1. Hizbullah, “the party of God,” is an Islamic resistance group formed after the Israeli invasion and the arrival of the U.S. military in 1982, during the civil and regional war (1975–1990). The group, which I discuss further in chapters 2 and 3, was founded to defend Lebanon against and to liberate the country from Israel occupation and Western control. For more on Hizbullah’s history and growth, see Norton (2014).


3. For recent anthropological work that considers the role of mobility in producing urban inequality, see Caldeira (2012) and Lutz (2014).

4. Services are shared taxis flagged down in the streets. They are the most widely used form of public transit in Beirut. During my first research period, September 2004–June 2006, a ride in a service cost 1,000LL (about US$0.66). Following the war with Israel during summer 2006, according to Ilham Khabbaz, whom I met with in summer 2010, of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, the Ministry agreed to the request of the Taxi Drivers Syndicate for an official fare increase of 500LL. In practice, she said, drivers asked for 2,000LL rather than 1,500LL and received this amount from passengers. Thus, following the 2006 war, the fare for a service ride became 2,000LL (about US$1.30).

5. Popular and cultural productions focused on the city’s traffic situation include the Al-Fassad (Corruption) television news show on July 9, 2010, with guest Ziad Aql, director of the Youth Association for Social Awareness (YASA), a traffic-safety organization; the theatrical production ‘Ajat as-sayr (Traffic Jam), staged at the Monnot Theater in Beirut in 2013; the documentaries Taxi Talk (2009) and Taxi Beirut (2011); and the popular web-based video series Shankaboot, which chronicles the life of a delivery worker on a motor scooter (see http://www.shankaboot.com/).

6. Often described as a civil war, the protracted conflict in Lebanon (1975–1990) had both domestic and regional dimensions and was fought by the armies of several nations. See chapter 2 for a complete overview of the war.

7. In particular, I draw on Low’s (2004) and Caldeira’s (2000) ethnographic investigations of sociospatial inequality in my theorization of how social power is constituted through spatial movement. I share Low’s and Caldeira’s conceptual approach to space: that space is socially constructed and that the social is spatially constructed as opposed to the idea that space is a mere container or “setting” for social life.

8. The understanding of sectarian identity that I hope to convey here is a nonessentialist one that rejects the idea of there being a kind of necessary correspondence
between sectarian belonging and other characteristics such as political ideology, religious belief and practice, and class status. Indeed, features of identity do not match up in such an uncomplicated way in any context, and Lebanon is no exception. Many Lebanese reject the idea that they can and should be defined in sectarian terms, and this sentiment is formalized in the vibrant activism of antisectional civil society groups whose aims range from the establishment of a unified and secular (rather than sect-based) civil code that governs personal-status laws to the toppling of the “sectarian regime.” And yet, because Lebanese religious identities have been mobilized for political and social purposes since the nineteenth century (Makdisi 2000), sect remains a meaningful indigenous category. In this vein I emphasize the political aspects of sectarian identity in this chapter, rather than those that have to do with religious belief and practice, in order to investigate the role political sectarianism plays in configuring everyday geographies. Thus, I use the term political sectarianism primarily to highlight the ways in which sectarian identity is animated through mechanisms of the state and citizenship that are governed by and through the workings of party politics.

9. Deeb and Harb (2013, 234n17) note that “prior prisoner exchanges between Hizbullah and Israel set the precedent for Hizbullah’s capture of Israeli soldiers to use in future exchanges.” For more on the July 2006 war, see “The Sixth War” (2006).

10. These studies include Ghannam’s (2002) on Cairo and Kanna’s (2011) on Dubai.

11. Here I draw on the notion of the wounded city as explored in Schneider and Susser (2003).

12. For ethnographic examinations of spatial movement amid conflict and insecurity in this region, see Ochs (2011) on Israel and Allen (2008) and Peteet (forthcoming) on Palestine.


14. For an investigation of what it looks like on the ground when citizens move to protect themselves and their communities, see Goldstein (2012).

15. See Gusterson and Besteman (2010) for a multifaceted approach to the kinds of lived insecurities faced by Americans in the face of growing inequality and weakened structures of social support in the United States.

16. On the experience of checkpoints and closure for Palestinians, see Allen (2008); Hammami (2004); Peteet (forthcoming); Wick (2011).

17. In a social and psychological analysis of emotions in everyday situations, Katz (1999) closely examines the emotions of driving.

18. A group of scholars (mainly from Europe and the United Kingdom in the fields of sociology and human geography) have forged an interdisciplinary field of mobility studies (see Hannam, Sheller, and Urry 2006), which investigates the physical movement of people and objects as well as the movement of images and information across space. These mobility studies have drawn our attention to the broader social processes that produce and inhibit movement but, in their abstract and case-study approaches, have been less effective in providing concrete insights into the different kinds of power relations that surround everyday mobility practice. There is also a significant body
of historical work on automobility that focuses primarily on the United States and Europe.

19. The contributions of feminist thought to our understanding of space and place have been interdisciplinary and include, to highlight just a few areas of research, studies of housing and interior design (Hayden 1982), gated communities (Low 2004), and community organization (Pellow 2008), as well as theoretical projects that integrate gender analyses into critical geography studies of capitalism and economic restructuring (Massey 1994).

