Nature and the Place of Man

From what we have seen so far, our moral traditions already embody an ethic on which humans are the stewards and guardians of nature, an ethic which derives from the Judaeo-Christian tradition and is apparently well-suited to our current ecological problems. But it remains appropriate to enquire whether our underlying view of reality and our traditional interpretations of the scheme of things are sufficiently suited to our problems, or whether, as a number of writers have maintained, we need a new way of regarding mankind and the world, or, in other words, a new metaphysics. Latterly John Passmore has claimed that the elaboration of a new metaphysics suited to environmental problems is ‘the most important task which lies ahead of philosophy’;1 John Rodman has urged a holistic ethic based on ‘the nature of things’;2 Henryk Skolimowski has advocated, as the counterpart of the ecological humanism which he commends, an evolutionary cosmology which gives rise to an ethic of reverence for life;3 and, as we have seen in chapter 3, Walter H. O’Briant has criticized the ‘religious’ view of ‘man apart from nature’ in favour of a more organic view of the universe, mankind included. To what extent, it should be asked, should our traditional metaphysics be rejected or revised, and what range of metaphysical positions can prove equal to current insights and problems?

No comprehensive treatment of these issues can be attempted here; yet it is worthwhile to stand back so as to make sure, if possible, that the principles of value and obligation presented in other chapters are not vitiated by adherence to a fundamentally inappropriate metaphysics. I shall first investigate O’Briant’s critique; this will involve a brief historical survey of Judaeo-Christian metaphysical positions. I shall then consider which metaphysical views satisfy the requirements of evolutionary theory, ecological
science and belief in the intrinsic value of forms of nonhuman as well as human life.

Theistic anthropology

In his essay 'Man, Nature and the History of Philosophy', O'Briant depicts two views of man and nature in our culture, the religious view of 'man apart from nature' and the scientific view of 'man a part of nature'. In the Judaeo-Christian tradition man alone is made in the image of God and alone has a rational soul, something which sets him apart from all other creatures. Man has dominion over the other creatures, according to O'Briant's interpretation, in the sense that they 'were put here by the Creator for man's use and enjoyment'. Though his body is material his soul is immaterial and incorruptible: in this tradition man is sometimes regarded as comprising a union of body and soul, and sometimes as consisting in the soul alone, a supernatural being temporarily imprisoned in a natural body.

On the scientific view, by contrast, man differs from the other animals not in kind but in degree. He is an animal among his fellow animals, and has no dominion over them except insofar as his intelligence makes him their effective superior. As an animal he is mortal, and made of matter like everything else, for there is no soul and no Creator, nor anything else which cannot be investigated empirically. Indeed there may be nothing more distinctive about man than the relative absence of body hair.

The religious view, O'Briant believes, is in need of radical reform. As we have seen, he believes that its preoccupation with the salvation of the immortal soul has issued in the view that the natural world is not our home, and indeed that 'our animal nature is vile and contemptible': also it involves a 'careless attitude' toward the environment. The connection is that religious beliefs about salvation make people see themselves as exempt from the consequences of past misbehaviour, and not ultimately a part of the world at all. So people have felt 'comfortable in raping and pillaging this earthly abode'. Not that O'Briant commends the 'scientific view' which he describes, with its empiricism, its mechanism and its scepticism about values; rather he favours the ontology of philosophers such as Leibniz who refuse to admit a radical distinction between the living and the nonliving. But he is clear that our religion and our metaphysics need revision, as well as our ethics, if we are to solve the problems affecting ourselves and our environment.
O'Briant's characterization of the scientific view will not be discussed here. Many different metaphysical and ethical views have, in fact, been held by scientists; for my own part I have attempted elsewhere\(^9\) to set out the logic of the relations between theism and empirical science, and in chapter 5 I shall return to the bearing upon ecological matters of belief in technological progress. As to our religious tradition, I shall here assume, on the strength of the preceding chapters, that the Bible does not take the dominion of man to imply that all other creatures were made solely for man's use and enjoyment, and that Jews and Christians have not standardly construed it in this sense. I shall also assume that as Leibniz, whose metaphysics O'Briant favours, believed both in God as creator and in the immortality of the soul, not all those holding such beliefs are thought to hold exploitative attitudes or to suffer from metaphysical arrogance.

