Rephrasing Heidegger

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CHAPTER 2

HERMENEUTIC PHENOMENOLOGY
AS FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY

2.1 UNDERSTANDING VERSUS PERCEPTION

In Chapter 1 we discussed the history of the phenomenological movement and emphasized the themes and approaches that are particularly significant for an adequate comprehension of Heidegger's philosophy as it is presented in his main work, *Being and Time*.¹ We noted that in order to understand Heidegger's phenomenological methodology, it is particularly important to begin with a basic knowledge of the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. Without a knowledge of Husserl, it is very easy to confuse Heidegger's philosophical methodology with a merely "descriptive" approach, a confusion that we will address in the course of the following sections. Of course, the Heidegger of *Being and Time* also modifies the Husserlian approach in important and decisive ways; these modifications will be addressed in further detail in Section 2.4.

Even when the requirement of a familiarity with Husserl's phenomenology has been met, further difficulties present themselves when first approaching *Being and Time* as a philosophical work. Chief among these difficulties is the peculiar lack of organization that the book exhibits. Particularly frustrating for the first-time reader is the fact that the initial sections of *Being and Time* all presuppose an acquaintance with Heidegger's conception of *understanding* [Verstehen] and are not
comprehensible without it. Unfortunately, Heidegger's own presentation of his concept of understanding in *Being and Time* is not particularly accessible, the more so because it presupposes an acquaintance with the initial sections of *Being and Time*. I am not inclined to attribute any deeper significance other than lack of literary foresight to this peculiar arrangement of the material. However, the fact remains that the material must be presented differently if there is to be any hope of helping readers along towards a real appreciation of the philosophical meaning and significance of *Being and Time*.

It would hardly be an exaggeration, as Sections 2.2 to 2.6 will demonstrate, to call Heidegger's conception of the act of understanding the foundation of his philosophy. From this conception Heidegger derives his unique view of the world and of the structural constitution of human existence. As important as it is unusual, with this conception Heidegger's entire philosophy stands or falls. If one is thoroughly acquainted with the concept of understanding as presupposed in the book, then the approaches and analyses of *Being and Time* are clear and easily understood. If not, Heidegger's intentions and arguments appear incomprehensible.

Although it is usually best to present a philosophical line of thought after the manner of the philosopher in question, in this particular case to do so would clearly be counterproductive. Because of the central role played by Heidegger's concept of understanding and because of the highly inaccessible manner in which Heidegger himself presents this concept in *Being and Time*, we will in the present section of the book introduce a highly simplified and condensed illustration of Heidegger's theory. With this initial grasp of the subject matter, we will then be in a position to supplement our original account with Heidegger's own perspectives and terminology in the following sections.

*Being and Time* begins with a phenomenological analysis of the world and our relation to it. This analysis has puzzled many readers because, despite its claim to articulate the structures of our experience of the world at a basic, everyday level, the
concrete results of the analysis seem to be utterly at odds with the world as we usually conceive of it. It is, however, crucial that we understand that Heidegger's phenomenology is not a theory of perceptual experience in the manner of, say, John Locke (1632–1704), George Berkeley (1685–1753), or Hume. It is, rather, a theory of interaction with the things we encounter in the world around us. Heidegger, in short, is interested not in the act of perception as such and in isolation from other possible human acts, but rather in our manners of comportment [Verhaltungen] towards others, towards ourselves, and towards the various things or entities we find in our immediate surroundings.

"Comportment" in this sense is a general term referring collectively to all the possible ways of interacting with things in our immediate environment. Thus buying, selling, cooking, longing, thinking, considering, willing, wanting, wishing, admiring, observing, perceiving, viewing, pondering, managing, and so on are all ways in which we comport ourselves towards the things we come across in daily life. Heidegger's term for the "things" towards which we can comport ourselves is Seiendes, which we will render as "entities." Heidegger uses the term "entity" to designate all the animate and inanimate things (in the widest sense of "thing") that are possible "targets" or "goals" of our comportments.

Heidegger believes, for reasons that are obviously connected with his phenomenological approach, that our everyday manner of comportment towards entities is not primarily a perceptual one. He thinks, in fact, that perceptions so-called are a theoretical superimposition on our actual experience by way of a later theoretical re-interpretation of this experience. Recalling the third fundamental characteristic of Heidegger's phenomenology in Section 1.4, the position that the fundamental structures of our comportment towards entities are in some way hidden, for Heidegger it is our very familiarity with entities that disguises the true structural complexity of our comportments towards them. (There is a further and more technical reason, involving Heidegger's account of inauthenticity, why the familiar structures of everyday life are hidden. See Section 2.8 for details.)
This point is really quite commonplace; for example, a proficient guitarist might find it difficult, when asked by an eager beginner, to explain exactly how a particular technique is executed. Similarly, when asked by non-native speakers to explain grammatical and syntactical peculiarities of our mother tongue, we are frequently at a loss for an explanation, although we ourselves appear not to make mistakes with respect to the point under consideration. In both cases, it frequently happens that we even give the wrong explanation. In a similar fashion, then, we might out of habit, when asked about our comportments towards entities, simply give the wrong answer, namely that the most important comportment was the act of perception.

Using a phenomenological approach, Heidegger believes that he can show that the actual range and variety of our comportments towards entities in the world is much wider than the restricted sphere of purely perceptive acts would allow. For Heidegger, then, there is a more fundamental range and structure of comportment than perception. This primeval [ursprünglich] structure of comportment (which, as we will see in Section 2.5, Heidegger calls being-in-the-world) influences and determines the manner in which all other comportments, including and in particular perception, take place. Heidegger's first philosophical ambition in Being and Time is to work out a comprehensive theory that describes the basic structures that underlie all particular manners of comportment. Accordingly, the theme of §§ 9–44 of Being and Time is the preparatory fundamental analysis of human existence, or Dasein.  

For Heidegger, one of the fundamental manners in which we comport ourselves towards entities is understanding. Understanding has what we can call (for now) a referential structure. On this account, when I “understand” a particular entity, I understand it with reference to—that is, in terms of, or on the basis of—something else. This wider context or frame of reference with reference to which I understand particular entities is what Heidegger calls meaningfulness [Bedeutsamkeit]. In practical terms, this is very easy to illustrate. Consider, for
a moment, a piece of chalk. How do I understand what this chalk is? For Heidegger, I understand the chalk with reference to the act of writing on a blackboard (for example). The chalk as a whole and as such simply is the sum total of purposes for which it can be used.\(^5\) The blackboard, in turn, is understood with reference to the wider system of references involved in the classroom; the classroom is understood with reference to the educational institution in which it is found, be it a school, college, or university. The classroom is understood with reference to the institution as a whole and with reference to the particular educational context carried with it, the institution is understood with reference to the province in which it is located, and so on. In short: we understand particular entities such as the chalk and the blackboard with reference to interlocking and nested systems of meaningfulness.

According to Heidegger’s account of human comportment, we comport ourselves towards entities by understanding their meaningfulness. Meaningfulness is always situated in a context. Without this understanding of their meaningfulness, this understanding of what they are and of what they are for within a wider frame of reference, my mere perception of these entities can tell me nothing about them. A merely perceived entity, an entity that is not meaningful in our specific terminological sense of “meaningfulness,” is simply “mutely there,” like letters in a foreign alphabet, which are not even recognized as letters, but only perceived as “not-even-squiggles.” In order to perceive entities in any significant and informative way, I must first understand their meaningfulness. Accordingly, it seems that we have a case for arguing with Heidegger that understanding is more fundamental to our interaction with entities than perception. Ultimately, the various interlocked and interrelated “systems of reference” considered as a totality of meaningfulness constitute what Heidegger calls the worldliness of the world. That is to say, they are the characteristic fundamental structure and defining feature of the world phenomenon as such.
2.2 WHY ASK THE QUESTION OF BEING? (§§ 1-4)

Following these explanations, we are in a position to address Heidegger's use of the term "Being" as well as the meaning and purpose of the "question of Being," both initially perplexing Heideggerian notions. We will begin with a preliminary explanation of "Being." As we saw in the last section, entities are always understood within a particular frame of reference, that is, as meaningful. Given that this is so, it is also the case that particular types of entities are defined by their common meaningfulness. Thus everything belonging to a classroom situation shares in the meaningfulness defined by the classroom frame of reference, everything properly found within a workshop shares in the meaningfulness defined by the workshop frame of reference, and so on. This is not to say that everything actually found in a workshop, for example, is necessarily understood as meaningful within the workshop. It might be that a particular object, say a musical instrument, is so strongly tied to its own meaningfulness that it is felt to be in the wrong place when it is found in the workshop. The essential point is merely that particular types or ranges of entities are defined by shared meaningfulness.

It is also clear that meaningfulness itself is structured into interlocking or nested systems. Even within the workshop as a whole, there are particular objects that are defined by a "subsystem" of meaningfulness. Thus chisels all share in chiselling-meaningfulness; screwdrivers all share in screwdriving-meaningfulness; hammers all share in hammering-meaningfulness; and so on. Within these systems we could distinguish still smaller subsystems, such as the specific meaningfulness belonging to handles, blades, and heads. This pattern of interrelated systems of meaningfulness is, however, also true on a larger scale. The workshop as a whole could belong to a homestead. The homestead could be one of many in a particular county; the county could belong to the meaningfulness particular to a province; the province could share in the meaningfulness of a particular country; the country could belong to the meaningfulness of a particular continent, and so on.
Is there any fundamental meaningfulness that underlies all the various interlocking or nested systems of meaningfulness? Heidegger believes that there is. Recall that the fundamental feature of all meaningfulness is that meaningfulness defines particular entities as the entities that they happen to be. Thus a hammer is only a hammer because it is found within the particular system of meaningfulness that makes it possible to understand the act of driving nails and its specific purpose. The fundamental feature of meaningfulness is thus that it permits us to comport ourselves towards entities as those particular entities that they are. There is, in other words, a basic structure to all meaningfulness, a general, overarching frame of reference with reference to which we understand what it means for something to be an entity at all. This can be slightly rephrased by saying that there must be a fundamental frame of reference by means of which we understand the difference between existence and non-existence. This overarching and fundamental frame of reference according to which we discriminate between what actually exists and what does not is what Heidegger calls Being [Sein, das Sein].

It may seem, at first glance, strange that such a criterion exists at all, or that it exists without our knowing what it is, or that (for the later Heidegger) such a criterion can change in different historical epochs. However, we can better understand what Heidegger means by taking a concrete example. Let us consider a particular theoretical position to the effect that scientific knowledge is the final arbiter of truth and falsity. In some extreme forms, this position is put forth as the thesis that only those things and events that can be measured and quantified under strictly controlled laboratory conditions are in fact real. For our purposes, we can give a Heideggerian characterization of this theory as the definition of existence as observability under laboratory conditions.

This particular definition of existence, or to put it in more Heideggerian terms, this planning [Entwerfen] of entities towards
Being understood as laboratory observability, has interesting consequences for the proponents of such a definition. With our present technology, biochemical and biomechanical events can indeed be observed in the laboratory and quantified; therefore they exist. Emotions, thoughts, wishes and the like—the "mind" or "soul" in the widest traditional sense—cannot. Therefore, according to this position, either these phenomena do not exist—their existence is not acknowledged and they are ignored—or, where their existence is acknowledged at all, it is re-interpreted in terms of those entities that are recognized as existent, namely biochemical and biomechanical events. On this view there arises the familiar "behaviourist" denial of consciousness, or at least of the importance of consciousness for a properly scientific theory. Character and inclination are defined in terms of heredity. Love is compared with a chemical addiction. There follows the well-known "epiphenomenalist" theory, according to which consciousness is a non-essential byproduct of the chemical activity of the brain, as meaningless to properly scientific explanation as the noise of a lawnmower is to the act of mowing the lawn.

Why is it that such theories do not acknowledge the existence of certain classes of entities while other theories do? Why is their existence concealed or obscured within the laboratory meaningfulness schema and not in other systems of meaningfulness? We might be tempted to say: because these entities are not found in the laboratory, the proponent of a radically materialist behaviourist theory decides that they do not exist. The existence of such entities has not, on this view, been confirmed by careful and systematic scientific investigation; therefore their existence is doubtful.

Upon further reflection, however, we see that this conclusion is unwarranted. The supposedly doubtful status of the existence of such entities cannot be justified by an appeal to the results of laboratory experiments because the possible results of laboratory experiments are determined in advance by the conditions of the laboratory. If, for example, we peer through a pair of binoculars, we obviously will not be able to see protozoa, which are too
small to be observed except through a microscope. Similarly, we cannot conclude from our laboratory experiments that certain types of entities do not exist at all, because having entered the laboratory, we can only interact with the type of entity that has meaningfulness in a laboratory frame of reference.

If, nonetheless, we do go on to conclude, based on the range of entities we come upon in the laboratory setting, that our experiments have categorically disproved the existence of certain types of entities, the argument is obviously circular, because we began with the assumption that the laboratory is in fact the proper arbiter of the entire range of truly existent entities. The experimental results cannot justify the criterion of laboratory observability, because the criterion of laboratory observability is already assumed by the interpretation of the experimental results. Our interpretation of the laboratory results in fact does nothing but make our hidden assumptions evident. It is an argument in a circle.

For Heidegger, neither is this circularity a simple mistake nor does it characterize the physical sciences as such. This circular structure is, so Heidegger believes, an essential feature of all acts of understanding. Since we can never comport ourselves towards entities except insofar as they are characterized by meaningfulness, the system of reference from which their meaningfulness is derived must precede any actual comportment towards them. This necessary and unavoidable pre-structure of understanding constitutes what Heidegger calls the hermeneutic circle. For Heidegger, there can never be any question of abolishing or putting aside the essentially circular structure of our understanding. Philosophically speaking, an adequate understanding is not a matter of “getting out of” the hermeneutic circle but of “getting into it” in the proper manner. In other words: our understanding can never function without a presupposed frame of reference from which the meaningfulness of entities is derived. Thus an adequate understanding is dependent upon beginning with an appropriate frame of reference suitable to the nature of the entities in question. (Compare the remarks on Heidegger’s concept of phenomenology in Section 2.4.)
Every act of understanding, then, assumes an ultimate frame of reference or *horizon* [Horizont]7 with reference to which we understand whatever is understood. We will address the subject of understanding and its circular structure in more detail in Section 2.6. For now, it is sufficient to underscore in passing that Heidegger believes that it is simply not possible to comport ourselves towards entities unless they are understood as meaningful. That is to say: we must always assume some prior frame of reference in order to understand what entities are, and it is never possible to comport ourselves towards them outside of the meaningfulness conferred upon them by this frame of reference. Thus in the case of our example, it would be wrong to say that entities exist in some objective non-meaningful state and that this state is merely layered over with a surface interpretation, which does not affect their essential objective nature. Rather, from Heidegger’s point of view, the definition of Being as laboratory observability quite literally determines what does and does not exist because it determines how we do and do not comport ourselves towards the entities in question.8

Returning to our example, it has become reasonably obvious that if we make the decision that whatever cannot be observed under laboratory conditions does not exist, this decision cannot properly be the result of our laboratory experiments but only of a criterion of existence that we assume beforehand. This implied criterion does not appear to arise from a conscious decision to restrict oneself to laboratory facts in our example. It is rather more the case that it has the status of a latent background assumption. How, then, does it come about that we make such assumptions? We could almost say—and Heidegger does say—that such background assumptions are emotional in nature. They occur prior to any actual working out of conceptual systems and systems of meaningfulness. The proponents of radical behaviourism and of radical materialism, on this account, begin with an inclination to acknowledge laboratory phenomena and a disinclination to acknowledge the existence of entities outside the laboratory.9 Heidegger’s term for this sort of inclination and disinclination is sensibility [Befindlichkeit].
According to Heidegger's phenomenological analysis, it is only on the basis of sensibility that a person can be concerned or occupied with entities in the world at all. This is because one's basic sensibility—one's emotional state or mood—determines the range of entities towards which one is inclined or disinclined. Heidegger sometimes puts this, as we shall see in Section 2.6, by saying that sensibility reveals to us the fact that we ourselves exist and have the task of existence before us. It is because of our basic sensibility that we can comport ourselves towards entities in the world at all. This sensibility is the foundation of what we call emotions, feelings, and states of mind.

In other words: radical behaviourism and similar positions are not merely theoretical positions. They are associated with a certain sensibility, that is, with a certain fundamentally emotional relation to the world. From a Heideggerian point of view the theoretical position of radical behaviourism is a consequence of this particular emotional relation to the world, and not vice versa. The priority of feelings and emotions, of sensibility, in Heidegger's description of our comportment towards entities in the world is a unique feature of his philosophy, and it is this feature that, in his later writings, lends his philosophical aesthetics its peculiar and fascinating explanatory power.

Let us pause to take stock of the results of our explanations. On Heidegger's account of understanding, entities in the world are always understood in terms of their meaningfulness. The various systems of meaningfulness are interlocked or nested. Furthermore, for Heidegger, there is a fundamental overarching system of meaningfulness with reference to which we determine what does and does not exist. Heidegger's name for this system or criterion is Being. In short: every possible comportment towards entities presupposes an understanding of Being, since it is only with reference to Being that we are able to understand what does and does not exist, what is and is not to be found within systems of meaningfulness at all.

In order to make this idea plausible, we interpreted a radical form of materialist behaviourism as a theoretical position arising
from a particular restricted definition of Being. It is, however, evident that the criterion of laboratory observability is not the only possible definition of Being, nor is it necessarily even the most fundamental. Most of us do not make use of this particular criterion—and yet we have no problems comporting ourselves towards entities at the level of everyday life. On Heidegger’s view, there must be a fundamental understanding of Being, since without this understanding we would be unable to comport ourselves towards meaningful entities at all. The question then arises: what is the fundamental everyday understanding of Being upon which all our comportments towards meaningful entities in the world is based?

We began with two initial definitions of “Being”: (1) that with reference to which we understand what it means for something to be an entity at all; and (2) that by means of which we understand the difference between existence and non-existence. To borrow a distinction from Leibniz, it is clear that these two definitions are merely nominal definitions. That is to say: they do indeed specify unique and characteristic features of Being, but they do not yet tell us what Being in fact is. The aim of Heidegger’s Being and Time is to supplement these nominal definitions with a real definition: to specify the precise criterion in terms of which we understand an entity as at all meaningful, as something to which it is possible to comport ourselves at all.

“Being” in Being and Time is that which characterizes entities as such, that is, the criterion with reference to which we decide what is and is not an entity (or demarcate the existent from the nonexistent, both terms taken in their usual sense). It is particularly important not to confuse this sense of “Being” with the other senses in which Heidegger uses the term. Thus the “being” in “being-in-the-world” simply means “the human act of existing (in the world).” There is absolutely no implication that Being is manifesting in the world through human agents; thus Heidegger’s concept of Being is not at all to be equated with Hegel’s concept of Geist or “spirit.” Furthermore, Heidegger sometimes speaks of the “being” of a particular phenomenon.
This use of "being" simply means the characteristic feature of the phenomenon in question. Thus, when Heidegger speaks of the "being of entities," he simply means their defining feature, which, for entities as such and as a whole, is Being. A frequently repeated claim in *Being and Time* is Heidegger's insistence that "Being is not something like entities." By this, he simply means "If we want to know what Being is, it makes no sense to examine entities and find out what 'stuff' they happen to be made of, whether 'atoms' or 'substances' or anything of that sort because it will not answer our question—our answer would be determined in advance by our hidden assumption of what Being is. What we really need to do is inquire into the fundamental criterion we use to decide what the basic defining feature of entities as such is; and this is 'Being' in the proper sense of the word. Once we have this answer, then we can go back and ask what they happen to be made of and get a proper answer." The difference between Being and entities is neither mysterious nor mystical. It is as simple as the distinction between a criterion for meaningfulness (Being) and the meaningful thing itself (entities).

### 2.3 THE STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK *BEING AND TIME* (§§ 5, 6, 8)

*Being and Time*, in the form in which we have it, is in fact only a portion of the first part of a much longer projected work, which Heidegger never finished writing. Up until the publication of the seventh edition in 1953, *Being and Time* carried the words "First Half" on its title page; they were deleted with the publication of the seventh and following editions. Generally speaking, when scholars refer to the book *Being and Time* they are referring only to the portion of the book that was actually written and published by Heidegger. We will retain this use of the title *Being and Time* as meaning only the actually published work unless it is explicitly stated that we are discussing the originally planned book as a whole. Note that some commentators refer to the published
portion of *Being and Time* as "Division I," following Macquarrie and Robinson's translation of Heidegger's Table of Contents, where the main text of *Being and Time* is referred to as the *Erster Teil* (the "first part").

In order to understand the true significance of the published parts of *Being and Time*, it is important to clarify their function within the much larger work that *Being and Time* was originally intended to be. Heidegger tells us in § 8 of *Being and Time* that the book as a whole is divided into two parts, corresponding to the two tasks involved in working out the answer to the question of Being. Each of these two parts is divided into three sections as follows:

**Part One.** The Interpretation of Dasein towards Timeliness and the Explication of Time as the Transcendental Horizon of the Question Concerning Being.
1. The Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein.
2. Dasein and Timeliness.
3. Time and Being.

**Part Two.** Fundamentals of a Phenomenological Destruction of the History of Ontology Following the Guiding Theme [Leitfaden] of the Problematic of Temporality.
1. *Kant's* Doctrine of Schematism and of Time as a Preliminary Stage of a Problematic of Temporality.
2. The Ontological Foundation of *Descartes'* "cogito sum" and the Incorporation of Mediaeval Ontology into the Problematic of the "res cogitans."
3. *Aristotle's* Treatise on Time as a Turning Point for the Phenomenal Basis and the Limits of Ancient Ontology.

