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CHAPTER 4

The Boundaries of Indigenous Nationalism

Space, Memory, and Narrative in Hualapai Political Discourse

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Introduction

Fred Mahone had grown tired of seeing white ranchers running cattle on his reservation. A member of the Mahone Mountain Band and nephew of Indian scout Jim Mahone, Fred served in World War One, walked across France, and pursued a college education. When he returned to Hualapai country in 1919 from his years abroad, Mahone was angered by ten thousand non-Indian-owned cattle on the reservation. Voicing concerns expressed by many Hualapais about their economic, political, and legal status in northwestern Arizona, Mahone wrote the Commissioner about the “dictatorial” Superintendent who controlled the reservation. He told the Commissioner he wanted “freedom from ‘restrictions or wardships’ under which Indians exist” and demanded cancellation of all leases on the reservation. He wanted to “be as Americans are, free to develop our resources, as a community and to hold our reservation land for future generations.”

Not all Hualapais possessed Mahone’s rhetorical flair, but he gave voice to a growing Indigenous nationalism that tied the common grievances of Pai bands to the abuses of the Indian Bureau, as epitomized in its failure to protect the Hualapais from ranchers and the Santa Fe Railway.
Mahone’s nationalism emerged from a hybrid political culture situated at the historical cusp of “traditional” and “modern” discourses that symbolized the colonial conditions for Hualapais and Indians across the West in the early twentieth century: land allotment, second-class citizenship, reservation tensions, boarding schools, and religious discrimination.

The stories of Fred Mahone and his contemporaries are central to Hualapai history and the experiences of Native people caught in the maelstrom of empire. They stand in contrast to meta-narratives of immigrant achievement, the progressive impulse to protect the weak, the ever-expanding access to voting and civil rights, and the liberal vision of a multicultural nation. Heroic themes of westward expansion, the growth of democratic institutions, and the trope of rugged individualism reveal an American imagination that accepts violence as a necessary byproduct of “settling” the West. The notion that this violence was inevitable is tightly interwoven with the denial of sovereign peoplehood and the existence of Native nations as historical actors (Blackhawk 2006, 2; Guidotti-Hernandez 2011, 3; Ostler 2004, 2).

Recent scholarship has unmasked these myths to foreground how colonialism radically altered life for Indigenous peoples in the Americas. Colonization and empire building were central characteristics of American society, and as Matthew Frye Jacobson (2001), Amy Kaplan (2005), and Noenoe K. Silva (2004) have shown, much of U.S. history has been characterized by the dispossession of Indigenous peoples. To analyze the impact of U.S. colonialism upon Indigenous peoples, one must foreground Native communities and evaluate how they have negotiated the multifaceted nature of empire. Doing so reveals how Native people have employed a sense of space and place, drawn upon their cultural memories, and crafted political narratives about who they are as a people to directly engage the nation-state. The points of interaction where space, memory, and discourse collide with empire serve as useful sites of articulation for Indigenous efforts at nation building in the wake of conquest and in reaction to ongoing settler colonialism (Rifkin 2009, 31).

Historicizing these zones of violence and resistance yields insights into theories of nationhood that complicate the hegemony of “the nation.” The frameworks of “the nation,” nation building, and nationalism describe how modern structures of governance and social organization have arisen across Indian Country, but these concepts reflect Euro-American epistemologies. Many scholars have assumed that their research neutrally tracked the progression of societies from tribalistic and feudalistic, and ultimately to modern nation-states. While some scholars have acknowled-
edged that these developments were fraught with upheaval, they have uncritically applied these units of analysis to non-Western peoples. They built theories of history from a fraction of humanity and concluded that these were universal processes of development (Alfred and Corntassel 2005, 600).

Applying these frameworks to peoples outside of the Western tradition challenges scholars seeking to interpret the ways in which those people organize themselves in light of European colonialism. Interpretation is complicated by the pollination of concepts tied to the Enlightenment, liberal individualism, and the cluster of ideals enshrined in the American and French Revolutions. Without delving into the critiques of glorifications of these events and the “American Democracy” they gave birth to, Independence and the “postcolonial” nation-building project were marked by myriad complexities that problematized the “American experiment.” As the United States engaged Indigenous peoples the discourse of American politics worked its way into the treaty-making process and the larger array of relationships that comprised “Indian affairs.” These ideas filtered into Indigenous communities and influenced their internal political identities. This is important for my purposes here because any analysis of Hualapai nationhood and nation building must confront the acceptance of “non-Hualapai” notions of identity that moved across the permeable cultural boundaries between Natives and non-Natives (Chakrabarty 1992, 3; Chatterjee 1993, 12; Cherniavsky 1996, 87; Hobsbawm 1997, 9; Prakash 1995).

By drawing on Indigenous, postcolonial, and subaltern studies, this chapter evaluates how thirteen decentralized bands confronted American colonialism and in the process forged the modern Hualapai nation. This sense of “being national” was a layered and performative identity fraught with ambivalence about and debate over three key issues: band and family identities that cut against a centralized and externally imposed notion of a unified Hualapai nation; the cultural, physical, and discursive complexities of associating “Hualapai-ness” with the colonial site of the reservation; and the tensions emanating from a “third space” of Indigenous sovereignty, that is, Hualapais’ attempt to move through history as a people with rights to their land and culture while an imperial nation-state sought their absorption into the greater body politic (Bruyneel 2007, xiii). By embracing the discursive points of convergence between ideas such as “the Hualapai nation, tribe, or people,” I demonstrate how the Hualapais confronted conquest and social marginalization to challenge the rhetoric of disappearance and forge an Indigenous discourse of belonging. Anchoring that sense of belonging were memoires of violence, reactions
to the colonial/Native space of the reservation, hybrid political groups that represented multiple bands of Pai, and the crisis of legitimacy faced by the Hualapai government in the mid-twentieth century. These themes helped establish the discursive parameters of the highly contested notion of the Hualapai nation (Deloria 2004, 12; Denetdale 2007, 15; Smith A. 2005, 7; Smith L. 1999, 7).

Nations are products of powerful internal and external historical forces, which in the case of the Hualapais involved their reorganization from decentralized bands into more centralized yet layered identities. This process involved painful transformations that linked together nations, nation building, and nationalism. Nations are modern constructs that gain power from their ability to explain the world as it is perceived by groups subscribing to the threads binding them together. This sense of being a nation is tied to nationalism, which is a politicized movement employing the rhetoric of the nation and the implicit commonality of interests to mobilize people for various purposes. Finally, nation building is the complex process of gaining control over the cultural, human, and natural resources of a people and using them in ways that further the survival of that nation (Anderson 1983; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983).

