January 30, 1933, brought the National Socialists into power in a not-so-silent coup. It was a “revolution,” as Joseph Goebbels noted in his account of the moment, even though the transition, like the previous twenty-two separate coalition governments during the Weimar Republic, was the result of a normal shift of power.\(^1\) At the beginning of 1933, aging President Paul von Hindenburg appointed a minority cabinet headed by—but not, he hoped, controlled by—Adolf Hitler.

The meaning of Hitler’s ascendance for the idea of a Jewish or a German or a German Jewish cosmopolitanism was clear, however. Jewish cosmopolitans—and indeed, non-Jewish German cosmopolitans who did not support the regime after July 1933—were quickly transformed into “exiles” and “refugees.”\(^2\) This nomenclature represented more than a mere shift in terms; it constituted an epistemological shift in identity. While fleeing from National Socialist antisemitism, some assimilated Jews suddenly understood themselves as Jewish for the first time.\(^3\) Indeed, Jewish exile reified the condemnation of Jews as cosmopolitans and nomads by the new political order and its advocates such as Martin Heidegger. German cosmopolitans of the Left, such as Heinrich Mann, president of the Literature Section of the Prussian Academy of Arts, became exiles, no longer voluntary cosmopolitans, even though they returned to places such as Paris where they had been part of the new cosmopolitan Europe.\(^4\)

In some cases, however, such as that of the poet Stefan George, who was offered Mann’s former post, exile was indeed voluntary, at least in 1933. For Jews, especially with the passage of the first round of antisemitic laws that
year, leaving Germany was rarely voluntary in the same sense. They had become “wanderers,” in an older understanding of Jewish cosmopolitanism, even when they thought their sojourn would be very short-lived. Cosmopolitanism, however, was never banished as a theme in the writing of Jewish thinkers. Often struggling with their status as exiles and refugees and simultaneously trying to earn a living in settings where doing so was difficult for multiple reasons, they turned to writing great historical novels that documented, in an imagined past or a fabled landscape, the complications and travails of their altered status. They were no longer flaneurs but rather, as Thomas Mann’s son, Klaus, contended from his exile in the United States, cosmopolitans by force. In 1942, on the ninth anniversary of his exile from Germany, Klaus Mann, who was of German, Brazilian, and Jewish ancestry, wrote in his diary,

You can’t go home again, nor can you find a new home. The world will be your home, or you will be homeless, disconnected, doomed. The world will be your home: if there is a world. The issue, therefore, is not exile or return. The issue is whether there will be a world for people like us to live in, to work for. And this world, if it comes into being, will accept and need our services. . . . The drama of our deracination may turn out to be the most effective training for the vast and delicate service ahead.

These writers in exile became focused on what cosmopolitanism may have meant and perhaps could mean again, and the Jew became the salient symbol of their enforced rootless state, which they nonetheless chose to embrace. Kurt Tucholsky’s 1935 death from an overdose at Hindås, Sweden; Joseph Roth’s miserable 1939 death in Paris after hearing that Ernst Toller had hanged himself in New York; and Stefan Zweig’s 1942 suicide in Pétropolis, Brazil, only begin to illustrate the protracted human cost of this exile.

**Thomas Mann and Egypt**

In 1926, three years before he would win the Nobel Prize for Literature for his “family” novel, *Buddenbrooks* (1901), Thomas Mann sat down to begin a new historical novel. The Buddenbrooks were *Großbürger* in the sense of the early twentieth century. They dominated the social and economic life of Lübeck, where they came to represent a new form of bourgeoisie whose collapse Mann tracks. A fascination with what Walter Benjamin and Willi Haas described in 1932 as the transformation of the cosmopolitan bourgeoisie into the “grand
bourgeoisie” dominated Mann’s account of their physical and moral decay, from Gabriele Kloterjahn in Tristan (1903) to Gustav Aschenbach in Death in Venice (1912) and beyond.\(^7\) Such texts chronicle the peripatetic if not nomadic life of the grand bourgeoisie in search of some type of succor for the lost center of their lives. For Mann, this was not merely the topic of grand historical novels, it became a way of representing the dynamics of social change in the new German state.

The new social order, however, remained fascinated with its own history, at least in fictionalized form. The craze for long historical novels in Germany and beyond (for example, Emil Ludwig) was evident from every best-seller list, and Mann, having completed his philosophical coming to terms with World War I (as well as with nomadism, Jews, and illness) with the publication of The Magic Mountain in 1924, turned to his account of the biblical tale of Joseph and his brothers.\(^8\)

The novel was published sixteen years later in a different world, one in which Thomas Mann found himself in California exile, the de facto intellectual leader of the non-Jewish antifascist exiles, invited to have cocktails at the White House, and publishing a novel about Jews in a quite different exilic tradition. The novel represents the subtle shifts in the meaning of cosmopolitanism from Weimar Germany to the world of the non-Jewish exile. It is a novel with an odd history of its own: Mann was abroad lecturing on Wagner when the National Socialists came to power in January 1933 and did not return to Germany until after 1945. At the end of April 1933, Mann’s chauffeur in Munich, who was also a government spy, gave the suitcase with the draft manuscript and other materials to state authorities. The National Socialists seized some of Mann’s contracts but sent the suitcase on to him in Switzerland, as the text held no interest for them. Mann had become an exiled cosmopolitan.

Mann had always seen himself as cosmopolitan, but as one commentator observed, his cosmopolitanism had an odd, German turn: “Mann had a generally cosmopolitan attitude, considered German culture quintessentially European and opposed democracy that he [initially] confused with ideology. His anti–National Socialism is not a reversal, but a continuation of Mann’s Observations of a Non-Political Man.”\(^9\) The essay, which was published between 1915 and 1918, advocated a German “civilization” (O, 18). It was his most important political statement about the meaning of the Great War, and he distinguished between the healthy “cosmopolitan” and the corrupt “international,” which he detested:

The difference between intellect and politics, as a further example, is the difference between cosmopolitan and international. The former concept
comes from the cultural sphere and is German; the latter comes from the sphere of civilization and democracy and is—something quite different. The democratic bourgeois is international, even though he may drape himself everywhere ever so nationally; the burgher . . . is cosmopolitan because he is German, more German than princes and “nation”: this man of the geographical, social, and spiritual “middle” has always been and remains the bearer of German intellectuality, humanity, and antipolitics.

(O, 18)

For Mann and his protofascist contemporaries such as Gottfried Feder, such a sense of the international reflects that which is not-German. It very much echoes the discussion that began in eighteenth-century Germany with Kant’s cosmopolitanism about the compatibility between cosmopolitanism and nationalism. Indeed, in 1909, Swiss theologian Karl Barth simply equates cosmopolitanism with “being without character,” since “in a republic all are answerable.” This view closely resembles Friedrich Meinecke’s argument in his 1907 Cosmopolitanism and the National State. One very articulate voice that was clearly in opposition to this rereading of the cosmopolitan was that of Mann’s left-leaning brother, Heinrich, who in 1923 condemned such vanchantist nationalism, disguised as the cosmopolitan, as the “newly aggressive form of the preservation of the state.”

Jewish thinkers of the Left took a very different turn. During World War I, the founding father of socialist revisionism, Eduard Bernstein distinguished among Jewish patriotism for the national state (Landespatriotismus), patriotism for the Jewish community (Stammespatriotismus), and a cosmopolitan orientation (weltbürgerlicher Patriotismus). He stressed that for the Jews and their descendants, these ideas were complementary rather than contradictory.

At least in his 1907 essay, “Die Lösung der Judenfrage” (Solving the Jewish Question), Thomas had seen the parallel “Jewish Question” as “purely psychological” because the Jew is “always recognized as a stranger, feeling the pathos of being excluded, he is an extraordinary form of life.” Mann’s views also parallel the discussion of the “international Jew” as a central trope of the debates of the time, including those among the other contributors to the special 14 September 1907 issue of the Münchner Neuesten Nachrichten, where Mann’s essay appeared. The progress of cosmopolitan German culture, not Zionism or assimilation, Mann argued, permitted—indeed, demanded—the spiritual integration of the Jews into Europe. Mann’s fantasy of the Jews imagines them primarily as provincial inhabitants of the ghettos of Eastern Europe (L, 243). Their movement into European culture is not mere social acculturation but, in the terms of his comments a decade later, the movement from inter-
nationalism to cosmopolitanism. Mann sees this movement as parallel to the replacement of the ghetto Jew, with his “hump back, crooked legs, and red, gesticulating hands” (L, 244), by “young people who have grown up with English sports and all of the advantages without denying their type and with a degree of physical improvement.” (L, 245). For Mann, this transformation is part and parcel of the “general cultural development” of Europe—of the new cosmopolitanism (L, 246).

Mann’s rethinking of cultural cosmopolitanism as a German national project had odd implications for Jewish thinkers in the 1930s. After Hitler’s ascent to power, Robert Weltsch, editor of the Berlin-based Jüdische Rundschau (Jewish Review, founded in 1896, the journal of the Zionist Federation in Germany); a Zionist; and a vocal opponent of the National Socialist government, argued that Jews should be proud of their Jewishness: “Tragt ihn mit Stolz, den gelben Fleck” (Wear it with Pride, the Yellow Badge). But Weltsch also defends his brand of Jewish identity in this context against those who “preached to us nationally-oriented Jews often enough the ideals of an abstract cosmopolitanism in an effort to destroy all deeper values of Judaism” (W/JR, 147). He wrote, “there is a new type of Jew: the new, free Jew, a kind as yet unknown to the non-Jewish world” (W/JR, 147). Such Jews work against the stereotypes perpetrated by “the National Socialist and German patriotic newspapers” (W/JR, 148) of the self-hating cosmopolitan Jews who “applauded their own degradation, and many attempted to create an alibi for themselves by joining in the mockery” (W/JR, 149). Such Jews, he argued, “have tried to derive a financial profit from the Jews” (W/JR, 150) and are the source of the Nationalist Socialist view that Jews and capital were inherently linked.

Weltsch thus places the National Socialists’ stress on the Jewish economic function in Germany on the same plane as the function of the cosmopolitan Jews. They are equally destructive, at least from the perspective of 1933. This was not a new argument for Weltsch. In 1913 he contributed an essay on Theodor Herzl to the collection of materials put together by members of the Prague Jewish circle on the state of Jewish identity. Weltsch’s piece quoting Jacob Wassermann’s 1909 views (W/JR, 158) as the antithesis of modern education and the true literary type. The nationalism of Weltsch’s Zionism rejects Jewish cosmopolitanism as strongly as Mann’s recycles the cosmopolitan during World War I to his own ends. But from the position of the non-Jewish writer, Mann makes the question of Jewish cosmopolitanism and its function one of the litmus tests for modernity’s focus on geographic and economic mobility.

Inspired by his 1925 trip to Egypt, Mann wrote a four-part novel, Joseph
and His Brothers, that used the account of Joseph’s life before, during, and after his time in Egypt to frame what is clearly the most complex account of Jews on the move written by a non-Jewish writer during the National Socialist era. For Mann, Egypt was the antithesis of the Greco-Roman classical world, a world of the exotic cosmopolitan. Joseph was not to be understood as a novel about Jews—it was not a “Jew book,” Mann wrote to Eduard Jedidjah Chavkin in August 1934; rather, it was a “picture book and historical account of human beings,” a point he repeated in August 1944, calling the novel “not a Jewish Novel but a happy-serious song of humanity.” Yet Mann’s novel is shaped by the antisemitic rhetoric of his time and is in complex ways, like his model Friedrich Nietzsche, a work of anti-antisemitism, as he wrote to Ludwig Lewisohn on April 19, 1948. Speaking on “The Theme of the Joseph Novels” at the Library of Congress in November 1942, Mann declared that he saw the novel as a reaction to anti-Semitism: “Most certainly there were hidden, defiantly polemic connections between it and certain tendencies of our time which I always found repulsive from the bottom of my soul; the growing vulgar anti-Semitism.”