Before we go on to further discuss the structure of *Being and Time*, a few brief remarks concerning Heidegger's terminology are in order. Dasein is Heidegger's term for humans and for the particular manner of existence that characterizes them. It is an
ordinary German word and in everyday speech means the same as “existence.” Etymologically, Dasein is a compound of the adverb *da*, meaning “there,” and the infinitive *sein* or “being.” As Heidegger frequently plays upon the literal meaning of the word, it is important to somehow preserve the etymology in translation, but there unfortunately seems to be no elegant means of doing so. In order to avoid such clumsy neologisms as “therebeing,” most translators simply retain the original German word *Dasein*. As this word has become more or less familiar to the English-speaking philosophical world, we will also follow this convention here.

It is important to keep in mind that Heidegger’s use of the term *Dasein* in *Being and Time* is equivocal. In the strict sense, the term *Dasein* refers to “being-in-the-world,” or the structural unity of the world, the self, and the world–self relation. In some passages, however, Heidegger uses *Dasein* as a synonym for the self alone. This equivocation may occasion some confusion as to whether Heidegger believes that there is a plurality of “Daseins.” As we shall see, Heidegger of course believes that there are many separate selves. However, the world in which these selves exist is indeed a shared world common to all. These points should be firmly kept in mind in order to avoid the confusion of Heidegger’s concept of *Dasein* with a “universal mind” and similar philosophical constructions.

With respect to the German words *Zeitlichkeit* and *Temporality*, it is important to break with the convention established by Macquarrie and Robinson. Both terms are normal German words with the same meaning, namely “temporality.” Unfortunately, Heidegger appears to use both words in distinct terminological senses. *Zeitlichkeit* seems to refer to the authentic time of *Dasein*, whereas *Temporality* is Heidegger’s terminological designation for the most primeval manifestation of time. This distinction allows Heidegger to later say that temporality “is the most primeval timing of timeliness as such.” It is thus important to maintain the distinction in English translation. For *Temporality* we will use the obvious translation “temporality,”
while we will appropriate the word “timeliness” as a translation of Zeitlichkeit. Bear in mind that “timeliness” in this sense has nothing to do with the usual meaning of the word. These terms will be further addressed in Section 3.5.

A brief glance at the Table of Contents of Being and Time shows us that the book as we have it consists only of the first two sections of Part One. Technically speaking, Being and Time is in fact less than the “First Half” of the book Heidegger originally planned to write. We do, however, have a fair idea of the issues Heidegger would have addressed in the unfinished parts of Being and Time had he decided to follow his original outline. From a note to the first page of the posthumously published lecture Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, originally held in 1927, we know that Heidegger intended the lecture as an attempt to work out the contents of Section Three of Part One, “Time and Being,” to his satisfaction. As Being and Time was itself published in 1927, we can be reasonably certain that the contents of the lecture were being considered for possible inclusion in the “Second Half.” The historical analysis that the lecture undertakes is meant to justify the introduction of the concept of the “ontological difference,” a topic to which Heidegger would return in 1929 in “Vom Wesen des Grundes.”

The intended contents of Section One of Part Two, “Kant’s Doctrine of the Schematism and of Time as a Preliminary Stage of a Problematic of Temporality,” can be guessed at by examining the unpublished lecture Phänomenologische Interpretationen von Kant’s Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1927/28) and the book Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, published by Heidegger in 1929. Heidegger was particularly fascinated by a particularly obscure section in the second book of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason entitled “Of the Schematism of the Pure Concepts of Understanding.” In this section Kant believes it necessary to introduce mediating structures between the Categories and the appearances (phenomena) given to us in experience. Kant terms such a “mediating representation” a “transcendental schema.” A transcendental schema is able to “subsume appearances under
Categories" by means of the "transcendental determination of
time," time being common to both "the manifold of the inner
sense," whose "formal condition" it is, and to the Categories,
whose generality implies a transcendental determination of
time. Accordingly, the transcendental schemas are manners
in which transcendental subjectivity generates the temporal
structure of experience. Kant's treatment of the subject bears a
certain resemblance to Heidegger's investigation of the temporal
structure of Dasein in Being and Time, which suggests that
Heidegger's interest in this Kantian framework was based on
more than simple historical curiosity.

Although Heidegger's remarks on Kant, Descartes, and
Aristotle in § 6 give us a rough idea of the planned contents of
Part Two, Heidegger does not appear to have worked out the
contents of Sections Two and Three of Part Two at any great
length. His probable general line of argument can be inferred
from a reading of §§ 19–21 of Being and Time, which contain
Heidegger's critique of Descartes' determination of the "world"
as a res extensa, read in conjunction with §§ 78–81, which address
the origin of the "vulgar" (inauthentic) concept of time. The brief
remarks on Aristotle in §§ 81–82 along with the comments on the
measurement of time in §§ 78–80 allow an educated guess as to
Heidegger's concrete objections to Aristotle's theory of time. (See
Section 3.8 for further details.)

Heidegger's own presentation of the outline of Being and
Time is particularly clumsy. He discusses the intended structure
of the work as a whole in § 8, from which the outline of the two
parts given above was taken, but explains the actual contents of
Part One in § 5 and the contents of Part Two in § 6. To compound
the confusion, it is not even clear that § 5 corresponds to Part
One and § 6 to Part Two, because the reader can only figure this
out by matching up the titles and contents of § 5 and § 6 with
the structural outline given in § 8. To ensure that the reader will
almost certainly overlook the connection, Heidegger inserts
the notoriously obscure § 7 on the concept of phenomenology
between the two sections on the detailed contents of the book.
In § 5 of *Being and Time*, entitled “The Ontological Analytic of Dasein as an Exposure of the Horizon for an Interpretation of the Overall Sense of Being,” Heidegger emphasizes, in accordance with his phenomenological method, that the task of Part One is to identify and describe fundamental structures of human existence—of Dasein—in its “average everydayness” [in seiner durchschnittlichen Alltagslichkeit]. The point of describing Dasein at the level of average everydayness is to avoid the artificially restricted contexts of scientific explanations (recall the quasi-behaviourist example discussed in Section 2.2) as well as the artificially created sphere of transcendental consciousness resulting from the Husserlian *epoché*. (See Sections 1.3 and 1.4.) The “sense” [Sinn] of the being of the entity called Dasein will, so Heidegger tells us, turn out to be “timeliness” [Zeitlichkeit]. This analysis is a preparatory analysis (recall the title of Section One of Part One, namely “The Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein”), because it will serve as a foundation for going on to inquire what the overall sense of Being [der Sinn von Sein überhaupt], and not just the being of Dasein, is. The preparatory analysis will lead to the question of “Dasein and timeliness” (Section Two). It will be shown, says Heidegger, that it is with reference to time that Dasein can at all understand and interpret what Being is (hence the title of Section Three of Part One, “Time and Being”). The concrete answer to the question concerning the sense of Being will arise as a result of the problematic of the “temporality of Being.”

In § 6, entitled “The Task of a Destruction of the History of Ontology,” Heidegger describes the fundamentally historical task of Part Two of *Being and Time*. Early interpreters of this section typically failed to realize that Heidegger was using
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the term “destruction” in its literal Latin sense, namely the act of “unlayering” or of “taking apart,” and not in the sense of “destroying.” This mistake in turn frequently led early interpreters to maintain that the importance of history could be taken as a reliable indicator of the difference between the early and the late Heidegger. It is, however, plain that Part Two of Being and Time was from the very beginning intended to contain a number of historical analyses concerning the origin and development of our present understanding of Being. We can sum up Heidegger’s aim in Part Two in three questions:

1. Why does Kant identify time as the structure mediating between the phenomena of experience and the spontaneous subjective activity expressed in the Categories?

2. Why does Descartes conceive of the existence of the ego (or res cogitans) as absolutely certain, and why does he follow mediaeval ontology in conceiving both of the ego and of the world (res extensa) as temporal creations of a timeless and uncreated Divinity?

3. Why is the ancient Greek conception of time oriented towards presence (i.e., duration) and the present, and in what sense is Aristotle’s explanation of time in the Physics a historical turning point for the comprehension of time?

In the following chapters we will present an interpretative overview of the main theses of Being and Time in its published form, that is, of Sections One and Two of Part One. The rather confused and confusing Table of Contents that Heidegger himself published at the beginning of Being and Time is of little use in organizing the material in a comprehensible fashion. It would perhaps not be too much of an exaggeration to claim that the main contribution of the complicated arrangement reflected in the Table of Contents is to obscure the underlying conceptual structure of the book. Accordingly, we will employ a somewhat
different arrangement of the material, which rather better reflects the true conceptual structure of *Being and Time*:

*Remaining Introductory Material*

Section 2.4: Heidegger’s Concept of Phenomenology (§ 7)

*The World Analysis*

Section 2.5: The Everyday World (§§ 9–27)

*The Indifferent and Inauthentic Modes of Existence*

Section 2.6: The Indifferent Mode of Being-in (§§ 28–34): Sensibility, Understanding, and Talk

Section 2.7: The Inauthentic Mode of Being-in (§§ 35–38): Turmoil, Curiosity, and Crosstalk

*Authenticity I: Sensibility*

Section 2.8: Authentic Sensibility: Angst (§§ 39–40)

*The Consideration of Primeval Structures*

Section 2.9: The Primeval Structure of Dasein as Concern (§§ 41–42)

Section 2.10: Reality and Truth (§§ 43–44)

*Authenticity II: Understanding and Talk*

Section 3.1: The Problem of Completeness and Authenticity (§§ 45–46)

Section 3.2: Authentic Understanding: Death (§§ 47–53)

Section 3.3: Authentic Talk: The Call of Conscience (§§ 54–60)

*From Authenticity to Timeliness*

Section 3.4: The Structure of Authenticity as Decidedness (§§ 61–62)

Section 3.5: Timeliness as the Sense of Concern (§§ 63–66)

*Timeliness and Temporality*

Section 3.6 Timeliness and Its Modifications (§§ 67–71)

Section 3.7 The Foundation of Historicity (§§ 72–77)

Section 3.8 The Vulgar Concept of Time (§§ 78–83)

It should also be kept in mind that in each section we will be discussing only the highlights of the sections in *Being and Time* to which the sections of this book correspond. Our aim is
an adequate understanding of Heidegger's philosophy as it is expressed in *Being and Time*. An exhaustive commentary would surely require many volumes.

2.4 HEIDEGGER'S CONCEPT OF PHENOMENOLOGY (§ 7)

In § 7 of *Being and Time* Heidegger puts forth his concept of the "phenomenological method of investigation." The section is divided into three subsections entitled "The Phenomenon Concept," "The Concept of Logos," and "The Preliminary Concept of Phenomenology." Heidegger's aim is to explain the meaning of "phenomenology" by explaining the meanings of its two component words. This can, however, only result in a preliminary concept of phenomenology because, as we shall see, Heidegger's concept of phenomenology is decisively influenced by the results of his analysis of the act of understanding. In this section we will attempt to unite these disparate threads of Heidegger's exposition and weave them into a coherent and consistent whole.

Following Heidegger, we can begin with a consideration of the etymology of the terms in question. The word "phenomenon" is a transliteration of the ancient Greek word *phainomenon*, a form of the verb *phainō*, meaning "to show," "to bring to light," or "to make appear." The verb, used in an intransitive sense, can also mean "to shine" or "to gleam." Unsurprisingly, *phainō* is also etymologically related to *phaos* (or *phōs*), meaning "starlight," "brightness," or "daylight."

We are familiar with the distinction in English grammar between the active voice and the passive voice of verbs: the former communicates that the subject of the verb is itself undertaking the action expressed by the verb ("I see"), while the latter indicates that the subject in question is undergoing the action which the verb expresses ("I am seen").

Ancient Greek recognized a third or middle voice, which was used to indicate a close relationship between the subject and the action expressed by a verb. Thus
when the middle voice is used, the action is done to, for, or by the subject itself.

Heidegger calls attention to the fact that *phainomenon* is a present participle of the verb *phaino* in the middle voice (-o-men-) with a neuter ending (-on). If, following Heidegger, we render *phaino* into English as “showing,” we can approximate the literal meaning of *phainomenon* in English as “[a] thing that shows itself by itself.” Two issues are particularly important here: that a phenomenon shows itself, and not something else; and that it does this by itself, that is, in an “objective” manner. Thus “phenomena” are, for Heidegger, the “totality of that which is clear as day or can be brought to light” [§ 7 A, p. 28].

Phenomena in this Heideggerian sense are clearly not phenomena in the Kantian sense, that is, not mere appearances of an unknown and unknowable thing in itself. In order to further clarify the meaning of “phenomenon” and, in particular, to divest the word of its peculiarly Kantian associations, Heidegger introduces conceptual distinctions between a “phenomenon,” a “semblance” [Schein], and an “appearance” [Erscheinung]:

(1) A phenomenon in the proper sense is a “self-showing” thing, that which shows itself as it truly is.

(2) By contrast, something that shows itself as other than it in fact is, such as fool’s gold, Heidegger terms a semblance.

(3) Finally, something that, in showing itself, indicates something else, is an appearance. Thus reddened cheeks, a sweaty forehead, trembling, and so on are, for Heidegger, appearances of the underlying fever.

By means of these conceptual distinctions, Heidegger arrives at what he terms the “formal phenomenon concept.” The formal phenomenon concept is a characterization of the manner in which something shows itself; whatever shows itself as what it truly is is a phenomenon. No definite sort of thing is being spoken of at this stage. This also holds true of our definitions of semblance
and appearance. In each case we are concerned solely with the manner in which things—any and all things—show themselves. In order to undertake a concrete phenomenological investigation of a particular subject, however, we must make a decision as to precisely which things we will address as the phenomena of our investigation. We must, in Heidegger's words, "deformalize" the formal phenomenon concept. If we make the decision to allow entities (in the Heideggerian sense; see Section 2.1) to serve as our phenomena, we arrive at the vulgar phenomenon concept. It must be kept firmly in mind that here, as everywhere else, Heidegger always uses the word "vulgar" in the original sense of the Latin vulgaris, namely "general," "usual," and "everyday." Heidegger never uses the word in a pejorative sense. The vulgar phenomenon concept refers merely to the usual habit of considering entities as the primary objects of interest.

Heidegger further distinguishes a second deformalized phenomenon concept, namely the phenomenological phenomenon concept. The phenomena of phenomenology—in the sense of that which phenomenology wants to bring to light—are the obscured and hidden features of experience as such, that which is constantly present in every experience as such but which is also constantly overlooked in experience. Recalling what we said in Section 2.1 about Heidegger's position that it is our very familiarity with entities that disguises the true structural features of our comportments towards them, it is clear that for Heidegger the phenomena of phenomenology are simply these very structural features. That is to say: the phenomena of Heidegger's phenomenology are the defining structural features of entities themselves and as such: the being of entities, or more generally, Being itself. This is why Heidegger can say that "taken concretely, phenomenology is the academic discipline that addresses the being of entities—ontology."

Having clarified the subject matter of Being and Time by explaining the word "phenomenon," we will go on to clarify its approach by considering the meaning of the word logos.
The Greek verb *legein*, from which *logos* is derived, originally meant “to gather together,” “to collect,” or “to harvest.” Depending on the particular context, the chief meanings of *logos* include “speech,” “reason,” “rationality,” “sense,” “meaning,” “definition,” “argument,” “principle,” and “account.” For his own purposes, Heidegger settles on the literal translation of *logos* as “talk” [*Rede*].

Following Aristotle, Heidegger sees the essential feature of *logos* or “talk” as the ability to reveal that which is talked about, the ability to indicate something, to make one aware of it. In Aristotelian terminology, this peculiarity of revealing (*déloun*) the matter in question through talk occurs as an *apophainesthai*. This verb is a compound word consisting of the preposition *apo-*, meaning “away from,” “down from,” “hither from,” and the verb *phainesthai*, the middle-voice infinitive of *phainó*, whose meaning we discussed in connection with the word *phainomenon*. According to Heidegger, talk as *apophainesthai* is in some way connected with *phainomena*: talk “brings something to light,” “clears matters up,” and it does this for (expressing the middle voice) the talker and the partners in conversation themselves. There is no reason for us to be particularly surprised by this evaluation of the *logos*; our whole academic culture is founded upon the assumption that talk does indeed have the power to clarify matters, to bring hidden facts to light, and ultimately to correct mistakes and misapprehensions. Consider the common function of talk in Plato’s dialogues, in democratic government, in careful explanation, in verbal instruction, and in everyday conversation. In each case, we assume that talk does indeed have the ability to clear up difficulties, and not merely in the abstract and formal sense of isolating and correcting merely “logical” errors.

Given that talk does indeed have the ability to clear up matters in this way, what is the fundamental nature of its clarificatory activity? In §7 B, Heidegger renders Aristotle’s *apophainesthai* into German as *Sehenlassen*, or “letting see.” In German, the verbal phrase *sehen lassen* has two possible senses. If the object is a thing, *etwas sehen lassen*, then its meaning is
“to let something be seen.” If, on the other hand, the object is a person, jemanden sehen lassen, the meaning of the phrase is “to cause someone to see.” The nominalized form used by Heidegger, Sehenlassen, has the double meaning of “to let see” and “to cause/allow to see.” For Heidegger, then, the fundamental characteristic of talk is to let something be seen and to have someone see. Elsewhere I have suggested that in analogy to words such as “encumber,” “ennoble,” “enflame,” and “entangle,” Heidegger’s use of Sehenlassen could be reflected in English by means of the term envisioning. Following Heidegger, then, we will denote the fundamental character of logos as talk as envisioning.

According to Heidegger, “the function of the logos consists in the unembellished envisioning of something, of letting entities be found out.” Logos as talk thus plays an essential role in the phainesthai (“self-showing”) of the phenomenon (“self-showing thing”). This special role of talk in making things evident is reflected in the Greek etymology of the terms, although the connection is not merely etymological. Talk has the capacity to envision phenomena. By this we do not mean that talk alters our physical perceptions of the world around us; rather, we mean that talk has the capacity to modify our comportments towards entities such that we envision them as they truly are. The phenomena that are envisioned in this way are envisioned through talk. That is to say: phenomena are envisioned by talking about them. For a phenomenologist working in the Heideggerian tradition, then, talk is the manner in which we gain access to phenomena.

What, then, is the meaning of “phenomenology” as a compound of phainomenon and logos? Quite simply, phenomenology is the systematic pursuit of envisioning phenomena through talk. Heidegger’s name for this systematic pursuit is hermeneutic phenomenology. The discussion of the hermeneutic character of Heidegger’s phenomenology in §7C begins with the following words:

It will emerge from the investigation [i.e., from Being and Time] itself: the methodological sense of phenomenological
description is *interpretation* \([\text{Auslegung}]\). The *logos* of the phenomenology of *Dasein* has the character of *hermeneuein*, through which the actual sense of being and the fundamental structures of its own being are *declared* \([\text{kundgegeben}]\) to the understanding of being belonging to *Dasein* itself. [§ 7 C, p. 37]

In ancient Greek, the verb *hermeneuein* has the meanings "to explain," "to interpret," and "to translate." Heidegger chooses to call his phenomenology *hermeneutic* phenomenology because it is by means of talk that Being is to be investigated. In contrast to Husserl’s methodological use of the *epoché*, it is through talk alone that Heidegger wishes to envision the ontological structures that are its chosen phenomena. In so doing, Heidegger’s phenomenology does nothing more than to articulate what we already know from our everyday practice and experience, although this knowledge, which is tacitly assumed by every manner of comportment, typically remains ungrasped and unarticulated. It is clear from this, however, that Heidegger’s method in *Being and Time* cannot be purely descriptive in nature. Were it a purely descriptive approach, it could never expose hidden features of existence but would have to remain content with a description of the features that are not hidden.\(^34\) (See the further explanations below.)

The context of the first sentence of the passage quoted above makes it clear that in speaking of the methodological sense of phenomenological description as "interpretation," Heidegger is referring to § 32 of *Being and Time*, which is entitled "Understanding and Interpretation." It is important to combine what is said in § 7 with the detailed analysis of interpretation in § 32. For our purposes, however, this can be deferred until the discussion of the circular structure of understanding in Section 2.6. For the present, it is sufficient to remark in passing that the second title used by Heidegger to designate his philosophical enterprise in *Being and Time*, namely *fundamental ontology*, is derived from the concept of hermeneutic phenomenology. For Heidegger,
Hermeneutic Phenomenology also seeks to work out the conditions under which ontological investigation is at all possible— that is to say, it attempts to give a detailed and accurate account of what any and all acts of understanding and interpretation in the widest sense entail. Because it works out the foundation of any possible ontology, hermeneutic phenomenology is also fundamental ontology, that is, the philosophical basis upon which all other ontologies have to build.

As we have briefly seen in Section 2.2 and as we shall see in more detail in Section 2.6, for Heidegger understanding has an essentially circular structure. What does this mean for the methodology of Being and Time? Heidegger addresses this question briefly in § 61 and towards the end of § 62, at length in § 63, and in passing in § 65 and § 69 b). Without a consideration of these sections it is not possible to truly understand the nature of Heidegger’s descriptive and interpretative method in Being and Time. We will, however, restrict ourselves to the main points.

Towards the end of § 61, Heidegger remarks that a genuine method “is founded in a suitable preliminary glimpse [Vorbliek] of the fundamental constitution of the ‘object’ or object realm [Gegenstandsbezirk] that is to be disclosed” [§ 61, p. 303]. Accordingly, in order to come up with a genuine method at all, we must already know something in advance about the essential nature of the objects of our concern. Towards the end of § 62, Heidegger notes that his phenomenological interpretation of Dasein is not presuppositionless in any true sense. He claims, in effect, that a truly presuppositionless philosophy is impossible. However, genuine philosophy will employ presuppositions in a legitimate manner, namely to bring to light the character of the phenomena with which it is occupied.

