INTRODUCTION

Here and There: The Subject in Space and Text

Talisman and Map

Toward the end of October 1830, an unnamed young man, having bet and lost his last coin on cards at the Palais Royal, enters a curiosity shop on the Left Bank to while away the hours until the evening, when he can throw himself in the Seine under cover of darkness. To his mild surprise, the dejected youth finds before him four galleries of astonishing antiquities encompassing all regions of the world and reaching back to the beginning of time. In a state of confusion between waking and dreaming, he practices a Cartesian philosophical doubt (“le doute philosophique recommandé par Descartes”) concerning these fantastic visions, reminding himself that magic does not happen in the Paris of the nineteenth century. Suddenly, there appears in the shop an ancient man, the antiquarian proprietor, who resembles either Moses or Mephistopheles. Mocking what he supposes to be the trivial torments afflicting the young man, he offers him both a general law of human nature and a Faustian bargain. The antiquarian’s philosophy juxtaposes on the one hand the two words Will (“VOULOIR”) and Power (“POUVOIR”) that sap the force out of life, and on the other Knowledge (“SAVOIR”), which lulls the mind into a perpetual calm. Between the deadening stillness of scholarly detachment and the fatal pursuit of sensual gratification, the old man encourages him to choose knowledge, as it affords the vicarious, “intuitive” pleasure of seeing. If the youth rejects his sage advice, a shagreen (“chagrin”) or talisman made from a wild ass’s skin will confer on its contractual owner the power to effect anything he wills. The talisman bears an inscription in an Eastern language promising to shrink in size with every wish granted, “even as thine own days” and is roughly the dimension of a “geographical map.”
So begins Honoré de Balzac’s 1831 novel *La Peau de chagrin*. Of course, the unknown young man (“l’inconnu”) accepts the bargain with the talisman only to die at the end of the novel, and the reader’s knowledge of Parisian society and human nature grows as the magic skin shrinks with every wish fulfilled. I would like to argue that the talisman functions as both text and map of the unknown subject, the “inconnu” whose story, the reader is often reminded, could belong to anyone. He acquires an identity and a name, the impossibly fanciful Raphaël de Valentin, but only after he accepts the contract, when he leaves the shop and encounters some friends on their way to a gala. The morning after, the third-person novel becomes a fictional autobiography as Raphaël recounts in flashback the woes that led him to contemplate suicide. As if in a lucid dream, exactly like the “Cartesian” one he experienced at the start of the novel, Raphaël can see, not all of human history and geography as he did in the shop, but his entire life spread out before him in the distance:

> Je ne sais en vérité s’il ne faut pas attribuer aux fumées du vin et du punch l’espèce de lucidité qui me permet d’embrasser en un instant toute ma vie comme un même tableau où les figures, les couleurs, les ombres, les lumières, les demi-teintes sont fidèlement rendues. . . . Vue à distance, ma vie est comme rétrécie par un phénomène moral.  

Instead of the wine or a “moral phenomenon,” Raphaël might attribute his heightened awareness, his ability to see his whole life framed in the space of a painting or contracted in the distance, to his new “skin” that is from now on bound to his fate. The talisman, later in the novel explicitly compared to a map, is a simple atlas that represents time spatially; Raphaël counts with horror the dwindling years, days, and minutes remaining in his life by carefully tracing the skin on the wall and accurately measuring the gap between the line and the talisman that expands with every desire realized. Just as Raphaël and the magic skin share a mysterious and inextricable bond as geography to map, their contractual union is inscribed as text into flesh: inspecting the talisman in the shop, Raphaël attempts to cut away a slice of the magic skin to see how the text was engraved, but the lettering reappears, as if materializing Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s words in his *Confessions, intus et in cute* (“inside and under the skin”).

