The Temporality of Care

Being and Time’s Division Two engages in a temporal reformulation of its initial characterization of Dasein’s care structure, demonstrating that interpreting Dasein’s being in terms of temporality will offer a deeper understanding of what grounds and unifies care: “The primordial unity of the structure of care lies in temporality” (BT 327/301); it “makes possible the constitution of the structures of care” (BT 331/304). And as we saw in chapter 4, such a temporal analysis will also account for how time serves as the horizon of every understanding—a horizon in terms of which both things and other Dasein are able to show themselves as themselves. Thus William Blattner notes in Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism that “Heidegger is not introducing an independent, unifying scheme to explain care; he is showing how care’s internal structure is inherently unified because originally temporal.”

Thus Heidegger claims in History of the Concept of Time that “Dasein itself—as we shall later see—is time” (HCT 197). It is important to uncover what Heidegger means by this, however, since he emphasizes that such claims cannot be understood in terms of our ordinary conception of time—a sequence of undifferentiated and anonymous “nows, without beginning and without end” (BT 329/302). Rather, the ordinary conception of time is itself based on “originary” or “primordial” time—on the essence of Dasein’s subjectivity as temporal. Instead of occupying particular regions of the linear sequence of undifferentiated moments, past, present, and future must be understood as lived dimensions of Dasein’s being-in-the-world. Thus Dasein’s projectedness—and the understanding that discloses it—is rooted in a fundamentally futural way of being, from which we then derive our everyday concepts of futurity as the “not yet now”: “ ‘Future’ does not mean a now that has not yet become ‘actual’ and that sometime will be for the first time, but the coming in which Dasein comes toward itself in its ownmost potentiality-of-being . . . Dasein, as existing, always already comes toward itself, that is, is futural in its being in general” (BT 325/299). The fact that it is futural in its being in general is captured in the for-the-sake-of-itself that characterizes Dasein’s projecting—the purposiveness of its pressing into possible ways for it to be: “The ‘before’ and the ‘ahead of’ indicate the future that first makes possible in general the fact that Da-sein can be in such a way that is concerned
about its potentiality-of-being. The self-project grounded in the ‘for the sake of itself’ in the future is an essential quality of existentiality. Its primary meaning is the future” (BT 327/301). Thus the primordial meaning of the future is not some moment that is simply waiting to be actualized—rather, it is the manner in which Dasein is always moving toward being the self that it has the potential to be.

Similarly, the originary meaning of the past is not some “now” that was once objectively present but is present no longer, but refers in its most fundamental sense to Dasein’s thrownness or facticity and the attunement that discloses it. As we will recall, thrownness relates to the sheer “that it is” of existing that permeates every moment of this existence—the fact that Dasein is always already defined by the situation in which it simply discovers itself to be. This dimension of existence is the primordial meaning of the past since it refers to the conditions from out of which one’s understanding must always arise: “In attunement Da-sein is invaded by itself as the being that it still is and already was, that is, that it constantly is as having been. The primary existential meaning of facticity lies in having-been. The formulation of the structure of care indicates the temporal meaning of existentiality or facticity with the expressions ‘before’ and ‘already’. (BT 328/301).

Thus Dasein’s futurity and having-beenness cannot be understood in terms of ordinary time designations without distorting the always-on-the-way nature of Dasein’s existence:

If the expressions “ahead of” and “already” had this temporal meaning, which they can also have, then we would be saying about the temporality of care that it is something that is “earlier” and “later,” “not yet” and “no longer” at the same time. Then care would be conceived as a being that occurs and elapses “in time.” The being of a being of the nature of Dasein would then turn into something objectively present. If this is impossible, the temporal significance of these expressions must be a different one. (BT 327/301)

In this originary sense of time, then—temporality as that which constitutes the very subjectivity of the subject—Heidegger must distinguish the past and the future from the everyday way in which they are understood—no longer can they be understood simply as occupying particular regions of some linear sequence of undifferentiated “nows.” Dasein’s ability to experience the future or past is not referring to the fact that it once lived in a present now that is over or will live in a present now that is not yet—it refers to the fact that every present now is always weighted with a past and directed toward a future. To be constituted by originary
temporality means to project forward into potentialities that only arise on the basis of what Dasein has been.

A difficulty arises for Heidegger’s account when we consider the following issue: how exactly can the shift to temporality clarify the care structure if the meaning of time with which Heidegger is working in his discussions of originary temporality does not seem to bear any real resemblance to what we ordinarily mean by time—namely, a sequence of undifferentiated nows? By grounding care in such an unfamiliar conception of time, what is being gained? Why should originary time be considered “time” at all, since it’s missing a—if not the—main quality we associate with the word “time”—namely, sequentiality? What justifies Heidegger’s claim that he’s talking about time at all? As Blattner notes in regard to this issue, “It is possible, after all, to violate the terms of a concept so egregiously that we are justified in claiming that one is using the wrong word or concept. The notion of nonsuccessive time might seem to be such a violation, for we do ordinarily think of time as essentially sequential” (HTI 94).³

