Notes

Introduction

1. “Dasein” is the term Heidegger uses to refer to the beings that we are—a term that is meant to avoid the conceptual baggage affiliated with terms such as “subject,” “self,” or “consciousness.” It will be used throughout the book to designate the self as Heidegger conceives it.

2. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: State University of New York Press, 1996). Heidegger’s critiques of such a Cartesian view of consciousness can be found throughout Being and Time. See, for example: 60, 61, 62, 136, 137, 146, 162, 204, 205, 206, 273, 288, 289. The German text is Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2001). Further citations of Being and Time will be given in the text and referenced as BT, with the German pagination cited first, followed by the English translation’s pagination. Attributing such a picture of the self to Descartes does not entirely do him justice, however, since Descartes’s system relies on the presence of something other than the self—namely, God—in order to “get the world back” so to speak. Nevertheless, Descartes’s work powerfully influenced the distinctively modern shift toward emphasizing the independent, individual notion of the self, and in this regard, he is taken as a representative figure. For a particularly illuminating discussion of Heidegger’s critique of Cartesianism, see Matthew Shockey, “Heidegger’s Descartes and Heidegger’s Cartesianism,” European Journal of Philosophy 20, no. 1 (2012). The relationship between the two figures is also examined in John Richardson, Existential Epistemology: A Heideggerian Critique of the Cartesian Project (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).

3. See, for example, Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, trans. Dorion Cairns (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1999). Such approaches, Heidegger notes, start “by imagining an Ego in a purely Cartesian sense—an Ego given by itself in the first instance who then feels his way into the other—thus discovering that the other is a human being as well in the sense of an alter Ego. Nevertheless, this is a pure fabrication.” Martin Heidegger, The Zollikon Seminars (1959–1969), trans. Franz Mayr and Richard Askay, ed. Medard Boss (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 2001), 111. Further citations of this work will be given in the text and referenced as ZS.

4. Indeed, as Stephen Mulhall shows, such approaches tend to beg the question insofar as “the similarity that legitimates the inductive inference . . .
turns out to be the similarity that it is supposed to demonstrate.” Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Heidegger and “Being and Time” (New York: Routledge, 2005), 63.


6. Though typically translated as “anxiety,” the original German word Angst will be used throughout the text in an effort to distinguish it from the contemporary psychological usage of the term “anxiety” as interchangeable with “worry.” Such a usage is at odds with the existential dread and sense of uprootedness that Heidegger is designating with the term. Further discussion of Angst can be found in chapter 7.

7. Dominique Janicaud, “The Question of Subjectivity in Heidegger’s Being and Time,” in Deconstructive Subjectivities, ed. Simon Critchley and Peter Dews (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 54. Janicaud points out that Heidegger’s critique of subjectivity in Being and Time tends toward caricature insofar as it presents subjectivity as “a reified, narcissistic, high-strung ego that repeats: ‘I, I’” and “fashions thereby a custom-made foil” (54). As Janicaud rightly notes, Kant, Hegel, and Husserl would “all agree with Heidegger’s criticism, in the end to enhance it, in the very name of a subjectivity given back its depth.”

8. In “Heidegger’s Descartes and Heidegger’s Cartesianism,” Matthew Shockey shows that Heidegger’s anti-Cartesianism is in fact a methodological critique of Descartes’s inability to analyze the very subjectivity that Heidegger himself took to be Descartes’s greatest discovery.

9. Some may object that the use of later texts such as The Zollikon Seminars is inconsistent with Heidegger’s so-called turn. Though it is impossible to make the case for it here, it is my belief that such a break between the early and the later Heidegger is not so definitive as commentators make it out to be.

Chapter 1

1. See especially BT Division One, chap. 6, section 43.

2. Thus when Heidegger compares Dasein to Leibniz’s concept of the “windowless monad” he claims that they are windowless “not because they do not need to go out, rather because they are essentially already outside.” Martin Heidegger, Einleitung in die Philosophie (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1996), 144. Translation found in Jean Greisch, “The ‘Play of Transcendence’ and the Question of Ethics,” in Heidegger and Practical Philosophy, ed. François Raffoul and David Pettigrew (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), 105.


4. Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hof-
stadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 298. Further citations of this work will be given in the text and referenced as BPP.

5. Heidegger’s dissatisfaction with his ability to capture this quality in language affected him throughout his writing life. In his later work he moved increasingly away from this type of language toward more symbolic, poetic formulations. The danger, however, is that such formulations are so novel that the reader is given no sense of what the phenomenon is to which Heidegger is attempting to refer. Heidegger’s early work, I believe, most clearly indicates what other philosophical approaches were attempting to express while simultaneously distancing itself from their flaws.

6. For Heidegger’s account of care, see in particular BT Division One, chap. 6, sections 41 and 42. As Theodore Kisiel notes in The Genesis of Heidegger’s “Being & Time” (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 201, Heidegger’s use of the term “care” derives from the Latin cura, which he translates early on as “Bekümmerung (distress, concern, the trouble of search)” by drawing on “a Latin etymological tradition which relates cura to quaero, seeking, and its concomitant tribulation or anxiety.” Thus “care” includes the sense that the self matters to itself—a point to be examined further in the discussion of mineness in chapter 2.

7. As Jean Greisch puts it in “The ‘Play of Transcendence’ and the Question of Ethics,” Heidegger “accuses all philosophies of consciousness and reflection (including Husserlian phenomenology) with simultaneously under- and over-determining the essence of subjectivity. The underdetermination is that the self-founding and self-determining autonomous subject of modernity does not require the other in order to achieve its self-understanding. At least on the level of understanding, it has enough in itself. The over-determination is that the lacking relation to the other must be compensated for, (i.e., overcompensated for) through a theory of intersubjectivity, or more modern still, of ‘communication’” (104).

8. For example, Heidegger shows in BPP 140–54 why he believes Kant’s notion of the I to be fundamentally Cartesian—that is, substantial.


11. This is evident as early as the fifth Logical Investigation, in which intentionality is characterized as placing the subject in a relation with objects that are not reel constituents of consciousness but transcendent to it. See Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, trans. J. N. Findlay, ed. Dermot Moran (New York: Routledge, 2001). The later Husserl moves increasingly in the direction of the self’s worldliness, as we see, for example, in Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, trans. David Carr (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1970).
Further citations of this work will be given in the text and notes and referenced as *Crisis*. For a discussion of this development, see Donn Welton, *The Other Husserl*, particularly “Cartesian Enclosures” (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000).

12. See Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: First Book*, trans. F. Kersten (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1998). Further citations of this work will be given in the text and notes and referenced as *Ideas I*. Husserl claims that through my intentional orientation “this world is not there for me simply as a world of mere things but, in the same immediacy, as a world of values, a world of goods, a practical world” (*Ideas I*, 50). Husserl’s approach, as Donn Welton puts it, is to “treat . . . subjectivity and world as equiprimordial moments . . . to understand subjectivity as a co-originary correlative feature of what is meant by horizon” (*The Other Husserl*, 96). Further discussion of this issue can be found in Felix O’Murchadha, “Reduction, Externalism and Immanence in Husserl and Heidegger,” *Synthese* 160 (2008).

13. Heidegger makes this statement in the context of explaining Max Scheler’s position as a positive though insufficient move away from the traditional, substantive view of subjectivity. Insofar as Heidegger approves of Scheler’s move away from “psychical” to intentional interpretations of personhood, this statement can be taken as representative of Heidegger’s view, though this is not to imply that he unqualifiedly accepts Scheler’s position; on the contrary, Heidegger feels that Scheler’s view fails insofar as it does not analyze what this “carrying out” of intentional acts must be.

14. For further discussion, see Dermot Moran, “Heidegger’s Critique of Husserl’s and Brentano’s Accounts of Intentionality,” *Inquiry* 43, no. 1 (2000).


18. As we have already noted, the “primacy of the practical” is evident in many of Husserl’s analyses of the lived body. It is also a major theme in his efforts to demonstrate the pragmatic foundations of the theoretical—see *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), for example, where Husserl demonstrates the practical basis of many theoretical modes of intentionality.