Balzac’s *La Peau de chagrin* allegorizes the transubstantiation by which any subject can be inscribed in the space of a text. Like Descartes, whose anonymous doubter must first doubt his own material existence before proclaiming the metaphysical and universal “cogito,” and like Marcel
Proust’s nameless narrator, who floats amid various bedrooms of his past before landing in the bedroom of the present and the beginning of his narrative, Balzac’s unknown young man, on the verge of suicide, finds himself outside of space and time ready to abandon himself to the unknown of a text. His suicide by drowning exchanged for the certain death of the self in a text, his initial anonymity replaced by the universal “I” of a narrative that refers to anyone. Raphaël de Valentin signs a contract of dubious value. To write oneself as text, to enter into narrative language is to lose the connection with the material world. Fighting for his life, attempting to abolish all desires from his mind, Raphaël imposes an absolute, prescribed order on his new mansion, where he no longer has to engage with the world. He reserves his concern only for the magic skin, the map of his life, which shrinks in inverse proportion to the expanding novel recording the details of his agony. After the analeptic, autobiographical middle section of the novel, Raphaël’s story returns to the third person; the slow contraction of the skin, the world surrounding him, and his life can only be witnessed from the outside. The allure of the talisman lies here, in the illusion of a text upon which can be engraved an image of one’s entire life from birth to death.

The question of the subject’s relation to space and text has been at the center of French thought for at least the last several hundred years. From Renaissance cosmography to poststructural critiques of cyberspace, French thinkers conceive of power in spatial terms. The constructions and contradictions of the modern subject were formed before the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. The founding text of the Cartesian moment and of the modern conception of subjectivity, the Discours de la méthode takes the ambiguous form of a spiritual journey of a man who discovers a scientific method and epistemology but who eventually does away with the spiritual in favor of the rational—the mirror image of the journey taken by Raphaël de Valentin. René Descartes’s project is purposefully oxymoronic: an anonymous autobiography that creates a universal model for subjectivity. The narrating je (“I”) is divided into at least two modes; the first je, autobiographical and personal, prepares the way for the second je, which is metaphysical and universal. The care taken in the employment of the two rhetorical voices is designed to guide and control the understanding of the reading public. The autobiographical voice announces itself as if it were writing a fictional text: “[Je ne propose] cet écrit que comme une histoire, ou, si vous l’aimez mieux que comme une fable” (Discours, 49–50) (“[I only propose] this text as a story, or, if you prefer, as a fable”). This is the “fable” of a man who searches for truth in
all of the traditional methods: letters, science, travel, and war. But instead of finding a certainty for truth in any of these ways of learning, instead of finding his own Being, he fears losing himself in illusion (after one has traveled too long “on devient enfin étranger en son propre pays”—“one becomes in the end a stranger in one’s own homeland”; Discours, 52). The autobiographical voice prepares the way for the metaphysical voice by demonstrating its own incapacity for finding the truth and establishing the negation of knowledge not derived from reason. The autobiographical voice creates an itinerary of salvation, a pilgrim’s progress, where the self can be lost; the metaphysical voice draws a perspectival map for the foundation of subjectivity.

Descartes recounts in the first four sections of his Discours the studies of his youth, his travels, his doubts concerning scholasticism, and finally the fateful night when he feigns that he has no past, no body, no perceptions. All that remains is the fact that he doubts and thinks. The moment of doubt, and the creation of a universal subject, is a moment of fiction that depends upon the feigned negation of time (both past and future) and of body:

> Je pensais qu’il fallait que . . . je rejetasse comme absolument faux tout ce en quoi je pourrais imaginer le moindre doute . . . je voulus supposer qu’il n’y avait aucune chose qui fut telle qu’ils nous la font imaginer . . . je me résolus de feindre que toutes choses qui m’étaient jamais entrées en l’esprit n’étaient non plus vraies que les illusions de mes songes . . . que je n’avais aucun corps et qu’il n’y avait aucun monde ni aucun lieu où je fusse. . . .” (Discours, 98–101)

