On November 1, 2013, Germany became one of the first countries in the world to offer parents of intersex newborns the freedom to avoid hasty surgeries and leave their baby’s sex “unspecified” on the birth certificate and other identity documents. In 2007, a national debate broke out in the Federal Republic about the perceived problems of forced marriages in the migrant community and of immigrant women’s linguistic isolation; the country’s immigration law was revised to address these concerns. And in 2015, after a decade of political debate, Germany introduced a minimum wage law, lifting the earnings of the lowest-paid employees in the country—two-thirds of them women.

In all of these examples, national-level political debates focused on the (perceived) concerns of people belonging to more than one disempowered group—poor women, migrant women, and intersex individuals who can claim membership in neither category of the sex binary. While these developments are consistent with normative expectations about how democracy should work (elected officials represent the concerns of the governed), and while such public attention to a group’s concerns is a commonplace occurrence for individuals belonging to multiply empowered groups (such as businessmen or well-to-do white families), elite discussion of and legislation regarding the needs of individuals at the intersections of disempowered groups is unusual.

Instead, extensive research on intersectionality, or the study of overlapping social identities and systems of oppression, has consistently found
that citizens belonging to intersectional groups are often overlooked by or invisible to policymakers. For example, Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw’s (2005 [1989]) pioneering work on African American women’s experiences with employment discrimination found that the U.S. women’s movement focused primarily on rectifying the concerns of white women, while civil rights organizations championed the needs of male African American workers, with both overlooking the problems faced by individuals discriminated against on the basis of their race and their sex. Public policy, in turn, failed to adequately address women of color’s workplace discrimination. Similar oversights have been found when studying the needs of immigrant women in Western Europe (e.g., Verloo 2006; Weldon 2006; Krizsan, Skjeie, and Squires 2012; Siim and Mokre 2012; Agustín 2013; Bassel and Emejulu 2014; Lepinard 2014), poor women in Latin America (Blofeld 2012), and lesbians and transgender citizens worldwide (Wilson 2014).

This volume examines cases when state- and national-level political leaders have addressed the (perceived) concerns of people from intersectional groups. We seek to explain how and why this unexpected attention is achieved. Because such citizens often have few resources at their disposal and at times are limited in number, intersectional groups must gain the support of allies beyond the group itself to bring their concerns to the attention of top policymakers. Drawing on broader literature regarding interest groups and lobbying, we recognize that there are multiple institutional venues in which intersectional groups may gain allies and, with these allies’ assistance, articulate their concerns. The scholarship on “venue shopping,” developed in the United States (i.e., Holyoke 2003; Constantinlos 2010) focuses on powerful interests such as the banking, insurance, and investment industries. It argues that these interest groups strategically choose their battlegrounds, deciding whether to expend resources on, for example, lobbying Congress, targeting members of legislative committees, or filing suit in the Supreme Court. These interest organizations are expected to deploy the most effort in venues where they have the highest probability of success. Like intersectionality, the concept of venue shopping has also been applied beyond its original context. In this case, the literature has been used in studying Europe (e.g., Guiraudon 2000) and extended to nonbusiness interests. Research on gender as a category of difference, for example, finds that women’s movement organizations engage in “limited forms of venue shopping” (Celis, Mackay, and Meier 2012, 44).

On its face, the venue shopping literature would seem to be of little use in a study of intersectional groups such as minority women, as citizens
belonging to more than one disempowered category generally have few resources to deploy and little room for strategic maneuvering. The concept of venue shopping does, however, call our attention to the fact that there are more and less promising venues through which various interest groups—including intersectional groups—can pursue their goals. Here we consider various channels through which intersectional groups may find allies who can, in turn, help amplify claims. Depending on the social categories with which their sex intersects, women may (or may not) be able to take advantage of various aspects of a given political opportunity structure.

Our research identifies three possible venues in which citizens from more than one marginalized group can gain critical allies and pressure governments to respond to their concerns: the top-down venue, acquiring an international organization as an ally; convergence with policymakers’ interests, gaining the governing party/parties or administrative agencies as allies; and finally the bottom-up venue, forging alliances with domestic interest groups. These three venues are not mutually exclusive (or exhaustive), and the most successful intersectional groups access allies within all of these areas—for example, working with domestic interest groups to win the support of an international organization, which can, in turn, pressure the governing party to act. Conversely, some multiply disadvantaged citizens will not be able to locate allies in any of these venues and are thus likely to remain invisible to policymakers.

The top-down venue involves intersectional group members working through international organizations to pressure domestic policymakers to address concerns. For example, the law allowing an “unspecified” option on German birth certificates was passed after intersex advocacy groups, in conjunction with the United Nations, framed the unnecessary, nonconsensual surgeries on infants resulting from the status quo as violations of the Right to Health clause of the UN Convention to Eliminate Discrimination against Women, of the UN Convention against Torture, and of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. The subsequent concerns expressed by the UN shamed the German government into passing the “third gender” law.

This “boomerang approach” (Keck and Sikkink 1998), whereby feminists and other activists use transnational political networks to force domestic-level change, is not new and not unique to intersectional groups. Keck and Sikkink’s “activists beyond borders” are networks that coalesce and operate across national frontiers to pressure international organizations. If those supranational bodies then adopt activists’ preferred posi-
tions, the activists, in turn, can use the (hard or soft) power of international organizations to pressure individual states for policy change. Woodward (2004) has similarly documented the presence of “velvet triangles” linking academics, domestic social movement activists, and EU bureaucrats seeking to maximize their own agencies’ power and prestige (see also Abels and Mushaben 2012). Eurocrats’ support in turn allows academics and activists to further press their claims at the domestic level. While business interests have long used the European Court of Justice’s support of a single market to obtain domestic policies that increase their profit margins, the strong support for human rights exhibited by the United Nations, the European Union, and other European bodies make them particularly important potential allies for intersectional groups (see Abels and Mushaben 2012; Ayoub and Paternotte, 2014). Courts of law, such as the European Court of Justice, where citizens experiencing personal hardships can speak directly to judges about their negative experiences, have also been a useful vehicle for social change at the domestic level in areas such as sexual harassment (Zippel 2006; see also Blofield 2012; Fuchs 2013). Finally, international organizations are less motivated by electoral considerations than are domestic politicians, who tend to prefer to focus on large groups of powerful social actors rather than disempowered minorities.