20. Fenster and Hamdan-Saliba (2013) highlight these issues in their review of gender and feminist geography in the Middle East. Works that take up issues of gender and space in Middle Eastern cities include Ghannam’s (2013) research about young men and women in low-income Cairo, which traces gendered experiences of public mobility; Newcomb’s (2008) account of gender and identity in Fes, Morocco; de Koning’s (2009) ethnography of elite consumption practices and uses of Cairo’s public space; and an edited volume by Rieker and Ali (2008).

21. Ethnographic works concerned with masculinity in the Middle East include Ghannam (2013) and Inhorn (2012).

22. Here I am inspired by theorist of space Henri Lefebvre ([1968] 1996), who linked enactments of citizenship to the urban through what he referred to as “the right to the city”—that is, the right to inhabit the city in the broadest sense and thereby actively produce the city. Relations of power confound exercise of this right as users of the city confront limits to their spatial, civic, and political possibilities by structures of dominance and control.

23. Increasingly, scholars have seen modern citizenship not only as a category of legal and political membership in a nation-state but also as a site of “multiple logics of belonging” (Vora 2013, 33) informed by both historical and contemporary cultural, social, and political economic experiences of, among others, transnationalism, migration, diaspora, and consumerism.

24. This literature confounds the state-society binary in various ways by, for example, interrogating theories of the state that endow it with a coherence, autonomy, and unity that it does not possess (Mitchell 1991), conceiving of the state as being made up of a multiplicity of actors (Abrams [1977] 1988), examining the spatial characteristics of the state (Gupta and Ferguson 2002), and undertaking ethnographic investigations of state-citizen interaction (Sharma and Gupta 2006).

25. See chapter 6 for more on this understanding of Lebanon as a weak state.

CHAPTER 1: THE PRIVATIZED CITY

1. The first Palestinian refugees settled in and around Beirut after the establishment of Israel in 1948 and significantly more arrived following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. The two largest refugee camps near Beirut—Burj al-Barajneh and Sabra-Shatila—are adjacent to the Hizbullah-controlled neighborhoods of the southern suburbs. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)
reports that many, but not all, of the 455,000 Palestinian refugees registered in Lebanon live in camps (see UNRWA’s webpage about Lebanon, http://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/lebanon). Living conditions for the majority of Palestinians in Lebanon, both within and outside the camps, are characterized by poverty, disenfranchisement, and overcrowded habitation with inadequate infrastructure. Those living in the camps and informal settlements around Beirut experience, in addition, social and spatial exclusion effected through their geographical isolation from other parts of Beirut as well as constraints on access to the camps by nonresidents (Hanafi, Chaaban, and Seyfert 2012; Peteet 2005). In 2005, officially registered Palestinian refugees were granted permission by the Lebanese state to work in the clerical and administrative sectors for the first time, but they are still prohibited from seeking employment in many other professions and can neither legally own nor inherit property or petition to gain Lebanese citizenship (Khalili 2007, 56). Refugees also have extremely limited access to governmental facilities, including schools, and no access to public social services. Most rely on UNRWA and, increasingly, NGOs for education, health, and social services. The Lebanese government justifies the lack of Palestinian civil and political rights—and representation—by claiming that Palestinians are only temporarily residing in Lebanon. For more on Palestinians in Lebanon, see Allan (2013); Hanafi, Chaaban, and Seyfert (2012); Khalili (2007); and Peteet (2005).

2. This estimate from UN-Habitat (2012) includes neither migrant workers nor refugees who have come to Beirut since the escalation of the Syrian conflict in late 2011.

3. Lebanon has six administrative governorates that are divided into twenty-five districts and then subdivided into municipalities. Municipal Beirut comprises a governorate and a district whereas its suburbs are municipalities housed within other districts.

4. According to Fricke (2005, 177), nearly half of Beirutis rent their homes, and tenants typically pass their leases on through family members.

5. Beirut’s downtown area is variously called in English the “Beirut Central District” (or BCD for short), which is how the area’s postwar developers often refer to it; “Solidere,” which refers precisely to the company that redeveloped it after the war; and “downtown”; in Arabic, wast al-balad; in French, centre-ville (city center or downtown).

6. Sociologist Samir Khalaf (1985, 231) discusses the role of private property in the planning and design of Beirut and also its significance as a source of wealth.

7. For more on the Armenian community in Lebanon, see Migliorino (2008).

8. Extending across the midsection of much of the country, the Lebanese mountains are a site of biblical importance.

9. Gates (1998) outlines how the development of Lebanon’s “tertiary” (service) sector became the most productive segment of the economy and how the mercantile elite—in collaboration with French commercial interests—succeeded in creating an extreme state of laissez-faire.

10. The Tanzimat reforms created conditions favorable for investment in such projects as the construction of a toll road between Beirut and Damascus and the rebuilding of the city’s water-supply system (Fawaz 1983, 78).
11. Religious violence of the nineteenth century, which culminated in sectarian mobilizations and massacres in 1860, was, as Makdisi (2000) argues, the outcome of a joint “modernizing” effort by Ottoman and European powers that reconfigured the basis of political loyalties from peasant-noble to sectarian ties. This new culture of sectarianism reconfigured the geography of Lebanon into distinct sectarian communities and “singled out religious affiliation as the defining public and political characteristic of a modern subject and citizen” (174).