In connection with O'Briant's account of the 'religious view' it should next be remarked that belief in the immortality of the soul is not, in general,\(^10\) a biblical belief — nor a centrally Christian one, Leibniz notwithstanding. Prior to the latest stages of its composition (e.g. Job 19:25—27, 2 Maccabees 7:23, 28f), the writers of the Old Testament did not believe in personal survival of death, and the passages about man's creation in God's image must be interpreted otherwise. The author of Ecclesiastes could even claim that 'a man hath no pre-eminence above a beast' as man and beast die alike, and alike return to their native dust.\(^11\) (On this passage Black\(^12\) comments that the very biblical elements which it has been most difficult to assimilate into orthodox Christianity may have a peculiar appeal in the twentieth century: be this as it may, the passage is a striking affirmation of human kinship with the beasts.) The New Testament writers, for their part, affirm a belief in eternal life and in the resurrection of the body, rather than in a soul possessed of natural immortality: and so does the 'Apostles' Creed'. Even Paul's distinction between flesh and spirit concerns not, as has often been supposed, different elements of a person or even different sets of desires, but rather two opposed ways of life, one in accordance with God's will and the other heedless of it.\(^13\) In general the Bible does not take a radical dualist view of man as composed of a separable body and soul; rather the soul is what gives life to a body, though 'soul' is sometimes metaphorically used of the quality of a person's moral or spiritual life.\(^14\)

Belief in a separable and naturally immortal soul entered Christianity rather from Platonism, but the ideas of Platonizing
Christians such as Origen had to compete not only with the Hebraic view but also with that of Aristotle on which the soul is the form of the body. Indeed the Christological controversies of the fourth and fifth centuries can be regarded as a struggle between the Platonizing tradition of Alexandria, in which the Word constituted the soul of Christ, and the more Aristotelian view of the Antiochenes, on which Christ's body was informed by a human soul, without which he could not have been a man. On this view it was with a complete human, and not just a body, that the Word was united. At this stage, though all Christians believed in life after death, not all took this qualitatively to differentiate mankind from the beasts, as we have seen over Basil the Great, Chrysostom and Francis in chapter 3.

In more recent centuries the single most influential view has been that of Aquinas. As an Aristotelian, Aquinas held that plants have vegetative souls and animals sensitive souls, but contrasted with these the rational soul of man which, as it can operate without reliance on bodily organs, can exist independently of the body. But a disembodied soul is not a person, and is confined to the powers of intellect, will and memory. A soul is properly the form of a body, and there can be no human life without either body or soul. A man is not, as Plato held, a soul using a body, nor is a body a substance in its own right, for without a soul it perishes. Rather a man is an ensouled body; and human life can only be restored after death if God resurrects a body for the disembodied soul to inform.

These views allowed Aquinas to acknowledge that man is generically akin to the animals, even though specifically different. His actual attitudes to animals have been explored already in chapter 3: it remains only to observe that his instrumentalist view was not required by his beliefs either about the human soul or about the bodily and sensitive nature which men and animals share. Indeed O'Briant seems right to exempt versions of Christianity on which people are, like other animals, essentially composed of the union of a body and a soul from the charge of contempt for animals and for our animal nature. The Thomist metaphysic, indeed, does not require the despotic attitude to animals held by Aquinas himself; and as to human nature (and the nature of creatures in general) Aquinas believed that God's providential activity does not overthrow or destroy it, but preserves it with a view to its perfection.

