Notes

Chapter 1


17. Constraints on drone operations still exist and limit the extent to which these weapons platforms can be used. See Andrea Gilli, Mauro Gilli, “The Diffusion of Drone Warfare: Industrial, Organizational, and Infrastructural Constraints,” *Security Studies* 25:1 (2016), 50–84. These barriers are important to account for when estimating the likely extent of drone proliferation and predicting how drones will be used in future conflicts, but what is important for our purposes is that drones may be able to reduce the financial and material costs of war in ways that could lower inhibitions against fighting.


36. https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2015/02/02/almost-2500-killed-covert-us-drone-strikes-obama-inauguration/


41. Eric Schmitt and David E. Sanger, “Pakistan Shift Could Curtail Drone


50. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmhansrd/cm121106/halltext/121106h0001.htm#12110684000252


58. For more about the influence of institutional culture on innovations, see Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).


72. Data files and scripts used to clean and analyze this data are available at http://www.jamesigoewalsh.com

73. We preregistered these designs with the registry AsPredicted.org; see chapters 2 and 3 for details.

74. For discussions of preregistration, see Katherine Casey, Rachael Glennerster, and Edward Miguel, *Reshaping Institutions: Evidence on Aid Impacts Using a Pre-Analysis

Chapter 2


7. A. C. Grayling, Among the Dead Cities: The History and Moral Legacy of the WWII Bombing of Civilians in Germany and Japan (New York: Walker & Company, 2006).


28. We preregistered this experiment; the pre-analysis plan is available at https://aspredicted.org/6ivav.pdf

29. The experiment was fielded April 25–30, 2016. See table A2.2 in the chapter appendix for a comparison of demographic variables from this sample with those from the American National Election Studies.


34. This was also the case when we examined ratings of each attack type individually. Democrats provided lower ratings than did Republicans for drone strikes, air strikes, and the use of ground troops. See the replication materials for details.


36. Kreps, “Flying under the Radar.”


42. Table A2.1 in the appendix presents the results of the model depicted in figure 2.2. As a robustness check, it also reports a model using the rating variable. This has been transformed so that values of 4 or less on the seven-point rating scale are equal to zero, and values of 5 or greater are equal to 1. (This approach is suggested in Hainmueller and Hopkins, “The Hidden American Immigration Consensus.”) The findings from using this dependent variable are largely consistent with those in which the preference dependent variable is employed. The one difference to note is the results for international support, where the Security Council opposes and the human rights NGOs support and oppose variables are no longer statistically significant.


44. Will Dahlgreen, “Memories of Iraq: Did We Ever Support the War?,” *YouGov UK*, June 3, 2013, https://yougov.co.uk/news/2015/06/03/remembering-iraq/

45. $\chi^2 = 68.12, \text{ degrees of freedom} = 4, p < .01$.


Chapter 3


5. Gelpi, Reifler, and Feaver (*Paying the Human Costs of War*) distinguish between two different manifestations of this feeling. “Casualty sensitivity recognizes the human toll as a cost of war; casualty phobia refers to a sensitivity so great that it amounts to an unwillingness to support a military operation even if very low human costs are incurred.” What we refer to as “casualty aversion” is an opposition to a prospective or ongoing war that is informed by concern over military casualties, regardless of the extent of the anticipated casualties. Thus, unlike Gelpi, Reifler, and Feaver, we want to avoid suggesting that this phenomenon is linked to low casualty levels and to remain open to opposition being triggered by variations in the number of casualties. We also prefer to describe this as “casualty aversion” to avoid any pejorative implications of the term “phobia.”


17. Christopher Gelpi, Jason Reifler, and Peter Feaver, “Iraq the Vote: Retrospective and Prospective Foreign Policy Judgments on Candidate Choice and Casualty Tolerance,” *Political Behavior* 29 (2007), 151–74.


26. Sapolsky and Shapiro, “Casualties, Technology, and America’s Future Wars.”

27. Gelpi, Reifler, and Feaver, “Iraq the Vote,” 156.


34. Gentry, *How Wars Are Won and Lost*, 118.

35. Sapolsky and Shapiro, “Casualties, Technology, and America’s Future Wars.”


45. Perla, “Explaining Public Support for the Use of Military Force.”

46. See the chapter appendix for the full text of the treatment conditions, the survey items, and demographic profiles of the two respondent pools.

47. The YouGov survey was fielded April 8–13, 2016; the Mechanical Turk survey was fielded May 25, 2016. During the period between when these experiments were fielded, there were no unusual or prominent developments concerning the use of armed drones that received significant news coverage.

48. Respondents in the YouGov sample were matched to a sampling frame on gender, age, race, education, party identification, ideology, and political interest. The frame was constructed by stratified sampling from the full 2010 American Community Survey (ACS) sample with selection within strata by weighted sampling with replacements (using the person weights on the public use file). Data on voter registration status and turnout were matched to this frame using the November 2010 Current Population Survey. Data on interest in politics and party identification were then matched to this frame from the 2007 Pew Religious Life Survey. The matched cases were weighted to the sampling frame using propensity scores. The matched cases and the frame were combined and a logistic regression was estimated for inclusion in the frame. The propensity score function included age, gender, race/ethnicity, years of education, and ideology. The propensity scores were grouped into deciles of the estimated propensity score in the frame and poststratified according to these deciles.

