The Distinction of Peace

Goetze, Catherine

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Notes

Introduction


7. Ibid., 129.


27. Tsing, Friction, 11–12.


Chapter 1


8. Ibid., 195.


19. See, for further discussion, Swartz, *Symbolic Power, Politics, and Intellectuals.*


32. The former is particularly noticeable in the proliferation of titles like “The


38. See, for instance, Michel Foucault, L’archéologie du savoir (Paris: Gallimard, 1992).


41. Bourdieu, Ce que parler veut dire.


44. Autesserre, Peaceland.


47. It is this connection between doing and effect on society that probably led the German translator to translate “le sens pratique” (the practical sense) as “der soziale Sinn” (the social sense).


49. Bourdieu, Socialer Raum und Klassen, 73.


63. Many countries require visa applicants and bearers of student visas to prove that they have sufficient economic resources to sustain their studies and livelihood during their stay in the host country.

64. See Sozio-Ökonomisches Panel at http://www.diw.de/en/soep or the British household panel survey at https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/bhps, both accessed March 2015.


71. Berit Bliesemann de Guevara, *Staatlichkeit in Zeiten des Statebuilding: Interven-
Notes to Pages 39–44


Chapter 2


For a critical view on the state failure paradigm, see the following articles from Third World Quarterly 35, no. 2 (2014): Derick W. Brinkerhoff, “State Fragility and Failure as Wicked Problems: Beyond Naming and Taming”; Olivier Nay, “International Organisations and the Production of Hegemonic Knowledge: How the World Bank and the OECD Helped Invent the Fragile State Concept”; Isabel Rocha De Siqueira, “Measuring and Managing ‘State Fragility’: The Production of Statistics by the World Bank, Timor-Leste and the G7+”. See also Heather Marquette and Danielle Beswick,


7. See, for a discussion (particularly the conclusion), Ray Murphy, UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia and Kosovo: Operational and Legal Issues in Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).


11. Richmond and Franks, Liberal Peace Transitions; Autesserre, Trouble with the Congo; Catherine Goetz and Dejan Guzina, “Peacebuilding, Statebuilding, Nationbuilding—Turtles All the Way Down?,” Civil Wars 10, no. 4 (2008).

12. Mitchell, Lost in Transformation; Hughes, Dependent Communities.


16. For a detailed description of these events, see De Witte, Assassination of Lumumba. For a thorough discussion of UN special envoy Andrew Cordier’s dislike of Lumumba, see Carole Collins, “Fatally Flawed Mediation: Cordier and the Congo Crisis of 1960,” Africa Today 39, no. 3 (1992).


19. The arrest ultimately led to Lumumba’s assassination in Katanga at the hands of Moïse Tshombé and Belgian settlers; it remains unclear how far the CIA was involved in the assassination, see “Editorial Note,” Foreign Records of the United States, 1964–1968, vol. 23, Congo, 1960–1968, document 45; also De Witte, Assassination of Lumumba.


21. Kent, America, the UN and Decolonisation.


28. Kent, America, the UN and Decolonisation.


38. Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished, 45.


44. A good example of this is Stephen Engleberg’s analysis in the New York Times in which he ascribes Yugoslavia’s financial crisis to its political crisis and not the other way around; see “Feuds Crippling Yugoslav Economy,” New York Times, April 20, 1991. There has been in the meantime rather substantial research on the importance of Yugoslavia’s debt crisis in the 1980s and the pressures of structural adjustment programs: see Viachaslau Yarashevich and Yuliya Karneyeva, “Economic Reasons for the Break-up of Yugoslavia,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 46, no. 2 (2013); Woodward, Balkan Tragedy; Gibbs, First Do No Harm; David A. Dyker, Yugoslavia: Socialism, Development and Debt (London: Routledge, 2013).

