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Once again, the ninth week of a ten-week quarter in introductory anthropology had arrived. For eight weeks I had stressed how comparison and objectivity in anthropological research has helped us make sense of subjects as varied as human evolution and human activity patterns, the logic of kinship, and economic systems. Now it was time to turn from a discussion of anthropology as science to a discussion of anthropology as an interpretive discipline. It was time to focus class attentions on the variety of meanings with which social groups inscribe human experience and on the role of “culture” in shaping these.

I was at once relieved and anxious. Relieved because I was heading into an area that, for me, is familiar territory. With a research emphasis in shamanism and theoretical interests in interpretive anthropology and the anthropology of religion, I felt comfortable in presenting the hermeneutic side of anthropology to my students. Additionally, this was the time of the quarter when I would present accounts of my own fieldwork to my students—when I could speak about the discipline with “ethnographic authority.” But, I was also anxious—as I had been in every previous ninth week of every quarter that I had taught Anthropology 101. I was anxious because of the inevitable questions I knew I would be asked as students responded to the presentation of my fieldwork experience. For mine is a fieldwork experience rich in the discussion of spirit entities, of soul loss and recovery, of hexing and curing, and of the envy between friends and family that underlies a desire to seek out sorcerers and to cause intentional harm.
The Account

I began by telling my students how I became interested in studying anthropology while living in Trujillo, a sprawling city located eight hours north of Lima in the heart of Peru’s coastal desert. There, as an exchange student for eleven months in 1975–76, I lived with a middle-class family and attended a Catholic high school. After conquering the culture shock, estrangement, and ennui so commonly experienced by those who step outside the boundaries of their own cultural traditions, I began to feel very much at home in this far-away place. Over the course of my stay I mastered the language and became quite comfortable with the roles of daughter, sister, and student into which I was being socialized. I came to the (premature) conclusion that underneath the veneer of culture, people are pretty much the same wherever you go.

Then one day, a good friend (whom I’ll call Sylvia) told me very matter-of-factly that her grandmother had died because of sorcery. According to the account, the grandmother had taken a pitchfork to her neighbor’s guinea pigs when they invaded and destroyed her garden. A few weeks later, the neighbor celebrated a birthday and, as is customary, she prepared a feast to entertain all the guests who would drop by her home to extend their best wishes. Sylvia’s grandmother, still smarting from the guinea pig incident, didn’t go to the celebration. The neighbor, as a kind of “peace offering,” sent over a large portion of roast pork from the feast she had prepared for the well-wishers. But, after accepting and eating the pork, Sylvia’s grandmother became very ill, suffering stomach pains, nausea, diarrhea, dehydration, and weight loss.

Sylvia hurriedly took her grandmother to the doctor. She suspected that the grandmother was suffering from a food- or water-borne parasitic infection. But the tests revealed nothing. After more tests and a trip to a private clinic to consult a medical specialist, the infectious cause of her suffering was still a mystery. Finally, desperate to help her grandmother, Sylvia took her to a curandero—a kind of healer who specializes in diagnosing and treating sorcery.

During the all-night session (called a mesa) the curandero—like shamanic healers in other cultural traditions—“saw” behind the veil of ordinary reality and communed with spirit entities who might know the cause of the old woman’s suffering. He told Sylvia’s grandmother that, wanting revenge, the neighbor had swept up the impression left by the grandmother’s footprint and had taken it to a sorcerer. He saw how the sorcerer had given the neighbor hueso de muerto (powdered human bone) to slip into the roast pork. He explained that when Sylvia’s grandmother ate the pork, she sealed her doom. Unfortunately, according to the healer, the sorcery was pasado—it had been done too long before—and he would be unable to undo the harm. As
Sylvia finished recounting the story she sighed deeply, “If only we had gone to a healer earlier we might have saved her. But she died within the month.”