12. Hanssen (2005) and Sehnaoui (2002) provide elaborate descriptions of these leisure sites.

13. At the outbreak of war, the Ottoman government abolished Lebanon’s semiautonomous status and established a military occupation of the country. Anti-Ottoman political activity was violently repressed (Volk 2010), and food shortages during the war—aggravated by a locust plague in 1915—which were an outcome of shipping interruptions and military requisition of supplies by the Ottoman army, resulted in a famine that claimed the lives of more than one hundred thousand residents of Beirut and the Mount Lebanon region (Traboulsi 2007, 72).

14. Maronites are an Eastern Catholic community that takes its name from a fourth-century monk. Since the sixteenth century, French Catholic missionaries had developed ties to the Ottoman Empire’s indigenous Catholics and had seen themselves as their protectors (Dueck 2012).

15. Maronite political influence was expanded through their placement in positions in the high commissioner’s administration in Beirut, for example, and their increased representation in elite military divisions (Picard 1996, 65; Salibi 1988, 35). These forms of patronage and centuries-old cultural and economic ties meant that Maronites were loyal to the newly established state whereas many Muslims who had aspired to create an independent and unified Syrian Arab nation constituted by its natural geographical borders rather than those drawn by the colonial power rejected the mandate.

16. Owen (1976) analyzes the underdevelopment of industry and agriculture as a direct consequence of the decision to create a Greater Lebanon, whereas Gates (1998) emphasizes this underdevelopment as being an outcome of the coalition of financial interests among the national mercantile elite.


18. Naiden and Harl (2009) argue that Beirut’s commercial strength and thus its role as a political asset make it a veritable city-state.


20. There are eighteen different sects documented as existing in Lebanon. While English-language texts sometimes use the words communitarian or confessionalist to describe Lebanon’s political system, the Arabic words ta’if (sect) and ta’ifi (sectarian) were those used most often by my respondents to describe the political and social structure. For this reason, I adhere to the usage of these latter terms rather than the former except when citing others.
21. The French urban planner Baron de Haussmann transformed Paris in the 1860s. Features of this transformation included the creation of wide boulevards, architectural uniformity achieved through uninterrupted building façades, and the production of consumer and civic areas for social and economic use by the “modern” French bourgeoisie.

22. However, in the end, not all aspects of Haussmann’s Paris could be exported. Two of the avenues that radiated out from the point of the “star” at Place de l’Etoile were cut off because they ran into three important historic religious structures (Davie 2003).

23. In 1922, Ottoman Turkish was abolished in schools where it was still taught and French and Arabic were made the official languages of Lebanon. Language, as historian Nadya Sbaiti notes, was central to how the mandate extended its discursive and physical authority: “Language was the means through which people could assert or express their own national sentiments, and, particularly in Beirut, it was also the axis around which national, religious and class affiliations were formulated by the residents of the new Lebanon” (Sbaiti 2009, 77). See Dueck (2010) also for a discussion of the role of education in French governance of Lebanon.


26. The planning system in Lebanon is complex. Planning occurs at three main levels: national, regional, and municipal. At the national level, the Directorate General for Urban Planning within the Ministry of Public Works and Transport develops planning regulations and master plans and issues building permits for some municipalities. The Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) is a semi-governmental agency linked with the Council of Ministers, which is responsible for the allocation of the majority of funds earmarked for the post–civil war reconstruction of Lebanon, supersedes all other public institutions in implementation decisions, and governs a body called the Higher Council for Urban Planning. The municipal and regional levels (regions are collaborations or federations of municipalities) are responsible within their geographic territories for planning and day-to-day maintenance of infrastructure, public transportation, and so forth. Some municipalities issue building and construction permits. For more on Lebanon’s planning organization and processes, see Stevenson (2007). See UNDP (2011) on Beirut as haphazard, Khalaf and Kongstad (1973) on the city as unplanned, and Perry (2002) on Beirut as unregulated.

27. As an example of this kind of political infighting, it was widely reported that Ghazi Aridi, head of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, was forced out of his position in 2013 as a result of his clashes with Walid Jumblatt, a fellow Druze (a minority religious sect in Lebanon), but a more powerful, political leader.
28. See chapter 3 for a discussion of Solidere’s rebuilding of downtown. Solidere is an acronym for Société Libanaise pour le Développement et la Reconstruction de Beyrouth, French for the Lebanese Company for the Development and Reconstruction of Beirut.

29. For scholarship that examines these processes in the Arab world, see Elsheshtawy (2008); Singerman (2011); and Singerman and Amar (2006).

30. Solh made these comments at a public symposium, “City Debates,” held at the American University of Beirut on May 12, 2006.

31. This issue of varying setbacks and lack of regulation of the built environment is discussed in a UNDP report (2011, 252).

32. Beirut’s first street atlas, Zawarib Beirut, was first published in 2005 and was aimed primarily at an audience of Lebanese ex-pats returning to the city for leisure and business; they found it challenging to navigate the city without precise street names and addresses.