Heidegger himself recognizes that he must earn his claim that primordial time is really time: “We must clarify how and why the development of the vulgar concept of time comes about in terms of the temporally grounded constitution of being of Da-sein taking care of time. The vulgar concept of time owes its provenance to a leveling down of primordial time. By demonstrating that this is the source of the vulgar concept of time, we shall justify our earlier interpretation of temporality as primordial time” (BT 405/372).⁴ According to Heidegger, the “vulgar” understanding of time does in fact consist “among other things, precisely in the fact that it is a pure succession of nows, without beginning and without end, in which the ecstatic character of primordial temporality is levelled down” (BT 329/302). This vulgar understanding of time, Heidegger argues, originates in a more primordial temporality that is then inauthentically temporalized to produce ordinary time. If he is able to show the dependence on and source of ordinary time in originary time, Heidegger believes he will be justified in calling the latter “time.” We can note here the relationship to his Kant project; Heidegger is attempting to show that by understanding the fundamental horizon of Dasein’s being to be rooted in temporality, he can account not only for the ecstatic, non-sequential care structure, but also for the ordinary, sequential sense of time and the “within-timeness” of worldly things. Heidegger will unify these seemingly antithetical branches by showing that both arise out of originary, ecstatic time—and in particular, how ordinary sequential time does. By demonstrating that commonsense understandings of time are not primordial but arise, instead, from originary temporality, we will be
justified in understanding Dasein’s primordial temporality as a form of time \((BT\ 329/302)\). “Originary temporality and ordinary time are not two otherwise unrelated phenomena, one of which happens to explain the other. Rather, we shall see, originary temporality modifies itself—its own features—so as to yield the more complex phenomenon that is ordinary time. The conceptual features that define ordinary time are derived from originary temporality insofar as originary temporality can be modified to make them up” (\(HTI\ 95\)). As Blattner goes on to argue, however, Heidegger faces serious difficulties in his attempt to link the non-sequential originary temporality that grounds the care structure with the sequence of undifferentiated nows that characterizes ordinary time. Indeed, Blattner argues that Heidegger ultimately fails in his attempt to show “that originary temporality is ordinary time stripped of one of its disunifying features” (\(HTI\ 126\)).

As we will see, the reason that Blattner reaches this verdict ultimately lies in the fact that he does not take into account the unique temporality of being-with—a mode of temporality that explains the transition from originary time to ordinary time through world-time.\(^6\) Blattner’s neglect of this intersubjective dimension is likely rooted in Heidegger’s own failure to articulate the implications of his own position in this regard, however, and to the obfuscation and confusion in which this results. In what follows I will demonstrate the route that Heidegger should have taken in tracing the origin of ordinary time, an interpretation that recognizes the pivotal role that the shared temporal nature of a community of Dasein must play in the establishment of world and world time.

Accounting for the originary temporal sense of the “present”—the temporal horizon established when multiple temporalizing Dasein encounter each other—will be essential for doing so. As we have seen, in mapping Division One’s care structure onto the temporal structures of past, present, and future, Heidegger equates having beenness with thrownness, and futurity with projection. When it comes to the present, however, Heidegger claims that, unlike the past/thrownness and future/projectedness connections, “such an indication is lacking for the third constitutive factor of care: entangled being-together-with” \((BT\ 328/301)\). Though Heidegger does not directly address the reason for this lack, I will argue that it arises from two related phenomena: (1) Heidegger’s confusion of being-with and fallenness—a tendency that becomes increasingly pronounced as \(Being\ and\ Time\) progresses; and (2) the resulting masking of the complexity that will be required of Heidegger’s position if he is to genuinely account for the manner in which multiple temporality-defined Dasein interact with each other. This confusion and oversimplification
becomes evident when he attempts to move from originary time to ordinary time through world time.

Being-With or Fallenness?

Though the claim that being-with is not necessarily fallen or inauthentic is, as we can recall from chapter 1, obviously a controversial one, in what follows I will show that there is an ambiguity in Heidegger’s understanding of the relationship between being-with and fallenness—an ambiguity with which any interpreter must come to terms. Despite contradictory textual evidence that could be marshaled against this view, I will argue that Heidegger’s account would be more structurally coherent if he maintained his initial distinction between being-with and fallenness by designating the former as the modally indifferent existential that is expressed in either an authentic or inauthentic way. Such an interpretation is more in keeping with the general structure of Heidegger’s characterization of Dasein’s fundamental suspension between authentic and inauthentic ways of being. Though the manner in which one encounters other Dasein may encourage tendencies toward inauthenticity, then, this is not structurally necessary and the distinctness of these concepts must be maintained.

Early claims in Being and Time indicate that Heidegger’s original sense of the care structure takes being-with, and not fallenness, as the fundamental existential specific to encountering other Dasein: “Da-sein is essentially constituted by being-with” (BT 120/113). “Being-in is being-with others” (BT 118/112) he argues; “the understanding of others already lies in the understanding of being of Da-sein because its being is being-with” (BT 123/116). Elsewhere, however, he will explicitly claim that “the third constitutive factor of care, falling prey, has its existential meaning in the present” (BT 346/318) and that “the fundamental, ontological characteristics of this being are existentiality, facticity, and falling prey” (BT 191/178). This ambiguity leads Blattner to claim that “textually it is a little unclear how to fill out the structure of care” (HTI 34). As we will note below, however, Blattner’s own account tends to follow Heidegger in equating being-with with fallenness, despite his claim that “given that the term ‘falling’ moves around in Heidegger’s architectonic, it is best to treat it as an ambiguous term and to sort out the various phenomena to which it equivocally applies” (HTI 55). John Haugeland also notes this troublesome ambiguity when he argues—in terms of the
modes of disclosure specific to dimensions of the care structure—that “Heidegger is not consistent about this . . . sometimes falling is substituted for telling [Haugeland’s translation of Rede, or discourse] (SZ 349), and other times all four are given (SZ 269, 335).”

Such a blurring of the fallenness/being-with distinction is present at BT 328/301, for example, where Heidegger points to the lack of a clear indication of the connection between temporality and the third constitutive dimension of care, which he here describes as “entangled being-together-with.” This is not supposed to mean, he continues, that “falling prey is not also grounded in temporality” (BT 328/301). The suggestion here is that “entanglement”—and not modally undifferentiated being-together-with—is to be taken as the third dimension of the care structure. In contrast, however, he thereafter claims that “resolute, Dasein has brought itself back out of falling prey in order to be all the more authentically ‘there’ for the disclosed situation in the ‘Moment’ [Augenblick]” (BT 328/301–2), which he defines elsewhere as the authentic present (BT 338/311).