Nevertheless Christians have at times thought of man as nothing but a soul. Such seems to have been the view of the heretical Christian, Origen, who believed that souls were fallen angels,
punished by being made to inhabit mortal bodies; these beliefs, however, were not readily accepted in face of the common belief of Christians that God had taken on flesh for the sake of man's salvation without being defiled thereby. Nor, as we have seen in chapter 3, did the efforts of Eastern monasticism to mortify the flesh issue invariably in contempt for nature.

The belief that man survives death as a soul, albeit as a soul which in life is closely attached to the body, exercised a widespread impact, not least among Christians, through the advocacy of Descartes, in whom O'Briant finds an alternation between the 'religious' and the 'scientific' view. Descartes regarded bodies, both human and animal, as mechanisms; but construed the subject of reason and will as an immaterial substance, which was not subject to dissolution at death, and in which human immortality was located. Unlike Aquinas, Descartes derived the soul's immortality from its immaterial nature; and in this he was followed by many writers such as Samuel Clarke and Richard Price who saw no other way of reconciling Christian beliefs about life after death with science.

Descartes' dualism and his view of animals as automata lead, as we have seen, to an insensitivity towards beasts. But it did not in his own case engender otherworldliness or irresponsibility in moral matters. Nevertheless it was prone to produce in some of his philosophical heirs a disparagement of the body and of the joys of this life, as sometimes in that in many ways enlightened figure, Richard Price. In a period when the doctrine of the natural goodness of creation often went understressed, the Cartesian distinction between mind and matter must at times, as O'Briant implies, have led to a sense that man was not truly at home on earth, and that as far as his true interests were concerned the natural order was as dispensable as his natural body. Indeed, as William Blackstone has written, 'There is no room for an ecological ethic within the Cartesian metaphysic.'

Doubts should be expressed, though, about whether these attitudes have actually led to improper exploitation of the environment (if this can be considered separately from the matter of the treatment of animals). The link suspected by O'Briant is that if salvation is in another world and God's forgiveness exempts people from the consequences of their sins, then these consequences can be disregarded. This criticism of Christianity as 'antinomian' is an age-old one, and has at other times been focused on sayings such as Augustine's 'Love and do as you like'. Yet with negligible exceptions Christianity has always stressed the need for sanctifica-
tion or moral development, whether this was seen as desirable for the sake of fellow-creatures or as evidence of the repentance which God required as a condition of salvation. As I have allowed in chapter 3, other-worldliness has sometimes led to a narrowing of Christian social teaching; but it is doubtful if, beyond that, a careless attitude to nature has been engendered.

Further metaphysical options

Yet O'Briant is right in stressing the problems for humans about their own identity which arise from Cartesian dualism, and in holding that beliefs such as the denial of our kinship with creatures of other species are prone to vitiate our practice. In the last century it has been the Darwinian theory of evolution by natural selection which has undermined this denial; but it is important to realize that not all Christians have endorsed Descartes' radical dualism, and that its rejection is not the rejection of our religious tradition as a whole. Thus John Locke held that, for all we know, that which thinks in us may be material, and that God may add to matter the power of thought, just as he adds that of vegetation to peach-trees, and of sense and spontaneous motion to elephants. Indeed Locke employed the status of animals as an argument against dualism. For it seems arbitrary either to hold that animals are bare machines without sensation or to hold that, despite their lack of intellectual and moral capacities, they have immaterial substantial souls, the solution preferred by Cudworth. But if the remaining alternative, that matter can feel, is adopted, then it is arbitrary to deny that matter can think.

A few years later, the scientist, philosopher and theologian, Joseph Priestley put forward the view that humans are systems of matter. Like Locke, Priestley was aware that the Bible teaches the resurrection of the body rather than the immortality of the soul, and Priestley added the claim that belief in an immaterial soul was a perversion of Christianity introduced from Greek philosophy. Price replied that belief in an immaterial soul was indispensable for Christianity and for any account of consciousness; and he subjected Priestley's theory to searching objections, as had Clarke the somewhat cruder theory of Locke's materialist follower, Anthony Collins. Nevertheless it does not seem impossible to reconcile Priestley's position with ordinary understandings of personal identity, or with the belief in the resurrection of a former person with identity intact. Thus the Christian tradition itself includes at least
two alternatives to the dualism of mind and matter which O'Briant and Blackstone see as harmful, Priestleian materialism, and also the older view of Aquinas.

