3

The Tradition of Stewardship

It is worthwhile to investigate further whether the central religious and ethical tradition of our culture has been despotic or environmentally responsible. Even if the Bible is not despotic as to its writers' view of nature (as was argued in chapter 2), the teaching of its adherents could still have been so; and if it had been so, then the causes of our ecological problems would be easier to understand, and we should be obliged to depart from this teaching as radically as possible. If, however, as I shall argue in this chapter, the Judaeo-Christian tradition has historically stressed responsibility for nature, and that not only in the interest of human beings, and if its secular critics have often echoed this emphasis, then whatever the causes of the problems may be, our traditions offer resources which may, in refurbished form, allow us to cope with these problems without resorting to the dubious and implausible expedient of introducing a new environmental ethic.

Classical Christian attitudes

Christian attitudes to nature have in fact been much more diverse than their critics suppose. Thus the belief that everything was made for mankind was held by some Christians such as Origen, Peter Lombard, Aquinas and Calvin, but was expressly rejected by others such as Augustine, Descartes, John Ray, Linnaeus and William Paley, and by the Jewish philosopher Maimonides, and was implicitly rejected by many others, such as Alan of Lille, whose high view of nature was anything but an instrumental one.¹

The Eastern Church, at any rate, seems to have adhered to a compassionate view of nonhuman species. Thus a prayer for animals of Basil the Great accepted, probably on the strength of Romans 8, that God had promised to save both man and beast. There is also
the testimony of St Chrysostom, who in the fourth century wrote of the beasts as follows: ‘Surely we ought to show them great kindness and gentleness for many reasons, but, above all, because they are of the same origin as ourselves’, and apparently regarded this as a requirement of justice. There are many stories of saintly gentleness to animals, and it has been claimed that in Eastern Orthodoxy ‘awareness of man’s cosmic vision has never been lost to sight, has never ceased to be an integral part of man’s redemption’. Thus St Isaac the Syrian in the seventh century urged compassion for all creatures, and ‘a heart which could not bear to see or hear any creature suffer hurt, or the slightest pain’. The secular state too accepted (at least in theory) that there is a *jus naturae*, a law which nature has taught all animals, as well as a *jus gentium* which is peculiar to humans, by admitting this distinction of the third century jurist Ulpian into the *Institutes* of Justinian. The recognition of motives such as self-defence and the care of the young as falling under the *jus naturae* suggests that animals were accorded some degree of moral acknowledgement, even if nothing as clear-cut as moral entitlements. Indeed John Rodman has contended that this understanding of the *jus naturae* tradition was widely accepted until it was redefined in a ‘hominicentric’ way by Hugo Grotius in *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* (1625).

Even in the West, St Bonaventure wrote of St Francis: ‘When he considered the origin of all things, he would be filled with overwhelming pity, and he called all creatures, no matter how lowly, by the name of brother or sister, because as far as he knew, they had sprung from the same original principle as himself.’ And Nicholas Arseniev has shown how echoes of Francis’ cosmic vision persisted, at least among some of his early followers. On the other hand the Stoic view that irrational creatures lack rights heavily influenced Origen, as Passmore has shown, as also did the Stoic belief that nature exists only to serve mankind’s interests. Passmore also finds this influence in the anti-Manichaean passage of Augustine already cited in chapter 2, where the view is ascribed to Christ that there are no moral ties between man and animals. But Augustine also rejected the belief that nonhuman creatures have instrumental value only, and that everything was made to satisfy mankind’s need or pleasure. Each creature, he held, has value in itself in the scale of creation. Indeed, as I have argued much more fully elsewhere, his position, seen in the round, was far from reflecting ‘Greco-Christian arrogance’.