34. While Krijnen and Fawaz (2010) track the increase in these practices of informal decision making and allowing exceptions to the law, Fawaz (2009c) demonstrates the historical precedence for this “building by exception” through a discussion of planning regulations and illegal housing in Beirut’s peripheries. According to Riachi (1963), until 1945 the prevailing type of construction in the city was the three-story, two-apartment walk-up building. Seven- and eight-story buildings appeared during a construction boom after 1945, and later, in 1954, a special amendment to the building code was passed by Parliament permitting a maximum of nine floors per building. Krijnen and Fawaz (2010) provide a detailed analysis of processes of informality in the planning, design, and construction of Beirut’s built environment.

35. Zoning exists for only some of Beirut’s land, and rezoning, after original regulations “expire,” is common (Glasze and Alkhayyal 2002, 332). Khalaf has written about how informal patron-client relations influence zoning to the degree that “virtually everyone within the government civil bureaucracy—from the simple municipal clerk who overlooks a minor transgression to a high government official who intervenes on behalf of either his client or patron to reroute a road network or rezone a certain area—is placed in a strategic position to affect the redistribution of rewards and benefits. Such manipulations are especially frequent when the case involves land or real estate” (1985, 230).

36. Here I draw on Fawaz’s (2009a) insights into the role of Hizbullah in urban planning and construction.


38. The French built the first railway in Lebanon at the end of the nineteenth century. For much of the twentieth century, there were lines connecting Beirut and Damascus, the eastern Bekaa Valley with Aleppo, and another that ran along the coast. The rail network, which had already fallen out of use by the 1970s because of the popularity of cars and buses, was destroyed during the civil and regional war and has not been revitalized.
39. A 1931 announcement in the Lebanese newspaper La Syrie about the founding of a new organization, the Association of Automobile Importers, championed the benefits of the automobile for the tourism sector and urged the government to ensure that the nation’s roadways were improved so as to reap these benefits: “The vehicle, with its indispensable ally, the good road, encourages and facilitates the arrival of tourists to a country. . . . Lebanon, once the seat of humanity and of religions and civilizations, is sure to attract an increasing number of tourists provided that a wise legislation facilitates and develops the touristic effort” (La Syrie, May 8, 1931).

40. “Beirut Tourist Police Attempt to Silence Automobile Horns” (1964) details the roles and responsibilities of this special traffic-police force.

41. Nakkash and Jouzy (1973) offer a picture of the traffic congestion during this time.

42. These and other statistics regarding traffic in Beirut can be found in a report by Aoun et al. (2013).

43. According to Ilham Khabbaz, whom I met with in summer 2010, director of Land Transport at the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, intensifying traffic congestion was also an outcome of the growing number of public transportation vehicles operating illegally without proper licensing—including shared service taxis, minibuses, and buses.

44. The suffix *ayn* denotes the dual or two of something in Arabic. Lebanese commonly add this to non-Arabic words like *service* or *Bonjour*.

45. For more on the city’s parking problems, see a 2011 UNDP report (244).

46. See, for example, Nahnoo (Arabic for “we”), a youth organization (nahnoo.org), and the Beirut Green Project (beirutgreenproject.wordpress.com).


48. The Fouad Boutros Highway project, which was still in the proposal stage as of this writing, is a controversial plan to build a 1.3 km highway linking Ashrafieh with the port area. The project has been widely protested by residents who argue that it will destroy historic properties and increase neighborhood traffic.

49. In their work on the political economy of urban development, Logan and Molotch (1987) outline the political, planning, and investment processes that constitute the city as a “growth machine” in which the urban landscape is developed for its exchange rather than use value.

50. Sarkis has been an active in both public and scholarly forums about Beirut’s urban development; see, for example, Rowe and Sarkis (1998).

51. The notion of the right to the city is an idea first proposed by Lefebvre ([1968] 1996). Lefebvre conceived of it as the “right to urban life,” a right with which ordinary residents of the city are endowed and which can become a basis for class-based political and structural change. David Harvey (2008) reexamines the right to the city through the relations between urbanization and capitalism and calls for a democratization of the power to shape processes of urbanization.
CHAPTER 2: THE SPACE OF WAR

1. For more on the National Museum and its emphasis on a Phoenician national narrative that orients Lebanon’s past toward the West and away from that of the eastern Islamic world, see Kaufman (2004).

2. Here I draw on Tahan’s (2005) discussion of the museum during wartime along with artist Lamia Joreige’s (2013) narrative that accompanied her installation documenting the history of the National Museum.

3. In everyday parlance, I found that people did use the term civil war (al-harb al-ahliya), although they assumed knowledge and understanding, on the part of those they were speaking with, of the regional dimensions of the war. In short, while the term civil war was regularly used, it was shorthand for a war of strategic global geopolitical significance that was fought by both domestic and regional players.

4. Article 9 of the constitution, for example, put rights and rulings on personal status (marriage, divorce, custody, adoption, inheritance) under the domain of religious sectarian communities (Traboulsi 2007, 90).

5. This idea of Lebanon’s Muslim and Arab character represented an ideological compromise between the Muslim and Christian groups. The compromise was that Muslims would recognize the distinct nature of their country, marked by its sectarian political system and historic ties with the West, and that Christians would renounce any protective links to the European powers and affirm the Arab character of the country and its membership in the Arab world.