However, bringing cases to international courts and networking with international organizations requires considerable resources and expertise not available to all intersectional groups. Germany’s intersex advocates, for example, prompted the UN to pressure the German government only by filing an extensive, professionally prepared report with the United Nations. The intersex condition cuts across class lines, ensuring that some members of this group were not economically marginalized. In addition, international organizations tend to privilege liberal concerns such as negative freedoms (i.e., freedom from nonconsensual surgeries) and thus may have been more receptive to these activists’ claims than to demands for government financial assistance to a particular group.

A second venue through which intersectional groups may achieve a place at the forefront of a country’s political agenda is through convergence with policymaker interests. However rare, there are occasions when governing parties and/or leading bureaucrats do see utility to championing an intersectional group. Group members may thus find that their (purported) interests overlap with political or administrative leaders’ preexisting agendas; these policymakers, in turn, find self-serving reasons to take up that intersectional group’s banner. The 2007 debate over forced marriages, for
example, emerged when conservative Christian Democrats instrumentalized immigrant women’s (perceived) problems with arranged nuptials as a reason to make family unification more difficult, limiting immigration to Germany. This instrumentalization and the creation of corporatist bodies in which immigrant concerns could be discussed at the national level subsequently spurred immigrant women to mobilize to articulate their own concerns, including improved access to vocational training and employment rather than forced marriage.

As with working through international organizations, achieving convergence with policymaker interests is a strategy open to groups of non-intersectional citizens as well. Strategic (re)framing of an issue to achieve such convergence can help any political issue gain attention. However, this example and others included in this volume are distinct because policymakers initially spoke on behalf of migrant women rather than with them—presupposing their needs without actually consulting with them. Migrant women and girls became hypervisible in political discourse without any organizing on their own behalf—a stark contrast to the strategic venue shopping behavior of more powerful interests. The most marginalized members of a polity (often noncitizens) commonly are weakly organized as a consequence of lack of resources and thus are less able to speak for themselves than are multiply advantaged groups such as affluent men. Therefore, they are more vulnerable to such political appropriation than are more resourced and organized citizens, including those with intersections cutting across class or racial/ethnic lines.

A third venue through which intersectional groups may gain allies is through collaboration with domestic interest groups to pressure national governments from the bottom up. Intersectional groups can at times obtain support for their causes from interest organizations in their own country representing the broader social categories to which their members belong—in the case of female low-wage workers, for example, women’s groups or labor unions. These allies can in turn deploy their strength in the domestic arena to press the national government to adopt policies favoring the intersectional group. This is indeed what happened with the minimum wage law in Germany. Labor unions, Germany’s largest women’s organization, and the women’s auxiliary organizations of the Social Democratic and Green Parties spent years trying to convince the governing coalition to pass a minimum wage law. Alliances with domestic interest groups are not guaranteed, however, and such alliances tend to form only when intersectional citizens’ needs overlap with the preferences of the broader group
and/or when policymakers have already addressed the problems faced by the dominant members of potentially allied groups. For example, Germany’s most powerful labor unions were not receptive to low-wage women’s initial demand for a minimum wage until their male members were negatively affected by foreign competition. When unions and political parties as a whole (rather than the women’s auxiliary organizations) began a push for a minimum wage—almost a decade after low-wage women had first called for one—they did so by portraying the law as a solution to problems of male workers facing foreign competitors, although the main beneficiaries of the law were women working in feminized sectors, who had long experienced wage discrimination. Forging alliances with domestic interest groups thus runs the risk of delay or invisibility and only functions when relevant interest organizations exist and are receptive to intersectional groups’ concerns. Our research finds that the most marginalized members of the polity—such as immigrant women of color—are the least likely to obtain such effective allies.

The eight substantive chapters in this volume explore these three venues through which intersectional groups can gain allies. Each author focuses on an intersectional group and its experiences in twenty-first-century German politics. Before turning to these case studies, however, we explain how we came to ask our research question, how we selected empirical cases to study, and the methods through which we explored them. We also outline the shape of the volume.

Intersectional Groups and Politics: What Do We Know?

Our research contributes to the existing literature on intersectionality and politics in two ways. First, in a single institutional setting (contemporary Germany), we explore a broad range of intersections—including the intersexed, disabled women, immigrant women and girls, female soldiers, women who work for low wages, lesbians, and East German women. Other volumes, in contrast, focus either on a single intersection across political contexts (e.g., Blofield’s 2012 study of domestic workers across Latin America) or multiple intersections across several countries (e.g., Wilson’s 2013 volume including pieces on trans* citizens in Chile, Kurdish feminists in Turkey, and lesbians in the UK). Second, rather than focus solely on exclusion, we investigate ways in which intersectional groups’ voices come to be included in political discourse. This research design allows us to in-
investigate how individuals at the intersections of various social categories are (or are not) able to take advantage of various aspects of a given political opportunity structure.

The intersectional approach to political science was born in the 1980s out of African American women’s experiences with the (non)responsiveness of the U.S. political system (e.g., hooks 1981; Crenshaw 2005 [1989]) and continues to call our attention to the invisibility of African American women in U.S. political discourse (e.g., Strolovitch 2007; Crenshaw 2014). Over time, this approach has expanded both geographically (to settings beyond the United States) and conceptually, focusing not only on race and gender but on other intersecting axes of disempowerment. There is a scholarly consensus that intersectionality can “travel” beyond the United States (Lutz, Vivar, and Supik 2011). Much of this work has empirically examined Western Europe and focused not on female racial minorities but on women immigrants whose ethnic and religious background differs from the native population, often mutually intersecting with class difference as well (e.g., Verloo 2006; Weldon 2006; Krizsan, Skjeie, and Squires 2012; Siim and Mokre 2012; Agustín 2013; , Bassel and Emefulu 2014; Lepinard 2014). These studies highlight many ways in which migrant women are excluded from full democratic participation.

Despite this excellent research on gender and race/ethnicity, gaps in our understanding remain. As Yuval-Davis points out, while these two categories “tend to shape most people’s lives in most social locations,” they are not the only politically significant intersections of dis/advantage. Instead, she cautions, “the construction of social categories of signification is, in the last instance, a product of human creative freedom” (2006, 203). While it is important not to lose sight of intersectionality’s original focus on racial disadvantage (Smooth 2013), the concept also cautions us to be sensitive to other lines of division that may render additional groups of women invisible or marginalized in political discourse. This tendency can be witnessed in some of the systematic cross-national research on intersectional groups in Western Europe, which has largely ignored women. For example, only one of the fifteen articles in a Council for European Studies report, *Over the European Rainbow: Sexual and Gender Minorities in Europe* (2014), mentioned lesbian-specific concerns (such as access to reproductive technology, discrimination on the basis of sex and sexual orientation, and lesbian invisibility in popular culture) in any depth.