He was addressing an audience with at least potentially a number of American Jews, for whom public antisemitism, which arose with the Joseph Seligmann Affair in 1877, had taken on a more sinister coloration by the 1930s. In 1877 the Jewish owner of a private investment bank, J. & W. Seligman, a major figure of Gilded Age New York and a crony of Jay Gould, was turned away from a spa hotel in Saratoga Springs, New York, because he was a Jew, even though he and his family had stayed there before. By World War I the Jewish grand bourgeoisie no longer faced social ostracism. The lynching of Jewish factory manager Leo Frank in Marietta, Georgia, in 1915 had set a tone of confrontational antisemitism echoed in the 1920s by Henry Ford as well as Father Charles Coughlin. This strain of thought stressed that Jews could not become “real Americans” because of their cosmopolitanism. During the 1930s, the isolationists (“America-firsters”), led by Charles Lindbergh, picked up this thread of Jewish cosmopolitanism as one of the components of their anti-Semitic rhetoric. In this period of heightened antisemitism, any German exile text that featured Jews, especially evocative of the common ground between Jews and Christians, was read as philosemitic. In the mid-1950s, Lewisohn saw the Joseph cycle as a “super-midrash,” a metacommentary seen from a Jewish perspective. Lewisohn picked up on Mann’s comment in his Washington talk that the novel “often reads like an exegesis and an amplification of the Tora, like a rabbinical Midrasch.” Here Mann provides his American as well as his Jewish readers with a point of identification between his reading of Jew-
ish cosmopolitanism and that of the acculturated and integrated American Jewish reader, such as Lewisohn.

Mann’s novel is a complex account of cosmopolitanism in the most difficult reading of the “Old Testament” as a Jewish forerunner of Christianity’s sense of the cosmopolitan. As Gabriel Josipovici notes, Mann surrenders to the traditional Christian preference for fulfillment narratives—in other words, tidy endings rather than the open-ended account in Genesis that keeps open the question of rootedness. Mann’s account is part of a long tradition of non-Jewish German constructions of Jewish cosmopolitanism that is at heart problematic and perhaps even tragic in its expectations, much as the Jews’ flawed claim to chosenness clouds the question of transmutability inherent in this notion.

The key lies in the moment when Joseph enters into the Kingdom of Egypt as a slave of the Midianite caravan that has purchased him from his brothers. In a scene redolent of Nietzsche’s crippled dwarf riding on Zarathustra’s shoulders in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the caravan is greeted by a dwarf, Gottliebchen, whose nickname is that of the comic god Bes-em-heb and who speaks in “an asthmatic, cricket-like voice” (JB, 642). Gottliebchen sees himself “left here among the overstretched, all a dwarf can do is yawn. I don’t wish to buy your monstrous wares and I’d not accept your thumping wit even as a gift. I simply want to see if anything new in your giant epoch has come to our courtyard—strange men, men of misery and sand, wild nomads, in clothes no man wears . . . phooey!” (JB, 642). These are not cosmopolitans but nasty nomads, dirty, dangerous, and threatening, except that the dwarf sees that they are nothing of the sort. They are just pathetic strangers. Thus, he becomes Joseph’s friend and confidant.

The caravan with Joseph is quickly confronted by the malicious dwarf, Dudu, another servant of the Potiphar, one of the “Greats of the Great” in Amenhotep III’s kingdom (GW, 4:718). Dudu comes to be Joseph’s true adversary in the court and attempts to discourage Potiphar from purchasing Joseph. Dudu is aware that Joseph’s presence will disrupt the rules of the Old Kingdom, which the dwarf upholds and which give him his status. Gottliebchen had recognized Joseph as a merely wild man, as a nomad, as the object of merchants now hawking him among their other exotic wares. Joseph presents a real danger, leading Dudu to first stoke Mut-em-net’s attraction to Joseph and then to betray her to her husband, Potiphar. Through Potiphar’s agency, the Jew from the desert, the nomad, becomes an acculturated Egyptian while remaining a Jew. According to one of Mann’s sources (Arthur Weigall’s study of the monotheistic Pharaoh Akhnaton), Egypt was a cosmopolitan society.
gall’s image of the Egyptian court bears striking parallels to its depiction in Mann’s work:

He had not walked in the shadow of the cedars of Lebanon, nor had he ascended the Syrian hills; but nevertheless the hymns of Adonis and the chants of Baal were probably as familiar to him as were the solemn chants of Amon-Ra. At the cosmopolitan court of Thebes men of all nations were assembled. The hills of Crete, the gardens of Persia, the incense-groves of Araby, added their philosophies to his dreams, and the haunting lips of Babylon whispered to him mysteries of far-off days. From Sardinia, Sicily, and Cyprus there must have come to him the doctrines of those who had business in great waters; and Libya and Ethiopia disclosed their creeds to his eager ears.29

It is not lost on Mann that this “cosmopolitanism” prefigures, as Weigall observes, the creation of the core of Jewish beliefs. “This Aton worship . . . developed into an exalted monotheism, and it originated in Heliopolis. Now Heliopolis is the ancient On, where Moses learnt all ‘the wisdom of the Egyptians’; and thus there may be some connection between the Jewish faith and that of the Aton.”30 The open and syncretic cosmopolitan court is linked to the narrowness of monotheism and the dictates of the one God. It is thus not German cosmopolitanism in the sense of Mann’s 1918 discussion but a form of internationalism.

In The Magic Mountain, Mann had already used the figure of the dwarf servant to comment on the nature of the social structure, as Diego Velázquez did in Les Meninas. States the aged and dying Mynherr Pieter Peeperkorn, one of the few characters whose sympathetic qualities define him,

“You are small—what is that to me? On the contrary. I find it a positive good, I thank God, that you are as you are; I thank God you are so small and full of character. What I want of you is also small and full of character. But in the first place, what is your name?” She said, smiling and stammering, that her name was Emerentia.31

Emerentia is the supposed name of one of Christ’s grandmothers, and she sets the stage for our understanding of the idea of empathy in the social structure of the novel. But as in our introduction of Joseph as a nomad, this is a false and even rather cheap means of using a disability to provide insight into the nature of the world into which our protagonists are thrust.
Hans Castorp’s move to *The Magic Mountain* brings him not only into a world of contradictory psychological and philosophical motivations but also into the international world of the tuberculosis sanitarium, in which Jews have a special role as placeholders for the corrupt and the corrupting. At Davos, Castorp meets Leo Naphta, who is immediately revealed as a Jew by his appearance, which is “caustically, one could almost say corrosively, ugly”:

Somehow everything about him was caustic: the aquiline nose dominating the face; the small, pursed mouth; the pale gray eyes behind thick lenses in the light frames of his glasses; even his studied silence, from which it was clear that his words would be caustic and logical. (MM, 366)\(^ {32} \)

Leo (or as he was then called, Leib) Naphta comes from the eastern reaches of the Austrian empire, from the Galician-Volhynian border, a far distant world from Switzerland. And he is defined not only by his appearance but also by his rhetoric, his language, which is demonic because it is coldly rational and legalistic—in other words, Jewish. And Mann is more than explicit about this.

Leo Naphta is at Davos being treated for tuberculosis because his mother was tubercular. According to Mann, Leo has inherited his lung disease from his mother and his extraordinary intelligence from his father (MM, 432). Both traits define his Jewish cosmopolitanism. In Mann’s representation of the sanatorium as microcosm of the cosmopolitan world, Naphta is the regressive pedagogical force (opposed to Settembrini and Peeperkorn) in the fictive world of Mann’s “magic mountain.” But the only truly modern figure in the novel is Castorp, who learns from experience, under the motto *placet experiri*, rather than from books or tradition—and who is not actually tubercular. The vicarious experience of death and dying in the sanatorium serves as his true introduction to life. Much like the Tower Society in Goethe’s *Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship*, the sanatorium is Castorp’s means of learning about the world beyond. He is in this cosmopolitan world but not of it. Indeed, the sanatorium represents a rejection of the international cosmopolitan for the healthy and the rooted.

Naphta’s physical appearance reveals him as a wandering Jew, just as the *Joseph* novels represents the nomadic Jews through their inalterable physiognomy. But Joseph, like Naphta in the chapter in which Joseph “becomes visibly an Egyptian,” is to always remain a Jew (GW, 5:959–77). The Semites’ language is shaped by their biology. They are “thick lipped”—a stereotyped quality of “Semitic” features and their language (GW, 4:586, 588, 667, 779). Joseph’s acculturation moves him from the language of the Jews, which is analogous to the “asthmatic, cricket-like voice” of the dwarves, to “be” an Egyptian:
He was nourished by the airs and juices of Egypt, he ate Keme’s foods; the cells of his body swelled with the thirst-quenching water of the Two Lands, whose sun’s rays filled them with warmth. . . . Each day his eyes actively took in realities and hallmarks that human hands had shaped out of these same silently determinative and all-embracing impulses; and he spoke the language of the land, which reformed his tongue, lips, and jaw from what they once were, so that Jacob, his father, would very soon have said to him: “Damu, my twig, what is wrong with your mouth? I no longer recognize it.” (JB, 780–81; GW, 5:963)

Yet this is a misapprehension. In his 1907 essay on the Jewish Question, Mann gave an odd account of physical transformation in which the “gesticulating Jews” of Eastern Europe become Europeans, if not Germans, through English sports but never shed their essential type. Even international Jews—and Joseph here is the most international of all the Jews through his exposure to Egyptian society in the novel—ultimately remain Jews. This is the slipperiness of the cosmopolitan, as expressed in one bon mot of the time recorded in a Viennese paper: “A real cosmopolitan is someone who thinks in one language, speaks another, and acts in a third.” Here again we have Kafka’s nomads, their jackdaw language incomprehensible, learning a new language but ultimately remaining only settled nomads. For the secret of Jewish cosmopolitanism is that it remains Jewish at its core.

Heinz Schlaffer points to this double standard of competency in his definition of what is “German” in “German literature” when he notes, “German culture, which had appeared from a sacral language, was resecularized by Jews at the close of the nineteenth century.” Language became the true proof for “integration into German society in general.” “By the early twentieth century,” Schlaffer quite correctly opines, “if one does not understand the word ‘German’ to have a purely ethnic dimension, one can consider the Jews to be the more serious Germans,” since they claimed a complete identification with German culture because of their commitment to the written word. This view became part of the mantra of exiled Jewish writers between 1933 and 1945 when they claimed that they were the “real German culture,” preserving the German language from National Socialist thugs. Mann takes a slightly different view, noting the transformation of Jews into speakers of Egyptian with the disconcerting quality that their Jewishness remained legible.

Such a transformation evokes over and over again the question of Jews and their relationship to models of economic exchange as central to the definition of the cosmopolitan Jew. Joseph is not only successful as a new Egyp-
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He introduces a new form of economic exchange as the “Pharaoh’s great marketer” (JB, 1440). He is first and foremost a factor, an economic wheeler-dealer, the “rascal servant” (JB, 1438). But because he is also a hidden Jew, he is an economic trickster:

He acquires a mythical popularity . . . based above all on the shimmering mixed character and ambiguity—mirrored by the laughter in his eyes—of his measures, which functioned, as it were, in two directions at once, combining in a thoroughly personal way his various purposes and goals with a kind of magical wit. (JB, 1438)

He is, according to the omniscient narrator, the consummate economic manipulator: “Joseph’s conduct was aimed entirely at casting a magic spell over the idea of property, at leaving it hovering between ownership and nonownership, in a state of conditional or feudal tenure” (JB, 1441–42).

Joseph’s model is joint private-state ownership, a sort of quasi-communal structure where the individual retains four-fifths of the rights to the land and property but the collective, the state, still has a determining voice. “The people of the land would likewise regard themselves as not more than custodians of the soil and pay one-fifth tax—but not to some Horus in his palace, but to Yahweh, for He alone was King and Lord” (JB, 1444). “Property still remained property” (JB, 1444), but the state (read: Joseph as the agent of the Pharaoh) determined value and exchange, and the Jewish God was now its recipient. Nomadic Jews were still benefiting a Jewish God—as well as themselves; cosmopolitans were now benefiting their host but doing so for their own parochial gain (JB, 1444). Mann hammers home this point by paraphrasing David’s Psalm 23: “To the mythically trained ear this salient and formulaic word ascribes to Jacob’s son the role and character of a good shepherd who tends his people, who grazes them in green pastures and leads them to fresh waters” (JB, 1440–41). Why does Mann evoke David at this juncture? He is not merely a prefiguration of the rule of the Kingdom of Israel and Judea, a pharaoh in his own right, but also the prophetic ancestor of Christ. In the novel, Joseph moves from Jewish nomad to a harbinger of Christian civilization.