19. Sheehan demonstrates that the late Heidegger’s term *Ereignis* derives from *sich ereignen*, the primary meaning of which is “to come into view, to appear, to be brought forth and revealed”—an event that should not be thematized as some kind of one-time metaphysical happening, then, but as the very condition of being open to the self-showing that is enacted and analyzed in phenomenology. Thomas Sheehan, “A Paradigm Shift in Heidegger Research,” *Continental Philosophy Review* 32, no. 2 (2001): 15.


23. This tendency is evident, for example, in perhaps the best-known account of Heidegger’s theory of being-with: Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural, trans. Robert Richardson and Anne O’Byrne (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2000). There Nancy reaches metaphysical conclusions about the nature of reality that are not substantiated through phenomenological analyses. Thus he claims, for example, that “there is no other meaning than the meaning of circulation. But this circulation goes in all directions at once, in all the directions of all the space-times [les espace-temps] opened by presence to presence: all things, all beings, all entities, everything past and future, alive, dead, inanimate, stones, plants, nails, gods” (ibid., 3). But claims about the “circulation” characterizing the relationship to “gods” and “the future”—let alone rocks and the dead—are extremely problematic philosophically, as are claims about the nature of Being as “indissociably individual and collective” (ibid., 49). Though Nancy gestures toward the phenomenologist’s demand that one avoid metaphysical presuppositions—“the primordial requirement of ontology or first philosophy must now be that Being not be presupposed in any way or in any respect”—in the very next paragraph he simply asserts that “existence exists in the plural, singularly plural” (ibid., 56). Even if this claim is true, Nancy provides no phenomenological grounding for accepting it. He seems to believe that this claim—and many others like it—is justified by the mere fact that it is the reversal of the traditional monist view. But in the absence of phenomenological grounding in any kind of first-person Evidenz, we have little reason to accept Nancy’s claims about the nature of Being itself or its relationship to rocks, nails, or gods.

J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper and Row, 1968). Further citations of this work will be given in the text and referenced as WCT.

25. One strand of Heidegger interpretation dismisses such claims as still too mired in the (misguided) philosophical tradition. Heidegger came to reject demands for this kind of traditional philosophical grounding, they argue, because he was committed to uncovering “a ‘more originary essence’ than essence . . . a more fundamental foundation” than could be recognized on accepted paradigms of truth-telling. Rodolphe Gasché, “Tuned to Accord: On Heidegger’s Concept of Truth,” in Heidegger Toward the Turn: Essays on the Work of the 1930’s, ed. James Risser (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 41. In other words, Heidegger’s shift to the “happening of Being” undermines traditional philosophical methodology. See also Walter Brogan, “Da-sein and the Leap of Being,” in Companion to Heidegger’s “Contributions to Philosophy,” ed. Charles E. Scott et al. Even if we accept claims about the need to transform philosophical methodology, however, the inquiry dedicated to uncovering this “fundamental foundation” still must be governed by norms of adequacy—else we have no way of assessing when the inquiry goes astray. For Heidegger—both early and late—these norms include some reference to the first-person *Evidenz* of the thinker. Here too there are those who disagree, however—claiming, in essence, that philosophical reflection need not be governed by any norm for assessing the appropriateness of the response (i.e., its truth): “The best experiences with Contributions happen when readers feel no requirement to agree or disagree but feel a drawing allowance to encounter Heidegger in the process of his thought with as much thoughtful intensity as they can stand. I believe it is the quality of the engagement that counts, not agreements.” Charles Scott, “Introduction: Approaching Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy and Its Companion,” in Companion to Heidegger’s “Contributions to Philosophy,” ed. Charles E. Scott et al., 4. But without the norm of truth, one’s ruminations are not philosophy, however pleasant or “intense” the experience.


27. Phenomenology avoids traditional skeptical questions—including the problem of other minds—because its project is one of analyzing how existence claims show up as meaningful within experience, not one of proving that something does or does not exist. Thus the task of the *Epoché* is to bracket the existence claims characteristic of the natural attitude in order to uncover their structure, not to prove their legitimacy. As Husserl notes in the *Crisis*: “The point is not to secure objectivity but to understand it” (§55, 189). Through the shift in attitude brought about by the *Epoché*, Husserl is able to distinguish between beings and the manner in which they become manifest. This distinction can of course be understood as a precursor to Heidegger’s ontological difference, according to which the difference between beings and Being is recognized. It is therefore false to claim—as many readers of Heidegger do—that for Husserl “the phenomena of phenomenology are beings (Seienden)” (Morrison, “Husserl and Heidegger: The Parting of the Ways,” 50). Rather, for Husserl the phenomena of phenomenology are the *how of manifestation* of beings—not beings themselves.

28. Steven Crowell, “Does the Husserl/Heidegger Feud Rest on a Mistake?

29. Ibid., 134–35.


32. The classic Heideggerian example being the hammer, whose intelligibility as a hammer relies on its location in a web of equipment that is ultimately grounded in my particular ways to be in the world—as a carpenter, for example, or as one who dwells sheltered from the elements. See *Being and Time*’s Division One, section 15.

33. It is this “subjective” quality of meaning that prompted the later Heidegger to doubt the adequacy of his earlier philosophical efforts. Jeff Malpas traces the development from the subjectivity-tinged “meaning of being” to the Dasein-independent “truth of being” in *Heidegger’s Topology*, especially chapter 4. Well-known accounts of the nature of this “turn” in Heidegger’s thought include William J. Richardson’s *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003); and Otto Pöggeler’s *Martin Heidegger’s Path of Thinking* (New York: Humanity Books, 1994). However, as Thomas Sheehan points out, this shift cannot mean that Being alone simply takes center stage and Dasein becomes merely secondary. Despite the popularity of this narrative, this would mean that philosophy engages in a kind of “‘Big Being’ story and hypostasize[s] das Sichentziehende into Being Itsel[f] in its absential mode (the ‘Lethe’) and then have It (whatever ‘It’ is) do the withdrawing, the opening-of-the-open, and the giving-of-being. But this would only be metaphysics in its most banal and vulgar form, the destruction of everything Heidegger stood for” (Sheehan, “A Paradigm Shift in Heidegger Research,” 16–17). In contrast to this approach, we must come to an understanding of Dasein that genuinely acknowledges its receptive and thrown qualities—not simply its agency and self-assertion—instead of fixating on some mystical notion of Being. In Sheehan’s words: “What Heidegger is expressing in both the earlier language of *Geworfenheit* and the later language of *Ereignis* is that being-open is the ineluctable condition of our essence, not an occasional accomplishment of our wills” (ibid., 12).


36. Heidegger, *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, 84–85. Translation by Greisch,
“The ‘Play of Transcendence’ and the Question of Ethics,” 101. Greisch notes there that because of this profoundly social feature of being, solitude is a deficient state for human beings: “For this reason can solitary confinement in an isolation cell be perceived as a heightened punitive measure” (“The Play of Transcendence,” 103).


Chapter 2


3. There are, however, pathological cases in which this is not true. For an interesting account of the schizophrenic’s loss of his sense of the mineness of his experiences, see Dan Zahavi, *Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005), 74–77.


7. For a critique of this view, see John Drummond, “The Case(s) of (Self-) Awareness,” in *Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness*, ed. Uriah Kriegel and Kenneth Williford (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006).