Whereas the fields of American Indian history and ethnohistory address these issues through the lenses of cultural adaptation and persistence, scholars of Native American and Indigenous studies tackle them head on. For instance, Taiaiake Alfred and Jeff Corntassel problematize nationhood with the concept of “peoplehood,” which is rooted in an “oppositional, place-based existence, along with the consciousness of being in struggle against the dispossessing and demeaning fact of colonization by foreign peoples. . . . [This] fundamentally distinguishes Indigenous peoples from other people in the world” (Alfred and Corntassel 2005, 601). As such, Hualapais have faced modernity through colonial law, liberal democracy, capitalist development, and Western time to construct identities that reflect and reimagine preconquest relations with the land. This is an organic sense of peoplehood articulated in lived experiences and ongoing struggles to hold onto land, history, and culture. These concerns are tied to debates about postcolonialism, decolonization, and subaltern studies. I am intrigued by the arguments of scholars such as Ann Laura Stoler (2006, 21), Jennifer Denetdale (2007, 29), and Jodi Byrd (2011, 33), who observe that the United States maintains a colonial relationship with its subjects. Their work situates Indigenous peoples across the United States within a global framework of ongoing Indigenous-colonial interactions. Indeed, the United States subjugated nonwhite peoples and
relegated their land and labor to marginality as part of the expansion of capitalism, individualism, and liberalism (Prakash 1995, 1481).

Interpreting Hualapai history as a subaltern confrontation between colonialism and nation building provides a different vantage point for understanding the Hualapai community. The same forces that sought to strip them of their land and culture were central to shaping their common historical memories and the symbolic and real boundaries around them and their landscape. Their sense of peoplehood was and is rooted in a preconquest world when the Pais differentiated themselves from others and retained band autonomy. As a colonial settler state invaded their lands, the federal government labeled the Pais as “Hualapais,” set aside a reservation for them, and then made resources and recognition contingent on acceptance of that identity. Thus, the notion of being Hualapai rather than Pai deepened. Some people rejected the notion, while others fleshed it out with the creation of political institutions, legal codes, and cultural cues and behaviors. Band differences and family rivalries persisted but within common experiences and solutions to community problems. In short, the Hualapai nation today could not have evolved as it did without a preexisting sense of peoplehood, ties to the land, and a shared set of memories, all of which shaped Hualapais political discourse and interactions with the U.S. Empire (Gooding 1994, 1190).

The Conquest of Aboriginal Homelands and the Restructuring of Hualapai Space

Pai origin stories, which place their emergence at Spirit Mountain, west of Kingman, Arizona, anchor the Hualapai nation along the Colorado River, a place of spiritual sustenance. One story recounts how the ancestors of the Pai left the banks of the Colorado River, migrated to the east and south, and populated what became their cultural homeland of six million acres in northwestern Arizona (Figure 4.1). This landscape is a striking combination of rugged desert, windswept plateaus, mountains covered in pine trees, and deep canyons feeding into the Grand Canyon and Colorado River. These features characterized a borderland shared with Mohaves and Chemehuevis to the west, Paiutes to the north, Hopi to the east, and Yavapai to the south. These relationships tied them to a larger trade network extending from the Pacific Ocean to New Mexico and from Nevada to Mexico. Such relationships enabled the thirteen Pai bands comprised of extended families to survive on a range of wild game
and plants, roots, and berries. These bands also maintained local economies through light agriculture and migration around a tightly defined landscape (Hinton and Watahomigie 1984, 15).

The expansion of the Spanish into this Indigenous world had minimal direct impact on the Pais, but the legacy of new technologies, animals, food, plants, and ideas was lasting. Francisco Garcés travelled along the Colorado River in the 1770s, and in 1776 people whom he called “Jaguallapais” led him to Havasupai Canyon, where he met several families. His journals indicate that he camped in territory claimed by the Truxton Canyon or Hackberry band northeast of Kingman. Garcés and his men chose to establish missions further south on the Colorado River among the Quechan nation, but local groups rose up to kill the Spanish colonists (Spicer 1962, 264; Weber 1991, 32).

Very little direct Spanish activity followed in northwestern Arizona, but trading in humans, weapons, and horses did continue to shape the region. A vast slave trade emerged in the late 1600s when Spanish communities demanded Indian labor in the borderlands. This stream of human
labor flowed southward along the Colorado River through Quechán and O’odham lands and then to the Spanish markets in Sonora and Chihuahua. The demand for workers outstripped the preexisting practices of Native people as slave raiding became a goal itself rather than a byproduct of territorial disputes. This process evolved even as the destabilization of Spain’s northern frontier bled into Independence and the emergence of the Republic of Mexico. As land switched hands from empire to republic in the 1820s, the borderlands competition for resources increased and Indians fell to the lowest rung of the economic ladder. The short Mexican period was also noteworthy for the conflict between the states of Sonora, Chihuahua, and Arizona, New Mexico and Texas, with the Yaqui, Apache, and Comanche nations (Braatz 2007, 16; Brooks 2002, 5; Dobyns and Euler 1976).

With the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo between the United States and Mexico in 1848, the Pais faced westward-bound immigrants, military expeditions, miners, trappers, and traders interested in the resources of this new territory of the United States. U.S. Army mapping explorations led by Capt. Lorenzo Sitgreaves in 1851 foreshadowed conquest. When Sitgreaves entered Pai lands to determine their amenability to a railroad, men from the Cerbat Mountain or Hualapai Mountain band shot his guide. Miners assisted Sitgreaves and his soldiers as they killed two dozen Pais in retaliation. Ensuing explorers, such as François Xavier Aubry in 1853 and Lt. Amiel W. Whipple in 1854, exacerbated this violence. In 1857, Lt. Joseph C. Ives, an engineer for the Department of War, entered Pai country to determine if a wagon road would suffice as a train route. While scouting through the region, Ives’ Mohave guide made reference to the Amat Whala Pa’a band of Pais, also known as the Hualapai Mountain people, who lived nearby. Ives misunderstood and thought Amat Whala Pa’a was the name for all Pais. When Ives submitted the Report: Colorado River of the West in 1861, he established the falsehood that the Anglicized term “Hualapai” applied to all Pai bands (Braatz 2002; Casebier 1980; Dobyns and Euler 1970, 1976; Goetzmann 1993).

These conflicts led to military intervention and facilitated settler colonialism, resistance to which marked the birth of Hualapai nationalism. In 1859 the Army established Fort Mohave at Beale’s crossing on the Colorado River, just west of Pai lands. Fort Mohave, situated along the trading routes connecting the Southwest to the nation, was the central command for western Arizona. The onset of the Civil War stalled the buildup at the fort, but the end of the War brought changes for the Southwest because it enabled the federal government to concentrate on
conquest and because ex-soldiers and civilians hoped to acquire land under the Homestead Act of 1862. Union troops established Fort Whipple outside of Prescott in 1863, and in 1864 territorial officials reached the outpost. Crews constructed a wagon road from Prescott to Fort Mohave, linking the capital with the Colorado River and the Gulf of California and the Pacific Ocean and steamboats carrying supplies traveling along the Colorado River landed at Hardyville, a port near Fort Mohave (Dobyns and Euler 1976, 31; Sheridan 1995; Wagoner 1974, 323).