This view of a form of economy that benefits the settled nomad is Mann’s version of Georg Simmel’s view in the *Philosophy of Money* (1900) that “if the whole property of a primitive group consisted of landed property, then development would take place in two main directions. First, by producing food from property it gains a more mobile character; as soon as this happens, private property emerges.” For Simmel, “nomadic peoples hold land as common prop-
erty of the tribe and assign it only for the use of individual families; but live-
stock is always the private property of these families. As far as we know, the
nomadic tribe has never been communistic with regard to cattle as property.”
Real, unsettled nomads, unlike those who have transitioned into landowning,
as Simmel notes, are very different, since the “Arab nomadic tribes were pro-
hibited by law from sowing grain, from building a house, or similar things in
order to avoid disloyalty to the tribal traditions by becoming settled.”37 Indeed,
the economic model of the settled nomad is Joseph’s model for agricultural
Egypt—at its core that of the nomad in transition to the model of agriculture,
with the common property now that of the state yet with individuals retaining
the rights to much of their own labor.

Simmel’s views on the cosmopolitanism of the settled nomad were dia-
metrically opposed to those present in Mann’s Joseph novels. Simmel used the
term nomadism in the Philosophy of Money to speak about a historical moment
in the development of capitalism where groups move from an avoidance of
settlement to contingent rootedness, with all of its potential conflicts. Simmel’s
work encouraged Max Weber to turn to the question of the meaning attached to
the origins of capitalism in 1905 and helped Simmel come to terms with no-
mads and pariahs, including the Jews, well before Thomas Mann but in texts
well known to him. Mann was familiar with Weber’s view that being settled
means becoming part of a community within the paradigm of mobility.38 Sim-
mel’s essays, such as “Bridge and Door” (1909) and “The Metropolis and
Mental Life” (1903), stressed an absolute imperative of urban modernity: to
connect with others in ways that define what we now call human mobility. He
uses the term nomadism in the general context of other forms of mobility, such
as wandering, a royal tour, diasporic travel, migration, and even adventure.
What is unique is the “form of sociation in the case of a wandering group in
contrast to a spacially fixed one.”39

Yet Simmel’s sojourner—his stranger described in the oft-quoted appendix
to his 1908 Sociology, “who comes today and goes tomorrow,” with no specific
structural position in society—reflects both Weber’s coinage of pariah capital-
ism, with its association with the negative status of the Jews as a result of their
self-isolation, and Mann’s contingent image of the economics of the Jews in
Joseph’s Egypt.40 Simmel’s Sociology also provides an extensive map of the
qualities ascribed to the nomad.41 But the stranger differs from the wanderer:

The stranger will thus not be considered here in the usual sense of the term,
as the wanderer who comes today and stays tomorrow—the potential wanderer, so to speak who, although he has gone no further, has not
quite got over the freedom of coming and going. He is fixed within a
certain spatial circle—or within a group whose boundaries are analogous
to spatial boundaries—but his position within it is fundamentally affected
by the fact that he does not belong in it initially and that he brings quali-
ties into it that are not, and cannot be indigenous to it.\textsuperscript{42}

His position is determined by the fact that he may leave again.\textsuperscript{43} Joseph
fulfills the image held by Simmel, a baptized Jew, of the “strangerness” of the
ghetto Jew—what Simmel labeled “racially inferior Jews.”\textsuperscript{44} Mann evokes that
Jew in his 1907 essay, and that Jew runs like a red thread through the \textit{Joseph}
novels.

By the 1930s, the view that Mann espouses in the \textit{Joseph} novels has a
parallel in the theory of cosmopolitanism and the role of the stranger in defin-
ing it in the writing of jurist and philosopher Carl Schmitt.\textsuperscript{45} Schmitt had co-
opted the basic framing of the antagonism of the crowd (and the role of the
leader) from the World War I discussion of the mob in thinkers such as Simmel
as well as from Freud’s 1921 essay, “Group Psychology and the Analysis of the
Ego.” In \textit{The Concept of the Political} (1927), Schmitt had examined the enmity
between groups and “the other, the stranger” as “in a specially intense way,
existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts
with him are possible.” But this enmity could be breached, since “it may be
advantageous to engage with him in business transactions.”\textsuperscript{46} Schmitt makes
concrete this economic abstraction of the Other after the National Socialists’
rise to power.

By the 1930s, Schmitt has defined the enemy in terms of Jewish nomad-
ism. For Schmitt, commenting on the new concept of National Socialist law,
the existence of such an enemy explains the domination of normative law in
post-Enlightenment Europe. Such law was essentially a product of the Jews as
a nomadic people, now in the status of the \textit{metic}, a resident alien who required
rational statutes and abstract Cartesian principles—“the artificial superstruc-
ture of the \textit{idées générales}”—for protection, whereas indigenous people could
rely on the communality of blood. Schmitt opposes the normalization of the
nomad as part of the nation because

this abstract normativism has been driven into healthy German brains. The
normativistic way of thinking that thus arose among us was further
encouraged in the nineteenth century by the fact that the influx of the Jew-
ish guest \textit{Volk} drove this development [even] further in the direction of a
normativistic way of thinking about the law.
The Jews see this process from a radically different angle as

it goes without saying that a foreigner, a guest, a *metic*, sees the law of a *Volk* under whom he is guest normativistically and only from the point of view of legal certainty, from the point of view of the predictability of legal decisions. This foreigner certainly does not belong to the reality of the *Volk*, the reality in which he lives. The foreigner perceives this reality’s law as a calculably effective norm, as a standard of the state’s functioning to which he conforms, upon whose basis he can calculate outcomes and upon “whose basis he can protect himself from the state.” The foreigner wants to have the timetable in order to know when and where he can get on and get off. As a result, he puts in place of justice the law in the sense of a previously determined, calculable norm.47

This is the definition of Joseph’s economic reforms in Egypt. They are intended to solidify the status of “a foreigner, a guest, a *metic*,” exposed to the enmity of the Egyptians as a pariah people, now controlled by a new rule of law, a law defined by the practices and beliefs of the monotheistic God.

The image of the settled nomad as a productive (if still alienated) member of society is part of a discourse of the 1920s in which both Simmel’s images and Schmitt’s theory participated. Lenin’s nationality policies had demanded in the 1920s that nomads, such as the Kazakhs in Central Asia, become settled or sedentary so that they could become productive parts of the new state. A continuation of imperial policy, Lenin’s edict was articulated in a social Darwinian model of the survival of the fittest understood in terms of the modern industrial state, as the model saw nomads as less productive and settlement as transforming them into modern citizens. This was a radical break with the romanticized view of writers such as high Victorian George Barrow and of the British Gypsy Lore Society, in which Romani culture was depicted as a healthy alternative to the urbanization of nineteenth-century industrial life. Proponents of this view were inspired by the German Romantic notions of writers such as Goethe, but Western European nations echoed policies of forced settlement (or expulsion) with regard to the Sinti and Roma, whom the National Socialists considered a pure race but whose nomadic life was unacceptable in a *völkisch* state. Heinrich Himmler, obsessed by the Sinti and Roma, saw their criminality as a result of race mixing but also saw that they could never become part of the nation-state:

Previous cumulative experiences in combating the Gypsy plague and the knowledge gained through racial biological research appear to indicate
that control over the Gypsy question can be achieved through racial principles. Experience shows that those of mixed race are involved in most of the Gypsy criminality. On the other hand, it has been shown that the attempt to make Gypsies sedentary, especially among the racially pure Gypsies, has failed as a consequence of their strong nomadic drive.48

As a result, in 1939, Sinti and Roma were confined to concentration camps to begin their elimination from the new state. For Mann, the settled Jews of Egypt were just as inassimilable as the Sinti and Roma and were not romanticized as they had been in the nineteenth century.

Mann’s hesitation about Jewish nomadic internationalism dates from his views during World War I, which positioned the Jews as neither culturally valid nor rooted, unlike true German cosmopolitans. His 1907 essay on the “Final Solution of the Jewish Problem” sees this risky and nomadic internationalism developing among the young Jewish Weltbürger and posits it as lying at the core of his portrayal of Joseph. Mann had evoked this idea well before the 1907 essay, which had demanded a true Jewish cultural integration into European society even to the point of mixed marriages and baptism (GW, 13:459). Mann does not see this happening in 1907. Yet Mann’s not-very-veiled antisemitic tale, “Blood of the Walsung” (1905), with its antisemitic Yiddish ending altered in publication to avoid offending his Jewish in-laws, suggested that such integration was inherently impossible in that the Aryan-looking Aarenhold twins remain at their incestuous core Jewish.

This was mere formal acculturation, not the psychological transformation of the Jewish essence that Mann demanded. Thus despite his ironic “becoming an Egyptian” (JB, 1441–42), Joseph remains Jewish in the blood, as he and his people assume an Egyptian identity but reinterpret it through their essentially Jewish perspective. Thus the Egyptian custom of male circumcision becomes a “mystical” religious obligation of the blood for Mann’s Jews. (GW, 4:79–80) Ruth Klüger sees Joseph as a rare example of the German-Jewish symbiosis from a philosemitic point-of-view.49 Yet Mann’s Jews truly differ little from the National Socialist image of the Jews as superficial cosmopolitans, whose so-called acculturation was merely a form of cultural camouflage. In Mann’s Egypt they borrowed local customs such as circumcision. In the German-speaking world, according to National Socialist propaganda such as Veit Harlan’s film Jüd Süss (1940) (as discussed in chapter 2), they assume the mantle of German high culture. Yet this only provides a disguise for those who cannot see their true nature beneath their cosmopolitan veneer. They can acquire but
also shed their cosmopolitan identities as needed by circumstance. In the end they remain Jews.

**Joseph in Sigmund Freud’s Egypt**

The figure of Joseph captured at least one other writer during the period of exile. In 1934, Sigmund Freud, still sitting his apartment in Vienna, wrote to Arnold Zweig, a historical novelist and disciple now in British mandated Palestine. Zweig had begun to write an account of Napoleon’s campaign in Egypt, and Freud commented,

Incorrigible dreamer that [Napoleon] was, he had to play the rôle of Joseph in Egypt, and later on provided for his brothers in Europe, just as though he had been successful in his conquest of Egypt. And by the way, we owe the deciphering of the hieroglyphics to this piece of folly on Napoleon’s part.

Freud’s free association provides a moment of insight into his relationship with his much older brothers, distant yet always competitive. Indeed, given Mann’s lectures on Freud during the 1920s, such a claim about decoding an unknown script also reflects Mann’s sense of reading the relationship between settled Germans and nomadic Jews as revealed in the figure of Joseph. Freud had earlier noted that psychoanalysis was indeed much like the Rosetta Stone in deciphering the unconscious a view that Mann echoes. Thus Joseph is a case study in sibling rivalry, not an inappropriate model for the German-Jewish symbiosis, at least according to its Zionist critics.