It is instructive, moreover, to trace two traditions depicted by
Passmore, the Stewardship tradition (involving the belief that people are entrusted with a duty to preserve the earth's beauty and fruitfulness) and the tradition of Cooperation with Nature (embodying the view that mankind should endeavour to develop and perfect the natural world in accordance with its potentials) — traditions of which Passmore discovers no trace between pagan antiquity and the seventeenth century. But in fact both views were held widely among Christians in the patristic period in both East and West. Thus, as Glacken points out, Basil's understanding of man as the furnisher and perfecter of creation was further stressed in the West by Ambrose and in the East by Theodoret; and Augustine's praise of improvements to nature and his belief that man participates in God's work through sciences like agriculture as well as in the arts led to the deliberate application of this teaching in the monasteries of the Benedictine rule. As to the belief that man's role is that of God's steward of creation, this view may also be found in the patristic period. Indeed Glacken locates it in The Christian Topography of the sixth century traveller, Cosmas Indicopleustes, and implicitly in Basil, Ambrose and Theodoret. Moreover the belief that the land should be improved seems throughout the Middle Ages to have been taken for granted, without this preventing active measures to conserve the forests; while Christian writers such as Albertus Magnus have long since given warnings against damaging the landscape. There is strong evidence, then, against the claim made by Walter H. O'Briant that the Judaeo-Christian tradition regards man as 'apart from nature', and gives people a careless attitude towards the environment, being preoccupied with the salvation of the soul and unconcerned about a world which is not their true home. Some strands of Christian teaching could have fostered such a view, but the underlying metaphysic can scarcely enjoin it, granted the concern to enhance natural beauty and fruitfulness shown by such a representative figure as Bernard of Clairvaux, and the compassion for other creatures evinced by St Isaac the Syrian, one of those desert fathers often associated with the kind of other-worldliness which O'Briant deprecates.

But it is in the matter of the treatment of animals that the accusation that Christianity embodies a despotic view is most insistent. In this area Peter Singer, in Animal Liberation and other writings, has supplemented the evidence adduced by Passmore and has drawn even blacker conclusions. I have argued elsewhere that his charges of despotism and anthropocentrism conflict with a good deal of the evidence, though it must be granted that until the
Reformation there was no opposition to practices such as bull-fighting, and that even since then the Christian and other opponents of cruelty to animals have had an uphill struggle.\textsuperscript{23} Christianity, however, abolished animal sacrifices,\textsuperscript{24} and, though the spectacles of the arena involving contests between animals were not banned when gladiatorial contests were abolished, the continuing ban on attendance by Christians must have contributed to their disappearance in their ancient form.\textsuperscript{25} At the same time in both East and West the veneration of the saints, associated in many cases with kindliness to animals, encouraged a gentle attitude,\textsuperscript{26} an attitude evidenced also both in the prayers for sick animals in the medieval Roman liturgy\textsuperscript{27} and in medieval bestiaries.\textsuperscript{28}

Thus though nonhuman creatures were usually omitted in the West from the scheme of salvation, they were not omitted from the moral reckoning of the patristic and medieval period. (Indeed when, as occasionally, they were put on trial, too great a degree of responsibility was imputed.) Domestic animals, of course, continued to be used as beasts of burden, and cattle were still killed for food; but a case has to be made out before these practices are accepted as exploitative, as opposed to the abuses which sometimes accompany them. (Singer himself does not object to killing and replacing animals which lack self-consciousness.\textsuperscript{29}) There again, Basil’s prayer for ‘the humble beasts who bear with us the heat and burden of the day’\textsuperscript{30} suggests that beasts of burden were not always treated oppressively.

Thus in the patristic and medieval periods there was a widespread sense of responsibility for the care of the earth and for the completion of God’s work of creation, together with an underlying sense that animals should be treated with kindliness and were of more than merely instrumental value. Aquinas, however, held an instrumentalist view of animals,\textsuperscript{31} and taught that cruelty to animals is wrong mainly because of the adverse consequences upon the character of the perpetrator and the loss of property to their human owner.\textsuperscript{32} Yet he allowed that irrational creatures ‘can be loved from charity as good things we wish others to have, in that from charity we cherish them for God’s honour and service. Thus does God love them from charity’;\textsuperscript{33} a sentiment sometimes taken to imply that we should love them, if not for themselves, then because God does. He also contended that Paul’s question about whether God cares for oxen implies no more than that God has no regard for them as rational creatures, not that they fall outside the sphere of his providence.\textsuperscript{34} Indeed he expects the just man to feel pity at their suffering, lest he should fail to feel compassion for fellow-men.\textsuperscript{35}
Such teaching at any rate allowed Scholastics in the seventeenth century to maintain the reality of animals suffering against the Cartesians;\textsuperscript{36} it should also be remarked that some of Aquinas' modern followers, such as Maritain and Journet,\textsuperscript{37} have been able to accept nonderivative duties to animals without abandoning his overall metaphysical system. Though his doctrines have often encouraged a despotic attitude to animals, they were not, in fact, ineradicably despotic.