In § 63 Heidegger addresses the question of method at length by addressing the hermeneutic situation that his philosophical explorations have attained. The “hermeneutic situation” is a “preliminary clarification and securing out of and in a fundamental experience of the ‘object’ that is to be disclosed” [§ 45, p. 232]. It is the initial situation with which
every interpretation begins. Since every interpretation is also an act of understanding, the hermeneutic situation is characterized by its threefold structure: "prepossession" [Vorhabe], "preview" [Vorsicht], and "preconception" [Vorgriff]. (These terms will be addressed at length in Section 2.6.) This threefold structure expresses the sum total of the methodological presuppositions that every interpretation requires. Ontological interpretation too, such as Heidegger undertakes in Being and Time, is characterized by this structure.36

If no philosophical interpretation can be truly presuppositionless, is Being and Time in effect not presupposing the very points that its phenomenological analysis is supposed to demonstrate? Is Heidegger not in effect arguing in a circle? Heidegger addresses the problem with the following words:

The "circle reproach" levelled against the existential interpretation claims: the idea of existence and of overall Being is "presupposed" and "afterwards" Dasein is interpreted in order to derive the idea of Being from it. But what does "presupposing" mean? Is a proposition put forth with the idea of existence from which we deduce further propositions concerning the being of Dasein according to the formal rules of implication? Or does this pre-supposing not rather have the character of an understanding planning [des verstehenden Entwurfens], such that the interpretation which elaborates such an understanding first lets the interpreted itself speak out so that it can decide of itself whether it, as this entity, yields the being-constitution towards which it was disclosed [...] in the plan [Entwurf]? [§ 63, p. 314-315]

In other words: for Heidegger every act of understanding inevitably and necessarily involves presuppositions. This is a fundamental trait of the human act of understanding. Accordingly, even in a phenomenological investigation of the fundamental structure of Dasein, such as we find in Being and Time, presuppositions are inevitable. However, it is not the case
that these presuppositions are arbitrary. Ideally, they are founded in a preliminary understanding of the subject matter, in this case the structure of Dasein itself. The hermeneutic situation of Being and Time (ideally, at any rate) is deliberately structured so as to bring this essential feature of human understanding to light in an appropriate manner. Having done this, the reader, who is himself or herself also Dasein, can go on to decide whether Dasein has been appropriately characterized by this conceptual schema.

Heidegger, in effect, claims to be articulating a convenient conceptual schema within which certain essential features of Dasein become visible. This conceptual schema is meant to articulate what we always already know and do in contrast to Husserl's awkward and artificial theoretical modification of the everyday point of view. Husserl's approach had been criticized by other philosophers because any theoretical observation of a state of consciousness alters it. Thus the state of consciousness being studied is not the same as the original state. It becomes an observed state rather than the lived state it originally was before undergoing Husserl's theoretical modification. Heidegger, who agreed with this criticism in principle, replies that we already know how we interact with the world. Therefore we do not need to theoretically study this interaction, but rather merely articulate it.

In putting forth a conceptual schema for the articulation of Dasein's everyday comportment towards the world, Heidegger is of course not merely putting forth an arbitrary set of ideas. He also believes that this conceptual schema is particularly suited to express the structure of Dasein. Just as every interpretation is dependent upon presuppositions, Dasein itself is dependent upon "presuppositions" as to what constitutes Being in order to be able to interact with entities at all. (Recall the example in Section 2.2.) The interpretation of Dasein put forth in Being and Time is adequate when it brings the circular structure of understanding to light and when it identifies the presuppositions involved in any interaction with entities (i.e., when it is able to answer the question of Being). The conceptual schema of Being and Time is thus to be understood as a particularly suitable, but
not necessarily the only, hermeneutic situation within which such an interpretation is possible.

In any case, Heidegger explicitly and repeatedly states that Being and Time itself, being an interpretation, shares in the circular structure of understanding. On Heidegger's own account of understanding and interpretation (§§ 31-32) a purely descriptive account is impossible. It follows that a characterization of Heidegger's methodology as purely descriptive in nature is onesided and inadequate. Hermeneutic phenomenology does not just involve observation. It is also intensely practical. It is supposed to have a concrete effect on the way we live our lives.

As we shall see in Section 2.6, Heidegger also believes that no act of understanding, and thus no act of interpretation, can take place without a particular sensibility [Befindlichkeit]. That is to say: every interpretation is dependent upon a particular mood or emotional timbre. No doubt some of the peculiar stylistic features of Being and Time can be traced back to this conviction of Heidegger's. This topic is too complex to explore here, but the interested reader should compare § 69 b) of Being and Time with the remarks on retrieval [Wiederholung] as authentic continuance [Gewesenheit] in Section 3.6.

2.5 THE EVERYDAY WORLD (§§ 9-27)

Let us now return to the subject of Section 2.1 and begin translating our initial presentation of the subject matter into a more properly Heideggerian framework. As we saw previously, a central feature of Heidegger's philosophy in Being and Time is its conception of the world and its relation to Dasein. In § 9 of Being and Time, Heidegger points out that an essential feature of Dasein is that it is characterized by selfhood. Dasein is in some sense a "self." This characteristic of Dasein Heidegger terms "evermineness" [Jemeinigkeit]. Anticipating the content of later analyses, Heidegger distinguishes three existential modes of evermineness: "authenticity" [Eigentlichkeit], "inauthenticity" [Uneigentlichkeit], and "averageness" [Durchschnittlichkeit] or
"indifference" [Indifferenz]. The analyses of §§ 14-34 of Being and Time are concerned with indifferent modes of existence, that is, with existence insofar as it is neither properly authentic nor properly inauthentic. Inauthenticity is the subject of §§ 35-38, while §§ 39-40 and §§ 45-60 investigate fundamental structures of Dasein with a view towards explaining the concept of authenticity. (Compare the outline of Being and Time given in Section 2.3.)

At this point in the ongoing analyses of Being and Time, the primeval structure of Dasein is grasped by Heidegger as being-in-the-world. (As we shall see in Section 2.9, Heidegger will later understand being-in-the-world in terms of a more primeval structure, namely concern, and will go on to understand concern in terms of a still more primeval structure, namely timeliness, as we shall see in Section 3.5.)

"Being-in-the-world" is a term referring to the essential unity of three different fundamental structures of Dasein, namely,

1. the world in which Dasein exists and towards which it comports itself;
2. the entity that is in the world and that is characterized by evermineness, namely the self; and
3. the relation that exists between the world and the aforementioned entity, namely "being-in."

Two important points must be made at this juncture. Firstly, in Being and Time Heidegger, rather inconveniently, uses Dasein in two senses. In the loose sense, Dasein denotes the self, or an entity characterized by selfhood; in the strict sense, Dasein refers to the entire structure of being-in-the-world, that is, the world, the self, and being-in. The reader must constantly be aware of the context when reading Being and Time in order to decide in which of the two senses the term Dasein is presently being used. Secondly, note that the "being" in "being-in-the-world" is not the same as the "Being" that it is the task of the question of Being to define. In "being-in-the-world" the word "being" is simply an
equivalent term for existing in a world. (See the commentary on “being-in-the-world” in Appendix A for more details.)

The third chapter of the first section of Part One of Being and Time is comprised of §§ 14-24 and is entitled “The Worldliness of the World.” In these sections Heidegger undertakes a detailed phenomenological analysis of the concept of world and attempts to isolate and describe its defining structural features or “worldliness” [Weltlichkeit]. In the fourth chapter, which includes §§ 25-27 and is entitled “Being-in-the-world as Being-with and Being-self. The ‘One’,” Heidegger investigates the structural foundations of the self and selfhood. We will address both these topics, Heidegger’s third and fourth chapters, in the present section, namely Section 2.5.

Finally, in the fifth chapter of the first section of Part One, which includes §§ 28-38 of Being and Time, Heidegger is concerned with working out the structural details of the relation between the world and Dasein. He addresses the indifferent structures of the Dasein-world relation in §§ 29-34 through his phenomenological delineation of the roles played in everyday life by sensibility, understanding, and talk. We will devote Section 2.6 to these three indifferent modes of Dasein’s comportment towards the world. In §§ 35-38 Heidegger addresses these same three structures in their inauthentic modes, which he calls “turmoil” [der Wirbel], “curiosity” [Neugier], and “crosstalk” [Gerede]. These inauthentic modes of existence will form the subject matter of Section 2.7.

a) The Worldliness of the World

We might think that our interaction with the world is a familiar enough comportment; why, then, should a detailed phenomenological analysis be necessary at all? Again we stumble upon a peculiar feature of everyday life: that it is possible to carry out actions without an explicit knowledge of what these actions involve. (Recall Section 1.4.) As a preliminary justification for a phenomenological analysis of the world, consider the trivial example of walking through a hallway. How do we actually experience the hallway when we make use of it to get from one place to another?
A theoretical description might take into account the total distance travelled and divide it by the total time taken to traverse the distance in question. We might conclude from this that our experience of walking through the hallway must involve an awareness of travelling so many feet per second. And yet, if we attend closely to our experience of the hallway, we discover something very different from what the theoretical account leads us to expect. If, for example, I leave a classroom and make for the nearest exit, I typically am not focussing on the hallway in the process of making use of it to leave the building. Rather, I am focussed on a particular purpose, for instance, that of getting home in order to eat lunch. While I am actually walking through the hallway, the hallway itself seems to “fade into the background” while I am going about my task. True, the hallway does not “disappear” altogether; but my experience of it is quite different from what the theoretical account suggests it should be. There is, typically, no awareness of travelling so many feet per second and of counting off time second by second, no awareness of making progress foot by foot; rather there is a sort of “flowing along” from the classroom through the hallway and, finally, into my home.

Given that we do in fact experience our everyday world in this way (or in a manner more or less resembling the above description), and given that we spend most of our lives interacting with the world at this level, the level of pragmatic everyday use, why do we expect an ultimate explanation of the world to come from a theoretical reflection upon our experience? It surely is inappropriate to describe our usual everyday experience of walking through a hallway as a marking off of travelled distance and elapsed time. Given that this is the case, it seems that a proper account of our experience of the world requires a completely different type of analysis. In order to understand our world, then, it is important to begin with a phenomenological, that is, descriptive–interpretative, account of our interaction with the world that preserves the original and distinctive character of this interaction. Only in this manner can we prevent our theoretical
accounts from obscuring the very phenomena that they are supposed to reveal.

Heidegger begins his investigation of the world phenomenon with an ontological analysis of the entities we come upon in the immediate everyday environment. This type of analysis differs from the analysis of Being as such because it focusses on a very narrow range of entities, namely those that we employ in the accomplishment of everyday tasks. Heidegger warns us in the initial paragraphs of § 14 that the world phenomenon is something different from the totality of "intramundane" [innerweltlich] entities and as such cannot be understood in terms of such entities. The analysis of intramundane entities serves only as a preparatory stage from whose perspective the world phenomenon as such can be sighted. In sighting the world phenomenon our final aim is to specify the "worldliness" [Weltlichkeit] of the world, that is, its fundamental and defining structural feature.

The subject of our preliminary analysis is everyday intramundane entities insofar as they are met with in the comportment of "concernedness" [Besorgen]. Concernedness refers to the range of comportments that are characterized by manipulation and use. Entities that we manipulate and use are "tools" [Zeug]. The term "tools" is used here in the widest possible sense. Anything used as a means to an end or to get something done is a tool. Tools include door handles, hammers, pliers, nails, needles, pliers, pens, pencils, paper, cars, elevators, computers, cups, glasses, knives, forks, spoons, and so on. Any entity exhibiting the characteristic of "usability" [Verwendbarkeit] for a particular purpose or "what-for" [Wozu] counts in Heidegger's terminology as a "tool." In turn, Heidegger calls the entity to which the what-for of a tool refers (the entity to which the tool is applied) the "for-that" [Dazu] of that particular tool.

A fundamental characteristic of tools is that they are never found in isolation but always within "tool-wholes" [Zeugganzen]. A tool-whole is the sum total of "references" [Verweisungen] that constitute a particular "in-order-to" [Um-zu]. Within tool-wholes
as systems of reference (compare the less detailed explanation in Section 2.2), individual tools are assigned their particular what-for. That is to say: tools are only recognizable as tools and can only function as the particular individual tools they happen to be when they are found within an appropriate context. In order for a hammer to be recognized as a hammer, I must understand the particular tool-whole in which it appears, that is, the general context of hammering, which includes such specific tasks as driving nails in order to fasten two boards together. Beginning with the tool-whole, which is characterized by a particular in-order-to (in this case, the particular in-order-to of fastening two boards together), I go on to assign the particular individual entity that I come upon in my immediate environment a particular what-for (in this case, the what-for of driving the nail that will hold the boards together).

On Heidegger’s “top-down” account, in the course of our everyday comportments towards entities we never begin with entities, but rather with tool-wholes, with general contexts or entire systems of reference. Beginning with tool-wholes, which constitute specific purposes, or in-order-tos, we go on to comport ourselves towards particular entities in our immediate environment. It is only by being found within tool-wholes that specific tools acquire their individual applications or what-fors. In other words: a workshop is not merely the totality of individual entities found within it. It is not a whole assembled from the sum of its parts. Rather, a workshop in the strict phenomenological sense is a particular tool-whole or context within which work is accomplished. Upon entering the workshop, I already expect the individual entities found within the workshop to have some relation to the work accomplished there. Beginning with this expectation, that is, with an understanding of the sort of work accomplished within a workshop, I go on to interpret the individual entities I find within the workshop with reference to my specific understanding of what takes place within a workshop. It is first within this interpretation with reference to tool-wholes that individual entities can be used as tools at all.
Of course, this act of interpretation (see Section 2.6 for Heidegger’s analysis of interpretation) does not create the entities in any real sense.\textsuperscript{42} When I come upon and employ tools within their particular tool-wholes, I clearly find and use them as separate from me (compare Section 2.10 for details on Heidegger’s rejection of idealism). But it is equally clear that tools must be interpreted with reference to tool-wholes on order for their specific what-fors to be understood, that is, for them to be used as the tools that they in fact are. Imagine the visit of the luthier to the examining room of the X-ray technician, or of the dentist to the sculptor’s studio. It is clear in each case that the tool-wholes are different from the ones to which the luthier and dentist are accustomed, and thus the particular entities they come upon within their immediate environment are lacking in meaningfulness for them. The particular entities that the luthier and the dentist find within the examining room or the studio are interpreted as unfamiliar tools, or in extreme cases, may fail to be interpreted as tools at all. There is, then, a certain plausibility to Heidegger’s contention that tool-wholes are prior to individual tools, and that individual tools only acquire meaningfulness within tool-wholes.

We will conclude our example by briefly noting that the physical workshop as such is itself an entity, that is, a tool acquiring its significance from a specific tool-whole. The wider tool-whole in which the entitical workshop acquires its particular what-for, namely to act as a convenient location for accomplishing particular sorts of work, is, for example, the building in which the workshop is located. This building is itself a tool with its own what-for (to house workshops, stores, apartments) rooted in a yet wider tool-whole (the municipal economy), and so on. In every instance it is the case that a tool-whole must be understood before the individual tools within that particular tool-whole are interpreted and used as tools. It is only because of the prior understanding of a tool-whole that a tool can be happened upon at all. Similarly, it is only because of the prior understanding of Being that an entity can be experienced as an entity.
Another interesting feature of our tool-using comportments is their characteristic form of "knowledge." When we actually make use of tools in everyday situations, we are not explicitly aware of the tools in the process of using them. A hammer has a certain mass, colour, shape, and density, and all of these objective characteristics can be isolated, observed, and quantified. Even without scientific instruments it is possible, at an everyday level, to undertake a detailed study of the hammer and its physical properties. However, it is a fundamental characteristic of the successful use of tools that we are not aware of them in this way. In fact, such a "theoretical" comportment towards a tool would rather hinder our actual use of it by getting in the way of our ability to concentrate on the task before us. It seems that during actual successful use a tool "fades into the background" in a certain sense, just as, when entering a room, we are not distinctly aware of the door whose handle we turn, but rather simply make use of the door without an explicit consciousness that we are doing so.

At the same time, our use of items is not "blind." There is a very definite awareness of the tool, its what-for, and the in-order-to belonging to the tool and our comportment towards it. This practical awareness of the tool is, however, very different from the sort of awareness involved in a deliberate systematic observation of the tool. The "view" we have of tools in their actual pragmatic use Heidegger calls our "purview" [Umsicht]. The literal meaning of the German term Heidegger uses is "view around." "Purview" is, accordingly, the view we have of a tool during its use, that is, when we are occupied with the totality of references assigned to the tool by the in-order-to of its specific tool-whole and that determine its what-for. Heidegger's term for the characteristic feature of tools found within our purview is "to-handedness" [Zuhandenheit]. To-handedness denotes the peculiarly "transparent" quality of a tool whose use is smooth and uninterrupted. This quality can be contrasted with the distinctive quality of a tool that is involved in a theoretical comportment in which it is observed rather than used. The characteristic feature
of observed tools is their “at-handness” [Vorhandenheit]. Such tools are merely available; they simply lie around. They cannot even be considered tools in the proper sense, since they are not at all in use. A tool is only truly experienced as a tool when it is being used in a proper manner. The theoretical consideration of tools, whether formally scientific or informally descriptive, robs them of their tool-character.

What, then, confers tool-character upon entities experienced as tools, and what is lost when our theoretical comportments relate to tools as at-handed rather than to-handed? In § 16 of Being and Time Heidegger attempts to answer this question by analyzing cases in which the successful use of tools is impeded. Heidegger distinguishes three characteristics of tools in such situations:

1. a tool that is unusable, that is, not in a state to accomplish its particular function, is characterized by “obtrusiveness” [Aufdringlichkeit];
2. a tool whose use is hindered by something missing that is required for its use is characterized by “obtrusiveness” [Aufdringlichkeit]; and
3. a tool whose use impedes something else and is in the way is characterized by “defiance” [Aufsässigkeit].

We can clarify these characteristics by means of a concrete example:

1. the hammer is available, but the head is loose; the unusable hammer is characterized by conspicuousness;
2. the hammer is usable, but the nails are missing; the missing nails cause the hammer to become characterized by obtrusiveness; and
3. I have to lock up the workshop and be home by six, but I still have to finish the hammering (the hammer is usable and nails are available); the hammer is characterized by defiance in the face of the other task I have to accomplish.
On Heidegger's analysis, these three characteristics are all ways in which to-handed tools become at-handed. The essential feature of such situations, of the transformation of to-handedness into at-handedness, is the *disturbance of a reference*. When tools cannot be used for their intended purpose, the constitutive reference of the in-order-to to a what-for has been interrupted. For Heidegger, it is precisely in such situations that the structure of the world becomes conspicuous by its absence:

> With the purviewing awakening of the reference to the individual what-for, the latter itself, and with it the work-context, the entire "workshop," comes into view, and it does so as that in which concernedness always already resides [*worin sich das Besorgen immer schon aufhält*]. The tool-context strikes one [*leuchtet auf*] not as something that one had never yet seen, but rather as a whole, which is constantly already viewed in advance in the purview. With this whole, however, the world makes itself known [*meldet sich*]. [§ 16, p. 75]

Note that it is precisely because the world, for the most part, does *not* make itself known that we are able to make proper use of tools at all. Just as the tool itself must remain to-handed in the process of accomplishing its work, the "not-making-itself-known of the world is the condition of the possibility of the not-stepping-out of the to-handed from its inconspicuousness" [§ 16, p. 75]. In other words, in order for us to make proper use of tools, we *cannot* be concentrating on the specific system of references that define the tool as the tool that it is. In the process of hammering, we cannot undertake a thematic analysis of hammering, or we would not be hammering. This accounts for the initial hiddenness of the world phenomenon and its historical neglect (according to Heidegger) in previous philosophical accounts of the worldliness of the world, and above all in Descartes' definition of the world as spatial extension.

What, then, is the fundamental being-character of to-handed entities, that is, tools? Heidegger introduces the term
“connection” [Bewandtnis] in § 18 of Being and Time to designate the fundamental ontological structure of tools. According to Heidegger, the characteristic structural feature of intramundane entities as such is that they can be used as tools. When we come across entities in everyday life, our fundamental comportment towards them, on this analysis, is to use them to accomplish specific in-order-tos. We experience entities on the everyday level as means towards ends.

Connection is a binary relation: there is always a connection of —— with ——. That is to say: the fundamental structure of a hammer is the connection of (the hammer) with (the nails). Heidegger states that the term “reference,” which he had previously been using as though it were a more or less transparent notion, is in fact identical with the “of —— with ——” relation. This means, however, that we must search for the specific meaning of the term “connection” elsewhere. The act of connection is, according to Heidegger, a name for a specific comportment of Dasein:

The connection-whole, however, can finally be traced back to a what-for with which there is no longer any connection, which is not an entity in the being-manner [Seinsart] of a to-handed entity inside a world, but rather an entity whose being is determined as being-in-the-world, to whose being-constitution worldliness itself belongs. This primary what-for is not a for-that [Dazu] as a possible with-which of a connection. The primary “what-for” is a purpose [Worum-willen]. The “sake” [Umwillen], however, always concerns the being of Dasein [...]. The indicated context [Zusammenhang] […] leads from the structure of connection to the being of Dasein itself, as its actual [eigentlich] and sole purpose [Worum-willen] […]. [§ 18, p. 84]

The comportment in which we confer a connection upon the entities we come upon in the world and so allow them to serve us as tools is termed “discovering” [entdecken] by Heidegger. “Discoveredness,” then, functions as a term that indicates the
appearance of an entity within the world as a result of Dasein’s comportment towards it. *The discovery of entities is an activity of Dasein.* The discovery of intramundane entities occurs by comporting ourselves towards them such that we make a connection between the entity as a tool and a particular what-for. This connection, however, can only be made with reference to a purpose, that is, to a particular use or end that we desire to attain. Heidegger’s claim is that at the everyday level our fundamental interaction with the objects in our immediate environment consists in viewing them as means for achieving our own ends.\(^{44}\)

It is important to emphasize that in Heidegger’s phenomenological account of such an interaction with entities, these entities are not created by Dasein’s comportment towards them, such as they might be considered within an idealist framework. Rather, it belongs to the very nature of Dasein’s discovering that entities are discovered as already having been there before Dasein comported itself towards the entities in question. We find entities in our environment, whether natural products such as trees, animals, and metals, or products of human craft, such as hammers, chisels, and screwdrivers, to be things that are already particularly suited to achieve certain ends. They are discovered and not created by Dasein’s experience of them.

