Notes

Series Editor’s Foreword


Introduction


3. Ibid., pp. 246 and n163, 247 and n164, 254 and n238, 255 and n240.


Chapter 1. Personal Madness

1. My analysands who permit me to cite their words and experiences have richly contributed to this writing and to my perception and thinking. I offer my heartfelt gratitude to them for teaching me.


11. Ibid., pp. 5, 112.
16. Ibid., p. 334.
17. Ibid., pp. 238n91, 253, 270, 314 and n271, 365.
18. Ibid., p. 298n189, painting 107.
19. Ibid., pp. 244, 295, 296.
22. Ibid., pp. 238, 298.
24. Ibid., p. 264.
25. Ibid., pp. 246, 300n204, 325.
26. Ibid., p. 366.
27. Ibid., p. 300.
28. Ibid., pp. 288, 300 and n204.

Chapter 2. Collective Madness

3. Ibid., p. 352.

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6. Director Steven James interview by Terry Gross, *Fresh Air*, National Public Radio, Woodbury, Conn., August 1, 2011. Another striking example of making space is the work of Leymah Roberts Gbowee, executive director of the Women’s Peace and Security Network Africa, based in Accra, Ghana. As founding member of Women in Peace Building, she organized collaborative efforts from nine of Liberia’s fifteen counties. Groups of women gathered their strengths and numbers to end pernicious war by dressing in white, praying, and establishing a sex fast, withdrawing conjugal relations with their husbands, until peace was sought and established. When one meeting of men threatened to break up without results in peace building, the women surrounded the meeting place, preventing the men’s exit until they worked further and reached agreement. Leymah Gbowee was later awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

7. Anthony Lane, “Hack Work: A Tabloid Culture Runs Amok,” *The New Yorker*, Aug. 1, 2011, p. 25; Jung, *The Red Book*, pp. 300, 333, 339, 359. I must note another boon from closer connections between cultures through the Internet. We can better discern the underlying image from which a culture grows and, surprisingly, see some of that other image appearing in our own culture. I was struck by Astrid Berg’s noting that Africa does not labor under the Cartesian body-mind split duality that Western Europe and America do. We must labor to reach the unity beneath and beyond the either/or of binary thinking. Berg says that although “there is no single African philosophy and culture . . . there are common underlying motifs.” Berg sees the South African notion of Ubuntu—the spirit of of concern for and recognition of each other, of meaning “a person is a person because of persons,” “I am because we are”—as such a motif. This motif is illustrated by the idea, which Margaret Lawrence shares, that we are all parents to all children, responsible for sheltering and fostering their creativity, that we are one community. Berg, a white psychiatrist-psychoanalyst in Capetown, South Africa, and Lawrence, a black psychiatrist-psychoanalyst in Harlem, New York City, share this same view. (See Astrid Berg, “Ubuntu: A Contribution to the ‘Civilization of the Universal,’” chap. 16 in *The Cultural Complex: Contemporary Jungian Perspectives on Psyche and Society*, ed. Thomas Singer and Samuel L. Kimbles, pp. 244–45).


18. Ibid., pp. 290, 291n150. New Yorkers remember the crime against Kitty Genovese, a young woman attacked at night coming out of the subway and pursued down the street. She screamed again and again for help. People heard, but no one ran to help. No one called the police in time to save her life. When this was reported in the press, many of us dreaded that we, too, might have succumbed to such passivity.

19. A frequent misunderstanding assumes that feeling types do not think well, are subject to inferior thinking. In fact, their thinking just differs from that of thinking types. Thinking for the feeling types, when developed, tends to emerge from very deep roots in their psyches, differentiating the fundamental value of a point of view or a question and issuing in profound and original thoughts.

*Notes to pages 27–34* (99)
Chapter 3. The Compelling Complex

1. In the fashions of psychoanalysis, the new emphasis of Relational Analysis is on what Relationists call “self-states”—what Jung called our complexes. The Relationists question the notion of a unitary self, preferring the idea that we are made up of numerous self-states that need to talk to one another. Jung had this idea about complexes and indeed locates madness in a complex overcoming us so we are in it instead of it being in us, though Jung sees our self as both multiple and one. He sees the psyche as dissociating more than repressing. The complexes, or self-states, can break apart from one another, segregate some into neighborhoods not to be entered, and give others a lot of energy and development and defend them closely. From this picture we can see the interpenetrating of what is inside us with what is outside us in actual neighborhoods and actual defended privileges denied to others.