\textit{Early modern attitudes}

It was, however, Calvin who explicitly resuscitated the New Testament metaphor of Stewardship, which he applied both to a person's possessions\textsuperscript{38} and to the care of the earth as a whole, decrying the 'plundering of the earth of what God has given it for the nourishment of man' as frustrating God's goodness.\textsuperscript{39} Calvin's version of the Stewardship tradition was anthropocentric, but in the next century Sir Matthew Hale (who was, according to Passmore, one of the earliest Christian adherents of this ancient tradition)\textsuperscript{40} gave it an ampler interpretation, somewhat reminiscent of Chrysostom, Basil, Ambrose and Theodoret. Hale, in a notable and much-quoted passage, concluded that 'the End of Man's Creation was, that he should be [God's] Viceroy . . . Steward, \textit{Villicus}, Bailiff, or Farmer of this goodly farm of the lower World', and was endowed with this 'dominion, trust and care' to restrain the fiercer animals, defend the tame and useful ones, to conserve and cultivate plant species, and 'to preserve the face of the Earth in beauty, usefulness and fruitfulness'.\textsuperscript{41} Passmore's comment on Hale's view that there is such a duty is that it is not a typically Christian view, but embodies a Pelagian emphasis on what can be accomplished by the human will, an emphasis which plays down original sin.\textsuperscript{42} Certainly Calvin stressed original sin more than Hale, but he too stood in the Stewardship tradition and acknowledged that man's dominion is subject to moral limitations; and as to the claims about Pelagianism, such a charge would make the patristic adherents of the Stewardship view and of Cooperation with Nature Pelagians too, including even Augustine!\textsuperscript{43} There was, in fact, considerable continuity between such seventeenth-century advocates of stewardship and the further adornment of creation as Hale and John Ray on the one hand,\textsuperscript{44} and the fathers and monastic communities of the early centuries of the Church, as reviewed above, on the other. It should also be stressed that Hale and Ray, like Basil and Chrysostom (and indeed
Augustine), but unlike Calvin, accepted the intrinsic value of nonhuman creatures.

Now Passmore ascribes the inauguration of a more actively despotic attitude to Francis Bacon and René Descartes, an approach on which, 'since everything on earth is for man’s use, he is at liberty to modify it as he will'. Undoubtedly both Bacon and Descartes advocated and pioneered new methods in the investigation of nature. But to what extent did they adhere to the attitude just mentioned, and to what extent did it become accepted as a legitimate Christian view in the period which followed?

Both Bacon and Descartes commended the systematic study of nature so as to improve the human lot. Bacon in particular consciously reinterpreted the doctrine of dominion over nature, which he held to have been twice forfeited, once by Adam’s fall and then again by a fall into ignorance. To some degree, he held, it could be recovered through a patient and humble investigation of nature. He opposed those versions of religion which held that natural causes should be treated as sacred and left uninvestigated, holding that God was honoured rather by their study than by wilful ignorance in the face of apparent mystery. Moreover his emphasis was one of technological optimism: ‘Now the true and lawful goal of the sciences,’ he wrote, ‘is none other than this: that human life be endowed with new discoveries and powers.’ Indeed in a work of fiction he ascribes to the scientific community of New Atlantis the goal of increasing human power in every possible way.