From the moment of doubt, which is a moment of fiction, he establishes consciousness, then being, and finally God in an ontological proof in the tradition of Saint Anselm. He constantly moves between the use of fiction and the counterfactual mode (indicated by the imperfect subjunctive) and a condemnation of imagination and the unconscious. Descartes incessantly worries throughout the text about publication, about losing possession of his theory, of his self. He claims that no one has ever understood or ever will understand his method, but he wants the Discours to provide a model: his discovery is unique and personal, but reveals the centrality of reason and its universal effect. The paradox of an inimitable yet rational model pervades the Discours through the mapping of textual space. In The Self-Made Map, Tom Conley has argued that Descartes’s is a cartographic text. Descartes’s famous affirmation of planned cities by rational engineers and architects also applies to the planned writing of the
text and more generally to the planned invention of subjectivity (Conley, 289–91). The single, mathematical perspective of the architect configures the city in the same way that the authority of the author configures the text and its future readers:

The cartographic subtext implies that the space that the author is describing is available to anyone and everyone, like a regional projection, but that a regional projection is also conceived according to the laws of monocular perspective. An all-powerful author needs to be placed at the vanishing point of a city-view redesigned by mechanical or artificial means. (Conley, 291–92)

In the unsigned and anonymous Discours, Descartes inscribes himself at the vanishing point of his cartographic text (Conley, 298). He is a new subject reborn from maps, “René Descartes.” Cartesian metaphysics relies on a suspension between an autobiographical and a fictive mode in order to present a theory of a unified, universal subject, which is nonetheless dependent upon the perspective of an author mapped onto the spaces of a text. Descartes’s vision of a universally applicable method and a rational subject relies on the fiction of a “novel map,” a textual projection fusing the subject with its object of study.

As if in response to Descartes’s intuition that his universal experience of the cogito may not be repeatable, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, at the other end of the Enlightenment, developed in his Confessions a theory and praxis of an intensely personal autobiography, of a unique style and character. The originality of Rousseau’s enterprise is that it places at the center of hundreds of pages of text the history of one individual—it makes the self into a subject worthy of investigation. Previous forms of autobiography, memoirs, journals, and conversion stories sought to elucidate a truth beyond a single person, whereas autobiography since Rousseau shifts the emphasis of discourse to the uniqueness of the individual (Lejeune, L’Autobiographie en France, 15–16).

Rousseau can place himself at the center of the Confessions, as the subject of significant attention, because he believes himself to be unique and different from others. He affirms that he is not better or worse, simply different. He does not even claim that he knows all of the truth about his past. What matters is not the subject’s privileged perspective with regard to an absolute objective truth (as in Descartes), but rather the sincerity of feeling, the affirmation of individuality, what makes one subject different from another. As opposed to Descartes’s universalizing cogito of negation and thought, Rousseau creates a personal cogito of sentiment
("Je sentis avant de penser: c'est le sort commun de l'humanité"—"I felt before thinking: this is the common fate of humanity," *Les Confessions*, 36). Rousseau’s project exceeds a simple avowal of his own originality, for he offers his autobiography as a tool for others to know themselves. The *Confessions* will not just create Rousseau as a textual subject open to the scrutiny of readers, but will transform its readers into individuals, into subjects of the study of feeling. If Descartes attempted to mold his readers into rational practitioners of the method for which he is the only model, Rousseau proposes to make his autobiography the basis for any subsequent understanding of the self by means of antirational feeling.