But if falling prey is a constitutive dimension of the care structure it is not clear how Dasein can be “brought out” of falling prey to reach the authentically temporal “Moment.” Indeed, grouping falling prey with thrownness and projectedness as fundamental existentials would seem to make authenticity structurally impossible, since authenticity is not an escape from Dasein’s care structure, but a different mode of existing in terms of it. Heidegger’s early position recognizes this: “Angst takes away from Da-sein the possibility of understanding itself, falling prey, in terms of the ‘world’ and the public way of being interpreted” (BT 187/175). But if falling prey were an equiprimordial existential in the same way that projection and thrownness are, it would not be possible to “take it away as a possibility.” Indeed, Heidegger even claims at BT 186/174 that “the turning away of falling prey is rather based on Angst which in turn makes fear possible.” If falling prey and attunement were equiprimordial dimensions of the care structure, how could falling prey be based on Angst—a particular attunement? Similarly, the third mode of disclosure—discourse, the one specific to the third dimension of care (whatever that turns out to be)—is characterized, along with understanding and attunement—as having particular fallen modes (idle talk, curiosity, ambiguity) which would seem to indicate that discourse is a modally indifferent disclosure that is then modified by falling prey.

If the original characterization of the care structure as thrown, projecting, being-with is maintained, then, Heidegger can avoid the difficulty that the authentic/inauthentic modalities pose to any account that includes falling prey as a fundamental dimension of care. This interpre-
tation is supported by the fact that even authentic Da-sein will “be with” worldly things and persons—just in a different, non-fallen mode: “Authentic being one’s self is not based on an exceptional state of the subject, a state detached from the they, but is an existentiell modification of the they as an essential existential” (BT 130/122). Though Heidegger does acknowledge that the modification of being-with that occurs in authenticity will be extreme, he does not claim—as he does with falling prey—that Dasein will be “brought out” of it. Thus he will claim that “in Angst, the things at hand in the surrounding world sink away, and so do innerworldly beings in general. The ‘world’ can offer nothing more, nor can the Mitda-sein of others”—but note that it is the particular innerworldly way of being that stops being meaningful in a particular way; Angst cannot be understood as “transposing an isolated subject-thing into the harmless vacuum of a worldless occurrence” but instead as bringing “Da-sein in an extreme sense precisely before its world as world, and thus itself before itself as being-in-the-world” (BT 188/176). Unlike being-with, then, taking falling prey as an existential cannot be reconciled with Dasein’s way of being as a suspension between authenticity and inauthenticity because falling prey does not continue to obtain in authenticity—while being-with does. Thus Heidegger notes in The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic that “in choosing itself Dasein really chooses precisely its being-with others and precisely its being among beings of a different character. In the express self-choice there is essentially the complete self-commitment, not to where it might not yet be, but to where and how it always already is, qua Dasein, insofar as it already exists” (MFL 190). If we recognize being-with as a constitutive dimension of being-in-the-world, Heidegger can make room for being-with both in its authentic and inauthentic modes of being.

The question of why Heidegger increasingly elides the distinction between being-with—a dimension of the care structure—and falling—the tendency to succumb to its inauthentic manifestation—cannot be addressed here; for now, I will simply assume that such a distinction can be made and that a reformulation of Dasein’s care structure in terms of temporality must therefore map being-with—understood as modally indifferent existential—onto the originary present. In doing so, I will therefore take this originary present—like the originary future and past—to be modally undifferentiated with regard to authenticity and inauthenticity. Originary temporality is, as the essence of selfhood, more primordial than the authentic and inauthentic modes in which it will necessarily manifest itself: “Only because this being is, in its essence, defined by selfhood can it, in each case, as factical, expressly choose itself as a self. The ‘can’ here includes also its flight from choice” (MFL 189). Blattner also endorses this interpretation, arguing that Heidegger’s authentic/inau-
authentic distinction implies a basic structure of temporality that is then modified by these different modes: “Heidegger begins his treatment of Dasein’s temporality by focusing on authentic temporality. However, in order to understand how authentic temporality is possible, he must show how it is a mode of a more basic sort of temporality, the sort of temporality that Dasein cannot help but have, the sort of temporality that characterizes Dasein’s being as such... authentic temporality is merely one mode of originary temporality” (HTI 99).

This is not an uncontroversial view, however; there appears to be a fundamental ambiguity in Heidegger’s texts regarding the relationship between original temporality and authentic temporality, and some readers question whether the two are in fact equivalent. Thus in Die Zeitanalysen in Heideggers ‘Sein und Zeit’: Aporien, Probleme und ein Ausblick, Margot Fleischer argues that: “Die Analyse der Zeitlichkeit kann das nicht leisten, was Heidegger sich mit ihr offensichtlich vorgenommen hat—eben, wie erwähnt, eine ontologische Meta-ebene zu betreten, d.h. die Sorge als Sein des Daseins auf ein zugrundeliegendes Sein hin zu überschreiten und also in der Zeitlichkeit ein Seinsgeschehen zu fassen, das gegen die Seinsvollzüge der ‘alltäglichen’ und der eigentlichen Sorge wie das Fundierende vom Fundierten abzugrenzen wäre.” Indeed, she claims that Heidegger himself fails to consistently maintain this distinction, blurring the relationship between “the founding” and “the founded.” The distinction is clear in texts such as Being and Time paragraph 16 of section 65, she argues, where Heidegger implies that originary temporality is the condition for the possibility of authentic temporality: “Temporal- ity temporalizes, and it temporalizes possible ways of itself. These make possible the multiplicity of the modes of being of Da-sein, in particular the fundamental possibility of authentic and inauthentic existence” (BT 328/302). In paragraphs 7 to 9 of section 65, however, Heidegger seems to conflate the two, according to Fleischer, since he seems to repeatedly equate resoluteness with the general structures of temporality—having been, making present, and futurity.

