 412, to §80, p. 414, the rest of §80 being occupied with commentary and further exposition.

According to Heidegger, concerned time exhibits four principal and fundamental structural features:

1. “Datability” [Datierbarkeit] is the association of time with a particular entitical state of affairs: “now that—the door is slamming, now that—my book is missing, and so on” [§ 79, p. 408]. Datability has three basic forms corresponding to the present, the past, and the future: “now that ...” [jetzt, da ...], “back when ...” [damals, als ...] and “later as ...” [dann, wann ...]. Datability is the quality making it possible to assign dates to occurrences or events [§ 79, p. 407].

2. “Stretchedness” [Gespanntheit] is the feature of concerned time making it possible to speak of duration in the sense of the length of a particular state of affairs. It is the length of time during which a state or arrangement of entities persists. This quality of concerned time is a further modification of the extension, or primeval timely unity, of Dasein. (See Section 3.7.) [§ 79, p. 409]

3. “Publicity” [Öffentlichkeit] refers to the public or universally binding character of concerned time, its universalization. Concerned time is not merely private; it acts as a generally established temporal framework considered to be universally valid for all peoples, events, and occurrences. The universal character of concerned time is a function of the one-self; it is only because it is the time with which one reckons that it can be binding for all individuals [§ 79, p. 411].

4. Finally, “worldliness” [Weltlichkeit] is the suitability (and unsuitability) of specific times for particular manners of comportment towards entities, that is, for the accomplishment of particular tasks. Worldliness has
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a structural feature to which Heidegger refers as the "time-to" \([\text{Zeit-zu}]\) structure. The time-to structure of any particular time reveals an in-order-to, a fundamental characteristic of meaningfulness, and thus of Dasein's use of entities as tools, familiar to us from Section 2.5.

These four characteristics are the fundamental structural features of concerned time. Insofar as this concerned time functions as the ontological basis of the meaningfulness-structure underlying our experience of the world, Heidegger speaks of "world-time" \([\text{Weltzeit}]\). By contrast, intramundane entities encountered within world-time exhibit "intrachronicity" \([\text{Innerzeitigkeit};\) see the commentary to "Timeliness" in Appendix A]. Lastly, time, insofar as it is measured using instruments of whatever sort—"the world-time that is 'sighted' in such a manner in the use of the clock" \([\S\ 81,\ p.\ 421]\)—is "now-time" \([\text{Jetzt-Zeit}]\).

Now-time is the conceptual foundation of the vulgar concept of time. How are we to understand the relationship between now-time and world-time? In the vulgar concept of time, which is derived from now-time, the essential relationship of dataibility to meaningfulness is ignored. Whereas world-time is by nature associated with entities, now-time is a "pure sequence." It is an empty form or arrangement in which events take place, as in a sort of vessel. Being a purely formal structure, now-time has no true relationship with the entities filling it. It can exist completely on its own, whether full or empty of entities.

Similarly, the stretchedness of world-time, the duration of entities or entitical states of affairs, for example the duration of an evening meal, becomes fragmented in now-time. No longer do events take time and endure throughout their span of time; rather, in now-time, stretchedness is replaced by an "uninterrupted and gapless" \([\S\ 81,\ p.\ 423]\) sequence of empty nows. Because of its essential disconnectedness from meaningfulness, now-time appears as an endless and beginningless now-sequence, obscuring the essentially finite nature of primeval timeliness.
As a further result of its detachment from meaningfulness, now-time appears as a "free-floating in-itself of an at-handed now-sequence" [§ 81, p. 414; the phrase is italicized in the original German text]. With this further development time becomes "objective" and therefore universally binding. Accordingly, in the vulgar conception of time,

the now-sequence remains completely unrecognizable with respect to its origin in the timeliness of individual Dasein in everyday togetherness [Miteinander]. And how should it affect the march of "time" in the least when a human being, present [vorhanden] "in time," no longer exists? Time goes on, just as it already "was" when a human being "came into life." One only knows the public time that, levelled off [nivelliert], belongs to everyone, and that means to no one. [§ 81, p. 425]

When we consider the manner in which the three aforementioned structures of world-time are modified in now-time, it seems clear enough that the transition from world-time to now-time takes place when the fourth characteristic of world-time, namely worldliness, is suppressed. The separation of world-time from its essential connection with meaningfulness permits the theoretical construction of an abstract and objective—and therefore apparently absolute—form of time.

