blown rumors of unceasing hostility, Lander sought out and met with Pocatello. The famed and unfairly feared headman told the superintendent, “his tribe had received . . . ‘assaults of ignominy’ from white emigrants on their way to California; that one of his principal men had had his squaw and children killed by the emigrants quite recently; that the hearts of his people were very bad against the whites; that there were some things he could not manage, and among them were the bad thoughts of his young men towards the whites.”

Pocatello’s people had adapted to the violence and dislocation that came with the overland migration and permanent white settlement by becoming raiders.

In his travels Lander visited as many Newe bands as possible, and in the winter of 1860 submitted an official report to the commissioner of Indian affairs. Lander identified seven principal Newe bands along the overland trail routes: Washakie’s people, the “Shoshonees or Eastern Snakes”; the “Salmon River Snakes, Bannacks and Snakes and Sheep Eaters,” the mixed bands of Shoshone and Bannock speakers of the Lemhi Valley; the Northwestern Bands, including Pocatello’s, who Lander called “Western Snakes”; the mixed buffalo hunting bands of Fort Hall, the “Bannacks, or Panackees or Pannacks”; the “Bannacks of Fort Boise,” who were probably the Shoshone-dominated mixed band later known as the Boise Shoshones; the “Salt Lake Diggers, Lower or Southern Snakes” who were Northwestern Shoshones living among the Mormon settlements of northern Utah; and finally, the “Warraricas, (in English ‘Sun-Flower Seed Eaters,’) or Diggers or Bannacks, Below Fort Boise, West of the Blue Mountains,” most likely the Paiute-speaking people known as “Snakes” in Oregon. Lander concluded, “All the above Indians travel together and intermarry. They hold the entire country.”

Situated in the midst of Newe country, it fell to officials of the Utah Superintendency to manage the conflicts. Violence on the trails spiked again in 1862 at the same time tensions rose between the local Newe and the growing Mormon population in the Cache Valley of Utah. In August, Little Soldier, leader of the “Weber Utes” (in reality a Newe band), warned Superintendent James Duane Doty that, inspired by a “great Bannock prophet,” the Newe had “set aside Wash-i-kee, the great chief of that nation, because he is a man of peace and a friend to the whites” and determined to wage a general war upon the settlers and emigrants. Meanwhile, to the north, the Newe band led by the dai’gwhani’...
Bear Hunter, became embroiled in growing conflicts with the settlers as well as travelers along the road to the Montana mines. It was in this tense climate that the California volunteer regiment under the command of Patrick Edward Connor arrived in Utah.

Connor had already employed brutal methods to suppress Indian raiding during his march across Nevada when he turned his attention to the situation in Cache Valley. In January 1863, Indians attacked two separate parties traveling along the Montana road and Utah Chief Justice John F. Kinney issued arrest warrants for Newe leaders Bear Hunter, Sagwitch, and Sanpitch. When the territorial marshal approached Connor for assistance in executing the warrants, he was told that the colonel already had plans to punish the Shoshones and “it was not [his] intention to take any prisoners.” Traveling at night to avoid detection, the troops arrived at the Newe village on the Bear River in freezing cold on January 29, 1863. The ensuing battle quickly turned into a slaughter. Bear Hunter and at least 250 Newe died that day. The Bear River Massacre is perhaps the darkest day in Newe history, but it encouraged Doty to begin the treaty-making process. “The fight on Bear river was the severest and most bloody of any which has ever occurred with Indians west of the Mississippi,” he wrote. “It struck terror in the hearts of savages hundreds of miles away from the battlefield.”

At the end of June 1863, Doty embarked on a mission to conclude peace treaties with the greater “Shoshonee Nation.” Although shaped by his own cultural assumptions, compared to many of his contemporaries, Doty possessed a more sophisticated understanding of the peoples with whom he was to meet. The result was a series of five treaties with Newe groups living from the plains of central Wyoming to the Humboldt Valley of Nevada. The superintendent traveled first to Fort Bridger to treat with Washakie and the Eastern Shoshones. That treaty became a model for the four others that followed: the Treaty of Box Elder with the Northwestern Bands, the Treaty of Ruby Valley with the Western Shoshones, the Treaty of Tooele Valley with the “Shoshoni-Goship,” and the Treaty of Soda Springs with the “mixed bands of Shoshones and Bannacks.” Doty directly linked the Box Elder and Soda Springs treaties to the Fort Bridger treaty by inserting a clause that made them essentially addendums to the earlier pact. No such provision appeared in the Ruby Valley and Tooele treaties. Echoing Lander’s earlier assessment he reported, “As none of the Indians of this country have permanent places of abode, in their hunting excursions they wander over an immense

57 Madsen, _Shoshoni Frontier_, 178, 190–92.
58 ARCIA, 1863, 420.
region, extending from the fisheries at and below Salmon Fall, on the Shoshonee [Snake] river, near the Oregon line, to the sources of that stream, and to the buffalo country beyond. The Shoshonees and Bannacks are the only nations which, to my knowledge, hunt together over the same ground." In effect, the superintendent was reifying the divisions that he perceived to be most important among the Shoshones and assuming much greater power on Washakie's part than he actually possessed.

The subsequent history of the Doty treaties illustrates both the vast differences between white and Newe cultures and the effects that such dealings could have on internal Newe politics. The Senate ratified all of the treaties except the final agreement reached at Soda Springs, due to a technicality. In a culture where leaders maintained political power by providing for their followers, evidence of influence among the whites was crucial and access to annuities essential. Washakie was the principal beneficiary of the treaties while other Newe dai'gwhanee saw their influence diminished. Taghee, the most influential leader among the Shoshone-Bannocks, for example, could not understand why the government failed to fulfill its promises. He and his followers were drawn toward Fort Bridger, in Washakie's debía, in search of presents and annuities. In 1866, agent Luther Mann at Fort Bridger reported the visit of Taghee and four hundred Bannocks. "I did not have any presents for them," he wrote, "and was informed that they had not received any from the Great Father in times past." He attributed this neglect to their location far from the agency.

Washakie's political acumen and long history of friendship with the whites paid dividends as officials consciously and unconsciously buttressed his influence among Newe peoples. Utah Superintendent O. H. Irish's comments of September 9, 1865, were typical both in their admiration of Washakie and in the overestimation of his power among all Shoshones and Bannocks: “The eastern bands of Shoshones and mixed bands of Bannacks and Shoshones number upwards of four thousand souls. These bands are under the control of Washakie, the finest appearing Indian I have ever seen. He is justly regarded as a firm friend of the government and the whites, and steadily refuses to hold communication with bad Indians.”