Rousseau’s argument that his innate difference (his individuality) and original enterprise (his autobiographical text) constitute the basis for any future knowledge of the self relies on the assertion that his autobiography provides the reader with adequate knowledge of Rousseau through an accurate representation of himself. The text that presents such a unique subject must itself be unique. In the *Confessions*, Rousseau conflates his book with himself even further, ultimately revealing the autobiographical simulacrum that equates the autobiographical subject with the textual subject: “Si la nature a bien ou mal fait de briser le moule dans lequel elle m’a jeté, c’est ce dont on ne peut juger qu’après m’avoir lu” (*Les Confessions*, 33) ("If nature was right or wrong to break the mold in which she formed me, only after having read me can one judge"). To read the *Confessions* is to read Rousseau, and yet if nature broke the mold used to cast Jean-Jacques, the text can only be a forged copy of the original. Rousseau’s autobiographical subject simultaneously follows at least two textual models, that of a religious confession in the style of Augustine, and that of Rousseau’s own previous novels and *discours*. Jean-Jacques is the man of nature who received the kind of education that he would later promote in *Émile* and yet who was later corrupted by society. The well-known “conversion” scene in book 8 (structurally similar to Augustine’s conversion scene) reveals the stakes of textuality when Rousseau reads the subject for the Académie de Dijon prize and enters the world of letters. His decision to write and enter the public sphere is both a fall from the state of nature and the revelation of the positive and transformative power of writing. Rousseau’s conversion as a born-again man of letters, and by extension his rebirth as text in the *Confessions*, risks corrupting his nature, erasing his original difference, through the contamination of (inter)textuality. But once the “fall” has happened, the only cure, the only way to correct one’s ways, is to control the power of textuality by using it to serve the individual.
While Descartes and Rousseau provide the models for a theoretical and textual subjectivity, the historically determined discourses of space and time in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries influenced the experience of subjectivity and served as catalysts for the transformation of the subject. Rousseau’s focus on the individual subject was adopted by the universalizing and centralizing project of the French Revolution. As Michel Foucault has famously theorized in *Surveiller et punir*, starting in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the state and other institutions assumed the role of producing and controlling individuals through education, discipline, and surveillance. The promise of freedom gained through self-consciousness dreamt by the Enlightenment was now transformed into a method of normalizing, classifying, and organizing the subjects of the State. The overarching metaphor for the new surveillance society, according to Foucault, was Jeremy Bentham’s late eighteenth-century invention, the panopticon: a mechanism that organizes human beings into individuals who interiorize the power of surveillance, each one of whom becomes “le principe de son propre assujettissement” (“the principle or beginning of his own subjection”; *Surveiller et punir*, 236). The exterior space of surveillance is now converted into the interior space of the subject.

At the turn of the last century, Henri Bergson in *Matière et mémoire* and *L’Évolution créatrice* criticized the spatialization of thought, of time, which sought to measure time as if it were space. Spatial time, present in the spatial metaphors of language and in the idea of homogenous time, prevents us from perceiving time’s true nature as duration, as well as the creative processes of life or “l’élan vital.” But Bergson’s rejection of spatial quantity over temporal quality tended to neglect art forms, such as cinema and even literature, that combine the spatial and the temporal to visualize an image of time emerging from space. Rebelling against the sway held over French thought by Bergson at the beginning of the twentieth century, phenomenological thinkers from the middle of the twentieth century such as Gaston Bachelard (*La Poétique de l’espace*) or Georges Poulet (*L’Espace proustien*) sought to describe the effects of space on a conscious mind, as revealed most clearly in literary works. Whereas Bergson insisted on the role of intuition over analysis, Bachelard proposes a “topo-analysis” in which the intrinsic qualities of specific types of places (essentially interior spaces such as houses) are analyzed in relation to their power to create poetic images (both representations of the real and unreal inventions). Bachelard’s treatment of the transformation of space as image in a literary text risks simplifying the ever-changing relation between writing subject and textual space to a series of recurring topoi.
With structuralism and what became known as poststructuralism in the United States, space became not just the object of thought but its subject; space can be conceived of as what structures thought and subjectivity once philosophy turns its attention away from consciousness. Claude Lévi-Strauss’s rearrangeable “mythèmes,” Pierre Bourdieu’s “habitus,” and Foucault’s “panopticon” describe social phenomena in spatial terms even as their own thought relies on spatial metaphors. What might distinguish poststructuralists from structuralists is a certain self-awareness of the (spatial) patterns of thought. The philosopher turned writer of texts, in drawing a diagram of power relations at a given time, also invents alternative structures of thought and action: as Gilles Deleuze writes, ventriloquizing Foucault, “écrire, c’est lutter, résister; écrire, c’est devenir; écrire, c’est cartographier, ‘je suis un cartographe . . .’” (Deleuze, *Foucault*, 51) (“to write is to fight, to resist; to write is to become; to write is to draw up maps, ‘I am a cartographer . . .’”).