Other important work in comparative politics has indeed focused on
the intersections of gender and class (Blofield 2012), gender and sexuality, gender and illness, and gender and gender variance (Wilson 2013; see also Lutz, Vivar, and Supik 2011). This research highlights some similarities and differences among various intersectional groups of women and their experiences with policymakers. For example, Angelia R. Wilson notes that “some [intersectional] voices may be heard while others are not” (2013, 6). Although these authors make excellent contributions by discussing multiple social intersections and highlighting the ability of some to gain political influence, their case studies differ from one another in their geographic focus, making it impossible to draw systematic conclusions about how various intersections differentially shape access to a given political system. Are lesbians, disabled women, and immigrant girls, for example, equally able to gain allies and hear their interests articulated in national political discourse in a given country? If not, why not? If so, are the allies they gain and the venues through which they gain these allies similar or different?

As Wendy Smooth admonishes,

Intersectionality requires that we pay close attention to the particulars of categories of social identity[,] that we recognize that systems of oppression and hierarchy are neither interchangeable nor are they identical; therefore, much is made of understanding the ways that these categories function. These social categories have differing organizing logics in that race works differently than gender, class, or sexuality. Power associated with these categories is neither configured in the same ways nor do they share the same histories therefore they cannot be treated identically. (2013, 22)

This volume begins to address these questions and takes up Smooth’s challenge by systematically examining a range of social intersections while holding the national institutional setting constant. Our research design allows us to go beyond the well-established focus on gender and race or ethnoreligious minorities (although we do include case studies on this subject) and broaden our empirical scope to study a range of intersections. Limiting our study to a single country allows us to compare the ability of, and methods used by, citizens from a range of social groups to make their voices heard in a particular institutional context. The advantage of this research design is that it possesses a high degree of internal validity. We recognize that its external validity is limited and therefore seek to inspire other scholars to undertake studies in this vein elsewhere to allow the field
of political science to draw additional, generalizable conclusions about the venues through which various intersectional groups may find allies and a voice in political decision making across polities.

**Case Selection: Why Contemporary Germany?**

Investigating the different venues through which intersectional groups obtained allies and influenced a country’s political agenda required us to identify a democratic polity in which (1) various intersectional groups were present and (2) state- or national-level policymakers had spoken or acted on behalf of at least some of these groups. Moreover, we sought a country with many institutional channels through which marginalized citizens could gain allies, so that we could identify as many routes to political inclusion as possible. In short, we desired a crucial case. Crucial cases are the most likely to exhibit a given outcome, allowing researchers to conduct (dis)confirmatory hypothesis testing (Gerring, 2002, 89–90). Such a case would feature many opportunities for the phenomenon we seek to explain—intersectional groups’ gaining allies and their (perceived) concerns being articulated by political elites—allowing us to investigate whether various intersectional groups worked with international organizations, state or national policymakers, domestic interest groups, or other allies to make their voices heard. If these venues are open to intersectional groups in a crucial case, they are worth investigating in other contexts as well; if, in another context, a given group cannot access one of these paths to gaining allies and pressuring policymakers, we may be able to explain why a given group’s interests have been overlooked in that case. If intersectional groups are unable to form alliances in the venues we study in this most likely case, they will probably not succeed elsewhere. In other words, we do not expect intersectional groups to be as successful at gaining allies in all cases as they are in a crucial case, but the crucial case allows us to understand what can help minority women overcome invisibility in certain settings.

The Federal Republic of Germany provides just such a crucial case. Over the twenty-first century, state or national policymakers have articulated intersectional groups’ concerns in a number of instances. Moreover, Germany’s decentralized political institutions feature a high degree of integration into international organizations, strong state capacity, several ideologically diverse political parties, a federal system, a vibrant civil society, and corporatist policymaking structures, all of which offer multiple points of access where intersectional groups and their allies can influence state
and national policymakers from the top down, through interest convergence, and/or via the bottom up.

German policymakers have articulated intersectional groups’ (perceived) concerns in a number of instances in recent years. In addition to the examples mentioned earlier, Germany’s social security code has been reformed in ways helpful to disabled women, combat positions have been opened to female soldiers, school reforms beneficial to migrant children have been proposed, lesbians have received growing opportunities to adopt children, and state-funded initiatives have promoted eastern German women’s access to employment in science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) related fields.

Germany’s decentralized political institutions represent a most likely case for intersectional groups to be able to locate allies in international organizations, among parties in power or within government agencies, or via domestic interest groups. History—specifically, two world wars and the Holocaust—casts a long shadow over much of German politics. To prevent the rise of another Hitler, German political institutions were deliberately crafted in a way to disperse political power. These institutions have been described as creating a “semisovereign” state with many checks added to a parliamentary system (Katzenstein 1987). These multiple veto points include a bicameral legislature in which the upper house has a say over many domestic policies; a federal system containing sixteen states (Länder) that have sole discretion over many policies; the Constitutional Court, to which aggrieved individuals may take their cases directly should they believe their civil liberties have been violated; and membership in the broader European Union. In addition, while the Basic Law does not permit national-level referenda, they are available at the state level. The public policymaking process in Germany is highly corporatist and consensus-driven, granting interest organizations a high degree of influence over decision making (Streeck 2009). The country also has a rich civil society (Conradt and Langenbacher 2013) and history of feminist organizing (Ferree 2012). Thus the Federal Republic’s political institutions and its embeddedness in the EU and other international organizations offer multiple access points that provide intersectional groups many opportunities to seek allies. Moreover, Germany has high state capacity with a professionalized, multilevel bureaucracy and its personalized proportional electoral system creates multiparty competition among a range of ideologically distinct parties. These conditions offer many opportunities for intersectional groups to experience (or endeavor to achieve) convergence with policymakers’ interests.
Germany and International Organizations

To overcome Germany’s troubled past with its neighbors, the preamble to the country’s Basic Law, installed by the Western allies after World War II, requires it to be a peace-seeking member of a united Europe, and the country has a good record of complying with European regulations (Falkner and Treib 2008) as well as other international agreements. Indeed, some have classified it as a European “norm taker,” particularly eager to adopt what are considered European human rights standards (Kollman 2014). The Allied powers also ensured that the Federal Republic has a strong system of judicial review; citizens who feel their human rights, spelled out in international agreements, have been violated can take their cases directly to the country’s Constitutional Court. These aspects of the German political opportunity structure offer top-down venues through which intersectional groups can obtain international allies and endeavor to pressure the national government to take up their concerns.