As a result of texts such as the latter, Daniel Dahlstrom disagrees with Fleischer’s claim that Heidegger distinguishes originary from authentic temporality, arguing, on the contrary, that Heidegger does not explicitly use the term “original” to refer to this temporality that is the condition for the possibility of the authentic and inauthentic modes. Though Dahlstrom admits that this does not rule out Fleischer’s claim that Heidegger characterizes originary time as the condition for the possibility of authentic time, he argues that “the fact that Heidegger so explicitly and constantly links original and authentic temporality should give one pause before endorsing Fleischer’s interpretation.”
necessary linkage between the authentic and the originary is particularly evident, Dahlstrom thinks, in *Being and Time*’s multiple references to “primordial and authentic temporality” (*BT* 329/302–3). As Dahlstrom notes, “These claims represent a substantial hurdle for any interpretation asserting that Heidegger implicitly considered or, on his own understanding of original temporality, ought to have considered it something indifferently instantiable as authentic or inauthentic.”

It is important to note, however, that these references linking primordial and authentic temporality occur immediately after the above-mentioned claim that temporality makes possible the inauthentic and authentic modes—thereby implying that the discussion that follows is simply an elaboration on the authentic mode. And in refusing the distinction between authentic and originary time, Dahlstrom does not want to deny that Heidegger has some account of Dasein’s temporality “in general.” He admits that Heidegger “does characterize temporality in a rather neutral way as the unified phenomenon of this future ‘having been presenting,’ but temporality, so characterized, is not identified with original temporality. If the characterization needs to be labeled, it would seem to be an account of ‘the temporality of Dasein in general.’” According to Dahlstrom, however, this characterization of temporality “in general” is so abstract and barren that it cannot be understood in terms of the richness and power that Heidegger attributes to notions of origin. Indeed, Dahlstrom claims that it is particularly evident that this “temporality in general” cannot be equated with originary temporality insofar as “Heidegger explicitly sets out to establish that inauthentic time is *not* original and instead is springing away (*entspringend*) from authentic temporality.” In other words, not only is inauthentic temporality in no way originary temporality, it also does not directly spring, strictly speaking, from original temporality, but rather from authentic temporality (even though authentic temporality is in some way originary temporality).”

To argue that inauthentic temporality is not originary temporality, however, does not allow us to conclude that therefore authentic temporality is. As I will be arguing below, Heidegger’s position is that neither authentic nor inauthentic temporality can be equated with original temporality. Though inauthentic temporality does not directly “spring” from original temporality, neither, I will argue, does authentic temporality; rather, both are modifications of world time—and it is *world time* that arises out of original temporality. Though inauthenticity may be characterized as a “springing away” from authenticity, then, this does not allow us to conclude that authentic temporality just *is* original temporality. Rather, both are modifications of original time’s worldly expression.

Though Dahlstrom’s distinction between authentic/originary tem-
porality and an abstract, general sense of temporality underlying its modal manifestations allows him to both accommodate cases where Heidegger appears to equate originary and authentic temporality and to allow for an underlying, modally undifferentiated temporal structure, it appears to be a rather artificial distinction. This is evident, as Blattner notes, insofar as the term (überhaupt) that Dahlstrom translates as “in general” in “temporality in general” can also be read, as I do, to mean “at all.” So, when . . . Heidegger states that Dasein can be “authentically futural,” only in virtue of “coming toward itself überhaupt,” he can mean, and I think makes more sense to read him as meaning, that authentic futurity depends on futurity at all, that is, that Dasein is in any way futural . . . Heidegger states that “coming toward itself überhaupt” makes possible the authentic future. So temporality überhaupt is an originary phenomenon, one that makes possible authenticity. (HTI 100)

Though it cannot be denied that there are cases in which Heidegger appears to equate original and authentic time, these cases are better understood, I believe, as ambiguously phrased attempts to emphasize the authentic manifestations of original time. Focusing on points at which Heidegger does clearly articulate the relationship between authentic/inauthentic temporality and the modally undifferentiated primordial temporality underlying it will help keep this in mind: “If resoluteness constitutes the mode of authentic care, and if it is itself possible only through temporality, the phenomenon at which we arrived by considering resoluteness must itself only present a modality of temporality, which makes care possible in general” (BT 327/300). Such a claim, as well as his statement at BT 350/321 that “the disclosedness of the There and the fundamental existentiell possibilities of Da-sein, authenticity and inauthenticity, are founded in temporality” seem to be a strong indication that Dasein’s basic temporal structure cannot be characterized as authentic or inauthentic. The strongest justification for my interpretation, however, is found in the general structure of Heidegger’s project. Like the refusal to equate being-with and fallenness, Heidegger’s characterization of Dasein as fundamentally suspended between authentic and inauthentic ways of being supports the distinction between modally neutral temporal structures of selfhood and its authentic manifestation. Structurally, Dasein is not just authentic or inauthentic but is defined in terms of the underlying ontological makeup that makes both modes possible. Though Dasein will only
ever exist concretely in terms of these modes, reducing one to the other will not help elucidate their shared structure.