While structures express a subjectivity determined by space, the origin of the structure along with its blind spots and internal breaks cannot be known. The obsession with spatial structures inevitably leads to the search for an image beyond space where new spaces and new subjects can emerge: either the negation of space, utopias (Louis Marin’s *Utopiques*) and nonspaces (Marc Augé’s *Non-lieux*), or the invention of other places, Foucault’s “heterotopias” or Michel de Certeau’s subversive (narrative) practice of space. Reality itself becomes a “simulacrum” for Jean Baudrillard, and for Paul Virilio the increased speed of information and transportation shrinks space faster than Raphaël de Valentin’s shagreen, to the point where all movement stops.

To paraphrase Jacques Derrida in “Le Signe, la structure, et le jeu dans le discours des sciences humaines,” the subject of space at the center of French thought blocks the play it opens up and makes possible (*L’Écriture et la différence*, 409). Whether the subject is completely determined by spatial structures or it is an ideological burden to be discarded, scientifically quantifiable or an Enlightenment illusion, theories of subjectivity either dissolve or normalize the relationship between the subject’s constituent parts—self and nonself. On either extreme, theoretical formulations of subjectivity tend to obscure possibilities for individual transformation through a restructuring of subjectivity.

Just as theories of subjectivity provide an important but limited understanding of the spatial subject in literature, in a similar way, the empirical discipline of geography, or geographical information science (GIS), can offer tools that illuminate a particular real place at different specific moments in history, which may usefully be compared to the places repre-
sent in a text. As Stanley Fish suggests in his *New York Times* review of the collected volume *GeoHumanities* (edited by the geographers Michael Dear, Jim Ketchum, and Douglas Richardson and the English professor Sarah Luria), a hybrid, interdisciplinary approach such as “geohumanities” represents the breakdown of the distinction between empirical and interpretive discourses. But if Fish can assert that “interpretive methods and perspectives are necessary to the practice of geography” and that the humanities “have been busily moving into, even colonizing” geography and other disciplines, the converse must be approached with caution, since geography as an empirical, quantitative discipline necessarily reduces time to space. As Edward L. Ayers writes in one of the volume’s central articles, “Mapping Time,” the metaphor of the layering function so crucial to the mapped time of GIS “is a useful fiction, since it reminds us of the structural depth of time and experience” (Dear, *GeoHumanities*, 223). Mapped time is a fiction useful for geographers to understand their own interpretive strategies, but the literary scholar, already dealing with fictional maps and texts, must not conflate the metaphors used by empirical disciplines with actual quantifiable evidence. Whether the current interest in digital humanities, the sociological approach of Pierre Bourdieu’s mapping of the character Frédéric Moreau in *Les Règles de l’art*, or Franco Moretti’s call for a textless literary criticism in *Graphs, Maps, Trees*, quantifiable approaches supplement and supplant the fictional maps of the text with maps of the critic’s own invention. One empirically based fiction, that of a contemporary scholar, covers that of another, the literary text.

While theoretical concepts provide insights on particular strategies deployed to write the self in the space of a text and empirical analysis can offer a glimpse of how space changes across time, literature alone conveys the experience of abandonment to language from the inside, the defiance of an individual who realigns spatial boundaries to imagine a new world and new subjects.

**The Novel Map**

The literary and cultural contexts in nineteenth-century France reconfigured both the ways literature could represent subjects and also the ways subjects related to space. This period saw the emergence of autobiography in the wake of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s *Confessions* and the rise of the novel as the dominant literary genre. First-person works occupying the space between the two genres of autobiography and novel show that
the act of writing the self unsettles the linguistic and representational stability of the subject while also providing the self with the freedom to redefine the subject.

At the same time as the literary field was transforming itself, the physical space of nineteenth-century France was radically altered. The Revolution of 1789 rationalized the division of national space, drawing up départements around natural landmarks. The Cassini and États-Majors maps from the beginning of the nineteenth century gave the most detailed representation of geographical space available in the world. Space itself was both “compressed” by the rapid development of transportation technologies such as the railroad and homogenized and abstracted by the state’s centralization, as David Harvey has argued. The “production of space” by capitalism, according to Henri Lefebvre, disrupts the subject’s relationship to space when space becomes “pulverized” as it is parceled out and sold. This pulverized and commodified space destroys the connection not only between places but also between subject and place, connections that can be repaired through the fictional maps found in first-person texts.