45. Kent, America, the UN and Decolonisation.

46. For example, a number of analysts argue that timely debt rescheduling or debt relief would have decisively strengthened the Yugoslav federal government and, consequently, deflated the conflict between the republics, while depriving Slovenia and Croatia of the most virulent nationalist propaganda; see, for instance, Michael


49. Gibbs, *First Do No Harm*.

50. For the French context, Alice Krieg-Planque has undertaken a very thorough newspaper analysis to retrace how the notion of “purification éthnique” has taken root and meaning in French media; see Alice Krieg-Planque, *Purification éthnique: Une formule et son histoire* (Paris: CNRS, 2003). For a differentiated analysis of French, German, and British news reporting, see Reiner Grundmann, Dennis Smith, and Sue Wright, “National Elites and Transnational Discourses in the Balkan War: A Comparison between the French, German and British Establishment Press,” *European Journal of Communication* 15, no. 3 (2000).


55. The “consortium” that put in place the Office of the High Representative comprised 51 actors, states, and international organizations, of which the UN was one.


60. See letter dated December 15 by the Secretary-General in the preamble of the report.
61. “Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35, the Fall of Srebrenica” (New York: United Nations, 1999). The report on Srebrenica was commissioned through General Assembly Resolution 53/35 in November 1998, which had been introduced by Bosnia and Herzegovina and sponsored by Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Liechtenstein, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Malaysia, Morocco, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, Turkey, and the United States. UN Security Council Resolution A/53/PV.72. The resolution was adopted without a vote.


64. Orford, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect.

65. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, “A New Partnership Agenda.”

66. Orford, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect.

67. See, for instance, the interviews with UN staff Sture Linner and F. P. Liu at the UN oral history project, http://www.unmultimedia.org/oralhistory/, accessed November 2014.


69. Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide, 110.

Chapter 3


2. Séverine Autesserre has documented a great number of these frames, ideas, and practices: “Hobbes and the Congo,” 249–80; Trouble with the Congo; Peaceland.


7. The information for this table was extracted from various sources: autobiographies, memoirs, biographies, encyclopedia entries, UN documentation, newspaper archives, and personal communications from family members.

8. UCLA 2051/208/3, Brian Urquhart also quotes this letter in his biography of Bunche; see Brian Urquhart, *Ralph Bunche: An American Life* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1993).


22. See the critique of too rigid a notion of “class” in Bourdieu, “Social Space and the Genesis of Groups.”


28. See, for instance, the testimonies (mainly from white men) at his birth’s centennial on the webpage of the Ralph Bunche Institute, www.ralphbuncheinstitute.org/ralphbunchcentenary.


32. O’Brien, *To Katanga and Back*.


35. Usually, these two titles are combined in one post, however occasionally a mission has a head of mission (or chief of staff) and a special representative of the Secretary-General. The special representative can be additionally doubled up with a special envoy for specific matters for instance, in 2006 Martti Ahtisari was the Secretary-General’s special envoy to Kosovo to report on the opportunities of Kosovo’s independence.

36. A few smaller missions have been omitted in this table, notably purely military missions like the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). This table also takes into account only missions that were ongoing and funded at the moment of the writing of this book; hence, even if there were former missions in Somalia, this table only takes into account the United Nations Support Office for African Union Mission in Somalia (UNSOA).

37. For Koenders’s biography, see http://www.parlement.com/id/vg09llmaheyj/a_g_bert_koenders, accessed October 2014.

42. See Novosads and Werker, “Who Runs the International System?”
43. See chapter 1 for a discussion of methodological questions.
44. This qualification follows the World Bank distinction of industrialized high-income countries (distinguished again between OECD and non-OECD countries), upper middle-income countries, lower middle-income countries, and low-income countries as of 2012.
45. The total number of the prosopographic sample is 557 but only 330 of these have a postgraduate degree.
47. They came to similar conclusions in their analysis of university students; see Pierre Bourdieu and Jean Claude Passeron, Les héritiers, les étudiants et la culture (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1965).
52. Urquhart, Ralph Bunche.
53. In the qualitative interviews the only worker child I interviewed confirmed this. The interviewee recounted how the parents insisted on hard work for school and were extremely supportive of all educational matters even if this support entailed financial sacrifices.
54. This finding has been similarly brought about by Magdalena Nowicka, Transnational Professionals and Their Cosmopolitan Universes (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2005).


