Notes to Part I

1. This essay is based on the inaugural Multaqa Sultan Haji Ahmad Shah Lecture, Kuantan, October 14, 2002, an event organized by the Institute of Islamic Understanding, Malaysia.

2. See also the comments on these verses by Mustansir Mir in chapter 3.2 in this volume; al-Nisāʾ 4:58, 59.


4. al-Bukhārī, 3:592.


6. Further comments on hisba and naṣṭha can be found in Kamali, Freedom of Expression in Islam.

7. It is no coincidence that activist poet-priest Daniel Berrigan is one of Isaiah’s more perceptive modern interpreters. See his Isaiah: Spirit of Courage, Gift of Tears (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1996).

8. The books of Joshua through Kings.


11. As in Isaac Watts’s hymn: “Jesus shall reign where’er the sun / Does his successive journeys run; / His kingdom stretch from shore to shore, / Till moons shall wax and wane no more.”


13. Citations to psalms will be made parenthetically in text.

14. Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 1991), 348, explains the distinction: “The Right of God is so called not because it is of any benefit to God, but because it is beneficial to the community at large and not merely to a particular individual.”

15. In Shi’a interpretation, obedience to “God and the Messenger” also involves obedience to the imams.

16. Fuṣūṣāt 41:34. The principle of “repelling [evil] by that which is better,” idfa billattī hiya aḥsan, expresses the Islamic belief that good deeds have the capacity to erase bad deeds and can be applied even to limit the application of just retaliation (qiṣāṣ), albeit the latter already has built into
it the limitation of proportionality as compared with the pre-Islamic blood feud.

17. Kamali, *Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence*, 245, translates *istihsân* as “equity in Islamic law” but notes a distinction between this and Western conceptions of equity based on natural law: “*Istihsân . . . is an integral part of the Shari‘a, and differs with equity in that the latter recognises a natural law apart from, and superior to, positive law."


19. “Instituted,” *tassō* (1b); “resist,” *antitassō* (2a); “appointment,” *diatagē* (2a).

20. *Diakonos* is unlikely to have any technical Christian meaning here, and Ernst Käsemann shows that throughout this passage Paul is using the “vocabulary of Hellenistic administration.” Käsemann, *Commentary on Romans*, trans. G. W. Bromiley (London: SCM, 1980), 353.

21. Mark 12:17, and parallels—the same verb *apodidōmi* occurs in both the Gospels and the Epistle.

22. *Phobos* and *timeō* in the New Testament are generally reserved for God.

23. Acts 16:37, 22:25–28, though against this must be set Philippians 3:20: “our citizenship is in heaven.” *Purōsis*—the same word as in Revelation 18 for divine punishment of the enemies of God’s people.

24. Even in Revelation 18, the resistance to the state enjoined for humans is passive—though it correlates with an active opposition to Rome on the part of God.

25. Cf. Jeremiah 51:45, where the prophet in God’s name summons his people out of Babylon.

26. Other *aḥādith* are referred to as *ḥadīth nabawī*, utterances of the Prophet himself.


30. Cf. the pagan tribesman’s cry: “I am of Ghaziyya; if she be in error, then I will err; And if Ghaziyya is guided aright, I go right with her!” Toshihiko Izutsu, *Ethico-Religious Concepts in the Qur‘ān* (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1966), 55. This is precisely the “my country right or wrong” of twentieth-century jāhiyya. For Arabian tribalism, see further ibid., 55–72; M. M. Bravmann, *The Spiritual Background of Early Islam: Studies in Ancient Arab Concepts* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972), 67.
31. al-Bukhārī, Śulḥ, 11.
32. al-Bukhārī, Aḥkām, 6; Muslim, Imāra, 13.
34. Ḥadīth qudrī narrated by al-Bukhārī, Aḥkām, 6; Muslim, Imāra, 13.
37. Abū Da‘ūd, Witr, 32.
41. Cf. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Alternative Paradigms: The Impact of Islamic and Western Weltanschauungen on Political Theory (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994), 102: “The necessity of human cooperation has been explained by Muslim thinkers on the basis of the virtue of love rather than the natural feeling of competition as the basic psychological stimulus.”
42. Muslim, Imāra, 40.
44. For medieval Islamic separations of religious and political institutions, see Ilkay Sunar, “Civil Society and Islam,” in Civil Society, Democracy and the Muslim World, ed. Elisabeth Özdalga and Sune Persson (Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute, 1997), 14–15. A few exceptions (usually Sufis) to this rule nonetheless bear mentioning. Perhaps the clearest example is Qāḍī Burhān al-Dīn of Sivas (d. 1398), a religious scholar who by a series of promotions in the state’s administration became prince of a sizable territory. Vehbi Cem Aşkun, Kadi Burhanettin: Sivas sultanı (Eskifelhir: Akdeniz Matbaai, 1964); William Chittick, “Sultan Burhān al-dīn’s Sufi Correspondence,” Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes 73 (1981): 33–45. Other examples would include the Emir ‘Abd al-Qādir of Algeria and ‘Uthmān dan Fodio in Hausaland.
45. The case is made, for instance, by John Gray, Al-Qaeda and What It Means to Be Modern (London: Faber, 2003); also L. Carl Brown, Religion and State: The Muslim Approach to Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 41: “The political ideology advanced by Ayatollah Khomeini and the political reality of a government actually led by mullahs, represents a sharp break with tradition.”

47. South Africa’s policy was, significantly, largely designed by the country’s justice minister, the Muslim jurist Dullah Omar.


49. Ibn Hishām, Strāt Rasūl Allāh (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr, 1980), 2:1257–58. As is so often the case, the parallel with the Jerusalem sanctuary, which was created “before the world,” is striking. Geza Vermes, Jesus the Jew: A Historian’s Reading of the Gospels, new. ed. (London: SCM Press, 2001), 117.


53. al-Ghazālī, Remembrance of Death, 200; for the principle of radd al-maẓālim, see 198–205.