These passages raise, without answering, the question of whether Bacon simply favoured the alleviation of disease, poverty and famine, or commended uncompromising ruthlessness in the interests of any community equipped with power based on knowledge, at whatever cost to other humans and other creatures. There are certainly times at which he seems to approach the latter view, at any rate when he apparently endorsed the practice of experimenting on live animals in the interests of the progress of surgery. Yet Bacon was also deeply concerned about the misguided uses to which knowledge might be put, and was adamant that neither contemporary nor future people should have to suffer as a result of its pursuit or its applications. Thus in the Dedicatory Epistle of The Great Instauration he wrote:

Lastly, I would address one general admonition to all — that they consider what are the true ends of knowledge, and that they seek it not either for pleasure of the mind, or for contention, or for superiority to others, or for
profit, or fame, or power, or any of those inferior things, but for the benefit and use of life, and that they perfect and govern it in charity. For it was from lust of power that the angels fell, and from lust of knowledge that man fell; but of charity there can be no excess, neither did angel or man ever come in danger by it.\textsuperscript{52}

These are not the words of an advocate of the belief that ‘man is at liberty to modify everything on earth as he will’. Rather Bacon was in effect acknowledging constraints on acts which might harm either our fellows or our descendants, and on the kind of motives which have in actual fact prompted exploitation of man and nature.

Ethically, then, Bacon may well have had anthropocentrist leanings, but his opposition to uncharitableness towards people suggests that he could have endorsed Calvin’s strictures on ‘plundering the earth’, though not, perhaps, the duty to preserve the beauty of nature, as well as its usefulness, as recognized and advocated by Hale. Only through the kind of misinterpretation which borders on wilfulness could Bacon be cited in justification of the employment of technology in the heedless pursuit of profit or sectional advantage.

It was, however, the aim of Descartes to ‘find a practical philosophy by means of which, knowing the force and the action of fire, water, air, the stars, heavens and all other bodies which environ us, as distinctly as we know the different crafts of our artisans, we can in the same way employ them in all those uses to which they are adapted, and thus render ourselves the masters and possessors of nature.’\textsuperscript{53} A despotic attitude is certainly implicit in this interpretation of dominion over nature, an attitude which becomes even more evident over his understanding of animals and other nonhuman species. For Descartes went so far as to maintain that nonhuman creatures lack conscious thought and can be regarded as automata.\textsuperscript{54} He does not seem, as Passmore asserts, to have held that animals cannot feel: \textsuperscript{55} ‘I do not deny sensation, in so far as it depends on a bodily organ’, he wrote. But the same passage concludes with a declaration that since animals lack thought, there can be no ‘suspicion of crime when [people] eat or kill animals’.\textsuperscript{56} Indeed Descartes and several of his followers practised vivisection in the course of their researches.

Yet Descartes held no brief for the unbridled pursuit of power or gain. Defending a decision to delay the publication of his findings, he wrote:
although it is true that each man is obliged to procure, as much as in him lies, the good of others, and that to be useful to nobody is popularly speaking to be worthless, it is at the same time true that our cares should extend further than the present time, and that it is good to set aside those things which may possibly be adapted to bring profit to the living, when we have in view the accomplishment of other ends which will bring much more advantage to our descendants.\footnote{Passmore further contends that Descartes' system in no way depended on revelation, and plays down the traditional emphasis on human limitations and the need for humility: hence it could be inherited unreflectively by a post-Christian Europe and exported readily to non-Christian cultures elsewhere. No doubt elements of his system have been pressed into service in this way; but Descartes himself stressed our dependence on revelation in theology in general and in particular in matters of our inability to discover God's purposes 'by the powers of the mind', and of the requirement of humility to reflect on our faults and the feebleness of our nature. These elements in his system, however, were discarded by some later mechanists who abandoned his theology, such as La Mettrie, D'Holbach and Diderot. Thus Descartes' own remarks suggest that the duty to make the world a better place to live in belongs to a faith involving answerability to God: but it was comparatively easy for some of his followers to omit the traditionally Christian elements in his thought, and to stress his rationalism and his mechanism without the theological and moral constraints with which he tempered them. This is not to imply, however, that the attitude of the French Enlightenment was uniformly more ruthless than Descartes': thus such an advocate of science and a sceptic about revelation as}
Voltaire could still reject the view that animals lack feelings and thought, and contend that animals' powers were God-given; while other *philosophes* replaced duties to God with duties to posterity (see chapter 5).