59. UNICEF’s data and statistics page, for instance, gives an impression of the high inequality of educational attainment in the world, see http://data.unicef.org/education/overview, accessed November 2014.

Chapter 4


2. United Nations, Assistant Secretary-General for Human Resource Management, Generic Job Profile Associate Political/Electoral Affairs Officer, P2, 2007.


8. See, for an extensive discussion of privileging the global, that is, the Western, over the local, Autesserre, *Peaceland*.


11. The Russell Group comprises British universities that were formed out of colleges of the University of London, hence, which count as “traditional” universities similar to the universities of Oxford and Cambridge.


23. See Kofi Annan’s foreword to Simon Chesterman, *Secretary or General? The UN Secretary-General in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).


26. Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War; Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars 2001; Duffield and Marston Hewitt, Empire, Development and Colonialism.

28. Zanotti, Governing Disorder.
29. Smirl, “Building the Other, Constructing Ourselves”; Smirl, Spaces of Aid.

31. The reasons for the greater introversion of the academic systems in continental Europe or Japan might be very different. In France the strict control governing admittance to the system through its “aggrégation” and stern Francophony leads to in-breeding; whereas in Italy or Germany the scarcity of full-time professorial chairs leads to a high dependence of junior researchers on senior colleagues. See, for a discussion of national differences between the United States, Great Britain, and France in the field of economics, Marion Fourcade, Economists and Societies: Discipline and Profession in the United States, Britain, and France, 1890s to 1990s (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).

32. Dezalay and Garth, Lawyers and the Construction of Transnational Justice; Dezalay and Garth, Lawyers and the Rule of Law in an Era of Globalization.
34. Keck and Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders.

40. Based on the compilation of conflict resolution and peace studies graduate programs by the Center for Conflict Resolution at Salisbury University, http://www.conflict-resolution.org/sitebody/education/grad.htm, accessed November 2014.
41. Michael N. Barnett and Janice Gross Stein, Sacred Aid: Faith and Humanitarian-

42. See Mark Juergensmeyer, Global Rebellion: Religious Challenges to the Secular State, from Christian Militias to Al Qaeda (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008); Monica Duffy Toft, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy Samuel Shah, God’s Century: Resurgent Religion and Global Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2011).


45. See Barnett and Gross Stein, Sacred Aid.

46. See Eyben, “The Sociality of International Aid and Policy Convergence.”


Chapter 5


2. Bourdieu, Le sens pratique, 90.

3. Ibid., 92, 97.


10. Bröckling, Das unternehmerische Selbst; see also Boltanski and Chiapello, Le nouvel esprit du capitalisme.


15. Ibid., 55.


18. Urquhart, Hammarskjöld.


27. Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, 123.

28. Ibid., 47, 53, 123.


41. Ibid, 10.

42. Urquhart, *Ralph Bunche*.


46. See Kilson’s discussion of Bunche’s pragmatism in “Ralph Bunche, African American Intellectual.”


48. Ralph Bunche’s personal papers are partly accessible at the library of the University of California in Los Angeles but, given the huge preponderance of mundane correspondence and the almost complete absence of working papers, notes, or memos, this archive does not provide any other information than that already used by Brian Urquhart for his biography. This is of little surprise if one considers that it was Urquhart who selected the papers to go into this collection.


52. O’Brien, *To Katanga and Back*, 47.


61. For the history of the responsibility to protect doctrine, see Orford, *International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect*.