Later, in his exile, Freud again turned to Joseph in *Moses and Monotheism*. Given that Moses was in Egypt because of Joseph’s movement of his people into the land of plenty, it is not surprising that this ancestry would appear in Freud’s account of the Jews. Freud’s fascination with Moses was a leitmotif of his work even before his 1913 visit to Rome, where he first saw Michelangelo’s sculpture, and Freud’s 1914 essay on the work. His fascination with Joseph takes a very different turn. Freud begins with the idea of a Jewish character based on the idea of the chosen people, since the Jews have a particularly high opinion of themselves, that they regard themselves as more distinguished, of higher standing, as superior to other
peoples—from whom they are also distinguished by many of their customs. At the same time they are inspired by a peculiar confidence in life, such as is derived from the secret ownership of some precious possession, a kind of optimism: pious people would call it trust in God. (SE, 23:104)

And this is certainly not a modern development: as Freud observes, the Jews “behaved in Hellenistic times just as they do to-day, so that the complete Jew was already there; and the Greeks, among whom and alongside of whom they lived, reacted to the Jewish characteristics in the same way as their ‘hosts’ do to-day” (SE, 23:105). But as with the model of Jacob choosing Joseph as his favorite son, being chosen leads to antisemitism and persecution:

If one is the declared favourite of the dreaded father, one need not be surprised at the jealousy of one’s brothers and sisters, and the Jewish legend of Joseph and his brethren shows very well where this jealousy can lead. The course of world-history seemed to justify the presumption of the Jews, since, when later on it pleased God to send mankind a Messiah and redeemer, he once again chose him from the Jewish people. The other peoples might have had occasion then to say to themselves: “Indeed, they were right, they are God’s chosen people.” But instead of this, what happened was that redemption by Jesus Christ only intensified their hatred of the Jews, while the Jews themselves gained no advantage from this second act of favouritism, since they did not recognize the redeemer. (SE, 23:104–5)

The “stiff-neckedness” of the Jews has its roots in the father’s preference for one of his sons. Sibling rivalry, the key to G. E. Lessing’s “Parable of the Three Rings,” which defined the complex Enlightenment relationships among Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, comes to explain Jewish particularism through Freud’s reading of Jewish chooseness. This is an odd claim, as Freud evokes Lessing’s Nathan as “a curious Jew” as early as 1882.54 Jewish character and practice (Freud, like Mann, is evoking, circumcision, which they and many other European intellectuals saw as retrograde and primitive) inevitably lead to exile and to the jealousy and hatred of others—that is, to antisemitism. Indeed, according to Freud, the rejection and murder of the first Moses, who demanded that the Jews serve only one, invisible God, leads to the murder of the initial Moses, and this patricide eventually causes the Jews eventually to accept the second Moses. Jewish monotheism is rooted in the first act of disavowal, which has its roots in Joseph’s exile. Freud, as he reveals in an unpub-
lished letter of 23 February 1938 to a Czech correspondent, Frank Selinek, knows well Friedrich Schiller’s negative account of Moses and the corruption of the Jews in Egypt after Joseph, which we discussed in chapter 2, as well as an essay by the young Goethe gesturing toward the murder of Moses by the Jews. Thus the nomad Joseph sets the stage not simply for any rebellion against the father but for a specific rebellion that shapes and structures Jewish belief and Jewish character. Freud’s Joseph is the product of exile—specifically, the exile of the Jews in a diaspora that very much mirrored Germany and Austria, a phenomenon that shaped Freud’s relationship to the Austrian state and Jewish identity in the diaspora.

When Freud comes to imagine the origin of antisemitism in exile, he sees the present status of the Jews as the result of the Germans’ false universalism in their semiconversion to Christianity. Just as Mann sees Jewish immutability underlying the definition of the causes of antisemitism, Freud sees in London exile the incomplete transition of the Germans to a new, cosmopolitan worldview, that of Christianity. He observes that the Germans were “mis-baptized” as they were coerced into conversion to the new universal faith (SE, 23:91): “They have been left, under a thin veneer of Christianity, what their ancestors were, who worshipped a barbarous polytheism. They have not got over a grudge against the new religion, which was imposed on them; but they have displaced the grudge on to the source from which Christianity reached them” (SE, 23:91). Antisemitism is only the crude displacement of anti-Christian feelings onto the Jews, who are the featured players in the Gospels, because

hatred of Jews is at bottom a hatred of Christians, and we need not be surprised that in the German National-Socialist revolution this intimate relation between the two monotheist religions finds such a clear expression in the hostile treatment of both of them. (SE, 23:91)

As Freud suggests, German antisemitism is really a hatred of Christian cosmopolitanism in contrast to the rootedness ascribed to the Germans.

For Freud as for many commentators on National Socialism, the sense of an opponent common to both Christians and Jews creates a bond in exile. The reality of the Catholic Church’s 1933 concordat with the National Socialists and the rise of German Protestant groups, with their overt antisemitic rhetoric even before 1933, are lost in this fantasy alliance of Jews and Christians in exile. The tale of Joseph captures moments of cosmopolitan identity both as a German/European and as a Jew, while the Germans remain parochial and
mired in their pagan rootedness and inability to be transformed into what for Thomas Mann was true cosmopolitanism.

**Heidegger’s Rootless Jew**

The relationship between the non-Jewish exiles from and the supporters of the Third Reich was usually clear-cut. In 1933, the National Socialist press dismissed Mann as having “had the misfortune to forfeit his erstwhile national sentiments at the time of the establishment of the Republic, exchanging them for cosmopolitan-democratic views.” Yet the views of some exiles (such as Mann) and those of fascist thinkers such as Martin Heidegger overlapped substantially with regard to the rootlessness of the Jewish cosmopolitan. In *Sein und Zeit* (Being and Time) (1927), Heidegger defined the philosophic notion of being in the world as existing in the truest sense, since “taking up relationships towards the world is possible only because Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, is as it is.” What it is becomes defined in terms of being *bodenständig*—autochthonous, or, more simply, rooted. George Steiner calls this idea Heidegger’s “stress on rootedness, on the intimacies of blood and remembrance, which an authentic human being cultivates with his native ground. Heidegger’s rhetoric of ‘at-homeness,’ of the organic continuum which knits the living to the ancestral dead buried close by, fits effortlessly into the official cult of ‘blood and soil.’” As a result, Heidegger’s “critique of ‘theyness,’ of technological modernity, of the busy restlessness of the inauthentic,” mirrors the “Hitlerite denunciation of ‘rootless cosmopolitans,’ the urban riff-raff, and unhoused intelligentsia that live parasitically on the modish surface of society”—that is, Jews.

After his term as rector at Freiburg and his unqualified support for the new National Socialist government as well as his subsequent dissatisfaction with the new regime, Heidegger restated more or less the same idea in a 1937 lecture: “A Slavic people would experience the essence of our German space certainly differently than we do. Semitic NOMADS would most probably not experience it at all.” Heidegger again echoed this viewpoint in his 1941 *Black Notebooks*, when he defined the Jews not as a people but as a state of mind: “The question of the role of world Jewry is not a racial but rather a metaphysical one about the type of human specificity that in all cases can be extrapolated as a world-historical ‘goal’ from the ROOTLESSNESS of the becoming from being.” Jews, now a state of mind, cannot grasp the notion of a national or particularist space. This is the key to post–Friedrich Ratzel views of the scien-
scientific relationship between a people and their geographic space. Ratzel had argued that space defined character, and while this older claim had its roots in German idealism (contrary to Herder), Ratzel rested it on scientific claims of physiology, space, and mind. According to Heidegger’s interpretation of this view, the Slavs had an ideology of pan-Slavism that was rooted in their national identity and geographic space. The Jews—and Heidegger clearly rejects a Zionist model for Jewish identity rooted in the land—had no such possibility of identification. His image of the Jew is that of the perpetual wanderer and the eternal capitalist.

If there is a trope that ties Heidegger to the straightforward rhetoric of classical nineteenth-century antisemitism, which he shared with Karl Marx, it is the notion that the such a metaphysical notion of the Jews is made concrete by their economic exploitation: “One of the most secret forms of the gigantic, and perhaps the oldest [qualities of the Jew], is his tenacious skillfulness in calculating, hustling, and intermingling through which the worldlessness of Jewry is grounded.” That such views are not unique to Heidegger after 1933 is evident when he turns to a critique of Jews and capital:

Even though the spirit of egotism, self-aggrandizement, and ruthless greed had already become the driving force behind economic activities by the time of the 1789 revolution as a result of the prevailing doctrine of Freemasonry and had dismissed the Christian doctrine of the individual’s inherent obligation to the common good as antiquated and backward, there were still certain internal reservations non-Jews had to overcome before they could adopt without any qualms the Jewish economic methods that fed into capitalism. So non-Jewish devotees of capitalism always came in a few lengths behind their unscrupulous Jewish forerunners in the capitalist race.

A consistency exists within racial antisemitism as a continuation of the religious charges of usury against the Jews. Thus, the Jews corrupted Western society with a model of capitalism that is Jewish to its metaphysical core. Hitler repeated the substance of what he had learned about Jews in the boarding-houses of Vienna before the war in a 1919 letter and echoed those ideas again in Mein Kampf (1925–26):

His power is the power of money, which multiplies in his hands effortlessly and endlessly by way of accrued interest, and which forces the Volk under the most dangerous of yokes whose ultimately tragic consequences
are concealed by the initial attraction of gold and glitter. Everything men strive after as a higher goal—be it religion, socialism, or democracy—is to the Jew but a means to an end, a way for him to satisfy his lust for money and domination.62

For Hitler, the Jew is defined by the rootlessness of capital, the ability to move seamlessly across all boundaries, both geographic and moral. Jewish rootlessness is a permanent stain on Jewish character and contrasts with the stability of the German or even the Slav. Unlike the nomad, who has a territory, albeit a huge one, the Jew is truly rootless. This is a standard trope of National Socialist rhetoric. In a 13 September 1935 talk, “Communism with the Mask Off,” Goebbels observed that Jewish cosmopolitanism constituted the core of contemporary “Judeo-Bolshevism,” since “Bolshevism is not merely anti-bourgeois; it is against human civilization itself. In its final consequences it signifies the destruction of all the commercial, social, political and cultural achievements of Western Europe, in favor of a deracinated and nomadic international cabal that has found its representation in Judaism.”63 That the Jews are simultaneously a race and not a race, nomadic as well as cosmopolitan, is reflected in National Socialism’s eclectic arguments about the Jews: they represent all forms of evil.

By the 1940s, this rationalization provided the rhetoric not only for exclusion but also, given Hitler’s January 30, 1939, statement about the Jewish Bolshevik responsibility for any further war and its implications for the survival of the Jews, for genocide. The press specialist in the anti-Comintern section of the German Foreign Office, Karl Baumböck, wrote in 1942 that

with ice-cold, diabolical calculation, [the Jews] unleashed a new world war that they hoped would defeat the national-authoritarian nations. After destroying these nations, the way would once again be open to establish Jewish domination of the remaining nations. The immutable and lunatic goal of world Jewry is and remains the domination of every nation on its own territory, by firmly lodging itself in nations’ organs and exercising complete control of their soil, their money, and all their goods.64

Heidegger’s September 1941 version of this claim states that

at the start of the third year of the planetary war.—Common sense would like to calculate history, and longs for a balance sheet. . . . World Jewry, spurred on by the emigrants who have been let out of Germany, is intan-
gible everywhere and, as much as it develops its power, never has to take part in warlike activities, whereas the only thing left for us is to sacrifice the best blood of the best of our own people.65

German Jews specifically are at the forefront of the destruction of Germany through their planned world conflagration. When Heidegger (and Gottfried Benn and an entire cohort of Weimar intellectuals in thrall to National Socialism) turn on the “intellectuals”—a trope of antisemitism reaching back to the Dreyfus Affair—he, too, echoes the rhetoric of the party’s attack on rootless intellectuals, now literally driven from pillar to post:

This island of whining, fault-finding, bloodless intelligentsia floating in a sea of swirling renewal and change is admittedly growing smaller by the month and far more seldom seen. Nevertheless, even if there are scarcely a hundred thousand of them left in Germany today, they are all the more numerous in foreign countries, which, for the New Germany, is perhaps as pertinent. There they are in league with German outcasts and emigrants, those who have been dismissed from their positions and thus remain vicious enemies.66

The reality of the war is the rationale for seeking its causes. If World War I was caused by a Jewish stab in the back on the home front (as argued by General Erich Ludendorff, who joined Hitler during the 1923 Beer Hall Putsch) rather than by the ineptitude of the country’s leaders, then World War II must also have its roots in the betrayal of Germany by pseudo-Germans—in this case, German Jewish exiles such as Stefan Zweig. Such a metaphysical definition of the Jews demands the existence solely of a nomadic mind-set that may mask itself as national identity but that is permanently opposed to the true grounded spirit of the rooted Aryan.