8. I cannot do justice to the range and complexity of the analytic debates on these issues, but here my purpose is simply to indicate how Heidegger’s general orientation toward such issues differs from prevailing tendencies. As Donald Davidson describes it in “Knowing One’s Own Mind,” in *Mind and Cognition: A Reader*, ed. William Lycan (Malden, Mass: Blackwell, 1999), the general tendency is to view the mind as “a theater in which the conscious self watches a
passing show [which] consists of ‘appearances,’ sense data, qualia, what is given in experience” (392). The difficulty with this picture is not only how to account for the relationship between the “inside” and the “outside” but also how to “locate the self” when it “seems on the one hand to include theater, stage, actors, and audience; [and] on the other hand, what is known and registered pertains to the audience alone” (ibid.). The solution, Davidson argues—much as Heidegger does—is to free ourselves “from the assumption that thoughts must have mysterious objects” (ibid., 394). To be first-personally self-present is not to grasp certain “inner” objects as if they were external objects, but to relate to external objects in a particular way. For a general introduction to analytic approaches to these issues, see the anthology in which Davidson’s article can be found: Mind and Cognition: A Reader.


11. Recently the “self-representational” model has attempted to overcome these difficulties by arguing that a mental state is conscious if it represents itself in the correct manner. Conscious states are conscious by being simultaneously represented and representing in the right way. See Kriegel and Williford, eds., Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. Though this seems a step in the right direction, it nevertheless continues to use the language of self-representation, which seems to maintain the inappropriate subject/object model for understanding first-person self-givenness. For a more thorough discussion of the difficulties with such approaches, see the work of Dan Zahavi, especially Self-Awareness and Alterity: A Phenomenological Investigation (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1999).

12. In the language of many discussions of intentionality, Heidegger is interested in what makes us the types of beings that have intrinsic intentionality; for Heidegger, not only are such secondarily intentional things like signs derivative of our way of being, but so too are our own particular intentional acts. For an excellent discussion of the intrinsic/derivative debate, see John Haugeland, “Understanding: Dennett and Searle,” in Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998).


14. Even in the case of sheer observation—in which one cannot be taken to be engaged in trying to succeed at an action—the experience is normatively
governed insofar as experiencing the thing as meaningful requires us to understand it as an “x” or a “y,” and taking something as something in this way requires standards that allow one to determine whether it is in fact an x or a y in this instance. It also requires norms governing what counts as a normal instance of seeing, as Husserl makes clear throughout his corpus, especially in the analyses of perception found in *Ideas II*.

15. The authors note that they take this definition from Donald Davidson.


17. Ibid., 263.

18. Ibid., 264.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid., 265.

21. Ibid., 267 (emphasis mine).


25. Ibid., 9.


27. Ibid., 294.

28. Strawson discusses this danger in “Real Intentionality,” where he argues that unless you’re willing to restrict intentionality not simply to “aboutness,” but also to the “experiential realm,” the only way you can distinguish such things as conscious human intention, a robot’s purposive behavior, and a plant’s environmental responsiveness is through a “certain zoomorphic prejudice” (296).


30. Ibid., 11.

31. Ibid.

32. In keeping with this position, Strawson has argued that, contrary to popular interpretations in analytic philosophy, though intentionality entails aboutness, not all aboutness entails intentionality, but only that aboutness which is “a matter of cognitive EQ content” (“Real Intentionality,” 306)—which he takes to be the first-person, “experiential qualitative” or “what-it’s-likeness” of experience (ibid., 289). In this regard I agree with Strawson’s argument, though I believe that his cut-off point for what counts as EQ content should not and need not be so cognitive, and expanding what counts as “EQ” need not commit us to the realm of “intentional thermometers” (ibid., 296).

33. This is not to imply that this is sufficient for explaining the capacity for first-person self-givenness. Like Husserl, I believe that a complete account would require an analysis of the lived body and internal time consciousness (Heidegger’s version of which we will consider in the coming chapters). For Husserl’s
analyses of internal time consciousness, see On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, trans. John Barnett Brough (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1991). For his analyses of the Leib/ Körper distinction, see Ideas II and Cartesian Meditations. As Thomas Metzinger puts it, “phenomenal subjectivity . . . amounts to the fact that under standard conditions the dynamics of conscious experience unfolds in a space that is centered on a singular, temporally extended experiential self” (“The Subjectivity of Subjective Experience: A Representationalist Analysis of First-Person Perspective,” in Neural Correlates of Consciousness, ed. Thomas Metzinger [Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000], 289). Heidegger’s account is unique, however, in its recognition that such conditions are not sufficient for first-personal self-presence: rather, Dasein’s care for who it will be is the basis for all comportments in which the self is given to itself.

34. This care-based structure of our everyday self-presence is particularly evident when contrasted with schizophrenic cases. One young patient describes the distortion of the first-personal nature of her experiences in the following way: “I am more and more losing contact with my environment and with myself. Instead of taking an interest in what goes on and caring about what happens with my illness, I am all the time losing emotional contact with everything including myself. What remains is only an abstract knowledge of what goes on around me and of the internal happenings in myself.” Zahavi, Subjectivity and Selfhood, 74.


36. Ibid.

37. Ibid., 31


42. According to Kisiel and von Hermann, talk of reflection or theory misrepresents Heidegger’s project insofar as Heidegger accepts Natorp’s criticism of the necessarily distorting quality of reflection. See Paul Natorp, Allgemeine Psychologie nach kritischer Methode (Tübingen, 1912). In response, they claim, Heidegger develops a hermeneutic alternative which rejects the methodological use of reflection and seeks to base phenomenology on an a-theoretical, non-objectifying, and non-reflective form of understanding instead. See Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger’s “Being & Time,” 47, 376; and Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, Hermeneutic and Reflexion (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000), 23. But contrary to this view, Heidegger took phenomenological reflection
and its method—formal indication—to enable a kind of non-objectifying reflection that makes the intentional structures of life available to explicit conceptual grasping. I am especially indebted to Matthew Burch’s discussion of these issues in “The Existential Sources of Phenomenology.” See also Dan Zahavi, “How to Investigate Subjectivity: Natorp and Heidegger on Reflection,” *Continental Philosophy Review* 36 (2003).


44. For further discussion of the manner in which Dasein is the being that is ontological, see Iain Thomson, “Heidegger’s Perfectionist Philosophy of Education in *Being and Time,*” *Continental Philosophy Review* 37, no. 4 (2004).

Chapter 3

1. Simon Critchley, “Enigma Variations: An Interpretation of Heidegger’s *Sein und Zeit,*” *Ratio* 15, no. 2 (2002): 169, expresses this common view when he claims that according to Heidegger, “all relationality is rendered secondary because of the primacy of *Jemeinigkeit* [mineness].”


5. Schroeder, *Sartre and His Predecessors,* 147.

6. Nancy, *Being Singular Plural,* 50. All references in this section of the chapter will be to this work unless otherwise noted.

7. According to Nancy Bauer, Heidegger “conceives of our Being-with others, primordially, as a simple, if fateful ontological fact: the world of any single individual just is, inevitably and through and through, a world shared with others. And indeed, this fact creates at least as many philosophical problems as it solves” (“Being-With as Being-Against: Heidegger Meets Hegel in *The Second Sex,*” *Continental Philosophy Review* 34 [2001]: 141).

8. This claim to plurality can be contested, however—at least in the early Heidegger—since Dasein’s status as an ultimate for-the-sake-of-which unified in authenticity seems to undermine such plurality, as does *Being and Time*’s attempt to find the meaning of being in general. The later Heidegger seems to be more genuinely committed to an irreducible ontological pluralism (though not one from which Dasein’s contribution can be entirely separated, as Nancy would seem to have it). I am indebted to Iain Thomson for reminding me of this point. See chapter 1 of Thomson’s *Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

9. It is for this reason that we can recognize the enormous influence that Sartre had on Levinas—who not only criticizes Heidegger on similar grounds,
but adopts Sartre’s phenomenological starting point. For Levinas, as for Sartre, the other appears as such in terms of the self’s experience of its own freedom being called into question. In a particularly Levinasian turn of phrase, Sartre claims that the other appears as “a subject beyond my limit, as the one who limits me. In fact nothing can limit me except the Other” (BN 287). Levinas’s work is of course full of such claims. See especially Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 194–201.