6. For more about the 1932 census and its enduring political significance, see Maktabi (1999).

7. See Jim Lehrer’s PBS News Hour interview with President George W. Bush about the state of the war in Iraq (Bush, 2007).


10. Indeed, the militias became large business enterprises during Lebanon’s war. Among other activities, Traboulsi describes how the militias monopolized foreign trade, controlled the lottery business, participated in the narcotics traffic, developed a black market of imports to Syria, and engaged in “exchange services” with the bourgeoisie (protection money in return for import and export quotas or sheer profiteering). They became an integral part of that class, entering into close business partnerships with many of its members, especially in the flour and fuel trade (2007, 236–237).

11. These figures are from Peteet’s (2005) study of Palestinians in Lebanon.
12. There are now twelve camps in Lebanon. See the UNRWA website (http://www.unrwa.org/) for information on the present situation.
13. Several anthropologists have documented the experience of Palestinians in Lebanon. See, for example, Allan (2013); Khalili (2007); and Peteet (2005).
14. Fisk’s on-the-ground narrative *Pity the Nation* (2002) provides this kind of account by detailing the many stages, theaters, and episodes of the war. Haugbolle (2011) offers a thorough review of the historiography and memory of the war.
15. Haugbolle (2012) analyzes discourses about masculinity and militiamen during the war from various angles, including that of the “little militia man,” who takes up arms in the midst of the transition from boyhood to manhood.
16. Here, I borrow Picard’s term (1996, 149) to describe the divided political and administrative structure of the city during the war.
17. Israeli troops withdrew from South Lebanon in 2000, and a United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon zone was established in an area between the city of Tyre and the Israeli border. For more on Hizbullah and the Israeli withdrawal, see Norton (2000). Many Lebanese and Hizbullah dispute the Israeli occupation of a piece of land at the Lebanon-Syria border called Shebaa Farms, which Israel seized as part of the Golan Heights in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. The possession of weapons by Hizbullah is an ongoing issue of political contention in Lebanon.
18. These figures are taken from Labaki and Abou Rjeily (1994, cited in Haugbolle 2011). In his review of the historiography and memory of the war across scholarly, literary, and artistic realms, Haugbolle (2011) discusses politicization surrounding the quantification of the war’s casualties.
19. I have heard the ending of the war referred to as the moment when “people tired of fighting one another” but also as the moment when the powers-that-be tired of having the militias fight for them because the war had ceased to be profitable.
20. Although the Ta’if Accord increased the number of parliamentary seats from 99 to 108, in 1992 this number was changed to 128. Farid el Khazen discusses the rumors and lack of transparency surrounding the decision to establish 128 as the number of seats. The before Ta’if/after Ta’if parliamentary seat distribution looked like this: Maronite before Ta’if 30/after Ta’if 34, Greek Orthodox 11/14, Greek Catholic 6/8, Armenian Orthodox 4/5, Armenian Catholic 1/1, Protestant 1/1, Other Christians 1/1, total Christians 54/64; Sunni Muslims 20/27, Shi’i Muslims 19/27, Druze Muslims 6/8, Alawite Muslims 0/2, total Muslims 45/64. Total seats 99/128 (el Khazen 1994).
22. For example, after returning from exile in France in 2005, Michel Aoun, a former Lebanese Army commander during Lebanon’s war, became the leader of the Free
Patriotic Movement, a powerful political party with a substantial number of parliamentary seats. Nabih Berri, the current speaker of Parliament, led the Amal Movement during the war and the War of the Camps, in which several Palestinian refugee camps were besieged.

23. According to Mawad (2009), because the state gives schools the freedom to choose their own history textbooks, schools usually select one that is in line with their political and religious affiliation. This point highlights the ways in which political groups, some of which are framed through religion, are not only active in providing interpretations of present-day issues but serve as interpreters of the past.

24. This is the outlook that Peleikis (2006) encountered in her research with residents of a multisectarian village in the Shouf district of Mount Lebanon.

25. A significant amount of scholarly and artistic work also engages memories of the war. See, for example, West Beirut (1998); Larkin (2012); Makdisi (1999); Raad (2007). There are also ways in which the war is mined in popular culture for its irony-laced “cool” factor. For instance, in 2004, a bar named “1975” with waiters in camouflage, floor seating lined with sandbags, and graffiti-marked walls opened in the upscale nightlife district of Monot, a playground for the young and affluent.

26. The phrase in Arabic is ‘amaru al-hajr bas ma ‘amaru an-nas.

27. The Syrian army first entered Lebanon in 1976 at the request of Lebanese President Suleiman Frangieh in the second year of the war, and the Arab League then gave Syria a mandate to retain troops in Lebanon with the objective of restoring peace. Syria became one of the major players in the war and asserted throughout that its actions were necessary to ensure the protection of both Syria and Lebanon.

28. Larkin describes one such plaque commemorating a martyr of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party in the Hamra neighborhood (2012, 104), and on walks through Ashrafieh and adjacent neighborhoods I have seen graffiti and banners honoring Bashir Gemayel, commander of the Lebanese Forces militia and senior member of the Phalange party, who was killed in 1982. For a discussion of martyrdom in the Lebanese context, see Volk (2010, 32–35).

29. In Larkin’s research (2012) with members of what he calls the “post-memory” generation, the war was always present in their sentiments about political, civic, and social life.