Meanwhile in England the founders of the Royal Society, which received its charter in 1662, set out to employ the methods of Bacon's *Novum Organum* somewhat after the manner of the scientific community in his *New Atlantis*. Their scientific method, like that which he advocated, was secular and autonomous, but they nevertheless perceived their enterprise as a religious duty whereby the Creator was glorified and his workmanship disclosed and published abroad. They rejected the view that nature was 'venerable' and therefore not to be controlled, modified, or understood: but the modifications of the natural environment which they favoured were moderate ones, such as the adornment of the countryside with fruitful fields, orchards and woods, as advocated by John Ray, who was a close associate of the Society's members. Indeed in one of the earliest publications by a member after its foundation, *Silva, or a Discourse on Forest Trees*, John Evelyn warned his readers against excessive deforestation, and exhorted them to take seriously both the theory and the practice of silviculture, so that the nation would be deprived neither of the resources of the woods nor of their beauty. Evelyn, indeed, was concerned about the air of conurbations as well as about the preservation of the forests, and anticipated many later ecological writings in his *Fumifugium*, a study of atmospheric pollution in cities. Accordingly at any rate the first generation of Baconian scientists would have rejected the view that 'man's relations with [nature] are not governed by moral principles'. (It should, however, be acknowledged that Evelyn also participated in experiments on living animals, like several members of the Society.)

*The subsequent period*

The humanitarian movement, which successfully altered attitudes and practice in matters of slavery, punishment, working conditions and also the treatment of animals gathered strength in the following century, though there had been predecessors of its concern in matters of animal welfare such as Philip Stubbes (1583) and the Massachusetts legislature (1641). In these matters the movement was fostered in its early stages by Christian moralists such as Locke, Wollaston, Balguy and Hutcheson, and in general by Quakers,
Methodists and Evangelicals, as well as by sceptics such as Montaigne, Shaftesbury, Voltaire, Hume and Bentham. Thus Passmore's view that theological doctrines retarded this movement, while sustained by some of the evidence, is in conflict with much of the rest: for the Christian humanitarians were motivated by a profound belief in Christian charity, and by their religious convictions in general, and not in spite of them. Thus Alexander Pope wrote in 1713 about vivisection that "The more entirely the inferior creation is submitted to our power the more answerable we should seem for our mismanagement of it." Further examples of Christians concerned to avoid harm to animals are the philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, and the Anglican poet William Cowper, who held that the true appreciation of nature was sullied by the detestable cruelty of blood-sports, from which he rescued a hare. Though the victory of humanitarianism is less than complete in matters of the treatment of animals, it has long been beyond dispute, both among religious believers and others, that it is wrong to treat nonhuman animals as nothing but means to human ends, and it has become a religious and secular commonplace that they should not be treated oppressively.

It is becoming clear that whatever has caused our ecological problems, they cannot be set down to Judaeo-Christian attitudes to nature. This conclusion is further supported by the reasoning of Lewis W. Moncrief. Moncrief holds that Lynn White is mistaken to regard the Judaeo-Christian tradition as causing an exploitative attitude to nature, at any rate directly, and stresses the cultural, technological and social forces which have more directly fostered this outlook. Thus he ascribes our ecological 'crisis' directly to urbanization, increased wealth, increased population and to the rise of the private ownership of resources; and these factors in turn are set down to capitalism (with science and technology in attendance) and the growth of democracy. The connection between all this and the Judaeo-Christian tradition is at most that this tradition may have encouraged capitalism and democracy: but the empirical evidence for this link, Moncrief holds, is slender. (It should be observed that, as Moncrief has in mind democracy in a property-owning form, the link for which he believes the evidence to be wanting would have to be between the Judaeo-Christian tradition and capitalism; even if this tradition fosters democratic self-management, as in some of its forms it undoubtedly does, the link here is irrelevant unless the tradition supports capitalism too.) To this critique of White's position William Coleman has responded by maintaining that the theologian
and scientist William Derham, and the apologetic tradition to which he belonged, supply just the empirical evidence which Moncrief believes to be required and missing. Derham, he alleges, gave the blessing of Christianity both to capitalistic enterprise and to science-based technology, and thus White's claims are vindicated, albeit in connection with the period just after 1700, and not with the medieval technology of a millennium earlier.