**Zweig’s Erasmus in Exile: The Cosmopolitan par Excellence**

By 1934, Zweig had left his beloved Austrian home in Salzburg into exile in London, where he turned to his literary biography of Renaissance Dutch scholar Erasmus of Rotterdam, through whom Zweig made his increasingly urgent call for a cosmopolitan society. *Erasmus* (1934) represents Zweig’s final attempt to rescue European culture from the vandalism of extreme nationalism.67
The conditions of exile lead Zweig to use the figures of the cosmopolitan and the wanderer to convey the unalterable yet constantly unstable nature of society and culture, an image that was also being foreshadowed in Mann’s Joseph. Given Zweig’s refuge in London, it is not coincidental that the book contains a number of favorable passages about Britain, which Zweig depicts as an early harbinger of a positively conceived cosmopolitanism, in contrast to the antiquarian and contradictory cosmopolitanism of Mann’s biblical Egypt. Erasmus also represents Zweig’s perhaps most concerted effort to assert the quintessentially European roots of cosmopolitanism and culture at large as a world of texts shared by intellectuals across European languages and borders. Zweig presents the Renaissance scholar as “the first conscious European and cosmopolitan” (E, 4), recognizing “no superiority of one nation over another” (E, 4) and transcending both national and scholarly boundaries in his life and work. Erasmus’s mastery of Renaissance Latin, Zweig argues, gave the ancient language a new lease on life as a means of global communication in the age of exploration. The irony, of course, is that Erasmus had attempted to resuscitate the classical Greek term cosmopolitan in the early sixteenth century and transformed it into a label for the positive and constructive sojourner.

In Erasmus, Zweig implicitly constructs parallels to his own life and cosmopolitanist beliefs as Hitler persecuted his political opponents and Jews and Stalin conducted his Great Purges. Like Zweig and his cosmopolitan peers in interwar Europe, Erasmus believes before the Thirty Years’ War that political neutrality and general education would lead the way to a better world. And like Zweig and his contemporaries, Erasmus lives in an era of great scientific and intellectual promise. For the first time since the end of the Roman era, Zweig argues, scientific and artistic innovation during the Renaissance have created a collective confidence among Europeans and with it a cosmopolitan sensibility fostering a common culture and ideal of human welfare.

Through Erasmus, Zweig reprises his vision of a cultural rather than political cosmopolitanism. Renaissance humanism is presented as a strong point of attraction for intellectuals from all countries, “so that in every land the finest idealists flocked to the standard of humanism. Each desired to acquire citizenship in the new world of culture” (E, 6). But humanism’s investment in knowledge also causes its ultimate downfall, creating an educated elite that arrogantly disregards the lower classes. This construction invokes the emerging twentieth-century chasm between bourgeois cosmopolitanism and revolutionary socialism, which Zweig’s friend, Joseph Roth, had begun to treat in his 1924 novel Hotel Savoy. Because humanism catered only to the “happy few, not for the broad multitude” (E, 85), its cosmopolitan message could not suc-
ceed during the Renaissance and, the text implies, is equally doomed to fail in
the present.

Nonetheless, Zweig represents politically neutral cosmopolitanism,
which he embraced, as the only viable stance in the age of dictatorship. Eras-
mus’s cold intellect, which grows from his fierce desire for intellectual and
moral independence, regularly leads him to withdraw into impartiality when
partisanship is demanded. Erasmus’s tragedy, according to Zweig, is that

the most unfanatical, the most anti-fanatical of men, living at a moment
when the supranational ideal was taking a solid hold upon European
thinkers, had to witness one of the wildest outbreaks of national and reli-
gious mass-passion that history has ever had to relate. (E, 8)

The battle in question is that between Pope Leo X and Luther, between
Catholicism and Protestantism, between the political establishment and the
Reformation. It is the greatest controversy of Erasmus’s time and will set off
the Thirty Years’ War, destroying large parts of the European population.

Because, as Zweig contends, “humanism can never be revolutionary” (E,
61), Erasmus choses to remain neutral in this epic battle, which implicitly re-
lects the monumental clash between communism and fascism, Stalinism and
National Socialism, in Zweig’s time. Zweig paints in Luther the unmistakable
image of Hitler. This is not incidental, given that in spite of its ostensibly anti-
religious stance, National Socialism from early on co-opted both Luther’s fig-
ure and his virulent antisemitism. Like his modern counterpart Hitler, Zweig’s
Luther, “the fanatical man of action, baked by the irresistible force of a mass
movement” (E, 88)—Zweig adds the word national here in the German
original—brutally shatters the “supranational dream” (E, 88) of Europe. The
text parallels this onslaught with the ancient Germans’ destruction of Rome. It
brings the advent of the Thirty Years’ War as a new world war, whose blaze
“was to destroy with incendiary force the ideal world so confidently expected
by the humanists” (E, 88). The emphasis on the direct line between the destruc-
tive aspect of early modern culture and the mid-twentieth century comes to be
one of the themes of the so-called inner emigration in Germany. German Cath-
olic Werner Bergengruen penned a novel, Der Großtyrant und das Gericht
(The Great Tyrant and the Court, 1935), that presents exactly such a moral di-
lemma, with a Machiavellian ruler who brutally reshapes the state in specific
historical terms. For Bergengruen, like Zweig, the appropriate world is that of
a fantasy European Renaissance. Such historical distance paradoxically made
Bergengruen’s novel acceptable even to the SS, and it ultimately became a best
seller in Hitler’s Germany, praised as the “Führer novel of the Renaissance.”

Erasmus’s implicit Jewish attributes in Zweig’s portrayal further highlight the text’s apparent analogy between Luther and Hitler. Zweig’s invocation of the concept of race in this context is therefore not incidental. Like German and Jew in National Socialist ideology, Luther and Erasmus are described in terms of essential differences in body and mind: “From the outward bodily manifestation to the finest of nerve-fibres they hailed from different and hostile races, so far as habit of body and mind were concerned. The conciliatory temperament as opposed to the fanatical, cosmopolitanism against nationalism, evolution versus revolution” (E, 90).

Luther, the son of miners and farmers who are attached to the land, reflects the vitality and physical strength that National Socialist ideology ascribed to the Aryan. Like leading National Socialists Goebbels and Alfred Rosenberg, Luther is the holder of an academic degree who also revels in battle: “In the arena, the erudite doctor theologæ was instantly transformed into a soldier” (E, 96). In contrast, Zweig lends Erasmus implicit Jewish attributes to suggest the affinities between the cosmopolitan project and the Jews. Erasmus has “no mother country, no home. In a certain sense, he was born in void space” (E, 21). This description reflects the condition of the Jewish luftmensch, the rootless Jew, who had come to represent the cosmopolitan prototype in Zweig’s, Roth’s, and Feuchtwanger’s great novels of the interwar period. This predicament is only reinforced when Erasmus, like Zweig in exile, becomes a “life-long nomad” (E, 28) wandering the countries of Europe, “always (like Beethoven) living ‘in the air’” (E, 28). Of course, the historical Erasmus, while an excellent Hebraist, had little time for his Jewish contemporaries, and like most of the figures of the Northern Renaissance, dismissed the worldliness and materialism that they saw both in Judaism as a religious system and in their stereotype of the Jews of their world. As he wrote in an oft-quoted 30 January 1523 letter, “I have a temperament such that I could love even a Jew, if only he were well-mannered and friendly, and did not mouth blasphemy on Christ in my presence.”

The tensions between humanist tolerance and anti-Jewish sentiment are maintained in Zweig’s portrayal of Erasmus, which is itself tinged with anti-Jewish imagery. Both physically and mentally, Erasmus, with his “delicate, almost feminine hand” (E, 43), displays the stereotypical features of the sickly, emasculated, cold intellectual Jew. Indeed, Zweig’s portrayal of Erasmus recollects the figure of Buchmendel, the Jewish book peddler in Zweig’s 1929 novella. Like Buchmendel, the feeble and neurotic Erasmus lives solely in his abstract intellectualism rather than also in his body: “He saw with his mind’s
eye, not with his living and absorbing organ of sight” (E, 48). This portrayal paralleled that of the sickly, cosmopolitan Jewish intellectual whom Thomas Mann had presented in the figure of Leo Naphta. Naphta’s stereotypical Jewish features are displayed through not only his intellectualism but also his corrosive critique of all religion. Written at a time when these attributes became conflated in the images of the scholar and the Jew, Zweig’s portrayal of Erasmus thus both cites and reiterates the common humanist ambivalence on the subject.

Through Erasmus’s Jewish features, Zweig imbues cosmopolitanism with a quasi-innate stance of resistance against the forces of extremism that, in the guise of the Pope and Luther in Erasmus, demand that the intellectual take sides. This, Zweig argues in reference to his political position, is a false choice because the intellectual can never succeed in direct battle and thus must maintain neutrality: “An intellectual cannot afford to take sides, his realm is the realm of equable justice; he must stand above the heat and fury of the contest” (E, 98). As philosopher Peter Sloterdijk has noted, such a view of humanism sees itself as a force based primarily in words rather than action. This is true for both Zweig and his Erasmus, whose lacking intervention gives free rein to the forces of violence. Yet consent to extremism appears as the far more problematic stance, since violence, even in its revolutionary guise, only breeds further destruction. Now in clear reference to the Russian Revolution and its aftermath, Luther thus suffers the “fate of every revolutionary” (E, 142) when he is overrun by even more radical zealots in the guise of Thomas Münzer and the “communistic theologians” (E, 144). The Thirty Years’ War, with its destruction of vast populations in Western Europe, a thinly disguised reference to the new world war on the horizon, is the consequence of these ideological battles.

But the cosmopolitanist rejection of the impossible choice between two evils leaves the individual with a crushing historical guilt. Erasmus’s insistence on neutrality not only destroys the personal lives of his friends but discredits the cosmopolitan idea at large. Having refused to take sides between Luther and his adversaries, Erasmus rejects offering shelter to German humanist Ulrich von Hutten, who dies, homeless and miserable, in Zurich. With him goes the cosmopolitan dream “of a spiritually-united, humanistic Europe” (E, 155). Yet Zweig again defends Erasmus’s legacy by asserting the inherently intellectual rather than political nature of the humanistic ideal as an “ideal grounded upon breadth of vision and clarity of mind, . . . destined to remain a spiritual and aristocratic dream which few morals are capable of dreaming” (E, 168).

Throughout his writings, Zweig thus maintained the separation between the aspects of the intellectual, moral, and aesthetic, on the one hand, and politics, on the other. For Zweig, Erasmus heralds the inevitable defeat of the
intellectual in the face of brute violence, a phenomenon that camp survivors Jean Améry and Primo Levi later described so eloquently. In contrast, Thomas Mann, whose *Joseph* had remained suspended between observation and the call for action, ultimately recognized, at least after 1945 with the publication of *Dr. Faustus* (1947), that the artist and intellectual could not remain apolitical in times of crisis.

**Roth and Zweig: Idealizing the Austro-Hungarian Empire**

Following the publication of *Erasmus*, Zweig’s vision of a future cosmopolitan Europe increasingly receded. His pessimism found its perhaps clearest literary expression in a short story, “The Buried Candelabrum” (1937), that revisited his Jewish legends of the fin de siècle, in particular the ancient Roman-Jewish encounter in “Die Wanderung” (The Journey, 1904). The image of the buried candelabrum anticipates the theme of lost hope, which is reprised in the closing metaphor of an old man’s dead body lying in the open road in the shape of a crucifix, its lips “firmly closed, as if guarding a secret that was to endure after death.” Zweig subsequently located the cosmopolitanist project in the distant worlds of the Austro-Hungarian Empire before World War I and on the shores of modern Brazil. Zweig’s idealization of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in his memoir *The World of Yesterday* (1941), which he completed in Brazil just one day before his suicide, was no doubt influenced by Joseph Roth’s similarly nostalgic portrayals beginning with his best-selling *Radetzky March* (1932). Although Roth had been living in Paris exile since 1933, much of *The Emperor’s Tomb* (1938), in which he reprised the leading themes of *Radetzky March*, was penned during his stay with Stefan and Friderike Zweig near Salzburg in 1937. When Austria was united with National Socialist Germany in March 1938, Roth had finished all but the last chapter of the novel, which he completed under the immediate impression of the seemingly joyful Austrian incorporation into the National Socialist state. Within a year of the novel’s publication, Roth had drunk himself to death in Paris.