For this reason, in clarifying the nature of the originary present, I will bracket considerations of the explicitly authentic and inauthentic manifestations of Dasein’s present. Heidegger refers to the former as the Moment (Augenblick) and the latter as a type of abstract and distorted “now”: “The vulgar understanding of time sees the fundamental phenomenon of time in the now, and indeed in the pure now, cut off in its complete structure, that is called the ‘present.’ One can gather from this that there is in principle no prospect of explaining or even deriving the ecstatic and horizonal phenomenon of the Moment that belongs to authentic temporality from this now” (BT 426–27/391). Rather than examining the Moment or the “present,” I will isolate the now “in its complete structure”—the modally indifferent temporality from which they are derived. I will similarly avoid Heidegger’s discussions of historicity, since they invariably speak only of authentic historicity, and thereby fail to isolate the general underlying structures. Indeed, Heidegger indicates that Dasein’s historicity is itself a function of its underlying temporality: “the temporality of Da-sein, which constitutes this being as historical” (BT 417/383), and it is this that needs to be analyzed.

The Originary Present

It would seem, then, that the originary present is the modally indifferent primordial temporalizing that enables the being-with dimension of Dasein’s care structure. But what exactly are we to understand by the “originary present”? The basic structures of originary time underlying both authentic and inauthentic time are difficult to discern because of Heidegger’s tendency to explicate them only in terms of their modal manifestations. Nevertheless, we can see hints: one indication is found at BT 328/302, for example, where he expresses the basic structures of originary time as follows: “Future, having-been, and present show the phenomenal characteristics of ‘toward itself,’ ‘back to,’ and ‘letting something be encountering’ ” (BT 328/302). Later, he claims that “making present always . . . temporalizes itself in a unity with awaiting and retaining, even if these are modified into a forgetting that does not await” (BT 407/373–74). Elsewhere, he claims that we can characterize this “being toward presencing things as a holding in attendance or, more generally, making present” (MFL 202). Just as futurity can only be understood in
terms of Dasein’s projecting toward potentialities of being and pastness can only be understood in terms of Dasein’s being burdened with what it always already has been, so too must the present be understood in terms of a primordial dimension of Dasein’s being. In this case, the originary present is the space opened up by the tension between pastness and futurity such that an encounter—an “enpresenting”—is enabled. The originary sense of the present is Dasein’s letting something be encountered through its temporal unifying of awaiting and retaining—a point that is clearly reminiscent of our discussion of temporality as the unifying horizon of intuition in the Kant book.

What is the nature of this unity that “lets something be encountered”? According to Heidegger, the modes of disclosure belonging to the care structure—understanding, attunement, and discourse—are themselves derivatives or manifestations of the expressive nature of the temporal disclosure that is the essence of Dasein. The modes of disclosure must be understood in light of the fact that primordial temporality always expresses or interprets itself in time: “If in saying ‘now’ we are not addressing ourselves to anything extant, then are we addressing ourselves to the being that we ourselves are? But surely I am not the now? Perhaps I am, though, in a certain way . . . The Dasein, which always exists so that it takes time for itself, expresses itself . . . it utters itself in such a way that it is always saying time. When I say ‘now’ I do not mean the now as such, but in my now-saying I am transient” (BPP 259). Dasein’s interpretive expression of its temporal structure is not an occasional activity but the subtext of all its activities: “Time is constantly there in such a way that . . . in all our comportments and all the measures we take, we move in a silent discourse” of now saying (BPP 259). According to Heidegger, the now is “nothing but the ‘expression,’ the ‘speaking out,’ of original temporality in its ecstatic character” (BPP 270). Time as we understand it in an everyday way is a derivative of temporality’s self-disclosure: “The making present that interprets itself, that is, what has been interpreted and addressed in the ‘now,’ is what we call ‘time’” (BT 408/375). Temporality expressed is time, and this expression is the very selfhood of Dasein’s being-in-the-world.16

To better understand the implications this temporal structure has for how Dasein is able to encounter other Dasein as what they are, we must consider the four features that characterize this self-expressive temporality: spannedness, datability, publicity, and significance (BT 416/382). As we will see, all of these features demonstrate the ecstatic nature of originary temporality—that in “speaking itself out,” Dasein is constituted by certain types of relationality or possibilities of encounter. Heidegger notes in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, “Temporality as unity
of future, past, and present does not carry the Dasein away just at times and occasionally; instead, as temporality, it is itself the original outside-itself, the ekstatikon. For this character of carrying-away we employ the expression the ecstatic character of time” (BPP 267). To understand Dasein’s primordial temporality as expressive or ecstatic is to recognize the fundamental other-directedness of Dasein’s existence—the fact that its very way of being is a pressing out into relations with that which it is not. Levinas himself acknowledges this structure in Heidegger’s thought:

Without being cognition, temporality in Heidegger is an ecstasy, a “being outside oneself.” This is not the transcendence characteristic of theory, but it is already the leaving of an inwardness for an exteriority . . . indeed it is he who has grasped, in its deepest form, the ultimate and universal essence of this play of inwardness and exteriority, beyond the “subject-object” play to which idealist and realist philosophy reduced it. What is new in this conception is that this ecstasy is seen to be more than a property of the soul; it is taken to be that through which existence exists. It is not a relationship with an object, but with the verb to be, with the action of being. Through ecstasy man takes up his existence. Ecstasy is then found to be the very event of existence.17

Each of the four features of ecstatic temporality—spannedness, datability, publicity, and significance—demonstrates a particular type of “outside itself,” of ecstatic relation to otherness. In keeping with Heidegger’s critique, however, this type of relation cannot be modeled on the subject/object relationship, which presupposes the independence of the subject and the contingency of its encounter with objects. Rather, Dasein’s very way of being is to be the site of encounter with otherness—the genuine subjectivity of the subject is to be opened up to world and in this very openness to simultaneously express the “who” of its own existence. Dasein’s existence “is the original unity of being-outside-self that comes-toward-self, comes back to self, and enpresents” (BPP 267). Dasein’s originary now is the moment of openness in which both things and Dasein itself become present as what they are—a moment characterized by the “carrying away toward something” (BPP 267) that is the essence of temporality’s ecstatic structure.