But, as Coleman admits, other Christians of the period were outspoken in their condemnation of avarice, and Isaac Barrow, Newton's mentor, wrote that, though man could and should use God's terrestrial gifts, he should do so only to meet his daily needs, and under no circumstances so monopolize them as to hinder the satisfaction of the needs of others. Nor do Christian writers of the decades following, such as Swift, retract the traditional strictures on greed and self-aggrandizement. Indeed, as I have argued in 'Christian Attitudes to Nature', Coleman exaggerates both the extent of Derham's blessing on capitalism and its influence. There was no question of 'a divine command to steel ourselves for a ruthless assault upon nature', though there was a somewhat uncritical extension of the legitimate areas of stewardship to all the various callings, trade and war included (and with no qualification about the slave-trade), which contemporary society regarded as respectable. Yet the evidence proffered by Coleman for the link, doubted by Moncrief, between Christianity and untrammelled capitalism, remains too scanty to sustain Coleman's reapplication of White's thesis to the early modern period. Additional evidence, it may be thought, is supplied by Locke's second Treatise of Civil Government, with its justification of private property and enclosures; yet even Locke's justification embodied significant constraints, sufficient severely to limit the pursuit of economic growth if they were to be put into effect at the present time. (These constraints are discussed further in chapter 6.)

The actual attitude of the churches, or at least of the Church of England, to the new capitalism may, as R. H. Tawney held, have been one of resignation verging on indifference. Coleman, who maintains, as against this view, that Derham's position was in fact symptomatic of an attitude of actual favour, has not sufficiently made out his case. Indeed the areas to which Christian social teaching was applied at this time seem to have contracted in some quarters to those of individual piety and the prevention of social disorder, though the Evangelicals, Quakers and Methodists upheld the lively concern of their Puritan forebears for social justice (as
related above). Undoubtedly there was an insufficient condemnation of the greed and injustice implicit in the excesses of the new capitalism, and an insufficient advocacy of community and fraternity. Yet the awareness of answerability to God was not lost; indeed it was widely appealed to in the nineteenth century by humanitarians and by Christian Socialists. It has also been applied more recently to ecological problems in such works as the 1974 Report of the Doctrine Commission of the Church of England, published in Hugh Montefiore's *Man and Nature* alongside a number of essays in which responsibility for the care of nature is the common theme.

Thus there has been a strong tradition in Europe and lands of European settlement, a tradition of Judaeo-Christian origins but not confined to adherents of Judaism and Christianity, of belief that people are the stewards of the earth, and responsible for its conservation, for its lasting improvement, and also for the care of our fellow-creatures, its nonhuman inhabitants. This tradition, far from being merely modern, has been a continuous one, at any rate among Christians, from the Bible, via Basil, Chrysostom, Ambrose, Theodoret and Bernard of Clairvaux, to Calvin, Hale and Ray and to modern writers like Black and Montefiore. And, though some of its adherents, such as Calvin, have regarded nonhuman creatures as of instrumental value only, or, like the Puritan Philip Stubbes and the Catholic Cardinal Manning, as meriting our care simply because they are loved by God, it has more usually been held that cruelty and injustice in their regard are wrong in themselves, and that these creatures are of intrinsic value, this being, perhaps, the reason for God's love. Variants of this tradition, indeed, have at most times played a leading role in our culture. Accordingly, as Val Routley recognizes, the Stewardship tradition is not confined to human interests, but is concerned with much else besides; indeed the same holds good of the related tradition of Cooperation with Nature (see above), the variant of the Stewardship tradition in which human agents have the role of perfecting the created order by enhancing its beauty and actively conserving and improving its fertility on a sustainable basis.

These traditions, taken together, are at least as representative of Christian history as any despotic view, and may well be considered to offer materials from which an environmental ethic equal to our current problems can be elicited, without the need for the introduction of a new ethic to govern our transactions with nature. Indeed in our existing moral thought and traditions (whether
relational or secular) the roots may be found from which, with the help of the findings of ecological science, a tenable environmental ethic can grow.