Blackstone, indeed, suggests that 'a metaphysic suitable as a companion to a genuine environmental ethic' may be found in Aristotle, Spinoza or Aquinas; while the alternatives considered by O'Briant are the metaphysical systems of Spinoza and Leibniz. But Spinoza's necessitarianism and belief that there is only one substance, all truths about which follow from its nature, seem to underrate the activity and spontaneity both of people and of animals; and in fact, as Passmore points out in 'The Treatment of Animals', Spinoza held attitudes to nonhuman creatures which were exploitative in no small measure. 'I do not deny that beasts feel,' he wrote, 'but I deny that on that account we should not consult our necessity and use them as much as we wish and treat them as we will, since they do not agree with us in nature, and their emotions are in nature different from human emotions.' Even if Spinoza's system were purged of these attitudes, its necessities are too rigid for the metaphysical counterpart of an environmental ethic, and, as we shall see, its treatment of individuals as mere modes of one substance is ethically hazardous, even if the problems about its intelligibility are waived.

O'Briant's preferred alternative is the system of Leibniz, who held that no metaphysics based on inert matter can explain activity or consciousness, and maintained instead that the fundamental units of reality (the monads) are themselves active and possessed of (unconscious) perception. Leibniz's monadology enabled him to stress the similarities as well as the differences between humans and other animals, and to admire their diverse perfections. Though his system has seldom been accepted as a whole, his belief that the organic underlies the mechanical has been revived this century in A. N. Whitehead's doctrine of 'organic mechanism'. Indeed L. Charles Birch has summarized this position in a form O'Briant would be likely to applaud: 'Man is not separate from nature, but a part of nature.' There are in fact considerable difficulties in the way of the acceptance of Leibniz's unextended monads as the basis of everyday physical objects, though there may be less in the way of accepting the view that the capacity for life and consciousness is proper to the elementary particles of matter (a view which Leibniz himself rejected).

While radical Cartesian dualism can be rejected on grounds such as its failure to make action or perception possible, whether in
humans or in other animals, and also on evolutionary grounds yet to be presented, it is perhaps unnecessary for present purposes to adjudicate between the remaining metaphysical possibilities. For it is possible to recognize both the kinship of mankind and the other animals and the characteristic rational, cultural and moral capacities of humans on a variety of theories, including Priestleian materialism, Leibnitian monadology, Whitehead's organic mechanism and the Thomist view of man and other animals as ensouled bodies. None of these theories, I suggest, requires the undervaluation of nonhuman creatures (even though Thomism has at times been so interpreted); and, though not all can be equal to reality, it would be superfluous here to attempt to decide between their relative merits. For present purposes, at any rate, a Lockean agnosticism about the nature of that in us (and in the other animals) which feels and thinks will suffice.

Requirements for a satisfactory metaphysics

It is nevertheless worth asking what are the requirements for a metaphysics which encourages sensitiveness towards the natural environment as well as towards human nature. In this connection Mary Midgley makes the point that if human nature is to be understood against the background of the kindred nature of other animals (and it is certainly unlikely to be well understood otherwise), then theories on which human nature as it is could never ‘have evolved without celestial interference’ are to be rejected. But the theories of Plato and of Descartes can only be squared with belief in evolution if at some stage a wholly alien element was supernaturally added to existing organisms. On their theories, after all, the loss of the body makes little difference to the real person, who continues to exist as a soul. Such a soul is therefore discontinuous with all other characteristics of living organisms, and could not evolve from them. But, as Midgley remarks, such ‘celestial interference . . . does not make sense in a nonreligious context . . . [or] in a Christian one either. Christianity is not Platonism. If God created through evolution, he surely designed it and used it properly.’ And in fact she goes on to suggest that ‘a far more coherent view of human wholeness’ is supplied by Bishop Butler, with his contrasting accounts of behaviour which fits the balance of our natural desires, and behaviour disproportionate to their integration. Indeed Midgley's evolutionary requirement is plausibly satisfied by the
metaphysical views, presented above, of Aquinas, Leibniz, Priestley and Whitehead alike.

