CHAPTER 3

Speaking Out of Turn: Cutting through Monologues of Exclusion and Partisanship

Maritza Felices-Luna and Anouk Guiné

Critical criminology in its many forms (e.g., feminist, anarchist, radical, Marxist, post-structuralist, pragmatist, etc.) positions itself as a critique of power; works against practices of individualization, differentiation and normalization; and expands the confines of the discipline beyond crime and punishment (Frauley 2008; Garland 1992). Critical criminologists offer up counter-discourses to hegemonic discourses produced by mainstream criminology and, in doing so, often face attempts to undermine their research. Although there is an extensive literature on mechanisms used within academia to police the production and circulation of counter-hegemonic knowledges, there is little discussion on how other institutions contribute to such policing.

To dismantle the ways in which counter-hegemonic knowledges are silenced we need to describe and analyze the manners and mechanisms through which it takes place. Researchers working on sensitive or controversial topics that challenge hegemonic knowledges have experienced backlash from within academia; they have been confronted with the possibility of legal action, and have even received threats to their personal safety. While researchers tend to share these experiences with colleagues and students informally, this chapter seeks to move such discussions from a private forum to a public one and reframe what is taken as anecdotal conversational pieces to empirical material. This chapter is therefore an invitation to reflect on how practices of knowledge dissemination are hindered and how researchers are policed when producing counter-hegemonic knowledges.
The chapter builds on Joane Martel’s (2004) analysis of her own challenges in disseminating the results of her qualitative research on women in prison by identifying formal and informal ways academia, media, NGOs, interest groups, and the state attempted to disrupt the dissemination of counter-hegemonic research on women’s involvement in the Peruvian internal armed conflict that began in May 1980. It draws on personal recollections and field notes, newspaper articles, and social media publications, as well as formal communications with diverse institutions, organizations, and individuals with whom we communicated during the organization of a series of events geared towards the dissemination of counter-hegemonic knowledges on women’s involvement in political violence. Knowledges shared during the events challenged two distinct hegemonic discourses on the Peruvian armed conflict and questioned the way most researchers tend to study women’s involvement in armed conflict.

The first section presents the hegemonic discourses surrounding women’s involvement in armed struggle we wanted to challenge through the organization of a series of knowledge dissemination events. It problematizes the way in which mainstream scientific literature (re)produce essentializing tropes that disregard insurgent women’s agency and their politics, while excluding them from the conversation (Felices-Luna 2007; Sjoberg 2013). The second section presents the opposing hegemonic discourses on the Peruvian conflict and analyzes how they encumbered attempts at open dialogue and hampered the production of critical analyses regarding the Peruvian conflict through the marginalization, stigmatization, and silencing of non-aligned researchers. We conclude by highlighting that successfully disrupting and decolonizing hegemonic monologues requires researchers to continue generating spaces for dialogue and public discussion, despite the potential for state repression and academic repercussions.

**Marginalizing and Exclusionary Tropes within Scientific Literature on Women in Armed Struggles**

Since the 1980s, the mainstream scientific literature has studied women’s involvement in armed struggle as a new phenomenon on the rise where women’s roles are shifting from support to combat. These researchers tend to explore three distinct but interrelated lines of inquiry.
The first one implicitly relies on the premise that women’s use of violence is an abnormality, and explained this premise through the lens of their gender identity or “femininity.” Most researchers resort to deterministic theories to explain why and how women join armed struggle. Some researchers explain women’s involvement by focusing on their characteristics or traits and the role played within the organization as either traditional or non-traditional based on a context of sexual division of political labour. In doing so, researchers rely on another set of tropes which construe insurgent women, on one hand, as cold, hard, authoritarian, aggressive, virile, asexual, lesbian, or promiscuous, and whose masculine traits explain their involvement or, on the other hand, as kind, caring, soft, maternal, ladylike, romantic, and nonviolent, and whose feminine traits explain being duped, manipulated, forced, or used by men within the organization (Sjoberg 2010). Other researchers explain women’s entrance in armed struggle due to their socio-demographic characteristics and personal experiences or through cultural factors. By establishing such naive causal relationships, by refusing to connect personal experiences of violence and discrimination to political structures, and by oversimplifying cultural contexts, researchers perpetuate patriarchal constructions of womanhood as intrinsically non-violent and lacking agency (Deylami 2013; Gentry 2009). In doing so, researchers depoliticize women’s involvement. Moreover, by focusing on deterministic elements instead of analyzing the decision to resort to political violence within the historical-political context of social movements and social struggles, the scientific literature further entrenches the idea that it is unreasonable and/or abnormal for women to join an armed struggle. The fact that very few authors presume that women might opt freely and conscientiously to engage in political and military actions demonstrates how researchers contribute to the (re)production and injunction of social roles through the abnormalization of these women and, consequently, the essentialization of all women (Gentry 2009; Henshaw 2016; Sjoberg 2010).