This temporal ecstasis finds various forms, however, which Heidegger notes in his distinction between the four features of temporality. As we will see, these are the different ways in which Dasein exists outside of itself in relation to otherness. In the case of spannedness, the present maintains itself in terms of a relation to past and future. In datability, the now is ecstatically related to a pragmatically weighted thing or event. In
publicity, it is the originary temporality of the other Dasein to which the now is ecstatically related. And in significance, the now speaks itself out into relation with the significance-constituting norms or measures that characterize what Heidegger calls “world.”

Dimensions of Ecstasy

Spannedness receives little attention from Heidegger, perhaps because it is a feature characteristic of all time dimensions and refers to their inseparability—it designates the space or “span” opened up by the now’s simultaneous relation to both past and future (BPP 270). Spannedness is a type of temporal stretch, the lasting or enduring quality that arises because Dasein’s temporality is a drawing of the past and the future into relation with the present such that the duration “from then until then” is experienced as such: “Expressed time, the now, is dimensionally future and past . . . each now stretches itself out as such, within itself, with respect to the not-yet and the no-longer. The transitory character of each now is nothing but what we described as the spannedness of time” (BPP 273–74). Thus in spannedness, the now accomplishes what Heidegger elsewhere calls “the ecstatic unity of future and having-been-ness” (MFL 207). Time cannot accomplish this breadth or span quality simply by amassing a collection of nows, however, since each now is itself characterized by this kind of spread; each now is always pulled open between the past and the future. The fundamental unity of the temporal dimensions is therefore evident in spannedness—every now is a now only insofar as it is simultaneously a coming back to and a going toward. It seems in this regard that Heidegger is indebted to Husserl’s account of internal time consciousness, which engages in an exhaustive examination of how the experience of time as enduring indicates that retention and protention “extends the now-consciousness.” Like Husserl, Heidegger takes this kind of span to be essential to the very possibility of experience—of intentional directedness toward that which it is not (BPP 268). For this reason Heidegger will claim that “as the primary outside-itself, temporality is stretch itself” (BPP 270). This primary “outside itself”—which Heidegger also speaks of as originary temporality’s “expressive” character—is what enables Dasein to transcend toward entities. Note also that this primary outside-itself is only possible on the basis of temporality’s structure as articulated unity—a point that supports Heidegger’s claim that his temporality analysis will serve to demonstrate the fundamental unity of the care structure. Dasein is always outside itself because it is always simul-
taneously on-its-way-to and on-its-way-from—a fact that gives the now its particular character of both stretch and presentness “in the sense of the enpresenting of something” (BPP 269). As we saw in the Kant discussion, Dasein’s temporality thereby provides a unified horizon against which things can announce themselves as what they are.

This unity is further demonstrated by the fact that like all four ecstases, spannedness is deeply entwined with the meaning and expression of the other features. Thus Heidegger will note that the span’s breadth is “variable” depending on the manner in which it is dated: “But every ‘then’ is as such a ‘then, when . . .’; every ‘on that former occasion’ is an ‘on that former occasion when . . .’; every ‘now’ is a ‘now that . . .’ We shall call this seemingly self-evident relational structure . . . datability” (BT 407/374). Thus the duration of some now—its span—will depend on what is occurring “within” it: “The diversity of this duration is grounded in concern itself and in what has been placed under care for the time being. The time which I myself am each time yields a different duration according to how I am that time” (HCT 231).

Because the temporal nature of Dasein’s “speaking-itself-out” is one of ecstatic transcendence, it is defined in terms of these relational structures. With datability, Heidegger claims, “in the enpresenting of a being the enpresenting, intrinsically, is related ecstatically to something” (BPP 269). In the case of datability, this “something” is some worldly thing or event of encounter. Datability is temporality’s expressive relatedness to some instance of such making-present: “If I say ‘now’ . . . I encounter some being as that by reference to which the expressed now dates itself. Because we enunciate the now in each case in and from an enpresenting of some being, the now that is thus voiced is itself structurally enpresenting. It has the relation of datability, the factual dating always differing in point of content . . . In other words, time in the common sense, the now as seen via this dating relation, is only the index of original temporality” (BPP 269). This mode of temporality’s ecstatic relationality or indexicality—its self-locating in terms of a particular thing or event—plays a central role for Heidegger, since Dasein does not necessarily index or date the now according to an objective calendar time—indeed, Heidegger notes that “the dating can be calendrically indeterminate” (BPP 262). Rather, the things and events according to which dating occurs are generally determined on the basis of Dasein’s practical projects. Datability is therefore the primary temporal expression of Dasein’s practical way of being. Though this will be further explained in terms of significance, datability expresses Dasein’s purposive character by tying its temporal self-expression to the events and objects that are made salient by its practical projects: “The now itself guides and pushes us forward to that which is
just transpiring there in the now . . . the now is, in its essence, a ‘now when this and that . . . ’, a ‘now wherein . . . ’” (MFL 200). All of the examples Heidegger uses to demonstrate this sense of the now’s being indexed to a “this” or a “that” make reference to particular projects or events with which Dasein may be engaged—lecturing, discovering that one’s book is missing, and so on. “When we say ‘now,’ we are not focused thematically on the now as an isolated now-thing” he notes; “we are, rather, occupied with things, related to them” (MFL 200, 201).