Washakie was indeed a man of great influence, but he still was essentially a dai'gwhani' who spoke foremost for his own following and whose influence

60 ARCIA, 1864, 174–75.
61 ARCIA, 1865, 158. Doty had inserted an unnecessary clause in the Soda Springs treaty that required the assent of the leaders involved. He never reassembled the “mixed bands” and so the treaty never went into effect.
62 ARCIA, 1866, 126–27 (Document 132, this collection).
63 O. H. Irish to CIA, 1865 Sep. 9, M234: Utah Superintendency, NARA (Document 121).
was greatest in his own “native land.” Taghee in particular chafed at the erosion of his followers and when given the opportunity, vented his feelings to white officials.\textsuperscript{64}

The cultural misunderstanding of Newe politics was also evident at the Fort Bridger Treaty council of July 3, 1868. The government representative at Fort Bridger, Gen. Christopher C. Augur, shared his contemporaries’ assumptions about Washakie’s power and was hopeful of consolidating all of the mounted Shoshone and Bannock bands together on a single reservation. Taghee would have none of it, nor would he even agree to receive his people’s annuities at Fort Bridger. He demanded a reservation in his own native land and that all annuities be delivered there. “We are friends with the Shoshones and like to hunt with them, but we want a home for ourselves,” he told Augur. The general finally agreed to two reservations, one on Wind River on lands Washakie described, the other a more vaguely defined reservation for the Bannocks that included “reasonable portions of the ‘Port Neuf’ and ‘Kansas [sic] Prairie’ countries.”\textsuperscript{65}

The Fort Bridger treaty was a watershed moment in Newe history. By 1869, reservation life increasingly defined the future. The Fort Bridger treaty remains the basis of relations between the federal government and the Eastern Shoshone Tribe of Wind River and the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes of the Fort Hall Reservation. Of course, enormous changes had already marked Newe history by that time. Horses, guns, epidemics, trade goods, overland emigrants, and permanent white settlement all presented new challenges and opportunities. The Newe groups that dealt with the Utah Superintendency had already reacted, adapted, and reshaped their world based on their own cultural understandings and the choices at hand. These are the native people who ultimately became the Shoshone and Shoshone-Bannock people of today.

\textsuperscript{64} ARCIA, 1868, 197–98. Taghee’s comments came at a treaty council with the Idaho territorial governor in August of 1867.

\textsuperscript{65} C. C. Augur to President of the Indian Peace Commission, Omaha, Nebraska, 1868 Oct. 4, USNA, RG 75, Irregular Sized Papers; ARCIA 1868, 156–58; Treaty with the Shoshonees and Bannacks, 15 Stat. 673–78. The clerk’s obvious misspelling of camas left an opening for unscrupulous whites who moved onto the prairie in central Idaho at the foot of the Sawtooths in the 1870s.
Stereograph image of Shoshone Indians in front of the Salt Lake City ZCMI building on north State Street, ca. 1869–1875. Photo by C. W. Carter. LDS Church Historical Dept.
As virtually the first step taken for the extension of government into the territory acquired in the Mexican cession, late in March, 1849, President Zachary Taylor directed that the Indian agencies for the Upper Missouri and Council Bluffs be transferred to Santa Fe and Salt Lake. On April 7, John Wilson of Missouri was notified of his appointment to the Salt Lake agency, and James S. Calhoun, of Georgia, to the Santa Fe agency, at salaries of $1,500 per year.¹

Various motives may have attended these appointments—the routine expansion of government administration into a political vacuum; a first effort to cultivate relations with the Indians along the main transcontinental trails; or, most subtly and most pressingly, a project for procuring the admission into the Union of the vast territory just obtained from Mexico. Both Wilson and Calhoun had secret instructions from the administration for bringing about the admission of the prospective states without touching off anew the bitter wrangling between North and South.² Calhoun stayed on in New Mexico to become the first territorial governor,³ but Wilson, who went on to California after conferences with the Mormons in September, 1849, resigned his commission within a few months.⁴ On September 5, 1850, Edward Cooper was named to succeed him,⁵ but his office was abolished before he traveled to his post,⁶ and the “Salt Lake Agency” has

1 William Medill to Wilson, April 7, 1849; Medill to Calhoun, April 7, 1849; 31st Cong., 1st sess., House Executive Document 17 (Serial 573), 182–84.
3 The Official Correspondence of James S. Calhoun while Indian Agent at Santa Fé and Superintendent of Indian Affairs in New Mexico, ed. Annie Heloise Abel (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1915).
4 Wilson to Secretary of the Interior, February 22, 1850 (W/438–1850). File marks cited in this and subsequent notes are those of the original documents in the records of the Office of Indian Affairs, now in the custody of the National Archives, Washington, D.C. Where the documents have been published, citation is made to the published texts instead, but all quotation is from the original documents.
5 D. C. Goddard, Acting Secretary of the Interior, to A. J. Loughery, Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs, September 5, 1850 (I/459–1850).
nothing to show for its brief existence except a handful of interesting letters from Wilson preserved in the archives of the Indian Office.\footnote{These letters are dated at Fort Bridger, August 22, 1849 (in 31st Cong., 1st sess., House Executive Document 17 (Serial 573), 184–87); Great Salt Lake Valley, September 4, 1849 (ibid., 104–12); San Francisco, December 22, 1849 (W/420–1850); and San Jose, December 28, 1849 (W/495–1850).}

The obsolescence of this first administrative provision for Indian affairs in Utah was brought about through the creation of the Territory of Utah on September 9, 1850. Among the provisions of the act was a section stipulating that the territorial governor should be ex officio superintendent of Indian affairs and fixing his annual salary at $2,500, of which $1,000 was to be in consideration of services in overseeing Indian affairs.\footnote{United States Statutes at Large 9 (1851): 453–58. Hereafter cited as U. S. Stat. at L. [Morgan’s citation format is non-standard but accurate. Following the abbreviated title he gives the publication volume number, the year of the congressional session (not the volume’s publication date), and page number(s). Modern citations to the Statutes now follow a different form, arranged by congress and act number without reference to pages; since these early volumes do not have act numbers, his original citation form is followed. —Ed.]} Eleven days after this act was passed, President Fillmore named Brigham Young governor of the new territory. News of this appointment reached Young early in 1851, but he did not commence acting in his capacity as superintendent of Indian affairs until the subagents reported for duty in July.

Provision for staffing the Utah superintendency had been made by an act of Congress on February 27, 1851, which authorized the appointment of an agent at a salary of $1,550 per year.\footnote{U. S. Stat. at L. 9 (1851): 587.} In addition, two subagents were provided for by the Indian Office, at annual salaries of $750. Nominated for these offices were Jacob H. Holeman, a Kentuckian,\footnote{Lea to Holeman, March 29, 1851, Indian Office Letter Book, no. 44, 267.} Henry R. Day, a Missourian,\footnote{Lea to Day, March 20, 1851, Indian Office Letter Book, no. 44, 243.} and Stephen B. Rose, a Mormon from New Jersey.\footnote{Lea to Rose, March 21, 1851, Indian Office Letter Book, no. 44, 244.} Day and Rose, the subagents, reached Great Salt Lake City on July 19,\footnote{“History of Brigham Young,” 1849, 55; quoted under this date in Journal History of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, hereafter cited as Journal History. This [scrapbook-style] compilation is found in the Historian’s Office [now the Historical Department] of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints at Salt Lake City.} and Holeman on August 9.\footnote{Holeman to Lea, September 21, 1851, in Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 32nd Cong., 1st sess., House Executive Document 2, part 2 (Serial 636), 444–46. Holeman’s first name here is erroneously given as John.}

Immediately after the arrival of the subagents, on July 21, 1851, Brigham Young issued a proclamation\footnote{A certified copy of the proclamation is attached to Young’s letter to Lea, October 20, 1851 (U/87–1851). It was printed in the Deseret News, August 8, 1851.} dividing the territory into three districts: the “Parvan”
(Pahvan) agency, which was to administer the country west of the Shoshoni territory and north of the southern line of Pahvan Valley; the Uinta agency, which was to look after the Uinta (Ute), Yampa (Ute), and all other tribes east of the eastern rim of the Great Basin and south to the territorial boundary; and the Parowan agency, which was to administer the country lying west of the eastern rim of the Great Basin and south of the southern line of Pahvan Valley to the western boundary of the territory. Day was named to the Parvan agency and Rose to the Uinta.