During the mid-1860s, the region was quickly engulfed by racial violence, as recollected by Hualapais decades later. A member of the Whala Pa’a band, Auggie Smith was born at Walnut Creek (Tak Tadapa) in 1876. His father was Amutoo’ and was related to a Pai band “chief” named Leve Leve. During an interview with the Indian Claims Commission in the 1950s, Smith narrated the conquest as told to him by his father, “When the white people first came in, they came with soldiers, and they shot down every one of them... [T]his was the first time white men came. They came from the east killing from water to water until they came to this place. The white people did this.”

Echoing Smith’s story, another Hualapai recalled memories of his mother,

The first settlers came to Big Cane Springs [in the Big Sandy region to the south]. These first settlers were friendly, they don’t molest us very much. But finally other white families and white ranchers came and took over this whole valley, our gardens, our homes. We didn’t give this country up voluntarily. We were just overrun by white people taking up the springs, the grass, the gardens and all of this territory. We never gave up anything; these people just overran us.

In this landscape of uncertainty the military sought to concentrate northwestern Arizona Indians onto one reservation along the Colorado River. In 1864, Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the territory of Arizona, Charles Poston, met in La Paz, at the southern tip of the recently created Colorado River Indian Reservation, with hundreds of Native people from the region. Poston believed the proposal to concentrate the tribes on the single reservation was “the best both for the whites and the Indians” because the Indians would receive assistance with farming. The rejection of his proposal by the Hualapais marked one of the first disagreements in the era frequently known as “the Indian Wars.” Following Pais’ resistance to relocation, conflict increased after the killing of a
well-known Pai leader, Ana:sa. Anglos accused the Pais of retaliating for the death of Ana:sa by killing a prospector, so the population of Hardyville demanded vengeance, and the Army declared all Indians seventy miles east of the Colorado River subject to extermination. The final straw for the Pais was the murder of headman Wauba Yuma and his sons. Wauba Yuma’s murder and the fears of whites about an “Indian uprising” precipitated a violent cycle: non-Indians demanded soldiers to protect them; the Arizona Miner, a paper in Prescott, called for the extermination of all “hostiles” in the region; and Pais and Anglos repeatedly attacked each other (Braatz 2002, 87).

The result was a volley of bloodshed that lasted for half a decade. Pai leaders Schrum and Hitch Hitchi sought justice for the murder of Wauba Yuma, and Pai bands killed teamsters and miners near the Colorado River. Hardyville citizens killed two dozen Pai men and captured nineteen Pai women, and an Anglo posse joined fifty Mohaves in exterminating twenty-one Pais. During an attack on mail carriers, the Pais suffered nearly twenty casualties in a day-long fight. The anarchy brought five hundred troops from the Eighth U.S. Cavalry and Infantry in 1867, but Pai leaders continued defending their lands against settlers and the military. One such assault took place in the summer, when Schrum organized two hundred and fifty Pais and Southern Paiutes to attack the Camp Beale’s Spring mail station. In the wake of the assault the commandant of Fort Mohave reported that “the most hostile band is led by Chief Chesora [Schrum], the chief of the Hualapai Tribe.”

The beginning of the end of warfare came with the arrival of Colonel William Redwood Price in mid-1867 when he implemented a scorched earth policy against the Pai. He penetrated Pai territory, “driving and harassing” the “degenerate” Hualapais until they were “thoroughly whipped.” Writing to Maj. John P. Sherburne, Price recalled how “Genl Gregg and a party had come on to a rancheria, charged it, killing four Indians, Capturing a large lot of Buckskins, Furs, and food.” In letters to superiors he wrote about an excursion down Diamond Creek that resulted in killing nearly a dozen “Indians,” most likely members of the Milkweed or Peach Springs band. On 8 November 1867 a lieutenant under Price “surrounded and attacked a rancheria of Hualapai Indians . . . killing nineteen Indians, and capturing Sixteen Squaws and children” while they roasted agave. On 2 December he reported that a lieutenant “surprised a rancheria of Hualapais . . . killing three Indians and capturing four children and one horse, also destroying a large quantity of seed and Indian property,” while another detachment “destroyed two rancherias and a large
amount of property, captured one squaw, [and] killed one Indian.” January brought the same: an attack on a ranchería with nearly one hundred people led to the death of sixteen Pais and the capture of thirty, while another attack killed nearly twenty-five individuals. Overall, Price claimed to have killed over one hundred Pais and injured twice that many.

This relentless pursuit of Pai bands revealed two competing responses that framed the parameters of an incipient indigenous nationalism: those supporting Schrum and his resistance to the military, and those supporting Leve Leve, the Peace Chief, and his program of conciliation. After a year of negotiation, in 1869 leaders of the conciliatory Pai bands under Leve Leve signed an agreement to end hostilities and discuss settlement on a reservation. The problem with this “solution” was that the military wanted them to move to the Colorado River Indian Reservation. The bands maintained their resistance until the military began rounding up families for a forced removal to La Paz on the Colorado River Indian Reservation. When the military began what Hualapais now call the Long Walk to La Paz, in 1874, band members scattered across the region as the military corralled them near Camp Beale Springs in preparation for their march (Dobyns and Euler 1976).

Recreating the removal is difficult, but memories of survivors and stories passed down by ancestors provide a window onto a traumatic experience that shaped the national consciousness of the Hualapai. Kate Crozier, a boy during removal, remembered how “all Walapai Indians we skipped off, going down into Grand Canyon [to] get out of the way. So they left Beale Spring and gone into the Grand Canyon.” His group stayed there for “must have been two weeks,” until Captain Byrne convinced them to return to Beale’s Springs. A few days later Crozier and his family marched to La Paz. Bob Schrum, son of the Pai leader Schrum, survived the march as a child. Speaking in 1944, he recalled how “the young and very old Indians [were] unable to continue the march,” which ended two weeks later. Indian Honga, who was roughly seven years old when “the Indians were gathered up to go there,” recounted his memories of La Paz during an interview in 1943. Honga recalled: “My family got away with the other Indians belonging to the Pine Springs group and we went to the mountains.” Similarly, Koara, who was related to Jim Fielding, an important leader during the early twentieth century, recalled that he and his family ran into the Hualapai Mountains, using guns taken from the military. They remained in hiding for over a year. Estimates of the number of Pais relocated range from four to six hundred, but all accounts agree that dozens died in the removal.
Exodus, Space, and the Hualapai Reservation

Internment was a brutal reality that resulted in death for many, but precisely one year later Pai bands escaped and tried to return to their northern homelands and reconstitute themselves as a People. The year at La Paz allowed Anglo newcomers to take Hualapai land. Jane Huya, from the Big Sandy band, recalled her father’s attempt to return to land occupied by Anglos:

My father used to have a place down there before I was born. I saw that when I was old enough. They can't stay [at] that place without anything to eat, have to go out to mountain to hunt deer, antelope, Indian food. The white man come in and take them all away, the land—land down on the Sandy. I never heard about trading off the land to white man, or sell the land to white man. They came in themselves and took it away.  