The second line of inquiry relates to why an organization would accept, recruit, or want women in their ranks. Researchers never ask this in regard to male membership, which demonstrates that researchers not only think of women’s involvement as anomalous, but of little use to politico-military organizations. The answers provided by these researchers rely on the following tropes: the organization is in a desperate situation due to low membership; the organization sees the
exploitative potential of women; the organization uses its recruitment of women as a means to convey a message to the rest of the population or to present themselves in a particular way.

Finally, the last line of inquiry focuses on the short- and long-term consequences of women’s involvement in armed struggle for the women themselves, for their organizations, and for society (Auchter 2012). By debating whether or not a specific armed struggle is a source of liberation or oppression, or whether a particular organization is truly feminist or reproduces patriarchal relations, these researchers are confining and reducing women’s involvement to a matter of “gender relations.”

These three lines of inquiry fail to look at how women’s involvement and experiences can contribute to the understanding of political violence and social movements at large. Moreover, by focusing solely on gender, they oversimplify a complex phenomenon and obscure the different ways in which a variety of subjugating positions and positions of privilege—such as class, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and ability—intersect in and through armed struggle.

Despite being interested in insurgent women, few researchers actually rely on oral or written first-hand material produced by them. This is due in part to the difficulties of accessing current or past members of insurgent organizations, as well as the security risks it entails for both participants and researchers. These facts notwithstanding, there seems to be another factor at play: the legitimacy and credibility ascribed to the women (Deylami 2013; Gentry 2009; Henshaw 2016). Insurgent women’s apparent nonconformity to the naturalized view of what being a woman entails—combined with their direct and indirect attacks of social and economic order—provides implicit justifications to undermine and delegitimize their voices and to silence them. Consequently, many researchers do not conceive them as social and political agents actors capable of providing relevant information emanating from their situated knowledges and intersecting perspectives. Researchers therefore tend to exclude insurgent women from knowledge-production activities about themselves and their political projects. These methodological choices result in women’s views and understandings of their experiences and of the conflict being (at best) ignored or (at worst) silenced and demonized.

Without implying that conducting interviews with or researching materials produced by these women is the only legitimate way to explore this phenomenon, we believe that the limited use of women’s
accounts, narratives, analysis, and ideological productions generate significant blind spots in the scientific literature. These blind spots minimize the numbers and roles played by women; ignore their contributions to women’s emancipation (particularly in regard to poor and racialized women’s rights); disregard their involvement in the social, political, and economic transformation of society; and construe them as objects to be researched in order to combat and criminalize them.

Researchers challenging the mainstream scientific literature attempt to produce alternative knowledges that eschew common tropes and disrupt the hegemonic framing of insurgent women. These researchers do not assume that women’s involvement is an anomaly or abnormality. They draw on theoretical and methodological approaches that recognize women’s agency and see analytical value in what they have to say. They expand beyond the emancipation/oppression conundrum and the limitations of causal analysis and they may acknowledge the intersectionality of subjugating positions, as well as positions of privilege. In attempting to de-marginalize and de-stigmatize female combatants, these researchers face their own marginalization and exclusion. As exemplified by Arlette Farge’s account of her own experiences, researchers who engage in counter-hegemonic discourses face marginalization and silencing in an attempt to reduce the potential disruptive effects that the alternative knowledges produced might have on current forms of socio-political orderings and gender relations. Not only are the knowledges they produce policed and, in some instances, silenced, the reputation, credibility, and even the safety of these researchers can be at stake. In the next section, we analyze the ways in which producers of hegemonic discourses have attempted to silence and stigmatize alternative knowledges about insurgent women’s involvement in the Peruvian conflict.