These plans, however, were disrupted when Holeman reported for duty on August 11. He advised Young of the great council with the Plains Indians being held at Fort Laramie by Superintendent D. D. Mitchell of the Central (St. Louis) superintendency, and asked sanction to attend that council for the purpose
of treating with a band of Shoshoni he had encountered en route to his post. He wanted Day and Rose to accompany him.\textsuperscript{16} To this proposal Young readily agreed,\textsuperscript{17} and Holeman and Rose left immediately for Fort Laramie. Day remained behind to persuade a delegation of Utes to accompany him to the treaty grounds, but the principal Ute chiefs were suspicious of trickery and declined to go.\textsuperscript{18}

Day shortly let his sympathies become involved in the controversy which broke out between the Saints and the Gentile [i.e., non-Mormon] territorial officials, and when Judges Perry E. Brocchus and L[emuel] G. Brandebury, together with Secretary Broughton D. Harris, abandoned their posts at the end of September, he went with them. After reaching Washington, he announced his willingness to return to Utah but asked for instructions which would enable him to act independent of Young and the Mormons, on the grounds that no agent controlled by Young could adequately serve the government in its relations with the Indians.\textsuperscript{19} Five weeks later, however, Day resigned, requesting that his resignation be accepted as of January 16, 1852.\textsuperscript{20} No successor was ever appointed, and Utah was left with one agent and one subagent to handle Indian affairs under Brigham Young’s superintendence.

Meanwhile, at Fort Laramie, Holeman was listening to the mountain men. An outspoken hostility had arisen between them and the Mormons in the four years since the Saints had migrated to the Rockies. Although a social antagonism existed as well, the basis of this hostility was primarily economic, arising out of the indirect effect upon the Indian economy of Mormon settlement upon the richer lands of the Utes, which impaired their ability to trade, and out of the direct clash of interest contingent upon the Mormon arrogation to church members of the exclusive right to trade with the Indians and to maintain ferries on the Bear and Green rivers.

Setting forth the mountain men’s side of this conflict, expressed to him, of course, in terms of Indian interest, Holeman wrote the Commissioner of Indian Affairs that in settling and taking possession of the Indian country, the Mormons provoked the Indians to “attack emigrants, plunder and commit murder whenever they find a party weak enough to enable them to do so.” At the same time, Holeman termed the mountain men a class “equally injurious to the country and the Indians,” and he thought it would require “extreme measures and some

\textsuperscript{16} Holeman to Young, August 11, 1851, copy attached to Young’s letter cited above.
\textsuperscript{17} Young to Lea, October 20, 1851, cited in note 15.
\textsuperscript{18} Day to Lea, January 2, 1852, in Message of President, Transmitting Reports of Secretaries of State, War, Interior, and of Attorney General, on Military Expedition Ordered into Territory of Utah, in 35th Cong., 1st sess., House Executive Document 71 (Serial 956); 130–32. This document is hereafter cited as Utah Expedition.
\textsuperscript{19} Day to Lea, January 9, 1852, Utah Expedition, 132, 133.
\textsuperscript{20} Day to Lea, February 19, 1852 (D/24–1852).
force to relieve the country of them.” 21 Although not all his strictures were well taken, in this and later communications Holeman showed himself a zealous public servant.

Two weeks after his return to Great Salt Lake City, Holeman submitted to Young a report on his trip to Fort Laramie, and in transmitting this report to Washington, the governor not only commended it as highly satisfactory, but also took occasion to remark that Holeman had “spared no pains to make himself useful.” 22

This good feeling was largely one-sided and not very long-lived. On November 28, in a private letter to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Holeman spoke in highly critical vein of the Mormons. At first, he said, they had “conciliated the Indians by kind treatment, but when they once got a foothold, they began to force their way—the consequence was, a war with the Indians, and in many instances a most brutal butchery.” At the time of his return to Great Salt Lake City, Holeman had found Young absent, locating the site of Fillmore in Pahvan Valley; he objected to the fact that Young had taken with him several hundred dollars’ worth of Indian goods as presents “for the purpose, no doubt, of conciliating the Indians and getting their permission to extend his settlements, thus making use of his office, as superintendent, and the money of the government to promote the interest of his church.” He felt that “no Mormon should, officially have anything to do with the Indians,” because of the self-interest involved. 23

A month later, the agent wrote to the commissioner to describe a lawsuit, brought against him as an individual, to force him to pay the interpreter who had served Subagent Day in September. Holeman agreed to pay the account provided the governor would certify its correctness, but Young declined to do so. Hotly, Holeman wrote that Young has been so much in the habit of exercising his will, which is supreme here, that no one will dare to oppose anything he may say or do. . . . I feel well assured that he was at the head of this suit . . . against me. He wished to show to his people that he was sincere in his expressions of contempt towards the government and her officers here, by having them annoyed in every possible manner, in order to force them to leave the Territory, or succumb to his will. 24

Such letters never aroused the Commissioner of Indian Affairs even to reply, and on February 29, Holeman expressed, by no means for the last time, something

21 Holeman to Lea, September 21, 1851 (Serial 636), 444–46.
22 Young to Lea, November 30, 1851 (U/1–1852).
23 Holeman to Lea, November 28, 1851, Utah Expedition, 128–30.
24 Holeman to Lea, December 28, 1851, Utah Expedition, 133–36.
of the irritation and bafflement the men in the Indian service felt at being left to their own devices. “You would greatly oblige me by giving me some instructions, in regard to my duties here, and the wishes of the department. I have been, as the saying is, going it blind, pretty much, and I fear I may have acted improperly, in some respects.” He feared that little could be done for the benefit of the government or the Indians under existing conditions.

The superintendent and sub-Agent, Rose, seem disposed to conceal their movements from me; they never consult with me, or pay any attention to my opinions. They have licensed many traders, some against my wishes, and who I know to be unworthy; they are traversing the country in every direction, though they reside in this city. Have I the power to stop this kind of traffic? I have pestered you so much with my communications, that I fear you will think me troublesome. . . .

At the end of March, Holeman reiterated his grave suspicions of the Saints. Their group feeling he could interpret only in treasonable terms, and he thought every effort would be made “to prevent the government from peaceably extending her laws over the Territory.” Reporting the Gentile gossip that an effort was being made by the Mormons to form an alliance with the Indians for mutual defense, Holeman added that he could give “thousands of circumstances, tending to show their deadly hostility to the government, and their determination to resist her authority in all matters which conflict with their notions and church regulations. They say, that ‘God and the governor commands;’ and they obey no one else.” The agent concluded by remarking that he intended making a trip to the Humboldt Valley unless otherwise instructed.

A considerable coolness had arisen between Brigham Young and his Indian agent, but things froze over altogether when a copy of the Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs arrived in Great Salt Lake City early in the spring. The only communication from Utah printed in that report was the letter Holeman had written from Laramie, the contents of which were calculated to arouse the ire of the governor. In a letter of May 28 to the commissioner, Young declared that at the time Holeman submitted these opinions he had never seen an Indian upon whose land the Mormons had settled.

The Shoshonees and Uintas, to whom I more particularly allude being the only ones in the Territory with whom the Major had at that time had any knowledge of, or intercourse with, have at various times solicited settlements to be made in their respective lands in order that they might be

26 Holeman to Lea, March 29, 1852, *Utah Expedition*, 139–44.
benefited in the articles of clothing and provisions, as the game spoken of affords even in the most retired and secluded places, but a very precarious dependence for subsistence. The only dissatisfaction that I have ever been able to learn as existing among them, was in consequence of no such settlements being made as they desired. . . .