Kate Crozier recalled events after La Paz: “The first settlers came to Big Cane Springs. These first settlers were friendly, they don’t molest us very much,” he said. By the late 1870s “other white families and white ranchers came and took over this whole valley, our gardens, our homes. We didn’t give this country up voluntarily. We were just overrun by white people taking up the springs, the grass, the gardens and all of this territory. We never gave up anything: these people just overran us.” Such stories were common for Hualapais in a post-La Paz era.  

Disputes over land and laws reflected confrontations over space as settler societies moved into Native territory, thus revealing the spatial terrain of Indigenous nations’ claims to sovereignty. Most accounts of expansion focus on battles and physical struggles, but European notions of land privileged private tenure and bureaucratic definitions of space, while the science of cartography facilitated conquest. Colonial settlement redefined Indigenous lands in terms that made sense to non-Natives: latitude and longitude, township, and block replaced Hualapai names for the land (Harris 2003, 22). Lands newly classified as public domain and private property were integrated into a new field of knowledge and a matrix of laws and symbols. Politicians and surveyors redefined Pai spaces as non-Indian territories and extracted aboriginal homelands from the reach of Native peoples by new maps, new modes of power, and the growth of a system that devalued Native territories and valued capitalist economies (Fisher 2001, 472; Said 1979, 2; Todorov 1999, 4; Whatmore 2002, 3).
The Pais did not fully lose contact with or knowledge of these lands as they crossed into and tried reclaiming them in ways that reflected their traditions and cultural maps. The Pais challenged colonial boundaries by denying charges of theft and “trespassing” on private property (Carson 2002, 773). When headmen Schrum, Little Captain, and Hualapai Charley met with Lt. H.L. Haskell in 1878, they questioned ranchers such as William Grounds, who claimed that Pais killed his cattle. Little Captain retorted that white thieves or Tonto Apaches killed the stock, and several whites admitted that they could not identify the thieves. A few even praised the work of Hualapai women in their homes, who “were of more good than harm to white people.” The condescension aside, the comment reflected the permeability of the legal borders demarcating Native land and private property and the flexibility of racial borders between Indian and white.

As exemplified by these interactions, the cultural geography of the region had begun to change as bands of Pais competed with non-Indians for access to space in northwestern Arizona. Pai lands witnessed the emergence of towns and “settlements” that were racialized but included interactions between Indian, Mexican, Anglo, Irish, African, and “white.” Non-Indians established these towns thinking that the lands were “vacant” and void of “civilization.” This view required “improvements” such as roads, barns, agriculture, water wells, branded cattle, and so on (Allen 2003). The Pais lived a different existence that involved seasonal migrations to specified places, light agriculture, rancherías, and hunting. This lifestyle left a lighter footprint on the land that many non-Indians failed to perceive or respect. New property rights and capitalist resource extraction created areas of contention as the Pais tried returning to familiar locations occupied by ranchers, miners, and small towns. Thus, conquest threatened to divest the Pais of their identity, but bands negotiated new relationships with each other as they faced a common set of experiences that contributed to an emerging discourse of national identity (Crum 1994; Hall 1992, 186; Hoxie 1997, 6; Iverson 2002).

The enclosure of aboriginal territory by Anglo property lines and the related loss of the Pais’ land base compelled Pai headmen to demand a reservation. This marked a turning point in Hualapai history because it signaled the preservation of a piece of their homelands, even though reservations conjured images of disease and poverty. Serious discussions about creating the reservation began in 1881 when Colonel Price, the main purveyor of violence against Pai bands, met with Pai headmen Schrum, Hualapai Charley, Soskourema, and Cowarrow. Pai leaders bor-
rowed from their service as Indian Scouts under the command of General George Crook and Colonel Wilcox, who in the mid-1870s promised them a reservation. After relatively little debate and surprising support from William Price to Wilcox, Wilcox issued General Order no. 16, reserving land for the tribe upon approval of the President.\(^{18}\)

The order was approved by President Chester A. Arthur in January 1883. Schrum, Charley, Soskourema, and Cowarrow supported the reservation on the Colorado River even though it did not seem promising for agriculture. This location contained good timber and its grazing lands and springs promised to support cattle ranching. The reservation included lands occupied by the Grass Springs, Milkweed Springs, Hackberry, Peach Springs, Pine Springs, and possibly the Cataract Canyon bands, but it excluded territories of the Red Rock, Clay Springs, Cerbat Mountain, Hualapai Mountain, Mahone Mountain, Big Sandy, and Juniper Mountain bands farther to the west and south. Finally, the executive order seemed to protect the bands’ land from the railway lurching westward.\(^{19}\)

The 997,000 acre Hualapai reservation affirmed Hualapais’ right to a portion of their homelands and recognized the territorial and political basis for their modern sovereignty, but it left a contradictory legacy for Pai identity. The Pais traditionally consisted of thirteen bands of extended families that did not recognize a centralized leadership. They lived in rancherías and migrated throughout the year to fixed destinations and seasonal homes. They spoke a common language and shared beliefs about the world, their origins, and their cultural landscape, but their identity remained rooted in the band, not a modern tribe. This decentralization shaped reactions to the reservation. Overlaying the reservation upon a few band territories and attaching the name “Hualapai” to it acknowledged spatial and symbolic boundaries that included and excluded some bands. This bureaucratic colonization of indigenous space overshadowed Pais’ use of band names and geographical monikers to describe themselves, racializing the Pais as a single group in the minds of non-Indians. Bands referred to themselves in traditional ways even as the new identity of “Hualapai,” tied to a reservation, altered their self-identification—for better or worse—as a modern nation. The common experiences of internment and escape also reconceptualized the Pais from dispersed bands to a people with a similar fate. The new reality, symbolized by the reservation and the separation of identities into “white” and “Indian” across the region, caused the similarities among Pais to overshadow ambivalence about the reservation and the decentralized structure of the bands (Campbell 2001, 549; McMillen 2007, 49).
These trends highlighted the tensions among band identities, racialization and the implications of coding the reservation as a Hualapai space. As noted previously, the term Hualapai came into usage when non-Indians garbled the name of the Amat Whala Pa’a band of Pais. Many bands did not identify with this misplaced term, but its repeated usage and its coupling with the reservation demonstrated the power of colonization to rename peoples along racial and spatial lines. By labeling the Pais as “Hualapaivs,” the Anglos enacted a symbolic colonization that facilitated the conquest of Indigenous peoples. Thus, the reservation revealed a double-edged sword: it served as a potential refuge within their traditional landscape, but it tied the bands to the signifier “Hualapai,” itself a byproduct of racialization (Frazier, Margai, and Tettey-Fio 2003; Jett 2001, 171).