At this point we can briefly mention a technical definition of *meaningfulness*, which Heidegger, typically, first introduces much later on in *Being and Time*, namely in the first two sentences of § 69 c). There we are told that meaningfulness is the “context” *[Zusammenhang, literally “hanging together”]* of the relations in-order-to, what-for, for-that, and purpose. The manner in which these four relations are woven together in our comportments towards intramundane entities constitutes meaningfulness. It is to their structural unity that Heidegger refers when he speaks of the “worldliness” of the world.

More light will be shed on Heidegger’s position towards entities and their independence from Dasein in Section 2.10, but for now it should be sufficient to clarify Heidegger’s position by
quoting a short passage from § 39 of Being and Time: "Entities are independently of the experience, acquaintance, and knowledge through which they are disclosed, discovered and determined. Being, however, only 'is' in the understanding of the entity to whose being such a thing as the understanding of being belongs" [§ 39, p. 183]. In opposition to idealism, Heidegger affirms that entities do indeed exist independently of us and our mental activity. However, the overarching framework by means of which alone we are able to comport ourselves towards entities, namely Being, is a part of us and belongs to our essential structure as Dasein. In Being and Time at any rate, Being is there only as long as we are.

The comportment by which we assign connections to entities in order to discover them as tools is, according to Heidegger, the understanding of world. In the act of understanding world, Dasein refers itself to an "in-which" as the medium or environment for Dasein's ability to relate to entities characterized by connection. This, on Heidegger's analysis, is the phenomenon of world. In plain English, the world is simply the sum total of connections and connection-wholes within which Dasein discovers entities. Since connections are an element of Dasein, the structure of the world is itself a part of Dasein's structure. Since connections always emerge as a result of Dasein's purpose, the world—the sum total of connections and connection-wholes—is simply an expression of Dasein's purpose. The world is the "in-which" that Dasein carries along with itself as the area for its interaction with entities. This area is not to be understood as a physical space (though Heidegger will later contend that physical space is a function of this primeval spatiality); rather it is the network of references that connect entities as tools to each other and so to their individual what-fors. This entire system of references or relations emerging from Dasein's particular purpose, and which functions as the area in which Dasein can discover entities, is the phenomenon of the world.

We saw that for Heidegger, there is a fundamental comportment, namely understanding, in which the fundamental
structure of the world as such is created and maintained. For Heidegger, the world emerges from an act of understanding. This act of understanding creates the system of references that Dasein uses to guide itself in the course of its comportments towards intramundane entities. Insofar as individual references are grasped by Dasein in individual acts of understanding, Heidegger refers to them as having “meaning.” The sum total of these individual “meanings” Heidegger calls “meaningfulness” \([\text{Bedeutsamkeit}]\). In the act of assigning meaningfulness to intramundane entities, Dasein understands its world. That is to say: the world is not an independent extended space in which human beings happen to find themselves; rather, the world is an essential structural feature of Dasein itself. We are not contained in the world. Rather, we carry the world along with us. Such a fundamental structural feature of Dasein is what Heidegger terms an existential. Meaningfulness is an existential of Dasein. It is this meaningfulness, as we shall see in the next section, that is of particular significance for Heidegger’s analysis of language as talk.\textsuperscript{46}

With the conclusion of the world analysis, we have finished our phenomenological investigation of one of the fundamental structures of being-in-the-world, namely the world in which Dasein exists and towards which it comports itself. Before we go on to discuss the second fundamental structure of being-in-the-world, namely the entity (Dasein) that is in the world and that is characterized by evermineness or selfhood, let us, following Heidegger at the end of § 18, briefly sum up the main points of the world-analysis:

1. the being of the intramundane entities that we first discover in our everyday comportments is to-handedness;
2. the being of to-handed entities is connection;\textsuperscript{47}
3. the being of entities insofar as they are discovered in theoretical comportments is at-handedness;
Rephrasing Heidegger

(4) worldliness itself is a system of references [Verweisungs zusammenhang]; and

(5) the worldliness of the world is an existential, a structural feature of Dasein.48

Heidegger terms the types of being expressed in (1) and (3), namely to-handedness and at-handedness, categories, because they refer to entities that do not have the character of Dasein. By contrast, structures of being that refer to Dasein rather than intramundane entities are not categories but existentials. One of the fundamental distinctions to emerge from Heidegger’s world analysis, then, is the distinction between intramundane entities and Dasein. The characterizations or categories that are applicable to the former are not, for Heidegger, under any circumstances applicable to the latter.49 Given that this is the case, how do we go on to characterize Dasein in contradistinction to entities? What and who is Dasein at the everyday level?

b) The One-self
In the course of the world analysis we investigated the fundamental nature of Dasein’s comportments towards the entities it interacts with at the everyday level. In the process, we saw that the what-for of entities so discovered is a function of a particular purpose. Since the being of to-handed entities (or tools) is understood with reference to connection, and connection itself arises from a purpose of Dasein, it is clear that the being of tools is rooted in the being of Dasein. In order to complete our analysis of intramundane entities, it is therefore necessary to consider the being who interacts with these entities. Who is it that makes use of tools on the level of everyday interaction?

As we previously saw, Heidegger’s term for the essential quality of selfhood is evermineness. Evermineness is what allows me to recognize my own existence as my own. The term expresses the fact that in existing, I myself am concerned with my own existence. The choices I make are my choices, choices that belong to me and my life history and that are made by me and not by another. The inquiry into the evermineness of Dasein
Hermeneutic Phenomenology is accordingly an inquiry into the existential structures that make selfhood and the self at all possible. Why are my choices my own, and who is it that makes them at the everyday level of interaction with the world?

To answer these questions, Heidegger picks up the threads where he left them upon the conclusion of the world analysis. In order to answer the question concerning the evermineness of Dasein, we will continue our investigation at the everyday level of Dasein’s comportment, the average level of existence at which Dasein is first and foremost \( \text{[zunächst und zumeist]}^{50} \) to be found: its discovering of tools in the world.

When we consider the use we make of tools, we see that the what-for of tools, that is, the particular work that they are meant to accomplish, often exhibits an essential reference to others. That is to say: if we consider a shoemaker at work, the shoemaker’s product, namely the shoe, is not merely produced for the shoemaker’s own purpose. The shoe, as a shoe, is meant to be worn by another. The shoe has an essential connection with a wearer. Similarly, to follow Heidegger’s examples, a field belongs to ——— and is properly tended by ———, a book was bought at ——— and gifted to us by ————; the boat at anchor is sailed by ————; and so on. It seems, then, that an essential feature of the worldliness of the world as such is that it contains lasting and unmistakable references to other people (others who are also Dasein\(^51\)). It belongs to the world structure as such that it is a shared world.\(^52\)

These other people we meet with in the course of our use of tools are neither to-handed nor at-handed. Their manner of being is radically different from the being of tools. They too are characterized by Dasein. That is to say, they too are experienced as characterized by purpose. They too are there in the world as Dasein together with our own Dasein. Dasein’s being-in-the-world is necessarily and fundamentally also a \textit{shared} being-in-the-world.

This is a somewhat subtle point, the significance of which is likely to seem obvious to non-philosophers or those without
an in-depth knowledge of the history of philosophy. In short, Heidegger's analysis is directed against Descartes' account of subjectivity. One could argue that this account is the distinguishing feature of Modern philosophy, as it has exercised a decisive influence on virtually every important philosophical movement following Descartes. For our purposes, the Cartesian theory of subjectivity can be interpreted as having two main influential features: (1) knowledge of one's own perceptions is held to be more reliable than knowledge of the external world; and (2) our knowledge of the external world is held to be some sort of inference from our own perceptions. These two theoretical features lead to the central problem of how to demonstrate the existence of other subjects beside oneself in the world (the problem of solipsism).

Husserl, who was strongly influenced by Descartes, addresses this problem in the *Cartesianische Meditationen*, fifth meditation, §§ 42-62. For Husserl, our perception of other people as fellow subjects with conscious experiences resembling our own is an inference from their bodily movements. These bodily movements, experienced as similar to ours, are therefore understood to be the results of a conscious awareness similar to our own. Heidegger, by contrast, attempts to deal with the problem by denying that the Cartesian theory in fact accurately reflects our experience of the world. At the level of everyday comportment we do not begin with an encapsulated ego, which, possessed of certainty concerning its own existence, goes on to examine the content of its perceptions and infer the existence of other conscious beings in a spatially extended world. Rather, the world in which we live at the everyday level is first and foremost a shared world. We begin with the conviction that there are other people in the world along with us. Since we begin with this conviction, there is no need to explain it in theoretical terms. It is a brute fact of our experience.

In fact, in order to arrive at the conception of an epistemologically isolated ego conceived as a Cartesian *res cogitans* ("thinking thing") we have to subject our experience of the world to a thoroughgoing theoretical revision. Descartes
has to *obliterate* our everyday experience of the world in order to carry out his “method of universal doubt” and arrive at the proposition “I think, therefore I am.” Of course, Heidegger might reply, theoretical problems will arise after the superimposition of this stripped-down theoretical framework upon our experience of the world. Our experience of the world has not been explained but erased. The problem of solipsism is a natural result of the fact that the theory is fundamentally unsuited to the facts it purports to explain.

Of course, the fact that our world is by nature and prior to all theoretical analysis a shared world does not mean that we never make mistakes— that we never, for example, mistake a storefront mannequin for a real person at a distance. However, it does mean that beginning with an epistemologically encapsulated perceiving ego-thing and then attempting to explain how this ego-thing gets outside the range of its perceptions into a real world with real people is very much a case of putting the cart before the horse. The more interesting question is how Descartes could possibly have overlooked something that was as plain as the nose on his face.

How, then, do we in fact experience this shared being-in-the-world at the everyday level? Who, in other words, are these others whom we happen to find along with ourselves in the world? According to Heidegger, they are precisely those “from whom one mostly does not distinguish oneself, among whom one also is” [§ 26, p. 116]. This everyday existence, in which *no strict difference is made between oneself and others*, Heidegger terms “being-there-with” [Mitdasein], that is, being together with others in a world of entities towards which we all comport ourselves in the manner of concernedness. That is to say: at the everyday level, we meet with people at work. The Other is experienced with respect to the shared purpose of concerning oneself with entities as tools. We interact with each other by going about our business, that is, by pursuing the purpose we have in our concernedness with entities and their use as tools, as means for achieving ends.
It belongs to the essential structure of Dasein that others are there in the world along with us and that in our primary interaction with them we make no strict distinction between our purposes and theirs in our use of tools. The proprietor of the corner store is there to sell me ice cream. The bus driver is there to drive me downtown. The teacher is there to teach me. The newspaper vendor is there to sell me a newspaper. In all these examples concerning the use of entities as tools, whether ice cream, the bus, information, or the newspaper, the manipulation of these entities is understood as fulfilling a common purpose. In selling me ice cream, the proprietor is fulfilling his own purpose of selling ice cream, while at the same time he is fulfilling my own purpose by doing so. Thus, strictly speaking, we should speak not of two different purposes but of one common purpose: exchanging ice cream for currency. The same is true of the vendor’s perspective on the matter; and it is also true in the case of the other examples.55

Heidegger, continuing the theme of the essential difference of Dasein from to-handed and at-handed entities, introduces a special term for comportments towards other people (other entities characterized by Dasein). Whereas our fundamental comportment towards entities used as tools is concernedness (i.e., employment and use), Heidegger terms the fundamental character of our comportments towards others “concernfulness” [Fürsorge]. Concernfulness is an existential: a fundamental ontological structure of Dasein. This implies that Dasein, insofar as it exists within a world, is not only possessed of an understanding of its own existence but also understands itself as essentially linked with others in the act of existing. That is to say: “As being-with [Mitsein], Dasein ‘is’ thus essentially for the sake of others.” Even when a particular Dasein happens to be neglecting its proper concernfulness towards others, the fact that this is recognized as neglect at all shows that Dasein is essentially linked with others. For Heidegger, it is never possible to free oneself from the shared character of the world. The choices we make in our everyday life as we pursue our concernedness with
entities always have consequences for others. For Heidegger an existential isolation from others is impossible, because the existential structure of Dasein necessarily implies the presence of others. The "isolation" of which Heidegger speaks in the context of authenticity has an entirely different sense, as we shall see in Section 3.3.

In order to complete our analysis of evermineness, we need to consider more closely the fundamental character of sharing the world with others. We mentioned in passing above that in meeting others in the comportment of being-with, for the most part we find them at work. At this level of everyday comportment, others are what they do. One particular person is a bus driver; another is a newspaper vendor. At the everyday level we make no clear distinction between occupation and selfhood. This is because the everyday level of comportment is oriented towards concernedness with entities. It is concerned with tools, with the use of entities in order to fulfill a purpose of Dasein's.

According to Heidegger's analysis in § 27, it is also a distinguishing characteristic of the everyday level of interaction with others that the different purposes of Dasein are to a large extent fixed. One's purposes are prescribed and regulated by an understanding of what "simply is not done," of what "one should do in such circumstances." In Heidegger's own words,

We enjoy and delight ourselves, as one enjoys; we read, see, and judge literature and art as one sees and judges; but we also withdraw from the "great mass" as one withdraws; we are "outraged" by that which one finds outrageous. The one, which is no one in particular [kein bestimmtes] and which everyone is, though not as a sum, prescribes the being-manner of everydayness. [§ 27, p. 126-127]

The regulation or standardization of everyday life is, for Heidegger, a fundamental structural feature of Dasein (an existential). The self of Dasein at the everyday level is the "one-self" [das Man-selbst]. At the everyday level of existence, which
is primarily oriented towards the use of entities as tools, the concrete comportments of concernedness and concernfulness are all prescribed by an awareness of what is and is not done, of what "one" should and should not do.

As Heidegger repeatedly points out in § 27 and elsewhere, the one-self is an essential structural feature of Dasein. The one can never be done away with because it is the basis of any form of shared existence. In any situation where a number of people are involved, whether it be a classroom or a corporation, there must be some general understanding of what one can and cannot do. To do away with this standardization of comportment would of course mean chaos and disorder. In fact, for Heidegger completely doing away with social rules and norms is technically impossible, since the one-self is an existential of Dasein. Unfortunately, Heidegger's terminology suggests that his conception of such existential structures as the one-self is entirely negative. It is thus easy and tempting to read Heidegger as an advocate of "radical freedom" along the lines of Jean-Paul Sartre's "existentialism." Heidegger is, however, more subtle than this.

As we shall see in the later chapters (principally in Sections 2.10-3.6) addressing Heidegger's concept of authentic selfhood, authenticity in the Heideggerian sense is not a question of eliminating the one-self. Rather, it is a question of not being caught in the one-self as the only and exclusive way for Dasein to exist. For the moment we will simply quote Heidegger's own words at the conclusion of § 27: "Authentic self-being [Selbstsein] does not rest upon an exceptional state, cut off from the one, of the subject, but rather is an existential modification of the one as an essential existential."

2.6 THE INDIFFERENT MODE OF BEING-IN
(§§ 28-34): SENSIBILITY, UNDERSTANDING, AND TALK

In order to complete our analysis of being-in-the-world we now turn to its last structural feature, namely the relation holding
between the world and the entity that is ever mine (Dasein). Heidegger's term for this relation, as we saw earlier, is "being-in." As Heidegger points out in § 12, "in" in this sense has no connection with the usual spatial meaning of the preposition "in." The usual meaning of "in," according to Heidegger, is properly applicable only to spatial relationships between at-handed entities. The character of such relations is "categorial." The character of the "in" in "being-in" is, by contrast, existential, that is, refers to structural features of Dasein. When we speak of Dasein's "being-in" the world, we do not mean that Dasein is in the world the way water is in a glass. (This should be evident from the analyses of the last section.) Rather, we mean that Dasein is "acquainted with" a world in which it "resides." Dasein, in other words, is able to understand what world means and is able to interact with entities discovered within this world.

What, then, are the fundamental comportments that make this interaction possible? What is involved in living within the system of references that constitute the worldliness of the world?

For Heidegger there are three coeval [gleichursprünglich] comportments that play the most fundamental role in the relation of Dasein to its world. These three comportments are "understanding" [Verstehen], "sensibility" [Befindlichkeit], and "talk" [Rede]. In the present section we will be discussing these three in their indifferent mode. That is to say: we will be observing their essential structural features without reference to the question of whether the comportments themselves are authentic or inauthentic.

a) Sensibility
Let us begin with the fundamental comportment of sensibility. Sensibility manifests itself at the familiar level of everyday life as the possibility of having moods, feelings, sentiments, and emotions. The task of the phenomenological analysis of sensibility is to give a clear philosophical account of this possibility. Moods, according to Heidegger, make one's own state apparent. By disclosing this state, moods and emotions also bring Dasein
before its world. They do this by means of “inclination and disinclination” [An- und Abkehr]. In order for us to concern ourselves with entities at all (to understand them as tools for accomplishing a purpose) we have to be inclined towards them in a certain manner. If, for example, I visit a workshop, but am completely bored by the situation, the individual entities within the workshop are not discovered as tools. Rather, insofar as they are discovered (noticed) at all, they appear as useless entities, entities with no particular what-for, as far as I myself am concerned with them. Similarly, if I happen to have eaten painfully spicy food, in the resulting sensibility I will be concerned with nothing at the table but the nearest means for doing away with the pain. Table, cutlery, chairs, tablecloths, other food—all these will disappear (fail to be discovered) in the particular sensibility (mood or emotion) resulting from having eaten too much spice.

If Heidegger’s analysis is essentially correct, then the fact that we can relate to connection-wholes at all, and the manner in which we relate to them, is dependent upon our moods and emotions. (Recall the laboratory example in Section 2.2.)

From these considerations we can propose a definition of sensibility: sensibility is the primeval comportment that discovers connections and connection-wholes and simultaneously discloses the existential possibilities for comportment towards intramundane entities. It is the existential structure that makes inclination and disinclination possible; it is “the fundamental manner in which Dasein has itself be addressed [sich angehent lässt] by the world.” As Heidegger further puts it: sensibility both brings Dasein before the world and before itself. It discloses that Dasein exists and that existence is its task.

An important existential character of Dasein made evident through sensibility is “thrownness” [Geworfenheit]. Thrownness designates the simple fact that coming into existence at all is not one of Dasein’s own possibilities. One cannot have an inclination or disinclination to be born: one simply is born, hurled or thrown into the world. An important consequence of this fact is that Dasein, through sensibility, discovers connection-wholes as
already there, that is, independent of its own choosing. In short, sensibility discovers connection-wholes as existing prior to and independently of Dasein’s own existence. In Heidegger’s own words: “In [thrownness] the fact discloses itself [enthiilt sich] that Dasein always already is [i.e., exists] as mine, and as this one, in a particular world and in a particular sphere [Umkreis] of particular intramundane entities” [§ 44 b), p. 221]. It is this feature of thrownness—the independence of large areas of the world from Dasein’s own choice—that makes history at all possible and that plays an essential role in Heidegger’s analysis of the past, as we shall later see.64

b) Understanding
The second fundamental comportment of being-in is understanding. Understanding is the comportment in which (1) tools are discovered within tool-wholes, that is, apprehended as means towards ends; and (2) the possible uses of such tools are grasped. In other words, the act of understanding reveals both the structure of the world and the possible ways in which Dasein can exist in the world (use tools). In Heidegger’s own words,

In purpose, existing being-in-the-world as such is disclosed [erschlossen]; this disclosedness was called understanding. In understanding purpose, meaningfulness, which is founded in purpose, is co-disclosed [miterschlossen]. The disclosedness of understanding [i.e., the disclosedness resulting from the act of understanding], as the disclosedness of purpose and meaningfulness, involves [betrifft] the full [phenomenon] of being-in-the-world in a coeval fashion. [§ 31, p. 143]

By “disclosed” and “disclosedness” Heidegger refers to the emergence or appearing of structures of Dasein within the range of Dasein’s experience. (In fact, Heidegger coins these expressions precisely because he wishes to avoid such philosophically loaded terms as “experience”.) The term is used by Heidegger in opposition to “discoveredness,” which denotes the givenness
of entities and entitlal structures within the world. Accordingly, one speaks of the disclosedness of the world in understanding, the world being a non-entitlal structure of Dasein. On the other hand, one would speak of the discoveredness of a tool within a particular tool-whole, or of the discoveredness of the tool-whole itself, since we are referring in both cases to entities or entitlal structures.

