INTRODUCTION

1. In fact, Raphael Lemkin had been working on the subject for nearly two decades. Lemkin was horrified by the Armenian genocide and later by genocidal social practices of the Nazis. However, he first coined the term “genocide” in his classic work *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944).

2. Genocide has been a crime under international law since the UN General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG) in December 1948. In fact, drafting of the Convention began in 1946 and lasted for over two years. There were many disagreements, including whether political groups should be protected. Finally, political groups were excluded in order to ensure ratification by as many states as possible. Since the CPPCG came into effect in January 1951, it has been ratified by most countries in the world. The issues surrounding the exclusion of political groups from the Convention are of fundamental importance and will be discussed in detail in chapter 1 of this work.

3. It should be noted that little was written about Nazism until the 1960s and 1970s. Since the early 1980s, the number and range of studies have increased almost exponentially. Until the 1960s, however, very few people considered the Nazi genocide as a key development in contemporary European history or a fundamental problem for philosophy and the social sciences.


This point was made by the International Criminal Tribunal that tried the crimes in Rwanda and has been conceded by Dadrian himself. It has also been well received by Eric Markusen and Alison Des Forges, among others.


See Kiernan, “Twentieth-Century Genocide,” 51.


Among those I have omitted because of their questionable theories and politics are Ernst Nolte and Andreas Hillgruber. Nolte portrays Nazism as a “European reaction” to “Bolshevik terror,” comparing the repressive methods of Nazism and Stalinism in order to establish causal connections between the two and minimize the role played by Germany’s—and Europe’s—ruling classes in implementing genocide. Thus, the Nazi genocide—in Nolte’s view—was simply a “defensive” response by civilized Europe, shocked at the “barbarism” of the “Slavic” Russian Revolution. In other words, it was communism that unleashed total war in Europe. Andreas Hillgruber shocked German and European scholars with his analysis of the “end” of European Jewry and the “tragedy” of the German army on the Eastern Front at the end of World War II. Hayden White has insightfully pointed out that Hillgruber pushes discourse to its limit by describing the sufferings of the German army as a “tragedy” while referring to the sufferings of European Jews with the neutral and impersonal term “end.” Answering calls for a ban on Hillgruber’s work, Hayden White argued that Hillgruber’s was just one more way of emplotting a historical discourse. The real question was how to account for the ideological implications of different discourses. For Hayden White’s approach to the Holocaust, see “Historical Emplotment and the Problem of Truth,” in *Probing the Limits of Representation: Nazism and the “Final Solution,”* ed. Saul Friedlander
A more acceptable but clearly conservative approach is found in the work of Eric Weitz, who attempts to link Nazism, Stalinism, and genocide in Cambodia. Weitz suggests revolutionary upheaval as the main explanation for the appearance of genocidal social practices in these three political and social experiments. As can be seen very clearly from these examples, the ideological implications of any given approach may be more or less obvious, more or less explicit, but they cannot be eliminated and are always implicit in the historical examples chosen for comparison. See Weitz’s “The Modernity of Genocide: War, Race, and Revolution in the Twentieth Century,” in The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical Perspective, ed. Robert Giladelle and Ben Kiernan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).


I follow Michel Foucault in my use of the terms “diagram of power,” “technology of power,” and “devices of power.” These concepts will be dealt with at length in chapter 3.

A possible example is Arno Mayer in Why Did the Heavens Not Darken? The “Final Solution” in History (New York: Pantheon Books, 1990). Mayer provoked enormous disapproval for suggesting—perhaps somewhat sketchily—that the key to understanding both Nazism and the Nazi genocide was anticommunism. Mayer’s theory will be examined in this book, particularly in chapter 5. For a critique of Mayer, see Christopher Browning, “The Holocaust as By-product? A Critique of Arno Mayer,” in The Path to Genocide: Essays on Launching the Final Solution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

The six extermination camps—Auschwitz, Treblinka, Belzec, Sobibor, Chelmno, and Majdanek—were all located in occupied Poland. Extermination camps (Vernichtungslager) or death camps (Todeslager) were built specifically for industrial-scale murder in gas chambers and remained in operation between 1942 and 1945. In contrast, concentration camps (Konzentrationslager) were primarily intended as places of incarceration, forced labor, and torture of detainees. The first camp in Germany was opened on 22 March 1933 at Dachau near the city of Munich. It is estimated that the German Reich was crisscrossed by between 2,000 and 5,000 camps (including labor camps, transit and collection camps, prisons, ghettos, and other means of enclosure), whose purpose was different from that of the extermination camps. For a survey of the Nazi concentration camp sites and an attempt to classify them, see Aharon Weiss, “Categories of Camps, Their Character and Role in the Execution of the Final Solution of the Jewish Question,” in David Bankier, ed., The Holocaust: Perpetrators, Witnesses, and Bystanders (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1986). For some suggestions on ways to analyze the “reorganization” of German society, see Robert Gellately, Backing Hitler: Consent and Coercion in Nazi Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); and The Gestapo and German Society: Enforcing Racial Policy, 1933–1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).

Although Argentina’s military dictatorship seized power in a coup on 24 March 1976, the extensive and systematic destruction of population groups began almost immediately after the death of President Juan Domingo Perón on 1 July 1974. At first, executions were carried out exclusively by state paramilitary organizations like the Argentine Anticommunist Alliance and the Commando for the Liberation of America,
until the Argentine army launched “Operation Independence” in the province of Tucumán in December 1974.


CHAPTER I DEFINING THE CONCEPT OF GENOCIDE


2. The Kingdom of Spain, founded by Ferdinand and Isabella in 1492, was Europe’s first modern proto-state. Its Catholic confessionality excluded Jews and Muslims both physically and symbolically despite centuries of social integration. In the same year, 1492, Columbus reached the Americas, and soon afterward debates began about whether the newly discovered peoples of the Americas were human or not. Perhaps an earlier starting point for our model is *Malleus Maleficarum* (The hammer of witches) published in Germany in 1487. Originally applied to women freethinkers, the methods outlined in this handbook for witch-hunters and inquisitors were used by the Inquisition over the centuries in the protomodern stigmatization, harassment, and destruction of people and social relations.


5. Although I have used the term “genocidal social practices” more or less intuitively in earlier writings (e.g., *Cinco estudios sobre genocidio* [Five studies about genocide] [Buenos Aires: Acervo Cultural Editores, 1997]), I first became aware of its potential for systematic explanation after speaking to survivors of the Argentine genocide. As Marx says about social relations and Piaget says about awareness: “He doesn’t know it but he does it.” It was these survivors who made me know it.

6. Political groups were protected in both the Secretariat Draft of May 1947 and the Ad Hoc Committee Draft of April 1948.


9. A catch-22, coined by Joseph Heller in his novel *Catch-22*, is a logical paradox wherein an individual finds him or herself in need of something which can only be had by not being in need of it. It refers also to a difficult situation from which there is no escape because it involves mutually conflicting or dependent conditions.


Another important point is that political groups (and more inclusive terms such as “any group,” “any community” as well as sexual groups, health groups, and others) have been included in definitions of genocide contained in the penal codes of a number of states, such as Bangladesh, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, France, Finland, Ivory Coast, Lithuania, Panama, Peru, Portugal, Romania, and Uruguay, among others. This trend has increased in recent years. Argentina has not yet included genocide in its penal code, but all the bills presented—including one currently under discussion in Parliament—protect political and other groups.

Special Rapporteur is a title given to individuals who bear a specific mandate from the UN Human Rights Council (or the former UN Commission on Human Rights), to investigate, monitor, and recommend solutions to human rights problems.

There have been two major United Nations documents on genocide, the Ruhashyankiko Report of 1978 and the Whitaker Report of 1985. Ruhashyankiko recognized that the Convention was only a “point of departure” for preventing and punishing genocide but advised against modifying the Convention. Instead, he suggested preparing new instruments where appropriate.

In his report, Whitaker cites Donnedieu de Vabres’s criticism of the Convention: “Whereas in the past crimes of genocide had been committed on racial or religious grounds, it was clear that in the future they would be committed mainly on political grounds” (Whitaker Report, para. 36).

*Ethnocide* is the destruction of the culture of a people, as opposed to the people themselves. *Ecocide* is a large-scale destruction of the natural environment.

Unfortunately, this article of the Spanish Penal Code was suppressed in 2010.

According to the court, the new Article 607, which follows the terms of the Genocide Convention of 1948, did not allow for the inclusion of the victims within the category of a “national group.”


Ibid.

See, for example, Alison Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*: *Genocide in Rwanda* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999). In fact, this was also noted by the ICTR judges.

*Bjornlund, Markusen, and Mennecke, “What Is Genocide?”