It is for this reason that the future ecstasis of originary temporality is of such importance in understanding the temporal structure of Dasein’s way of being qua care; it is the basis of Dasein’s projective ability to understand itself by pressing forward into different possibilities and thereby accounts to a large degree for the fact that expressed temporality is dated. Temporality is tied or indexed to particular things or events—it receives connotation, we could say—because of Dasein’s ability to express itself in terms of possible ways of being-in-the-world. It is important to note that these possibilities are not to be conceived of as some “not yet nows” that are waiting to be actualized, however. This is, for example, the interpretation of Dasein’s “purposiveness” that Mark Okrent gives in Heidegger’s Pragmatism: “Understanding consists in projecting an end or purpose for oneself in terms of which those things other than Dasein have a significance, and that one’s understanding of oneself is as an end to be accomplished.”19 Okrent repeatedly makes use of this idea of “accomplishment” or “realization” in reference to Dasein’s projecting: “The self-understanding of Dasein itself as an end to be realized.”20 The problem with such language, however, is its implication that Dasein’s being-toward itself is something that could be realized or attained—a picture that contradicts Dasein’s nature as open-ended and incomplete. Such realization or actualization is in principle not possible, according to Heidegger, because Dasein is “always already its not-yet as long as it is” (BT 244/227). This projection and the future ecstasis in which it is rooted cannot be characterized as Okrent does since “the constant being-ahead-of-itself, is neither a summative together which is outstanding, nor even a not-yet-having-become accessible, but rather a not-yet that any Da-sein always has to be, given the being that it is” (BT 244/227). Characterizing the teleological structure of action in terms of states of affairs that are not yet now but are somehow waiting to be actualized—to be “made” now through action—misinterprets what Heidegger means by Dasein’s futurity or purposiveness. Since it is an existential feature rooted in Dasein’s way of being qua originary temporality, Dasein’s projecting toward an end refers to a possible self that Dasein continually struggles to be—it does not refer to a succession of events that eventually culminate in a final state.
As Theodore Schatzki puts it: “The end at which an action aims ... must be its end as long as the action is performed. The end achieves this by being a possible way of being pursued by the actor. The end (or purpose) of an action is not something that occurs after the action; it is not a state of affairs that does not yet obtain.”

Despite the tendency to take futurity as the primary ecstasis, then, futurity’s entwinement with past and present makes such a prioritization impossible. The structure of expressed temporality is a unity of the ecstases and cannot therefore focus on futurity in isolation from the other ecstases:

The then, which is utterable and arises in making-present, is always understood as “now not yet” (but rather: then). Whichever then I may choose, the then as such always refers in each case back to a now, or more precisely, the then is understood on the basis of a now, however inexplicit. Conversely, every formerly is a “now no longer” and is as such, in its structure, the bridge to a now. But this now is, in each case, the now of a particular making-present or retention in which a “then” and a “formerly” is, in each case, uttered. (MFL 202)

The futural ecstasis of originary temporality operates in and through this now—not some yet to be actualized now—and in datability, it does so by allowing particular things or events that are made present to achieve a particular import for Dasein’s self-understanding. Thus Heidegger claims that Dasein is constantly dating the now in everything taken care of: “First, because in addressing itself to something interpretively, it expresses itself too . . . And secondly because this addressing and discussing that also interprets itself is grounded in a making present, and is possible only as this” (BT 407–8/374). As we will note in our examination of the remaining features of expressed time—publicity and significance—it is not necessarily the case that the content of specific datings is determined by Dasein’s practical projects, however. Indeed, we will come to see that the public dimension of expressed time results in a mode of dating the now that is not tied to my particular projects, but establishes measures by which dating can be shared.

Before turning to these remaining features, however, we must note, first, that the expression of spanned, dated—ecstatic—temporality is only rarely explicit, despite its omnipresence. For the most part the now is expressed, according to Heidegger, “unthematically,” and “latently” (MFL 201). Despite our tendency to overlook it, however, the ecstatic relationality of the expressed now plays a crucial role for Heidegger: in spannedness it establishes and maintains the movement whereby origi-
nary temporality ties itself or locates itself within a specifiable present, while simultaneously managing to maintain its reference and openness to the past and future ecstases. Similarly, datability’s “relational structure” (BPP 262) establishes an ecstatic link between Dasein’s originary temporality and worldly things or events.

World Time

In both of these cases the ecstatic nature of the now is characterized by what Heidegger calls a particular type of “double visage”: its relational structure both maintains that which it expresses—originary temporality—while simultaneously granting it a type of detachment through its relation to otherness: “The now has a peculiar double visage . . . Time is held together within itself by the now; time’s specific continuity is rooted in the now. But conjointly, with respect to the now, time is divided, articulated into the no-longer-now, the earlier, and the not-yet-now, the later . . . The now that we count in following a motion is in each instance a different now . . . The ever different nows are, as different, nevertheless always exactly the same, namely, now.”22 In saying “now,” Dasein thus expresses a temporal moment that encompasses both sameness and difference: all nows are expressive of Dasein’s original temporality, but this interpretive self-expression comes in the form of a temporal articulation that is always defined in terms of “otherness, being-other” (BPP 247). Thus in characterizing the “then”—the expression of originary temporality’s futurity—Heidegger will “locate” it “neither in objects nor in subjects (in the traditional conception), neither here nor there but, as it were, on the way from the subject to the object! But we are already acquainted with this ‘on-the-way,’ as the stepping-over, as transcendence. This on-the-way is only a reference to the ‘location’ where, in the end, that ‘is’ which we utter as time character” (MFL 202).