In an aside to my students, I described how the healers I’ve worked with have explained sorcery to me. I told them how, according to their logic (and while under the influence of a hallucinogenic mixture brewed from the San Pedro or Trichocereus pachanoi cactus), the curandero would have seen the ritual in which the sorcerer effected the magic that would eventually kill my friend’s grandmother. This magic would have consisted of the sorcerer “calling” the grandmother’s shadow-soul away from her body. This ability to lure the shadow-soul into leaving the grandmother’s body and appearing before the mesa would be possible through the use of sympathetic magic. Like a photograph, the image of her footprint which had been gathered up would serve as a kind of double or “stand-in” for the grandmother and the shadow-soul would come to the mesa because of it. Once her shadow-soul presented itself, the sorcerer would have persuaded one of his allies—probably an ánima or spirit of the dead—to imprison the grandmother’s shadow so that it couldn’t return to her body. The hueso de muerto given to the neighbor would be from a cadaver whose spirit had been unable to rise to heaven because of sins committed in this life. Ingesting this powder would seal the bond between the grandmother’s shadow-soul and that of the ánima, so that her shadow-soul would not be able to return to her body. If her soul were not released within a set amount of time by the magical interventions of a healer, the result of this forced separation would be sickness and death. Accordingly, her symptoms would reflect the kind of sorcery she had ingested. Because her shadow-soul was tied to that of a cadaver, she would become more and more emaciated and cadaver-like as her conditions worsened.

The Reaction

As I had done in previous terms, after finishing the story I looked around the room and tried to read my students’ reactions. I asked for “comments, questions, concerns . . . ?” and let the silence that followed do its work. One student—an anthropology major—suggested that we should not be ethnocentric in our assessment of my friend’s belief in sorcery. “Even if sorcery doesn’t make sense to us, it is part of their culture and we can’t judge it by any other standards,” the student insisted. Then, several others students who were obviously less indoctrinated in this anthropological paradigm of cultural relativism asked what most students in the room want to know whenever I tell this story. ‘Does sorcery really exist or is a patient’s suffering just ‘in their heads’? Is it the patient’s belief in sorcery that actually causes their
affliction or are there really spirit powers that sorcerers and healers manipulate? Do you believe in it, Dr. Glass-Coffin?"

The First Response: The Logic of Sorcery

These are the questions which underscore my anxiety when I present this material to my students. In part, the anxiety arises from the fact that I have no ready answers. The scientific method does not easily lend itself to measuring the activity of spirit entities and whether observable consequences result from "good" or "evil" intentions. Translating belief into seemingly culture-free physiological consequences attributed to placebo and nocebo effects may satisfy the interrogator as to the mechanisms by which sorcery and healing are translated into body function, but it doesn’t negate the fact that underlying causes for cultural belief may, in fact, exist in the "real" world. Neither does it explain how sorcery can affect the unbeliever.

Specifically, anthropological theory and practice has shown the power of cultural belief and tradition in shaping perceptions, not only of our "informants" but also of the researcher and the audience.1 As Richard Robbins (1997, 80–87) has shown, magic is invoked to explain physical events because of selective perception, rationalization, secondary elaboration, and appeals to faith, mystery, or authority. Tanya Luhrmann (1989) has used the term "interpretive drift" to label the process by which people come to view magic as an efficacious and rational explanation of events (even in the face of contradictory evidence). According to her analysis, interpretive drift includes three elements, which might be summarized as perceptual or cognitive, affective, and intellectual or analytical. In her model, a ritual participant experiences some kind of catharsis, revelation, insight, or direct numinous experience that provides emotional rather than cognitive certainty of veracity. Whether preceding, concurrent, or as a consequence of this experience, the participant also experiences basic shifts in perception and analysis of observable events, and concludes that human will or spirit power has, indeed, influenced these. Finally, the participant seeks intellectual strategies to explain the phenomenon experienced that minimizes dissonance or disjunction between magical and scientific explanations of observable consequences.

In the account described above (as well as the scores of stories I have been told by victims in the twenty-plus years since my first encounter with Peruvian sorcery), interpretive drift can be used to make sense of sorcery as follows: an individual experiences some kind of suffering and attempts to relieve the
symptoms. If symptoms are somatic, and if the victim has had no previous experience with sorcery, he or she will first rely on home remedies or pharmaceutical products and will seek information about how to alleviate the symptoms from family, friends, or health care professionals. If symptoms do not subside after exhausting all biomedical resources, the victim will pragmatically seek other alternatives. In the search for explanation, the victim will likely be urged by someone who has had a similar experience with symptoms that did not respond to medical treatment to consider sorcery as a possibility.4