As to the Utes, all lived south of the transcontinental trail and, being enemies of the Cheyennes and Shoshoni, never extended their travels as far north as the Oregon-California trail, and consequently could not, were they so disposed, trouble the immigrants. In view of these facts, Young explained, he had called on Holeman,

hoping that his longer residence in the Territory and more extended acquaintance had served to correct the views which he had so erroneously entertained and expressed. I sincerely regret to say that he still adhered so strenuously to them as to induce the belief that he was at least indifferent to the interests of the community, by so manifestly endeavoring to prejudice the mind of the Government against them.27

It is curious that, with diametrically opposed points of view, the two men equally had at heart the well-being of the Indians. Holeman conceived that he had no other responsibility than to the Indians, and he was prepared to defend their interests against anyone. Young’s point of view was more colored by social self-interest, yet it was essentially more realistic because it took into account the continuing pressures of American expansionism. The question was not what was best for Indians living in a political vacuum or cultural void, but how Indian interests could best be reconciled with the expansionist forces of white colonization. Young foresaw that the Indians must suffer, in the loss of their historic folkways and culture patterns, but he saw also that their individual good would best be subserved by changing the character of their life and providing them with a new economic base. Mormon colonization was a more efficient utilization of the land, and if by precept and example the Indians could be persuaded to change the pattern of their lives, settling down to an agricultural life, in the long run the Indians would gain more than they would lose from Mormon occupation of their lands. At best, theirs was a substandard level of subsistence, attended by poverty and more than occasional starvation. Young’s thinking about the Indians was thus discerning and farsighted, looking beyond the possible immediate injustices which aroused the zealot in Holeman.

But if the quality of Young’s mind was superior to that of Holeman, and the range of his ideas greater, his personality was not such that he could have

27 Young to Lea, May 28, 1852 (U/8–1852).
any patience for, or brook any opposition from, a person of sharply antagonistic
views. Henceforth, so far as was practicable, he officially ignored Holeman.

The agent frankly this situation in a letter to the Indian Office on May 8. If
Young was continued as superintendent. Holeman said, in this letter,

I had as well leave, for it must be evident to the department, from his
course recently, that his personal feelings towards me, or something else,
has induced him to neglect the interests of the government in a mat-
ter in which but a short time since he seemed to be deeply interested,
and which he considered [to be] of the greatest importance to the gov-
ernment, to the Indians, and to this Territory [i.e., the Humboldt trip].
Whether any other Gentile could succeed better with him than I have
done is extremely doubtful, as I have studiously avoided meddling with
their peculiar notions of religion in any manner, and have endeavored to
avoid giving them any offence personally. So far as my public duties have
prompted me to speak of them, I leave to the department to judge. I have
spoken of them and their acts, as I believed to be my duty; I have misrep-
resented them in nothing, for I have had no personal enmity to gratify.\(^{28}\)

The issue was clearly drawn between the two men over the Humboldt expe-
dition Holeman had projected. Young had originally approved Holeman’s design
and had even prepared instructions for him, but on finding, as he expressed
it, that Holeman “strenuously” adhered to views “erroneously entertained and
expressed,” and that he refused to retract those views, Young “declined giving
him any instructions as was designed.”\(^{29}\)

In a word, Young was perfectly prepared to stand obstinately for his princi-
ples, and though the Humboldt trip had only the slightest relevance to the inter-
ests of the Mormon community, Holeman’s inability to see things right about the
Mormons raised the question of his fitness to act in his office, and indeed of his
personal integrity. Young’s was a mind of extraordinary quality, but it was not
at all a subtle mind, and he was incapable of handling a refractory personality
gently. The tone taken toward Holeman could only have the effect of settling the
agent more obdurately within his prejudices.

And Holeman was no less a stubborn man of principle. On April 19 he wrote
Young, officially requesting advice and instructions about the proposed western
operations. Four days later, however, Young left on a visit to the southern settle-
ments without taking any notice of the letter. Having no instructions either from
Washington or from Young, and unwilling to remain idle, Holeman decided to

\(^{29}\) Young to Lea, May 28, 1852 (U/8–1852).
\(^{31}\) Holeman to Lea, June 28, 1852 (H/133–1852).
go ahead on his own initiative.\textsuperscript{30} With an escort of thirty-five men, he left Great Salt Lake City on May 13.\textsuperscript{31}

On his return from the south, Young wrote John M. Bernhisel, the Utah delegate to Congress, that Holeman had left “altogether without my consent or any instructions from me”; he was inclined to believe Holeman was doing everything he could against him, and announced his intention of improving “an early opportunity of investigating matters pertaining to his doings.”\textsuperscript{32} Yet, in his letter of May 28 to the Indian Office, Young gave a sufficiently fair statement of the case to make it evident why Holeman had gone ahead on his own responsibility, and he said he should await the result before acting in the matter, and that it was to be hoped the enterprise would prove beneficial.

The agent returned on August 22, feeling he had accomplished a great deal by his trip,\textsuperscript{33} since in this most extensive year of the California immigration there had been less trouble with the Indians than in any year since the gold rush began. Young himself had no official comment to offer except that “we learn of no depredations of importance; this however is the usual result during the heavy emigration; whether they will again commence when that has passed, and small companies again tempt their [the Indians’] rapacity time will develop.”\textsuperscript{34} More scornfully, he added in a personal letter to Bernhisel,

Major Holeman . . . has not accomplished anything that I have heard of and is literally doing nothing, unless, as I suspect, writing letters designed by him to injure the good people of this territory, and prejudice the people and government of the United States against us. . . . He assumes that he has accomplished great things. I hope it may prove so, but have my doubts, if it has accomplished any good. I should not have instructed him, if I had given him any to have gone with a large company. It was not at all necessary when there was so much emigration on the road, but I am desirous of getting along with him with as little difficulty as possible, therefore pass by many things, that might with a great deal of propriety be commented upon.\textsuperscript{35}

Holeman now got involved anew in the controversies between the Mormons and the mountain men. Early in October he rode to Fort Bridger to look into some difficulties with the Shoshoni. There he learned that the source of the trouble was the Green River ferry grants made by the Mormon legislature.

\textsuperscript{32} Young to Bernhisel, May 27, 1852, quoted in Journal History under this date.

\textsuperscript{33} Cf. Holeman’s letters to Lea, June 28, 1852 (H/133–1852); August 30, 1852, Utah Expedition, 155–58; and September 30, 1852 (H/163–1852).

\textsuperscript{34} Young to Lea, September 29, 1852 (U/17–1852).

\textsuperscript{35} Young to Bernhisel, August 28, 1852, quoted in Journal History under this date.
The Mormons were determined to maintain their grants, while the Indians, as Holeman heard the facts, were determined that they should not. In all probability the Indians had no serious interest in the matter, but they lived on terms of intimacy with the mountain men, who themselves had a direct financial stake in the issue, and the Indians might well have been aroused against the Mormons by the mountain men. Or the mountain men’s own interest may have been expressed in terms of Indian interest. Once again, Holeman was impelled to take a position adverse to the Mormons, and he advised the Indian Office that if the Saints should persist in their project, a war would be the consequence. He thought, further, that the charter stipulation by which 10 per cent of ferry receipts was to be paid into the tithing office of the church (for the Perpetual Emigrating Fund) was unconstitutional.36

Before he could leave Bridger, Holeman was snowed in, and it was not until early March that he could return to his official station. At that time he addressed a troubled letter to the commissioner. He felt disposed, he said, to treat all parties fairly and to protect the Indians so as to prevent difficulties with the whites, but Young seemed to have no other anxiety than to favor his own church and people.