“Being Hualapai” nonetheless had a literal and symbolic utility because the Indian Office marked the reservation as a protected space within the Pai cultural landscape and because the Pais themselves changed the meaning of that same reservation. In short, the reservation became a focal point for a collective national identity, a process that revealed the complexities of settler colonialism. Hualapai-ness became part of their layered identity as members of families and bands, as well as residents on the Hualapai reservation, itself a new spatial dimension to their changing identity. It weakened the localized identities of the Hualapai Mountain, Juniper Mountain, Red Rock, and Big Sandy bands, but they found solace knowing that the reservation met their practical need for water and situated them near their place of origin (Whatmore 2002). Hualapai leaders who struggled to protect the reservation hoped that it would help them maintain traditions and build a tribal economy. They also saw it as compensation for serving as scouts during the campaigns against the Apaches. For many, it was a spatial representation of their past and a marker of their survival. They hoped to fill it with new memories of a nascent nation.

A Modern Indian Nation: Cultural Legitimacy and the Politics of Memory

Hualapais entered modernity as they navigated the gaze of the state and grappled with racial hierarchies, colonial citizenship, and assimilation. Tied to Hualapais’ collision with modernity was an assault on the new reservation and their defense of that land with political institutions that reflected a quasi-nationalist hybridity reminiscent of anticolonial move-
ments worldwide. Two generations after President Arthur established the reservation, a new cadre of Indigenous leadership emerged in the early twentieth century in reaction to land allotment and claims by the Santa Fe Railway that it owned a third of reservation. Several Pai political organizations incorporated the rhetoric of tradition while harnessing the modern vocabulary of human rights and self-determination. They defended the rights of all Pais through a growing reliance on a collective identity situated somewhere between the constructs of Indigenous tribalism and nationhood (Hoxie 2001, 3; McMillen 2007, 12).

The political organizations were led by a small cohort of Pai men born after the Long Walk and internment at La Paz, who witnessed the uncertainties of life on the reservation and survived the traumas of boarding school. They spoke Hualapai and English and came of age when the United States entered the world stage as an imperial power. In 1918, Fred Mahone, a key figure in these movements, returned from military service and created the “Redmen Self Dependent of America” to promote self-government, control grazing rights, and oversee boarding school education. A related organization known as the Hualapai Welfare Committee in 1919 requested control over the tribal herd. In 1921, Mahone established the “American Wallapai and Supai Indian Association” to restore Indian land rights and challenge the “rules and regulations” imposed “like slaves” upon them by the Indian Bureau. In one of his numerous letters to federal officials, Mahone argued that the Hualapais had “the right to bring any matter before the state and Federal Court to justify any wrongful causes amongst the Wallapai Indians and others.” The proclamations of Mahone and the Association to protect “the Indians’ right of prior occupancy of the lands and waters” covered not only the reservation but all northwestern Arizona. Following this organic leadership, in 1925 the Hualapais in Kingman created a Welfare Committee to address group rights off the reservation (McMillen 2007, 13).

These bodies purportedly represented Pai bands in a centralized manner that reflected an increasingly common set of experiences that were crucial to the crafting of a national identity and history. Their political rhetoric was bolstered by the discourse and memories of older men who only spoke Hualapai and who had survived internment at La Paz. This provided the new leadership with an “authentic” foundation rooted in historical trauma and collective memory. Hybrid politics enabled these groups to attack the Bureau of Indian Affairs for mismanagement of lands and the Santa Fe Railway for its claim to one-third of the reservation.
Fred Mahone, when critiquing the BIA and renewed threats of allotment, observed, “we want freedom from the ‘restrictions or wardships’ under which Indians exist. We want all reservation land leases cancelled and leasees removed in our favor so that we may occupy the grazing land and use the waters upon it.” Mahone then defined self-determination: “We want to be as Americans are, free to develop our resources, as a community, and to hold as community property, our reservation land for . . . future generations. No separate allotments do we desire, but urge that the Executive Order of January 4, 1883 be enforced.”

By the late 1920s, the Hualapais, the Santa Fe Railway, and the Indian Bureau held different views of the situation in northwestern Arizona. The railway pressed its claim to Peach Springs and odd sections of grazing land totaling 350,000 acres, and in their support, the Indian Bureau believed that the Hualapais had to assimilate and ultimately forfeit the reservation. Yet the Hualapais viewed the land claims debate as a struggle over homelands that could materially and culturally sustain them. As evidence of this, ninety-seven male members signed a letter expressing their “desire to make this tract our everlasting home for ourselves and our future generations.” In 1927, tribal member Bob Schrum wrote to the Commissioner, “We are much disturbed about our land leased to cattlemen,” and in reference to the Railway, he affirmed that “we want to use our reservation from now on.” He concluded his letter with an insightful query: “There are Indians who wish to establish a home. But the agent objected, why?”

With the onset of the Great Depression and as the conflicts over land and water accelerated, the Hualapais became increasingly nationalistic as they tried to strengthen their claims to the reservation. They grasped the foundations of the Executive Order creating their reservation and reminded officials about their service against the Apaches and in World War One. They employed discourse about citizenship and Americanism, and recalled memories of racial violence, relocation, and internment. Much of their dissent rested on the belief that their struggles gave them a “charter,” or right, to redress of their grievances (Fowler 2002). Citing the relationship with the government and their aboriginal claims to the land, Hualapai leaders reminded officials that they wanted to decide their future on their terms. This confluence of history, resistance, and adaptation characterized Native leadership as communities incorporated Indigenous rights and nationalism in hybrid political responses to modernity.

The major source of Hualapai nationalism was a growing dispute over water from Peach Springs and the land claims case with the Santa
Fe Railway. Raising questions about aboriginal occupancy and the validity of federal railroad grants, the dispute tied up decisions about land use and residency because the Hualapais thought they might lose portions of the reservation. This uncertainty caused tribal members to remain off the reservation for nearly fifty years, but it facilitated Hualapai nationalism by uniting bands against a common threat. The challenge underlined their peoplehood by sharpening a nationalist agenda defined by “tradition” mixed with discourse on progress and a desire to maintain a reservation in their homelands (Alfred and Corntassel 2005; McMillen 2007, 92).