It is important to keep in mind that Heidegger’s use of the term “understanding” is very different from the usual meaning of the term. Normally, when we speak of “understanding,” we refer to the act of intellectual comprehension or apprehension. Heidegger, however, is using the term to indicate a much wider and more fundamental comportment of Dasein. For Heidegger, the primeval comportment of understanding has two aspects. On the one hand, it is the act by which we relate tools to tool-wholes. More plainly, it is the fundamental human act that allows us to actually follow the linked systems of references that constitute our world. On the other hand, in permitting us to make sense of these linked systems of reference, the act of understanding simultaneously discloses the various ways in which we can make use of these references to accomplish our purposes. In understanding intramundane entities as tools, we simultaneously understand their possible uses (the possibilities they offer us), that is, our own purposes in comporting ourselves towards them. This is why Heidegger often identifies understanding with Dasein’s “being-ability” [Seinkönnen], or its ability to pursue various courses of action (more technically, to discover tool-wholes in the act of disclosing purposes).

Let us pause to briefly consider the contrast between the respective functions of sensibility and understanding. Sensibility, we said, is the primeval comportment that discovers connections and connection-wholes and simultaneously also discloses the existential possibilities for comportment towards intramundane entities. This sounds remarkably like the definition we have just given of understanding, but there is a fine nuance. Sensibility, as inclination and disinclination (moods and emotions in the widest sense), is the primeval comportment making it possible
for us to relate to connection-wholes at all. Understanding, by contrast, is the primeval comportment making it possible for us to relate to connection-wholes in specific ways, to discover a tool as the specific tool which it is. To give a specific example: my particular sensibility makes it possible for me to do productive work within the tool-whole of the workshop (because I have the proper inclination). My act of understanding, however, makes it possible for me to discover individual tools with respect to the tool-whole of the workshop and thus use them as the individual tools that they happen to be.

The fact that we can be occupied with connection-wholes and tool-wholes at all, as well as the range of connection-wholes and tool-wholes with which we are able to be occupied, is a function of sensibility. The fact that I can experience particular tools as meaningful within these connection-wholes and tool-wholes is a function of understanding. In Heidegger's own terminology, sensibility discloses thrownness into the world (that particular connection-wholes, and not others, happen to be "present" or "discoverable"), while understanding plans and interprets the entities that are discovered within this world.

We have already seen that for Heidegger understanding has an essentially referential structure. We have previously explained this feature of understanding by saying that, for Heidegger, whenever something is understood, it is always understood with reference to something else. This locution is particularly appropriate when speaking of entities discovered within the referential structure of the world, but in § 31 Heidegger adds yet another dimension to his analysis of the understanding. According to Heidegger, the fundamental existential structure of understanding is the "plan" [Entwurf]. "Planning," the characteristic act of understanding, is the ability to disclose and pursue Dasein's own possibilities (as opposed to thrownness, the existential character of possibilities that are not open to Dasein to choose).

With this more elaborate conception of understanding, we can introduce a preliminary definition of the difference between
authenticity and inauthenticity. For Heidegger, inauthenticity is characterized by an understanding that "places itself primarily in the disclosure of the world, that is, Dasein can first and foremost understand itself hither from its world [aus seiner Welt her]." By contrast, authenticity is characterized by an understanding that throws itself primarily into purpose, that is, Dasein exists as itself. Understanding is either authentic understanding, emerging from one's own self as such, or it is inauthentic understanding. The "in-" [in "inauthentic"] does not mean that Dasein cuts itself off from its self and "only" understands the world. World belongs to its being a self [zu seinem Selbstsein] as being-in-the-world. Authentic as well as inauthentic understanding can in turn be genuine or not genuine. [...] But shifting oneself [das Sichverlegen] into one of these fundamental possibilities does not put aside the other. [§ 31, p. 146]

Two points in particular are to be emphasized: Firstly, as we saw in Section 2.5, both the world as such and evermineness necessarily belong to the structure of Dasein. Accordingly, the difference between authenticity and inauthenticity can only be based on a shift of emphasis. In the case of authentic understanding, the emphasis is on selfhood. Here Dasein emphasizes its own purpose rather than that of the one-self. By contrast, in the case of inauthentic understanding, the emphasis is on the interaction with the what-fors of tools. Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that Heidegger further distinguishes between genuine understanding and understanding that is not genuine [unecht]. Just because an act of understanding attemptis to emphasize the purpose of Dasein does not necessarily mean that it thereby succeeds in doing so. The same is true in the case of inauthentic understanding. In both cases, it is still possible to be mistaken. The mere attempt does not guarantee success.

It is clear that Heidegger does not wish his analysis of authenticity to be either prescriptive or proscriptive in any sense. He merely wishes to explain what authenticity and inauthenticity,
or genuine and false selfhood, are. In accordance with this aim, Heidegger declines to give any concrete guidelines of judging others' actions to be either authentic or inauthentic. I am inclined to believe that Heidegger felt the enterprise of judging others' existential (but not necessarily ethical) decisions to be inauthentic by definition. The reader interested in pursuing this line of thought is referred to the discussion of death as Dasein’s “ownmost” and “irrespective” possibility in Section 3.2.

In §32, Heidegger goes on to discuss the structure of planning in more detail. Every concrete interaction with intramundane entities takes place within the general framework of a plan. Within the framework of a plan, entities are interpreted as the particular tools that they happen to be. In Heidegger’s words, “There is always already a connection, disclosed in the understanding of the world, with intramundane entities as such, which is brought out by interpretation [die durch die Auslegung herausgelegt wird]” [§32, p. 150]. Interpretation is the act of understanding that “brings out” the connections of tools by understanding them with respect to connection-wholes. For Heidegger, interpretation is characterized by an “as-structure”: in interpreting a tool as a hammer, for example, I discover the hammer as a hammer; I experience it as the tool that it in fact is.

This act of interpretation is only possible, however, because of the “pre-structure” of understanding. This pre-structure is composed of three structural elements: “prepossession” [Vorhaben], “preview” [Vorsicht], and “preconception” [Vorgriff]. According to Heidegger,

(1) prepossession is an already understood connection-whole that serves as the framework or context of an interpretation;

(2) preview is the angle or perspective from which the interpretation will be carried out; and

(3) preconception is the set of concepts that will be used in order to carry out the interpretation.
Heidegger intends these "pre-" words to reflect the fact that there is no such thing as a presuppositionless interpretation. Every interpretation must begin with some preliminary understanding of the thing in question, with some preliminary frame of reference. Otherwise it would be impossible even to see the need for interpretation at all, and it would be impossible to know how to begin. As Heidegger puts it, "Every interpretation that is to produce an understanding must already have understood that which is to be interpreted" [§ 32, p. 152]. (Recall the account of the hermeneutic circle in Section 2.2.) Taken together, the definite prepossession, preview, and preconception involved in any given interpretation are called the hermeneutic situation. (See § 45, p. 232.)

The function that the threefold pre-structure of understanding—that is, the hermeneutic situation—plays in the act of interpretation is to organize the sense of the interpretation. In carrying out an act of interpretation we begin from a particular hermeneutic situation and progress towards a particular sense. "Sense" [Sinn] is defined by Heidegger as "the towards-which of the plan, structured by prepossession, preview, and preconception, hither from which something becomes understandable as something" [§ 32, p. 151]. In other words, sense is that with reference to which something derives its meaningfulness. Thus, for example, the sense of intramundane entities is the worldliness of the world.

Typically, Heidegger reserves a clear definition of "sense" for a much later point in Being and Time, where it is mentioned only in passing. In § 65, p. 324, we learn that

[...] sense is that within which the understandability of something is kept without itself being explicitly and thematically seen. Sense means the with-respect-to-which [Woraufhin] of the primary plan hither from which something can be conceived as what it is in its possibility. Planning discloses possibilities, that is, that which makes possible.
According to this definition, the “sense” of something is the background against which it is understood as what it is. In the act of understanding the thing in question, the background is not explicitly grasped as such. It remains as the latent structure with reference to which we accomplish the act of understanding. The background functions, in Kantian terms, as the “condition of the possibility” of the thing. It is the latent conceptual structure that makes it possible to understand the thing as what it is at all. “Sense,” then, is Heidegger’s term for the conceptual background necessarily presupposed, but not explicitly grasped, in each act of understanding a given thing, and in terms of which the thing in question is understood.

It is important to understand Heidegger’s use of the word “sense” because the question of Being, which Heidegger also calls “the question of the sense of Being,” has a particular technical nuance that we could not previously make clear. In investigating the sense of Being, Heidegger is not asking what it means to be, nor is he asking whether it makes any sense to exist. Heidegger is attempting to clarify what the universal criterion or framework is within which we understand what does and does not “exist,” that is, what can and cannot be discovered (entities) and what can and cannot be disclosed (existential structures of Dasein). Ultimately, as we shall see towards the end of Chapter 3, Heidegger’s answer will be that the sense of Being is primeval timeliness as the unity of horizontal and ecstatic time.

c) Talk
As we have seen, sensibility makes it possible for us to comport ourselves towards entities at all; this it does by discovering connection-wholes through inclination and disinclination. By contrast, understanding, in the form of planning and interpretation, makes it possible for us to comport ourselves towards individual entities within the wider framework of connection wholes. Understanding makes it possible for us to recognize entities as the particular entities that they happen to be. In § 34 of Being and Time Heidegger introduces another
fundamental comportment, “talk” [Rede], which, he informs us, is “coeval with sensibility and understanding.” “Talk” in this sense, like interpretation, is not a human activity that occurs now and then in particular situations; talk is a fundamental human comportment that makes it possible for us to relate to the world at all.

Like § 7 of Being and Time, § 34, which addresses Heidegger’s philosophical conception of language, is infamous for its unintelligible treatment of a vitally important subject. That Heidegger himself attributed a great significance to § 34 is clear from his dialogue “Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache,” published in the anthology Unterwegs zur Sprache. When the “Japanese” interlocutor remarks that Heidegger’s treatment of language in Being and Time is “quite meagre” [recht sparsam], the “Questioner,” Heidegger himself, replies, “But perhaps you will read § 34 in ‘Being and Time’ more attentively after our conversation sometime.” Leaving the question of the “meagreness” of § 34 aside for the moment, we can surely agree with the reply: “I have already read it often and regretted each time that it was kept so short.”

In § 34, Heidegger introduces a distinction between “talk” [Rede] and “language” [Sprache]. It is difficult to translate this pair of terms elegantly into English, although French possesses a similar distinction in the difference between “parole” and “langue.” Language, in Heidegger’s terminological sense of the word, is the entitical form of talk, talk insofar as it appears as a to-handed intramundane entity. That is to say, language consists of sounds, characters, and symbols used as tools (in Heidegger’s special sense of the word) in the act of talking. This is why Heidegger informs us that “the outspokenness [Hinausgesprochenheit] of talk is language.” Furthermore, like all tools, the to-handedness of words (the tools used in language) can, when the tool becomes the matter of a theoretical consideration, be transformed into at-handedness. In Heidegger’s words, “Language can be shattered into at-handed word-things” [§ 34, p. 161]. This is, of course, what normally happens in grammar,
linguistics, and language philosophy. In Heidegger’s opinion, these disciplines are characterized by the fact that in them the to-handed quality of language in use is completely suppressed for the sake of a supposed gain in clarity, certainty, and logical transparency. For this reason Heidegger feels justified in calling for a liberation of grammar from logic [§ 34, p. 165]. The logical analysis of language is to be replaced with a phenomenological analysis of the “fundamental forms of a possible meaningful structuring [bedeutungsmäßige Gliederung] of the understandable in general” [§ 34, p. 166]. Only in this way can an intelligible account be given of the to-handed character of language, of language as it is actually experienced and employed in daily life.

Talk itself, by contrast, is the fundamental comportment of Dasein that makes language and the use of language-tools (words, sentences, etc.) at all possible. In § 34, Heidegger provides three different definitions of talk:

1. Talk is the articulation of understandability [Verständlichkeit];
2. Talk is the meaningful [bedeutende] structuring [Gliedern] of the understandability of being-in-the-world; and

The sudden introduction of three new technical terms, “articulation,” “understandability,” and “meaningful,” is surprising and confusing. If, however, we are careful to keep our previous terminological distinctions in mind, it should be possible to work out what Heidegger in fact means. Comparing the three definitions, it seems reasonable to conclude that Heidegger uses “articulation” as a synonym for “structuring.” This articulation or structuring occurs, according to the definitions, “so as to mean” [bedeutend, literally “meaningly”] or “in conformity with
meaning” [bedeutungsmäßi]g. Lastly, that which is articulated in this manner is “understandability.”

(1) Let us begin by working out the meaning of “articulation.” Heidegger informs us that that which can be articulated in interpretation, and yet still more primevaly already in talk, we called sense. That which is structured in talking articulation as such [das in der redenden Artikulation Gegliederte] we will call the meaning-whole [das Bedeutungsganze]. This can be dissolved into meanings. As the articulated of the articulatable, meanings always have sense [sind immer sinnhaft, i.e., are in possession of or qualified by sense]. [§ 34, p. 161]

In the more detailed analysis of § 33, Heidegger refers to interpretation as a “structuring” and to sense as that which is “structured.” From the context it is evident that the “structuring” activity of interpretation involves the setting up or putting forth of sense, being that with respect to which the interpreted is understood. From the quote above it is clear that talk undertakes a similar structuring of sense, which, however, occurs prior to the structuring activity of interpretation. In § 33, Heidegger briefly characterizes the as-structure of interpretation as “reaching out [ausgreifen] into a connection-whole.” By contrast, a theoretical statement [Aussage] “is cut off with respect to its possibilities for the articulation of reference-relations [Verweisungsbezügen] of meaningfulness, which, as such, constitutes the defining characteristic of the surrounding world [Umweltlichkei]t” [§ 33, p. 158]. Clearly, then, “articulation” is nothing other than the act of discovery of the references that are the defining feature of the world as the sum total of connection-wholes.

(2) The term “understandability” literally denotes “the quality of that which can be understood.” What is, for Heidegger, that which can be understood? The structure of connection-wholes as defined through the pre-structure, that is, sense. This reading of Heidegger’s terminology is supported by the statement that
understandability "is also already structured [gegliedert] already before acquisitive [zueignende] interpretation." That is to say, even before any act of interpretation takes place by which tools are understood as the tools they are with reference to a particular connection-whole, the entire structure, involving connections, connection-wholes, and tools, is already structured (articulated) by talk. "Understandability," then, is simply a term referring to the world-structure insofar as it is structured by talk prior to the further structuring activity of understanding and interpretation.

(3) Heidegger also tells us that the product of the act of articulation undertaken by talk is a "meaning-whole" [Bedeutungsganzes]. A meaning-whole "can be dissolved into meanings. As the articulated of the articulable, meanings always have sense [sind immer sinnhaft]. [...] Words grow upon meanings. It is not, however, the case that word-things are provided with meanings" [§ 34, p. 161]. The term "meaning-whole" is clearly conceived in analogy to "tool-whole" and "connection-whole" and so also refers to an aspect of the worldliness of the world. The term "meanings" is also clearly intended as a reference to "meaningfulness," which, as we saw in Section 2.5, denotes the essential character of the references constituting the worldliness of the world, insofar as they are conceived as acts of Dasein's understanding. As we previously explained, it is in the act of assigning meaningfulness to intramundane entities that Dasein understands its world. A "meaning-whole," then, will be identical with a connection-whole insofar as it is viewed as structured by talk prior to any further structuring activity undertaken by understanding and interpretation. Similarly, an individual "meaning" will be identical with a particular connection insofar as this connection is viewed as structured solely by talk prior to any act of understanding. 

What, then, is talk, insofar as it is conceived as the "meaningful articulation of understandability"? Let us reflect that talk, according to Heidegger, is an existential of Dasein, coeval with sensibility and understanding. Sensibility, we recall, is the comportment that discloses the world and its constituent
connection-wholes at all. Understanding and its derivative interpretation are the comportments that allow us to discover entities within the worldly network of connection-wholes. Talk, as we have seen in the previous discussion, is the comportment that, before all understanding, structures meaningfulness (meaning-wholes together with meanings). These latter—meaning-wholes and meanings—are connection-wholes and connections prior to the act of understanding. The clear implication of the priority of talk with respect to understanding is that talk organizes the meaningfulness-structures that understanding discovers when it understands tools as tools. Sensibility makes it possible for us to relate to connection-wholes at all, while understanding discovers tools within these connection-wholes; but the fact that particular connection-wholes, and not others, "exist" at all is a function of talk.72

This point of view has a certain plausibility to it; in order to comprehend what a workshop is and what sort of tasks may be taken care of within its boundaries, I need to be taught what a workshop is for. In being taught or shown what a workshop is, its organization or structure needs to be made clear to me. Of course, the primary way of doing so is through verbal explanation, through language. It is important, however, to preserve the Heideggerian distinction between language and talk. Verbal explanation cannot "language" an unreal object into existence; but no one who has understood Heidegger's world analysis will believe that this is in any way what Heidegger means. If, on the other hand, we conceive of talk in fundamentally Heideggerian terms as the fundamental comportment by means of which the referential structure of the world is established in order that it may function as the framework for all particular interactions with intramundane entities,73 it becomes quite plausible that there should be such a fundamental phenomenon involved in our comportments towards the world.74

If, for example, I define a "zayzax" as the point of contact between any glass surface and any other surface, I have introduced a completely new meaning into our present discourse.
This meaning has an entitical aspect, namely the word “zayzax,” which has the capacity to function as a tool. If it is made use of as a to-handed entity, the user is enabled to discover many zayzaxes in the immediate environment that were not previously experienced as zayzaxes, but were left completely undiscovered, for example the point of contact between the glass of drinking water at my right hand and the surface of the table. Zayzaxes such as this one simply did not “exist” — were not discoverable as zayzaxes — before the discovery of the meaning “zayzax.” Of course, the meaning “zayzax” is not likely to be very useful in a wider context because it is a somewhat artificial meaning whose chief significance is derived from a very specific meaning-whole with a very limited scope, namely explaining a finer nuance of Heidegger’s philosophy of language to newcomers. However, the point having been made, we can abandon the use of the term (though the essential rootedness of our experience in talk will really be driven home if the reader is phenomenologically adventurous enough to attend to his or her experience of the world for the next few days and note how zayzaxes now suddenly appear to be everywhere).

The above example is, of course, meant to be informative and entertaining, and its purpose is fulfilled if it successfully manages to be both. Nonetheless, it can perform yet another service by shedding some further light upon Heidegger’s concept of phenomenology. Recall that in Section 2.4 we characterized Heidegger’s phenomenology as envisioning phenomena through talk. It is not immediately evident when one first reads through § 7 of *Being and Time* that the talk that, as the *logos* of phenomenology, is involved in any phenomenological description is the same phenomenon that is analyzed and described by Heidegger in § 34. This is the reason that Heidegger, near the beginning of § 34, makes the somewhat cryptic comment, “We have already constantly made use of this phenomenon [namely talk] in the interpretation of sensibility, understanding, interpretation, and statement up to this point, but, so to speak, suppressed it in the course of the thematic analysis” [§ 34, p. 160–161]. In a
Rephrasing Heidegger

phenomenological analysis, then, we are doing nothing more than allowing meaning-wholes to “speak out” [zu Wort kommen, literally “to come to word”]. In so doing, we permit the meanings that are already present in our experience of the world prior to any act of understanding or interpretation to find their way into linguistic expression. That is to say, we furnish these meanings with an entititial form (“words”) of their own in order that they can be discussed and pointed out by means of language (in Heidegger’s technical sense of the word).

Again, it is vital for the reader to remember to distinguish sharply between talk and language. The former is a pre-verbal and pre-linguistic comportment of Dasein by means of which Dasein structures meaning-wholes. The latter is a comportment of Dasein through which meaning-wholes are dissolved into meanings and furnished with an entititial shape, that is, words and sentences, “language” in the usual sense. These specific technical definitions must be borne firmly in mind. Using terms in a vague and loosely philosophical sense, which is, moreover, alien to Heidegger’s conception of language, can only lead to hopeless confusion.

The further elaborate details of § 34 are not directly relevant for our purposes. As such, we will end this section with a brief presentation of the four structural features of talk Heidegger isolates by means of his phenomenological analysis. We will address the topics of hearing and listening in Section 3.3, since they are more informatively handled in connection with Heidegger’s analysis of the conscience as the authentic mode of talk.75

It should be noted that Heidegger’s analysis of the four constitutive structural features of talk is oriented towards its role in being-with. That is to say, it is primarily an analysis of actual situations of talking with each other at the everyday level. It is evident from § 34 that Heidegger does not mean to imply that talk only takes place when we are talking to each other; talk is a fundamental existential of Dasein that is coeval with sensibility and understanding.76 As such, talk structures both being-with and being-self (evermineness).
According to Heidegger, talk has four constitutive structural features.

1. the "discussed" (i.e., the subject matter addressed by the talk) [das Beredete] or the "about-which" [das Worüber]. This is what the talk happens to be "about";
2. the "spoken" [das Geredete]. This is the manner and scope in which the discussed is addressed, what is in fact said about it;
3. "announcement" [die Mitteilung]. "Announcement" is the structural feature of talk that allows it to be shared with others, its fundamentally communicative aspect (note that although Mitteilung means "message" or "act of informing"; its literal meaning is "with-sharing"). "Its being-tendency aims at bringing the hearer into participation in the disclosed being unto [that is, attitude or comportment towards] the discussed of talk" [§ 35, p. 168], that is, it tries to establish the same comportment towards the discussed in the listener as in the talker; and
4. "self-expression" [das Sichaussprechen, literally "speaking oneself out"], also referred to as "proclamation" [Bekundung]. This is the sensibility associated with talk, its emotional quality. According to Heidegger, it is particularly exhibited in pitch, modulation, tempo, and in the "manner of speaking."