Midgley has another requirement for a satisfactory metaphysics, namely that we must not only refrain from holding, with Kant, that animals and the rest of creation exist for man and that man is nature's ultimate end, but that we need to hold that other creatures either have no point or value or have a point which is quite alien to human purposes. Only thus can we escape from the narrowness of human concerns, and take pleasure in what exists independently of ourselves, and only thus can we benefit from the study of the adaptedness of different creatures each to its peculiar niche and role.

A parallel requirement for a satisfactory metaphysics is suggested in Passmore's contention that 'the philosopher has to learn to live with the "strangeness" of nature, with the fact that natural processes are entirely indifferent to our existence and welfare — not positively indifferent, of course, but incapable of caring about us — and are complex in a way that rules out the possibility of our wholly mastering and transforming them'. Passmore is partly rejecting here two forms of anthropocentric metaphysics. Cartesianism, he holds, encourages the exploitation of nature as 'the rightful manipulation of a nature which is wax in man's hands'. He grants that Descartes rejected the view that everything else in creation exists for man, but ascribes to him the attitude that everything that man finds on earth may and should be transformed for his use, like the wax which was Descartes' favourite example of variability. (This kind of account may not be altogether fair to Descartes.) Passmore is also rejecting the Hegelian metaphysics of nature on which its exploitation is held to constitute 'the humanising of it in a manner which somehow accords with nature's real interests', and on which nature becomes of value only through the taming of its initial state by man.

That some of Descartes' followers adopted the views attributed to Descartes, or that Marx and others (see chapter 5) in large measure took over those attributed to Hegel can scarcely be doubted. Passmore finds them defective not in rejecting the pre-Christian view that natural objects are sacred; for natural objects cannot be swayed by arguments, can be scientifically understood, and may rightly be in some measure transformed for the sake of 'civilization' and human interests. Rather he finds them defective in neglecting facts such as that 'natural processes go on in their own way, in a
manner indifferent to human interests and by no means incompatible with man’s total disappearance from the face of the earth’, and that human interventions in these processes set off a chain of interactions, some of them unforeseeable. If these facts are granted, then we neglect the autonomous nature of natural objects and processes at our peril, and should not construe them either as wax in our hands or as requiring our efforts to realize themselves. I suspect that Passmore is additionally holding that such attitudes to the exploitation of nature are morally wrong, as well as misconceived: certainly this is suggested by his beliefs that the wilful destruction of natural objects is blameable even when human interests are unaffected, and that a more realistic philosophy of nature can promote respect for natural processes. If so he needs to hold some such premise as that some of these objects and processes have an intrinsic value of their own (though, as I shall contend in chapter 8, the importance of understanding natural systems does not require locating intrinsic value in such systems, as holists sometimes require).

Now this rejection of anthropocentrism and the related refusal to undervalue nature are, as we have seen, required by the Old and New Testaments alike. We have also seen how these attitudes clash with Stoic (and, as Passmore points out, with Aristotelian) tenets adopted by Origen, Aquinas and in some places by Kant, and accordingly how some elements in these thinkers’ ideas need to be discarded. In chapter 3, moreover, it was argued that the Judaeo-Christian tradition can consistently accommodate the kind of nonanthropocentric metaphysics which is now commended by Passmore. Can it also accommodate the acceptance of nature’s ‘strangeness’ required by Midgley and Passmore?