14. To understand myself to be part of some universal group like “Humanity,” then, is an “abstract, unrealizable project of the for-itself toward an absolute totalization of itself and of all Others” (BN 547). The project is unrealizable because its very possibility depends on the look of an other who could encompass all of humanity: God or aliens or some other outside third party who unifies us. It is only in the eyes of the third party that I can experience myself as part of the “community of equivalence” (BN 541) characteristic of the public world.


16. In *Being and Nothingness* Sartre explains this project as the desire to be a god—simultaneously existing as fully self-aware consciousness and fully realized being. This “useless passion” is humanity’s “perpetual surpassing toward a coincidence with itself which is never given” (BN 139).

17. Sartre’s notion of conversion sounds remarkably Heideggerian at points. See especially Jean-Paul Sartre, *Notebook for an Ethics*, trans. David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 470–75. There he argues that in conversion one grasps oneself as having the burden of choosing who one will
be—a recognition that brings consciousness to “a new, ‘authentic,’ way of being oneself” (ibid., 474).


21. Ibid.


Chapter 4


3. Ibid., 240.

4. Christina Lafont argues this point in terms of the meaning-horizon established by language in *Heidegger, Language and World-Disclosure*, trans. Graham Harman (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Further citations of this work will be given in the text and referenced as *HLWD*.


10. Ibid., 196.


17. Carman argues that in Angst even occurrent entities are experienced through a kind of breakdown that reveals their strangeness and radical otherness, which demonstrates that Heidegger must be read as a variety of realist: “Anxiety thus reveals what Dasein always already understands about occurrent reality, namely, that it is radically, stubbornly, awesomely independent of us and our abilities, our fears, indeed the very conditions of our interpretations of things at large” (Heidegger’s Analytic, 195).


20. Ibid., 58, 58–59.

21. Ibid., 54

22. Ibid. Hubert Dreyfus and Charles Spinoza similarly argue that it is the conflict of incommensurable worlds that allows us to recognize that things exist independently of our interpretive or experiential frameworks (See “Coping with Things in Themselves: A Practice-Based Phenomenological Basis of Robust Realism,” Inquiry 42, no. 1 [1999]).


24. In Ethics and Finitude: Heideggerian Contributions to Moral Philosophy (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), Lawrence Hatab argues that the interruption of empathic engagement with others—an interruption that occurs in the deficient modes of Fürsorge (solicitude, the way of being towards other Dasein)—can be taken as analogous to the breakdown of Zuhandenheit that gives rise to Vorhandenheit. See 65–66, 143–45. However, despite his claim that “empathy could then serve as an existential exemplar, as a kind of measure for a significant range of ethical matters” (ibid., 145), he fails to offer an account of how this type of normal empathic “going-along-with” is to act as a normative constraint. We will return to this in chapter 6.

25. Theunissen, The Other, 181.
26. Ibid., 181.
27. Ibid., 182.
28. This claim is reminiscent of Paul Ricoeur’s critique of analytic thought experiments about the nature of selfhood—particularly in Derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons. Ricoeur argues that “what the puzzling cases render radically contingent is this corporeal and terrestrial condition which the hermeneutics of existence, underlying the notion of acting and suffering, takes to be insurmountable” (Oneself as Another, trans. Kathleen Blamey [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992], 150). In the case of being-with, what the “hermeneutics of existence” finds to be insurmountable is not the concrete fact of embodiment and rootedness on the Earth, but the concrete fact of encounters with individual others.

30. See Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger’s “Being & Time,” 135: “The ‘problem of facticity’ is not that of the transcendental determination of the individual out of ultimate logical laws. For the original facticity is not an absolute consciousness . . . but rather a primal reality ever to be experienced, the self in the actualization of life-experience . . . It is to be experienced not by taking cognizance of it, but by vital participation in it, being distressed by it, troubled and put out of ease, so that the troubled self who ‘minds’ or ‘cares’ is continually affected (betroffen) by this affliction.”

31. Lawrence Hatab makes a similar claim about concrete ethical terms: “I want to suggest a certain feedback loop between ethics and ontology, where ethical terms imply a situated involvement that keeps ontology in concrete existential territory, and where ontological terms drawn from, and pointing back to, ethical senses can ‘ontologize’ ethics in such a way as to surmount certain doubts, restrictions, or demotions that have been part of modern moral philosophy” (Ethics and Finitude, 80).

32. Ernst Tugendhat, Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1967), 165: “Husserl’s a priori itself holds absolutely, but only relative to the condition in question, which is not itself necessary” (translation mine, with thanks to Inga Römer).

33. See Husserl, Logical Investigations, sections 44–52. Klaus Hartmann, Studies in Foundational Philosophy (Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 1988), argues that phenomenology’s reliance on self-evidence in this regard is entirely unsatisfactory because “we do not know why, or on what grounds, thought holds of being. To claim self-evidence, and on various levels of constitution at that, does not really solve this overriding problem” (52). Hartmann does admit, however, that in the absence of a Hegelian-style approach, with Husserl’s phenomenology “what we have is much: a theory which tries to come as close as possible to wedding the quest for certainty to foundational, transcendental, and thus theoretical philosophy” (ibid.).

34. Martin Heidegger, Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, trans. Michael Heim (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 65. Further citations of this work will be given in the text and referenced as MFL.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
40. Tugendhat, *Der Wahrheitsbegriff*, 165. “According to Husserl, the a priori no longer holds directly for beings or objects of our experience in general, and so arises the possibility of an open plurality of modes of experience, each with its own a priori” (translation mine, with thanks to Inga Römer).
41. PIA 74. It is important to note here that Heidegger refuses to separate the ontic from the ontological not just in this instance but tout court, since doing so would invalidate his phenomenological method. I am grateful to Iain Thomson for urging me to make this clear.
42. Martin Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, trans. Richard Taft (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 18. Further citations of this work will be given in the text and referenced as *KPM*.
43. Note that, for Heidegger, such a total failure is also possible in the complete breakdown of the world’s meaning in *Angst*.
49. For a more detailed discussion of the extent and manner in which the unity of the form of intuition is itself intuitively given—and the “rather tortuous reading” of Kant that Heidegger engages in on this point, see Martin Weatherston, *Heidegger’s Interpretation of Kant: Categories, Imagination, and Temporality* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), 50–66.
50. Ibid., 55.

55. John Llewelyn, *The Middle Voice of Ecological Conscience* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1991), 87 (emphasis mine). Llewelyn notes that “Heidegger has problems avoiding an exaggeration of either the activity or the passivity in the attempt to describe this ‘relation’ which is neither just the one nor just the other” (ibid.). Insofar as he attempts to navigate such a middle ground, however, Llewelyn refuses to “follow Levinas in stressing as much as he does the place of practical power in the interpretation of Heidegger’s ontology” (ibid.), especially since Levinas himself suffers from a similar difficulty in exaggerating only one dimension of such a relation.


57. Ibid., 172.


Chapter 5


2. Steven Crowell, “Facticity and Transcendental Philosophy,” in *From Kant to Davidson: Philosophy and the Idea of the Transcendental*, ed. Jeff Malpas (New York: Routledge, 2002). Crowell notes that simply interpreting this temporal dimension of facticity as historicality has resulted in many narrativist conceptions of the Heideggerian subject, but the interpretation of *Gewesenheit* on which they rely—translating it as “having been”—“is misleading, since the term names something that is ‘not chronologically prior in any sense’ . . . *Gewesenheit* indicates not a tense but an *aspect*: the ‘*a priori* perfect’ . . . It is what I always already am” (114).

3. Interestingly, this objection has the same structure as Tugendhat’s critique of Heidegger’s notion of truth, which, as we mentioned above, argues that by defining truth as disclosure and jettisoning the claim that truth discloses the thing *as it is in itself*, what we mean by truth as a critical standard of evaluation is lost. According to Tugendhat, “Instead of broadening the specific concept of truth, Heidegger simply gave the word truth another meaning” (“Heidegger’s Idea of Truth,” 236).