Although it would be beyond the scope of the present section to discuss the considerable influence of this philosophical conception of language on Heidegger's aesthetics, the reader is certainly now in a position to understand its far-reaching significance by considering the following quotation: "The announcement [Mitteilung] of the existential possibilities of sensibility, that is the disclosing of existence, can become the proper goal of 'poetic' talk" [§ 34, p. 162]. Art in this sense is certainly much more than the contemplation of the beautiful.
2.7 THE INAUTHENTIC MODE OF BEING-IN (§§ 35–38): TURMOIL, CURIOSITY, AND CROSSTALK

In Subsection A of Chapter Five (of Section One, Part One), consisting of §§ 29–34, Heidegger, as we have just seen, undertakes a phenomenological analysis of sensibility, understanding, and talk. Sensibility, understanding, and talk together constitute the indifferent mode of being-in. That is to say, they are the basis of being-in insofar as no particular decision with respect to authenticity or inauthenticity has been taken. They are the fundamental structural features of being-in, structural features common to both the authentic and inauthentic modes.

After completing this analysis, Heidegger turns in Subsection B to a brief account of the inauthentic modes of these three existentials. In Subsection B, which is comprised of §§ 35–38, Heidegger discusses "the everyday being of the There [Da] and the falling of Dasein." Heidegger, working in reverse order (from that in which the indifferent modes were presented), discusses the inauthentic mode of talk, crosstalk, in § 35; the inauthentic mode of understanding, curiosity, in § 36, and the inauthentic mode of interpretation, ambiguity, in § 37; and finally he completes the analysis in § 38 by presenting the inauthentic mode of sensibility, turmoil.

In order to prevent any confusion between Heidegger’s phenomenological analysis of the modes of being-in and “existentialism” in the loose sense of the word, it is important to keep in mind that Heidegger is not undertaking an exposition of the "human condition." Nor is Heidegger pursuing a philosophical anthropology or sociological investigation of everyday cultural situations. Rather Heidegger is concerned with showing how the fundamental ontological structures of Dasein give rise to certain peculiar and disturbing features of everyday existence. These features are neither psychological nor social in any sense; they are a necessary and unavoidable consequence of the ontological structure of human beings and their communal existence. When conceived of as psychological
and sociological in nature, however, the inauthentic modes of being-in do not exhibit an essentially necessary character but are viewed as incidental, that is, contingent upon psychological or sociological factors. Heidegger’s innovation and his great philosophical contribution is that he has made it possible to discuss, in a stringently philosophical manner, wider features of human existence that are normally left to psychology and sociology because they have no other place.

a) Crosstalk

The German word Heidegger uses to denote the inauthentic mode of talk is Gerede, which in everyday German simply means “rumour-bearing talk” or, in some contexts, “gossip.” Heidegger warns his readers at the beginning of § 35 that he is not using the expression Gerede in a derogatory sense. Far more important for understanding Heidegger’s use of the term is the etymology of the word Gerede. The prefix ge-, when it does not indicate the formation of the past participle, frequently has a collective meaning. Das Gebüsch, for example, literally means “a collection of bushes,” that is, “the bush,” “bushes,” or “shrubbery” in English. A similar meaning can be seen in the words Gebäck (“cakes,” “cookies”), Gedränge (“milling crowd”), Gefieder (“plumage”), Geflügel (“poultry”), Geflüster (“whisperings”), Gelaber (“utterly ridiculous talk”), and so on. Gerede, for Heidegger, will thus mean something along the lines of “a mass of talk,” “talk for talk’s sake,” “chatter.” Its main structural feature is that it obscures what is being talked about. For this reason it seemed most appropriate to translate Gerede by “crosstalk,” that is, talk at cross-purposes.

Talk, for Heidegger, is a fundamental comportment of Dasein. Its function is to structure meaning-wholes. These meaning-wholes serve as the fundamental basis for all further acts of understanding that we undertake in comporting ourselves towards intramundane entities. The account Heidegger gives of talk in § 34 is, however, incomplete in one important respect. If talk really does structure the world in the way that Heidegger says it does, and if talk is preserved in language, then how is it
possible for any particular statement to be wrong? What is the structural difference between a "true" statement and a "false" statement?77

As we saw in the last section, the aim of the announcement structure of talk is to establish the same comportment towards the discussed in the listener as in the talker. That is to say, the aim of talk is for the hearer to understand what is being spoken (the second structural feature of talk) about a particular discussed entity (the first structural feature of talk). The remaining structural feature of talk, self-expression, anchors the other three features in a particular sensibility. Only by sharing this sensibility can the listener experience the other three structures of talk as they are truly meant.

Talk can, however, undergo a modification in which the aim is not for the hearer to understand what is being spoken. By listening to what is spoken rather than understanding the discussed entity, it becomes possible to understand the talk without understanding what the talk is about. This form of talk becomes "talk for its own sake." One no longer talks in order to address a particular entity or intramundane state of affairs. Rather, one talks simply in order to say something. In this form of talk, crosstalk, self-expression, or the emotional quality of talk, and announcement, or the social aspect of talk, attain a heightened importance. No longer does one talk in order to point out or clarify real states of affairs in the world. Talk becomes crosstalk, talk for the sake of merely saying something. In crosstalk, who does the saying, what is being said, and why it is being said are more important than the truth of the talk.

Accordingly, in crosstalk the four constitutive features of talk are modified in the following manner:

(1) in crosstalk, the discussed (what the talk is about) appears to be understandable independently of any actual verification or confirmation of what is spoken;

(2) crosstalk also emphasizes the spoken as such at the expense of the discussed, that is, at the expense of a real
understanding of the talk, resulting in "talk for talk's sake";

(3) the announcement structure of crosstalk aims at creating the same superficial relation towards the discussed in the hearer as in the talker, so that crosstalk spreads itself in ever-widening circles and acquires the authority of general consensus; and, finally,

(4) the self-expression or proclamation structure of crosstalk establishes the dominance of those and only those possibilities of sensibility that are permitted by the inauthentic one-self.

Crosstalk in this phenomenological sense is the existential foundation for meaningless talk. It is the structure that makes false and misleading talk at all possible. In its more harmless form, it is mere idle gossip; in a less harmless form, it is malicious rumour-mongering, and in its most pernicious form it is state-sponsored propaganda. It is, however, important to keep in mind that for Heidegger inauthentic is not necessarily synonymous with bad, nor is authentic necessarily synonymous with good. Crosstalk, or inauthentic talk, is an unavoidable consequence of the ontological structure of talk. It is simply not always possible or practical to verify the ultimate truth of any particular instance of talk. Whether this is good or bad, desirable or undesirable, will depend on the situation and on the standards of good and bad being employed. It is, for example, probably good—for practical purposes, at least—that high school students are able to understand geometry without being forced to investigate Zeno's paradoxes; although teaching of this sort is quite likely to be rooted in crosstalk at some ultimate existential level.

b) Curiosity

Heidegger's term for the inauthentic mode of understanding is Neugier, the ordinary German word for "curiosity." Its literal meaning, however, is "greed [Gier] for new [neu] things." In curiosity, the purview of our everyday interaction with the
world is modified in a decisive fashion. As we saw in Section 2.5, "purview" is Heidegger's term for the view we have of a tool and its surroundings when we make use of it. It is the special pre-theoretical awareness we have of tools when we are occupied with tool-using situations. According to Heidegger, purview can become altogether disconnected from tool use. That is to say, when the work has been interrupted or successfully brought to an end, purview can become free and altogether detached from work. No longer bound to the proximal world, it can abandon to-hand entities and seek out the "far, wide world." It becomes concerned with the "look" [Aussehen] of the world as such. In this form of concern, Dasein lets itself be carried along by the look of the faraway world. Its concernedness is aimed at unburdening itself of being-in-the-world. It seeks detachment and freedom from everyday to-hand entities. It abandons its factual responsibilities and seeks diversion and entertainment for their own sake rather than as refreshment, as an end in itself rather than as a means of returning to the task at hand with new vigour and inspiration.

The characteristic feature of the purview involved in curiosity is that it seeks to view for the sake of viewing. Purview is no longer guided by a particular purpose. It does not seek to view the look of the world in order to understand it; rather, its aim is to be distracted by the manifold and variegated look of the world. Curiosity, in Heidegger's words, is "everywhere and nowhere." It is characterized by three fundamental features:

1. "unrest" [Unverweilen], or the abandonment of proximal entities, the lack of interest in what is to hand;
2. "dispersion" [Zerstreuung], or the constant need for new looks to view, to know for the sake of knowing; and
3. "nonresidence" [Aufenthaltslosigkeit], the fact that curiosity is everywhere and nowhere.

In its harmless forms, curiosity is the ontological basis for mere entertainment and mindless diversion. In a more sinister
form, it is the basis of the superficial and patronizing study of supposedly "primitive" cultures, undertaken in order to disguise the obvious flaws in one's own cultural milieu. Note too that in §61, p. 304, Heidegger suggests that a characteristic of "the falling understanding of Being" is the understanding of Being as at-handedness. In the later philosophy, this line of thought will inspire the inquiry into the "forgetfulness of Being" [Seinsvergessenheit].

c) Ambiguity
Heidegger's term for the inauthentic mode of interpretation is Zweideutigkeit, literally "two-meaning-ness." The word is usually translated as "ambiguity." Owing to the predominance of crosstalk and curiosity at the everyday level, it is soon impossible to tell the difference between genuine understanding and false understanding. Heidegger calls this characteristic of everyday being-in ambiguity.

As a result of ambiguity, "everything looks as if it were genuinely understood, grasped, and spoken of, and yet at bottom is not, or it does not look as if it were and yet at bottom is." This ambiguity not only affects our understanding of the world and of intramundane states of affairs; it also blinds us to our own possibilities of existence as Dasein. We no longer know which ways of life are authentic and inauthentic, and we no longer have any criteria for deciding.

A further peculiarity of ambiguous situations, according to Heidegger, is that everyone involved claims to know what is truly happening and what really should happen in order to improve things. If, however, by some chance the supposed improvement should one day become a reality, then "ambiguity has already ensured that interest in the attainment immediately dies out. This interest only exists [besteht] at all in the manner of curiosity and crosstalk, as long as non-committal shared presentiment [Nur-mit-ahmen] is still a possibility" [§ 37, p. 174]. It is tempting to see ambiguity as a fundamental characteristic of so-called political discourse.
In short, ambiguity as the inauthentic mode of interpretation ensures that entities are not understood as the entities that they in fact are. Since they are not genuinely understood at all, any interpretation is possible. They can be interpreted as anything that it is convenient to interpret them as. Since it is impossible for any interpretation to be proven wrong, the illusion of genuine understanding is maintained.

d) Turmoil
Finally, in § 38 Heidegger introduces the concept of “turmoil” [der Wirbel] to refer to the inauthentic mode of sensibility. Turmoil is the emotional quality of everyday life that permits the one-self to function as the self of everyday experience. As we saw in Section 2.5, the one-self is characterized by the lack of a distinction between my own purposes and the purposes indicated to me by the prevailing world-structure. It is the emotional state in which no strict distinction is made between my purpose and the common purpose (the word “purpose” being used here in the strict terminological sense).

Heidegger’s name for the actual concrete sensibility or emotion that turmoil discloses is the “downfall” [Absturz] of Dasein. The downfall of Dasein is characterized by four structural features:

(1) “Temptation” [Versuchung]. Because, as we have repeatedly pointed out, inauthenticity is a necessary consequence of the structure of Dasein, it does not have an external source. Inauthenticity is a possibility that arises from Dasein itself. The fact that inauthenticity is rooted in the very structural organization of Dasein, and not in an external source, Heidegger terms temptation.

(2) “Reassurance” [Beruhigung]. While Dasein is predominantly inauthentic, the inauthentic modes of being-in disguise their essentially inauthentic nature. Existing as the one-self, nothing appears to be wrong because everyone else is doing the same thing.
(3) "Alienation" [Entfremdung]. Along with the reassurance that one is behaving properly because one is living as everyone else is living, the fact that one can also choose one's own possibilities for existence is submerged in the one-self. Dasein becomes alienated from itself as a being for whom existence is a matter of its own being.

(4) "Entanglement" [Verfangen]. Finally, by succumbing to temptation, reassurance, and alienation, Dasein also undergoes entanglement. In such a situation, Dasein's possibilities of existence, and in fact all the concrete choices Dasein makes, are taken over from the one-self. One's own existence follows the path prescribed for it by the world.

It should be noted in passing that for Heidegger primeval sensibilities such as the downfall of Dasein are not quite identical with emotions or moods in the everyday sense. Sensibility is the ontological foundation for concrete emotions and moods. As we shall see in more detail in Section 2.8, for Heidegger a sensibility is much more like the essential emotional structure of a particular situation. In this sense one could say that just as the downfall is the essential emotional structure of everyday life, love is the fundamental emotional structure of a successful marriage. We are speaking of ontological features of Dasein rather than of factual psychological events.

e) Falling
From the preceding descriptions of the inauthentic modes of being-in it will have become clear that they all have an essential structural characteristic in common: the dominance of the one-self in everyday concernedness with the world. Heidegger's term for this common structural characteristic is Verfallen. Verfallen in everyday German means the process of "falling" in the sense that one would speak of the decline and "fall" of the Roman Empire—to "decay" or "collapse." However, it can also mean "to succumb" or "to fall prey to," to "fall" to an opponent.
As Heidegger warns us, the "fallenness" of Dasein in this strict terminological sense is not to be conceived of as a literal fall from a higher state or a fall from grace [§ 38, p. 176]. Rather, falling to the world in the existential-ontological sense means "immersion [Aufgehen] in being with one another [Miteinandersein], insofar as it is led by crosstalk, curiosity, and ambiguity" [§ 38, p. 175].

The falling of Dasein is a "fundamental manner of the being of everydayness." As we shall later see in Section 2.9, it is a modification of the "being-among" [Sein-bei] structure of concern, the fundamental structural element of Dasein. For the moment, it is sufficient to emphasize with Heidegger that falling "reveals [enthüllt] a necessary and essential [wesenhaft] ontological structure of Dasein itself, which can hardly be said to determine its night-side, as it constitutes all its days in their everydayness." 

2.8 AUTHENTIC SENSIBILITY: ANGST (§§ 39–40)

At this point in Being and Time Heidegger undertakes the first of several attempts to ensure that the essentially unitary character of Dasein is not obscured by the bewildering multiplicity of structural features that his phenomenological analyses reveal. Heidegger's attempts are directed towards coming up with a primeval phenomenon that serves as the foundation of the multiplicity of Dasein's existential features. In so doing, Heidegger does not mean to reduce the many phenomena to one single phenomenon. Rather, he wishes to show how the multiplicity is grounded in a single, underlying phenomenon that, so to speak, pulls them all together, much as the trunk of a tree produces and supports its many branches.

In the pursuit of this aim, Heidegger begins with the analysis of "angst" [Angst] in § 40 and continues on to work out the fundamental structure of Dasein as "concern" [Sorge] in § 41. In § 39, Heidegger informs the reader that the unity of Dasein cannot be preserved by putting together or assembling the various existential structures that have emerged in the course of our
philosophical inquiry up to this point. Any such attempt would presuppose a knowledge of the unified structure according to which the process of assembly would have to take place. This is the point of Heidegger’s laconic remark “That would require a blueprint [Bauplan].” (See §39, p. 181.) Instead, Heidegger proposes that we attempt to “peer through” the structures we have hitherto uncovered in order to obtain a glimpse of the “primeval unitary phenomenon that already lies in the whole so that it serves as the ontological foundation of each structural feature in its structural possibility” (§ 39, p. 181; note the strongly Kantian overtones of this passage. Also compare Plato’s Republic 432b–e and 434e–435a). We will discuss how and why Heidegger feels that the threefold structure of concern preserves the unity of Dasein in Section 2.9. In the present section we will concentrate on the conception of angst as the authentic mode of sensibility, since it is the phenomenon through which Heidegger glimpses the primeval structure of concern.

As we saw in the preceding sections, an initial analysis of being-in-the-world indicates that the everyday self is first and foremost inauthentic, that is, the one-self. Dasein, as Heidegger puts it, has always already fallen—that is, has always already succumbed—to the world [§ 39, p. 181]. If we call to mind the characteristics of the inauthentic mode of being-in mentioned in the last section, it is clear that much of everyday existence is occupied with disguising the fact that one’s own existence is at stake. Everyday existence aims at relieving one of personal responsibility for one’s own decisions. The one-self alters the purview of everyday existence such that the authentic self and authentic possibilities of existence are obscured. Along with the suppression of authentic possibilities of existence, the one-self offers other public, social, and political comportments, all of which have a quieting, reassuring effect on Dasein. Yet this reassurance is false. As this inauthentic but socially and politically engaged one-self, Dasein can both fail to exist as its own self and simultaneously falsely reassure itself that it is in fact giving its all in the act of existence.
By dissolving into the one-self Dasein is relieved of the necessity of having to be involved with its own self. Clearly, Dasein strives in some sense both to be relieved of the burden of its own authentic existence and to be unaware that it is in fact so relieving itself of the problem of choice. Average everydayness, as Heidegger tells us in § 40, has the character of a flight [Flucht] of Dasein. Dasein's everyday level of comportment is first and foremost a flight from itself towards the world.

As Heidegger points out, every flight presupposes something that is fled. In order for there to be a flight from Dasein towards the world, there must already be a disclosure of Dasein. We cannot flee something of which we are completely unaware. To flee, we must at some level know or at the very least suspect what we are fleeing. Since our analyses show that Dasein flees into an inauthentic mode of existence, Dasein's flight must be a response to the prior experience of Dasein's authenticity. Thus Dasein's falling to the world is a defence against the prior disclosure of its own self as such.

Heidegger's argument in Being and Time at this point is subtle and fascinating. In order to flee from itself at all, Dasein must already know itself. Accordingly, we should be able to study the character of the everyday flight of Dasein from itself in such a way that it becomes clear what precisely Dasein is fleeing. Note, however, that Heidegger emphasizes the point that Dasein, in falling to the world, does not necessarily explicitly grasp the nature of its flight. At the everyday level there is no conscious awareness that Dasein is fleeing itself. Rather, it is an essential feature of the turmoil and downfall of Dasein that average everydayness is simply characterized by a vague sense of unrest or unease. It is a characteristic feature of turmoil that the awareness of the true reason for the fall to the world is suppressed.

This is an appropriate place for a few remarks on Heidegger's phenomenological methodology. Recall that in Section 2.1 we mentioned that it is the very familiarity of everyday features of existence that hides their structural details from us. We can now enlarge upon this account by pointing out that this unfamiliarity
Hermeneutic Phenomenology is an essential feature of average everydayness, which is first and foremost an inauthentic mode of existence as the one-self. The one-self hides from itself the fact that it is inauthentic. This compounds the difficulty of an accurate and faithful description of existential structures of Dasein, because the one-self does not wish to know that it is essentially a flight from itself. This is why a special technique of phenomenological analysis is required, and it is also why Heidegger repeatedly and continually insists throughout the course of his philosophical development that philosophy is not and cannot be a purely theoretical discipline. On Heidegger’s account it is impossible for a philosopher to recognize the essential structures of existence through a second-hand account. The analysis of Dasein is always primarily the investigation of one’s own Dasein. Without a willingness to call one’s own manner of being into question, the phenomenological investigation of existence is impossible:

The question of [Dasein’s] ability to be whole [Ganzseinkönnen] is a factual-existentic question. Dasein answers it as decided Dasein [als entschlossenes]. The question of Dasein’s ability to be whole has now completely shed its originally indicated character, as thought were simply a theoretical, methodological question of the analysis of Dasein, arising from the effort to attain a complete “givenness” of Dasein as a whole. [§ 62, p. 309; the first two sentences are italicized in the original]

We now turn to Heidegger’s interesting and provocative use of angst in the context of the phenomenological analysis of Dasein. At this stage of Heidegger’s continuing interpretations it becomes particularly clear that his phenomenology is not merely descriptive but also hermeneutic, or interpretative, in nature. Without a careful analysis of the text it may seem that Heidegger merely splices angst into his philosophy without any real justification, its connection with the previous philosophical material being tenuous at best. However, if we recall Heidegger’s characterization of falling as a flight, it becomes clear that any
flight must be a flight from something. Since falling is a flight into inauthenticity, it is clear that the something that falling flees is Dasein’s authentic state. If it were not, why should Dasein flee into inauthenticity? Heidegger’s proposed course of action, then, is to describe the flight of Dasein and in so doing infer the character of the state from which it is fleeing. As such we will “merely undertake the explanation of that which Dasein itself ontically discloses” [§ 40, p. 185]. Of course, this inference has to be confirmed by firsthand experience. But we should not lose sight of the fact that angst is introduced into the structure of the text as an inference.

Heidegger begins by pointing out that the type of flight involved in the sensibility of “fear” [Furcht] is, strictly speaking, always a flight from an intramundane entity. To be afraid of something, in Heidegger’s use of the term, literally means to be afraid of some thing, of an object with entitical characteristics. However, the type of flight associated with falling is not a flight from an intramundane entity but rather a flight from Dasein itself. Not only is the flight that characterizes falling not a flight from intramundane entities (not a fear), but it is in some sense the precise opposite: it is a flight to intramundane entities, a falling to the world. Accordingly, it would be quite misleading to characterize falling as a reaction to fear. Instead, Heidegger terms the sensibility of the state that inauthentic Dasein flees the sensibility of “angst” [Angst].