*Prosecutor v. Rutaganda* (Case No. ICTR-96–3), Judgment and Sentence, 6 December 1999, paras. 56–58, 373. The mixed approach, case by case, is also found in *Prosecutor v. Rutaganda*.
v. Musema (Case No. ICTR-96-13), Judgment and Sentence, 27 January 2000, paras. 162–163. The idea of the subjective definition of victims by the perpetrator had been previously developed in Prosecutor v. Musema and by Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analysis and Case Studies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), a line taken before and after such a work by many researchers in the field of genocide studies.


29. The countries are the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, and the Central African Republic. In the fourth case, Sudan, ICC intervention followed a reference by the Security Council of the UN (UNSC Resolution 1593).


32. This was clearly the case in Latin America, Indonesia, and several other countries during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, and even Rwanda during the 1990s.

33. See the Introduction to this book.


37. Ibid.


48. However, when I first spoke with Henry Huttenbach and Frank Chalk about applying their definitions to the Argentine case, it was not evident to them at all that the concept of genocide was appropriate. This section is partly based on conversations I have held with them, as well as with Eric Markusen, Enzo Traverso, Bruno Groppo, Barbara Harff, and Ted Gurr, among others.


50. This section was inspired by conversations with three Argentine philosophers, Héctor Schmucler, Gregorio Kaminsky, and Pablo Dreizik, and an Italian researcher, Enzo Traverso, each with different ideas on this matter. Obviously, the conclusions I present here are my own.

51. “Lectures on the History of Philosophy,” cited in Reading Hegel: The Introductions (Melbourne: re.press, 2008), 225. “In order to comprehend what development is, what may be called two different states must be distinguished. The first is what is known as capacity, power, what I call being-in-itself (potentia); the second principle is that of being-for-itself, actuality (actus). If we say, for example, that man is by nature rational, we would mean that he has reason only inherently or in embryo: in this sense, reason, understanding, imagination, will, are possessed from birth or even from the mother’s womb. But while the child only has capacities or the actual possibility of reason, it is just the same as if he had no reason; reason does not yet exist in him since he cannot yet do anything rational, and has no rational consciousness.”


53. The identity of the victims in a genocidal process is defined by the perpetrators, not by the victims. An extreme case is Günther Fleischel, an enthusiastic Nazi and SA man in Hanover, who discovered he was a Jew after his father died in 1937. Imprisoned and later deported to the Riga ghetto, Fleischel remained loyal to Hitler until his death in the ghetto in 1943.

54. See my comment on Gobineau below.


56. In contrast, the Nazis and many criminologists of the 1930s believed that criminal and asocial behavior was genetically transmitted.

57. In December 1977, Sisters Alice and Léonie were kidnapped along with ten other people connected with Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo after requesting the government to divulge the names and whereabouts of the “disappeared.” The two nuns were repeatedly tortured before being thrown out of a plane while still alive into the sea.

58. Argentina’s Military Code of Justice, which included the death penalty, was not abolished until 2008.

59. The General Jewish Labor Bund was a Jewish socialist party in Poland that promoted the political, cultural, and social autonomy of Jewish workers.

60. As mentioned in the Introduction to this book, Goldhagen later essentialized Germans as being anti-Semitic.
When the Nazis adopted Gobineau’s theories, they were forced to edit his work extensively, much as they did with Nietzsche’s writings.

Interestingly, the Nazis also applied the term of “criminal” to describe their victims, including Jews. This is brilliantly examined in two books that have not received the attention they deserve, despite their original and provocative approach. The works in question are Philip W. Blood, *Hitler’s Bandit Hunters: The SS and the Nazi Occupation of Europe* (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2008); and Eric A. Johnson, *Nazi Terror* (New York: Basic Books, 2000).

Nevertheless, the Nazi heritage was not limited to the use of concentration camps, torture, and mental breakdown. The Argentine perpetrators also treated certain victims with unusual cruelty, particularly Jewish prisoners.

This process operates in conjunction with the attempted “conversion” of society through terror. These practices—the effect of the concentration camp “outside” the concentration camp—will be discussed in detail in chapter 9.

CHAPTER 2    TOWARD A TYPOLGY OF GENOCIDAL SOCIAL PRACTICES


3. Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*.


8. See Roger Smith, “Human Destructiveness and Politics: The Twentieth Century as an Age of Genocide,” in *Genocide and the Modern Age*, ed. Walliman and Dobkowski. However, I disagree with Smith’s arguments about the delegitimization of ideologies or end of “grand narratives,” which are so typical of postmodern discourse.


10. In the case of constituent genocide, “us” and “them” components of the stigmatization process are still under construction. In the case of postcolonial genocide, the “outsider” was formerly one of “us,” and with reorganizing genocide—what Kuper and Smith call “domestic genocide”—they are still one of “us” and so need to be subtyped,
or mentally segregated from the rest of society. In my view, the Nazis were the first to segregate others in this way through stigmatization or “construction of negative otherness.” For the modes of construction of the notions symbolic of “self” and “outsider” see in Noufouri Hammurabi, *Del Islam y los árabes: Acerca de la percepción argentina de lo propio y lo ajeno* (Islam and the Arabs: On the Argentine perception of self and other) (Buenos Aires: Cálamo de Sumer, 2001).

11. I would like to acknowledge Barbara Harff’s work for the concept of postcolonial genocide. In my earlier work, I confused this type of annihilation with colonial genocide and reorganizing genocide. But it has its own distinctive nature and—in the twentieth century—has served as a bridge between constituent (foundational) and/or colonial genocide and the more specific form of reorganizing genocide.

12. The “concentration camp” aspects of Nazism and the Argentine genocide of this fourth type will be examined in detail in chapter 9.


15. With respect to the Amazon, see Andres Ruggeri, “Un caso de genocidio y conquista en la Amazonia: los Waimiri Atroari y la dictadura militar brasileña” (A case of genocide and conquest in the Amazon: The Waimiri Atroari and the Brazilian military dictatorship). This paper was first presented at the First International Meeting on Analysis of Social Practices of Genocide, Buenos Aires, November 2003, and is published on the CD of the meeting.

16. For more on Algeria, see María Eugenia Jeria and Rosario Figari Layús, “La construcción de otredad en Algeria: El tratamiento político del otro en la colonización y en la guerra contrarrevolucionaria en el marco de la liberación nacional” (Construction of otherness in Algeria: The political treatment of the other during colonization and the counterrevolutionary war in the context of national liberation), a paper presented in the framework of the graduate course “Analysis of Genocidal Social Practices,” Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Buenos Aires, December 2004.


20. “Apuntes sobre novedad y articulación: El nazismo y el genocidio nazi” (Notes on novelty and articulation: Nazism and the Holocaust), in *Genocidio: La administración de
CHAPTER 3 RECONCILING THE CONTRADICTIONS OF MODERNITY

1. Foucault has explored several aspects of technologies of power, and this discussion builds on his analyses. A technology of power typically affects a range of human behaviors. In Discipline and Punish (1975), Foucault focuses on modes of control and management of the physical body. He expands on this approach in his History of Sexuality (1976–1983), where he includes the role of moral regulation. He analyzes moral regulation from another perspective in Technologies of the Self (1982). Moreover, in lectures published under the title Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège De France, 1975–76, Foucault analyzes the consequences of these technologies of power at what he calls the “bio-political” level for mass population control and how technologies of power might contribute to hegemonic ways of understanding and representing the world.


5. Immanuel Kant, Über die verschiedenen Rassen der Menschen (On the Different Races of Man), 1775.

6. The text of this speech was sent to Argentina by the Argentine consul in Munich, Ernesto Sarmiento, and can be found in the Testimony Archive, Centre for Social Studies, from the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Worship of Argentina. A surprising feature is the accompanying note by Sarmiento: “In the hope that this work may be of some use to our country on the burning issue of race about which we have heard so much recently and, although at home it has not taken on the passion or proportions that it has taken on in Europe, I hope this matter can be studied by those in the know and, adapting it to our ways, could be used for a future study of the Immigration Law that will contemplate the new situations arising from new problems in which Argentine medical staff could (and why not?) use [sic] the most interesting and necessary type of race for the future of humanity.”


9. In the worst of the European colonies, the Belgian Congo, anywhere between two million and fifteen million are thought to have been murdered. See Adam Hochschild, *King Leopold's Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa* (New York: Mariner Books, 1998), 62.


12. “Instrumental reason” focuses on how rather than why things should be done. According to the Frankfurt School, instrumental reason was responsible for the rise of fascism and the reduction of human beings to objects of manipulation.

13. Note that the natural law is not an external source of authority, nor should it not be confused with the physical laws of nature, which science aims to describe.


15. A protoform of reorganizing genocide emerged in late fifteenth-century Spain after the Inquisition was created to discover and punish false converts to Christianity. Spain—Europe’s first modern nation-state—was a confessional state, and Jews (in 1492) and Muslims (in 1501) were given the choice of conversion or exile. With the advent of colonialism, repression of the domestic Other gives way to repression of the colonial Other (e.g., Native Americans or the inhabitants of Africa, Asia, or Oceania) before repression returns to Europe in the late nineteenth century with the suppression of the Paris Commune (1871), a wave of anti-Semitic pogroms in Ukraine and Poland (1881–1884), and the suppression of the Russian revolutionaries of 1905.