4. See also *BPP* 269.

5. In *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, Heidegger notes that Henri Bergson first made such a distinction between “a derived and an original time” (*MFL* 203). Heidegger argues, however, that Bergson’s account fails because he “went too far and said that time, once emerged, is space. Bergson thereby blocked the way to the real understanding of derived time, since he, in principle, mistakes the essence of emergent time, insofar as he does not view as emergent the time that has emerged” (*MFL* 203). The consequence, Heidegger argues, is that Bergson’s
account theorizes having-been-ness as a kind of “accumulating dead weight I haul behind me and to which I could occasionally relate in one way or another” (MFL 206). By maintaining the continuously “emerging” quality of time, however, one can recognize that Dasein’s “having-been only ‘is,’ in each case, according to the mode of the temporalization of the future, and only in that temporalization” (MFL 206). Thus Heidegger rejects Bergson’s account because it remains within the confines of ancient views on time according to which time is “something present-at-hand, which is on hand somehow in the soul” (MFL 149). The accuracy of this presentation of Bergson’s position cannot be examined here—for our purposes it is enough to note that Heidegger rejected it as sufficient for the matter under consideration. For Bergson’s own account, see Henri Bergson, The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Mabelle L. Andison (New York: Citadel, 1992 [1946]); and Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, trans. F. L. Pogson (Charleston, S.C.: Nabu, 2010).

6. Edgar C. Boedeker Jr. argues in “Phenomenological Ontology or the Explanation of Social Norms? A Confrontation with William Blattner’s Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 84, no. 3 (2002) that Blattner reaches this conclusion because he is operating under the mistaken assumption that Heidegger’s project is meant to have originary time explain ordinary time—as opposed to engaging in a phenomenological description of the conditions that make meaningful encounters in ordinary time possible. It is the emphasis on explanation, argues Boedeker, that leads Blattner to claim that Heidegger was trying—and failing—to endorse an idealist conception of time. Whether this position fails or not is immaterial, however, according to Boedeker, since Heidegger was not in fact endorsing it; “whereas Heidegger is trivially an ‘idealist’ about originary temporality, which surely depends on Dasein, he need not be read as committed to taking any stand—either realist or idealist—on the origin of ordinary time per se,” particularly insofar as Heidegger insisted that “his own position is beyond both realism and idealism” (ibid., 342). To a large extent I agree with Boedeker’s arguments, but I will be focusing on how Blattner’s failure to give due weight to being-with undermines attempts to account for the relationship between originary and ordinary time—regardless of whether this relationship should be characterized as an “explanation.”


8. BT 187/175. Mitda-sein should be translated as “co-Dasein,” and must be distinguished from Mitsein, or being-with. This distinction will be examined in detail below.

9. Margot Fleischer, Die Zeitanalysen in Heideggers “Sein und Zeit”: Aporien, Probleme und ein Ausblick (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 1991), 25: “The analysis of temporality cannot accomplish what Heidegger evidently resolved for it to do—simply, as mentioned above, to observe an ontological meta-level, namely to go beyond Care as the being of Dasein to an underlying being and so with the notion of temporality to characterize a happening of being which would have to be distinguished from the executions of being of the everyday
and of authentic care, as the founding would have to be distinguished from the founded” (translation mine, with thanks to Inga Römer).

10. Daniel Dahlstrom, “Heidegger’s Concept of Temporality: Reflections on a Recent Criticism,” Review of Metaphysics 49 (1995). For another position endorsing the view that originary temporality is authentic temporality, see Marion Heinz, “The Concept of Time in Heidegger’s Early Works,” in A Companion to Martin Heidegger’s “Being and Time,” ed. J. Kockelmans (Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology and University Press of America, Washington, D.C., 1986). Olafson also appears to hold this position, since he seems to imply in Heidegger and the Philosophy of Mind that originary and authentic temporality can be equated (91).


12. Ibid., 113.

13. Ibid., 111.


15. As Blattner notes, the main reason for “largely bypassing Heidegger’s discussion of historicity [not just because it relies on already working out what originary temporality and ordinary, sequential time are] is its unclarity; it slips quickly into a treatment of authentic historicity at the expense of that historicity that is modally indifferent” (HTI 29). Based on the individualization characterizing authenticity, it also seems evident that “authentic volk” is not a notion to which Heidegger is entitled if he wishes to remain consistent. Phillip R. Buckley makes a similar point in “Martin Heidegger: The ‘End’ of Ethics,” in Phenomenological Approaches to Moral Philosophy, ed. John J. Drummond and Lester Embree (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 2002). For a more positive assessment of Heidegger’s notion of authentic historicity and the role it can play in a possible Heideggerian ethics, see Mariana Ortega, “When Conscience Calls, Will Dasein Answer? Heideggerian Authenticity and the Possibility of Ethical Life,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13 (2005).

16. Kisiel notes Heidegger’s indebtedness to both Dilthey and the Christian tradition in this regard: through them he was able to articulate the “paradox” of subjectivity (though Kisiel’s formulation still uses quite loaded language)—“that this outwardness of inwardness at once makes it accessible” (The Genesis of Heidegger’s “Being & Time,” 103). The condition of the “inner world” is that “it is at once a historical world which as such can be understood . . . a life which is understandable because it always spontaneously expresses itself” (ibid., 103–4).


18. Husserl, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, 47.


20. Ibid., 35 (emphasis mine). Other examples include: “To understand myself as existing is to understand myself as an end that is not yet actual but that
I grasp as my possibility” (ibid.); “To understand myself it is necessary that I intend myself as a possible end to be realized” (ibid.); and “I understand myself as an end which is possible and to be attained” (ibid., 39).


22. BPP 247. This comment occurs in the context of Heidegger’s discussion of traditional concepts of time. Here he is analyzing the implications of Aristotle’s approach, but in doing so he is trying to bring out the manner in which Aristotle “brought a series of central problems relating to time, and in fact not indiscriminately but in their essential concatenation” (BPP 237).

23. See Olafson, Heidegger and the Philosophy of Mind, 75–84.
24. Theunissen, The Other, 181.
25. Fleischer, Die Zeitanalysen in Heideggers “Sein und Zeit,” 39: “If temporality is not understood as the being of Dasein, then according to my interpretation, as explained, no damage for the totality of care would arise” (translation mine, with thanks to Inga Römer). Dahlstrom, “Heidegger’s Concept of Temporality,” 99, makes note of this and argues that a similar position could explain the neglect of Division Two displayed by Dreyfus and Okrent.


27. Theodore Schatzki, “Where Times Meet,” Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy 1 (2005) examines the relationship between these two dimensions of time—which he calls “ordinary time” and “the time of the soul.” However, Schatzki fails to recognize the necessarily intersubjective aspect of this relationship and attempts to ground it, like Blattner, in a kind of pragmatic temporality.

28. This is very much like the position that Levinas came to advocate: “How indeed could time arise in a solitary subject? The solitary subject cannot deny itself; it does not possess nothingness . . . the absolute alterity of another instant cannot be found in the subject, who is definitively himself. This alterity comes to me only from the other. Is not sociality something more than the source of our representation of time: is it not time itself? If time is constituted by my relationship with the other, it is exterior to my instant, but it is also something else than an object given to contemplation” (Existence & Existents, 96). According to Tina Chanter, Levinas believed Heidegger to belong with the rest of the tradition insofar as he “always conceives of time in a solitary subject” (Time, Death, and the Feminine, 27–28). I hope to have shown, however, that though Heidegger did not examine these issues in sufficient—or at least comparable—detail, such an ac-
cussion is false, and Levinas’s own account must be seen as a continuation of—rather than a break with—Heidegger’s characterization of temporal diachrony. For further discussion of the Levinasian understanding of such diachrony, see his examination of the notions of “paternity” and “fecundity” in *Totality and Infinity* (especially 267–69 and 274–80). Levinas also finds this temporal alterity in the distance between the “saying” and the “said.” See “Time and Discourse” in Emmanuel Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being: Or Beyond Essence*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1998). One can find a similar (Derrida-inspired) position in David Wood’s notion of different “economies” of time (*Time After Time*).