If matters are not changed, so as to produce a better feeling in the Mormons, towards the government; or if the authority and laws of the government are not enforced, if it should be the wishes of the department I would like to be called home, as my duty to the government compels me to act in such a manner as to give offence, frequently, to the Mormons, who seem to recognize no law but their own self-will. . . . They seem desirous to hold all the offices themselves; and when a Gentile is appointed, he is never treated with respect, but is abused, let him do as he will. I have, and do yet, disregard their abuse, but feel that my efficiency as a government officer, is impaired by such conduct.37

Perhaps Washington had already come to the conclusion reached by Holeman, or perhaps the Democratic triumph in the 1852 election was having the usual result: On April 30, 1853, five weeks before this letter from Holeman reached Washington, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs wrote Edward A. Bedell of Warsaw, Illinois, that he had been named to succeed the Kentuckian.38

It seems probable that much of what Holeman wrote during his tenure of office was discounted on the grounds of prejudice, for no comment in which he could take comfort was ever sent him, and it would appear that Young’s course received general approval, for in a letter to Bernhisel on September 29, 1852, he remarked,

36 Holeman to Lea, November 3, 1852, Utah Expedition, 158–59.
37 Holeman to Lea, March 5, 1853, Utah Expedition, 160–61.
“I feel truly gratified in learning that the commissioner of Indian affairs seems pleased with my efforts to perform my duties in that department. I assure you that they are onerous and somewhat difficult.”

Although a rumor was current to the effect that he had been replaced, on July 6 Holeman left Great Salt Lake City on a second expedition to the Humboldt and Carson valleys. He returned on September 29, 1853, to find that his successor had arrived, and on October 17 he officially transferred his authority to Bedell.

Brigham Young’s first act as superintendent of Indian affairs had been to divide the superintendency into three agencies, but owing to the departure of Day and the hostile relationship with Holeman, the districting of the territory had been purely theoretical. Holeman had for the most part determined his own movements, while Rose was attached to Young’s office to handle the routine chores of Indian relations.

On the arrival of Bedell, on August 15, 1853, Young attacked anew the administrative problems involved in handling the Utah Indians. The territory was divided into two districts, the eastern and the western, with the former assigned to Bedell, and the latter to Rose. The territorial boundaries being the California line on the west, and the Continental Divide on the east, the U. S. Territorial Road (approximately the present US 91) was adopted as the line of demarcation, since it separated the country into nearly equal parts and was a line already determined and easily recognized.

The propriety, not to say the necessity, of appointing additional subagents to enable him “more efficiently to carry out the fatherly policy of our government towards its native children,” was suggested by Brigham Young in his quarterly report of December 31, 1853. He wanted a subagency established for Carson Valley and the Humboldt River area, another for the Green River country, a third for the territory centering about the confluence of the Grand and Green rivers, and a fourth for Washington, Iron, and Millard counties. Even with these four additional subagencies, he pointed out, it would be necessary for the subagents “to travel hundreds of miles annually to properly fulfill their duties, and a large area of country still be left to the shard of the present agent & Sub Agent, for the fulfilment of tribes in their allotted localities.”

Nothing was done about this recommendation. But the organization of the superintendency prevailing at the end of 1853 was soon altered because Bedell

39 Young to Bernhisel, quoted in Journal History under this date.
40 Holeman to C. E. Mix, Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs, August 19, 1854 (H/643–1854) [pp. 97–99 in this volume].
41 Young to George W. Manypenny, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, September 30, 1853 (U/26–1853).
42 Young to Manypenny, December 31, 1853 (H/28–1854).
died at Green River on May 3, 1854, and because Rose wanted to return to New Jersey. Another Mormon, George W. Armstrong, of Provo, was eventually named to succeed Rose, but a Gentile, Dr. Garland Hurt, of Kentucky, was appointed to the vacancy occasioned by Bedell’s death. Three years later, Hurt declared that he had originally come to Utah

fully resolved to divest myself of any predilection, or prejudice, either for, or against any of the people of the Territory, knowing that I should have an opportunity of forming an acquaintance with them from personal observations, and determined to make that, the basis of my opinions, and actions in regard to them. . . . It was not long however, till I recognized among them the existence of a heartfelt hatred for the people of the United States, and with surprise and regret, was I compelled to witness that this hatred was fed and sustained by harangues from those in authority of the Church, whom I have never known to loose an opportunity for fan[n]ing the flames of this rebellious spirit.

The period during which Hurt’s attitude underwent this radical adjustment may be quite accurately determined from his official correspondence. He arrived in Great Salt Lake City on February 5, 1855, and by May 2 he was finding it necessary to write Commissioner Manypenny concerning “some facts which I do not feel myself altogether at liberty to remain silent upon.” He had become alarmed at the program for Indian missions advanced at the April conference of the church; since intentionally or otherwise, the Mormons had created in the minds of the Utah Indians a distinction between Mormons and the generality of American citizens (“Americats” or “Mericats”), he feared that the Mormon missionary program would alienate the Indians all over the country. He wanted the conduct of the missionaries submitted to the close scrutiny of the Indian Office, go where they might. And like Holeman before him, Hurt was not attracted to Brigham Young. To get an interpreter, he had been “forced to the humiliating necessity of imploring” Young to excuse one of the Saints from the mission on which it had been designed to send him.

43 Young to Manypenny, June 30, 1854 (U/36–1854).
44 Manypenny to Armstrong, January 30, 1855, Indian Office Letter Book, no. 50, 459.
45 Mix to Hurt, August 16, 1854, Indian Office Letter Book, no. 49, 488.
46 Hurt to Governor Alfred Cumming, December 17, 1857, Utah Territorial Records, I, no. 164, in State Department records [RG 59], National Archives [and Records Administration].
47 Deseret News, February 8, 1855.
The suspicions which the agent throws upon the character of those Mormons engaged as missionaries are such as may make it necessary, as a precautionary step to preserve the harmony of our relations with the Indian tribes, to instruct the superintendent, agents, and sub-agents to scrutinize the conduct of the Mormons and all others suspected of having a design to interrupt the peace and tranquility between the Indians and government.49

Hurt had thus succeeded almost at once in making felt as a new force in Utah Indian affairs his suspicious mind and potential hostility. But at the same time he was a man of some imagination, and circumstances had so ripened that he could propose on behalf of the government the first really constructive steps toward a solution of the Indian problem in the territory.50

The need for a treaty had been recognized by everybody, from John Wilson on. In 1849, Wilson had recommended that the government “extinguish by treaty” the Indian title to the country adjacent to the Great Salt Lake as soon as possible.51 Holeman had taken up this theme in his own first communication to the Indian Office, when he expressed the opinion that “a treaty with the various tribes of Indians in Utah, would be productive of much good, if held immediately—it would have the effect of preventing depredations on their lands, quieting their excitement against the whites and ultimately save the Government from much trouble and expense.”52 He reiterated this advice in a communication of December 31, 1851.53 Brigham Young took up the matter on his own account in his letter to the Indian Office on November 30, 1851:

I cannot . . . be too strenuous in urging upon the department the necessity of securing the present favorable opportunity, while the Indians themselves are inclined to engage in it to institute among them the means of procuring the subsistence necessary to prolong life as well as the establishing of schools and all other things pertaining to civilization that can be made of use or benefit to them. . . . If previous to any such

50 The growth of a reservation system in Utah and elsewhere in the West is described in Alban W. Hoopes, Indian Affairs and Their Administration, 1849–1860 (Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1932; New York: Kraus Reprint, 1972). The present monograph is concerned with these developments only as they affected actual administration of Indian affairs in Utah.
52 Holeman to Lea, September 21, 1851, in Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 32nd Cong., 1st sess., House Executive Document 2, pt. 2 (Serial 636), 444–46.
53 Holeman to Young, December 31, 1851 (U/6–1852).
arrangements being made for their benefit it becomes necessary to enter into Treaty stipulations with them, then we should not delay that opera-
tion any longer, but go about it as speedily as possible. 54