Satisfying the requirements

It is clearly essential at the very least that nonhuman living creatures should not be regarded as nothing but chattels, property or resources. Val and Richard Routley now hold that the Stewardship tradition involves regarding the world as either human or superhuman property, the tenants of which should treat it as resources belonging to the owner. Peter Singer seems to adopt a similar interpretation; and Henryk Skolimowski likewise holds that in the Christian cosmology ‘everything is God’s personal property’ and that for this metaphysics an ethic of reverence for life is an ‘anomaly’. But this theory makes the Stewardship tradition adopt an instrumentalist view of nonhuman creatures, which in actual fact
its adherents have usually rejected. The suggestion may be that stewards are essentially managers who act on behalf of owners; if so, it should be replied that stewards can be curators, trustees, guardians and wardens, and that in any case the point of the metaphor is the steward’s responsibility and answerability, not the devaluation of the world which is their trust, and which is regarded as a reflection of the divine glory, and judged by its creator to be ‘very good’. Even if the tradition is secularized and adopts a nontheistic form, people do not forfeit their responsibilities, but remain answerable to the community of moral agents for the fostering and the preservation of all that is intrinsically valuable.

Nevertheless Passmore expresses strong reservations about people’s ability to ‘face their ecological problems in their full implications’ unless they see themselves as left to their own devices, without metaphysical guarantees of survival.\textsuperscript{50} Natural processes must not be seen as ‘so constructed as to guarantee the continued survival of human beings and their civilisation’.\textsuperscript{51} Hence a sufficiently naturalistic understanding of man is needed to guarantee that people are dependent on natural processes. This much, I should contend, can be accepted by anyone, whether a theistic believer or not, who accepts a sufficient kinship between humans and other species to recognize the essentially physical nature of both. Certainly theism does not entail that the earthly survival of our species is supernaturally guaranteed; and, as we have seen, belief in the survival of death need not impair conscientiousness about this-worldly obligations. Further, to affirm the naturalness of humanity commits us neither to the devaluation of nature feared by Skolimowski as a concomitant of some forms of the scientific world-view,\textsuperscript{52} nor on the other hand to ‘radical biotic egalitarianism’,\textsuperscript{53} the theory which makes all living creatures have the same intrinsic value, and which Blackstone shows good reason to reject on the count of its unacceptable implications.

Yet for Passmore nature’s strangeness consists not only in its less-than-total conformity to human purposes, but also in the gulf between the human and the nonhuman.\textsuperscript{54} In part Passmore is here reminding us of nature’s otherness, rather as Rodman insists on the inappropriateness of applying to alien creatures, with distinctive ways of life of their own, standards which relate solely to humans.\textsuperscript{55} But he is also stressing, to an unusual degree among writers on ecological subjects, the peculiar value of humans and what they create. This far, I suggest, we can follow him: our metaphysics should not so ‘naturalize’ man as to obscure the difference between
characteristic human capacities and relations and the capacities (and in some cases relations) characteristic of other species. To do so is to disown the very responsibilities for future people and for the natural environment which it is essential for normative ethics to stress (see chapters 6—9). Indeed much more is distinctive about mankind than the relative absence of body hair: in fact the importance of stressing the powers of commission and omission which these responsibilities presuppose is a central reason for upholding the belief (so easily misinterpreted) in man's dominion. Yet the peculiar value of the fulfilment of characteristic human capacities can be granted without denying the possibility of rights on the part of nonhuman animals, as Passmore frequently does. Nor can it be necessary for an environmental ethic to be committed to treating species-boundaries in themselves as a proper basis for discrimination and differential treatment.