32. For an examination of the status of Husserl’s transcendental ego in this regard, see Dermot Moran, _Edmund Husserl: Founder of Phenomenology_ (New York: Polity, 2007); and Dan Zahavi, _Husserl and Transcendental Intersubjectivity._

33. Zahavi, _Husserl and Transcendental Intersubjectivity_, 50.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid., 59.

36. Zahavi considers this point, but argues that because Heidegger always seems to base his analyses on the utilization of the Zuhanden, being-with seems to be better characterized in terms of the anonymous publicity of what he takes to be a third Husserlian mode of encounter (ibid., 128–29). In this sense, Zahavi is echoing Theunissen’s (mis)interpretation whereby the thingly encounter has priority.

37. Tugendhat, _Der Wahrheitsbegriff_, 223–24. Zahavi claims that insofar as Tugendhat’s understanding of constitution relies upon the traditional “opposition between epistemic and ontological priority” that the transcendental reduction was meant to overcome, “his suggestion misses the point” (*Husserl and Transcendental Intersubjectivity*, 107). The extent to which this is an accurate account of Husserlian constitution cannot be addressed here—the relevant point for our discussion is that the experience of the other as co-constitutor—as originary temporality speaking itself out into the world—cannot simply be a moment of my own originary temporality but is precisely an encounter with another now.

Chapter 6

1. Recent studies in developmental psychology support this distinction in our way of being-toward things vs. being-toward persons: as young as six-months-old children attribute intentionality and goal-directedness to the movement of a human hand—evident in anticipatory eye movement—but not to similar movements when the “agent” is a machine or not visible. See Vittorio Gallese, “Intentional Attunement: Neural Correlates of Intersubjectivity” (paper presented at
the Subjectivity, Intersubjectivity, Objectivity conference held at the Center for Subjectivity Research, University of Copenhagen, September 23, 2006).

2. The term “recognition” has an enormous philosophical history rooted in G. W. F. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), where he characterizes the “process of Recognition” in terms of the fact that “Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged” (111). Though an investigation of Hegel’s influence would clearly be important and relevant for this discussion, the enormity of this task demands that it be bracketed. In light of this, my use of the term “recognition” is simply meant to designate the manner in which one subject experiences another subject as such, and not to invoke all of the Hegelian implications of this term. I will also refer to this mode of subject-encounter using the term “acknowledgment”—taken not only from Hegel, but from Stanley Cavell’s The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy (Oxford: Clarendon, 1979). The use of this term is particularly helpful insofar as it has fewer “cognitive” implications and it also seems to indicate a moment of accommodation inherent in the encounter. However, as Axel Honneth notes in “Self-Reification: Contours of a Failed Form of Self-Relationship” (paper presented at the Subjectivity, Intersubjectivity, Objectivity conference held at the Center for Subjectivity Research, University of Copenhagen, September 23, 2006), the German word for recognition—Anerkennung—does not have such a cognitive tone, and also includes a sense of normative affirmation. For Honneth’s most famous examination of the meaning of recognition for understanding intersubjective encounters, see The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts, trans. Joel Anderson (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996).

3. Theunissen characterizes the interpretation of leaping-in and leaping-ahead as extremes on a continuum as “bizarre,” and claims that “it is certainly not to be assumed that ‘bypassing one another, not-being-involved with one another,’ provides the mean between the solicitude of leaping-in and leaping-ahead” (The Other, 397 fn. 32). If we consider the fact that these extremes are to encompass the entire range of human interaction, however—including murderous cruelty and self-sacrificial love—then characterizing the mean between them as bypassing one another in an indifferent state that is neither profoundly negative nor positive does not sound so “bizarre.”


6. Stephen Darwall makes this type of distinction between appraisal and recognition respect in his “Two Kinds of Respect,” Ethics 88 (1977). The former involves esteeming someone’s life or character as successful or worthy, whereas the latter is not a kind of esteem, but respect granted on the basis of the dignity of persons as such.


8. Young, Heidegger, Philosophy, Nazism, 104.
13. Ibid.
14. Kant’s profound influence on Heidegger’s thought is well chronicled in Kisiel’s *The Genesis of Heidegger’s “Being & Time,”* where he describes *Being and Time* as having “a Kantian overlay and impetus” from the start (411).
17. There are those who read Heidegger’s “call of care” or “call of being” as being equally anonymous; François Raffoul claims in “Otherness and Individuality in Heidegger,” *Man and World* 28 (1995): 346, for example, that “the call of care, that Heidegger will later designate as the call of Being, manifests the otherness which lies at the heart of Dasein’s self-appropriation. Dasein can belong to itself only if it takes upon itself a gift of Being which is so to speak impersonal, and at the very least pre-personal. This gift of Being is for Dasein otherness itself, even if Dasein constitutes itself on the basis of it.” Though the case may be made for such an anonymous and external source of Dasein’s subjectivity in the late Heidegger, it seems to directly contradict the early Heidegger’s entire project—namely, to force us to recognize that abstract and anonymous ways of speaking about subjectivity are meaningless except in terms of the concrete particularity of Dasein’s existing.
19. Ibid., xxi and 174.
20. Ibid., xxi.
23. See, for example, Sikka, “Kantian Ethics in *Being and Time*,” 316; and Llewelyn, *The Middle Voice of Ecological Conscience*, 73.
27. Ibid., 121.
29. Ibid., 20.
30. Ibid., 21.
32. Stephen Darwall, “Respect and the Second-Person Standpoint,” *Proceed-
ings and Addresses of the APA 78, no. 2 (2004). As Levinas notes in “Diachrony and Representation,” in Time and the Other and Additional Essays, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1987), 112: “The order concerns me without it being possible for me to go back to the thematic presence of a being that would be the cause or the willing of this commandment. As I have said, it is again not a question here of receiving an order by first perceiving it and then subjecting oneself to it in a decision I take after having deliberated about it. In the proximity of the face, the subjection precedes the reasoned decision to assume the order that it bears.” Further citations of this work will be given in the text and referenced as “DR.”

33. Darwall, “Respect and the Second-Person Standpoint,” 44.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid., 49.


38. Levinas, “Time and the Other,” 79. Indeed, following the discussion in “Diachrony and Representation” of the proximity of the other as a “putting into question” of the subject’s claim to perseverance, Levinas himself notes that “here is an indiscreet—or ‘unjust’—presence, which is perhaps already an issue in ‘The Anaximander Fragment,’ such as Heidegger interprets it in Holzwege. It puts into question the ‘positivity’ of the esse in its presence, signifying, bluntly, encroachment and usurpation! Did not Heidegger—despite all he intends to teach about the priority of the ‘thought of being’—here run up against the original significance of ethics?” (“DR” 108–9).