19. The following case shows how this uncertainty works. A man reported a Jewish woman to the Gestapo for prostitution and having sex with German men. The man later admitted that he had also slept with the woman, but had decided to denounce her before she could denounce him. The man was sentenced to just one year in jail for his cooperation. Cited in Robert Gellately, *The Gestapo and German Society: Enforcing Racial Policy, 1933–1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 686. For a version of events that gives a greater weight to the role of the authorities, see Eric A. Johnson, *Nazi Terror: The Gestapo, Jews, and Ordinary Germans* (New York: Basic Books, 1999).


21. Document included in the AIDA report (International Association for the Protection of Performers, Victims of Repression) and included by Prudencio García in *El drama de la autonomía militar* (The drama of military autonomy) (Madrid: Alianza, 1995).


24. The “picket” movement of unemployed workers that emerged in Argentina in December 2001 (although it had been building for several years) seems to be a clear attempt to break this pattern of domination. But it, too, has been hindered by fragmentation and sectarianism. In particular, leftist political parties have tended to create divisions and subdivisions within the movement.


29. Ibid.

**CHAPTER 4 DISCOURSE AND POLITICS IN HOLOCAUST STUDIES**

1. To understand the debate about “normalizing” Nazism, it is suggestive to address the controversy between Martin Broszat and Saul Friedländer about ways to write the history of Nazism. A summary of this debate can be found in Ian Kershaw, *The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation* (Baltimore: Edward Arnold, 1985). Some aspects of this discussion are also developed in Charles Maier, *The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).

2. I have taken the concept of “Non-Germans” from Kershaw’s *Nazi Dictatorship* since German concerns about Nazism were different.

3. Because of its popularity, *Hitler’s Willing Executioners* was one of the first works on Nazism to be translated into Spanish. It was published by Taurus, Madrid, in 1998. Works critical of Goldhagen have also been translated, including Omer Bartov’s *Ordinary Monsters*; Christopher Browning’s *Daniel Goldhagen’s Willing Executioner*; and Hans Mommsen, “The Thin Patina of Civilization: Anti-Semitism Was a Necessary, but by No Means a Sufficient, Condition for the Holocaust,” in the compilation by Federico Finchelstein, *Germans, the Holocaust, and Collective Guilt: The Goldhagen Debate* (Buenos Aires: Eudeba, 1999), summarizing the discussion generated in Argentina among Holocaust historians by Goldhagen’s work.

4. See, for example, Lucy Davidowicz’s classic book, *The War against the Jews* (New York: Pocket Bantam Books, 1986), or Yehuda Bauer’s *The Holocaust in Historical Perspective* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1982), as the most representative.
5. At the launch of his controversial book in Germany, Goldhagen himself explained that the “German disease” had been “cured” after the war, making this sedative attempt at interpretation ridiculous: the pathological condition of the German people was locked away at some moment in the past and simply left there, with no risk for the present.


7. It should be noted that not all views of uniqueness are linked to demonization theories. However, because the two perspectives are complementary, they tend to become interwoven.

8. See the repeated questioning of this position by authors such as Leo Kuper, Frank Chalk, Henry Huttenbach, Vahakn Dadrian, Israel Charny, Helen Fein, Barbara Harff, Eric Markusen, among some others. In view of the fact that many Holocaust researchers did not even recognize the Armenian genocide as such, dissent with the notion of uniqueness eventually led to the creation of the International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS) in 1994. IAGS brings together experts from around the world—including some researchers from the field of Holocaust studies—who are concerned with comparative issues within a more open view of genocide studies. The European Network of Genocide Scholars (ENOGS) was set up with similar objectives. In 2005, it became the International Network of Genocide Scholars (INOGS). Most of the IAGS Resolutions were passed during the 1990s and concerned the Armenian case, as this was the first case to disrupt the uniqueness frame.


10. See Steven Katz’s classic work *The Holocaust in Historical Context* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990) and Deborah Lipstadt’s *Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory* (New York: Plume, 1994). A good example of Yehuda Bauer’s early position is *The Holocaust in Historical Perspective*. His later position can be found in *Rethinking the Holocaust* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).

11. See the Introduction for Hayden White’s notion of history as a narrative framework.


13. Silvia Sigal used a similar argument to question the use of the term “genocide” to describe events in Argentina between 1974 and 1983 in a controversial speech at the Second International Meeting on the Construction of Collective Memory, organized by the Comisión Provincial de la Memoria (Memory Commission of the Province of Buenos Aires). Her speech was published in *Revista Puentes*, no. 5, Centro de Estudios por la Memoria, La Plata, 2001. Other points raised by Sigal are discussed in chapter 1 of this book, and in chapters 7 and 8 in connection with Argentina.

14. For a detailed discussion of what was and what was not new about the Holocaust, see the suggestive work of Guillermo Levy and Tomás Borovinsky: “Apuntes sobre novedad y articulación: El nazismo y el genocidio nazi” (Notes on novelty and connectedness: Nazism and the Holocaust) in *Genocidio: La administración de la muerte en la modernidad* (The management of death in modernity), ed. Daniel Feierstein (Buenos Aires: Eduntref, 2005).

15. The policies of resettlement in the East and the Madagascar Plan were developed at the highest levels of Nazi decision making.


18. The philosopher Jürgen Habermas responded to Nolte’s book accusing Nolte and others of trying to whitewash the German past by ignoring the specifically German aspects of the Holocaust. This gave rise to an intellectual and political controversy in West Germany—the _Historikerstreit_ (literally, “historians’ quarrel”)—which lasted from 1986 to 1989. At the heart of this dispute was the relationship between history and memory.


22. In his graphic novel *Maus*, Art Spiegelman narrates a young man’s attempts to talk to his father, a survivor of Nazi death camps. In this narrative, Jews are depicted as mice, Germans as cats, Poles as pigs, and Americans as dogs. Appealing to the conventions of the comic book, *Maus* is written with exquisite sensitivity and depth. However, it raises the issue of whether there are legitimate and illegitimate genres for narrating an experience like the Nazi genocide. Certain classical historians see the use of a “minor” genre like the comic book as a heretical and disrespectful way to refer to such events. White’s ideas are very stimulating in the context of this debate.


24. For White’s analysis of this specific topic, see “Historical Emplotment and the Problem of Truth,” in *Probing the Limits of Representation: Nazism and the “Final Solution,”* ed. Saul Friedlander. However, this is not his best work on the issue of modes of representation.

25. Roland Barthes distinguishes between “transitive” and “intransitive” writing along the lines of the older formalist distinction between “literary” and “nonliterary.” Hayden White, in “Historical Emplotment and the Problem of Truth,” 46, argues that “intransitive writing, in rejecting figurality and narrative emplotment altogether, effaces the subjectivity of the author by allowing the facts of the Holocaust, in their ‘actuality’ and ‘literalness’ to speak essentially for themselves.”


27. Nevertheless, this is not White’s best work, and he rather spoils his case by claiming that the alternative to a nondistancing approach is what in Greek is traditionally called “middle voice”—a middle ground between the active and passive voice, the intentional and the involuntary—that White identifies in the writings of Primo Levi.


CHAPTER 5  THE PROBLEM OF EXPLAINING THE CAUSES OF THE NAZI GENOCIDES

1. For discussion of the work produced in Germany itself, particularly in the Federal Republic but also in the Democratic Republic, see Ian Kershaw, *The Nazi Dictatorship* (Baltimore: Edward Arnold, 1985).


5. Some examples of these discussions can be found in Hannah Arendt, *The Jew as Pariah: Jewish Identity and Politics in the Modern Age*, ed. Ron H. Feldman (New York: Grove Press, 1978)—in particular her exchanges of letters with Walter Laqueur and discussions with her former friend, Gershom Scholem.


7. The already cited works of Ernst Nolte portray Nazism as a “reaction” to Bolshevism, minimizing Nazi crimes by presenting them as a pale reflection of those committed in the Soviet Union. As mentioned earlier, Jürgen Habermas’s criticism of Nolte’s position sparked a debate known as the Historikerstreit among German historians. Here we are more interested in certain mythic visions of Nazism in Germany and how these allowed the work of a revisionist like Nolte to find an echo among historians and among ordinary Germans tired of being presented as evil madmen by European and American historians during the 1950s and 1960s. Nolte put into words and justified previously silenced attempts to “normalize” German history in works such as those of Martin Broszat.