The (Im)possibility of Academic Dialogue in a Public Forum

The Peruvian conflict has produced two rival hegemonic discourses. One is tightly controlled by the PCP-SL (Partido Comunista del Perú—Sendero Luminoso; Communist Party of Peru—Shining Path) and mainly focuses on class struggle. The other is more subtly disciplined by a particular set of researchers recognized as “experts” within the Peruvian academic world. The discourses these experts produce align
with what has become the “official” history of the conflict. This history was primarily produced by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission which, although critical of the state and state actors, is considered by some as presenting only a partial analysis of the conflict or a “victor’s narrative.” These opposing hegemonic discourses have framed the way in which the Peruvian conflict can be spoken about, the questions that can be asked, who is entitled to answer them, and the lenses through which the conflict must be seen.

In 2014, Anouk Guiné from the Université Le Havre Normandie (France) co-organized with local human rights institutions, a graduate student history group from the National University of San Marcos (Lima), and a French research group, an international colloquium on gender, class, and peace building to focus on the Peruvian armed conflict in Ayacucho (Peru). She rallied a scientific committee of local and international researchers who had published on the conflict, most of whom shared the will to challenge hegemonic discourses on the conflict and, specifically, on women’s involvement in armed struggle. The colloquium sought to open up a dialogue between researchers working from different disciplines, perspectives, and approaches using first-hand empirical material. It took place in a non-academic space because the main human rights organization in Ayacucho was able to convince a popular Jesuit house of study to host the event when mainstream universities in Lima backed out. Despite being successful and drawing a large audience, the colloquium and subsequent scientific activities faced boycotting attempts and other adverse reactions from academia, political groups, civil society, the media, and state institutions.

The knowledge-disseminating activities sought to challenge the hegemonic discourses in Peru, as well as the hegemonic discourses produced by academia in the global North regarding women’s involvement in armed struggle. Through the call for papers, and every other event and publication we organized, we set out to open up new ways of thinking and speaking about the conflict by refusing to take up the premises, parameters, and frames of any of the competing hegemonic discourses. We aimed to have a conversation about the conflict and women’s involvement in it through an intersectional lens that refused to recognize, engage, or reproduce the dichotomies of guilty vs. justified, evil/bad vs. good, or wrong vs. right side of history. Consequently, we framed the conflict and the people involved as political actors, not as criminals or terrorists. We abstained from...
declaring one party to the conflict as carrying more blame or as being “worse” than another one. We refrained from attributing labels of guilty/innocent, victim/perpetrator, or stigmatized/worthy to all those involved. We aimed to understand the conflict and peoples’ experiences and perspectives of it, instead of explaining why and how people were wrong or right in their beliefs and actions. We sought to confront essentializing discourses about women, in particular their perceived natural peacefulness or non-violence. We also sought to expand our analytical tools to look beyond gender by also focusing on class and race. Finally—adopting a perspective of situated knowledge—we deemed that what people have to say, regardless of their past and current position regarding the conflict, is worth listening to and represents a potential source for a better understanding of the conflict. Hence, we sought to explore members’ artistic creations, which also tend to be invisibilized, marginalized, and/or demonized.

To disrupt hegemonic discourses on the Peruvian conflict, we needed to ensure the enrolment of researchers from the local scientific community and of the public to ensure a network of support that would legitimate the knowledge claims presented (Callon and Law 1989). Even leaving aside the existence of institutionally ingrained modes of gatekeeping through hiring, publication, and funding practices (Morgan and Hough 2008; Piron 2005; White 2002), not every knowledge producer is seen as legitimate or as valuable within academia (Bourdieu 1969). The knowledge produced is evaluated according to internally produced “scientific” criteria deemed neutral and objective (Bourdieu 1975, 1976; Latour 1987, 1999), as well as political, social, historical, and economic factors (Foucault 1972, 1979, 1980) in such a way that certain knowledges are legitimized, while others are subjugated, distorted, ridiculed, undermined, de-legitimized, and even demonized. Producing and disseminating alternative knowledges about the Peruvian armed conflict outside the premises, parameters, and frames established by hegemonic discourses is challenging because institutional agents can place significant hurdles to the production and dissemination of these knowledges and is risky because the researcher’s career, reputation, and personal safety can be at stake.

The colloquium was the first one to do an open call for papers on the Peruvian armed conflict and, as a result, the event gathered a large audience who actively participated during the discussion.
However, instead of being an open public dialogue across different perspectives, it ended up being a conversation between like-minded individuals, repeatedly interrupted by those protecting either of the two competing hegemonic discourses.