NOTES

1. On Maimonides, Aquinas, Calvin and Descartes, see *MRN*, pp. 12, 113, 13 and 20; on Peter Lombard, see Passmore, 'Attitudes to Nature', p. 253; on Augustine, Alan of Lille, Linnaeus and Paley, see Glacken, *Traces on the Rhodian Shore*, pp. 198, 216—18 and 424. On Origen see Glacken, pp. 185f, and *MRN*, p. 16; on Ray see Glacken, p. 424 and *MRN*, pp. 21f.


3. Thus he declared that 'Even in the case of creatures which lack reason and perception men ought not to deviate from the considerations of what is just and unjust.' This quotation, from Grotius' *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*, I:1:xi, is cited by John Rodman, 'Animal Justice: The Counter-revolution in Natural Right and Law', *Inquiry*, 22, 1979, 3—22, p. 8.


7. Ibid. pp. 3, 10 and 20, n. 2.


10. *MRN*, p. 16.


THE TRADITION OF STEWARDSHIP

17 Ibid. pp. 313—46.
18 Ibid. p. 315.
32 Ibid., III:II:113. In ‘Western Traditions and Environmental Ethics’, I have argued that this summary of Aquinas’ position may be an incomplete one (see n. 47 there).


34 Summa Theologiae, 1, q. 103, a5, ad2. See further ‘Western Traditions and Environmental Ethics’, section I.

35 Summa Theologiae, 2:1:102, a6, ad8.


38 ‘Let every one regard himself as the steward of God in all things which he possesses’: John Calvin, Commentary on Genesis 2:15; quoted, from a translation of 1847, by F. B. Welbourn at ‘Man’s Dominion’, Theology, 78, 1975, 561–8, p. 563.


40 MRN, pp. 29–31, 185.


42 MRN, pp. 30f.

43 See sections III and IV of ‘Christian Attitudes to Nature’.


45 MRN, p. 17.

46 Both philosophers are discussed in much greater detail in chapter 1 of Robin Attfield, God and The Secular, Cardiff: University College Cardiff Press, 1978. Passmore discusses them in MRN, pp. 18–21.


48 MRN, p. 19.

49 Novum Organum, 1:81.


51 Ibid. p. 241 (from The New Atlantis).

52 In The New Organon, pp. 15f.

54 The passages of Descartes on these topics are conveniently gathered together in Tom Regan and Peter Singer (eds), *Animal Rights and Human Obligations*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1976, pp. 60–6.

55 ‘The Treatment of Animals’, p. 204.


58 Ibid. p. 130; from *Discourse on Method*, Part VI.

59 *MRN*, p. 21.


62 See ‘The Enlightenment: Deists and ‘Rationalists’”, by David C. Goodman, in *Scientific Progress and Religious Dissent*, Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1974, 33–68, pp. 49–52, 60–6. Rodman (‘Animal Justice’, p. 9) represents La Mettrie as standing in the jus naturae tradition against those like Grotius and Pufendorf who played down the similarities between the behaviour of humans and animals. But La Mettrie in fact contended that humans, animals and indeed plants are all alike because they are all machines. Even his book *Les Animaux plus que machines* (La Haye, 1751) was intended to show that humans have souls, and are non-mechanical, no more than animals.


65 Thus Robert Boyle entitled one of his works *The Christian Virtuoso* (London, 1690).

66 *MRN*, p. 11; see also Attfield, *God and The Secular*, chapter 1.

67 See the passage cited in n. 44 (above), which echoes some of the words of Basil’s *Hexaemeron*. On William Coleman’s treatment of Ray, see ‘Christian Attitudes to Nature’, section IV.

69 Turner, *All Heaven in a Rage*, p. 46.
70 Ibid. p. 35.
73 Cf. the couplet from a hymn of Isaac Watts (1674—1748), an Independent, 'Creatures as numerous as they be/Are subject to Thy care;' in *The Baptist Hymn Book*, London: Psalms and Hymns Trust, 1962, hymn 58. (Parts of the present paragraph appear also in 'Western Traditions and Environmental Ethics'.)
80 Ibid. p. 38.
81 Ibid. p. 35.
82 Ibid. p. 28.