The division and abstraction of space for the production of homogenous subjects requires the concomitant division and abstraction of time. The nineteenth century was obsessed with theories of history, genealogy, evolution, and progress, all of which are various ways to measure and analyze the course of time. Alongside this theoretical abstraction of time, the nineteenth century witnessed the progressive introduction of standardized time through rail schedules, optical and electrical telegraphs, and the eventual adoption at the end of the century of Greenwich Mean Time (Kern, The Culture of Time and Space, 11–15). Chronological, homogenous time has the same effect on the subject as pulverized, homogenous space: a shock experience that alienates the subject from the past and prevents the assimilation of time into lived experience. Personal time and memories become isolated from the march of standard time and history. The romantic notion of being born too late, the decadent belief in the end of civilization and the degeneration of the race, and even Taine’s critical trio of “race, milieu, moment” all attest to the experience of being subject to a time outside of the subject’s control. The dominant literary movements of the second half of the nineteenth century (from the decadents to the naturalists) incorporated the shock of time and the acceptance of fatalism into their aesthetic. The bulk of scientific thinking before Einstein accepted the atomistic nature of time (Kern, 20–21).

The double context, literary and cultural, in which the novel map emerged necessitates a reading that is attuned both to the specific liter-
ariness of the text (the subject as represented by language) and the text’s materiality as a map. By looking at the maps drawn in the manuscripts of Stendhal’s *Vie de Henry Brulard* (1835), Nerval’s “Généalogie fantastique” (1843), *Sylvie* (1853), and *Aurélia* (1855), and Zola’s *dossiers préparatoires* for his Rougon-Macquart series (1871–93), I argue that the maps present in these works serve as emblems that indicate the subject’s unstable position between a visual and concrete representation in a map and a readable and abstract representation in narrative. Similarly, in Sand’s novel *Nanon* (1871) and in Proust’s *À la recherche du temps perdu* (1913–27), I show how the novel and the narrating self are structured around maps outside of the text: Nanon learns to read and memorize the complex Cassini maps to navigate the routes of France, while Marcel intuits the geographical and social space of Combray and Paris as a function of his family walks on “Swann’s Way” and “the Guermantes Way.”

From Stendhal’s illustrations of the events in Grenoble during the French Revolution to Sand’s tale of a young peasant girl whose explorations through revolutionary France allow her to cross the social and economic boundaries of her humble origins, from Zola’s detailed account of Haussmann’s transformation of Paris to Proust’s description of the society circles during the Dreyfus Affair, the mapping of space in the nineteenth-century novel sets the parameters of political action and defines the limits of interaction between subjects.

Far from being a death sentence (magic shagreens notwithstanding, an inevitable fate for us all), Raphaël’s talisman affords new possibilities of conceptualizing the self in time and space—as a subject of space. The talisman is a “novel map,” a term I use in this book to refer to any device in a narrative text that simulates a holistic image of the self occupying multiple times and multiple spaces. The novel map inscribes the writing subject in the spaces of the text, placing the subject simultaneously in the fictional world of the narrative, in the material world of the reader as a graphic representation on a page, and in the real-world spaces, such as Paris, referred to in the map-novel. For the geographer and historian of cartography Christian Jacob, all maps present the contradiction of materiality and representation: “[La carte] est un mélange problématique, où la transparence de l’illusion référentielle coexiste avec l’opacité d’un support qui matérialise cette image” (*L’Empire des cartes*, 41) (“[A map] is a problematic mixture, where the transparency of a referential illusion coexists with the opacity of a medium that materializes this image”). The “referential illusion”—the idea that the “here” of a map is identical to a distant “there” of another space—must coexist with the graphic
representation of space, a simple X which stands in for a singular place. Like the cartographic simulacrum which maintains the “referential illusion,” the autobiographical simulacrum, as defined by Louis Marin, simulates the (present) presence of the author in a past narrative creating the seamless illusion of an autobiographical subject. Yet just as the different types of textual spaces coexist without ever becoming strictly identical, the subject of these spaces is always only represented and never present. The multiplicity of spatial representations of the self, both readable and visible, that attempt to situate the subject in the text only serve to emphasize its absence. The novel map, a simulacrum representing an imaginary totality beyond time and space, can only exist in a work of fiction; Raphaël’s talisman works by magic.