8. In truth, these discussions are also associated with a political history, not only in Germany but also in Italy and France, as pointed out by Daniel Lvovich in *Historia reciente de pasados traumáticos: De los fascismos y colaboracionismos europeos a la historia de la última dictadura argentina* (Recent history of traumatic pasts: From fascism and European collaborationism to the history of Argentina’s last dictatorship), an unpublished original work which the author kindly allowed me to read and which was later published in *Historia reciente: Perspectivas y desafíos para un campo en construcción* (Recent history: Prospects and challenges for a developing field), ed. Marina Franco and Florence Levin (Buenos Aires: Paidós, 2007). Lvovich’s comparisons with Argentina’s dictatorship are highly relevant to my own work here.


11. Ibid.

12. Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1951). This book was Arendt’s passport to academic prestige. The dissemination of her work on totalitarianism and the respect she earned contrast strangely with the widespread hostility toward her work on Adolf Eichmann almost ten years later, see *Eichmann in Jerusalem* (New York: Penguin Classics, 2006).


16. This perspective degenerated into overt racism two decades later with Samuel Huntington’s theory of a “clash of civilizations” or references to the incompatibility between the West and the “Arab world” by authors such as Giovanni Sartori. See Giovanni Sartori, *Pluralismo, multiculturalismo e estranei. Saggio sulla società multietnica* (Pluralism, multiculturalism, and strangers: Essay on multiethnic society) (Milan: Rizzoli, 2000); and Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations* (New York: Polity Press, 2000).


20. At the political level, this blindness was even more acute. During the discussions at the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the positions of the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc (with the exception of the Yugoslav delegation, under the leadership of Tito, who developed a position diametrically opposed to this view) refused to look beyond the most basic ways of understanding genocide, insisting that genocide be defined in terms of the social practices of Nazism and thus preventing it from being understood as a constituent practice of modernity (even as a constituent practice of capitalism). The exclusion of political groups from the definition of genocide (discussed in detail in chapter 1 of this book) was due largely to the stubborn opposition from the Soviet Union to its inclusion (to prevent discussion of its own processes of repression). This exclusion, however, made the Convention inapplicable in genocidal processes that suppressed national liberation struggles (Indochina, Algeria, Vietnam) and the annihilation of the communist opposition in Indonesia or East Timor (occupied by Indonesia from 1975 onwards) or genocides in Latin America inspired by the National Security Doctrine. All these events, moreover, met with a lack of response from the Soviet Union as part of its strategy of appeasement in the Cold War. For the case of East Timor after the Indonesian invasion, see John Taylor, “Encirclement and Annihilation: The Indonesian Occupation of East Timor,” in *The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical Perspective*, ed. B. Kiernan and R. Gellately (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 163–185. For internal repression in Indonesia, ten years earlier, see Leslie Dwyer and Degung Santikarma, “When the World Turned to Chaos: 1965 and Its Aftermath in Bali, Indonesia,” in the same volume. See, too, Robert Cribb, “Genocide in Indonesia, 1965–66,” *Journal of Genocide Research* 3, no. 2 (June 2001), 219–239.

21. For a detailed discussion of these concepts and operations in modernity, see chapter 3.


25. Bauman’s Modernity and the Holocaust has already been mentioned extensively in this book, but this approach seeks to insert it into the discussion between Mayer and Browning, trying a third approach to the question of why the Jewish people were annihilated under Nazism.

26. This issue is dealt with in another context and with other cultural groups in the highly suggestive work of Hammurabi Noufouri, Del Islam y los árabes: Acerca de la percepción argentina de lo propio y de lo ajeno (Of Islam and Arabs: About Argentina’s perception of self and others) (Buenos Aires: Editorial Cálamo de Sumer, 2001). Hammurabi Noufouri is the Chair Professor of Islamic and Mudejar Art at the School of Architecture, Design, and Urbanism of the University of Buenos Aires. I have taken the concept of “identity based on exclusion” from various works of his.

27. This original article by Tony Barta, much cited by genocide scholars, appeared as “Relations of Genocide: Land and Lives in the Colonization of Australia,” in the excellent early compilation by Isidor Wallimann and Michael N. Dobkowski, Genocide in the Modern Age: Etiology and Case Studies of Mass Death (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987). It is a real pity that Barta did not continue this line of analysis. Despite proving problematic and questionable, it is certainly original.

CHAPTER 6 RESHAPING SOCIAL RELATIONS THROUGH GENOCIDE

1. In writing this chapter I have drawn principally on the testimonies of Bruno Bettelheim, Viktor Frankl, Jaika Grossman, Schmerke Kaczerginsky, Primo Levi, Marek Edelman, Tzivia Lubetkin, Charles Papiernik, Jack Fuchs, Iankl Nirenberg, and Irene Birnbaum. I have also included material from my own personal interviews with Charles Papiernik, which consisted of about twenty meetings over the period of a year. A selection of these were published in Charles Papiernik, Ser humano en Auschwitz: Conversaciones con Charles Papiernik (To be human in Auschwitz: Conversations with Charles Papiernik) (Buenos Aires: Acervo Cultural Editores, 2000). I also had occasion to personally interview Marek Edelman in a long talk lasting about three hours when he visited Buenos Aires in 1990.


3. Ibid., 324.


7. This obsession can be found also in other genocides, as in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, where dozens of testimonies from survivors of detention camps confirm that the perpetrators employed the most diverse forms of torture and mistreatment to “break” their victims psychologically.


12. Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 256.


15. Ibid., 97.

16. Ibid., 142.

17. Ibid., 125.

18. Gregory Stanton, “The 8 Stages of Genocide,” www.genocidewatch.org/eightstages.htm. What these two approaches do have in common, however, is that both are “nonlinear” and identify processes that are interrelated and overlapping rather than specific events.

19. This structure is derived from my earlier work, Cinco estudios sobre genocidio (Five studies on genocide) (Buenos Aires: Acervo Cultural Editores, 1997), and later Seis estudios sobre genocidio: Análisis de relaciones sociales: Otredad, exclusión, exterminio (Six studies on genocide: Analysis of social relations. Otherness, exclusion, extermination) (Buenos Aires: EUDEBA, 2000). At the time of publication, these books were only available in Spanish.

20. Charles Papiernik, interview in the context of this research, November 1997. Other elements of his testimony can be found in Una vida (A life) (Buenos Aires: Acervo Cultural Editores, 1997). Part of our talks are included in Ser humano en Auschwitz.

21. Adorno wrote a lucid analysis of the self-contradictory character of the accusations made by anti-Semitic ideology. See T. W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford, The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper & Row, 1950). It is very suggestive that highly prejudiced subjects criticize Jews, in the same survey or interview, as being too closed and too invasive, labor hoarding and work-shy, hypersexual and seductive and also withdrawn, subverters of the social order and also its most conspicuous defenders.

22. There are even homegrown Argentine versions of these conspiracy theories, from the myth that Jewish soviets or councils had been set up in Buenos Aires to the “Plan Andinia,” a hoax about an alleged Jewish plot to conquer Patagonia spread by a right-wing professor at the University of Buenos Aires in 1971. During the “Tragic Week” of 7–14 January 1919, many Jews were tortured and interrogated to make them “confess” to their part in setting up the Judeo-Bolshevik soviets in Buenos Aires. Similarly, the journalist Jacobo Timerman was tortured during the military dictatorship of 1976–1983 for information—among other things—about the “Plan Andinia.”

23. This effect should not be overlooked. In Nazi Germany, the victims often asked to be isolated in order to escape the harassment to which they were subjected. At the same time, others demanded that the victims be removed so that they would not have to witness more unpleasant scenes of public degradation. Thus, once the Other has become a “negative Other,” the victims are blamed for any discomfort or unpleasant situations that occur when they are punished for continuing to live among “normal folk.” In Argentina, the actions of the AAA (Anti-Communist Alliance Argentina) and other paramilitary forces during the years 1974 and 1975 caused large sectors of the population to argue for the “need” to regulate these actions within an institutional framework. The state terrorism of the military dictatorship was implemented to meet
this “need and to organize terror, murder, and repression from the appropriate institutional bodies: the security forces” (i.e., the police and the military).

24. Discussions of why the Nazis moved from a policy of forcing Jews to emigrate to a policy of extermination often assume that the earlier policies failed, as if the Nazis’ only goal was to separate the “different” from the “same.” One wonders, however, if migration actually solves the problems of eradicating certain social relations (autonomy, solidarity, and critical thinking), or if it is just an intermediate step toward genocide. What would have happened if the policy of expelling Jews from Germany had succeeded? Would it have been enough to expel stigmatized groups, as the Inquisition had done in Spain? Or did death play a central role in this new technology of power in constructing power relations? Could the Nazis have broken down social relations within the German state—let alone within the Reich or across the whole of Europe—without the use of terror involving mass annihilation? See, for example, Christopher Browning, The Path to Genocide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). For the role of the term “Nazi terror” in Nazi genocidal social practices, see Eric A. Johnson’s Nazi Terror: The Gestapo, Jews and Ordinary Germans (New York: Basic Books, 1999). For a discussion of the role of terror in Argentina, see the early work of Juan Corradi: “The Modes of Destruction: Terror in Argentina,” in Telos 54 (1982–83); A veinte años del golpe: Con memoria democrática (Twenty years after the camp: With democratic memory) (Rosario, Argentina: Homo Sapiens, 1996); and Juan Corradi, Patricia Weiss Fagen, and Manuel Antonio Garretón, Fear at the Edge: State Terror and Resistance in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).