Political Parties in Germany

Germany also offers many possibilities for multiply marginalized groups to find sympathetic political parties or bureaucrats within state or federal governments. The key actors in the German political system are political parties. They wield such strong influence that contemporary Germany has been called a “party state” (Conradt and Langebacher 2013). German parties are required by law to act in an internally democratic manner, and all the major parties have internal organizations of members with common interests; these groups work to develop public policies in a given area. Much of the bill-drafting work done by congressional staffers, special interests, or think tanks in the United States is performed in Germany by either these intraparty organizations, policy advisers employed by the parties, or by the parties’ publicly supported research foundations. These parties are present in the executive and legislative branches at the state and federal levels and at times are involved with state-level referenda.

Germany’s party system features five salient parties—two large and three smaller organizations—with a range of positions on gender-related issues (see table I.1). All the major German parties include intraparty organizations for women. Some, but not all, parties have intraparty groups for disabled people, those of immigrant background, working-class members, LGBT citizens, and Eastern Germans. The strength and status of
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Popular Vote in 2013 (%)</th>
<th>Years in Governing Coalition between 2000 and 2017</th>
<th>(Gender) Ideology</th>
<th>Name of Women’s Auxiliary Organization</th>
<th>Contains Intraparty Organizations for:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>2005–17</td>
<td>Christian Democratic; views women in their traditional roles as wives and mothers</td>
<td>Women’s Union (FRAUEN UNION [FU])</td>
<td>Turks - Working Class - East Germans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Party</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Far left; views gender through a Marxist feminist lens; stresses equality of outcome rather than equality of opportunity</td>
<td>LISA</td>
<td>Disabled - Peace - Immigrants - Working Class - LGBT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance 90/Greens</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2000–2005</td>
<td>Progressive/postmaterialist; stresses equality of outcome rather than equality of opportunity</td>
<td>Federal Women’s Council (Bundesfrauenrat)</td>
<td>Disabled - Peace - Immigrants - Working Class - LGBT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2009–13</td>
<td>Libertarian; views gender through a liberal feminist lens</td>
<td>Liberal Women (LIBERALEN FRAUEN [LF])</td>
<td>Immigrants - LGBT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*See individual chapters for more details about these groups, including their names, organization, and status within the party.

*In contrast to the other women’s auxiliaries, the LF is a voluntary association outside the formal party structures.*
Introduction

these intraparty organizations varies from party to party along ideological lines, as the chapters in this volume discuss. No parties have intraparty groups specifically for the intersexed or members of the military (although two parties have groups devoted to pacifism), placing these interests at an organizational disadvantage within parties. When marginalized women’s concerns can be framed as or perceived as aligning with these parties’ gender ideologies, intersectional groups are more likely to be able to forge an alliance with a given party.

The oldest party in Germany, and the largest on the left side of the political spectrum, is the Social Democratic Party (SPD). The party’s platform expresses support for gender equality and views gender primarily through an economic lens, stressing the need for state intervention to assure job and educational opportunities for women along with state-sponsored measures to reconcile home and family responsibilities (Xydias 2013, 8), rendering it a particularly likely ally for class-based concerns.

Its counterweight to the right is the Christian Democratic Union / Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU); the CDU contests elections in fifteen of Germany’s sixteen states, while the CSU is present only in the state of Bavaria. At the federal level, these two parties combine to form a single parliamentary party group. The CDU/CSU has historically held very traditional views regarding women’s roles in German society, although under the influence of the women’s auxiliary organization, the Frauen Union, and the leadership of Angela Merkel, these views have modernized somewhat (Wiliarty 2010). The Christian Democrats’ platform continues to view women primarily through the lens of their role as mothers and family members, however (Xydias 2013, 8). The party’s traditional Christian views make it an unlikely ally for lesbians or Muslim women. The SPD, the CDU/CSU, or both have been present in every state and federal cabinet since the founding of the Federal Republic; a CDU/CSU/SPD “Grand Coalition” governed Germany from 2005 to 2009 and has done so again since 2013.

Founded with the creation of the Federal Republic, the libertarian Free Democratic Party (FDP) served as a kingmaker between these two larger parties in the latter half of the twentieth century, forming national coalitions with the CDU (on economic issues) and the SPD (on social issues). It governed in a coalition with the CDU/CSU between 2009 and 2013; in 2013, the party suffered an unprecedented electoral loss and left the Bundestag. The FDP’s libertarian platform expresses support for gender equality, but, in contrast to the SPD’s position, rejects state-driven measures to
achieve this goal, instead preferring to rely on private sector solutions or an end to gendered state regulations (Xydias 2013, 9), such as bans on women serving in combat.

The Green Party emerged from 1970s social movements, including the peace, multicultural, and feminist movements, and entered the national stage in 1983. After merging with some eastern German citizen movements after German unification in 1990, the party changed its name to Alliance 90/Greens. It governed Germany in coalition with the SPD from 1998 to 2005. In keeping with its activist origins, the party assumes feminist stances on a range of gendered issues, including lesbians’ and migrant women’s concerns as well as issues of sex discrimination in employment. In contrast to the parties discussed previously, the Greens’ platform views women not just as family members or workers but also as individuals whose life chances are circumscribed by unequal gender roles in society. They focus on equality of outcome, not simply equality of opportunity (Xydias 2013, 7).

The newest party to enter the national parliament is the Left, which resulted from a merger of the heir to the East German Communist Party, the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), western German communists, and dissident elements from the SPD. The Left has been extremely successful in eastern German state and local elections (Green, Hough, and Miskimmon, 2008, 88)—essentially replacing the SPD as the largest party on the left in eastern Länder; however, it is a newcomer to state-level politics in western Germany and has yet to serve in government at the federal level. The Left Party’s view of gender issues reflects its Marxist heritage; its platform stresses how neoliberal economic policies and patriarchy create unequal gender roles, to the detriment of women, and prescribes extensive state intervention to achieve both equality of opportunity and equality of outcome (Xydias 2013, 6). It is particularly sensitive to the needs of East Germans and those with low incomes.