In what follows, I show how the novel map, this fictional representation of the self as subject of space, structures first-person narratives in nineteenth-century French fiction. Taking as exemplary the works of Stendhal, Gérard de Nerval, George Sand, Émile Zola, and Marcel Proust, I study how the inscription of a subject into a fictional text occurs through a superposition of the visual representations of space found in maps with the linguistic representations of space in written narrative; the resulting textual play intensifies the experience of space and unsettles the boundaries between subjects and places.

I broadly define the subject as a construct that determines the interactions between a conscious self and its others (the world, the body, the past, or other subjects). There is, however, an uncertainty principle of subjectivity, since the only way to comprehend or measure the subject (that is, from the perspective of a conscious self or from that of its objective other) modifies the relationship between the self and its outside, and so any attempt to grasp subjectivity consequently changes its very nature. The narrative subject that emerges from the human subject’s transcription into text constitutes a new web of connections (between author and text) that both reproduces the original structure of the subject (conscious self and other) and complicates this original structure exponentially. The writing act is inherently transformative, as the writer produces both a reflection of the self and an object that is other than this self. The text creates simultaneously the author as subject and a textual subject that is different from the author. The authorial subject and the textual or novel subject become superimposed and, at times, indistinguishable from one another. The literary work that results is a hybrid text caught between the contradictory genres of truthful autobiography and fictional novel. The play of these contradictions, the textuality of the literary text, allows the subject to alternate between a state of dissolution in the text (where
the novel subject is lost in the plurality of meaning) and one of actual-ization outside the text (where a new, “real” autobiographical subject is constructed).

Textuality creates the possibility for the subject’s self-transformation. The novel maps the subject and thereby draws the boundaries between self and nonself. As the lines that delineate the subject shift, they alter the relation the self has with its other. The textual space reconfigures the subject’s place in society, erasing social barriers and redistributing what Jacques Rancière calls the “partage du sensible” (“distribution of the perceptible”). The interior space of disciplinary surveillance is folded outward and projected onto the exterior, mapped space of the text. These mapped spaces of the text contribute to the suspension of form and matter found in all art, since maps represent both the space outside the text and also participate in the text’s system of signs. The novel map ensures that the texts cannot be read definitively as either autobiographies or as novels, since either mode of reading would privilege only one aspect of the dual nature of cartography as material object and representational construct.

**The Subject of Space**

In the first part of my book, “Stendhal’s Privilege,” I show how Stendhal, in his ambiguous work *Vie de Henry Brulard*, lays the theoretical foundation for the novel map along with an exaggerated anxiety of the loss of the self to the play of the text. The first chapter reads Stendhal’s text as a work that combines novel, autobiography, and cartography. Through a variety of techniques, especially the use of maps, emblems, and drawings, Stendhal’s text plays with the differences between the author (whose real name was Henri Beyle), the narrator, and the character (Henry Brulard). The second chapter returns to the first image of Stendhal’s text, where he introduces another cartographic representation, a bird’s-eye view of Rome, which allows him to see his own past, present, and future in a novel map. Nevertheless, the narrator professes that the act of writing and of drawing erases memory and being, which leads him abruptly to terminate the narrative only eighteen years into the “life” of Brulard. I contend that Beyle/Brulard prematurely closes the narrative in order to maintain the suspension between Beyle and Brulard, authorial and novel subject.