Angst is the usual German word for “anxiety” or “apprehensiveness,” but since (thanks to Heidegger) it has passed into English with more or less the same meaning, there are no serious objections to simply using the word “angst” as a technical term in the course of our further explanations. In speaking of the sensibility of angst it is important to keep in mind that for Heidegger sensibilities are the existential foundations of emotions, moods, and feelings. A sensibility – this is particularly evident in the original German word Befindlichkeit, which has the literal meaning of “locatedness” – is the structural arrangement of a particular situation, the location (within the referential structure of the world) at which Dasein happens to find itself.
Thus, as we pointed out in the last section, love is the sensibility that characterizes a successful marriage. This does not mean that the emotion of love is consciously and explicitly felt at every moment throughout the duration of the marriage. It does not mean that there is no space for disagreement or even argument. It does mean that the structure of the marriage is characterized by love, even at moments when one is disagreeing or arguing. There is no need for love to be experienced as a conscious emotion in every waking moment of one’s happily married life; this would, in fact, be psychologically impossible. However, the sensibility that characterizes a happy marriage is love, and this sensibility is constantly and continually present as the background to all the individual comportments that are part of the marriage. One does not have to continually remind oneself of the fact that one is married and in love in order to behave like a happily married person. One simply does behave this way, even if the fact is not explicitly present in one’s consciousness. One can act upon sensibilities without needing to be conscious of them. One only needs to be explicitly conscious of them in situations where this is appropriate—when one wants to remind oneself why one does what one does, or when something appears to have gone wrong.

Similarly, because average everydayness is characterized by a flight from authenticity towards the world there is no reason that the psychological state we call “anxiety” should be constantly experienced throughout one’s waking moments. There is no reason for the sensibility of angst to exclude the factual experience of real joy and real happiness. Still less is there a reason for cultivating the faddish angoisse of coffeehouse “existentialism,” since the ontic experience of emotion does not necessarily accurately reflect the true underlying sensibility. Nor, we might add, does it need to. As Heidegger puts it, “Along with the sober angst which brings us before our isolated being-ability [das vereinzelte Seinkönnen] comes the ready joy at this possibility” [§62, p. 310]. In authenticity we understand the possibility of angst as the unique sensibility that does not restrict and confuse us. “It frees
from 'empty' [nichtig] possibilities and allows [us] to become free for authentic ones” [§ 68 b), p. 344].

We should, then, not be misled by the everyday meaning of the words “angst” and “anxiety” into thinking that the sensibility angst is necessarily associated with an unpleasant or unhappy emotional state. The authentic experience of angst is perfectly compatible with factual happiness. On the other hand it is characteristic of the inauthentic one-self that the true underlying sensibility (namely angst) is hidden by the flight to the world. Precisely how we cover over our angst is an individual quirk. Our emotions may be superficially in agreement with angst; or they may superficially contradict it. We can hide our angst from ourselves both through euphoria and through melancholia. In the one-self our emotions serve to disguise the underlying sensibility to which they are a flight reaction. In short: psychological states—whether positive or negative, pleasant or unpleasant—are not reliable indicators of whether or not angst has been authentically experienced.

What, then, is angst according to Heidegger? We have already seen that it is the authentic sensibility that characterizes the state that falling Dasein flees. Accordingly, if we wish to investigate this authentic sensibility in detail, we must investigate the flight involved in falling with reference to the structure of Dasein as being-in-the-world.

According to Heidegger, angst is characterized by two basic features: an “of” [Wovor] and a “for” [Worum]. These two features are best illustrated by means of fear (though we must remember that angst is not fear, since it is not a flight from intramundane entities). We can speak of fear “of” something, that is, the object of the fear, that which one is afraid “of.” Similarly, we can speak of the person “for” whose safety one fears. The “for” of fear is thus the person who is threatened by the “of,” or object of fear.

Although fear too is characterized by an “of,” since fear is always fear of some intramundane entity, the “of” that characterizes angst is of a radically different nature. Since angst is never angst “of” an entity, its “of” is totally unrelated
to connections and connection-wholes. Angst is never angst of a particular threat. Rather, the "of" belonging to angst is completely indeterminate. Angst is not anxious about or afraid of anything that is part of the entitical world, whether at hand or to hand. Rather, in the sensibility of angst the world, so to speak, "collapses into itself. The world has the character of complete meaninglessness" [§ 40, p. 186].

Note that in speaking of the "complete meaninglessness" of the world, Heidegger is not speaking of "meaninglessness" in the everyday sense. He is using the term as the opposite of "meaningfulness" in the strict terminological sense established in Section 2.5, that is, the essential character of the references constituting the worldliness of the world. In the sensibility of angst, whose of is "nothing and nowhere," the connection-structure of the world is disrupted. This disruption of the world structure, however, should remind us of the discussion in Section 2.5 of the three ways in which tool use is impeded, namely conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and defiance. And as we saw there, for Heidegger in the disruption or disturbance of a reference the structure of the world as such becomes "conspicuous by its absence."

When we experience angst as a sensibility, the meaninglessness we experience brings us before the world as such. In the sensibility of angst we understand what the world is—the system of references that Dasein carries along with itself in order to exist. In angst the bare structure of the world as such is disclosed along with the fact that it exists in order to fulfill Dasein's purposes, that is, it exists for the sake of Dasein. This is the direct opposite of inauthentic existence, which is the state in which one exists for the sake of the world. In falling to the world as the dissolution in the one-self, Dasein is fleeing from the world as such (from its bare structure as the area in which Dasein seeks to fulfill its own existence) into the world of everyday concernedness with entities as tools. That is to say, using Heidegger's own words, the of belonging to angst is being-in-the-world, and more specifically the world as such. Afraid of its own world, of the area it creates in order to exist, Dasein seeks to forget this area and its purpose by occupying itself with entities within this area. We flee to things in order to escape ourselves.
Rephrasing Heidegger

What of the other structural feature of angst, namely the "for" belonging to angst? Just as its "of" is nothing in particular, the "for" that characterizes angst is not angst for one particular possibility of Dasein. It is angst for the possibilities of Dasein as such. Here too, angst turns out to be angst for being-in-the-world as a whole. By reducing the world to its bare structure, angst also completely prevents falling Dasein from understanding itself with respect to the "world" and public interpretedness [Ausgelegtheit]. It throws Dasein back to that for which it is anxious [sich ängstet], its authentic capacity for being-in-the-world. Angst isolates Dasein in its ownmost being-in-the-world, which as understanding essentially plans itself towards possibilities. Thus with the for belonging to being anxious [des Sichängstens], angst discloses Dasein as being possible, and as such as what it can only be with a view to itself [von ihm selbst her] as isolated in isolation [als vereinzeltes in der Vereinzelung].

Thus along with the bare structure of the world (its "of"), angst also discloses the bare structure of the self as existence (its "for"). Angst brings Dasein before its world as the world and before itself as the self. In Heidegger's turn of phrase, angst brings Dasein as itself before itself as being-in-the-world. Angst, accordingly, is the sensibility belonging to the primeval act of Dasein through which Dasein is enabled to exist in a world at all. 

Heidegger's term for the essential emotional quality of angst (i.e., angst viewed purely as a sensibility) is Unheimlichkeit, which we will translate as "unsettlement." Here too we must guard against the interpretation of this term as a mere psychological state or feeling. The German word means "uncanniness," but its literal meaning is "unhomeliness." Heidegger uses the etymology of the term to reflect the essentially "unsettled" and "unsettling" feature of angst as a sensibility. The sensibility of angst prevents one from "settling down" to the daily affairs of the one-self. In fact, it interrupts the factually existing systems of reference that allow us to comport ourselves towards entities
and thus prevents us from falling to the world. Instead, we are confronted with the basic fact of our existence: that we exist in a world and that existence is our task.

2.9 THE PRIMEVAL STRUCTURE OF DASEIN AS CONCERN (§§ 41-42)

Having investigated the phenomenon of angst as a primeval sensibility, in § 41 of Being and Time Heidegger returns to his original question: is there a way of grasping Dasein as a structural whole despite the bewildering multiplicity of ontological features that have become evident in course of the analysis of existence?

As we saw in the last section, angst is a fundamental sensibility disclosing Dasein in its authenticity. It is the state that everyday falling flees. In falling, Dasein as the one-self flees towards concernedness with intramundane entities. By contrast, angst discloses authentic Dasein, that is, Dasein as itself, as it truly is prior to the confused state of turmoil. Angst, as authentic sensibility, frees Dasein from its immersion in concernedness with intramundane entities, and in so doing brings Dasein before the bare structures of the world and of its own self. The fundamental authentic sensibility of angst discloses Dasein in its pure “that it is and has existence as its task” [daß es ist und zu sein hat]. Accordingly, if we wish to identify a primeval existential structure of Dasein that underlies the multiplicity of structural features hitherto revealed, we should begin with an analysis of the manner in which Dasein is disclosed in angst.

Heidegger begins this analysis in § 41 with a review of the essential points covered in the discussion of angst. These essential points are

1. angst, as a sensibility, is a “manner” [Weise] of being-in-the-world;
2. the “of” [Wovor] characterizing angst is thrown being-in-the-world (i.e., being-in-the-world considered with respect to its thrownness); and
(3) the “for” [Worum] characteristic of angst is the ability-to-be-in-the-world [In-der-Welt-sein-können], that is, being-in-the-world considered with respect to its ability to plan (in Heidegger’s technical sense of the word) its own existence [§ 41, p. 191].

Note that in each point of the summary, an essential aspect of being-in-the-world is addressed. In (1) angst reveals a manner of being-in-the-world; in (2) angst reveals being-in-the-world as thrown; and in (3) angst reveals being-in-the-world as existence. This is important because it hints at the fact that there is indeed an underlying structural unity despite the multiplicity of Dasein’s existential characteristics. Our next step will be to further examine these three aspects as a preparation for isolating and identifying this underlying unity. Following Heidegger, the three main aspects of angst allow us to discern three fundamental structural features of being-in-the-world. The technical terms Heidegger introduces for these three features are

(1) “being-fallen” [Verfallensein], which corresponds to the manner or way in which one exists in the world (see the more detailed explanations that follow);

(2) “facticity” [Faktizität], the quality of being thrown into a world, that is, the fact that Dasein always exists in concrete (or factual) situations in which it has to make concrete decisions concerning its existence; and

(3) “existentiality” [Existenzialität], the quality of having to exist, that is, the ability of Dasein to understand its own possibilities for existence.

According to Heidegger, by studying the phenomenon of angst we have identified and isolated the essentially unitary structure of Dasein. As Heidegger says, “These [three] existential determinations are not parts of a composite in which one part could be missing now and then; rather, a primeval context [Zusammenhang] weaves in them, which constitutes the sought-for unity of the structural whole” [§ 41, p. 191].
But how is this unity to be characterized? How can we reduce these three structural features to their most fundamental existential character? Heidegger carries out yet another series of phenomenological analyses aimed at identifying the primeval character of the three features discussed above.

Beginning with existentiality, Heidegger repeats his definition of Dasein: Dasein is an entity that, in its being (i.e., existence), is occupied with its own being. As we saw in the analysis of understanding as a mode of being-in, this "being occupied with ..." [es geht um ...] is, in a concrete sense, self-planning towards one's ownmost being-ability [sichentwerfendes Sein zum eigensten Seinkönnen]. In understanding, Dasein always understands its own possibilities for existence in the world, whether in an authentic or inauthentic fashion. This ability to understand possibilities is disclosed in a primeval and authentic manner in angst. How are we best to describe Dasein's understanding of its own possibilities, that is, its "being unto itself"? Heidegger suggests the formulation: in its concrete existence, Dasein is always open to possibilities. As such, Dasein is fundamentally and necessarily always "being-ahead-of-itself" [Sich-vorweg-sein]. Heidegger sometimes refers to this fundamental structure of Dasein as das Sich-vorweg or Vorweg-sein. For the sake of simplicity, we will use the two equivalent expressions "the self-ahead" or "being-self-ahead."

Turning to facticity, Heidegger points out (as we saw in Section 2.5) that Dasein is always essentially in a world. Dasein always finds itself thrown into a world. (Recall the relationship between sensibility and thrownness from Section 2.6, and recall that Heidegger's word for sensibility, Befindlichkeit, can also mean "the state of being found somewhere"). This abandonment to a world in which Dasein has to exist is also disclosed authentically and primevally by angst. The second fundamental structure, then, is "being-already-in-a-world" [Schon-sein-in-einer-Welt]. Following Heidegger, we will sometimes abbreviate this expression simply as "being-already-in" or, still more simply, as "being-already." Accordingly, Dasein is not simply self-ahead; it is self-ahead-in-being-already-in-a-world.
Heidegger uses this somewhat frightening hyphenated expression to indicate that being-self-ahead and being-already are not separate elements somehow fused together to make up Dasein. Rather, being-self-ahead and being-already are aspects of the same structure. Dasein’s existence is always factual. Its possibilities for existence are possibilities of existence in the world. To use the terminology of the world analysis in Section 2.5, the totality of references constituting meaningfulness is always anchored in a purpose, that is, an expression of Dasein’s possibilities for existence. It belongs to the essential and unitary ontological structure of Dasein to be existence in a world, “thrown planning.”

This leaves one remaining structure, that of being-fallen, or the manner in which Dasein exists in the world. Dasein is not merely a thrown ability-to-be-in-the-world in an abstract sense. Rather, Dasein always finds itself already involved in some concrete, factual situation in the world. Dasein is always occupied in some manner with the world of concernedness, occupied with the manipulation and use of entities as tools as means for achieving its purposes. We saw in Section 2.7 that Dasein was essentially and constantly involved in the act of falling to the world. Towards the end of Section 2.8, we saw that this falling was also a flight in the face of unsettlement. We emphasized repeatedly that falling is not a psychological state that could conceivably be eliminated at any stage of Dasein’s development. Falling is an existential—an essential, characteristic structure—of Dasein. The possibility of comporting ourselves towards entities in the world necessarily implies the possibility that in these comportments we will place the accent on manipulating entities, and in so doing neglect our own proper existence. The quality or structural feature common to all these existential characteristics of Dasein, however, is the fact of “being-among” [Sein bei] intramundane to-handed entities as objects of concernedness.

*Being-among* is just as much an essential feature of Dasein as are being-self-ahead and being-already-in. The world in which we exist is always a system of references for the discovery
of intramundane entities. Similarly, our own possibilities of existence are always possibilities for comportment towards intramundane entities as tools with which we fulfill our purposes. Accordingly, the full and complete primeval expression of the being of Dasein is being-self-ahead-in-being-already-in-the-world-as-being-among-intramundanely-confronting-entities. More briefly: Dasein is self-ahead-being-already-in-(the world)-among-(entities). This structural unity which—despite its unity—is distinguished by three clear functional divisions, Heidegger terms concern [Sorge].

In using the term Sorge, Heidegger is reaching back to two terms he introduced in the course of his world analysis: concernedness [Besorgen] and concernfulness [Fürsorge]. The former, we recall, denotes comportments towards entities, while the latter denotes comportments towards other people. Sorge is the root word common to both Besorgen and Fürsorge. Heidegger uses this etymological relation to indicate that Sorge or concern is the fundamental existential comportment making both concernedness and concernfulness possible. It is (at this stage in our ongoing phenomenological investigations) the most primeval structure in terms of which we can understand Dasein.

A short digression in order to clarify the meaning of concern is justified in the face of several misunderstandings to which the term can easily fall prey. Firstly, recall that “concern” is a name for a structural feature of Dasein. It is not the name of a sensibility. This should make it obvious that in speaking of concern Heidegger means nothing like the mood or emotional state of “worry,” “anticipation,” or “anxious involvement.” “Concern” is a term referring to the structural whole constituted by being-self-ahead, being-already, and being-among. This is all it means.

Secondly, it is important to emphasize that in locutions such as “Dasein exists for its own sake” [Dasein ist umwillen seiner] Heidegger does not mean anything more than that Dasein is characterized by selfhood, that is, by the ability to make its own choices and the necessity of doing so.87 I cannot exist for others any more than a personal trainer can exercise for his or her clients.
Similarly, when Heidegger says “The expression ‘self-concern,’ in analogy to concernedness and concernfulness, would be a tautology” [§ 41, p. 193], he means no more than that concern, as being-self-ahead, always discloses possibilities for existence that are not simply free-floating and up in the air but essentially and necessarily characterized by a reference to a self whose personal and private task it is to choose among those possibilities. Statements of this sort must always be read together with companion statements such as “Concern is always, if only in a privative sense, concernedness and concernfulness” [§ 41, p. 194]. To sum up, the existential possibilities we ourselves grasp necessarily also involve, and have consequences for, the world and for other people. Nonetheless, we must make these choices, and only we can make them for ourselves. Others cannot make them for us.

Let us pause to summarize the results of this section. We found that our analyses of angst and the phenomena it discloses were indeed able to lead us to a primeval and unitary structure of Dasein, which is the existential foundation of the multiplicity of previously revealed structures. Heidegger’s term for this structure is concern. Despite being a single, unified phenomenon, it has a threefold arrangement, which we can summarize in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>concern</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>being-already-in (facticity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sensibility and thrownness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is one surprising feature of this arrangement, which should not go unmentioned, namely the absence of talk. Talk is absent here because, as we shall later see in Section 3.6, it is a comportment of Dasein that plays a fundamental and all-encompassing role in the existence of Dasein. Talk is not an “isolated” comportment of Dasein; rather, it permeates the entirety of concern.88
One immediate and obvious advantage of the concept of concern is that it provides a more sophisticated, if still preliminary, manner of grasping the difference between inauthenticity and authenticity. According to Heidegger in § 41, inauthenticity is the result of a fundamental modification of being-self-ahead. The character of being-self-ahead does not disappear in inauthenticity; even in an inauthentic state Dasein is still, as it always necessarily is, occupied with its own existence. However, in an inauthentic state, the self of being-self-ahead is the one-self [§ 41, p. 193]. The fundamental existential character of concern remains, but being-self-ahead has been modified such that the self that Dasein is ahead of is no longer its own self, but the one-self.

The modification of being-self-ahead in inauthenticity is accompanied by a modification of being-already-in. Insofar as inauthentic Dasein is characterized by an absorption in concernedness with intramundane entities, being-already-in no longer discloses the world as the world of Dasein. Rather, being-already-in is modified in such a way that it makes an absorption in tool use possible. Being-already-in, in Heidegger's words, becomes "just-always-being-already-among ... " [Nur-immer-schon-bei ... ]. Both these characteristic modifications of inauthenticity will be investigated at a deeper level in Section 3.6 from the point of view where timeliness is seen to be the fundamental structure of concern.

We will end this section with a brief remark on the relationship between falling and being-among. Note that, strictly speaking, being-among is merely the existential structure that enables Dasein to discover entities within a world. Falling, however, is the existential structure that makes specifically inauthentic comportments towards intramundane entities possible. Obviously, comportments towards intramundane entities are not in themselves inauthentic.

Heidegger's somewhat unfortunate tendency to use terms with a pejorative everyday meaning in a terminologically neutral sense has occasionally led to confusion on the part of interpreters. As we briefly discussed in Sections 2.5 and 2.7, the one-self is not
merely inauthentic; it is also a necessary foundation of any sort of common enterprise. Any standardization and regulation will necessarily involve giving up some of one’s own possibilities of existence. The deciding factor is, however, whether this is done from deliberate choice or without explicitly choosing. Authenticity is not and cannot be an abolition of the one-self; rather, it is, as Heidegger repeatedly emphasizes, a modification of the one-self, an authentic manner of coming to terms with this primeval and necessary existential characteristic of Dasein.

Similarly, in speaking of falling to the world, we should be sensitive enough to the nuance of the original text to realize that Heidegger does not mean to say that concernedness with intramundane entities is something that can or should be done away with. We are not to become phenomenological hermits, existing in the barrenness of the desert, far from the madding crowd. In fact, on Heidegger’s own analysis it is inherently impossible to do away with concernedness. Of course, one can renounce the world in a factual sense, but the existential structure of concernedness remains. It merely glides into a privative mode, becoming the “absence-of-entities-in-concernedness.” Renunciation of everyday life serves only to make the burden of existing with others in the workaday world conspicuous by its absence. It is clear that falling, in falling to the world, is essentially falling into concernedness, but this should not mislead us into thinking that concernedness is evil or bad as such. In making being-among part of the structure of concern, Heidegger is, in part, attempting to establish a more obviously neutral term for the comportment of Dasein towards entities than falling. Naturally, being-among still remains the existential foundation for all comportments towards intramundane entities, including and especially falling and its concomitant inauthentic comportments.89

2.10 Reality and Truth (§§ 43-44)

In this section we will focus on §§ 43–44 of Being and Time with a view to clarifying three important issues: (1) the dependence of
Being on Dasein; (2) the independence of entities from Dasein; and (3) the connection between concern, truth, and authenticity. Heidegger does of course address other important topics in the course of §§ 43–44, such as skepticism and the reality of the external world, but for the purposes of an introductory exposition the three aforementioned issues are the most important. We will begin with the third issue, the connection between concern, truth, and authenticity.

a) Concern, Truth, and Authenticity
In order to understand Heidegger’s conceptions of reality and truth, it will be necessary to consider somewhat more deeply the nature of concern. In § 44 b), Heidegger informs us that

the discoveredness of intramundane entities is founded in the disclosedness of the world. Disclosedness, however, is the fundamental manner [Grundart] of Dasein according to which it is its there [Da]. Disclosedness is constituted by sensibility, understanding, and talk and coevally involves [betrifft] the world, being-in, and the self. The structure of concern as self-ahead—being already in a world—as being among intramundane entities harbours [birgt] disclosedness of Dasein in itself. With and through it [i.e., the disclosedness of Dasein] is discoveredness; thus it is first with the disclosedness of Dasein that the most primeval phenomenon of truth is attained. [§ 44 b], p. 220–221]

This quotation gives us important information with respect to the connection between concern and the structure of being-in-the-world. There are three important points:

(1) Disclosedness is the fundamental manner of Dasein according to which it is its “there.” In other words, disclosedness is the most basic comportment (in Husserlian terms, the fundamental act or universal synthesis) of Dasein, the comportment that “defines” Dasein at the most basic level.
(2) Disclosedness is constituted by or characterized by sensibility, understanding, and talk; and coevally by the world, being-in, and the self. Sensibility and understanding are the two fundamental existentials we addressed in the course of our analysis of being-in. The world, being-in, and the self together constitute the structure that Heidegger terms being-in-the-world. Talk, as we saw in the last section, is assigned a more comprehensive function the exact status of which is still to be clarified.