40. James Mensch, “Givenness and Alterity,” Idealistic Studies 33, no. 1 (2003): 3. Adrian Johnston provides a reading of Heidegger along these lines in “The Soul of Dasein: Schelling’s Doctrine of the Soul and Heidegger’s Analytic of Dasein,” Philosophy Today 47, no. 3 (2003), defining Dasein in terms of sameness and alterity that brings him in line with Schelling: “For Schelling and Heidegger, an adequate theory of subjectivity demands the paradox of thinking together both transcendence-potentiality and immanence-actuality at one and the same time, of positing that human beings are simultaneously immersed within a situated worldly reality as well as being constantly ‘in excess’ of this situation, continually stretching beyond the given-ness of the ‘there’” (241).
42. Ibid., 160.
43. Ibid.
44. This notion speaks to the type of selfhood that Paul Ricoeur characterizes as *ispe* in *Oneself as Another*, where he notes that human selfhood implies “a form of permanence in time which is not reducible to the determination of a substratum . . . which is not simply the schema of the category of substance” (118). Instead, selfhood involves a type of constancy achieved through commitment. Though Ricoeur recognizes Heidegger’s contributions in this regard—“Heidegger is right to distinguish the permanence of substance from self-substanece (*Selbst-Ständigkeit*)” (ibid., 123)—Ricoeur simply equates the Heideggerian originary temporality of selfhood with authentic temporality—“it is not certain that ‘anticipatory resoluteness’ in the face of death exhausts the sense of self-constancy” (ibid.). As a result, he fails to realize that Heidegger’s distinction between the individuating temporality of selfhood and that of substance is prior to the modal manifestations of this selfhood in authentic or inauthentic form, and, consequently, that this dimension of selfhood is encountered in all expressions of Fürsorge.
47. As Brandom argues, “recognition must not be taken to be a mental act, but . . . must be given a social behavioral reading in terms of communal responsive dispositions” (“Heidegger’s Categories in *Being and Time,*” 53).
53. Matthew B. Shockey addresses this issue in “Heidegger, Lafont and the Necessity of the Transcendental,” *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 34 (2008), where he argues that in response to the “tension between the transcendental and hermeneutic dimensions of Heidegger’s project” Lafont tends to reduce the former to the latter, thereby obscuring the Kantian thrust of Heidegger’s approach, according to which we must recognize the “universal, a priori, transcendental structures of meaning or being” (559, 558). Unlike the pragmatist tendency to separate “being from language by locating it in non-linguistic practice,” Shockey argues that “Heidegger locates it at a structural or ontological level, that is, a level which is in the Kantian sense universal and necessary” (ibid., 562). As will become clear, my position is more in keeping with Shockey’s treatment, but the point is moot—our purpose here is merely to call into question Lafont’s equation of meaning with language.
56. Ibid., 217.
57. At HTI 71, fn. 51, Blattner indicates that he has grouped “making known” (Bekundung) under the heading “communication” (Mitteilung). Though Heidegger differentiates them (see Being and Time, section 34), Blattner finds it hard to tell any real difference between the two, and therefore analyzes them as one phenomenon. We will be returning to this point below.
58. Blattner distinguishes his position from theirs by arguing that “discourse does not limp along after significations but, rather, institutes them in the first place . . . words do sometimes accrue to significations. But language does sometimes itself institute differentiations” (HTI 74). Nevertheless, he implies that this is simply a feature of understanding our particular world, and is not fundamental to understanding discourse.
59. As Lawrence Hatab notes, for example, in “Dasein, the Early Years: Heideggerian Reflections on Childhood,” presentation at the 38th Annual North American Heidegger Conference, New Orleans (May 2004), 9: “The phenomenon of pointing, a precursor to language development, is unique to humans . . . and it also exhibits an inter-subjective structure because when infants point, they look back at adults to see if they notice it too (a ubiquitous feature of child behavior called ‘social referencing’).”
61. This does not address Heidegger’s discussions regarding shared understandings and attunements of entire historical communities. Though such shared world-orientations will certainly affect the manner and extent of sharing available to me, this does not change the fact that I exist in a wide variety of changing orientations to specific situations.
62. Max Scheler offers powerful phenomenological analyses of the varieties of such communication or communion in his On the Nature of Sympathy, trans. Peter Heath (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954). Though Heidegger critiques the traditional notion of subjectivity present in Scheler’s work, his analyses are still some of the best available on the varieties of being-with.
63. For an example of one such discussion, see Hatab, “Dasein, The Early Years.”
64. Taylor Carman makes this point in Heidegger’s Analytic: “There are norms not just for doing, that is, but also for showing and saying” (235).
65. His claim that “the examination of these λόγοι belongs to rhetoric and poetics” (FCM 310) may be partially responsible for this.
67. Ibid., 520. O’Murchadha challenges this reading of Heidegger, arguing that Lafont’s invocation of the notion of the “expert” and her corresponding emphasis on the propositional form of language contradicts Heidegger’s emphasis on the experience of average Dasein and the role that poetic communication
can play ("Reduction, Externalism and Immanence in Husserl and Heidegger," 390). What is relevant for our purposes in Lafont’s characterization of Heidegger as an externalist, however, is the fact that through language Dasein regularly defers authority to others—assuming the other’s primordial experience of the matter being referenced without having to be brought into a genuinely communicative sharing of that experience. Thus “expert” can be very loosely understood here—other Dasein may be “experts” insofar as they have had a primordial experience that is then communicated. I agree with O’Murchadha’s reading of Heidegger, however, in recognizing that propositions—as opposed to poetic linguistic forms—tend to inhibit genuine communication in which the other is brought into a shared grasping. The relationship between phenomenology and the internalism/externalism debate is further examined in Steven Crowell, “Phenomenological Immanence, Normativity, and Semantic Externalism,” *Synthese* 160 (2008); and Dan Zahavi, “Internalism, Externalism, and Transcendental Idealism,” *Synthese* 160 (2008).


Chapter 7

2. See Lauren Freeman, “Recognition Reconsidered: A Re-Reading of Heidegger’s *Being and Time* §26,” *Philosophy Today* 53 (2009): 88. Freeman argues that Heidegger’s notion of leap-in must be understood as a continuum encompassing everything from indifference to violence. What characterizes this continuum, she argues, is the fact that it involves a category mistake in which one fails to “treat Dasein as Dasein and instead treat[s] it like something present-at-hand or ready-to-hand.” However, Freeman takes this kind of behavior to indicate that Dasein has also failed to recognize the other as Dasein—a position that is inconsistent with the many forms of abuse—such as rape and torture—in which the other’s humanity is implicitly acknowledged yet subsumed to behavior in which that humanity is used as a tool for the abuser’s pleasure. This issue was examined in greater detail in chapter 6.
3. It is here that Heidegger claims that their “description and classification lie outside the limits of this investigation,” *BT* 123/115.
5. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
9. Ibid., 131.
10. Ibid., 134.

11. Hartmann argues that Heidegger’s claims about derivative status, in the case of the encounter with things, simply relies on his assertions regarding the priority of the “pragmatic world view,” whereas a Hegelian or “speculative (logico-transcendental) account” is not “only posited” and therefore “might have satisfied the interests of a unitary theory” (ibid., 138). Comparing the relative pros and cons of Heideggerian and Hegelian methodology is beyond the scope of this discussion, but needless to say, Heidegger believes that his phenomenological descriptions of the everyday way of being make a greater claim to legitimacy than bald assertion, allowing him to characterize the everyday as having a certain normative default status—his existentials designate a range of possible existentiell manifestations, of which some—the “everyday”—are considered normal and others deficient.


13. One could argue that there is a type of human deficiency that is closer to the stone’s worldliness than the animal’s—in which the other’s claims completely fail to register as such. In these cases—in sociopathy, for example—the individual is not held to be deficiently responding to a normative claim that he implicitly acknowledges but is recognized to be in some sense incompletely human since he has no access to this claim or its normative force. Thus William S. Hamrick claims that “empathy, like the solidarity to which it contributes, is normative to the extent that its total absence is inhuman” (“Empathy, Cognitive Science, and Literary Imagination,” Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 31, no. 2 [2000]: 118).


15. Raffoul, Heidegger and the Subject, 351.

16. A common accusation leveled against Heidegger is, so to speak, the flip side of the authenticity/inauthenticity coin—namely, the view that “for Heidegger, authentic existence remains a private world, structured by Dasein’s concern for its own Being. The negativity and isolation associated with Dasein’s achievement of authenticity excludes a positive existential mode of being-with-others in Being and Time” (Frie, Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity, 84). For some of the earliest formulations of such a critique, see Karl Löwith, Das Individuum in der Rolle des Mitmenschen (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1969); and Ludwig Binswanger, Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins (Zürich: M. Niehans, 1953). I will be arguing against this interpretation in following sections.