In the second part, “Nerval Beyond Narrative,” the work of Gérard de Nerval breaches the border so ardently defended by Stendhal between
Introduction

author and subject, real and textual space, leading inevitably to madness. Nerval’s novel maps provide the cure to his narrative illness. In chapter 3, I demonstrate how Gérard de Nerval’s writing of a travel narrative, the *Voyage en Orient*, creates simultaneously the space of the “Orient” as text and the textual subject that travels through it. Nerval’s desire to restart his literary career, to rewrite himself as sane, leads him to orient himself through his inscription in Oriental space. Nerval’s narrator is able to pass himself off as “oriental” by the appropriation of foreign languages and customs, and by the introduction of three rewritten oriental myths. Chapter 4 analyzes Nerval’s “Généalogie fantastique,” *Sylvie*, and *Aurélia* to show how the spatial metaphor of the fold, as theorized by Gilles Deleuze in *Le Pli*, inscribes the subject in the world. In *Sylvie* space folds in on itself, isolating the narrator in his own illusions; in *Aurélia* space is opened up and now contains multiple times and perspectives which allow the narrator to embrace others and the flux of time.

The third part, “Sand’s Utopian Subjects,” examines George Sand’s first signed novel, *Indiana* (1832), and one of her last novels, *Nanon* (1871). Sand’s novels, I argue, figure the double bind of women’s textual subjectivity, since their fictional works were received by critics as inevitably autobiographical and their autobiographical works as inherently distorted. The play between truthful fiction and a fantasized autobiography along with the inscription of real places into the language of a text did not offer women a liberating escape from the traditional structure of subjectivity, since they did not enjoy the same status of subject as their male counterparts. Instead, Sand places novel maps, utopias of her literary imagination, into her realistic texts, inventing a new world out of the old. In Sand’s first signed novel *Indiana* (chapter 5), the unstable movement of meaning in a text and of places in the city pose a mortal danger to the eponymous character’s sense of self. Only the improbable utopian ending in the Île Bourbon renews identity and language for both Indiana and the male narrator. *Nanon* (chapter 6), Sand’s last great novel, is a first-person account of the French Revolution by a peasant woman who learns to read the Cassini maps of France as she builds her own agrarian utopia in the center of France. In the blank spaces of history, Sand writes the story of a young woman who builds her own community in the blank spaces of a map.

Part IV, “Branching Off: Genealogy and Map in the *Rougon-Macquart,*” reads the preparatory notes for Émile Zola’s *The Rougon-Macquart*, a novel series that studies the moral and genetic decadence of Napoleon III’s Second Empire by following the trajectories of two branches of one family. Zola displaces traditional representation, especially the visual, in the
form of the preparatory notes for his novels. The thousands of pages of Zola’s notes contain countless sketches, diagrams, maps, and lists of observations that attempt to convey a one-to-one correspondence between objects and linguistic representation. Focusing on the hand-drawn map of the “Aire Saint-Mittre” which opens the preparatory notes for the *Fortune des Rougon* and serves as the site for the origin of the novel series, I show in chapter 7 how in the passage from note to novel, visual representation and authorial autonomy are sacrificed in favor of the freedom of verbal expression. In chapter 8, I analyze the “archive fever” present throughout the novel series as a symptom of anxiety about the origins of the novel in the dossiers manifested in the novels’ narrative. Zola’s novel map, the Rougon-Macquart genealogical tree, hides and supplants the missing origin, serving as both the beginning and the ending of the novel cycle.

The final part, “Proust’s Double Text,” argues that Marcel Proust’s monumental novel *À la recherche du temps perdu* at the beginning of the twentieth century incorporates the nineteenth-century novel maps of his predecessors as the very structure of his novel. The novel subject, Proust’s anonymous narrator, exists only at the confluence of two differing texts, the novel about space written by Proust and the novel of time announced by the narrator. Chapter 9 describes how the division of space in Proust’s novel into two “Ways” imposes a law of place and a law of immutable signs. As the narrator wanders through the places of the text, he slowly learns how to decipher signs and eventually discovers the arbitrary nature of the text’s cartographic system, just as the reader perceives the text’s semiotic system. Chapter 10 reads Proust’s novel as if it were the book about time its narrator claims to write at the end of the text since time, as duration, is represented within the novel about space by means of metaphor, movement, and the cycle of narration itself.