*The Emperor’s Tomb* has often been considered a prime example of Roth’s nostalgia for the monarchy as a guarantor of humanism and integrity. These portrayals must be read as an immediate response to the end of Austria’s humanistic legacy brought on by the *Anschluss*. This event reverberated across the spectrum of exiles from National Socialism, as when Klaus Mann contended that “the end of Austria, although long predicted and anticipated, still
came as a stunning shock.”\textsuperscript{81} But Roth also injects his narrative of nostalgia with doubt.\textsuperscript{82} Again, the hotel and now also the coffeehouse and the train station function as ubiquitous signifiers of the monarchy and its equalizing institutions, which form the humanistic precursors of the cosmopolitan condition.

As the first-person narrator, Franz Ferdinand von Trotta, the second cousin of Carl Joseph von Trotta, Roth’s hero in \textit{Radetzky March}, concedes, only after World War I, called by this name not so much because it affected the entire world but rather because it had destroyed the world of the past, that he had realized how the dual monarchy’s “natural law of a strong spirit” (ET, 40–41) had united its distinct “landscapes, fields, nations, races, huts and cafés of all sorts” (ET, 40), be they in Zlatograd, Sipolje, or Vienna. (On 10 September 1918 the British Lieut. Col. Charles Repington met with an American officer in France and discussed the fact that this would not be the last Great War in the twentieth century. Repington published his diary entitled \textit{The First World War} in 1920 reenforcing this sad prophecy.)

Roth’s close alignment of the monarchy with the spirit of universal humanism again emerges in his portrayals of the empire’s liminal subjects and their rooted nomadism. The earthy Slavs and bucolic Jews from \textit{Radetzky March} reappear forcefully in \textit{The Emperor’s Tomb} in the wandering Slovenian Maroni seller Branco and the Galician Jewish coachman Manes Reisiger, who become the young von Trotta’s closest friends. In \textit{The Wandering Jews}, Roth had already glorified the Eastern European country Jew, whose ties to the land resemble those of the native Slavic farmer and who therefore displays a special vigor. Roth’s essay evokes the essentializing links between the land and ethnic type that figured so strongly in National Socialist ideology:

The rustic Jew of Eastern Europe is a type completely unknown in the West. No wonder: He has never gotten there. No less a “son of the soil” than the peasant, he is half peasant himself. He is a sharecropper or a miller or a village innkeeper. He has never learned a trade. . . . He is big and strong and of an improbably sound constitution. He is physically brave, doesn’t mind a fistfight, and is afraid of nothing.\textsuperscript{83}

In \textit{The Emperor’s Tomb}, the rooted nomadism of these Jewish and Slavic subjects feeds and is in turn nourished by the monarchy as an overarching and unifying principle. Franz Ferdinand’s father, for example, represents the monarchy’s assimilated Slavic constituent in his dreams of a Slavic kingdom, a monarchy of Austrians, Hungarians, and Slavs that would be ruled by the Habsburgs. Roth’s positive configuration of the monarchy’s cosmopolitan
spirit is further reflected in the figure of Count Chojnicki, a protagonist who had also featured in *Radetzky March*. There, Chojnicki’s southward travels had catalyzed Carl Joseph von Trotta’s emergent cosmopolitan awareness. In both *Radetzky March* and *The Emperor’s Tomb*, the last von Trottas represent the weakened bourgeois consensus, which fails to effectively resist the impending National Socialist catastrophe. In contrast, Chojnicki in *The Emperor’s Tomb* becomes a point of resistance to the forces of extremism. As Chojnicki contends, Austria’s apparent anomaly—that is, its lack of ethnic and national coherence—represents the natural state of polities: “So far as Austria-Hungary is concerned, the ostensibly peculiar is perfectly natural. It’s only in this crazy Europe of nation-states and nationalists that the natural looks peculiar” (ET, 15).

Through Chojnicki, Roth once again stresses the importance of liminal and deterritorialized subjectivities for the creation of a cosmopolitan sensibility. Chojnicki thus asserts that the monarchy had truly been sustained and affirmed by the “tragic love” (ET, 68) of empire’s peripheral subjects, among them “the gypsies from the Puszta, the sub-Carpathian Hutsuls, the Jewish cabbies from Galicia, my own relatives, the Slovene chestnut roasters from the Bačka, the horse-breeders from the Steppe, the Ottoman Sibersna from Bosnia” (ET, 68)—in short, the poor and deprived of all of the dual monarchy’s provinces. In contrast, the German-speaking middle class, “those Nibelung cretins” (ET, 135), had betrayed this love through their nationalism. Therefore, the true Austrian spirit was found in the Slavic crown lands rather than the country’s German-speaking center: “The heart of Austria is not the centre, but the periphery. . . . The substance of Austria is drawn and replenished from the Crown Lands” (ET, 15). The German derision for the empire’s other nationalities, Roth contends through Chojnicki, had caused the Slavs to hate the dual monarchy and resulted in the fatal shots at Sarajevo.

The benevolence and altruistic love of these marginal subjects for the monarchy, whose ruling German class has only exploited them, is again epitomized in the Jews. After hearing that the new pro–National Socialist rulers have disbanded Austria’s democratic government, Trotta’s friends leave the Viennese café in which they had been sitting, failing to pay the Jewish owner. But Trotta insists on paying for his last schnapps, but the Jew refuses to accept the money because there is no time left. Instead, he makes a fast exit to safety and leaves Trotta to shut down the café in an image signifying the impending apocalypse: “All the lights in the café went out, and pale, with a black top hat on his head, looking more like an undertaker than the jovial, silver-bearded Jew Adolf Feldmann, he handed me a massy lead swastika” (ET, 181). The closure of the café symbolizes the end of the Habsburg era. As the final chapter of the
novel thus suggests, the decisive trauma for the self-professed cosmopolitan Roth occurred when Austria was joined to Germany—the ultimate end of the dual monarchy’s humanistic legacy, which had received its first fatal blows with the outbreak of World War I. But even after the loss of empire, Roth’s cosmopolitan dream still found nourishment in the democratic setting of the new Austrian Republic, if only in the shape of nostalgia. *The Emperor’s Tomb* literally represents Austria’s union with Germany as the final nail in the coffin of this vision, and the narrative shifts into the stark events of March 1938.

By virtue of his elegiac fictions of the dual monarchy in *Radetzky March* and *The Emperor’s Tomb*, Roth can be credited with having both shaped and popularized the nostalgic image of the Austro-Hungarian Empire that pervades both scholarship on the period and Austrian culture today. In *The World of Yesterday*, Zweig implicitly pays homage to his dead friend’s idealized vision. The memoir represents the multiethnic Austro-Hungarian Empire as a hotbed of both cosmopolitan and radical nationalist ideas, from antisemitism and Zionism to the Serb nationalism that sparked World War I. Vienna, with its mix of European peoples and cultures—Germans, Slavs, Hungarians, Spaniards, French, Italians, and Flandrians—exemplifies this cosmopolitan drive: “Nowhere was it easier to be a European” (WY, 28). Culture and above all music fuses this mix into a new, Austrian, Viennese, and ultimately cosmopolitan spirit that transcends even class boundaries, “and subconsciously every citizen became supernational, cosmopolitan, a citizen of the world” (WY, 22).

The Jews’ passionate participation in this culture, Zweig argues, had perhaps been nowhere more productive and successful as in Austria. Yet he also suggests that the cultural productivity of Viennese Jews had not been specifically Jewish but intensely Austrian and Viennese, giving “through a miracle of understanding . . . to what was Austrian, and Viennese, its most intensive expression” (WY, 28). This cultural symbiosis, which had grown from millennia of Jewish intellectual activity, then invigorated and renewed the exhausted Austrian tradition. Its catalysts were a quartet of mostly Jewish fin de siècle writers—Arthur Schnitzler, Hermann Bahr, Richard Beer-Hofmann, and Peter Altenberg—“in whom the specific Austrian culture, through a refinement of all artistic means, had for the first time found European expression” (WY, 45).

Zweig paints the era before World War I, with its consolidation of national borders, legislatures, and cultures, as a truly cosmopolitan period with unlimited freedom for bourgeois individuals:

We could live a more cosmopolitan life and the whole world stood open to us. We could travel without a passport and without a permit wherever
we pleased. No one questioned us as to our beliefs, as to our origin, race, or religion. I do not deny that we had immeasurably more individual freedom and we not only cherished it but made use of it as well. (WY, 77)

Zweig even claims that he that never experienced any antisemitism until Karl Lueger became mayor of Vienna in 1897. This statement arises from both Zweig’s privileged experience as a sheltered, upper-middle-class schoolboy and his retrospective desire to idealize the lost world of his past life from the farthest point of his exile, when the cosmopolitan dream has been radically destroyed:

I was aware that our past was done for, work achieved was in ruins, Europe, our home, to which we had dedicated ourselves had suffered a destruction that would extend far beyond our life. Something new, a new world began, but how many hells, how many purgatories had to be crossed before it could be reached! (WY, 327)

As Zweig’s vision of a cosmopolitan Europe vanished together with his world of the past, he turned toward the distant shores of other worlds, where he now located the cosmopolitanist future.

Zweig’s Brazil: The Farthest Exile

Erasmus glorifies Columbus’s landing on American shores and Magellan’s circumvention of the world as the burgeoning of a European awareness of universalizing dimensions, when the “heroic intelligence of its race made Europe the ruler of the whole earth” (E, 16). Zweig is undoubtedly correct in pointing out the historical linkages between European colonialism and the cosmopolitan vision growing from its global reach. Despite occasionally chastising the colonialist practices of genocide and slavery, however, Zweig largely portrays European colonialism as a productive force, as when he claims that “thanks to the heroism” of its peoples—though the German original uses the word Rasse (race) instead of Völker (peoples)—“Europe had become the focus and ruler of the whole world” (E, 16). The reflection of this global reach in humanism, then, briefly gave rise a unifying European idea that sought to renew the world through intellect: “In its unity, in itself as a whole, Europe felt itself paramount. . . . Now or never was spirit to renew the world” (E, 20).

Zweig’s literary biography of the Portuguese explorer Magellan, who led
the first successful circumvention of the world—although he did not live to see its end, having died in battle in the Philippines in 1521—marks the transition between Zweig’s writings on the lost world of Europe and his vanishing hopes for the future. Zweig finds the latter in his idealized image of a racially harmonious Brazil arising from the presumed ideas of tolerance that the colonizers brought—alongside genocide and slavery. Zweig first expressed his interest in writing “a kind of handbook for foreigners” on Brazil in 1936, when he visited the country as a guest of the PEN club. Zweig began writing the first sections of this project on his return journey to Britain. In January 1941, now living in New York, Zweig paid a second brief visit to Brazil. He completed the manuscript in March 1941 and decided to move to Brazil at the end of that year.

Zweig’s positive images of race mixing in Brazil contrast starkly with the destructive nature attributed to the racial hybrid in nineteenth-century racial theory. Wilhelm Raabe had given these images literary provenance in his 1890 *Stopfkuchen: A Sea and Murder Mystery*, which proposed the dangers of German colonialism in its presumed dissolution of the true German spirit through intermarriage with the mixed-race peoples of South Africa. Thomas Mann had reprised these images, albeit more ambivalently, in his construction of a hybrid colonial South America in a number of his characters, from Gerda and Toni in *Buddenbrooks* to Consuelo in “Tonio Kröger.” As a German Brazilian, Mann’s mother, Júlia da Silva Bruhns, was the product of “whitening” in nineteenth-century imperial Brazil. In Lübeck, however, where she was educated and later married, she was perceived as black, and her memoir, *Aus Dodos Kindheit* (From Dodo’s Childhood) (1903), suggests that she felt more at home in a fantasy world of Brazilian colonialism and slavery than she did in Germany. This conflict was played out in Mann’s frequent metaphor of two souls divided against themselves, which he also saw at the core of his own life.