When they visit a curandero, these suspicions are likely to be confirmed. During the ritual curing session, the healer will often describe how another’s envy or unexpressed hostilities towards the victim led them to seek out the services of a sorcerer to cause the suffering. If the narrative fits the victim’s already conscious suspicions, or brings to consciousness previously unacknowledged anxieties, the victim will likely experience both catharsis and insight. If the victim did not previously believe in the power of spirits and the evil intentions of family and friends, he or she will probably experience a temporary shift in worldview to accommodate these possibilities. Then, depending on the victim’s faith in the healer’s ability to undo the sorcery and effect a cure, expectations may be raised, and a wholehearted embrace of the healer’s instructions may take place, replacing resignation to suffering with hope and a determination to overcome.5

Of course, this process of interpretive drift is not limited to a discussion of the efficacy of shamanic healing for explaining otherwise unexplainable suffering (sorcery) and healing (via participation in a healer’s mesa). Similar “shifts” seem to occur in all kinds of “symbolic” healing including psychotherapy (Lévi-Strauss 1965; Scheff 1979; Achterberg 1985; Dow 1986; Torrey 1986). Regardless of healing tradition, these cognitive, affective, and analytical shifts generally include the following elements: first, there is acceptance of both the illness label and the etiology that an expert assigns to the experience of suffering. Second, the victim experiences emotional engagement or catharsis. This leads to an experiential change in consciousness associated with “insight” or “revelation” about the cause of affliction as well as to confidence in the chosen healer and expectation of cure. Finally, the victim’s new sense of insight and confidence in the healer who facilitated this shift in awareness leads the victim to have a sense of mastery over the illness.

Thus, interpretive drift provides a very rational explanation for seemingly irrational belief and practice (Luhrmann 1989, 7). However, when researchers invoke this process as a means of dismissing the veracity of magic or the potential harm of sorcery, they sometimes underplay the fact that all paradigms—including the kind of observational positivism commonly,
glossed as "science"—limit perception. Just as Evans-Pritchard suggested for the magically oriented Nuer (1956), our paradigms work to keep us from hav- 
ing to face contradiction.

The following example will suffice to illustrate this point. In a recent 
article, C. Roderick Wilson (1994) recounts how one informant, when asked 
to describe a strongly bluish color card with an indigenous color term, 
described the card as "leaf-colored." Wilson and a fellow researcher had seen 
many leaves in the months they had spent with these people but they had 
never seen blue ones. So, they asked the man to demonstrate just where he had 
seen a leaf of that color. Without rising, the informant pointed to some trees 
on a faraway hillside and the two social scientists had to admit that the color 
matched perfectly. Wilson describes his point as follows:

As members of scientifically oriented North American culture, [we] 
"knew" that forested hillsides that appear to be bluish or purplish are in 
fact "normal" green. Moreover, we both knew that the apparent color 
change has to do with such phenomena as the diffraction of light, the exis-
tence of particulate matter in the air, and so on. To put it another way, we 
carried around with us scientific explanations of natural phenomena that 
allowed us to "normalize" observations, to bring observations that ran 
counter to the usual into conformity with the expected. I have no serious 
doubt that these particular "scientific" explanations are essentially correct. 
But still, I am concerned about the fact that my vision is so "normalized" 
that I could not see what was literally in front of my face. (1994, 199)

The Second Response: The Logistics of Sorcery

While the above paragraphs make sense of magic by problematizing reason, 
an alternative view has been to assert that the practice of magic has more to 
do with logistics than with logic. Advanced by social scientists, this response 
sidesteps altogether a discussion of the relationship between belief and prac-
tice. (It can also provide the anxious professor a way to avoid the question 
about what he or she personally thinks). Instead, this response looks at the 
utility of cultural beliefs for solving real-world problems. The "functionalists" 
assert that magic provides explanations for the otherwise unexplainable or 
manages the tension between individual desire and social imperative. The 
"structuralists" assert that magic is invoked to explain and to give shape to an 
otherwise incoherent reality. The "symbolists" contend that magic is 
metaphor—a way of expressing meaning poetically.

In the Peruvian case, functional views of sorcery draw attention to the 
conflict between fierce competition for limited resources and the structured
relations of social dependence. In this light, sorcery is seen as a projective mechanism for inexpressible hostilities. Alternatively, because the fear of sorcery can help diffuse expressions of conflict between the individually desirable and the socially necessary, it has been considered a means of social control.