30. Saree Makdisi argues, however, that the built fabric of downtown was damaged more by the reconstruction efforts than by the war itself: “It is estimated that, as the result of demolition, by the time reconstruction efforts began in earnest in 1993, approximately 80 percent of the structures in the downtown area had been damaged beyond repair, whereas only around a third held that status as a result of damage inflicted during the war itself” (1997, 674).

31. Prior to the war, downtown was a transportation hub with buses and service taxis lined up around Martyr’s Square beside signs indicating their destinations. As an eclectic retail center, with sex-based commercial activity along with upmarket shops and restaurants, and as a point of origin for travel to other parts of Beirut, downtown was used by most of the city’s residents. For more on downtown in the era prior to the long war
in Lebanon, see Khalaf (2006). For more on the early plans to rebuild downtown, see Beyhum (1992).

32. See Makdisi (1997, 667) for more on the demolition that was undertaken.

33. Residents and owners of property in the city center were offered modest compensation packages. Many of the displaced residents had fled to Beirut from rural areas during the war. Some residents were accused by Solidere of being “occupiers” or wartime militia members (or both) who filed illegitimate claims in order to receive compensation. According to the government, anyone who could present persuasive arguments or evidence showing that they were uprooted or relocated at least once during the war qualified for compensation from the Ministry of the Displaced and the Central Fund for the Displaced (Sawalha 2003, 276–278). The stated differences between the categories of “the displaced” and “the occupiers” were a subject of contention. In exchange for expropriation, property owners were offered Solidere shares. And it was stipulated that owners (or other interested parties) who wished to save buildings from demolition and instead recover and restore them would have to pay the company a 12 percent surcharge on the estimated value of the lot and be prepared to repair the building within two years.

34. Makdisi (1997) discusses the ancient archeological dimensions of the area.

35. For scholarly work on the downtown reconstruction and the politics of memory, see, for example, Haugbolle (2011); Makdisi (1997); Nagel (2002); Sawalha (2010); Schmid (2002); Yahya (2007).


38. See Hazbun (2008) for more on the effects of 9/11 on Arab tourism flows.


41. For more about the threat of war debris, see the Lebanon section on the United Nations Office for Project Services website (http://www.unops.org).

42. Hermez (2012) conceptualizes this state of anticipating future war, which is shaped by past experiences of conflict in Lebanon.

**CHAPTER 3: POLITICS AND PUBLIC SPACE**


1. In considering how everyday uses of the city can shed light on the workings of political sectarianism, I draw on de Certeau’s notion of “spatial stories,” which “have the function of founding and articulating spaces” (1984, 122).
2. For more on other divided cities, see Calame and Charlesworth (2009) on Belfast, Jerusalem, Mostar, and Nicosia, and see Allegra, Casaglia, and Rokem (2012) on the concept of the divided city.

3. Hizbullah expanded its role in government in 2005; for more, see Deeb and Harb (2013, 41).

4. These are young people from middle- and upper-class backgrounds who lived in neighborhoods of municipal Beirut and the northern suburbs. They shared many of the same leisure activities of the youth of the southern suburbs that Deeb and Harb (2013) describe; however, the subjects of piety and morality were not central in our conversations or in their talk about where they liked to have fun in the city.

5. Genberg (2002) also describes how boundaries between neighborhoods are drawn through various kinds of visual and aural sectarian markers.


7. On the allocation of welfare resources in Lebanon, see Cammett (2014).

8. The American University of Beirut is a selective and expensive English-language private university founded by U.S. Protestant missionaries in the late nineteenth century. The majority of its students are from relatively privileged backgrounds in comparison with the average Lebanese.

9. For more on the mosque’s construction and its relation to Sunni leadership in Lebanon, see Vloeberghs (2012).


11. For more on the relations of patronage that buttress the Lebanese political system, see Hamzeh (2001).

12. See, for example, Wedeen (1999) on the practice of public visual display of political leaders in Syria as a means of symbolic domination.

13. The singular, dahiya (suburb), is used to refer to the group of majority Shi’i areas in southern Beirut, and the plural, al-dawahi (suburbs), is used to refer to other suburban areas. For more on the formation of and nomenclature surrounding Dahiya, see Deeb and Harb (2013, 46–49).