In the following pages, we describe the strategies deployed by a variety of institutional agents that undermined the knowledges produced and de-legitimated those who produced them. We are not implying that this was a concerted “attack,” nor do we want to individualize these incidents as being simply the spontaneous action of a few disgruntled individuals. What we are highlighting is how agents from different institutions set out to actively hinder the dissemination of alternative knowledges to protect the existing hegemonic discourses on the Peruvian conflict.

Despite our intentions of opening up a public dialogue across diverse academic perspectives, we failed to secure a significant enrolment of the scientific community. They refused dialogue with those producing alternative knowledges and did not engage with the alternative knowledges disseminated. Furthermore, academics worked in subtle and surreptitious ways to undermine the events and defame the organizers. Aside from personally boycotting the colloquium, members of academia attempted to convince—sometimes successfully—other members of the academic community to not participate in the events by attacking the legitimacy and credibility of those organizing and participating in the events. They claimed our call for papers justified the armed struggle and represented the PCP-SL version of the events. They also asserted it was the PCP-SL organizing the event and that we were sympathizers and mouthpieces acting as a front. These researchers never confronted us directly or made their accusations publicly, which prevented us from being able to defend ourselves or attempt to engage with them in an actual discussion on the conflict. Consequently, although there was a high level of interest and support from members of the international and national scientific community, this interest dwindled as the call for papers circulated and the different events took place. Emails and phone calls inviting researchers went unanswered; others showed some initial interest, but became unavailable when we attempted to follow up; others accepted, but cancelled at the last minute without providing an explanation; and still others participated in one event, but refused to respond to further invitations. Those who did not heed the warnings found themselves ostracized and saw their reputations tarnished.
These unwarranted accusations endanger the career of young and upcoming researchers, and put those who participated in the events at risk of retaliation by state agents.

To our knowledge, state agents played a role in attempting to silence the dissemination of alternative knowledges. Police and intelligence agents were present at all the events and filmed not only the presenters, but the audience as well. It was a simple tactic of fear and intimidation, which did not appear to influence the audience or the presenters. In fact, during the colloquium, local residents, members of MOVADEF,22 dissidents from Abimael Guzman, youth connected to political parties with close ties to the MRTA,23 elder citizens who participated at the beginning of the conflict, as well as a lawyer representing members of the military, discussed openly from their respective positions and called for further events of this sort.

The more blatant hindrance happened when the publishing company made a request to host the book launch of Gender and Armed Conflict in Peru (Guiné and Felices-Luna 2018) at the Lugar de la Memoria, Tolerancia e Inclusión Social (LUM; Place of Memory, Tolerance and Social Inclusion). After several unanswered letters, we received an official response indicating that the LUM would not host the event as it went against the principles and mandate of the institution. The LUM has a mandate to promote dialogue and reflection on the intrinsic value of respecting human rights, citizen civic engagement, and the construction of a culture of peace.24 In a letter to the publishing company organizing the book launch, they justified their refusal by indicating that our “book uses terminology that does not dialogue with the content presented in the LUM nor with the goals it has set of building a society that recognizes the responsibilities and the facts that occurred in 1980–2000 in order to advance processes of reflection and victim reparation” (Zavaleta, 2018). This is a clear case of a hegemonic discourse demanding adherence to its parameters, premises, and frames as a precondition to engaging in any dialogue.

Our events had had limited mainstream press coverage prior to our attempt at holding the book launch at the LUM. However, soon after receiving the letter from the LUM, right-wing press reported on it. One can only assume that someone at the LUM leaked the letter, as the first newspapers to report the news published a copy of it (La razón, 2018). Contrary to surreptitious attacks by academia and the state, the mainstream press did not shy away from public personal attacks that challenged our legitimacy and demonized us. Using
headlines such as “‘Intelectuales’ querían hacer evento proterrorista en Lugar de la Memoria” (“Intellectuals wanted to host a pro-terrorist event at the LUM”; Rojas 2018) and “Apología Proterruca,” (“In defence of fucking terrorists”, Expreso 2018), the articles attacked the credibility, legitimacy, and identity of the researchers in remarkably similar ways. These reporters based their attacks on the terminology we used, which does not correspond to the accepted vocabulary of the “official” history. Here are some excerpts: “people that presented themselves as social science researchers wanted to use the LUM to portray terrorist criminals as social justice warriors” (Rojas 2018); “the text never calls terrorists, terrorists” (La razón 2018); “they call blood thirsty Elena Iparraguirre a political prisoner” (Expreso 2018); “they use terms such as militants, ex-combatants, insurgent organizations” (Rojas 2018). Aside from using our words out of context to undermine our credibility and question our intentions, one of the articles falsely reported that in one of the public events “the presenters even called PCP-SL and the MRTA ‘our armed groups’ in a clear association with criminals who murdered, tortured, kidnapped, raped and generated huge amounts of material loss” (La razón 2018).