Structural views of sorcery (with their predilection for illuminating the dichotomous categories of deep structure and how these are glossed with meaning) focus on the way Peruvians have accommodated tensions between pre-Columbian and post-conquest worldviews. Before the arrival of Catholicism in the mid 1500s and before the ensuing campaigns to “extirpate idolatries,” pre-Columbian cosmologies explained dualism in natural, social, and spiritual relations in terms of a moral code that was both complementary and ambiguous. Both order and chaos, good and evil, culture and nature, man and woman (or any other paired opposite that can be named) were necessary for the proper functioning of the universe. But after the Spanish conquest, an imposed Christian paradigm viewed these universal forces as absolute and contradictory. Both “good” and “evil” were reified, and Peruvian sorcery—at least as we know it today—was born.

Symbolic views of sorcery provide outsiders with a means of “teasing apart” the absolute and the relative in human existence. Suffering and, ultimately, death are universal phenomena, but they are expressed (and experienced) in widely different ways cross-culturally. Symbolic studies of sorcery focus on the meaning that is given to these experiences in specific contexts (physical, social, economic, and political). Thus, they give outsiders insight into the key role played by culture for shaping, contesting, and resisting responses to these realities.

But implicit in all these strategies—whether functional, structural, or symbolic—is an assertion of cultural relativism that smacks of ethnocentrism. Beneath the apparent epistemological generosity of the relativist argument lies a dangerous disclaimer—what may be true for others is not at all true for ourselves. To draw again from Wilson’s article on the subject, he reports the following curious phenomenon: when he brought a Cree medicine man to his classroom to discuss illness etiologies and healing cosmologies, he notes that his students listened with rapt attention and respect. But when he later suggested that shamanic practices are dynamic—that they have a pragmatic basis for their continued practice and should therefore be considered scientifically, his students patently denied this possibility. As he concludes, “Beliefs or practices which can be accorded respect by reasonably enlightened people when encountering aboriginal populations are dismissed from serious consideration within our own intellectual tradition . . . the moment an attempt is made
to bring alien beliefs and practices into the arena of scientific investigation, one is dismissed as a crank” (Wilson 1994, 201).

THE THIRD RESPONSE: INTERSUBJECTIVITY IN LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE

What alternatives exist to “explaining away” that which is beyond our vision as delusion, as metaphor, or as simply functionally proscribed? The authors of a recent collection on the anthropology of extraordinary experience recommend taking sacred worldviews seriously. They also ask researchers to entertain the possibility that an informant’s explanation of an extraordinary experience might be true instead of dismissing their accounts a priori as fantasy or superstition. This is not the same as wholeheartedly accepting these accounts without skepticism—which is tantamount to “going native” and which negates our ability to translate responses to other audiences. Neither is it the same thing as stepping outside our paradigms when interpreting the world around us, for this is a difficult, if not impossible, task (Pandian 1985). But this response demands awareness that all explanations, including our own, are limited by paradigmatic persuasions.

One way to challenge our own perceptions and to come to a closer realization of the intersections of paradigm and practice is through extended fieldwork and firsthand experience of the kinds of phenomena which our informants explain in magical terms. This approach to ethnographic research has been termed “experiential” (Goulet and Young 1994, 304) or “radically empirical” (Jackson 1989). The rationale for this kind of fieldwork stems partly from the assertion that personal experience “becomes a mode of experimentation, of testing and exploring the ways in which our experiences conjoin or connect us with others, rather than the ways they set us apart” (Goulet and Young 1994, 305). In other words, by living and doing as our informants do, we may at least approximate what it is like to see the world through their eyes. By using ourselves as “primary data,” we become able to comment on that which is not observable, except through our own experience. In short, experiential fieldwork allows us to explore the possibility (also raised by Luhrmann) that people come to believe in the reality of magic after experiencing effective results rather than the other way around.