2. W. R. Bion, *Attention and Interpretation*.  

(100) Notes to pages 34–42
4. Ibid., pp. 239n97, 254 and n229, 308, 323, 347 and n85. See also C. G. Jung, *The Symbolic Life*, vol. 18 of *Collected Works*, paras. 369, 374.
6. Masud H. Khan, *The Privacy of the Self*, chap. 7, p. 98. Khan says the analyst must recognize the patient’s practice of self-cure and its value and not reduce it to resistance. In fact, he continues, very few illnesses are hard to cure; what is hard to cure the patient of is his self-cure.
15. For discussion of loss of subjectivity and loss of objectivity as two forms of madness, see Ann Belford Ulanov, *The Unshuttered Heart: Opening to Aliveness and Deadness in the Self*, chaps. 1 and 2.
17. I am indebted to Annie Boland, MD (personal communication), for bringing this idea freshly to mind again.

*Notes to pages 43–56* (101)
22. Ibid., pp. 320–21.
23. Ibid., p. 321. A comment is pertinent here relevant to contemporary research of the brain. Jung is “hearing” from the Cabiri, so to speak, that psyche and its reality are not equated with the physical brain and its reality. Both are valid and they are interconnected, even mutually dependent, but they are not the same. For example, recent brain research can inform us where in the brain we dream, its site. But that does not tell us what a dream means.
34. Analogy can be made to the current crises around the earth, running out of energy, shortages of water and clean air. These problems can be seen as communications from our environment about its right for its own life, not just to be co-opted to our aims and greeds, annexed to our conscious exploitation. Another kind of relation of human and nonhuman is hinted at in this crisis, an interpenetrating of both/and to create a wholeness with space for both.

(102) Notes to pages 56–70
Chapter 4. From Compelling Complex to Creative Return

2. The acid from vomiting attacks the teeth, which often must be extracted.
5. A moving example of this is Sue Grand’s account of allegiance to the Good Breast model of being a therapist and finding instead she disliked her patient. Sue Grand, *The Hero in the Mirror: From Fear to Fortitude*, pp. 120ff.; see also Ann Belford Ulanov, “Hate in the Analyst,” chap. 16 in *Spiritual Aspects of Clinical Work*, pp. 433ff.
8. Primary process thinking is Freud’s term for mental processes that reign over the instinctual id. It is subject to the pleasure principle, and these processes admit of no distinction between inner and outer, subject and object, self or other. Instinct-backed impulses abound and press for instant gratification. Mechanisms of condensation and displacement are prominent. Such mentation characterizes the unconscious, dreams, children’s mental processes, and those of psychopathology. Jung’s term, nondirected thinking, is similar to Freud’s primary process, but Jung emphasizes that this mentation expresses our inner reality through instincts, images, and affects and is found in addition to the above list as well in myths, religions, fantasies, fairy tales, creativity, and the arts. This mentation is not pathological but is seen as the natural given life of the psyche from which directed thinking, characterizing consciousness, develops. It turns pathological only when it
dominates a person’s mental functioning, overwhelming consciousness. See Neville Symington and Joan Symington, *The Clinical Thinking of Wilfred Bion*, p. 92: “This is a particular fact that suddenly occurs to the analyst which makes sense of the disparate elements previously noted. What before may have been a jumble of fragmented material now becomes unexpectedly coherent and understandable; meaning suddenly dawns.”


21. For a very funny example of such coincidence, see Ladson Hinton, “The Enigmatic Signifier and the Decentered Subject,” *Journal of Analytical Psychology* 54, no. 5 (2009): 647, 648. After much analytical work, Hinton describes a critical turning point that led to a new path in his analysand: “a timeless moment between us, and a capacity to experience his core enigma as creative rather than merely as a terrifying and destructive gap. . . . One day he came into the room and lapsed into a pained silence that felt very different than the silence of the ‘gaps.’ Then he suddenly gave me a piercing, angry look and burst out, ‘What in the hell are we doing here?!’ With little hesitation the words sprang from my lips, ‘Fuck if I know!’ I was totally startled by my own words, as was he. It was very tense for a moment, and time seemed strangely suspended. After this pause in some atemporal-seeming space, he flushed and I flushed, and we broke down in mutual peals of deep belly laughter.” Later Hinton says, “Our enigmas touched, opening a space for renewed life in our relationship, and a new spaciousness in his being as a subject . . . a shift or partial re-creation of his subjectivity.”


29. Ibid., p. 299.


*Notes to pages 81–86 (105)*
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40. Ibid., p. 356.

Kearney sums up four “reductions” that open this space. The first “transcendental reduction” of Husserl “brackets our natural attitude of habit and opinion to return to the ‘essences’ of meaning . . . to the invariant essential structures underlying them [that] would lead us . . . to an inner realm of transcendental consciousness” (p. 5). The second “ontological reduction” of Heidegger is “from the essences of beings to being as being” (p. 5). The third “donological reduction” is Jean-Luc Marion’s “return to the gift” and to “saturated phenomenon’ . . . to the giveness of the gift” (pp. 5–6). Kearney adds a fourth “reduction”: “back to the everyday . . . of simple, embodied life where we may confront the other ‘face-to-face’” (p. 6). “We discover ourselves *before* God in a new way, recovering, by way of creative repetition, what was always there in the first place, but remained unseen” (p. 7).