These socialist, Christian Democratic, libertarian, Green, and Marxist ideologies relate not only to gender issues but to a host of other policy questions involving the female citizens we study in this volume: How should new immigrants to Germany be educated and incorporated into society? How can the poorest citizens, or residents of economically depressed regions, access well-paid, meaningful work? Should lesbians and gays be allowed to marry or adopt? Who should be allowed to take part in combat? Should a third gender option be available for official documents? How can disability best be accommodated? As the chapters that follow demonstrate,
when certain women’s intersections fruitfully fit into these ongoing ideological narratives (or can be portrayed as coinciding with these preexisting views), finding allies among policymakers becomes more likely.

The literature on gender and political representation (e.g., Mansbridge 1999; Celis 2006) suggests that the elected officials from these political parties most likely to take up intersectional groups’ concerns are the members of parliament who themselves belong to intersectional groups. While Germany’s electoral and party systems have created many opportunities for women to enter politics, the women who ascend to power are not often minority women. The Federal Republic’s mixed electoral system contains a proportional representation component compatible with the use of gender quotas, and all parties currently represented in the Bundestag employ quotas for women at the national level (Davidson-Schmich 2016). The Interparliamentary Union ranks the Federal Republic twenty-first in the world in terms of women in the lower house of parliament (36.5% parliament) and the cabinet contains 37.5 percent women—including Chancellor Angela Merkel. Among these elected women, however, are few immigrants (Donovan 2012), eastern Germans (Kintz 2011), or lesbians (Davidson-Schmich, this vol.). One study found no disabled women, female combat veterans, or intersexed individuals in the Bundestag (Davidson-Schmich 2011). In Germany, therefore, many intersectional groups have no (or very few descriptive) representatives to serve as allies among policymakers.

The German State

In addition to any descriptive representatives who may be present, members of the bureaucracy are also potential allies for intersectional groups. The nature and mission of women’s policy agencies vary greatly across countries (Rai 2003), as do welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1999) and equal employment regimes (von Wahl 1999), shaping the receptivity of state actors to various women’s demands. One group’s liberal call for the removal of state regulations, for example, may meet with greater sympathy than another organization’s call for social welfare protection in a liberal market economy such as the United States, whereas the reverse would likely be true in a conservative welfare state such as Germany’s. In many countries, state feminists, also referred to as femocrats, interested in expanding their policy competency may prove critical allies for multiply marginalized women.

However, this outcome is unlikely in Germany as a consequence of its
weak tradition of state feminism at the national level. The executive branch has a Ministry for Families, Seniors, Women, and Youth; the focus and strength of this office varies with the partisanship of government and the individual minister but is generally seen as a relatively soft portfolio. Leading ministry officials rarely have ties to the women’s movement and possess comparatively few implementation powers (McBride and Mazur 2010, 65). Since 2006, when forced to implement an EU directive, the country has also possessed a federal antidiscrimination office. However, this office is weak and underfunded (von Wahl 2011). There are thus unlikely to be many powerful national-level “critical actors” (Childs and Krook 2006) advocating on behalf of minority (or any) women in the Federal Republic.

At the state and local levels, in contrast, women’s policy agencies in Germany are quite well institutionalized and—in conjunction with left-wing state and local governments—can exert a powerful influence on local or state-level policy (Lang and Sauer 2012). Thus, where women in a given region can agree on priorities, femocrats may prove an important ally; however, this influence is unlikely to extend to the national level. In sum, there are mixed opportunities for minority women to achieve convergence with policymakers in the state apparatus but multiple opportunities for convergence with partisan political actors’ interests.

The Women’s Movement and Intersectional Groups in Germany

In addition to political parties, descriptive representatives, and femocrats, interest groups also play an important role in Germany’s strongly corporatist policymaking institutions, which promote consensus decision making involving all relevant stakeholders. This is due to another effort by the framers of the Basic Law to weaken central authority. Thus, intersectional groups can also search for allies in the domestic, extraparliamentary arena or bottom-up venue.

Women’s movements differ from country to country in terms of both ideology and organization (Weldon 2002, 2011; McBride and Mazur 2010; Ferree 2012; Htun and Weldon 2012;) and as a result may be more or less open to advocating for certain females from minority groups. For example, a Marxist feminist movement would be more prone to take up the cause of poor women than a middle-class movement; similarly, church-based women’s organizations might embrace disabled women’s concerns while eschewing those of lesbians. Radical feminists devoted to dismantling pa-
triarchal structures may prove reliable allies for minority women hoping to do the same but be less open to a group of women with more mainstream goals (for example, joining the military). Only where a subgroup of women’s concerns are framed, or perceived, as compatible with “women’s” interests more generally is the broader women’s movement likely to emerge as an ally.

Germany has a long history of various women’s movements (Ferree 2012). Historically, women’s organizing followed class and religious lines, with traditions of both socialist feminism and church-linked bourgeois women’s organizations. During the second wave of feminism in the 1970s, West Germany experienced a wave of radical feminism where activists opposed patriarchal state institutions in favor of alternative, women-only spaces. Issues important to the women’s movement included pacifism, combating sexual violence, and lesbian rights. However, because these activists rejected engagement with the state, no autonomous women’s organization along the lines of the National Organization for Women in the United States emerged to pressure elected officials. Instead, feminist scholars took up work in universities and in party-affiliated think tanks, and women interested in engaging with the state organized within the political parties to gain influence both in the parties themselves and as elected officials (Kolinsky 1989; Kittilson 2006; McBride and Mazur 2010, 54). These developments continued the influence of class and religious divisions among women and added in broader ideological divisions. Unification brought further regional divisions among women as well (Rohnstock 1994).