25. In general, this is how isolation is perceived in the logic of the ghetto. The perception was similar in the first proto-Jewish ghetto in the city of Venice starting in 1515.


27. Ibid., 83.


31. This position is very clear, since it sees a “political difference.” For an approach that treats the problem in terms of a “generation gap,” see Israel Gutman, Youth Movements in the Underground and the Ghetto Revolts (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1971).


33. On this point, see Feierstein, Seis estudios sobre genocidio, especially chapters 4 and 5.

34. Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, chap. II.

35. For a more extended account of what I understand by this concept, see my Cinco estudios sobre genocidio and Seis estudios sobre genocidio.


37. Both the “humanity” Arendt conceded in Adolf Eichmann as an exemplary parent figure and the genocidal potential in ordinary people discovered by Milgram were too painful, and almost impossible to swallow for Jewish scholars of the time, who preferred to treat the Shoah as a metaphysical phenomenon. (See chapters 4 and 5.)
38. The Nazis also applied “reeducation” policies for “undisciplined workers” and even for some political dissidents and those accused of “crimes of opinion” (who were sent to labor or concentration camps). On the other hand, Jews, Gypsies, homosexuals, “asocials,” “Bolsheviks,” and Russian political prisoners were considered “racially degenerate,” and thus irredeemable, with definitely no place in the new German society. Members of these groups were at first shot publicly and/or secretly, and later annihilated in mass extermination camps.


43. Ibid., 160.

44. For a detailed account of the effects of the Argentine genocide on language, see Marguerite Feitlowitz, A Lexicon of Terror: Argentina and the Legacies of Torture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).


PART 3 TOWARD A HISTORICAL BASIS

1. In this review of different causal explanation of events, I have excluded several important texts on the period—for instance, Elizabeth Jelin’s work on memory, the early works of Hugo Quiroga and César Tcach, the suggestive writings of Ludmila Catela da Silva on the ways different actors represent experience, or Beatriz Sarlo’s reflections on the status of survivor testimony, among others. This is because these works are concerned with other issues, and not with providing causal models of events. Some of them will be referred to later to account for specific aspects of the phenomenon under study. I have also omitted many reflections by political militants of the 1980s and 1990s, particularly those that have not been published in academic works. Although some selection is always necessary, I recognize that my understanding of the different consequences of genocidal social practices in Argentina has undoubtedly been influenced by the writings of these very different political groups. Moreover, although they are concerned with a comprehensive description of how concentration camps functioned in Argentina rather than with a broader analysis of the period, I am indebted to Alipio Paoletti’s work, Como los nazis, como en Vietnam: Los campos de concentración en Argentina (Like the Nazis, like Vietnam: The concentration camps in
Argentina), published by the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo, Buenos Aires, 1996. (In fact, the book was written in 1986 and first published in 1987.)

2. While this concept of closure is my own, I have since found a similar use of the term in Maria Sondereguer, “Los relatos sobre el pasado reciente en Argentina: Una política de la memoria” (The stories about the recent past in Argentina: A politics of memory), which appeared in Iberoamericana: Ensayos sobre letras, historia y sociedad, no. 1 (Madrid: Editorial Iberoamericana, 2001). Sondereguer, in turn, develops the concept used by Inés González Bombal in “Nunca Más: El juicio más allá de los estrados” (Never again: Judgment beyond the courtroom”), published in Carlos Acuña et al., Juicios, castigos, memorias: Derechos Humanos y justicia en la política argentina (Judgments, punishments, memories: Human rights and justice in Argentine politics) (Buenos Aires: New Vision, 1995).

CHAPTER 7 EXPLAINING GENOCIDAL SOCIAL PRACTICES IN ARGENTINA

1. This brings us to an ethical issue that I must address before starting this chapter. During the years I have been teaching “Analysis of Genocidal Social Practices” at the University of Buenos Aires, I have refused to include on my reading lists texts written by perpetrators of genocide. However, after discussions with the members of my chair team, and with many students, I began to doubt my initial decision, realizing that such readings are necessary despite the moral disgust they produce. I had to accept that it is not wise to ignore the words of the perpetrators, particularly when, as in the cases of Acdel Vilas, Ramón Camps, or Genaro Díaz Bessone, they are not mere manifestos “denying” the events, but are instead attempts to promote a particular way of understanding these events and that, one way or another, they recognize the nature of the practices involved—forced disappearance, torture in interrogations, harassment and murder of civilians, among others—and try to justify them within the framework of a causal explanation.

2. Vilas Acdel’s book is titled Tucumán: Enero a diciembre de 1975 (Tucumán: January to December 1975) and is reproduced in full at www.nuncamas.org. All quotes and comments in this chapter are taken from this source.

3. “Meeting place of detainees” was one of the euphemisms used by the military to refer to the concentration camps.

4. The Camps quotations are taken from Caso Timerman: Punto final (The Timerman case: Full stop) (Buenos Aires: Tribuna Abierta, 1982). It is noteworthy that the expression “full stop” that Camps uses to close off Argentina’s genocidal experience was also the one chosen by Alfonsín’s democratically elected government for its first impunity law in 1986.

5. Montoneros (Spanish: Movimiento Peronista Montonero—MPM) was a Peronist urban guerrilla group that engaged in armed struggle from 1970 to 1979. The name alludes to nineteenth-century caudillo-led armies. The definitive split between left- and right-wing Peronism came in 1973 with the Ezeiza massacre, which marked Perón’s return from eighteen years of exile. Members of the Triple A (Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance), who were sworn enemies of Montoneros, opened fire on the crowd awaiting Perón’s arrival at Ezeiza airport. Perón sided with the Peronist right wing and expelled Montoneros from the Justicialist party in May 1974. By 1977 Montoneros had been almost completely destroyed.

6. For Díaz Bessone, in addition to the “National Project” drafted by the military dictatorship’s Ministry of Planning, see Ramón Genaro Díaz Bessone, Guerra revolucionaria

7. A de facto government is one that has come to power by unconstitutional means—usually by force.


10. Reynaldo Benito Bignone, El último de facto II: Quince años después (The last de facto government II: Fifteen years later), published at his own expense at San Miguel Copy Center, San Miguel, Argentina, 2000.

11. Corrupt practices among both civil servants and businesspeople were the product of a worldview based on unbridled individualism and selfishness, which can be thought of as an adaptive response to a terror that had destroyed nearly every trace of solidarity.


13. Ibid., 40.


17. Whether these armed leftist organizations were “terrorists” or not is an issue that—without ever being made explicit—divides many of the approaches described in this chapter. Historically, terrorism is associated with violence directed against civil society as a whole, where the random nature of the victims is precisely what spreads terror. Terrorism involves attacks on highly populated areas and places such as bars, restaurants, railway stations, and supermarkets, sending the message that no one is safe. In contrast, the armed left in Argentina in the 1960s and 1970s—however legitimate or illegitimate their attacks may have been—never indulged in “random” terrorism with the one exception of the bombing of the building of Federal Coordination, an area used by the security forces and not a “neutral” area frequented by the general public. By describing these groups as “terrorists” and comparing them with other political groups that do (or did) practice terrorism—for instance, long-standing political organizations like ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, a Basque nationalist organization) or the IRA (Irish Republican Army) and even many Palestinian armed groups and important sectors of Islamic fundamentalism in the twenty-first century—not only creates confusion but seems to endorse the new security doctrines promoted by the United States since the 9th Twin Towers tragedy. Although the latter most certainly was a “terrorist” attack, the doctrines to which it gave rise use “terrorism” to describe a wide range of activities, from any type of armed action to simply belonging to certain ideological or religious groups, or participating in the antiglobalization movement or indigenous organizations, among others.
18. Elsa Drucaroff, “Por algo fue: Análisis del ‘Prólogo’ al Nunca Más, de Ernesto Sabato,” (There must have been a reason: Analysis of the “Preface” to Never Again by Ernesto Sabato), Tres Galgos, no. 3 (November 2002).


20. This need, as I have just noted, continues to exist today. For not only was the debate never settled, it was barely started.


22. I am not trying to justify the armed organizations of the left, let alone their political leaders who continued to insist on a policy of “offensives”—with terrible consequences for both the members of these organizations and their relatives—when what was required was a “strategic retreat.” What I am saying is that however misguided they were, we should never lose sight of the fact that these political groups were also victims of a genocidal process.


24. In fact, Hilb and Lutzky are among the few authors who cite Marín. They criticize his work harshly, especially his description of the period as a “war.”