Fueled by Eugen Fischer’s studies on mixed-race children in the German colony of South West Africa (now Namibia), the debates regarding race mixing entered the German parliament after World War I in the shape of proposals to forcibly sterilize the offspring of French North African troops and German women in the Rhineland. This plan was carried out during the early years of National Socialist rule. The 1935 Nuremberg Laws forbade intermarriage between those of “German blood” and “Jews,” positioning the perceived problem of racial hybridity at the core of National Socialist ideology. At precisely this political and discursive juncture, Zweig becomes interested in Brazil. Zweig’s early drafts of his book followed the writings of Alfred Döblin, who had fled to France in 1933. Two years later, Döblin began writing his *Amazonas* trilogy (1937–39), in which he, like Zweig, projected the cosmopolitan ideal onto Brazil.
Döblin began his work in the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris, ruminating over maps of South America to fill his time during his exile. In the second volume, *The Blue Tiger* (1938), Döblin moves his cosmopolitan Christian characters between Central Europe and northern Brazil in the age of the great Jesuit missions in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. For Döblin, this presumed civilizing mission is destructive, with no possible moral good. Indeed, the words placed in the mouths of the Jesuits and their allies repeatedly echo the demeaning rhetoric of German racial science. Unlike Döblin’s image of Brazil, which seems partially to mirror National Socialist Germany and its racial politics, Zweig presents Brazil as a utopian if ambiguous refuge. The cosmopolitan nature of the Jesuits in an odd way reiterates the fantasy of the cosmopolitan Jew. Brazil was the first large Jewish settlement in the Americas, with more than fifteen hundred Jews living in northeastern Brazil in the seventeenth century, when it was a Dutch colony. When the Portuguese reconquered Brazil in 1654, these Jews fled to other parts of the New World. When they tried to reestablish themselves in New Amsterdam, Peter Stuyvesant quickly pointed out that they were refugees, not good Dutch Protestant settlers, and turned them away.

In Brazil, Zweig feels himself “immediately transported into colonial days, where everything was close and handy; . . . when walking was still a peaceful pastime”—like the prewar Vienna he went on to depict in *The World of Yesterday*. Zweig’s seemingly paradoxical portrayal of Brazil of the site of colonialist benevolence unwittingly exposes both the conditioning of modern cosmopolitanism by European colonial expansion and cosmopolitanism’s fundamentally Eurocentric predisposition. Although Zweig partially reflects on the problems of European racism and colonialist domination, he overall suggests colonialism’s productive impact on Brazil. Zweig acknowledges that his previous “ideas of Brazil” involved a “semi-civilized” rather than cultural nation and “coincided with those of the average European and North American” (ZB, 1). Now, however, he sees Brazil as offering a foretaste of “the future of our world” (ZB, 4), since, according to James Bryce, “No large country in the world belonging to a European race possesses such wealth of soil for the development of human existence and creative industry” (ZB, 80). This phrasing stresses the dominant European properties in Zweig’s perception of Brazil.

Zweig contends that Brazil has solved a problem of utmost urgency for humanity—that is, how “to make it possible for human beings to live peacefully together, despite all the differences of race, class, colour, religion, and creed” (ZB, 7). Zweig argues that the history of European nationalism and racism could be expected to predict major strife in this heterogeneous nation.
Instead, however, Brazil’s disparate populations—descended from Portuguese colonizers, Native Americans, African slaves, and more recently Italian, German, and Japanese immigrants—have no greater ambition than to abandon their former particularities and transform themselves into “Brazilians as quickly as possible, and thus form a new and united nation” (ZB, 7–8). In contrast to the United States, his previous country of exile, Brazil is a successful melting pot that has achieved genuine social harmony: “One lives here a more peaceful, more humane existence,” Zweig claims, “not so mechanical or standardized as in the United States; not so irritated and poisoned by politics as in Europe” (ZB, 181).

Zweig arrives at this image by largely obliterating the legacies of slavery and social injustice that continue to blight the lives of Brazil’s black inhabitants. Despite Zweig’s explicit abhorrence of racial ideologies, his depiction of Africans is riddled with racist stereotypes such as that of atavistic creatures bare of intellectual capacity. Adopting the dominant view of European slaveholding societies that also informs his written sources, among them documents from Brazil’s slaveholding era, which persisted until 1888, Zweig largely objectifies black Brazilians and even euphemizes and justifies the slave labor that made Brazil’s wealth in the sugar plantations:

Two slaves (an ox would be too expensive) hold onto the vertical handle and move around in a kind of treadmill. Their tireless rounds cause the rolling pins to press upon each other until the last ounce of treacle is extracted from the cane. (ZB, 86)

Zweig briefly considers some of slavery’s atrocities, such when he describes the “nightmare” slave ships, where “half of the Negroes, chained and herded together, die on the voyage” (ZB, 91). Although these ambivalent passages denounce the murderous consequences of slavery, Zweig’s objectified and aestheticized portrayals of the slaves and their labor ultimately vindicate those horrors, as in the case of Zweig’s description of “a plundered and depopulated Africa” (ZB, 91), which has supplied Brazil with millions of slaves, albeit at uncertain economic gain. Although the slaves themselves may generate profit, costs are also incurred in importing “a strong-boned Negro from Guinea or Senegal” (ZB, 91) as a consequence of the freight price and “loss of merchandise damaged and thrown into the sea during the voyage” (ZB, 91–92). The objectifying term merchandise refers to human beings. Fetishistic portrayals of Africans as a faceless and only partially embodied mass in colonialist production—that “machine kept going by these millions of black arms”
further reiterate the objectified state of Africans in the discourse of slavery. Zweig’s colorful depiction of colonial sugar production, then, aestheticizes slavery and consequently minimizes its horrors: “With amazing rapidity white sugar, extracted from brown canes with green leaves by black slaves, is being converted into heavy yellow gold” (ZB, 87).

Zweig’s sentimental portrayals of colonialism and slavery climax in his suggestion that they have become objects of melancholia even for the former slaves themselves. In the evenings, he claims, black plantation workers would sit and sing “their melancholy songs. Perhaps one or two of the white-haired Negroes walking calmly and contently around here still remember the old days” (ZB, 228). Zweig’s descriptions of present-day Brazil are similarly problematic. Black people add color and exoticism to his perception, for example when he argues that black settlements render Rio “so colorful and picturesque” (ZB, 195). Such passages airbrush the brutal postslavery social conditions and suggest that these descendants of former slaves voluntarily live in the most primitive conditions because that is the unchanging nature of their origins. Their huts, although built from discarded rubbish, are exactly the same as those “which their ancestors built hundreds of years ago in their African kraals” (ZB, 196). Climbing up remote cliffs to these favelas, Zweig observes guileless and gold-toothed people in “the lowest form of living conditions” (ZB, 142)—indeed, in their “primitive original state” in their clay and bamboo huts: “The Negro carrying water smiles at one with gleaming teeth, even helps one up the slippery muddy steps. Women nursing their children look up kindly and without embarrassment” (ZB, 142).

These images oscillate between Zweig’s racist perception of black Brazilians as particularly threatening and his equally problematic images of their excessive naïveté. Both meanings are signified by the mention of the men’s shiny teeth, which suggest both the claims of Africans’ cannibalism and their primitive lust for adornments. And indeed, Zweig goes to some lengths to discuss cannibalism in his treatment of native Brazilians, whose depiction remains similarly problematic. Zweig identifies culture wholly with the European element, who are driven to biologically fuse the country’s diverse ethnic constituents into one nation, Native Brazilians, too, appear to have no genuine culture of their own. According to Zweig, “So far not even the most diligent research has succeeded in finding a contribution of any importance made by the naked and cannibalistic aboriginals toward the culture of Brazil” (ZB, 136).

In this representation, prior to the arrival of the Jesuits, the natives were cultureless nomads—noble savages in the vein of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, unclothed and without religion, technology, or any concept of labor. But they also
lacked any philosophy of menace against their enemies: “These savages live so far removed from any cultural or moral understanding that to them the eating of prisoners means no more or less than such festive pleasures as drinking, dancing, and sleeping with women” (ZB, 32).

Unlike Africans, the natives’ weak stamina and unwilling attitude render them unfit for slavery, which Zweig’s portrayal minimizes. The natives thus waste away, innately unfit to survive: “They wore themselves out in a few weeks under the whip, then lay down and died” (ZB, 84). Whereas Africans still appear inherently primitive, native Brazilians can be redeemed for the Jesuits’ civilizing mission in that they become willingly Christianized. While “the Jesuits, being the scholarly and ever-watchful realists that they are, realize this indolent thoughtless consent, the bowing and genuflexion of cannibals, is still far removed from real Christendom” (ZB, 33), the natives’ conversion is the first step in the Christians’ concerted efforts to produce a mixed-race population that will align itself with the colonizers. Zweig’s positive wording of the Jesuits’ efforts indicates that he sees this as a productive process, leading toward the ethnically heterogeneous Brazil of his own time. It is therefore not surprising that he barely refers to its flip side, the gruesome extinction of Brazil’s native population. Zweig’s uncritical celebration of Brazil’s history of ethnic fusion must be read against the backdrop of the National Socialists’ murderous project to create a racially pure German people, which had caused Zweig’s flight into exile. For him, Brazil’s ethnic heterogeneity, regardless of its inscriptions of colonial violence and genocide, therefore now points the way to humanity’s cosmopolitan future:

Whereas our old world is more than ever ruled by the insane attempt to breed people racially pure, like race-horses and dogs, the Brazilian nation for centuries has built upon the principle of free and unsuppressed miscegenation, the complete equalization of black and white, brown and yellow. What in other countries is only theoretically stated on paper and parchment—an absolute civil equality in public as well as in private life—shows itself here in reality in the schools, offices, churches, in business, in the army and the universities. . . . The allegedly destructive principle of race mixture, this horror, this “sin against the blood” of our obsessed race theoreticians, is here consciously used as a process of cementing national culture. (ZB, 8–9)

Seeking to counter the National Socialists’ obsession with racial purity, Zweig privileges racial hybridity. In doing so, however, he unwittingly per-
petuates the racial logic, which itself centered on narratives of hybridity. For race mixing is, as Zweig himself acknowledges, a concept steeped in racial ideology, and Zweig’s attempts to positively resignify the late-nineteenth-century American term miscegenation (miscigenação, or mestizaje in Brazilian Portuguese) itself thus cannot escape the racial logic.

The context of Brazilian history was even more complicated. The question of mixed race as a category is complicated in light of both the status of whitening as a measure of the relationship to Europe and the ever-shifting status of slavery. Thus mixed-race individuals in Brazil often self-identify as white even when their mixed-race status is apparent to others. The case of the most popular Brazilian writer of the period, Machado de Assis, is exemplary. Shortly after Machado’s death in 1908, journalist José Veríssimo wrote an article in which he referred to Machado as a “mulatto.” Machado’s close friend, abolitionist and politician Joaquim Nabuco, penned a note to Veríssimo in an attempt to prevent the use of that highly offensive word to describe the author:

Your article is very beautiful, but there is one sentence that gave me chills: “A mulatto, he was indeed a Greek of the best epoch.” I would have never called Machado mulatto, and I think that nothing would have hurt him more than your having concluded this. I implore you to omit this remark when you convert your article into permanent form: The word is not literary, it is pejorative. To me, Machado was white, and I believe he considered himself to be as well: whatever foreign blood he may have had in no way affected his perfect Caucasoid makeup. I, at least, saw only the Greek in him.

Zita Nunes has more recently argued that the making of the Brazilian nation was a “project by and for white men” and that the “father of the nation is thus the white man, the only appropriate sexual partner for both white women and women of color.” And this ideology had not vanished from Zweig’s Brazil. For Jews, this meant dealing with the problem of identifying oneself as marginally “nonwhite” in the Brazilian context. The situation for non-Jewish Europeans, such as Thomas Mann’s mother in Brazil, was radically different. She became “exotic” only when her family returned to Germany.