Awareness of our dependence on natural processes and cycles is sometimes thought, particularly by adherents of what Naess calls the 'deep' ecology movement, to require a shift at the level of metaphysics away from an atomistic view of society and the world to an acceptance of systems and wholes as the fundamental units of reality and the ultimate focuses of loyalty. Such seems to be the view of a number of ecological writers, including Leopold, Clark and Rodman.\textsuperscript{56} A virtue of this view is its resistance to attempts to construe all morality as concerned with individual rights and interests and to project Western property systems onto the universe as a whole. But the egoistic pitfalls of moral individualism can be avoided without denying the reality of individuals, and the scientific discovery of our interdependence with the other constituents of natural ecosystems does not show these systems to have value in themselves.\textsuperscript{57} Though Passmore is mistaken in objecting to Leopold's 'land ethic' that obligations arise only within those communities where they are recognized,\textsuperscript{58} he is right to hold that interdependence need not imply a moral relationship. As the Routleys remind us, we need to be able to see ourselves as belonging to societies and systems, and can take pride in communal as well as in individual fortunes;\textsuperscript{59} yet there are manifest dangers in any such metaphysical monism as that presented by John King-Farlow,\textsuperscript{60} on which the perfection of the one Substance is vastly more important than the well-being of the persons who are among its constituents. Real as social systems and ecosystems are, we should not forget that their value turns on the flourishing of the no less real individual organisms which make them up.
A metaphysics, then, which is suited to our ecological problems needs to treat humans alongside the rest of the natural order in a naturalistic way, without being reductionist about their irreducible characteristics. It must not deny the reality of the natural systems on which we depend, yet must allow the reality of their individual members, and uphold the responsibilities which as individuals and groups people have for the care of the natural environment. For man is neither ‘apart from nature’ nor simply ‘a part of nature’, whether nature is regarded as a collection of atoms or organisms or as a single organic system. It must further renounce anthropocentrism, recognize nature’s autonomy and otherness and the value of nonhuman creatures, and take full account of evolution. Thus, as Skolimowski points out, since mankind is the outcome of evolution, ‘the universe is to be conceived of as the home for man’; and, though Skolimowski may be too ready to ascribe value to whatever emerges from the evolutionary process, he is nevertheless right to point out that ‘we are the custodians of the whole of evolution’.

Platonism and Cartesianism do not, as we have seen, satisfy these criteria; nor do the anthropocentric aspects of Aristotelianism and of Thomism. But the systems of Aquinas, Leibniz, Priestley and Whitehead are, I should claim, equal to these requirements, or can be reconciled with them. Indeed a new metaphysics is needed only insofar as these longstanding systems need to be made more explicitly consistent with the criteria which have been supplied. Thus the Judaeo-Christian tradition, of which at least the first three of these systems are recognizably variants, is not essentially productive of metaphysical arrogance, despite the fact that such arrogance has often besmirched it. Nor is it committed to regarding man as ‘apart from nature’. Indeed it embodies indispensable insights about human capacities and obligations, such as that people are the custodians and stewards of a precious natural order, and have a creative role in actively enhancing it, as well as being among its participants — insights which we cannot afford to disregard.

NOTES

5 Ibid. p. 80.
6 Ibid. pp. 82f.
7 Ibid. pp. 85f.
8 Ibid. pp. 86—8.
10 Wisdom 3:4 and 5:15 are apparent exceptions, but even there immortality is not natural to man's soul, but a supernatural gift.
11 Ecclesiastes 3:19f.
15 Aristotle, *De Anima* II, 412a, 20f.
17 See chapter 3 (above), nn. 30, 2 and 8.
19 *Summa Theologiae* 2:1, q10, a4.
Locke’s main position was agnosticism about the nature both of matter and of that which thinks.

26 Ralph Cudworth, *The True Intellectual System of the Universe*, (2nd edn) London: 1743, p. 745; cited by Ayers (see above) at n. 64, p. 239.

27 This account of Locke’s position is derived from Ayers (see above), pp. 237—9.

28 In *A Free Discussion*; see n. 22. His materialism is expounded there at pp. 112f.

29 The correspondence of Clarke and Collins is published in Clarke, *Letter to Dodwell, Etc.*


37 Ibid. pp. 266—77.

38 Kant, however, seems later to have abandoned this view: see Glacken, *Traces on the Rhodian Shore*, pp. 540f.


49 Skolimowski, *Eco-Philosophy*, p. 83.

50 *MRN*, p. 184.


*MRN*, p. 116.

See ‘Social Theories, Self Management and Environmental Problems’, *passim*.


Ibid.