25. Juan Carlos Marín, Los hechos armados, Argentina, 1973–1976: La acumulación primitiva del genocidio (Armed actions, Argentina 1973–1976: The primitive accumulation of genocide) (Buenos Aires: PI.CA.SO./La Rosa Blindada, 1996). (Although I used this edition, which is the most revised and expanded one, Marín wrote the original version during the dictatorship, and there are several editions before this one.)

26. Marín did not write a new book on the subject until 2001—a brief treatise on civil society, genocide, and the perpetrators, which will be discussed later.

27. Marín added Marx’s idea of “primitive accumulation” as the subtitle to the 1996 edition.

28. This is “La conciliación de los victimarios: Una larga historia a propósito del genocidio” (The reconciliation of the perpetrators: A long history on the subject of genocide), mimeo, 2001, later published as a supplement by the Popular University of the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo in the newspaper Página 12.

29. I have taken the expression “adiaphorization” from Zygmunt Bauman. While it appears in several of his works, I think it acquires its deepest sense in Postmodern Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993). There he uses the term—taken from the ecclesiastical concept of adiaphoros—to account for behavior that arises from “moral indifference,” from an inability to evaluate in terms of merit or sin, of good or evil—in short, from a loss of moral judgment. We could understand this adiaphorization as resulting from “subjective leveling,” an idea that will be developed in chapter 9.


31. Ibid., 174.

32. Ibid.
33. Despite the fact that Duhalde clearly defines the notion of “terrorist state” in his book, some authors have chosen the term as a way of denying the appropriateness of the term “genocide” in this context. This contrasts with the repeated use of both concepts in Duhalde’s book and the priority given to the term “genocide” by the Argentine Commission on Human Rights (CADHU) in its legal complaints, which inspired Duhalde’s book.


37. Ibid., 165–193.

38. I am referring to articles such as “Psychology and Politics: The Question of Exile,” “Philosophy and Terror,” “Exile: War and Politics, an Exemplary Sequence,” all written between 1980 and 1990. These articles were published together with some earlier ones in León Rozitchner, *Las desventuras del sujeto político. Ensayos y errores* (The sorrows of the political subject: Trials and errors) (Buenos Aires: Ediciones el Cielo por Asalto, 1996).

39. Some of these ideas are taken up by Pilar Calveiro in *Política y/o violencia: Una aproximación a la guerrilla de los años setenta* (Policy and/or violence: An approach to the guerrillas of the seventies) (Buenos Aires: Norma, 2005). However, this is a first and somewhat hasty sketch. Unlike her other works, it slips at times into insults about the alleged dementia, madness, or irrationality of the armed left. Nevertheless, many of her ideas are incisive and merit deep and complex discussion, which, as I have said, has barely begun.


41. For Jacoby’s work, see *El asalto al cielo* (The assault on heaven), mimeo (Buenos Aires: Cuadernos del CICSO, n.d.).

42. Rozitchner, *Las desventuras del sujeto político*, 149.

43. I am aware that this conclusion differs radically from that of Beatriz Sarlo in *Tiempo pasado: Cultura de la memoria y giro subjetivo, Una discusión* (Time past: The culture of memory and the subjective turn, A discussion) (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 2005). In the Argentina of the 1980s and 1990s, Sarlo finds a wealth of evidence and ways of representing the events—a view I do not share with her. Very little of the evidence analyzed by Sarlo comes from survivors of the concentration camps; most of it comes from militants who had managed to avoid the clandestine detention centers—either by sheer good fortune or because they were able to flee the country.

44. Pilar Calveiro, *Poder y desaparición: Los campos de concentración en Argentina* (Power and disappearance: The concentration camps in Argentina) (Buenos Aires: Colihue, 1998). The author wrote the book in 1994, but it was only published—in an abridged form—four years later.

45. Ibid., 11. This metaphor can be compared with that developed by members of the Association of Ex-Disappeared Detainees about concentration camps as a “bouillon cube” or “stock cube” for a “social soup” that affected the whole population, an idea which will be developed later.

46. Ibid., 88.
47. Ibid., 92, 134.
48. Ibid., 169.
50. Ibid., 214.
51. Ibid., 212.
52. Ibid., 213.
53. Ibid., 214.
54. To my mind, his clearest work on the issue is “¿Hubo una guerra en la Argentina?” (Was there a war in Argentina?), published in *La escena contemporánea*, no. 3 (1999), 12–21.
55. Ibid., 17.
57. Ibid., 207.
58. For a review of the concept by Romero himself in a contentious and controversial article about the consequences of certain uses of memory, see Luis Alberto Romero, “Recuerdos del Proceso, imágenes de la democracia: luces y sombras en las políticas de la memoria” (Memories of the process, images of democracy: Lights and shadows in the politics of memory), a paper presented at the History and Memory Colloquium, Faculty of Humanities and Education Sciences, National University of La Plata, April 2002, and published in *Clio & Asociados*, no. 7 (2003). Despite these problems, the text points out a key issue for this book: the alienation produced by democratist texts on the “process” that took place between 1976 and 1983—an exculpatory alienation of society as a whole that demonized the military and has contributed little to the understanding of the Argentine genocide. These points are analyzed later in this book. I am indebted to Daniel Lyovich for pointing out to me some of the features of Romero’s article as well as the discussion that this triggered.
60. One wonders whether there was also the “spirit” of a “new era” that produced these “new” approaches on the issue. That is, if one can ever get rid of the “spirit of time.” On this topic, see the review article of Romero by Luciano Alonso and María Laura Tornay, “Políticas de la memoria y actores sociales (a propósito de un ensayo de Luis Alberto Romero)” (Politics of memory and social actors [à propos an essay by Luis Alberto Romero]), *Clio & Asociados*, no. 8 (2004).
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65. Vezzetti rules out the concept of war for much the same reasons as Duhalde. This leads to a dilemma: how to deny the concept of war without depoliticizing the conflict. This dilemma is posed very clearly by Mattini, who stresses that the answer to this question does not necessarily constitute the focus of the debate, namely, whether or not there was a war and how to affirm the political nature of the victims while recognizing that they were not necessarily militarized or at least not armed, even though they clearly politicized and opposed the regime. Vezzetti rules out the concept of genocide on the basis of the distinction between “being” and “doing” (already analyzed and criticized in chapter 1 of this book) and the political nature of the events in Argentina, which he tries to differentiate from the “apolitical” nature of the Nazi genocides, a problem I have already discussed in previous chapters. It is worth noting that most of these views are based on a partial or superficial knowledge of other genocidal processes, including the genocide carried out by the Nazis and their concentration camps, but also other important and problematic cases such as the genocide in Rwanda (Vezzetti cited this as a paradigmatic example of “ethnic” genocide) in which, however, the political factor was central in the choice of the victims of the massacre and where, paradoxically, the ethnic character was called into question. Indeed, the very complexity of the issue led to interesting developments in the proceedings of the International Criminal Tribunals, which tried those cases, and in case law about genocide. For a discussion of the legal ramifications of this discussion on genocide and politics, see, for example, the work of Matthias Bjørnlund, Eric Markusen, and Martin Mennecke, “¿Qué es el genocidio? En la búsqueda de un denominador común entre definiciones jurídicas y no jurídicas” (What is genocide? In search of a common denominator between legal and nonlegal definitions), in *Genocidio: La administración de la muerte en la modernidad* (Genocide: The management of death in modernity), ed. Daniel Feierstein (Buenos Aires: EDUNTREF, 2005).

66. The question of whether to characterize armed leftist groups in Argentina as “terrorists” not only implies a reasonably symmetrical balance of forces between victims and perpetrators, but has complex and troubling political consequences because of the way the term “terrorist” is currently used in the new “doctrines of international security.”


70. See, in particular, ibid., 70–71.
1. The child was the daughter of an assistant to the seminar held by the Association of Ex-Disappeared Detainees at the Human Rights Free Chair, Faculty of Arts, University of Buenos Aires, in 1997.

2. The reflections on this problem contained in this chapter have been greatly enriched by the contributions of successive generations of students to the course “Analysis of Genocidal Social Practices” that I teach at the University of Buenos Aires. In particular, I would like to highlight the work of Mercedes Aramburu, Eva Camelli, Verónica Daián, Rosario Figari Layús, María Eugenia Jeria, Jimena Juárez, Bettina Presman, Ana Lía Rodríguez, Gabriela Roffinelli, María Cristina Scarsi, and Lior Zylberman, from whom I have taken several suggestions.

3. This is what allows us to observe the spirit of the times that surrounded negativized figures in Argentina, a mixture of militancy, youth, and critical rebelliousness well illustrated by Alejandro Cattaruzza in “El mundo por hacer: Una propuesta para el análisis de la cultura juvenil en la Argentina de los años setenta” (A world in the making: A proposal for the analysis of Argentine youth culture in the 1970s), Entrepasados. Revista de Historia 6, no. 13 (1997). However, Cattaruzza fails to realize that the greater or lesser degree of coordination between the cultural climate and armed left-wing organizations was not a “misunderstanding” but precisely the kind of social relations and practices that the perpetrators set out to eliminate, and which constituted their definition of “subversive crime.”