Today, the largest nonpartisan, extraparliamentary umbrella organization claiming to represent women’s interests in the Federal Republic is the German Council of Women (Deutscher Frauenrat [DF]), which is composed of more than fifty women’s organizations from across the country, including the women’s groups from all political parties, all major religions, a wide range of economic and professional groups from both ends of the class spectrum, Germany’s largest lesbian organization, a network of disabled women’s advocates, and a group devoted to cooperation between eastern and western German women. The wide-ranging coalition of interests in the DF means that it is divided on a number of key issues, including, for example, whether lesbians make suitable parents, whether serving in the military is desirable, and whether aborting disabled fetuses is acceptable. Moreover, the DF includes no groups organized around the intersex condition or women in the military. These divisions and exclusions suggest that the Deutsche Frauenrat will be an unreliable ally in most
instances; however, where most members can agree, the DF is a potential ally to pressure decision makers from the bottom up.

Just as variation exists in the ability of different intersectional groups to harness the support of the women’s movement, the same holds true for their likelihood of gaining other interest groups’ backing. Previous work on intersectionality has demonstrated that obtaining allies from broader minority groups can prove particularly difficult for women (e.g., Crenshaw 2005 [1989]; Strolovitch 2007; Weldon 2011; Lepinard 2014). For such citizens to gain a domestic interest group ally, (at least) two conditions must be met. First, an interest group for their particular axis of disadvantage must exist, which for the most marginalized is not always the case. Second, if this broader group is dominated by men, these male leaders must be convinced of the merits of taking up female members’ concerns. This convergence may occur if men’s and women’s concerns overlap, if attention to women’s issues would aid men in their own struggle, or if men’s primary objectives have already been met.10 The groups considered in this volume have a variety of potential allies.

Intersex citizens—neither male nor female—are particularly unlikely to find affinities with either the women’s movement or other interest organizations. Under the Nazis, intersex citizens were either hidden or killed, and after World War II, they were “fixed” by involuntary surgical “adjustments” performed by doctors without input from either them or their families, even though 95 percent of intersex newborns are not in need of immediate medical attention (von Wahl, this vol.). The medicalization of the intersex condition has caused individuals to experience physical and psychological trauma, disability, depression, and a loss of sexual sensitivity/drive/ability. “Correcting” intersex bodies was in part motivated by the need to register babies as male or female on identity documents in the Federal Republic. Indeed, only with the passage of the 2013 law allowing parents to identify newborns as having an “unspecified” sex did intersex citizens officially come to exist in Germany. Intersex organizing in Germany did not begin until the mid- to late 1990s, and some of the movements in the intersex network were led by individuals who self-identified as women. Because the intersex condition cuts across class and ethnic lines and includes affluent German citizens, the intersex movement has had access to resources that allowed it to capture the attention of international actors.

Disabled citizens also have been similarly marginalized in German society but began to organize earlier than intersex people. Few disabled citizens—male or female—escaped the Nazi genocide alive. After World
War II, those who did were often institutionalized or dependent on their families. The 1970s brought about the rise of a disabled citizens movement advocating for broader access to mainstream society; disabled women, however, were invisible within this movement led by men. As a result, disabled women remained at risk for (sexual) violence from family members and caregivers, shut out of employment opportunities, and excluded from broader participation in education, health care, and social life. Recent decades have seen the emergence of disabled German women as political actors on their own behalf, seeking to overcome these obstacles to full citizenship and gain the attention of the male-dominated disability rights movement.

Immigrant women and girls are another economically and politically disempowered group in the Federal Republic. In Germany, 20 percent of the population is identified as “migrants”—about fifteen million individuals. Approximately half of them presumably are women. Of these women, only approximately four million are German citizens with voting rights (Die Beauftragte der Bundesregierung 2012, 27; see also Wüst 2011, 256). One of the most pressing questions in German politics has been how best to incorporate this growing immigrant population into German society. Individuals with migrant background are significantly more likely than native Germans to live in poverty and to possess lower educational attainment (Die Beauftragte der Bundesregierung 2012, 38). Relations between immigrants and ethnic Germans are often fraught with tension, and incidents of violence or discrimination against migrants are commonplace (“Verbände fördern” 2014; Schurman and Kurt 2015). These differences in status, cultural background, and language between native-born and immigrant women often make it difficult for migrant women to form alliances with ethnically European women’s groups (Rottmann and Ferree 2008; Predelli and Halsaa 2012; but see Mushaben 2008).

However, migrant women and girls also have difficulty finding allies among migrant men. First, Germany’s migrant population is far from homogeneous, making any kind of organization difficult. Many immigrants are ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe who moved to Germany in the early 1990s with the fall of the Iron Curtain. Another large group includes Turks who came to western Germany as “guest workers” as well as their descendants. While Eastern European ethnic Germans automatically received German citizenship, Turks have faced high barriers to becoming German citizens. Iranians are the second-largest non-ethnic-German group among naturalized citizens (Donovan 2007, 459–60). Other mi-
migrants come from affluent areas of Western Europe or North America. A final, more recent group of arrivals are asylum seekers from the Balkans, Middle East, and Africa fleeing civil wars and poverty in their countries of origin. Among Muslim migrants, there are marked differences in interpretations of Islam and appropriate gender roles for women. Many such organizations are often heavily dominated by men with traditional views about gender roles, making them unlikely to champion female immigrants’ (feminist) concerns. Moreover, until recently, broader immigrant associations often focused on homeland rather than German politics (Ögelman 2003)—perhaps because many of their members are not German citizens (but see Arkilic 2016). Thus, migrant women and girls are likely to have difficulties finding domestic interest group allies.

Women wishing to serve in top military positions have also been excluded in the Federal Republic and found allies within the military only recently. Many German feminists’ close connection to the peace movement as well as the mainstream women’s movement’s radical rather than liberal tendencies make most feminist groups unsympathetic to the concerns of women wishing to pursue military careers. Instead, militarism and war are often viewed as patriarchal pathologies. Moreover, the German population as a whole views the use of military force in a very negative light. Germans often consider the aftermath of World War II a “zero hour,” when the country completely broke from its militaristic past. The Basic Law allows troops to be used only for defensive purposes or in international peacekeeping missions, and contemporary Germany has been described as a “civilian state” where the public has little stomach for military action (Sheehan 2008). The German armed forces (Bundeswehr) employ only approximately 170,500 full time soldiers, or less than .5 percent of the total German workforce (Bundeswehr 2008). The army’s participation even in peacekeeping missions is highly controversial: for example, in 2013 only 37 percent of Germans favored involvement in state-building operations in Afghanistan (Alessi 2013). Since women were prohibited from serving in combat—even in the very limited circumstances allowed by the Basic Law—no military women’s group ever formed. The main interest group representing male soldiers, the Deutscher Bundeswehrverband (DBwV), ultimately took up women’s concerns but did not do so until forty years after the founding of the Bundeswehr.