14. Deeb and Harb discuss the area’s lack of singularity in regard to these characteristics (2013, 178).

15. Deeb (2006) and Deeb and Harb (2013) provide in-depth ethnographic investigations of piety and space in Dahiya.


17. The Phalange is a political party supported mainly by Maronite Christians. It played a major role in Lebanon’s war, and after a decline in the late 1980s and 1990s reemerged in the early 2000s. It is a member of the March 14th Alliance.
18. Fawaz, Harb, and Gharbieh discuss this as a form of security intended to counter the threat posed by intercommunal riots, which generally occur at the intersection of different territories (2012, 181).
19. See chapter 4 for further discussion of security processes in public space.
20. Years after this conversation with Layla, on May 22, 2007, a bomb did explode late at night in the parking lot of ABC mall, killing one and injuring nine others. Less than twenty-four hours later, a bomb went off in Verdun, near the Dunes shopping center, injuring ten, including two children.
22. This paradoxical image was expressed in the photo that won the World Press Photo Award in 2007. Widely discussed in the Western media, the photo depicts fashionable young people driving by and taking photos of destroyed buildings in the southern suburbs of Beirut.
23. For more on the state surveillance of young people in other contexts within the region, see Varzi’s (2006) description of how the public conduct of Tehranian youth is surveilled and policed in a city “inhabited by the state” and Ghannam’s (2013) discussion of male working-class youth in Cairo and their encounters with state security forces.
24. In addition to this sense of physical safety that arises from sectarian ties, other forms of security are cultivated through sectarian affiliation. As Sawalha found, the government’s failure to provide city residents with necessary urban services—such as electricity, building and elevator safety, and tenants’ rights—forces Beirutis to rely on sectarian connections to meet their needs (2010, 64).
25. For example, a French first name is often understood to identify an individual as Christian, while males named Ali or Hussein (prominent figures in the Shi’i hagiography) are thought to indicate a Shi’i family background
26. There is youth activism against sectarianism in Beirut, and this movement has been energized by the opening in the Mar Mikhael neighborhood of bookstores, galleries, and cafes that serve as a kind of launching pad and organizing base.
27. Interestingly, another report found that Lebanese youth showed “high levels of sectarian bias (in-group favoritism) along with low levels of acceptance of inter-sectarian relationships” (Harb 2010, 17–18).

CHAPTER 4: SECURING BEIRUT


1. This intensification of security for the protection of prominent and public figures is but one of the five modalities of security in Beirut that Fawaz, Harb, and Gharbieh (2012) outline.
2. For more on the relationship between automobility and warfare, see Davis (2007).
3. On gated residences, surveillance, and private security in urban sites, see Caldeira (2000); Davis (1992); Low (2004); and Zhang (2010). On the role of vigilante groups performing extrastate security, see Goldstein (2012).

4. For more on these modes of collaborative policing between private and state-based forces, see Yarwood (2007) on multiagency policing and Jones and Newburn (2006) on plural policing.

5. Drawing on Allen Feldman’s (2004) formulation of “securocratic warfare,” I use the term securocracy to refer to the ways in which heightened anxieties about the security of high-profile individuals appear not only as a spatial phenomenon but also as part of broader political strategy.

6. Writings about SUVs have focused on their materiality (Miller 2007), how their size and weight create physical dangers for other users of the road (Jain 2002), and how they encourage an atomistic model of citizenship in which drivers inhabit buffer zones that limit their contact with others (Mitchell 2005).

7. Geographer Louise Amoore (2011) refers to this calculation as the “ontology of association.”

8. These skills and tactics bring to mind the “ways of operating” de Certeau (1984) described as part of the everyday practice of making one’s way across spatial terrain.


11. Moreover, the increased militarization of the city not only connected this period with that of the civil war but also masculinized public space. Urban space was increasingly governed by men with guns, and moving through the city entailed regular interactions with them. These interactions were gendered, for example, through the use of aggressive verbal and physical action and the assertion of a masculinist protectionism particularly in relation to (some) women and children.

CHAPTER 5: THE CHAOS OF DRIVING


1. Lebanese Arabic is peppered with French words. Some Lebanese, for instance, use the French word accident rather than the Arabic hadith.

2. Statistics I obtained from the traffic-police division of the Internal Security Forces (ISF) recorded 6,508 injuries and 513 fatalities resulting from traffic accidents in 2009. In interpreting such statistics, the Youth Association for Social Awareness (YASA)
highlights the size and population figures of Lebanon, the existence of underreporting, and the fact that the traffic police investigate neither damages-only accidents nor those involving army and police vehicles, which may constitute about 15 percent of all road-related fatalities according to the Scientific Research Foundation, YASA website, accessed December 10, 2014, http://www.yasa.org/en/Sectiondet.aspx?id=10&kid2=371.

3. Buses, like service taxis, are also flagged down as there are no fixed stops along the bus routes. The routes themselves can vary as drivers often choose to avoid traffic or construction by taking a different series of streets that are not along their typical route. Buses came to replace the tram system in the early 1960s.

4. I use the male pronoun for service taxi drivers because in my time living in Beirut, I never saw a female taxi driver, although a friend insists that there are a few. She told me that she had seen two after living in Beirut for thirteen years.


6. Examples of cultural productions highlighting the intergroup sociality that takes place in service taxis are the feature film Taxi Ballad (2012), the documentary film Taxi Talk (2009), and a collection of essays in Arabic, Beirut bil Service (Krideyah 2009).

7. Stoller (1982) describes the bush taxi as a rich ethnographic site through which the anthropologist learns to interpret the signs that constitute the discourse of social action.

8. While perusing issues of L’Orient-Le Jour from the 1960s, I found articles about the service taxi system that confirmed comments by older Beirutis that “before the [civil and regional] war, the taxis were more orderly” because they followed fixed routes to different sectors of the city.

9. Most upper-income residents I met with said they rarely or never took service taxis, and women from this same class background voiced concerns about the safety of these taxis with reference to both themselves and their preteen and teenaged daughters.

10. Notar (2012b) discusses this phenomenon in the context of urban China.

11. As I describe here in the context of Beirutis’ various understandings of the chaos of driving, Anderson (1983) saw this “deep, horizontal comradeship” as being produced in spite of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in a national community.