6. This and the following quotes are taken from Judge Baltasar Garzón’s indictment in November 1999 of Adolfo Scilingo and other Argentine perpetrators for terrorism and genocide. For a detailed analysis of the role of the Catholic Church during the genocide in Argentina, see Emilio Mignone, Iglesia y Dictadura (Church and dictatorship) (Buenos Aires: Universidad Nacional de Quilmes and Página⁄12, 1999) (first edition by CELS, 1986); Horacio Verbitsky, El silencio: De Paulo VI a Bergoglio: Las relaciones secretas de la Iglesia con la ESMA (The silence: from Paul VI to Bergoglio: The secret relationships of the Church with ESMA) (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 2005); and Martin Obregon, Entre la cruz y la espada: La Iglesia Católica durante los primeros años del “Proceso” (Between a rock and a hard place: The Catholic Church during the first year of “the Process”) (Quilmes: National University of Quilmes, 2005).

7. Mariana Heredia, “La identificación del enemigo: La ideología liberal conservadora frente a los conflictos sociales y políticos de los años ‘70” (Indentification of the enemy: Liberal conservative ideology in the face of social and political conflicts of the 1970s), a paper presented at the 22nd Conference of the Latin American Sociology Association (ALAS), Concepción, Chile, 1999, unpublished, courtesy of the author.

8. Ibid., 12.

9. See chapter 2—in particular, the proposed typology of genocidal social practices.

11. José Luis D’Andrea Mohr, Memoria debida (Buenos Aires: Cocihue, 1999), 70. For the education policies of the dictatorship, see the work of Carolina Kaufman, ed., Dicataura y Educación (Madrid: Miño y Dávila, 2001).

12. Racism “contaminates” genocide because it is unnecessary for the destruction and remaking of social relations. Ethnic persecution increases the number of victims to be killed without any increase in the overall efficiency of the process. Of course, I use the term “contaminate” ironically.

13. For an analysis of the connections between genocidal social practices and the neoliberal economic model in Argentina, see Guillermo Levy’s “Consideraciones acerca de la relación entre raza, política, economía y genocidio,” in Hasta que la muerte nos separe (Until death do us part), ed. Feierstein and Levy. While these policies have been applied in other societies that did not necessarily undergo a genocidal process, note that Argentina was unique as regards the level of social integration achieved after Peronism. This society was more difficult to fracture than other more fragmented societies or societies where inequality had never been overcome.

14. Note that the link between the political and the criminal (mediated by ethnicity) was also present in Nazism in the persecution of “asocial” people, especially during the period from 1936 to 1938 and again toward the end of the war as the Nazi regime crumbled. This process is traced in depth by Robert Gellately, The Gestapo and German Society: Enforcing Racial Policy, 1933–1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); and particularly in Philip W. Blood, Hitler’s Bandit Hunters: The SS and the Nazi Occupation of Europe (Dulles, VA: DC Potomac Books, 2008).


16. Ariel Armony, La Argentina, los Estados Unidos y la cruzada anticomunista en América Central, 1977–1984 (Argentina, the United States and the anticommunist crusade in Latin America) (Quilmes: National University of Quilmes, 1999). Again, it is possible to trace the genealogies. In the case of the Nazis, Gellately stresses that the arrests that began in the late 1930s (when persecution became truly massive and then led to mass murder) were based on prior intelligence work consisting of tens of thousands of files about the political behavior of the German population. See Gellately, The Gestapo and German Society.

17. The history of these intelligence investigations in Argentina and their continuance after the genocide can be seen in one of the few files that were recovered about the functioning of the intelligence agencies. This is the DIPBA file (Intelligence Directorate of the Police of the Province of Buenos Aires), recovered by the Provincial Committee of Memory of the Province of Buenos Aires.

18. For an account of the Ezeiza massacre, see Horacio Verbitsky, Ezeiza (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 2002).

19. For the origins and activities of the Triple A, see Ignacio González Jansen, La Triple A (Buenos Aires: Contrapunto, 1986).

21. This tolerance of governmental and/or quasi-governmental groups, however, is one of the elements that transformed criminality in Argentina. Once democracy was restored, these groups (and later ones), made up of common criminals, members of the security forces, and prominent members of the political apparatus, devoted their energies to fund-raising for local politicians and their political brokers—especially in the province of Buenos Aires. This action has led to a corrupt political system, in which social welfare services are traded for votes, and a corrupt police force, which systematically participates in organized crime. These new social relations are also a result of the disappearance of reciprocal relations and the legitimizing of an informer culture through genocide.

22. Teresa Meschiatti, interviewed as part of the course “Analysis of Genocidal Social Practices,” Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Buenos Aires. Eric Johnson also notes the “selective” nature of Nazi terror implemented by the Gestapo. Johnson’s research shows that that terror was never haphazard or indiscriminate. For Johnson’s work, see *Nazi Terror* (New York: Basic Books, 2000).


24. Juan Carlos del Cerro “Colores” used to point this out to various survivors of Argentine concentration camps and detention centers. See “Archivo de Testimonios de Sobrevivientes de Campos de Concentración en Argentina” (Testimonials of Argentine concentration camp survivors) Course on analysis of genocidal social practices and Association of Ex-Disappeared Detainees.

25. There were six death camps: Auschwitz-Birkenau (one of the three subcamps of Auschwitz), Treblinka, Belzec, Sobibor, Majdanek, and Chelmno. Because their sole function was to systematically eliminate people, they were different from the thousands of concentration camps, such as Dachau, Buchenwald, Ravensbruck, or Theresienstadt. The fundamental difference lay not in the number of people killed at each site, but in the way this annihilation was organized and the innovative use of “factories” producing “collective death.”


27. It is possible, as Guillermo Levy pointed out to me, to think of the Argentine case as part of a continentwide application of the National Security Doctrine—which would change this comparison somewhat, though not in its core linked to the differential role of the extermination camp.

28. If the political expression of these statements can be found in Ernesto Sabato’s foreword to the CONADEP, their clearest cinematographic expression may be the film directed by Héctor Olivera, *La noche de los lápices* (The night of the pencils) (1986), in which victims appear as decontextualized youngsters—young people of the 1970s who speak and think like young people of the 1980s—who are only interested in trivial matters such as student tickets and are absolutely isolated and critical of those they describe as the “crazy Montoneros.” This type of political perception cannot be found
in any school in the 1970s, and much less so in La Plata, where the link between social organizations and political movements was highly effective, even among students—a fact that determined the relatively high percentage of victims from this town. The expression of this same type of approach in educational textbooks is summarized in Inés Dussel, Silvia Finocchio, and Silvia Gojman, *Haciendo memoria en el país del Nunca Más* (Constructing memory in the country of Never Again) (Buenos Aires: EUDEBA, 1997), where, again, young people are ahistorically represented, as youths from the 1980s, with interests, passions and ways of relating from the 1980s that are transferred to the youths of the 1970s, as if that were an essential attribute of youth. A counterpoint to this mode of cultural analysis can be found in the aforementioned article by Cattaruzza who, not coincidentally, was a politicized young man during the 1970s, and for whom this lack of historical authenticity is presumably even more inconsistent with his own memories.

29. It should be noted, however, that for a new generation to ask questions or problematize existing hegemonic discourses, a persistent hard core of older militants was necessary. It was the members of human rights organizations, trade unionists, political, student, and social activists, intellectuals, and survivors of the concentration camps who continued to resist and discuss these matters, which generated discourses and representations that would provoke questions and criticisms among the new generation from 1996 onward.

30. The fact that this task is still necessary tells us no more than that. Also, without the clarity and political will to seize it, it cannot be captured by new ways—no less effective for being new—of structuring a new “symbolic enactment,” both of the Argentine genocide and of the events of 2001.

31. Roberto Jacoby, “¿Se puede vencer el miedo?” (Can one overcome fear?), *Crisis*, nos. 47 and 48 (1986).

32. To Graciela Daleo I owe many of the reflections in this paragraph. She was also kind enough to let me have a transcription of the 1996 and 1997 seminars, which have extraordinary value. I am aware that Graciela’s reflections are, in turn, the product of discussions among members of the Association of Ex-Disappeared Detainees, as she never forgets to point out to me. However, the chain of concepts—always collectively contributed—can always be traced further back. I have come to these conclusions through the word of Graciela Daleo. To Elsa Drucaroff, I am indebted as well, for having noted the various symbolic uses of the phrase “Never Again” and the ways in which it can be redefined.

33. I find it much more difficult to assess the case of Guatemala, which shares elements of both processes. I do not understand it clearly enough to decide whether it is more similar to the Southern Cone genocides or to those in Central America. The consequences of the genocide in Guatemala are comparable to those of the Southern Cone. The scale of social rebellion, however, and its military challenge to the social order make it more similar to the Central American cases. This ambiguity makes it difficult to analyze satisfactorily.