If an experiential approach to fieldwork allows us to, at least temporarily, step into a new physical (and phenomenological) space, it also moves us to conclude that reality is shaped somewhere in the interstices between external event and the perception or meaning given it. As Goulet and Young put it, interpretation and understanding certainly go hand in hand with that of
"experience" (1994, 313). They give the analogy of language acquisition to illustrate their point:

In the context of repeated and prolonged exposure to members of a linguistic community, a process of assimilation occurs, involving a level of schemata formation of which even the individual who is assimilating the language is unaware. The anthropologist comes to live, as it were, in an acoustic world distinct from that which prevails in his or her own culture. Similarly the anthropologist may come to inhabit other domains of the native speaker's society, be it kinship, economic, or ritual, attending to socially constituted realities that would otherwise remain beyond his or her reach. (1994, 314)

In other words, meaning is "intertwined with intersubjectivity, and communication codes can best be understood in performances where the meaning is created."7

In my own fieldwork with northern Peruvian shamans, I came to realize how the intersections of ontological structure, perceived meaning, and intersubjectivity change the lives of both the researcher and the research subject one sunny day in November 1988. On that occasion, an amber-colored bottle that occupied a central space on the healing altar of my primary informant broke. In terms of the event itself, the breakage was a direct result of her taking out the mesa on a day I had asked to photograph the sacred objects on her altar. Had I not intervened in her life, the bottle would not have broken (at least, not at that particular time). At the time of the breakage, she and I both assumed the event to be of little significance. But six months later, while under the influence of the psychoactive San Pedro cactus, she learned that the breakage of that little bottle would shorten her life span by one-third. She exhorted me on that occasion to "make something of your life, so that this event, which has shortened my life and for which you were responsible, will not have been for nothing." Her invocation has stayed with me as a touchstone since that day and has had a profound impact on every aspect of my existence.

Finally, to return to the question of the definition of "rational" scientific inquiry and the way this is often contrasted with "irrational" claims of the veracity of magic, I would remind the reader that, at its root, the scientific method is empirical and that empiricism is based as much in experience as in observation. As Ken Wilber suggests in his latest work, scientific inquiry does not necessarily preclude a serious investigation of the numinous. Instead of dismissing that which is difficult to measure or observe as
patently “unscientific,” we should seek new ways to measure, replicate, and validate empirical experiences that go beyond those available to a detached, “objective” observer.

Conclusion: Experience Reconsidered

So, what does all this have to do with the question that my students ask and my anxieties about answering it? Does sorcery really exist? And how does it work? Is it “just” a question of belief and of neuropsychological processes that result from emotional engagement with a set of symbols? Or is there “really” some essential, yet largely invisible, force that certain individuals have the ability to tap into in order to alter the physical world? And, if this force is nonexistent, why do we have so many recorded instances of so-called supernatural phenomena in folklore and in the anthropological record (Walker 1995)? Called things like god, devil, vital energy, psi, or electromagnetism depending on the worldviews of the one doing the labeling, there are multiple millions of people who share such beliefs. Have they all been duped? In other words, do psychological theories of projective mechanisms, sociological theories of functionalism and social control mechanisms, or cognitive analyses of varying worldviews adequately account for the continued practice of magical rituals among otherwise rational (and highly literate, technologically sophisticated) people?

Based on my own dissertation fieldwork with female curanderas from 1987 to 1989, I know that shifts in perception are personally unconvincing if not accompanied by direct experience. I also know that the reality of magic exists somewhere between the ontology of structure and the inscription of meaning. Did I undergo interpretive drift while in the field? Undoubtedly. Did this interpretive drift influence my perception of external phenomena? Probably. Certainly, I was much more attuned to the night cries of distant animals, the appearance of the night sky, and to meteorological phenomena when I left Peru in 1989 than when I first arrived. I also reconceptualized my own attitudes and values while in the field based on the moral principles of “good” and “evil” which I saw in others (and experienced in myself). I was changed by my fieldwork and I saw sorcery change the lives of many other people.

But during my stay in this enchanted country, I also saw phenomena that I cannot explain, and experienced states that I cannot replicate. I know them to be true as certainly as I know the color of the leaves on the trees outside my office window. Among these events, I have seen a healer produce rain in a cloudless sky and I have also seen the rain cease instantly when commanded. I have witnessed the extinguishing of starlight in the night sky as if at the touch
of a light switch. I have seen visions, both under the influence of hallucinogens and in what has been called an “ordinary” state of consciousness.