The hybrid leadership of young and vocal advocates backed by elder Hualapais fought a long and victorious battle against the Santa Fe Railway. They gained assistance from non-Indian attorneys Felix Cohen, Royal Marks, and Arthur Lazarus, and successfully employed oral histories and individual memories to prove that they had never relinquished reservation land to the Santa Fe. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the tribe in 1941, citing aboriginal occupancy and chastising the government for the taking of indigenous lands (McMillen 2007, 99). The most crucial part of the case as far as this chapter is concerned is the nationalist rhetoric employed by the Hualapais during the conflict. This rhetoric marked meetings between the Hualapais and the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs during the 1930s, and drew upon memories and discourse about the past as they defended resources that were crucial to building a foundation for future generations. In one meeting, Special Commissioner H.J. Hagerman told the Hualapais that the railway would more efficiently lease grazing land on the reservation, but Bob Schrum challenged the premise of the railroad and government: “We once had this whole country to ourselves, but were put on a small reservation by the Government, and the Railroad is now after this reservation. We lived here before the white men came into this country, therefore it is ours.” Kate Crozier added that “the reservation belonged to the Wallapai Indian tribe and was given to them as their own home and in recognition of their services to the government . . . under the President’s order of 1883.”

The discourse about space and history continued through the 1930s. In 1931, Fred Mahone sent a petition signed by more than seventy-five Hualapais and members of the local American Legion to President Herbert Hoover. Mahone’s letter contained provisions covering land and water issues as well as criticism of the system of leasing land to Anglo ranchers. True to form, he made grandiloquent statements in defense of his people: “All rights, privileges, and profits that have already accrued to the reservation in respect to any portion of the Colorado River, or may hereafter
accrue, shall inviolably be secure to the Walapai Tribe," and he ended with a desire to "confirm and preserve the Walapai’s moral right to the land" based on "the fact that their present home was a part of their ancient habitation which was guaranteed to them by the terms of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848." He defended the Hualapai tribe, not bands, using an anticolonial discourse and historical memory as his weapons.  

The government responded with more meetings and obfuscation. The Senate Committee on Indian Affairs convened again to discuss the land dispute with Assistant Commissioner of Indian Affairs J. Henry Scattergood and Senators Burton K. Wheeler and Carl Hayden. The committee first heard Fred Mahone, who went to the heart of the matter: “To begin with, this land belongs to the Walapai Indians in Arizona. . . . I protested against the leasing of the land or appraisal of this land because this land as our reservation itself was set aside by the United States Army officials in the early days.” Wheeler asked for evidence. Mahone replied by bringing in Jim Mahone, who survived La Paz and served as a scout against the Apaches. Jim Mahone claimed that President Arthur established the reservation as a reward for the Hualapai scouts and to protect the tribe, because “there were a lot of people all over the world, just like a bunch of worms, and . . . they [were] coming to crowd out the Indians.”  

Although non-Indians were indeed crowding out the Indians, the Hualapais were fighting the court case and moving to the reservation in unprecedented numbers. This migration to the reservation was fueled by projects sponsored by the Indian Division of the Civilian Conservation Corps, which provided jobs while they improved the range and infrastructure that enabled tribal members to live on the reservation. The convergence of a growing reservation population and the battle with the railway increased Hualapais’ attention to the interrelated concerns of governance, nation building, and community identity. Leaders observed that as families followed the men working on the conservation projects, they hoped to remain on the reservation because their options in Kingman had narrowed due to the Great Depression. Anti-Indian sentiment spiked with rising unemployment rates, and members from southern bands slowly believed that moving to this space represented their best chance for survival. Additionally, they remained concerned about the conflict over land and springs, but they expressed those fears not to band leaders as they traditionally would have, but to the leaders involved with the political organizations that emerged after World War One. Their appeals to new leaders indicated a willingness to embrace new forms of political identity, but it also pointed to the high stakes of their troubling situation. Who spoke for all bands when they lacked a history of centralized leadership?
In addition to “who,” the “how” of the matter was crucial. How would the Hualapais make decisions about their collective leadership? Would leaders from each band vote on a council? What about the bands that had been absorbed into other bands? How would political conflicts be resolved? And finally, how would the Hualapais react to Commissioner of Indian Affairs John Collier and his proposal to overhaul Native governments and economies through the Indian Reorganization Act? The concurrent Indian New Deal programs that encouraged movement to the reservation, the lawsuit with the Railway, and questions about political leadership made the 1930s a pivotal era in the history of Hualapai nation building (Philp 1981, 1999).

Movement to the reservation and the conflict with the Santa Fe Railway precipitated a turning point in Hualapai political history that led to the creation of an Indian Reorganization Act constitution and government. The constitutions were templates practically forced on Native peoples as part of the effort to reform relations with Indian communities via John Collier’s Indian New Deal. Whatever one argues about the governments, the process of voting on the constitutions was flawed because the Department of the Interior counted nonvotes as yes votes, in a move that was clearly antidemocratic. When the Hualapais “voted” on the constitution in 1937, they came out against what they believed was a foreign system imposed on them by the very same people that they had been fighting against. The Department of the Interior ignored the popular vote and counted nonvotes as yes-votes in favor of the constitution and reorganization. Thus, the Hualapai tribal council that was inaugurated in 1938–1939 lacked the support of most voting tribal members (Biolsi 1998; Deloria and Lytle 1998, 267).

The origins of the new government cast doubt on its cultural legitimacy at a time when band members needed strong leadership that could cope with the changing world around them. As they moved to the reservation in greater numbers, Hualapai families and bands nonetheless crafted a new political identity as a nation. Though not everyone embraced this conceptualization of themselves, the Hualapai nation was encoded in a new constitution and government that became an important marker of collective political identity. The new government could claim victory against the Railway, but convincing tribal members of the efficacy of the new Council was something entirely different (Biolsi 1998; Dobyns and Euler 1976, 82).

With the victory against the Santa Fe behind them, Hualapai leaders worked with other Native people during the post–World War Two era to oppose a new series of policies tied to termination and relocation.
Like the organizations before it, the Hualapai tribal council proclaimed to serve all Pai bands within a greater Hualapai discourse about a common ancestry, history, and landscape. The new government attracted many of the individuals from the older organizations, but it lacked cultural legitimacy because it emerged from a dubious process marred by majority rule (and a failed example of democracy) rather than consensus building. The council faced the nearly impossible challenge of retaining legitimacy when it was so closely tied to the Bureau of Indian Affairs, long a target of anger among tribal members (Deloria and Lytle 1984; Dobyns and Euler 1976, 86; Rosier 2001). 28

These doubts burdened the council during the 1940s, when it was tested by the policies of termination and relocation, and the associated establishment of the Indian Claims Commission. The federal government launched the Indian Claims Commission in 1946 to resolve hundreds of land claims cases that were moving through the court system. Congress hoped that after the ICC addressed these grievances it could begin a new era of Indian Affairs characterized by the liquidation of the reservations and the termination of “government to government” relations. The ICC was supposed to finalize the assimilation of Native Americans into the mainstream of society, but it unintentionally sparked a political movement in the opposite direction. The ICC enabled Native people to air their grievances, present stories of dispossession, and articulate their histories of trauma and violence. This process politicized many communities and raised their consciousness about how they had been treated in the past. Established to divest Indigenous communities of their land, the ICC fueled anticolonial sentiments against termination (Cowger 1999; Iverson and MacCannell 1999; Metcalf 2002; Philp 1999).