63. See, for a longer discussion of the entrepreneurial personality, Bröckling, *Das unternehmerische Selbst*, chap. 3.


75. Schinkel and Noordegraaf, “Professionalism as Symbolic Capital,” 69.
77. Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War.
78. The question was “How challenging is your job?”; respondents responded on a five-step scale with 1 (very challenging) to 5 (not challenging at all).
79. The question was “In a typical week, how often do you feel stressed at work?”; respondents responded on a five-step scale with 1 (extremely often) to 5 (not often at all).
80. About 20 percent saw this as typical burnout; 16 percent would have recommended that the aidworker take it easy in the situation; 18 percent would have recommended that the worker pull himself together and show self-control in such a situation; 27 percent would have explicitly recommended that he seek another job if it was too difficult for him to deal with such a situation; 6 percent explicitly described the aidworker’s behavior as unacceptable; and only 7 percent showed outright, explicit sympathy.
82. See particularly the very popular blog Stuff Expat Aid Workers Like, http://stuffexpataidworkerslike.com; Smirl, Spaces of Aid, chap. 1.
Chapter 6

2. Most of these questions were open ended and allowed respondents to give multiple answers. They will be explained further below.
6. A good example of these is, for instance, the “Great Books” movement in the United States that originated in the 1920s, and which is still a reference for many college liberal art programs.
9. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
the United Nations; for a critical deconstruction of this narrative, see Vitalis, *White World Order, Black Power Politics*.


32. Ibid., 21, 29.


35. Mill, “A Few Words on Non-Intervention.”


37. The question asked was “If you could change the world tomorrow, what would be your priority?” with a rating from 1 (very important) to 7 (not important at all). Surveyees were then presented with a list of policy measures, one of which was “Abolish private property.” No one saw this measure as a priority; almost everyone rated this option as “not important” or “not important at all.”

38. This was an open-ended question asking “Which personality do you admire most?” Respondents could give multiple answers. See also the next chapter in this book.

39. This was an open-ended question asking “Which is the historical event that left the strongest impression on you?” See next chapter for further discussion.


44. Barnett, Empire of Humanity, 49.

45. This question asked respondents to express their agreement or disagreement with a battery of statements on global politics, war, and peace on a scale from 1 (strongly agree) to 7 (strongly disagree). The statements were taken from various agency publications, i.e., speeches by the UN Secretary-General, World Bank or UNDP reports, or discussion papers by donor agencies like the Department of Foreign and International Development in the United Kingdom.

46. The question about political values asked respondents to express their agreement or disagreement with a list of values that should be promoted in politics on scale from 1 (strongly agree) to 7 (strongly disagree). The values asked for were “individual liberty,” “equality,” “merit of individuals,” “tolerance,” “equity in the distribution of public goods,” “competitiveness,” “solidarity,” “security,” “critical discussion,” “state sovereignty,” “fairness,” “private property,” “community and belonging,” “loyalty to the state,” “ecology,” “harmony of society,” “identity,” “individuality,” “plurality of lifestyles,” “family values,” “nation and patriotism,” “contention of politics,” “home,” “conflict,” and “combativeness of individuals.” The question about political reforms was an open-ended question that asked “Which political reform do you admire the most?” respondents could give multiple answers. Welfare reforms were mentioned most often, closely followed by voting rights.


Chapter 7


6. Alan J. Kuperman, “Intervention in Libya: A Humanitarian Success?,” pod-
cast audio, Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict (2012), http://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/inter-
Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the Balkans,” International
Studies Quarterly 52, no. 1 (2008), 49–80; Timothy W. Crawford, and Alan J. Kuper-
man, Gambling on Humanitarian Intervention: Moral Hazard, Rebellion and Civil War
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2006); Alan J. Kuperman, The Limits of Humanitarian Interven-

Marketplace,” International Affairs 85, no. 1 (2009); Alex De Waal, “Darfur and the
Failure of the Responsibility to Protect,” International Affairs 83, no. 6 (2007); De
Waal, Famine Crimes; Rieff, Bed for the Night; David Rieff, “Humanitarianism in Crisis,”
Foreign Affairs 81, no. 6 (2002).

8. John Heathershaw, “Seeing Like the International Community: How Peace-
building Failed (and Survived) in Tajikistan,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding
2, no. 3 (2008).