Although the publishing house defended the book, the reporters also presented the publisher as being supportive of “the terrorist organizations” (Rojas 2018). The fear generated by this type of accusation led the printing company to cancel the contract at the last minute. Similarly, some student groups who had invited us to present the book ended up internally splitting and refusing to host any event in connection to the book. However, through the intervention of non-hegemonic and independent feminist researchers, seven presentations were successfully organized and attended between July and August 2018, and the book has sold out since.

Hegemonic discourses on the “official” history of the Peruvian conflict contain disagreements and even strong debates. However, this is possible only if those who speak do so within certain parameters (Angenot 1988). Based on our experience, to avoid being undermined, attacked, and silenced in mainstream debates, critical researchers must acknowledge the greater responsibility and guilt of insurgent organizations; recognize the intrinsically evil nature of these organizations; frame the conflict as criminal and not political; partake in the stigmatization of the organization and its members as terrorists; and admit that visible forms of violence are inherently worse than any other form of violence. Within these parameters of
imposed polarization, the only people deemed to hold useful information and legitimate knowledge or the only ones whose experiences are valuable and worthy of interest are the victims, state actors, members of civil society that battled insurgents, and those engaged in armed struggle who have repented. We can only use the voices of those who have not repented to challenge what they say or to use their words against them. Those who do not abide by theses parameter, or dare to challenge them, find themselves excluded from the conversation and declared “terrorists” or a “terrorist sympathizers.”

Probably because we refused to speak according to the rules established by one of the hegemonic discourses, the PCP-SL appeared to welcome the colloquium. However, it quickly became obvious that they were attempting to co-opt the event. In fact, female prisoners asked Anouk Guiné to read and circulate a political text during the colloquium. She responded by clearly stating that the event was not meant for that. At the end of the colloquium, she was told that one of the former female leaders of the PCP-SL had said “Anouk did not comply,” as if the researcher had been expected to submit to the will of the PCP.

Precisely because we refused to let the event be co-opted by the PCP-SL, and because we do not write about the conflict in alignment with the official version of the PCP-SL, when the journal’s special issue was presented in 2016, members or sympathizers of the organization attempted to silence the dissemination of alternative knowledges by sabotaging the event. A number of individuals placed themselves throughout the audience and pretended to be interested in a dialogue, but after asking provocative questions they did not let presenters respond; they interrupted, threatened, and humiliated them. When a former member of the PCP-SL attempted to speak, these individuals yelled, literally silencing him. After the presentation of the journal’s special issue, personal attacks through social media and other internet forums continued. Interestingly enough, the accusations hurled at the presenters were that they were reactionar-ies, CIA agents, representatives of the bourgeoisie, or imperialist pup-pets. Aside from these attacks, certain members of the audience also misrepresented the published work by accusing the presenters of perpetuating the myth that women are victims of men and not ideological beings in their own right.

Our experiences demonstrate that within the parameters of the hegemonic discourse produced by the PCP-SL, only those who have been directly authorized by the organization or those who are willing
to repeat the information and the analysis of the PCP-SL can legitimately speak. No alternative interpretations, lenses, or questions are permitted within this hegemonic discourse.

Throughout these events, both sides lambasted us precisely because we sought to challenge all hegemonic discourses on the Peruvian conflict. While one side accused us of being “terrorists” and having been financed by the PCP-SL during the proceedings, the other side accused us of being financed by “imperialism” (claiming that Guine had an NGO) and of being “reactionaries,” “imperialists,” “feminist bourgeoisie,” and “CIA agents.” Either way, the vehemence of these attacks showed that we were successful at disrupting both hegemonic discourses; we were able to speak out of turn.