The Hualapais stood at the center of this historical moment because their land claims case played a pivotal role in the creation of the ICC, its decision to allow oral testimony as factual evidence, and the partnerships developed between anthropologists, lawyers, historians, and Native leaders. The Hualapais testified to the ICC about their aboriginal homelands and their claims to northwestern Arizona. The eldest tribal members revealed sacred sites, family territories, cultural landmarks, and cultural boundaries between themselves and other Native groups. They bore witness to violence, trauma, removal, internment, and the establishment of the reservation. They narrated stories of resistance and survival, fear and hopelessness (McMillen 2007).

Their stories are important for what they say about Indigenous peoples’ endurance of colonialism, but they contain an implicit connection between history, memory, space, and discourse that was central to
the evolution of their national identity. The transcribed interviews and testimonies contain relatively few references to discrete or separate bands, while the majority of them refer to the “Hualapai” or the “Hualapai tribe.” The use of a term that had come into their lexicon fairly recently was employed by those testifying to refer to their ancestors in the past, when practically none of the latter would have embraced the notion of a collective Hualapai identity. Their use of the term might have been an expedient one based on the practicalities of speaking with non-Indians, but it raises the questions: Were the Hualapais unconsciously projecting this collective identity back onto the past and in doing so unintentionally recasting their historical memory as a unified “people?” Or, were they performing this unity because the ICC contained an antagonism toward decentralized social identities and favored hierarchical and unified forms of political organization? As the Hualapais repeatedly defended their lands and rights to non-Indians in colonial forums of judgment, they reshaped their own identities and histories in a more centralized and simplified manner (Iverson and MacCannell 1999, 117; Rosenthal 1990).

Rather than a contrived political notion of themselves, Hualapais’ articulations indicate the growing importance of the Hualapai nation that supplemented band and family identities. The Hualapai nation had coalesced, if in a halting and uneven fashion, during the 1950s in the midst of another assault on indigenous lands, cultures, and ways of life. This should come as no surprise considering the imperative that the Pai bands and families had collective interests to protect, even if that required their support of a tribal council that originated in the murky colonialism of the 1930s and the Indian New Deal. In short, perhaps the most important conclusion from their testimony to the ICC is simply the ubiquity of a unified history and sense of place, rather than the reasons for that discourse. The Hualapais consciously or unconsciously projected a collective memory because they wanted to defend their land in a colonial court, and because they had increasingly come to see themselves as a unified people with a common past. It was in these contexts that the discourse of nationhood and nation building were most evident.

Conclusions: History, Memory, and the Hualapai Nation

Thirteen bands of extended families known as the Pais confronted colonialism and in the process recast themselves as a modern Indigenous nation. By the mid-twentieth century they tentatively embraced the notion
of a “Hualapai Indian nation” as a politically, legally, culturally, and geographically distinct people. The Hualapai nation was a product of trauma, dislocation, historical memory, political discourse, space, and ancestry (Eley and Suny 1996, 10). Contributing to this sense of unity was a narrative of Hualapai history that sometimes dominated the stories that the bands told of themselves. Historical consciousness is an important ingredient to national identity. All nations tell stories about themselves, even if they use a language of essentialism that is less than “accurate.” Sometimes they employ stories that simplify the past and deny contingency, indeterminacy, and varied perspectives. Nations use narratives to explain who they are, demarcate their boundaries, and then define who is inside or outside the history of their nation, so they can claim political legitimacy or resolve controversy (Kramer 1997, 527).

As the Hualapai nation developed over the twentieth century, its members created a “metanarrative” as both a cause and a consequence of collisions with colonialism. This narrative held the Hualapais together as a people even as it silenced the complex stories of bands and families. This general history states that the Hualapais—not bands of Pais—originated from Spirit Mountain and lived on the Colorado River until several events caused them to leave their place of origin. The Hualapais and the ancestors of the Mohaves, Navajos, Hopis, and others migrated across the region and established themselves on the Colorado Plateau. They lived amid a six million-acre landscape and exploited a diverse range of topographical features and flora and fauna. Their worlds were turned upside down as Americans brought violence in the 1850s and were responsible for the Hualapai Wars in the 1860s, followed by the Long Walk and the escape from La Paz. When the Hualapais demanded a reservation on the Colorado River in 1883, they entered the “modern” era. Although elders today remember histories of their families and bands, most Hualapais embrace this general narrative, especially when in conversation with non-Indians. It appears in official materials and exemplifies the seamlessness of many national histories. The narrative ties bands of people into a unified entity called the Hualapais, which some project into the past as if it had always existed. It explains the connections between bands, highlights their survival in the face of aggression, and ultimately places the Hualapais on their present reservation. Its conclusion in the creation of the Hualapais as a people makes it a presentist rendering that explains the connections between history and the contemporary era.

There is nothing wrong with this version of Hualapai history. It brings the Hualapais together in the tribal collective imagination and
accommodates various histories that may merge into the Hualapai meta-
narrative. It requires important events and themes to make it compre-
hensible while remaining flexible enough for the Hualapais to incorporate
new ideas into the storyline. Events such as the Hualapai Wars, the Long
Walk to La Paz, and the escape a year later stand as foundational histori-
cal pivot points for both the Hualapai people and their notion of what
history means. The pre-Hualapai War era barely qualifies as “history”:
that category is reserved for the period beginning in the early 1860s and
going up to the creation of the reservation. The time before the Hualapai
Wars is referred to as “a long time ago” or “before whites came” or simply
“before La Paz.” The Pai past becomes “history” at the precise moment
when violence and invasion disturbed the indigenous landscape, an ironic
point considering the violence done to Native people by the Western
profession of history itself (Biolsi 2005, 243).
This narrative has played a powerful role in setting a basis for how
the Hualapais think about who they are as a people, even though the unity
expressed in the metanarrative did not always exist. Some of the most
important events of their history include pre-Indian Reorganization Act
leadership, which revealed differences between various leaders and bands.
Off-reservation communities offered diverse responses to colonialism and
strained the ability of the Hualapai leadership to present a united front to
BIA officials and Arizona politicians. They challenged the narrative that
tied Hualapai historical identity to the reservation. Yet their decentralized
responses were common to bands that saw themselves as independent
from others, even when nationalist leaders such as Fred Mahone advo-
cated for “all Hualapais.” Cultural schisms, changing gender roles, and
bands that refused to move to the reservation strained the cohesive power
of the metanarrative of Hualapai history.
As these historical tributaries reveal, the Hualapai past is a dialogue
open to interpretation and critique. Just as it is nearly impossible to sepa-
rare the metanarrative as a construct from subsidiary band and family
histories, it is difficult to isolate a moment when the Hualapai became
a nation. Neither the narrative reconstruction of Hualapai pasts nor the
construction of a nation is a linear process. The Hualapai past includes
moments of agreement and unity punctuated by dissonance and acrimony
in the narrative sense and their existence as a nation in various “pres-
ents.” Due to decentralized band identities, it has been difficult to draw
clear borders around the Hualapai nation and illuminate one common
history. I argue that the Hualapais engaged their past as they built their
future and used history in complex and surprising ways in the process of
self-definition and resistance. They employed it while confronting skeptical institutions such as the Indian Claims Commission, the Supreme Court, and the National Park Service. Thus, Hualapai national history has performed work that has been crucial to their land, culture, and identity.