A similar pattern of delayed alliance with a male-dominated group can be observed in terms of women who work for low wages. Compared to the United States or Latin America, Germany has a relatively equitable distribution of income and a strong labor movement. However, the gains
made by unions are strongly oriented toward protecting a male breadwinner's ability to support his family, and unions long ignored the concerns of low-skilled women needing to make ends meet. Germany’s corporatist system has also been slow to embrace concerns relevant to working women that are not commonly faced by their male peers, such as sexual harassment (Zippel 2006). Germany has traditionally had a conservative (Christian Democratic) welfare state organized around a male-breadwinner model (Esping-Andersen 1999) and a conservative equal employment regime (von Wahl 1999); wage agreements have often included lower wages for occupations that are typically held by women rather than men. For example, cleaning women earn lower wages than (male) janitors. The country’s taxation system continues to provide considerable incentives for single-earner couples (European Commission 2013), and one-third of German women aged between fifteen and sixty-four are not in the paid labor force—about 10 percentage points below men’s employment rates. Of these women, almost half are in part-time positions, and the gender wage gap in Germany is higher than in almost all of the other OECD countries (European Commission 2013). Only as neoliberal globalization has driven down male wages have German unions begun to address economic concerns long held by working-class women.

Lesbians, too, have gained male allies only over time. All of Germany’s multiple forms of national government—the monarchy in imperial Germany, the failed Weimar Democracy, the communist system of the German Democratic Republic, and the democratic Federal Republic—(initially) outlawed sodomy and restricted the sexual expression of lesbian and gay citizens via Paragraph 175 of the civil code. This provision was repealed only in the late 1960s, and as was the case cross-nationally, LGBT rights groups were slow to form, emerging out of other New Left movements beginning in the 1970s (D’Emilio 2015). Germany’s largest lesbian organization, the Lesbenring e.V., was founded in 1982. Today, the Federal Republic’s largest homophile advocacy group is the Lesbian and Gay Union in Germany (Lesben und Schwulenverband in Deutschland [LSVD]); it originated as the Gay Union in Germany. Lesbians joined first in 1999 and still make up only a minority of the group’s members. Since its inception, the LSVD’s priorities have tended to focus on gay men’s concerns, such as reparations for gay male victims of the Holocaust, violent homophobia, and partner benefits for tenured civil servants. The group has only recently taken up some key lesbian concerns, such as adoption rights and access to reproductive medicine.
The final intersectional group on which we focus is a regional minority, East German women. Since the 1990 unification of the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) and the Federal Republic (West Germany), the eastern part of the country has been plagued by poor economic performance and large-scale out-migration. Women, who had an extremely high labor force participation rate under communism, were the first fired and last hired as state-owned enterprises collapsed and West Germany’s male-breadwinner form of capitalism spread eastward (Rueschemeyer 1993). Many of the women previously employed in STEM fields have struggled to find meaningful employment and to keep their skills up-to-date. Easterners are a numerical minority in the united country, and as Eastern German Heinrich Bortfeldt wrote on the eve of the twenty-fifth anniversary of unification, “a majority of East Germans still feel like strangers in their new home. That surely also has to do with the fact that twenty years after unification the East is barely represented in the political, economic, intellectual, and media elite of Germany. . . . East Germans are absent wherever power is concerned” (2013, 57). The only specific eastern German interest group with which Eastern German women seeking high-tech employment could ally is the Left Party, which has always been in opposition in national-level politics. Similarly, there are no broader feminist interest groups calling for an increase in STEM employment or training: western German women have lower labor force participation rates than do easterners and are rarely employed in STEM fields.

In sum, all of the groups we study (with the exception of the intersexed) features an interaction of gender and another axis of social difference, while intersex individuals fall at the intersection of binary sex categories. These groups have varying possibilities for gaining domestic interest group or women’s movement allies with whom to pressure policymakers from below through domestic channels.

How We Researched Our Topics: Process Tracing

All of our authors employ qualitative analysis of primary documents, including reports and statements put out by interest groups, political parties and their foundations, the German government, courts, international organizations, and the Federal Republic’s news media. We also draw on German-language scholarly research, parliamentary transcripts, policy documents, and other official records of proceedings. We utilized the rich empirical details gleaned from these sources to engage in careful process
tracing, following how a particular issue emerged onto the public agenda and wended its way through the policy process. We asked who spoke on behalf a particular intersectional group, what they claimed the interests of that group were, and how these claims were received by members of the group itself, by the women’s movement, by other interest groups, by international organizations, and by German political parties and bureaucracies. We trace how certain claims were embraced, ignored, or altered over the passage of time, who spoke on behalf of the group, and in what venue this representation occurred.

Our research experience highlights several methodological challenges to doing intersectional enquiry. First, one of the primary issues was how to determine what exactly the concerns of intersectional groups are. Given marginalized women’s hurdles to organizing and the need for consideration of multiple perspectives before group interests can be accurately identified (Weldon 2002), locating actors able to reliably speak on behalf of intersectional groups of women was at times difficult. Moreover, sometimes those claiming to speak for a given group were not actually representative of its members—or even members of the group at all, as was the case when “interests” were appropriated by political parties pursuing their own electoral agendas. All of our authors were sensitive to this possibility and discuss how they determined what to identify as group preferences. Moreover, our process-tracing approach to case study allows us to document how depictions of a group’s needs evolve over time. In many instances, this proves to be an interactive process in which some spoke on behalf of certain citizens and others subsequently organized to complete or correct the initial claims. Process tracing also enabled us to hear multiple voices in a public debate in cases where there were differing perceptions within a certain group or different people speaking on behalf of the group.

Ideally, one way to supplement self-definitions of interests would have been to gather reliable empirical data about the objective situation of a particular intersectional group. For example, when discussing how educational policies differentially impact the school performance of immigrant boys and immigrant girls, a scholar would benefit from official data about these children’s educational outcomes. Unfortunately, because people belonging to more than one disempowered group are frequently overlooked by both scholars and policymakers, the data necessary to document these problems may never have been collected, complicating the determination not only of group interests but also of what policies may help mitigate group members’ problems. For example, in Germany educational data is
released disaggregated by sex and by national origin but not both (see Bale, this vol.). Where they could, our authors endeavored to gather such original data; where relevant sources were simply unavailable, we depicted what information would be useful for future scholars or government bodies to collect or disseminate.