**Interrupting Hegemonic Discourses**

Unsettling hegemonic discourses requires interrupting marginalizing and exclusionary monologues taking place within and outside academia regarding the Peruvian armed conflict and women’s involvement in it. Our experiences bring into sharp focus two reasons we cannot interrupt these monologues from the ivory tower of the academic world. First, the internal functioning of academia generates limited possibilities for actual dialogue between researchers who knowingly or unknowingly contribute to the (re)production of hegemonic knowledges and those producing alternative knowledges. As noted by Martel (2004), it also makes it easy for alternative knowledges to be excluded from academia under accusations of not being scientific or to be pushed to the fringes of academia by attacking, ignoring, or silencing these knowledges and their producers. Hence, researchers producing alternative knowledges dialogue mainly with similarly positioned researchers. Although these might be very fruitful discussions, they will not succeed in dismantling hegemonic discourses precisely because the critiques are circulating within a closed circle from which hegemonic discourses have made themselves impermeable.

This leads us to the second and main reason for stepping outside of the ivory tower. Hegemonic discourses are not circumscribed to academia. On the contrary, they are (re)produced in a multiplicity of social institutions and circulated within a variety of forums. By limiting ourselves to the academic forum, we are not engaging with the public and we are allowing for these other institutions to misrepresent our research and challenge our academic rigour and scholarly
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competence, or silence it altogether by refusing to acknowledge its existence. Dismantling hegemonic discourses therefore requires a dialogue in an open and public forum\textsuperscript{27} with those willing to hear about and engage with alternative ways of seeing and thinking about the world.

However, engaging in dialogue with state institutions and the public is complicated. Regarding her research on women in prison, Martel (2004) describes how institutional agents refused to engage with the knowledges produced: they cancelled private meetings between the researcher, civil society organizations, and state institutions’ representatives; they declined to discuss publicly the results of the research or their segregation practices; and they avoided contact with the researcher and her team. Researchers working for Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) and mainstream media policed and silenced alternative knowledges by arguing that the methodologies used and the author’s reliance on the women who had experienced imprisonment themselves as legitimate sources of information rendered the conclusions invalid. Martel (2004) further describes the challenges faced in disseminating to the public knowledges that challenge and destabilize common discourses on the use and experience of prison segregation by pointing to the media’s lack of interest in the press package and the conference her team organized. Whereas those policing Martel presented her and her team as bad or incompetent researchers for not adhering to positivistic parameters of science and not respecting the hierarchy of credibility,\textsuperscript{28} those policing us presented us as bad people or terrorists due to the language we use and our refusal to adhere to either of the hegemonic framings of the conflict.

Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated the different ways in which PCP-SL, mainstream academia, and other institutions interfered with our work that aims to create spaces for public dialogue on the Peruvian conflict. Interference included attempts at co-optation and threats of retaliation. We see these attempts as indicators of an actual success in interrupting the hegemonic monologues, in generating a dialogue outside the parameters established by hegemonic discourses. In fact, the events and publications we organized between 2014 and 2018 geared toward writing a new historiography of the Peruvian armed conflict have produced an emulating effect as other researchers are organizing
new events. However, we must bear in mind that the sites where the events took place and most of the public who participated in them were like-minded individuals who are also challenging hegemonic discourses on the Peruvian conflict within their own institutions. Consequently, the event remained on the fringes of mainstream public debates. Although these events were important in their own right, our experience shows that there are still many hurdles to organizing events that attempt to disrupt hegemonic discourses and immense challenges in having people who are influenced by the hegemonic discourses on the conflict attend or participate in these events.

The pressure not to squander any opportunity to speak and be heard burdens critical criminologists and feminists who endeavour to disrupt hegemonic discourses because what we have to say needs to be internally sound and must chip at those hegemonic discourses that marginalize, exclude, and demonize. The challenge for critical criminologists is therefore to be persuasive to those whose points of view are shaped by the hegemonic discourses we are attempting to dismantle because when we fail, our failure further entrenches and validates them.

Notes

1 Hegemonic discourses reinforce and reify a mode of knowledge production that serves as an instrument for power (Ogbor 2000). They present certain discourses as right, just, scientific, and objective (Nazir 2010) in an attempt to make us speak in a particular way on specific issues (Angenot 1988). Counter-hegemonic knowledge and discourses create conditions for resistance and unveil how hegemonic discourses attempt to exclude or silence them (Milliken 1999).

2 This term is used to encapsulate a criminology that is supportive of the status quo and the moral order of society and, therefore, is directly or indirectly part of the normalizing project of the state (Garland 1992; Morrison 2006). This type of criminology evolves from two different schools: classical or administrative criminology, which is primarily concerned with crime control (Cohen 1992; Morrison 2003) and positivist criminology, which adopts an etiological perspective concerned with the causes of crime (Cohen 1992).