12. Curiously, a French Mandate-era Lebanese newspaper cartoon I came across encouraged me to think about the origins of this discourse about “becoming” or “being” Lebanese through the way in which one drove. The 1922 cartoon from Al-Ma’aarad, entitled “How to Transgress Rules,” depicted a curbside lined with parked cars with a sign declaring “Parking of cars and carriages prohibited.”

13. Although emerging from an ecological perspective, the topic of social disorganization also engaged early urban studies scholars of the Chicago School. See, for example, Park, Burgess, and McKenzie’s now-classic The City (1925).


15. From “Fadlallah lors de sa Réception d’une Délégation de l’organisation YASA: Livrer un Permis de Conduire à un Non Méritant est Illicite et est Une Fraude!”


17. Here I invoke Lefebvre’s idea that cities have collective rhythms that are determined by the varied and contradictory forms of alliances that human groups create and in which class and political relations intervene (1968 [1996], 234).

Chapter 6: “There Is No State”

1. The ISF is the domestic police force under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior; among other duties, it administers traffic policing. Although separate from the armed forces, the ISF is paramilitary in its organization, decorum, and uniforms.

2. Baroud increased traffic fines, the number of traffic police, and the allocation of funds for traffic management, for example, while expanding the use of radar equipment. See Sikimic (2010).

3. Ethnographic attention is now being paid to the everyday bureaucratic activities and actors that make up the state. See, for example, Gupta (2012) and Navaro-Yashin (2012).

4. For examples of this kind of weak-state analysis of Lebanon, see Hanf (1993); Pan (2006); Rotberg (2003).

5. In the Lebanese context, however, Fregonese (2012) argues that a conception of a single sovereignty is ill-fitting as Lebanon is characterized by multiple sovereignties constituted by both state and nonstate actors.

6. The 16th Brigade was a special police force “of the most modern means” created in 1959 during Fouad Chehab’s presidency to deal with emergencies related to internal security (Malsagne 2008).

7. In saying “there is no state,” the policeman recalled to me the cynicism of the state administration workers in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus—a self-declared but internationally unrecognized state—which Navaro-Yashin (2012) refers to as being a “made-up state.” In his verbiage, the police officer may also have sought to distance himself, as the Indian government workers in Gupta and Sharma’s research did (2006, 286), from the well-circulated image of the lazy, inefficient, and corrupt state worker and thereby to remove himself, as it were, from the sullied reputation of the state and its functionaries like the traffic police.

8. Police training takes place in military schools where recruits participate in a month-long specialization program like policing traffic. For more on Lebanon’s security apparatus, see Nashabe (2009).

9. Although officially the ISF is not an exclusively male organization and while public relations materials for the ISF include images of women and I saw several when visiting ISF offices, on the streets I have only rarely seen female members of the ISF.

10. USAID provided this assistance. See, for example, usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACRo61.pdf, accessed May 16, 2012.
11. These numbers ebb and flow in response to domestic and regional political tensions and dynamics. The highest tourism levels thus far in the post-civil and regional war era—two million visitors—were recorded in 2009 (Kourchid 2009).
12. Here I make reference to Gupta and Ferguson’s (2002) analysis of the spatiality of the state and specifically its vertical and encompassing dimensions.
13. As noted, in 2004, there were only a few traffic lights downtown. By summer 2010, additional traffic lights had appeared and more drivers obeyed them. However, at the most unwieldy intersections policemen still controlled traffic.
14. For analyses of networks of favoritism and patronage in Lebanon and beyond, see Cunningham and Sarayrah (1994); Joseph (1983); Lomnitz (1971); and Makhoul and Harrison (2004).
15. On wasta’s effect on the business climate, see Loewe, Blume, and Speer (2008); on possibilities for career advancement, see Tlaiss and Kauser (2011); and on nations’ economic competitiveness, see Mohamed and Hamdy (2008).
17. This is due to the potential for a male-male encounter in this cultural context of policing, in which the hegemonic view of women is as nonthreatening, to become a violent power play.
18. On luxury license plates, see Braun (2004).

CONCLUSION

1. Nasrallah made this announcement on May 25, 2013. The day after his speech, rocket fire attacked Hizbullah-affiliated areas in Beirut and Hermel in eastern Lebanon. Syrian rebels were blamed for what was widely held to be a retaliatory attack. For more on the speech and the attacks, see “Nasrallah on Syria: The Battle Is Ours,” Al-Monitor website, accessed December 19, 2014, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/nasrallah-hezbollah-syria-speech-rockets.html#.
3. For more on how the refugee crisis has affected Lebanon’s economic and labor situation, see the International Labour Organization report (2014, 36).
4. Here, I borrow Neil Smith’s phrasing, from his entreaty for increased attention to class in contemporary social theory and geography, about how “class is thickly written through cultural, political, and economic landscapes” (2000, 1012).


7. Here I reference Timothy Mitchell’s critique (1991) of theorization of the state as a coherent, autonomous entity that operates in a separate realm from that of society.

8. Lefebvre wrote about the character—and social promise—of the city in several essays and addressed the nature of the urban fabric as a place of encounter in “The Right to the City” ([1968] 1996, 158).