34. It is highly significant that Alfonsín’s impunity laws had placed property rights above the right to life, establishing that theft (as opposed to murder, torture, illegal deprivation of liberty, or rape) should be excluded from both the Full Stop Law and the Law of Due Obedience.

36. Elsa Drucaroff, “Por algo fue: Análisis del prólogo al Nunca Más de Ernesto Sábato” (There was a reason: Analysis of the prologue to Sábato’s Never Again), Tres Galgos 3 (November 2002).


CHAPTER 9  CONCENTRATION CAMP LOGIC

1. Juan Gelman, “Químicas” (Chemistry), Página12, 10 February 1996.

2. It was thought that this story—their “own” story—would delegitimize attempts to convict the perpetrators. The hegemonic discourse about the victims during the 1980s was that all were saints or angels. This discourse colored both the CONADEP Report and the Trial of the Juntas.

3. For this line, see the work of Miguel Khavisse and Eduardo Basualdo, including Acerca de la Deuda Externa (About the termination of debt) (Quilmes: National University of Quilmes, 2002), among many other works published by the Center of Argentine Workers and the Department of Economics at FLACSO. The link between these policies and the need for a genocidal process is shown very suggestively in Mirta Mántaras, Genocidio en Argentina (Buenos Aires: Cooperativa Chilavert, 2005). An earlier work that suggests the existence of a joint political and economic project can be found in Juan Villarreal, “Los hilos sociales del poder” (Social strings of power), in Crisis de la dictadura argentina: Política econômica y cambio social [1976–1983] (Crisis of Argentina’s dictatorship: Political economy and social change [1976–1983]), by Eduardo Jozami, Pedro Paz, and Juan Villarreal (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 1985), 201–283.

4. Social facilitation studies the ways in which an individual’s behavior is affected by the real, imagined, or implied presence of others.

5. In contrast, most major account holders were warned by the banks in advance to move their funds abroad or to safe-deposit boxes.

6. The bombing was an attack on the Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA) Jewish community center in Buenos Aires on 18 July 1994, in which 85 people were killed and over 100 others were injured.

7. The República Cromañón nightclub fire occurred in Buenos Aires on 30 December 2004 and killed 194 people. The tragedy symbolized corruption and incompetence in Argentina, since the club was given a permit despite a lack of basic safety measures like fire extinguishers.

8. Guillermo O’Donnell, “¿Y a mí qué mierda me importa? Notas sobre sociabilidad y política en Argentina y Brasil” (And why the fuck should I care? Notes on sociability and politics in Argentina and Brazil), in Contrapuntos: Ensayos escogidos sobre autoritarismo y democratización (Counterpoint: Selected essays on authoritarianism and democratization) (Buenos Aires: Paidós, 1997). While O’Donnell uses the term in another sense, there is undoubtedly a shift in the meaning of this expression as a result of genocide.

9. Transcription of the seminars held by the Association of Ex-Disappeared Detainees (AEDD) in 1996 and 1997 (hereafter SAEDD). I would like to thank Graciela Daleo for lending me these transcriptions.

10. Transcription of SAEDD.
This image is found in various testimonies, although the names were different in different concentration or extermination camps. In Auschwitz these people were known as *Muschelmänner* or Moslems (perhaps because they had gone into their shells like mussels but also because the SS looked on Arabs as fatalistic); in Majdanek they were called *Gamel* (bowls, because food was their only interest), in Dachau *Kretiner* (idiots), and in Stutthof *Krüppel* (cripples—because of their immobility). In Mauthausen, they were *Schwimmer*, kept afloat by playing dead, while in Buchenwald the same people were known as *müde Scheichs* (tired sheikhs—fatalistic Arabs again). At the women’s camp of Ravensbruck, *Schmuckstücke* (jewels) was a euphemism for *Schmutzstücke* (filth). In all these cases, the images refer to the same social process: the loss of any capacity for self-determination. The “living dead” lost all control over their own lives. See Bruno Bettelheim, *Surviving and Other Essays* (New York: Knopf, 1979).

“An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct. In its conceptual purity, this mental construct cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality.” Max Weber, *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, trans. and ed. Lutz Kaelber (New York: Free Press, 1949), 90.


Calveiro, *Poder y desaparición*.

Bettelheim, *Surviving and Other Essays*.

Street sweeps involved an ex-detainee accompanying a group of repressors in random searches for former activist-friends in cafes, train stations, border crossings, and so forth where political dissidents might be circulating.

Interview with Mario Villani, Project “Archive of testimonies from survivors of clandestine detention centers in Argentina,” Chair of Analysis of Genocidal Social Practices, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Buenos Aires, and Association of Ex-Disappeared Detainees (AEDD). This story was told earlier by Villani at the hearings of the trial against the military junta in 1985.


Gellately estimates that more than 100,000 prisoners passed through the Nazi concentration camps during 1933 and 1934, mostly political dissidents. Their average stay was between one and two weeks and not more than one thousand prisoners died. However, the experience profoundly shook German society and paved the way for Nazi totalitarian rule. See Robert Gellately, *The Gestapo and German Society: Enforcing Racial Policy, 1933–1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
22. For a list of the main camps, see http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/cclist.html.

23. For the impact of such practices in Chile, see Elias Padilla Ballesteros, *La memoria y el olvido: Detenidos desaparecidos en Chile* (Memory and forgetting: Disappeared detainees in Chile) (Santiago: Ediciones Orígenes, 1995).

24. The impact of genocidal social practices on the hardest hit and most socially excluded sectors of Argentina has been little explored. A preliminary study can be found in Eva Camelli and Verónica Daián, “El genocidio en las villas de Buenos Aires durante la última dictadura militar (a través del testimonio de los sobrevivientes)” (Genocide in the slums of Buenos Aires during the military dictatorship [through the testimony of survivors]), a paper presented at the First International Symposium on the Analysis of Genocide as a Social Practice, Buenos Aires, 2003, published in the CD of the symposium.

25. The criticism of this type of discourse is very well developed in León Rozitchner, *Las desventuras del sujeto político* (The sorrows of the political subject) (Buenos Aires: El Cielo por Asalto, 1996).

26. For the concept of “mortification,” see Goffman, *Asylums*. I am indebted to Beatriz Granda for the concept of “confusion” and some of the ideas in this paragraph. An analysis of types of confusion can also be found in Sylvia Bermann, “Sociedad, psicología y tortura en América Latina” (Society, psychology, and torture in Latin America), published in Sylvia Bermann, Lucila Edelman, Diana Kordon, et al., *Efectos Psicosociales de la represion política* (Cordoba: Goethe Institute, 1994), 11 to 29.


29. Ibid.


33. By “walls” detainees meant hoods, bandages, etc. that prevented them from seeing. In contrast, “symbolic walls” prevent people from seeing other people or observing their physical environment even if they keep their eyes open. In both cases, the purpose of the “wall” is to place subjects in a situation where they can be seen but cannot see.

CHAPTER 10 IN CONCLUSION


3. An interesting reflection on the functioning of these processes with reference to the notion of “Arabs” and the way they are perceived in Argentina can be found in Hammurabi Noufouri, *Del Islam y los árabes: Acerca de la percepción argentina de lo propio y de lo ajeno* (Islam and the Arabs: About Argentine perceptions of self and others) (Buenos Aires: Cálamo, 2001).


5. As Jaspers himself observed, “People do not like to hear of guilt, of the past; world history is not their concern. They simply do not want to suffer any more; they want to get out of this misery, to live but not to think. There is a feeling as though after such fearful suffering one had to be rewarded, as it were, or at least comforted, but not burdened with guilt on top of it all.” Karl Jaspers, *The Question of German Guilt*, 2nd ed. (New York: Fordham University Press, 2001), 21.

6. The “intellectual and symbolic consequences” of this legal process, which I call “processes of transfer of guilt or responsibility,” are discussed in chapters 7 and 8.

7. This type of “confusion” has, in my view, played a critical role in creating a culture of impunity extending to all kinds of behavior in Argentine society, not only to genocide.

8. By way of illustration, it is worth rereading Alejandra Correa’s interviews with various leading figures from the world of culture in the first half of 2001. These appeared in *Revista Puentes*, no. 4, Center for Memory Studies, La Plata, July 2001. It is noteworthy that, unlike the concentration camp survivors, almost none of these celebrities admits to any moral guilt for not doing more than they actually did as journalists, academics, lawyers, and artists. No one feels that they should have given their lives to save others and most slip easily into the role of abstract victim without imagining that their omissions—however justified they may have been—helped to make genocide successful.

9. For a more complete version of Levinas’s ideas on this subject, see his books *Totality and Infinity* (1969) and *Otherwise than Being: Or Beyond Essence* (1998).