(3) The concern structure of Dasein, which consists of being-self-ahead while already-in a world and being-among intramundane entities, harbours disclosedness in itself. How are we to make sense of these three statements?

In saying that concern harbours disclosedness in itself, Heidegger means that disclosedness is the most fundamental or core comportment of Dasein. All other comportments are in a sense based on or are modifications of the fundamental disclosedness of Dasein. This comportment, the comportment by virtue of which Dasein is enabled to comport itself at all, is the basic and essential feature of Dasein. Disclosedness is the existential feature of Dasein that makes concern at all possible and upon which the three structural characteristics of concern are based. It is harboured in concern, that is, structurally implicated or contained in concern as the "condition of its possibility," to use a Kantian turn of phrase. It is the existential-ontological foundation of concern, the phenomenon without which concern could not occur as a comportment at all.

What of being-in-the-world? How is it related to the structure of concern? As we saw in the last section, sensibility corresponds to being-already-in, while understanding corresponds to being-self-ahead. By "corresponds" I mean to indicate that sensibility is a modification or derivative of the already-in structure of concern, just as concern itself is a derivative structure based on or founded
in the disclosedness of Dasein as such. Similarly, understanding is a derivative or modification of the self-ahead aspect of concern. These two existentials, sensibility and understanding, are coeval constituents of being-in, the comportment of the self towards its world. Accordingly, we see that being-in unites or mediates between two other structural features that are also rooted in or based on the structure of concern. These structural features, namely the self and the world, are to be considered as further modifications of the concern-structure of Dasein, which emerge at the existential level of being-in. The term “Dasein” itself, as Heidegger tells us, is merely a collective term for disclosedness and for all of the existential modifications to which it gives rise. We can sum up our results concerning the structure of Dasein in the following diagram. The arrows are meant to indicate a movement towards a more profound level of interpretation:

**The Structural Multiplicity of Dasein (§§ 1–44)**

```
being-in-the-world
   ↓
being-in
   ↓
sensibility/thrownness—understanding/planning
   ↓
concern
   ↓
disclosedness
```

Note that the lowest tier of the diagram indicates the most primeval ontological level, while the highest tier is the most derivative level. Note too how we see from the diagram that the course of Heidegger’s analyses in *Being and Time* proceeds backwards from the most derivative level of comportment towards the most primeval or least derivative. In undertaking our phenomenological analysis of Dasein we are in effect retracing the steps by which our more concrete comportments emerge or “trickle down” from the fundamental level of disclosedness.
There are, of course, obvious parallels between the structural elements of each level of comportment, but it would probably be somewhat artificial to attempt to discover a one-to-one correspondence between them, and this is how Heidegger intends it to be. Each more derivative level of more concrete comportment is a decisive modification of the previous, more primeval ontological level. As such, the individual structural elements characteristic of each level also undergo a decisive transformation as they go forth from the immediately preceding, more fundamental level. Note that Heidegger does not tell us either how or why these modifications occur. He feels, however, that a hermeneutic phenomenology is able to show that they do occur, and that they are all founded in one basic and essential structure: disclosedness (but compare the following remarks on talk).

In his attempt to clarify the relation of concern to being-in-the-world, Heidegger lists four constitutive existential structures of Dasein [§ 44 b), p. 221-222]. These are (1) "disclosedness in general" [Erschlossenheit überhaupt], (2) thrownness, (3) the plan, and (4) falling. Note how Heidegger combines elements from several different levels of comportment in order to map the structure of being-in onto the structure of concern. For our purposes, it is most important to concentrate on what Heidegger says concerning the first and the last of the listed structures.

In § 34 of Being and Time, as well as in the last section, we saw that Heidegger repeatedly emphasizes that talk "permeates" [durchgreift] the entire structure of Dasein. We will have more to say on this topic in Section 3.6. For now it is sufficient to briefly call attention to a statement that Heidegger makes further on in Being and Time. The first sentence of § 68 d) runs, "The full disclosedness of the There [Da], constituted by understanding, sensibility, and falling, receives its articulation through talk." Compare this with Heidegger's statement in § 44 b) concerning disclosedness in general: "It permeates the whole of the being-structure that has become explicit through the phenomenon of concern." By "disclosedness in general" Heidegger means the fundamental disclosedness upon which the disclosedness
of all other comportments of Dasein is dependent. (Heidegger also speaks of the “disclosedness of the world” or of specific existential structures of Dasein.) The sentence quoted from § 68 d) implies that disclosedness in general is articulated, that is, differentiated into other derivative structures by the activity of the phenomenon of talk. While we should emphasize that this is merely an inference from various statements that Heidegger makes in Being and Time, it dovetails nicely with the role that talk plays in his later philosophy and explains the importance he places on § 34 of Being and Time in the dialogue “Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache. Zwischen einem Japaner und einem Fragenden” in Unterwegs zur Sprache.51

The second important issue we need to address at this point is the role that falling plays in Heidegger’s clarification of the relation of concern to being-in-the-world. With respect to falling, Heidegger tells us,

First and foremost, Dasein is lost to [i.e., has fallen to] its “world.” Understanding […] has displaced itself there. The immersion in the One means the dominance of public interpretedness [Ausgelegtheit]. […] Being unto entities is not extinguished, but it has been uprooted. Entities are not completely concealed; it is precisely the case that they are discovered, but at the same time disguised; they show themselves—but in the mode of semblance [des Scheines]. […] Because it is essentially falling, Dasein is according to its existential constitution [Seinsverfassung] in “untruth.” […] Undisclosedness [Verschlossenheit] and coveredness [Verdecktheit] belong to the facticity of Dasein. […] But only insofar as Dasein is disclosed can it also be closed; and only insofar as intramundane entities are always already discovered with Dasein can they […] be covered (concealed) or disguised [verdeckt (verborgen) oder verstellit]. [§ 44 b), p. 221–222]

According to this quotation, falling, which is rooted in being-among intramundane entities, is the source of “untruth.” That
is to say, falling to the world involves an uprooting of Dasein’s comportments towards entities (what Heidegger calls its “being unto” them). In falling to the world, Dasein no longer comes upon entities in their true light. This is because falling, as the immersion in the one-self, implies that Dasein’s own structures are hidden. As such, they are understood in an inauthentic manner, and as a result Dasein no longer correctly interprets its own possibilities for existence. This confusion is, according to the previous quotation, the existential foundation of the possibility of error. We can only make mistakes when our interpretation of intramundane entities is confused. It can only become confused at all because we have the inherent tendency to become confused, that is, to interpret wrongly. Wrong interpretation is a result of the possibility of not comporting oneself properly as Dasein, as an entity to whose structural constitution interpretation necessarily and essentially belongs. Accordingly, the possibility of error is rooted in Dasein’s capacity to fail to be that entity which it is, in its capacity to be inauthentic.92

What, then, is truth for Heidegger? Recall that we spoke of disclosedness as the fundamental comportment of Dasein, the comportment which permits all other comportments, including the comportments that discover “truth” in the everyday sense of the word. According to Heidegger, truth in the primary sense is the phenomenon upon which all other truth-discovering comportments are based.93 Accordingly, truth, in the primary sense of the word, is nothing other than the disclosedness of Dasein.

Falling, however, belongs to the disclosedness of Dasein, as we have previously seen. Falling is nothing other than the tendency for the disclosedness of Dasein to become undisclosed (i.e., obscured or hidden in the everyday sense of the words). When Dasein falls, it fails to understand its own existence properly. In so doing it is characterized by inauthenticity, which is nothing other than a failure to understand its own existence as it actually is, as characteristically and essentially its own existence. Failing to understand this, it is immersed in the one-self. Immersed in the one-self, Dasein shifts the emphasis of its understanding to
the interpretation and manipulation of intramundane entities. "Error" in the sense of undisclosedness belongs to the disclosedness of Dasein. The undisclosedness of Dasein then in turn results in factual error at the everyday level. Note that Heidegger does not believe that it would ever be conceivable to do away completely with the possibility of factual error through authenticity. Undisclosedness and thus the ever-present possibility of error belong to the essential nature of Dasein. The two points that are brought out in this discussion are thus:

(1) truth, in the most primeval sense of the word, is the disclosedness of Dasein, to which the discoveredness of intramundane entities, and thus the possibility of error in the everyday sense, belong; and

(2) Dasein is coevally characterized by both truth (disclosedness) and untruth (undisclosedness).

In this manner Heidegger attempts to link the concept of authenticity with the concept of truth. Authentic existence is existence in conformity with the true structural nature of Dasein. Inauthentic existence is existence that is not so in conformity, that is, that is based on a false or confused understanding of what existence is. This inauthentic self-understanding is the reason that Dasein can fall to the world at all and immerse itself in the one-self, lost in the use and manipulation of entities at the behest of the world.

Heidegger's treatment of truth and authenticity should not, I think, deceive us into thinking that the philosopher necessarily always has some sort of advantage over others in the act of existence. Authentic self-understanding is not necessarily an explicit theoretical understanding of Dasein. One can act well without being able to explain how or why one acts well. By way of comparison, a musician can perform well without a systematic knowledge of music theory. Nevertheless, every good performance implies an underlying familiarity with the nature of good music, even when the musician cannot give an
explicit theoretical formulation of the rules guiding his or her performance. We would of course expect a knowledge of music theory to improve the musician's ability to perform well. Still, it need not. There are some musicians who become worse when they are forced to play by the rules.

A final brief remark on the subject of authenticity may be helpful at this point. The exact nature of authenticity in *Being and Time* is still very much a matter for scholarly dispute. However, my own solution to the problem involves distinguishing between two senses of authenticity. In the first sense, authenticity is identified with disclosedness and opposed to inauthenticity, which is in turn identified with undisclosedness. In the second sense, however, authenticity is understood as the awareness and acceptance of inauthenticity and of authenticity in the first sense as mutually antagonistic and yet equally necessary features of Dasein. For arguments in support of this interpretation see Section 3.3 and the second half of Section 3.4.

b) Being, Entities, and Dasein
We will now turn to the remaining two important issues, namely the question of the dependence of Being on Dasein and of the independence of entities from Dasein. In our introductory example in Section 2.2, we described how a particular scientific attitude could result in the re-definition of certain types of entities as non-existent. These entities were those that were not observable under laboratory conditions. At that time it was convenient to speak of consciousness and emotions as entities that were defined out of existence by the belief that only entities that are observable under laboratory conditions truly exist. Of course, for Heidegger consciousness and emotions are not entities. "Consciousness" is a philosophically inadequate concept referring to a phenomenon that is more accurately described as existentiality. Similarly, emotions in the usual sense are derivative phenomena ontologically rooted in sensibilities.

In Heideggerian terminology, we can go on to rephrase our example in the following more stringent way. In the scientific
attitude we described in Section 2.2, the being of entities is planned (in the strict terminological sense) with a view to laboratory observability. This plan is then extended to the being of all entities, including those that are not particularly suited to an interpretation whose criterion of existence and non-existence is laboratory observability, such as Dasein. Thanks to this plan, fundamental existential characteristics of Dasein, such as existentiality and facticity (sensibility) succumb to undisclosedness. The plan, however, also prevents us from realizing that this has occurred, since within the framework of this plan no sense\textsuperscript{95} can be attributed to these aspects of Dasein. Accordingly, insofar as they are disclosed at all, they are interpreted with a view to the criterion of laboratory observability. “Consciousness” becomes a mere epiphenomenon accompanying the true phenomena, namely observable quantifiable biomechanical processes. Moods become a function of hormones. Intelligence becomes a product of evolution assisted by chance.\textsuperscript{96}

The point of view of everyday common sense gives rise to a temptation to regard the planning of entities towards definite conceptions of Being as a merely psychological procedure. On this line of thought, entities (such as human beings) are always in possession of certain properties. If these properties are not evident within certain systems of thought, it can only be because they are ignored. This ignorance is the result of a mental attitude that causes one to take no notice of them. However, entities still retain their properties, even in the course of ignoring them. On this view, a radical behaviourist (for example) does not in fact alter the being of entities by planning them with a view to laboratory observability. A radical behaviourist simply fails to apprehend certain aspects or features of the entities subjected to the plan.

It is this fundamental misunderstanding of the status of Being and entities that gave rise to the confusion of Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology with “existentialism.” On this view, the relation between entities and Dasein is conceived as a psychological one. Entities exist objectively all on their own,
without reference to Dasein. Accordingly, when Heidegger speaks of planning, he is speaking of a purely psychological procedure, something in our heads, an attitude or stance that affects our apprehension of the entities in question but does not affect the entities themselves. The entities remain what they are. Their being too remains what it is, unaffected by the manner in which we apprehend them. They exist independently of us and of our apprehension of their properties. This interpretation is, however, as we have seen in detail, an inversion of Heidegger's actual line of thought in *Being and Time.* For Heidegger, entities are indeed independent of Dasein. Yet they are not independent of Being; and Being itself is dependent on Dasein.

In order to explain this startling state of affairs, we have to clarify the sense in which entities can be said to be independent of Dasein. Recall that for Heidegger, the being of entities is *connection.* Connection is the most fundamental structure of the worldliness of the world. Accordingly, the being of entities is the capacity to appear within a world in connection with other entities. This appearance within the referential structure of the world Heidegger terms discoveredness. Since discoveredness is the basic feature of entities as such, their being, we will no longer speak in an ontologically unenlightened way of the "existence" of entities, this term being too vague for proper philosophical use. Instead, we will speak of the discoveredness of entities. Our question then becomes: in what sense is the discoveredness of entities independent of Dasein?

An entity that is truly independent of Dasein is an entity that is outside any possible connection. We will refer to such an entity as an "entity in itself." If we call to mind the pertinent details of the world analysis and of the discussion of being-in from Sections 2.5 and 2.6, it is clear that we can never understand or interpret such an entity. Entities are only discoverable in connections, and as such only discoverable within the world structure. An entity in itself, being wholly outside of any possible connection, is an entity to which we can never comport ourselves and as such an entity that can never be discovered. This is not to say that Dasein
creates the entities it discovers in an idealistic sense. However, it does mean that the condition of entities in themselves—entities outside and beyond the world—is, for us, absolutely incomprehensible:

Before Newton's laws were discovered, they were not "true"; this does not imply that they were false, nor even that they would become false when no more discoveredness is ontically possible. [...] That Newton's laws were neither true nor false before him cannot mean that the entities that they indicate in the act of discovery [entdeckend aufzeigen] did not previously exist [sei vordem nicht gewesen]. The laws became true through Newton, with them entities in themselves [Seiendes an ihm selbst] became accessible. With the discoveredness of entities, they show themselves precisely as entities that previously already existed. To discover in this way is the being-manner [Seinsart] of "truth." [§ 44 c), p. 226-227]

Our comportments, in discovering entities, do not create them. Yet at the same time, it is impossible to discover entities except within the world. The world, in turn, is a structure of Dasein. It thus clearly follows that the discoveredness of entities—but not their existence in the everyday sense of the word—is dependent on Dasein. Although the entire referential framework within which alone entities can be discovered belongs to Dasein, entities are nonetheless discovered as truly independent entities. Dasein discovers them as having previously been around prior to the act of discovery. At the same time, we can say nothing about them except what we have discovered through our comportments towards them. Accordingly,

*All truth, according to its essentially Dasein-like being-manner, is relative to the being of Dasein. Does this relativity amount to: all truth is "subjective"? If one interprets "subjective" as "dependent upon the arbitrary whim of the subject" [in das Belieben des Subjekts gestellt], then certainly not. For discovery,
according to its deepest sense [eigenster Sinn], separates [entzieht] the act of making statements [das Aussagen] from "subjective" whims and brings Dasein, in the act of discovery, before the entity itself. And only because "truth" as discovery is a manner in which Dasein exists [eine Seinsart des Daseins ist] can it be separated from its whims. [§ 44 c), p. 227]

Can we talk things into existence? Obviously not, but we can invent new words, or use old words in new ways, such that previously undisclosed meanings (in the terminological sense) become disclosed. Can we talk things out of existence? Of course not, but we can misuse words in such a manner that previously disclosed meanings become hidden. Are the properties of entities created by our plans? Definitely not, but the degree of access to entities of which we are capable will be dependent upon the richness of our plan. Does Heidegger's interpretation of the world as a system of references result in a philosophical, moral, or cultural relativism, in the popular sense of the word? Certainly not, but we must keep in mind that very different plans may discover entities in very different manners, and it may not be immediately certain, particularly in view of the everyday dominance of the one-self, which plan is "better" according to any given criterion of "better." The popular charge of postmodernist relativism, insofar as it is applied to Heidegger, must be rejected as essentially groundless.

What, then, of Being, namely the fundamental ontological structure with reference to which all entities of whatever type are understood as entities? Here Heidegger is equally unambiguous:

That reality is ontologically founded in the being of Dasein cannot mean that real things [Reale] can only be as what they are in themselves [an ihm selbst] if and as long as Dasein exists.

However, only as long as Dasein exists [ist], that is, the ontic possibility of the understanding of Being, "is there" Being,
If Dasein does not exist, then "independence" and "in-itselfness" do not "exist" either. Things of this sort are then neither understandable nor incomprehensible [unverstehbar]. Then intramundane entities are neither discoverable nor can they lie in concealedness [Verborgenheit]. Then it can no longer be said that entities are, nor that they are not. Now, as long as the understanding of Being exists [ist] and thus also the understanding of at-handness, it can of course be said that then entities will still continue to be. [§ 43 c), p. 211-212]

In Being and Time, Heidegger maintains that there is a dependence of Being, but not of entities, upon Dasein. This can also be described as a "dependence of reality, not of real things, upon concern" [§ 43 c), p. 212]. In short, the world is dependent on Dasein but entities are not. Being, as the most primeval frame of reference for the discovery of entities, as the most fundamental sense of what it means to be an entity, is only given in Dasein's understanding. This should be obvious enough: since we can only discover entities in the act of understanding them, the fundamental sense with reference to which they are understood is also a function of the act of understanding. In short, Being, and with it the whole world structure of which it is the cornerstone, is merely a feature of Dasein's act of understanding. Without Dasein, Being itself would cease to be. Without Dasein there would no longer be any understanding. There would no longer be any criterion for the distinction between real and unreal. There would be nothing making this distinction anymore.

Yet the ontological dependence of Being on Dasein does not compromise the independence of entities from Dasein, despite the dependence of entities on Being. The entities that Dasein discovers within the referential framework of the world can be understood only within this framework, and so their discoveredness is dependent on Dasein's understanding of Being. At the same time, however, the act of discovery does not create the entities Dasein discovers:
Entities are independent of the experience, knowledge, and grasping through which they are disclosed, discovered, and determined. But Being only “is” in the understanding of the entity to whose being such a thing as the understanding of being belongs. [§ 39, p. 183]

Similarly, in reading a book, my comprehension of the text is a function of the interpretative structure I apply to the text (corresponding to Being) in conjunction with the acts of interpretation I carry out within this framework (my understanding). Any sense the book has is a sense arising in my understanding of the book. At the same time, it would be wrong to claim that I authored the book merely because its sense is a function of my understanding. The book is truly independent of me, not my creation (unless, of course, I happen to be its author; but this is not the point of the example). Yet its sense is dependent upon the frame of reference I bring along with me to the act of reading. Without this frame of reference—my knowledge of the language, my technical background, my expectations—I cannot even begin to read the book. The book has no meaning independently of some frame of reference for its comprehension. Still, the book is not created by being understood within this frame of reference. It is allowed to emerge into my experience to the fullest degree that my frame of reference allows it to do so.

It is fairly obvious that Heidegger’s position is essentially a reworking of the Kantian distinction between phenomena and noumena, the noumena in this case being entities insofar as they are considered independently of Dasein’s understanding. Thus we can see that far from being a truly “existentialist” project, Heidegger’s Being and Time is in essence a refurbished Kantianism with existential structures of Dasein replacing Kant’s pure concepts of the understanding or “categories.” In Being and Time Heidegger differs from Kant in that the existential structures are derived from a pragmatic analysis of experience rather than read off from a quasi-logical “Table of Judgements.” We will leave the question open as to whether the Heidegger of Being
and Time manages to avoid the paradoxes inherent in the Kantian distinction between phenomena and noumena.  

In conclusion, it is important to emphasize an aspect of Dasein's understanding of entities that we have not yet addressed. A superficial reader may be inclined to think that Heidegger believes that the sense of intramundane entities is always and solely dependent upon individual interpretations. Hostile critics might be inclined to conclude that Heidegger is, after all, a proponent of a sort of individualistic relativism. However, a brief consideration of the material we discussed in the course of the present section will show that this cannot be the case. In the first place, the act of discovery, according to its own nature, discovers entities to be independent of the act itself. Accordingly, it belongs to the very sense of interpretation that no interpretation creates meaning, but only reveals, in a more or less appropriate and suitable manner, the independently existing meaning of the entity in question. Thus a purely individualistic interpretation is, by definition, impossible. Secondly, it belongs to Dasein's very essence that it is characterized by thrownness into a world. Dasein, in formulating its own understanding, must always begin from a previous understanding of entities that it cannot create anew but only modify. Every new interpretation grows from the soil of already existing interpretations, which it influences and modifies in turn. Since the self of Dasein exists first and foremost in a shared world, in a world characterized by the presence of others, one's own interpretation, by definition, must also take others' interpretations into account—even if in the merely privative and inauthentic manner of denying their relevance in everyday ambiguity.
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