3 We use “mainstream scientific literature” to refer to positivist and liberal approaches that think of science as means of identifying social problems detrimental to society or hindering its progress, in order to find the root
causes of those problems and then propose ways to tackle them to prevent or eradicate the issues. The solutions envisaged seek to preserve the social order and therefore do not entail any significant transformation of society.

4 References listed in the chapter notes are examples of the type of research described in the text; references at the end of a sentence indicate authorship of the idea presented. The references are proof of trends in the literature and show their continuity across time and place in English, French, and Spanish publications.


8 Such as having a university education, being poor, or being racialized.

9 Such as having been victims of domestic violence or rape.

10 Such as the idea that different cultures have different constraints on women’s use of violence.

11 See Alison 2009; Berko et al. 2010; Bloom 2011; Cook 2005; Dalton and Asal 2011; Davis 2013; Gonzalez-Perez 2009; Gutiérrez and Carranza Franco 2017; Israelsen 2018; Kalinowski 1979; Khelghat-Doost 2018; Sixta 2008; Stack-O’Connor 2007; Thomas and Bond 2015; Varon 2004; Wood and Thomas 2017.


13 During the colloquium “Penser la violence des femmes” held by the Groupe européen de recherche sur les normativités (GERN) in Paris on 17 June 2010, Farge publicly discussed the virulent reactions she encountered in 1997 after the publication of a volume she co-edited (see
Dauphin and Farge 1997). The book was a collection of historical analyses of instances where women had been violent actors as opposed to victims of violence. Colleagues and friends hurled accusations towards her as having letting down the feminist movement, undermining the cause, and betraying women by presenting them as violent. Her career suffered and close friendships were broken. She became an outcast from feminist circles to which she had contributed throughout her life. Although seemingly “merely” anecdotal, many researchers speak of similar experiences behind closed doors but are unwilling or unable to discuss publicly, which demonstrates the silencing power of hegemonic discourses.

14 Asociación Nacional de Familiares de Secuestrados, Detenidos y Desaparecidos del Perú (ANFASEP), Movimiento Ciudadano por los Derechos Humanos de Ayacucho, Casa Matteo Ricci.

15 Analicemos Historia, Grupo Universitario de Estudios Histórico-Sociales.

16 Groupe de Recherche Identités et Cultures (GRIC), University of Le Havre Normandie.

17 These activities included the publication of a special issue, “Gender and Armed Conflict in Peru,” in the peer-reviewed journal Epistemological Others, Languages, Literatures, Exchanges and Societies (EOLLES) (2016); public presentations of the journal (in Lima and Ayacucho 2017); the publication of the journal in a book format with two added chapters (in June 2018); and public presentations of the book (from July to September 2018).


19 This event was the first academic roundtable to invite “non-repentent” ex-combatants.

20 On multiple occasions, we have been subtly threatened by police and intelligence agents while conducting separate fieldwork projects in Peru. Other researchers producing anti-hegemonic discourses describe similar experiences (see Silke 2001; Smyth 2001).

21 For a report on the event see Guiné 2014.

22 Movimiento por amnistía y derechos fundamentales is considered part of the PCP-SL.

23 Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru is a leftist insurgent organization.

24 According to its website: “It is a space created by the Ministry of Culture for cultural, pedagogical and remembrance events seeking to dialogue on human rights and the violence that occurred between the years
1980–2000 in Peru initiated by the terrorist groups” (*Lugar de la Memoria, Tolerancia e Inclusión Social* n.d.; our translation).

25 One of the leaders of the PCP-SL.

26 For a report of the events, see Guiné 2017. For a response to the events from one of the presenters, see Maldonado 2017. For a response by members of the audience, see *Fenix Peru* 2017a, 2017b, 2017c. This is not an uncommon occurrence; it is a tactic that the PCP-SL and its support organizations have used in the past and continue to use, see Realpolitik 2017.

27 Public criminology calls for a similar approach and “involves generating controversy, opening up and extending debate, challenging and provoking received public ‘opinion’ and political postures” (Loader and Sparks 2011, 132). However, because the call to dialogue with the public about fundamental values (Zussman and Misra 2007) does not automatically translate into challenging marginalizing, exclusionary, and demonizing practices, and because it tends to focus more on influencing policy (Piché 2016), we question its usefulness and relevance at dismantling hegemonic discourses and knowledges.

28 Becker (1967) explains that some people are believed more than others based on their social location.

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