On December 31, 1851, he submitted estimates as to the funds that would be required for holding treaties “or establishing schools, blacksmiths, mills &c at agencies, as usual in other Territories.” 55

It was of course not alone his zeal for the Indians which gave Young so warm an interest in the matter of treaties. The Mormons were worried about their land claims, and nothing could be done about getting valid titles until the Indian title was extinguished. On June 30, 1852, Young asked whether the government would authorize any agent or himself to conclude treaties with the Utah Indians. 56 In December, a year later, Bernhisel expressed the anxiety felt by his constituents over this problem of the Indian title to their lands, 57 and he implemented his inquiry by taking up the question with the House Committee on Indian Affairs. 58 The commissioner had already commended to Congress the propriety of extinguishing the Indian title, and in consequence the annual appropriation for the Indian service, passed July 31, 1854, authorized the Secretary of the Interior “to cause to be disbursed such of the moneys appropriated in this act for the Utah Indians, either under treaty stipulations, or for general incidental expenses by the Indian Agent in that Territory, as he may think proper.” 59

As a result of this act, on August 8, 1854, the commissioner wrote to the superintendents in Utah and New Mexico requesting estimates of goods that would be required in treating with the Indians. On October 30, Young transmitted his estimate, which totaled $34,055. 60 Unluckily, both the original estimate and the duplicate went astray, and a third copy was not provided the commissioner until July, 1855. In the meantime, Manypenny had received the requested estimate from New Mexico, so the governor of that territory was given authority to treat with the tribes in his area. 61 The Mew Mexican treaty, as it turned out, did not meet with favor when submitted to the Senate for ratification, and since the Indian Office had

54 Young to Lea, November 30, 1851 (U/1–1852).
55 Young to Lea, September 29, 1852 (U/17–1852).
56 Young to Lea, June 30, 1852 (U/13–1852).
57 Bernhisel to Manypenny, December 23, 1853 (B/314–1853).
58 James L. Orr to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, January 28, 1854 (O/63–1854).
60 Young to Manypenny, October 30, 1854 (U/41–1854).
61 Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1855, 34th Cong., 1st and 2nd sess., Senate Executive Document 1, pt. 1 (Serial 810), 567. [I.e., p. 333—Morgan’s original page citation is an error.]
The Administration of Indian Affairs in Utah, 1851–1858

projected the same sort of arrangements for Utah, the Utah estimates were simply filed when received. It was 1863 before any effective treaties were concluded with the Indians of the territory, and it was not until 1865 that Superintendent O. H. Irish, at Spanish Fork, negotiated the long-sought treaty with the Utes.

Although the treaty arrangements were to hang fire for so many years, at the time Hurt reported for duty, in February, 1855, the outlook was hopeful. Moreover, some tentative steps had been taken in the three preceding years toward establishing farms for the instruction and benefit of the Indians. The situation was ripe for constructive activity, the more so because Congress in 1854 and 1855 doubled its appropriation for incidental expenses of the Indian service in Utah, $20,000 being made available in each year.

The precise beginnings of the Indian farm idea in Utah are difficult to establish because there is singularly little information in the reports of Brigham Young, who evidently promoted the first arrangement resembling a farming system. It would appear that on his trip to the southern settlements in the fall of 1851 he appointed three men to be “farmers to the Indians,” at salaries of $600 per year. On October 28, 1851, Anson Call, at Fillmore, was appointed to act in such capacity with respect to the Pahvants, and on November 13, 1851, John C. L. Smith, at Parowan, was appointed farmer to the Piedes. A similar appointment, the date of which does not appear, was given to James Case in Sanpete Valley, to serve the “Uintas & D[iggers?].&c.” These men were evidently paid from that portion of the appropriation which was allotted for expending by Young as superintendent. Apparently, Anson Call served as farmer throughout the time of Young’s superintendency. John C. L. Smith died at Parowan on December 30, 1855, and was succeeded by John D. Lee on January 1, 1856. The terminal date of Case’s service does not appear, but Warren Snow became farmer to the “Sanpitch & Utah” Indians on July 2, 1855. He, like Lee, probably retained his position until Young was superseded.

62 Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1856, 34th Cong., 3rd sess., Senate Executive Document 5, pt. 3 (Serial 875), 567.
64 U. S. Stat. at L. 9 (1851): 226, 328, 698.
65 The facts concerning these Indian farmers are elicited from an “abstract of employees” in the Utah Superintendency certified by Young on September 30, 1853, and transmitted with his letter of that date to Manypenny (U/26–1853). [A study of Utah’s early Indian farms may be found in Beverly Beeton, “Teach Them to Till the Soil: An Experiment with Indian Farms, 1850–1862,” American Indian Quarterly 3, no. 4 (Winter 1977–1978): 299-320. —Ed.]
66 Young notified Manypenny to this effect in his quarterly report of March 31, 1856 (U/4–1856).
Hurt’s first official recommendation, after reaching his station, was that more help should be provided.\textsuperscript{68} He was more successful than Young in having additional subagencies authorized,\textsuperscript{69} but without waiting for Washington to act, got vigorously on with his job. Finding the Indians destitute, depending almost entirely for subsistence on food begged from the white settlers, he decided to make every possible effort to teach them to farm.

Many of them have expressed a desire to do so, and in order to encourage their inclinations I employed William Maxwell at Payson, Jeremiah Hatch at Nephi, and John A. Ray, at Fillmore, to give them such instructions, and to furnish them with such farming utensils as may be necessary to encourage them in the undertaking. . . . I think that appropriations could not be made in a better way to these people than to feed them while they are at work.\textsuperscript{70}

Sanction of the Indian Office was asked for such plans on April 2. Manypenny immediately replied, “The policy you have instituted, of employing farmers to instruct and direct the Indians in Agricultural labor, if carefully managed, will, I think, prove beneficial, but you will have care that the Indians shall not be encouraged to expect that they will be fed & clothed and cared for by the Agent & at the expense of the United States, without effort or labor on their part.” Payment was promised the white farmers if it should thereafter appear that they rendered valuable services, but Hurt was cautioned not to hire salaried employees at permanent pay the year round, the Indian Office having had sad experience along such lines.\textsuperscript{71}

Hurt embarked upon his farming project with enthusiasm, trusting that Washington would approve, but not waiting for that approval. Farming operations in 1855 were not an unqualified success, in part because of the grasshopper infestation of that year. But Hurt was pleased with the assiduity of the farmers at Nephi and at Corn Creek and with the generally coöperative attitude of the Indians and settlers,\textsuperscript{72} and in November went to Fillmore to work out more permanent arrangements. In company with prominent citizens of Fillmore and several Pahvant chiefs, on November 5 he visited Corn Creek and laid out a

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{68} Hurt to McClelland, February 7, 1855 (F/846–1855).
\item \textsuperscript{69} Sustained agitation during 1856 for an Agency in Carson Valley finally resulted in authorization from Congress on March 3, 1857 (\textit{U. S. Stat. at L.} 11 (1859): 169), but the office was not filled until the summer of 1858. Thus this agency was nonfunctional during the period of Young’s superintendency.
\item \textsuperscript{70} Hurt to Young, undated but clearly his quarterly report for March 31, 1855 (H/904–1855).
\item \textsuperscript{71} Manypenny to Hurt, June 20, 1855, Indian Office Letter Book, no. 52, 53.
\item \textsuperscript{72} Hurt to Young, June 30, 1855 (H/997–1855).
\end{itemize}
36-square-mile “reservation”—the quotation marks denoting its unofficial character. He went on to Twelve Mile Creek in Sanpete Valley, where he laid out a 144-square-mile “reservation” designed for the Ute chief Arrapine and his followers; and finally, he laid out a 640-acre “reservation” on the western bank of Spanish Fork Creek near its mouth, in Utah Valley.73

All this was done in advance of authorization from Washington,74 so Hurt justified himself at length in his quarterly report of December 31, 1855. He had no hesitation in asking that Congress be requested to appropriate from $75,000 to $100,000 for such purposes as its current session, “and at least $30,000 to meet my present engagements with the neighboring tribes.”75

Getting an appropriation from Congress, however, is, as the American experience has abundantly shown, a fine art which requires to be cultivated, and by now Hurt had plunged the whole superintendency into something of a financial predicament. On receipt of his report for the quarter ending September 30, 1855, when his farming program was just getting under way, Manypenny bluntly reminded Hurt that he had disbursed during the quarter nearly $12,000.