This form of time, now-time or the vulgar conception of time, is not the time involved in our everyday experience. It is not the time that lasts longer when we are in the dentist's office waiting for our root canal to begin, nor is it the time that flies when we are having fun. However, in the vulgar conception of time, the time whose length is variable, namely experienced time, is branded "subjective." It arises, on this interpretation, due to psychological quirks of the human mind. It would not arise at all if the human mind were not limited by the tendency to remember interesting events and to forget events of lesser importance. It is therefore ignored in favour of constructed time, which is "universal" and "objective." Experienced time, on
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this account, arises due to the failure of the subjective human mind to apprehend objective time objectively. In short, the vulgar conception of time affirms precisely the opposite of what Heidegger believes is the true state of affairs. It is the inauthentic conception of time that—in Heidegger’s view—underlies the entire history of Western ontology, from Aristotle to Hegel, and whose pervasive yet hidden influence continues to dominate the present era of philosophical and scientific thought.

Being and Time ends with a short reflection on the course Heidegger’s phenomenological analysis has taken throughout the entire book. The last sentences of the book contain a string of tantalizing and important questions: “Is there a way that leads from primeval time to the sense of Being? Does time itself reveal itself as the horizon of Being?” [§ 83, p. 437] For the moment, at least, these questions must remain unanswered. Later, Heidegger would claim that the existential-ontological framework of Being and Time was inadequate to the task of answering the question of Being. In an extended letter to Jean Beaufret written in the fall of 1946 and later published as “Brief über den ‘Humanismus,’” Heidegger implies that the approach of Being and Time still relied too heavily on traditional metaphysical conceptions. (See Wegmarken p. 327–328.) Explaining how and why this should have been the case is a task for a future work.

The planned “destruction or the history of ontology” in Part Two of Being and Time would have shown how the overall sense of Being had consistently and progressively been obscured in the course of the development of Western philosophy instead of being properly understood with reference to timeliness. While it is impossible to reconstruct the precise path Heidegger would have taken had he gone ahead with the writing of Part Two, we can at least outline the interpretative situation with which we are left at the end of Part One. The arrows in the diagram are meant to indicate a movement towards a more profound level of interpretation:
Rephrasing Heidegger

\[
\text{timeliness} \quad \downarrow \quad \downarrow \\
= \text{being of intramundane entities} + \text{being of Dasein} \\
= \text{horizontal timeliness} + \text{ecstatic timeliness} \\
\downarrow \\
\text{their unity} = \text{the overall sense of Being}
\]

This interpretative framework, in which the overall sense of Being is understood with respect to primeval timeliness conceived as the unity of horizontal and ecstatic timeliness, would have been used in Part Two in order to interpret the history of ontology, that is, the significant epochal developments in the occidental understanding of Being throughout its progressive development. Heidegger would eventually feel that it was precisely the task of trying to unify two separate realms of Being that made it impossible to answer the question of Being within the interpretative framework of fundamental ontology. According to this later self-interpretation, the very distinction for which Heidegger is perhaps best known, the "ontological difference," or the difference between entities and Being, contained a hidden element of "metaphysics." Heidegger would later claim that the essentially metaphysical nature of the ontological difference made it impossible to explain the connection between Being and entities. The concept of the "transcendence of Dasein," introduced in order to bridge the gap, further complicated matters without leading to a satisfactory resolution of the problem.

Eventually, Heidegger would decide to abandon the ontological difference altogether along with the concept of transcendence in favour of an entirely new form of philosophical investigation: ontohistorical thought [das seinsgeschichtliche Denken].