I also know that I interpret these shared experiences differently than do either the healers or the victims of sorcery that I worked with. This is so because the meaning I give to life experiences comes from my own stock of knowledge which has been gathered in the course of a lifetime of events that predate as well as postdate my immersion into the ethnographic experience. My understanding is as Wagner (1981, 12) has suggested. In his words, “what the fieldworker invents... is his own understanding; the analogies he creates are extensions of his own notions and those of his culture, transformed by his experiences in the field situation.” Because I have no cultural logic with which to attach these experiences I find sorcery a difficult concept to grasp at a phenomenological level.

Thus, when students ask if sorcery exists, I usually hesitate and then answer in the affirmative, or admit that I do not yet know. For, to suggest that sorcery only exists at the intersection of meaning and experience seems too reminiscent of the culturally relative response that explains away the relevance of sorcery with arguments of functionalism, structuralism, or metaphoric meaning. But to assert that sorcery exists because I experienced phenomena which I can’t explain both violates phenomenological principles of my own paradigms and falls short of the standards of validity and reliability which my students mainly share. And so, until I can articulate a model for explaining sorcery that makes sense both to me and to my students without violating the claims of my informants, “my “ninth-week anxiety” will not (and should not) abate. My students will have to learn to live with the ambiguities of empiricism. And, as researchers, we should continue to consider the role of experience in anthropology—as both science and interpretive discipline.

Notes

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life) over the last twenty-five years. Finally, my thanks to Joralemon and Sharon for including me in a grant which made my dissertation research possible and to the many colleagues and students and various Utah State University offices which have since supported and encouraged my research.

1. Although the people I interviewed (both patients and healers) assert that belief in the power of sorcerers and healers certainly underlies the petitioner’s susceptibility to harm and likelihood of a cure, I also encountered many patients who claimed to experience the effects of sorcery before they ever believed in its power. In fact, a common disclaimer among first-time patients to healers was that “I never believed in sorcery until it happened to me.”

2. For a good review of the scope of anthropological responses to “magic,” see Luhrmann (1989, 8–10) and Goulet and Young (1994), from which the following summary is drawn.

3. The following summary is based on my own research (Glass-Coffin 1984) in urban and peri-urban Trujillo, where multiple health resources are readily available. In rural areas, where access to biomedical resources is more limited, alternative health care options tend to be invoked earlier in the process of health decision making.

4. For reasons I have more fully described elsewhere (Glass-Coffin 1991), sorcery beliefs are common in northern Peru. One element of this belief asserts that there exist two categories of illness—those with natural causes and those caused by sorcery. While the former are best cured by a doctor, the latter never respond to biomedical intervention. If symptoms are not somatic, but rather economic (a thriving business suddenly fails), relational (a family member suddenly becomes abusive or distant), or affective (one experiences an otherwise unaccountable change in behavior or personality), the victim will likely suspect sorcery as the cause of their sudden turn of bad luck early in the diagnostic process.

5. Of course, it is difficult to unravel whether this felt experience of healing precedes or follows these changes in perception and emotional engagement. Most theories of symbolic healing (discussed following) suggest that the emotional engagement precedes the physical consequence, but I am inclined to support Luhrmann’s suggestion that belief often follows practice. I say this because of the number of people I have encountered in Peru who assure me that they never would have believed in sorcery as an explanation for their afflictions if they hadn’t experienced it directly for themselves. Certainly, belief and practice, experience and analysis are mutually important ingredients when considering the efficacy of symbolic healing.

6. For a good introduction to these orientations in anthropological theory, see Langness (1987). In the following text, I have summarized functional, structural, and symbolic contributions of over fifty years of research into northern Peruvian sorcery in other publications. For discussion, see Glass-Coffin (1991, 1996, 1998, 1999).
7. This quote is a paraphrase of Victor Turner’s assertion, as quoted in Bastien (1987) and cited in Goulet and Young (1994, 319).

8. These perceptions were not experienced alone, but in the company of other patients and ritual participants. Additionally, the rain incidents occurred before the start of the ritual, and before the ingestion of any psychoactive substances that might alter perception. The starlight incident occurred after the ritual was in progress, but was simultaneously commented on by at least a dozen other ritual participants at the instant of its occurrence.

9. As quoted in Goulet and Young (1994, 322).

10. See Young (1994) for a discussion of this approach to modeling that which is outside the investigator’s “reality.”

References