When you consider that there is another Agent in Utah, and that part of the appropriation for the ‘incidental expenses of the Service in Utah’ may be required also to meet requisitions of the Governor—and that the whole amount of the appropriation for the year 1855 & 6 [fiscal year 1855–1856] is but $20,000, you will perceive that the rate of expenditure indicated by your accounts, cannot be sanctioned. . . .76

On March, 19, 1856, Hurt was advised still more forcibly

of the propriety of there being some understanding between yourself and the Governor & Agent Armstrong, as to the manner in which the funds applicable for the Territory, will be taken up. It is not deemed proper, without hearing from them, to permit you to draw on account of the appropriations applicable to the Service there, that will leave little to

73 Hurt to Young, December 31, 1855 (H/115–1856).
74 In Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1856, 34th Cong., 3rd sess., Senate Executive Document 5, pt. 2 (Serial 875), 567. Manypenny summed up Hurt’s project:

That agent has . . . taken the responsibility of collecting Indians at three several locations within the Territory of Utah, and commenced a system of farming for their benefit. As the enterprise has not been sanctioned or provided for by appropriations for that purpose, and was believed to involve a larger expenditure than existing appropriations would warrant, without condemning his action in this respect, I have felt constrained to withhold an express approval. . . .

75 Hurt to Young, December 31, 1855 (H/115–1856).
76 Manypenny to Hurt, November 14, 1855, Indian Office Letter Book, no. 53, 42.
meet their drafts. Unless there be some explanation, at the present rate of drafts, the department may be compelled to reject yours in future.\textsuperscript{77}

On July 9 the agent was informed that his most recent draft had not been accepted: “This Department is without funds under the appropriation for the general incidental expenses of the Indian Service in Utah to meet this draft.” And Hurt was reminded that “this result is the necessary of your not strictly observing the cautions given you in the letters of this office of Nov. 14th, 1855, and March 19, 1856.”\textsuperscript{78}

At once the harassed agent sat down to write the Indian Office a justification of his course. To counteract the effect of the Mormon missionary program, he had thought a liberal policy necessary, so that the Indian prejudices toward the government and himself might not be confirmed. Young himself had always been liberal with respect to the making of presents, which made it all the more necessary not to relinquish such a policy too hastily. Besides, he had instructions from Young authorizing all the expenditures he had made since entering upon the duties of his office. The Indian farm program was of course his own idea, but even in that he had received Young’s most cordial approbation. Out of necessity he had had to draw upon the fund for contingent expenses to meet his engagements, which could not be relinquished without “blighting at once and perhaps forever the growing confidence which was arising in the minds of the Indians towards government and its accredited agents”; he had had the reasonable expectation that Young, approving so highly of the farm program, would relinquish in some degree “his own peculiar policy,” and thus increase the amount of funds available for the farming operations.

Consequently, he had been disconcerted to receive, in the spring, instructions from Young to make a trip to Carson Valley, which would cost from $5,000 to $6,000.

I am charged in your letter of the 19th March, with neglecting to consult his excellency and Agent Armstrong as to the manner in which the public funds should be taken up. . . . I will say . . . that I called at his office directly after receiving the letter of instructions to visit Carson, and expressed my fears that there would not be funds enough to meet our engagements for farming purposes; that the agency had been expensive during the winter; that I had been purchasing stock and farming implements. . . . His only reply was that he had no doubt but my drafts would all be paid.

\textsuperscript{77} Manypenny to Hurt, March 19, 1856, Indian Office Letter Book, no. 53, 517.

\textsuperscript{78} Manypenny to Hurt, July 9, 1856, Indian Office Letter Book, no. 54, 454.
Hurt ended by vigorously defending his farming policy.  
Nevertheless, the agent was conscious of the embarrassments of his position. Within a few weeks he wrote a friend in Congress seeking his influence in having an appropriation put through to finance the farms. Hurt had never been very favorably impressed with the Mormons and their influence on the Indians, and in his official reports a somewhat restrained dislike of Brigham Young had been apparent, but now the pressure of events led him to speak out harshly. The steady dispossesssion of the Indians from their lands, he said, made it “a beautiful time for unprincipled men to prejudice their minds against the government,” and he had

seized the opportunity as one portentous of the future destinies of these people, as well as that of the Indians. For the time is near at hand, when they [the Mormons] must espouse the institution of our government or reap the penalties consequent upon the debasing and corrupting doctrines of Mormonism. There are hundreds of honest, poor people here, (I might say thousands) who would gladly renounce the church if they were not afraid, and are ignorant of their own strength.

Soon after his arrival in the territory, he asserted in a second letter, he had been impressed with the fact

that the fund for incidental expenses had been used among the Indians in such manner as to exalt Brigham Young, without giving government any credit whatever in the matter. It has been my policy to teach them the source from which they derived their favors, and in doing so I have occupied an exceedingly delicate position between the two races. The policy of His Excellency, of feeding and clothing the Indians has caused them to become clamorous and insolent, and has imposed upon the people of the Territory a most oppressive burden. But His policy is to endure all manner of insult rather than be at war with the Indians. This however is done to preserve a christian relationship with a few chiefs, whom they have baptized into the Church. But the burden of this policy falls upon the poorer classes who are mostly foreigners inured to servitude, and have never learned their true relationship to our government. But many of them begin to see how they have been duped by a set of lying Missionaries and would gladly cast aside the galling yoke but for fear of the Priesthood, and it is this class whom their leaders would gladly see torn to pieces by the ruthless hand of the savage rather than see them return from them and expose the wickedness of their secret

80 Hurt to J. M. Elliott, October 1, 1856 (E/29–1856).
designs. It has been my object, to introduce a policy, which would be calculated to enable both classes [to] appreciate the relationship they occupy towards government.

He appended some estimates of the year’s crop and improvements, as an indication of what had been accomplished. The value of crops and improvements for the three “reservations” he estimated at $20,000.81

Hurt was no less willing to speak his mind to the Saints themselves. At the end of October he complained to Young about the treatment he and the surveyor general, David H. Burr, had received on a visit to the Indian farms, which had included the stoning of their house by some Mormon rowdies.