17. Theunissen, The Other, 189. See also Philipse, for example: “It seems, then, that Heidegger’s existentiale of das Man in Sein und Zeit has two aspects that cannot easily be reconciled. On the one hand it is a fundamental structure of everyday life that is constitutive of the cultural public world; it is the mode of Being in which we live ‘proximally and most of the time.’ On the other hand, Heidegger’s description of das Man is loaded with negative connotations” (“Heidegger and Ethics,” 451).
18. Rudi Visker, “Dropping—The ‘Subject’ of Authenticity: Being and Time on Disappearing Existentials and True Friendship with Being,” in Deconstructive Subjectivities, ed. Simon Critchley and Peter Dews (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 79, queries: “Is there no way then for Being and Time to keep to the promise of its opening pages where it was suggested that everydayness need not be inauthentic. . . ? What elements in Being and Time are responsible for its apparent failure to stick to this promise, for the fact that throughout the book more often than not everydayness is simply equated with the inauthentic?” Visker appears to consider the position I am advocating—namely, that the responsibility for this failure lies in Heidegger’s tendency to move toward understanding such relations as a simple dualistic opposition between two possible aspects, rather than adequately maintaining his initial insight into their nature as a continuum. In Visker’s case, however, these aspects are “truth” and “untruth”: “What if ultimately the responsibility lies with the way Heidegger here conceives of aletheia as a simple opposition between truth and untruth. . . ?” (ibid.).

20. Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, 144
21. This unavoidably public dimension of the self is perhaps what Simon Critchley is attempting to capture with his notion of an “originary inauthenticity” (“Enigma Variations: An Interpretation of Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit,” 169), but his use of “inauthenticity” here simply propagates a dualistic interpretation of what is a continuum phenomenon.

24. Ibid., 333–34.
25. Ibid., 334.
27. Ibid., 19.
28. Mensch, Ethics and Selfhood, 111.
29. Bernhard Waldenfels, Antwortregister (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1994), 357.
31. Ibid., 120, 131.
Heidegger's Doctrine of Intersubjectivity,” *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 29, no. 1 (2003): 13. Honneth notes that both Gadamer and Löwith emphasize the danger of such universalizing for distorting or concealing the genuine intersubjective encounter: “The idea that the greatest danger to any real intersubjectivity consists in the destructive power of reflection presents the most obvious type of connection between the two.” The difference between them, however, lies in their views on the significance for the formation of interpersonal relations of the third-person reflexive stance and the generalized norms arising therefrom: “While the former seems always only to recognize in reflexive acts the negative side of distanciation or externalization, Löwith sees structured within them the chance for a decentering of the ‘I,’ which presents a necessary presupposition for intersubjective interaction” (ibid., 16). As I am hoping to show, both moments are essential dimensions of the intersubjective relationship for Heidegger as well.

35. Sikka, “Kantian Ethics in *Being and Time*,” 310, 311.
37. Robert Dostal claims that “the very term with which Heidegger designates both forms of positive solicitude is not adequate to the phenomenon. ‘Leaping’ (*Springen*) mitigates against togetherness and mutual reciprocity. The verb suggests that one leaps ahead, or in place of, or even behind. Leaping is a decisive action that requires great exertion; ‘being together’ is contrary to it” (“Friendship and Politics: Heidegger’s Failing,” *Political Theory* 20, no. 3 [1992]: 407). Nevertheless, I believe the term is simply meant to evoke the particular ecstatic intentionality that characterizes Dasein’s way of being qua transcendence.
stand Heidegger’s existential notion of death in terms of our ordinary use of the term and suggests that death be understood in terms of both possibility and temporality limits.

42. We can recognize a significant difference between Levinas and Heidegger on this point, since Levinas argues that for Heidegger, it is power that constitutes being: being is defined in terms of my “abilities to be.” Levinas, on the contrary, emphasizes passivity and exposure. Thus even the nothingness of death, in Heidegger, is thought in terms of Dasein’s possibilities—in this case, the possibility of impossibility. Further, Levinas argues that taking up this possibility is a fundamentally solitary act for Dasein. Thus Heideggerian philosophy only heeds the voice of anonymous Being—not the ethical claim of the Other—because it represents existence as possibility in the face of limiting non-possibility, but it leaves this existence itself fundamentally unquestioned and unjustified. These criticisms cannot be addressed here—though I hope to have shown that Dasein’s struggle to be itself is not so anonymous as Levinas suggests. See Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, section 3: “The Ethical Relation and Time.” See also the helpful discussion in Iain Thomson, “Rethinking Levinas on Heidegger on Death,” *Harvard Review of Philosophy* 16 (Fall 2009).


44. See Buckley, *Husserl, Heidegger, and the Crisis of Philosophical Responsibility*, 171, on this point.

45. Simon Critchley claims, for instance, that according to Heidegger “the fundamental experience of finitude is non-relational, and all relationality is rendered secondary because of the primacy of *Jemeinigkeit*” (“Enigma Variations: An Interpretation of Heidegger’s *Sein und Zeit*,” 169). Lawrence Vogel similarly claims that “the fact remains that authentic being-with-the-other is characterized by indirectness. In other words, the authentic self is achieved without the positive cooperation of ‘Dasein-with.’ Authentic Dasein is not constituted through relation with the other” (*The Fragile “We,”* 84).


and Young, *Heidegger, Philosophy, Nazism*. For a refutation of this common view, see Burch, “Death and Deliberation.”

51. Buckley argues that “authenticity is not something to be achieved, but rather something that one ‘undergoes’” (“Martin Heidegger: The ‘End’ of Ethics,” 203).


54. Ibid., 4.

55. Ibid.

56. See Raffoul, *Heidegger and the Subject*, 225, on this point.


60. Ibid., 9.


62. One could perhaps argue that such a call can only have come from oneself because the “anticipatory” dimension of authenticity radically individualizes Dasein (down to its “solus ipse”) while the “resolute” dimension is necessary for Dasein to reconnect to the world and others. On this reading, anticipation temporarily dissolves the connection to world and others—thereby making it impossible, it seems, for another Dasein to trigger the isolating or “anticipatory” dimension of authenticity. For a discussion of this reading see Thomson, “Rethinking Levinas on Heidegger on Death.” But it is important to be clear that the radical individuation of authenticity refers to a condition revealing both the contingency of one’s specific innerworldly relationships and the self-responsibility called for in the face of one’s having-to-be. This individuating moment does not isolate one from the constitutive role that world and others play in that having-to-be, however, but brings them to light as what they are for the first time. It is only for this reason that a relationship with another Dasein could succeed in prompting me to enter this condition.


64. In “Ambiguous Calling? Authenticity and Ethics in Heidegger’s *Being and Time,*” *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 39 (2008), Tanja Staehler cautions interpreters against taking such talk of the “friend” too seriously when examining Heidegger’s notion of the call of conscience, since his references are extremely sketchy and do not, she argues, show a “necessary connection between the two phenomena” (304). In the absence of a thorough analysis of how such a concept would fit in the structure of *Being and Time* as a whole, we cannot understand the uncanny and “otherworldly” voice of conscience in terms of the voice of some “friend” without seriously misunderstanding Heidegger’s meaning. However, in light of the work of preceding chapters demonstrating the role of
others as co-constitutors of the world, it becomes clear how the silent call of the other can also be “uncanny.”

65. See, for example, Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*; and Mensch, *Ethics and Selfhood*.

66. See also Critchley, “Enigma Variations,” 173: “On my picture, conscience would be the ontic testimony of a certain splitting of the self in relation to a *Faktum* that it cannot assimilate, the lifeless material thing that the self carries within itself and which denies it from being fully itself. It is this failure of autarky that makes the self relational. The call of conscience is a voice within me whose source is not myself, but is the other’s voice that calls me to responsibility. In other words, ethical relationality is only achieved by being inauthentic, that is, in recognizing that I am not the conscience of others, but rather that it is those others who call me to have a conscience.”

67. As Crowell notes of the hearing that corresponds to this silent “percept-ability”: “The word he uses here is *Vernehmlichkeit*. To perceive in this way—*vernehmen*—is indeed to hear, but it is a hearing whose acoustic dimension is subordinated to a responsiveness to meaning” (“Subjectivity: Locating the First-Person in Being and Time,” 445).

68. See, for example, Frie, *Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity*, 80–82.


71. Ibid.

72. Ibid.


76. Ibid., 392.