In conclusion, Hualapai history has remained a crucial part of the cultural landscapes and indigenous geographies of the American Southwest. The Hualapais have reshaped traditional identities within a modern context and held onto a history that reflected their band identities, national adaptations, and dynamic interaction with colonial settler communities. Considering the trauma that has befallen them, the Hualapais continue to persevere. Political leaders are recalled and reelected a few years later. Their language suffered due to boarding school experiences, but students learn it in their classes, and people speak it on the reservation. Poverty persists, but the community adapts and finds new ways to survive—see the Grand Canyon Skywalk, for instance. Popular culture and the Internet compete with Hualapai ceremonials, but reggae music and basketball have enabled the youth to create social bonds, strengthen their sense of self-esteem, and find new ways of “being Hualapai.” Despite myriad social and economic problems, the Hualapais seek solutions to their own problems in ways that borrow from the surrounding world and yet are tailored to the realities, histories, and needs of The People.

Notes

1. Mahone to Albert B. Fall, Secretary of the Interior, 1 July 1921, Central Classified Files, Box 447, Part 1, Folder 34163-21-175—General Service, RG 75, NARA, Laguna Niguel.

2. Suwim Fielding, interview by Fannie Woodward, 10 July 1968, Peach Springs, Arizona, 8 (Doris Duke no. 464), American Indian History Project, Supported by Doris Duke, Western History Center, University of Utah, Salt Lake; Hinton and Watahomigie, 1984, 15; based on ethnographic and historical research, as well as interviews with Hualapais, Henry Dobyns and Robert Euler (1970, 1976) propose the following names for Pai bands: WiKawhata Pa’a (Red Rock People), H’a’Emete’ Pa’a (Cerbat Mountain), Amat Whala Pa’a (Walapai Mountain), Teki’aulva Pa’a (Lower Big Sandy), Ha’ Kiacha Pa’a (Mahone Mountain), Whala Kijapa Pa’a, (Juniper Mountain), Tanyika Ha’ Pa’a (Grass Springs), Ha’ Dooba Pa’a (Clay Springs), Kwagwe’ Pa’a (Hackberry Springs), He’l Pa’a (Milkweed Springs), Yi Kwat Pa’a (Peach Springs), Ha’ Kasa Pa’a (Pine Springs), and Havasooa Pa’a (Blue Green Water).

3. The political structure of the Pai bands was decentralized, and it lacked a single hierarchical leader. Rather, it included several leaders of different bands, as well as leaders (or chiefs) that dedicated themselves to peaceful and diplomatic
objectives while others focused on “military” necessities. Leve Leve (also spelled Levi Levi) was one of the leaders of a band, as well as a “chief” or “headman” who addressed issues of peace or diplomacy. Amatoo’ was probably the brother of Leve Leve. Dobyns, The Walapai Country, Section 10, The Whala Pa’a Band, 90.


5. Extract from the Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1864, in U.S. Congress, Senate, Walapai Papers, 33, hereafter cited as WP.


9. Price to Sherburne, 10 November 1867, Camp Willow Grove, Arizona Territory, NARA, Washington, D.C.

10. Price to Sherburne, 7 December 1867.


13. Indian Honga, interview, 6 April 1943, Peach Springs, Arizona, and Felix Cohen to Judge Richard H. Hanna, 17 April 1943, Field Service, Office of Indian Affairs, Land Division, Box 48-A, Folder, “U.S. vs. Santa Fe Railway” RG 75, NARA, Washington, D.C.

14. Deposition of Indian Koara, 17 February 1900, Hackberry, Arizona, Box 486, RG 123, NARA, Washington, D.C.

15. Affidavit of Jane Huya, 19 November 1927, Central Classified Files, Box 26, Folder 31229-23, Part 2 of 3, RG 75, NARA, Washington, D.C.

16. Kate Crozier, interview, 5 April 1943, Peach Springs, Arizona, and memorandum and documents from John Collier to Judge Richard S. Hanna, Box 48a, Folder “U.S. vs. Santa Fe Railway,” RG 75, NARA, Washington, D.C.


19. Executive Order Creating Hualapai (Walapai) Indian Reservation, Executive Mansion, 4 January 1883, signed by President Chester A. Arthur, WP; Dobyns and Euler, 1976, 62.
20. Light to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 29 June 1923; Fred Mahone, Jim Fielding, and “the Wallapai Indian Tribe,” to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 23 April 1923, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Box 11, Folder 30310-23, Truxton Canyon Agency 174.1, RG 75, NARA, Washington, D.C.

21. Fred Mahone, Jim Fielding, and “the Wallapai Indian Tribe,” to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 23 April 1923.

22. Bob Schrum, Philip Quasula, and Jim Fielding of the Walapai Tribe Committee to Hubert S. Works [sic], 17 January 1928, Central Classified Files, Box 26, Folder 31229-23, Truxton Canyon Agency 313, Part 2 of 2, RG 75, NARA, Washington, D.C.


26. WP, 242; Emergency Conservation Work Report, 1 November 1933, Hualapai Indian Reservation, Truxton Canyon Agency, Superintendent Guy Hobgood, and O.H. Schmocker, Camp Supervisor to Superintendent Hobgood, September 26, 1933, both in Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Central Classified Files, Indian Emergency Conservation Work, Box 41, Folder 341-8, RG 75, NARA, Laguna Niguel; Collins, 1999, 256; Indians at Work, 1 September 1935, 48.


28. Hualapai Tribal Council Minutes, 7 January 1939; Minutes, 2 November 1940.

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