Now I am satisfied, sir [he insisted], that you cannot approve of such conduct. . . . Soon after commencing my labors among the Indians of this Territory, I learned that they made a distinction between Mormons and Americans, which I thought was not altogether compatible with correct policy, believing that it would ultimately operate to the prejudice of one or the other party, and I have not been backward in expressing my views on all suitable occasions, to the people in regard to this matter, and have [taught the Indians] that there is no distinction between the two classes, but that we were all the Great Father’s people. . . . I am not unmindful of the delicate position I occupy as a mediator between the two races in this Territory, yet I am not unwilling that my official conduct should be subjected to the strictest scrutiny. . . .82

Fortunately, the financial pressure relaxed. Hurt did not get the news until March, but on September 24, 1856, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs had written him that, in consequence of a $45,000 appropriation by Congress on August 18, funds were again available for the Utah superintendency, and steps were being taken to pay drafts amounting to some $7,000 which previously had been rejected. At the same time he was pointedly reminded that the Utah officers had better get together and decide how much each needed for disbursements, as the appropriation must not be exceeded.83

This happy concurrence of Congress in his farm problem by no means solved Hurt’s problems. Almost immediately he found it necessary to write the Indian Office that on learning the appropriation had been increased by $25,000, he had reasonably supposed that this amount would be applied to that purpose; but much to my regret I have learned recently, (though not officially) that

81 Hurt to Elliott, October 4, 1856 (E/29–1856).
82 Hurt to Young, October 31, 1856, Utah Expedition, 181–82.
83 Manypenny to Hurt, September 24, 1856, Indian Office Letter Book, no. 55, 123.
His Excellency Brigham Young, through Agent Armstrong and himself, is arranging to take up the larger portion of the appropriation for the present year. And I have reasons to believe that this move is being made with the view of forestalling me, and throwing the expenditures of making these settlements upon my own shoulders without the means of liquidating them.

The awkward situation by which he seemed oblivious to the needs of his colleagues he felt frankly to be not of his making. Young had districted the superintendency during Bedell’s time but had allowed that arrangement to lapse, and Hurt and Armstrong were dispatched here and there throughout the territory as exigency might dictate. In the summer of 1855, Hurt said, he had requested of Young that the territory be districted, but he felt that it was rapidly becoming utterly impossible that any concert of action between His Excellency and myself can be had, and though it would be inconsistent with justice to myself as well as the great mass of the people, as also of the Indians, to relinquish these improvements without some assurance that the expense would be endorsed, yet, if some change, more compatible with the dignity and credit of the government cannot be made in the public functionaries of the Territory, I have to say, that it will be perfectly compatible with my feelings and desire, that my successor be named immediately, for I cannot consent any longer to take upon myself the burden of the service under the supervision of one who would decoy me into ruin, and who has so much disgraced the dignity of his position, and the name of an American Citizen.84

This was harsh language, but Hurt felt himself to have been badly used; and certainly Young could have made better administrative provision for his superintendency. As Hurt observed on receiving word by the June mail that others of his drafts had been rejected, he was in no way at fault that the superintendency had not been so districted that funds could be allocated; as it was, he was charged with all the expenses contingent upon the operation of the Indian farms, and at the same time was incurring expenses all over the territory in carrying out special assignments from Young. He felt himself, indeed, to have performed “the greater portion of the Service,” in addition to overseeing the farms.85

Accordingly, Hurt demanded to know whether or not the Indian farms were to be considered “part and portion of the Indian Service in this Territory.” He estimated the value of crops growing on the reservations in the summer of 1857 at $24,752.75, saying that some seven hundred acres were under cultivation. The

85 Hurt to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, James W. Denver, July 2, 1857 (H/684–1857).
uninterrupted harmony which had prevailed among the tribes for over a year he thought attributable to the efforts made to establish them upon suitable reservations, “and to introduce among them a system of agriculture, and though these reservations have been visited during the season by large bands of wild Indians who live east of the Wasatch Mountains, the influence which those farms exerted upon them, through the home tribes, has enabled [us] to conduct our intercourse with them in a very tranquil manner.”

The date of this report, June 30, 1857, marks the high point of Hurt’s labors in the Utah superintendency. The “Utah War” was about to break upon the territory, and Indian affairs with all other affairs in Utah were about to undergo some violent readjustments. Indian affairs, in fact, were not without some agency in the precipitation of the crisis. The long undercurrent of antagonism in the Indian service was symptomatic of deep maladjustments which extended into other areas, but the letters of Holeman and Hurt played their part in heightening the social and political tensions which culminated in the Utah Expedition.

Granted a historical perspective neither of the Gentile agents had, and removed from a situation in which refractory social attitudes made balanced judgement difficult, one can concede the essential good will of the Saints in their relations with the Indians, yet one can also allow for the reactions of the Gentile agents to a dynamism with which they could not identify themselves and the end purposes of which they could not foresee. There were plenty of intolerance on both sides, sharpened by a kind of moral outrage, with an admixture of distrust, fear, and social dislike. The result was an Indian service which in the nature of things could not be altogether efficient.

Yet would higher efficiency have resulted from a superintendency wholly Gentile or wholly Mormon? With the one, the problem of relations with the community, central to the handling of frontier Indian affairs, would still have remained to be solved; with the other, the separatist factor working in Mormon culture would have been granted fuller scope. The in-group psychology of the Mormons, with all its difficult social intransigence, stood as a barrier in any approach to the Mormon problem. Only great patience and understanding on both sides could have evolved a better working relationship, and once the social forces were set in motion, working at cross purposes became inevitable. Thus the Indian Office in Utah was the product of a larger social situation even as it helped to shape that situation.

In giving sustained attention to Garland Hurt’s role in the Indian affairs of the territory, it has been necessary to pass by some aspects of Young’s own relationship to the Indian Office.

The governor had got along well with Luke Lea, but things did not go so smoothly after George W. Manypenny succeeded to the commissionership in

86 Hurt to Denver, June 30, 1857 (H/685–1857).
1853. Thus, Young, by March 31, 1854, was finding it “strange, to say the least,” that his drafts were not “more seasonably paid, or official information furnished . . . why they are not.” The late course of the department with his accounts and drafts, he complained, had a direct tendency to embarrass his official usefulness and the responsibilities devolving upon him.87

And, for his part, Manypenny wrote the Secretary of the Interior suggesting that Congress be asked to repeal the ex-officio arrangement and authorize an independent superintendent for Utah Territory.

It is a public and well known fact that his excellency Brigham Young, the present governor, is also the head of the church of Latter Day Saints, and I am informed that the duties of his spiritual office require a large portion of his time and attention. . . . I should not, therefore, deem it good policy to superadd to the duties and responsibilities of his official positions as governor and head of the church the additional duty—one requiring time and deliberation, and to be performed most properly at points distant from the seat of the government of the Territory, and of the spiritual hierarchy—or visiting and negotiating treaties with the various Indian tribes within the limits of the Territory.88

In his annual report in November, Manypenny restates this conviction in oblique official language. He felt that “the harmony and efficiency of the Indian service” would be promoted by separating the office of superintendent of Indian affairs from that of governor in the four territories (Utah, New Mexico, Washington, and Minnesota) where the two offices were combined; it had been found more satisfactory in the territories of Oregon, Kansas, and Nebraska to have the superintendent an independent officer.89

Congress slept with this proposal for two years. During the interval, Young wrote a letter which, as a picture of Brigham in the toils of the bureaucrats, is something of a classic. In biting sarcasm he depicted his troubles in getting anything done over the obstructionism of the red tape in the Indian Office, and struck the commissioner over the head a time or two with a blunt instrument.90 The letter was merely filed on receipt, although when Young wrote in critical vein two years later,91 at a time when government officials were on the qui vive in regard to Utah, it was dug up and acidly replied to by the then commissioner.92

87 Young to Manypenny, March 31, 1854 (U/30–1854).
88 Manypenny to McClelland, April 10, 1854, Utah Expedition, 165–66.
89 33rd Cong., 2nd sess., House Executive Document 1, pt. 1 (Serial 777), 225.
90 Young to Manypenny, June 26, 1855, Utah Expedition, 170–75.
91 Young to Denver, September 12, 1857, Utah Expedition, 183–85.
92 Denver to Young, November 11, 1857, Utah Expedition, 186–88.