9. On the relationship between doxa and nomos, see Pierre Bourdieu, Propos sur le


11. Bourdieu, Propos sur le champ politique, 63.


14. See, for instance, Seumas Milne, “Mandela Has Been Sanitised by Hypocrites
commentisfree/2013/dec/11/mandela-sanitised-hypocrites-apologists-apartheid,
accessed February 2014.

15. For more critical biographies that discuss, among other things, the iconiza-
tion processes, see Gary Younge, The Speech: The Story behind Dr. Martin Luther King
Jr’s Dream (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2013); Jad Adams, Gandhi: Naked Ambition
(London: Quercus, 2010).

16. Time Magazine, August 26/September 2, 2013, double issue “I Have a Dream’
Anniversary Issue.”

http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,407356,00.html, accessed
February 2014.

University Press, 2008), 164.

19. Adams, Gandhi, 190.

(2008).

21. Apparently, Cordier dismissed Kwame Nkrumah as Mussolini and Lumumba
as “little Hitlers” in his private correspondence; see Carole Collins, “Fatally Flawed
Mediation: Cordier and the Congo Crisis of 1960.” See also De Witte and Wright,
Assassination of Lumumba.

22. Dower, Ethics of War and Peace, chap. 5.

23. Faisal Devji, The Impossible Indian: Gandhi and the Temptation of Violence (Cam-

24. David Hardiman, Gandhi in His Time and Ours: The Global Legacy of His Ideas

27. Ibid., 845.
31. See, for instance, the photographs reproduced in Remembering Martin Luther King, Jr.: His Life and Crusade in Pictures (New York: Life Books, 2008).
32. Young, The Speech.
40. This was an open-ended question asking “Which was, according to you, the most horrible event in recent history?” Respondents could give multiple answers.
43. Alice Krieg-Planque, Purification ethnique: Une formule et son histoire (Paris: CNRS, 2003); Gagnon, Myth of Ethnic War.


49. This is what the dispute is called that occurred in the 1980s between West German historians over the question whether the Holocaust was part of a “totalitarian” time period, which also included Stalinism, or whether it was unique to West German history. The controversy saw the sociologist and philosopher Jürgen Habermas and the historians Jürgen Kocka, Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Hans Mommsen, Martin Broszat, Heinrich August Winkler, Eberhard Jäckel, and Wolfgang Mommsen on the one hand arguing for the uniqueness of the Holocaust, and the philosopher Ernst Nolte, the journalist and editor of the newspaper *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* Joachim Fest, and the historians Andreas Hillgruber, Klaus Hildebrand, Rainer Zitelmann, Hagen Schulze, and Michael Stürmer on the other. See Konrad H. Jarausch, “Removing the Nazi Stain? The Quarrel of the German Historians,” *German Studies Review* 11, no. 2 (1988).


51. Dubiel, “Remembrance of the Holocaust as a Catalyst for a Transnational Ethic?”

52. Novick, *Holocaust in American Life*.

53. For example, Nelly Sachs, Imre Kertész, Patrick Modiano, Heinrich Böll, Günter Grass, Czesław Milosz, Wisława Szymborska.


55. Early formulations of this argument can be found in Elias Canetti, *Crowds and Power* (London: Gollancz, 1962); Karl R. Popper, *Open Society and Its Enemies*. Recently, it has been the philosopher Giorgio Agamben who has discussed “camp culture” and subjectivity: Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer* (Turin: Giulio Einaudi, 1995).


62. Fabre, “Cosmopolitanism, Just War Theory and Legitimate Authority.”


68. Ibid., 503.


72. See the webpage of Beyond Conflict, http://www.beyondbconflictint.org/history/.


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79. UCLA Ralph Bunche Collection, Collection 2051, Box 227, Folder 7, January 8, 1962, Letter to Mr. John Hitchcock.
82. Ibid., 250.
83. Ibid., 252.

Conclusion

4. See Goetze and Bliesemann de Guevara, “Cosmopolitanism and the Culture of Peacebuilding.”
6. Lippman, “Khrushchchev.”
10. Tsing, *Friction*. 