49. Preanalysis plans were filed with the registry aspredicted.org; the plan for the YouGov version of the experiment is available at https://aspredicted.org/6tb4m.pdf, and the plan for the Mechanical Turk version is available at https://aspredicted.org/rxj49.pdf


52. Levay, Freese, and Druckman, “The Demographic and Political Composition of Mechanical Turk Samples.”
53. $\chi^2 = 1.92$, degrees of freedom = 4, $p = .75$. We collapsed the seven-point measure of support for the attack to three levels for this figure.

54. Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler, *Paying the Human Costs of War*.

55. For more on the context of terrorist attacks during the period we conducted the survey experiments, see David Kilcullen, *Blood Year: The Unraveling of Western Counterterrorism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

56. $\chi^2 = 44.45$, degrees of freedom = 4, $p < .01$.

57. $\chi^2 = .59$, degrees of freedom = 4, $p = .96$.

58. $\chi^2 = .48$, degrees of freedom = 4, $p = .98$.

59. Some respondents assigned to the drone strike condition indicated that they expected military casualties, despite being informed that military personnel would not be at risk. There are a number of explanations for this. Some respondents might have thought that the remote pilots of the drone aircraft could suffer psychological harm, a possibility that has been frequently discussed in the media. Others might have thought about the longer-term consequences of the use of military force, worrying that seemingly low-risk attacks on the terrorist bases might lead to the introduction of more forces in the future, including ground troops who could be at greater risk of harm. Other research finds that there is a subset of individuals who strongly oppose the use of force under any conditions and that this preference negatively colors their assessments of the likely consequences of military action. On this point, see Feaver, Gelpi, and Reifler, *Paying the Human Costs of War*. Another explanation is that these respondents did not pay attention to the details of the treatment vignette or the question. It is possible that lower levels of attention would alter the relationships reported in table 3.2. To assess this possibility, we reran model 2 in table 3.2, but excluded respondents assigned to the drone strike treatment who indicated that military casualties were likely to result. Results are similar to those in model 2. See the replication materials for details.


Chapter 4


17. For example, when Buchanan and Keohane propose a regulatory regime that would apply to drone operations, they are almost exclusively concerned with the challenges related to the targeted killing of suspected terrorists. See Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane, “Toward a Drone Accountability Regime,” *Ethics & International Affairs* 29:1 (2015).


23. Respondents were recruited via Mechanical Turk and completed the experiment in January 2015. See the chapter appendix for demographic details.


28. For more discussion of the tone of research on casualty aversion and its normative implications, see Smith, “What Costs Will Democracies Bear?”


Chapter 5


18. For example see https://www.iraqbodycount.org/


44. At the same time, the public might recognize that decisions about which type of force to employ in a particular situation is a strategic one. Political and military leaders might choose, for example, to deploy drones against targets that are more difficult or costly to attack with manned aircraft or ground troops. In the case of the data summarized in figure 5.1, this recognition of strategic interaction between target characteristics and attack type is less likely to be driving estimates of success, as the respondents in this experiment were all presented with identical information about the target. Nonetheless, how such characteristics influence estimates of success is a topic that warrants further research.
45. The texts of the treatments, survey instrument, and demographic information about the respondents can be found in the chapter appendix.
47. \( \chi^2 = 10.92 \), degrees of freedom = 15, \( p = .76 \).
Chapter 6


10. Roese, “Counterfactual Thinking.”


15. We deliberately did not ask in the first round of this experiment questions about how concerned the respondent was about civilian casualties, since this might have primed attention to such casualties in subsequent information and questions. Instead,
we measure concern about civilian harm indirectly by comparing the overall level of support for the attack where the only factor that varies is likelihood of civilian casualties.

16. The United States military has regularly made such “condolence payments” to families of civilians killed as a consequence of American military operations. During confirmation hearings for the position of director of the Central Intelligence Agency in 2013, John Brennan stated that condolence payments are offered to families of victims of drone strikes: “In those rare instances in which civilians have been killed [in drone strikes], after-action reviews have been conducted to identify corrective actions and to minimize the risk of innocents being killed or injured in the future. Where possible, we also work with local governments to gather facts and, if appropriate, provide condolence payments to families of those killed.” See “Questions for the Record, Mr. John Brennan, Questions from the Chairman,” Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, n.d., available at http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/130207/posthearing.pdf; and Cora Currier, “Drones In Yemen: Does the U.S. Pay Families When Strikes Kill Innocent Yemenis?,” Huffington Post, August 12, 2013.


18. Results reported here are unchanged when the data is analyzed with logistic regression models that include control variables; see the chapter appendix for details.


20. See the replication materials for the details of these statistical tests.


24. This norm is typically called “discrimination” in just war theory and “distinction” in international law.


30. Tomz, “Reputation and the Effect of International Law on Preferences and Beliefs” (manuscript, 2008).


Chapter 7


15. Zack Beauchamp and Julian Savulescu, “Robot Guardians: Teleoperated Com-


32. Woods, Sudden Justice, 52.


Appendix to Chapter 6

1. The survey instrument includes items about the respondent’s political knowledge. We sought to use these items to create an index of political knowledge, but Cronbach’s alpha indicated that this index had low internal consistency.