Zweig leaves the reader in no doubt that the Brazilian hybrid type, which he deems supreme in body and soul, does not result from just any racial fusion but precisely from the white admixture, which lends this mélange of “chocolate, milk and coffee” (ZB, 8) its cosmopolitanist face. This wording conveys the full extent of Zweig’s disturbing fetishism of race and colonial slavery, for
it translates the biblical notion of the “land of milk and honey” into the context of Brazil’s colonial predicament. Brazil’s major economic assets—chocolate and coffee—are mapped onto its production of a corresponding palette of skin tones, in which milk—the signifier of whiteness and spiritual purity—acts as an ennobling ingredient. Throughout the text, Zweig leaves no doubt of his view that the white European immigrants, in contrast to their atavistic African and native Brazilian counterparts, have improved this racial mix through their superior intellect, culture, and technology. As a result,

one seldom sees anywhere in the world more beautiful women and children—delicate in build, gentle in manner—than among these hybrids. It is a joy to look at the half-dark face of a student and to find there an intelligence coupled with a quiet modesty and politeness. (ZB, 9)

Although this contention must once again be read as a defense against the National Socialist obsession with racial purity, Zweig’s reading of racial hybridity as an ennobling of races was itself part and parcel of racial theory. Indeed, most racial theorists agreed that mixing among related European groups was of beneficial effect, and even the National Socialists promoted the Aufnordung (Nordification)—that is, the improvement of European groups perceived to be partially related yet inferior, such as Poles of “Aryan” appearance, through restricted interbreeding with Germans. Zweig’s intended dissent from racial theory is clear in his celebration of the productive rather than degenerate effects of mixing among Europeans, Africans, and Native Americans, which racial theorists would have seen as the downfall of civilization. Furthermore, Zweig positions extensive mixing of different “blood-groups” (ZB, 135) at the center of his European narrative itself in claiming that “the first European arrival in Brazil, the Portuguese of the sixteenth century, is anything but of pure race. He represents, in fact, a mixture of his Iberian, Roman, Gothic, Phœnician, Jewish, and Moorish ancestors” (ZB, 135).

This description of the Portuguese as an inherently mixed-race group implicitly parallels the conception of the Jews, whom racial theorists since Houston Stewart Chamberlain had constructed as the quintessential mongrel race. Through this construct, which affords the Jews a special status within the Portuguese mix and the European arrivals in Brazil more generally, Zweig implicitly positions the Jews at the center of his cosmopolitanist narrative. The majority of early colonists, he claims, were rabble, brutal slaveholders who pillaged native villages and raped native women. Arriving in the mid-sixteenth century, the Jesuits added a humanist element to this mix. Not yet the religious, politi-
cal, and economic power they would become in later centuries, the Jesuits represent a purified power striving for spiritual rather than physical or material superiority. Zweig depicts the Jesuits as a humanizing force that opposes the enslavement and destruction of native Brazilians, seeking instead to civilize them through religious conversion and racial hybridization:

> Just because the native standard of living is low, they shall not sink still further into [the conditions of animalism] and slavery. They shall, in fact, be raised up, made into conscious members of the human race, and through Christianity they shall be drawn toward western civilization; and through miscegenation and education a new nation shall develop here. (ZB, 29)

In *Erasmus*, Zweig had similarly portrayed the humanist project as an effort to lift the lower strata of society into the higher echelons of culture. Just as the humanists envisioned a common European project, the Jesuits in Brazil strive to transcend the divide between “a master nation of whites and a slave nation of coloured folk” and to create “a unified free people on free soil” (ZB, 37).

Contrasting with “the inferiority of the cultural material sent to Brazil by the Portuguese” (ZB, 53), Jesuits and Jews (as well as the Dutch) represent the noble exceptions. The freshly baptized Jews are, in fact, “the only colonists who arrive of their own accord” (ZB, 23) rather than fleeing persecution. Having accepted baptism while still in Portugal, the Jews are motivated by caution and fear during the looming Inquisition. Entire communities of baptized and unbaptized Jews settled in the Brazilian harbor towns, becoming the country’s “first real civilian colonizers” (ZB, 23) and thus its oldest families. However, Jews were not simply the first actual Brazilians, given that they chose this land more or less voluntarily; “with their knowledge of the world market” (ZB, 24), they began to create the later wealth of the Brazilian export economy. Through this construct, Zweig once again positions Jews at the core of the humanizing mission of the cosmopolitan.

**Lion Feuchtwanger’s History in Exile, the Josephus Trilogy**

Whereas Roth and Zweig maintained their diasporic cosmopolitanism until the end of their lives, Lion Feuchtwanger’s turned from an affirmation of cosmopolitanism to Zionism in the second and third volumes of his *Josephus* trilogy, which were written in exile. In terms of the circumstances of its writing from
its beginnings in Weimar Germany to completion in exile, *Josephus* parallels Thomas Mann’s *Joseph*. Yet Feuchtwanger drew different conclusions from the new Jewish reality of exile and annihilation. Unlike the other writers, Feuchtwanger’s realization of the failure of the cosmopolitanist project changed the perception of the Jews’ particularist universality that the first volume of his trilogy had claimed. This shift is obvious in the trajectory of his trilogy, which moves from the initial critique of Jewish nationalism in the first volume to its reconsideration in the third volume. The National Socialists’ rise to power thus dramatically changed Feuchtwanger’s thinking about the relationship between nationalism and cosmopolitanism, a development that his essays also echoed.

This shift over the second volume was no doubt conditioned by the dramatic change in Feuchtwanger’s life circumstances during the decade during which he worked on the trilogy. In 1932, when the first volume was published, Feuchtwanger had already conceptualized and completed much of its successor, but the National Socialists looted Feuchtwanger’s house in March 1933, while he was traveling abroad, and destroyed his drafts. Feuchtwanger and his wife settled in southern France, where he completed the reconceptualized volume in 1935. After several other projects, Feuchtwanger returned to the trilogy in 1939, but its completion was delayed by his two-month internment at the French Les Milles and Saint Nicolas camps in 1941. After escaping from Saint Nicolas, Feuchtwanger went into hiding in Marseille, where he resumed working on the third volume. Feuchtwanger and his wife ultimately escaped to the United States, where the first complete edition of the trilogy appeared in 1942. Only in 1945 did Berman-Fischer publish the German original.

Whereas Feuchtwanger’s first volume, through the figure of Josephus, criticized Jews who continued to cling to their Jewish particularity, the second and third volumes returned to a proto-Zionist affirmation of Jewish nationalism on Judean soil. In light of the violent Roman onslaught, the second volume sees the Jews beginning to abandon their “universal mission which had been faithfully carried out for centuries.” The novel suggests the destruction of the cosmopolitan Jewish mission in the Romans’ murder of Josephus’s son, Matthias, the last in his Jewish line, who Josephus had hoped “would attain what he himself had not been able to attain: to be a Jew and at the same time a Greek, a citizen of the world.” In the second volume, Josephus’s dream of the Jew’s particularist universality had already begun to clash with the violent anti-Jewish hatred that is spreading among the Romans and their allies. In an allusion to the National Socialist ideology, the German troops stationed in Rome are particularly hostile to the Jews:
There was one species of human beings that got on their nerves: the Jews. In the swamps and forests of Germany wild legends were current about the peoples of the East, and about the Jews in particular, how they hated all fair-haired faces and loved the sacrifice of blond heads to their donkey-headed God. These bogey tales still reverberated in the minds of the German troops who were stationed at Rome, and they were liable to panic whenever they encountered people from the East. (JR, 239)

Under the new emperor, Domitian, a figure with a strong resemblance to Hitler, Rome’s war campaigns reflect ever more clearly the National Socialist war of total annihilation: “This was the ruthless countenance of Rome which doomed to destruction everything in which it sensed the slightest hint of menace to its power” (JR, 320). Through the Roman war against the Dacians to the east on the Danube, Feuchtwanger thus invokes the National Socialist campaign in Eastern Europe, with its special implications for the destruction of European Jewry: “The new war that now came rolling onward, this war in the East, could have unforeseen consequences for him and for Judea” (DWC, 10).

The Jews, having been “the first on earth to proclaim that their God belonged not to them alone but to the whole earth, turned into the most fanatical particularists” (JR, 363). Nationalist violence breeds armed resistance, which the novel increasingly condones through Josephus’s renewed gravitation toward the Judean cause. However, the novel does not leave this without debate. In an apparent allusion to World War I, Feuchtwanger thus has Joseph’s rival and friend, Judean writer Justus, blame the lost Judean War for driving the younger generation toward the impotent Christian messiah. “The present generation,” he surmises, “have little reason to imitate their fathers. Their fathers waged that dreadfully foolish war, and were dreadfully defeated, as was only right” (JR, 533). In response, “the sons have fashioned another crutch for their weakness, they pretend to themselves that a Messiah can help them, a Messiah who died for them on the cross. Belief in the nation, belief in the Messiah: both of them a foolishness, an expression of weakness” (JR, 534).

Feuchtwanger here implicitly links Christianity to the pacifist response to World War I, which had also informed Zweig’s notion of an intellectual cosmopolitanism that must abstain from political action. In the face of total destruction, Feuchtwanger suggests, such a purely intellectual stance is no longer viable. The novel’s early Christians, who have rejected the radical nationalism of their Jewish counterparts, now present another avenue toward the universalism that the Jews have largely abandoned. No longer promoting the Jewish God as
Israel’s inheritance but rather the God of the entire world, they seek to unite their teachings with those of the Jews and Greeks. In doing so, however, their cosmopolitanism has become diluted because it lacks the deterritorialized particularity of the Jews. Cosmopolitanism and nationalism, Feuchtwanger has Justus contend, ultimately condition each other, and the Christians are adept at neither:

The universalism of these people . . . is a mass commodity like all that they teach. They purchase their universalism at the expense of all that Judaism has achieved in the way of a great and strong tradition, of a history that has become spirit. One must have experienced nationalism in order to know what universalism is. (JR, 459)

The Christians’ meek pacifism and diluted universalism thus fail to respond to the crisis of the Jews’ annihilation. Josephus’s renewed turn toward the Jewish national cause, which Feuchtwanger penned under the immediate impression of his own internment and impending death, suggests that violent destruction necessitates armed resistance, even if this resistance leads to death and tragedy. The cosmopolitanist project is temporarily suspended, yet the German title of the trilogy’s last volume, Der Tag wird kommen (The Day Shall Come), suggests the utopian hope that its moment will return. It is not incidental that the novel represents this path through two Jewish writers, Josephus and Justus, for Feuchtwanger attributes to the politicized Jewish writer a special role in preserving the cosmopolitanist project for future generations. While the writer’s role may indeed seem politically inconsequential—“It was easy enough to be bold at one’s desk and to feel a cosmopolitan” (JR, 351)—the writer’s position is by no means neutral, for his power lies in his ability to shape history through writing:

The statesman passes away and his work passes away. The general dies and his triumphs fade. Are their achievements real and palpable? . . . And then comes the writer and takes these events in his grasp and presents them concretely, giving them a clear and delicate outline, so that they are visible for all time. . . . He has the mysterious power of staying the toppling wave so that it does not break but remains imperishably fixed for ever. This fact was early recognised by the Jews. For generations their history has been preserved in a tradition revealed to them by their God. They write history in the grand style. (JR, 133)
Josephus’s unattainable dream to become a cosmopolitan in a world of sectarian violence is ultimately crushed in the murder of his son, which the emperor, Domitian, had plotted to deal Josephus a vital blow. Josephus now renounces his cosmopolitanism and joins the militant particularists in Judea on their suicidal mission.

Josephus’s path from Jewish nationalist to cosmopolitan and his ultimate return to the Jewish national cause exemplify Feuchtwanger’s view of the failed cosmopolitan project. In contrast, a distinct Jewish particularity played a far less important role in Zweig’s oeuvre, which, with the exception of his Jeremias, largely abstained from treating Jewish themes in epic format. Zweig’s suicide in Brazil, the country that he cherished and praised as a cosmopolitan model for the future of humanity, may convey his sense of personal failure to make a fresh start in this new world. This, however, does not signal an enforced embrace of a Jewish particularist stance through his persecution as a Jew. On the contrary, Zweig emphasized the vital necessity of the cosmopolitan project for humanity into his final works. However, this path is no longer viable for the individual under the circumstances of extreme political adversity. Zweig’s Erasmus had claimed the liberal cosmopolitan’s essential pacifism, a position that ultimately renders the individual politically ineffective and defenseless. Erasmus, on whom Zweig had modeled himself, thus dies an isolated and shameful death. Feuchtwanger’s Josephus rises to meet his enemies in battle, only to die at their hands. The cosmopolitan project remains ambivalent in texts about Jews and “exile” from the critical Thomas Mann and antagonistic Martin Heidegger to the engaged historical works of Stefan Zweig, Joseph Roth, and Leon Feuchtwanger. Thus the transformation of the cosmopolitan into the exile, the nomad into the refugee, remains suspended as the Holocaust unfolds.