An additional challenge to our project was to empirically document silence or inaction on behalf of certain actors. In some cases women’s groups, minority organizations, or particular political parties or leaders did not take up the concerns of marginalized women even after they articulated their political preferences. When such actors spoke out against these women’s positions, it was easy to quote such statements. Most of the time, however, intersectional groups are not opposed but are ignored. Our work attempts to demonstrate this inattention through various methods, including depicting what potential allies are prioritizing instead and what alternative frames are being employed, noting the amount of time that passes before an issue is addressed, and documenting other political actors’ observations of nonresponses.

A final challenge our authors faced was distinguishing between word and deed—while some actors claimed to (want to) act on behalf of a group or implied that they were doing so, we also had to determine whether their actions followed their rhetoric. Conversely, at other times, certain actors promoted policies without mentioning that they benefited minority women, and our authors had to detect this pattern as well.

Plan of the Book

Eight empirical case studies follow. Each employs process tracing to study how intersectional groups of women or girls in early twenty-first-century Germany found allies and managed to have items of concern to them emerge in public policy debates. Our authors discuss how particular groups were (or were not) able to gain allies to articulate their concerns in various venues.

We begin with case studies highlighting how intersectional groups worked through international venues to gain allies to pressure national governments from the top down. In chapter 1, Angelika von Wahl describes how intersex advocates worked with the United Nations to pressure the government into adopting an “unspecified” sex option for newborns. Lisa Pfahl and Swantje Köbsell’s chapter 2 investigates disabled women and disability policy, another arena in which the United Nations proved a key ally. Christina Xydias’s chapter 3 demonstrates how women seeking access
to combat positions in the armed forces successfully used the European Court of Justice to pressure the Bundestag to take up these concerns. In all of these cases, the axis of intersection cut across class lines, giving groups the resources and skills needed to access international organizations; their demands were also consistent with prevailing liberal international norms.

The next chapters examine cases in which political parties appropriated the (perceived) concerns of intersectional groups, often without them having organized or articulated demands. In chapter 4, Barbara Donovan explores the Christian Democratic-initiated policy debate surrounding immigrant women and the adoption of policies to “integrate” these migrants into German society. Jeff Bale’s chapter 5 discusses the Hamburg state government’s failed attempt to promote school reforms conducive to migrant children’s educational attainment. These two chapters involve the most marginalized of the groups discussed in this volume—largely non-citizen women and girls, often Muslims of color, many with low levels of educational achievement and/or income.

The book’s final cases depict bottom-up pressure by domestic interest groups pushing concerns expressed by minority women. In chapter 6, Annette Henninger traces how female low-wage workers ultimately obtained allies within the women’s and union movements to achieve minimum-wage legislation, although the gendered framing of this economic reform was lost over the course of the debate. Louise K. Davidson-Schmich’s chapter 7 follows the debate over marriage and parenting rights from a lesbian perspective, documenting how Germany’s largest gay organization gradually took up concerns about alternatives to marriage, access to reproductive technologies, and adoption. Finally, in chapter 8, Katja M. Guenther examines how eastern German women working in STEM fields allied with state-level women’s groups to obtain discretionary funding for programs designed to increase women’s access to tech employment. The intersections studied in these cases—gender and class, gender and sexuality, and gender and region—usually involved German citizens, and the members of these groups were less likely than those in more marginalized groups to see their concerns appropriated by policymakers without their input. However, in contrast to the groups discussed in the first section, these women did not want protection from discriminatory state action but rather sought protection from market forces or government funding for programs of interest, causes less often embraced by the European Union or international human rights agreements. These intersectional groups’ alliances with domestic interest groups were often slow in coming (or failed to material-
ize), only emerging when men’s concerns had been addressed or when they overlapped with women’s.

Finally, the conclusion compares the power of the various intersectional groups we study to shape public policy in the Federal Republic, evaluates Germany’s political institutions in terms of their openness to intersectional groups, and offers suggestions for future intersectional research in Germany and beyond.

NOTES

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1. In some of the cases we studied, members of intersectional groups eventually saw their policy preferences adopted, whereas in other cases their (purported) concerns were debated but ultimately not acted on. Explaining variance in legislative success is an important avenue for future research but is beyond the scope of this volume. We concentrate here on the question of how usually overlooked groups initially become visible to policymakers.

2. Here we focus on efforts by intersectional groups’ interest association allies to pressure governments via domestic channels. However, such allies could also pursue policy change from above by working through international organizations—as was the case when Germany’s largest LGBT interest association worked through the European Court of Justice to improve lesbians’ property rights. In other words, the top-down and bottom-up venues are mutually compatible rather than mutually exclusive. In practice, however, not all intersectional groups enjoy access to multiple venues through which to press their claims.

3. For excellent reviews of the development of the intersectionality literature, see Hancock 2007; Zack 2007.

4. See also work on race and gender in Latin America (Townsend-Bell 2014).

5. Our points here also apply to men and other (nongendered) axes of intersection as well. This volume privileges gender as an intersectional category primarily because of the contributors’ preexisting research agendas. We encourage other scholars to take up different intersections in future research, focusing, for example, on such topics as how disability (as opposed to gender) intersects with race/ethnicity, class, region, (inter)sex, and sexual orientation.

6. An additional contributor pointed out that he was specifically focusing on gay men and noted the absence of research on lesbians in the context he studied.

7. We exclude nondemocracies from consideration here because in such polities there is little theoretical reason to expect leaders to represent any citizens’ concerns, let alone those of the most marginalized individuals.

8. Only the Social Democrats have quotas for migrants, and only in one state (Reiser 2014).
9. The DF also has state-level branches active in politics in each of Germany's sixteen Länder.

10. Some broader minority groups may at times be led by women, but these women may still face pressure to give primacy to men's concerns.

11. These are people who (1) were not born in Germany, (2) are not German citizens, or (3) had a parent who fell into one of the first two categories (Die Beauftragte der Bundesregierung 2012).

12. Recent changes have begun to address problems faced by working women, and the country has now begun offering paid maternity and paternity leave and promised universal day care, but these reforms have benefited professional women more than working-class women (von Wahl 2011).

13. Moreover, the Left Party has increasingly moved away from its eastern roots and gained ground in the West.

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Introduction