Thus the now occupies a pivotal role: using admittedly dangerous language considering Heidegger’s attempts to overcome this dichotomy, it brings the “subjective” into the “objective”—while maintaining its subjective nature by first giving it a relational context for self-interpretive expression. This constituted context is the essence of what Heidegger means by world time: “World time is more ‘objective’ than any possible object because, with the disclosedness of the world, it always already becomes ecstatically and horizontally ‘objectified’ as the condition of the possibility of innerworldly beings . . . But world time is also ‘more subjective’ than any possible subject since it first makes possible the being of the factual existing self, that being which, as is
now well understood, is the meaning of care” (BT 419/384–85). World time is therefore the context in which Dasein—the factual existing self—first becomes possible. Dasein’s temporality “speaking itself out” into time is what first constitutes the horizon in terms of which Dasein can understand itself as existing qua factual self—and results in the context in terms of which things can be encountered as existing within time at all. Thus Heidegger will claim that “the relationship we have to time at any given time is in no way tacit [or] something negligible, but is precisely what sustains our dwelling in the world” (ZS 66–67). Indeed, he makes explicit note of this order of temporal constitution: “Temporality, as ecstatic and horizontal, first temporalizes something like world time that constitutes a within-timeness of things at hand and objectively present” (BT 420/385). Originary temporality expresses itself in a world time which then constitutes the intratemporality definitive of things.

This dependence of the intratemporal on world time is clear: “That time should hold-around beings, con-tain them, in such a way that we recognize what it holds as intratemporal, is possible and necessary because of the character of time as world-time” (BPP 274). Emphasizing the distinction between ordinary time and world time—and characterizing the former as founded on or derivative of the latter—differs from interpretations such as Frederick Olafson’s, which consistently equates the two. Such an interpretation is clearly opposed to Heidegger’s distinction between them, however: whereas world time is explicitly characterized by significance, dataility and publicity, in vulgar time these are concealed and forgotten: “The vulgar interpretation of time covers them over” (BT 422/387). It is true, he acknowledges, that it is possible to conceive of time in terms of that which is nearest to us—Zuhanden things—such that we characterize the now in terms of undifferentiated objective presence. This is the essence of the vulgar concept of time: since “the common understanding of time is aware of being only in the sense of extant being, being at hand . . . time gets interpreted also as something somehow extant . . . The nows appear to be intratemporal” (BPP 272). Despite this intratemporal model for characterizing the now, however, we also recognize the now to be that within which the intratemporal occurs. Heidegger will consequently characterize the now as both articulated “in time” and as unifyingly constitutive of within-timeness. Though we generally overlook the complexity of this ecstatic structure and think of it merely in terms of vulgar undifferentiated instants, he is clear about the necessary complexity and order of priority for any adequate characterization of Dasein’s being-in-the-world: “Which is the ‘true’ time? Let us suppose that time were merely given to us as a sequence in which the aforementioned characteristics—dataility, significance, extendedness, and
Publicness—were all leveled down to an empty ‘now’ sequence. Affected only by time represented this way, we would become deranged” (ZS 50).

The world time context within which intratemporal things are encountered—and within which Dasein can first exist qua factical self—is essentially constituted not only by the ecstatic relationality of spanned-ness and datability, however, but by the remaining features of time to be considered: publicity and significance. Though the ordinary sense of time takes its understanding from thingly within-timeness, by analyzing the role that significance and publicity play in constituting world time, we can recognize the ontological priority that encounters with other Dasein will play in the possibility of world time. In the following sections it will become clear that the inter-Dasein encounter serves to co-constitute world time—encounters which therefore have priority over the Zuhanden and Vorhanden encounters with things that occur within this constituted world-time context. This intersubjective world-constitution thereby refutes critics such as Michael Theunissen, who argue that Heidegger’s claims regarding the difference between encountering things and encountering other Dasein is undermined by the priority that his work consistently gives to Zuhanden and Vorhanden—thingly—existence. Contrary to Theunissen’s claims, “the inner order of the event of encountering” does not, in fact, prioritize the latter, since thingly “intratemporal” encounters are dependent on the publicity of time and the context of significance that this helps to establish.

Publicity

In Dasein’s expression of its primordial temporality it speaks-itself-out into a now that both indexes and manifests Dasein’s ecstatic nature, thereby granting the now a “peculiar double visage”—a temporal ecstatic that is nonetheless tied to a datable present. Encounters between several such temporalizing beings navigate this complex structure of sameness and difference: “Several people can say ‘now’ together, and each can date the ‘now’ in a different way: now that this or that happens. The ‘now’ expressed is spoken by each one in the publicness of being-with-one-another-in-the-world. The time interpreted and expressed by actual Dasein is thus also always already made public as such on the basis of its ecstatic being-in-the-world” (BT 411/377). The import of such a claim is profound, for it characterizes the encounter between temporality-defined Dasein on the most fundamental level. The capacity to express my originary temporality in a now indexically tied to an event of making-present
for me—a now that is nevertheless also a now that is accessible for you and is thus simultaneously an expression of your originary temporality—will be the essence of a Heideggerian response to Sartre’s criticism. “Although each of us utters his own now, it is nevertheless the now for everyone” (BPP 264). In simultaneously speaking-themselves-out into a common now—a temporal structure defined by both commonality and difference—multiple Dasein encounter each other as beings defined by originary temporality:

Fourth, the datable, significant, and extended “now” is also never initially a “now,” merely referring to me. This erroneous opinion could impose itself insofar as at any given time I am the one who says “now.” In each instance that very “now” I just said is the “now” we say; that is, in each case, without reference to the particular I who says “now,” we all jointly understand it immediately. It is a “now” that is immediately commonly accessible to all of us talking here with each other. (ZS 48)

Thus the publicity that is definitive of temporality’s self-expression points us again to Heidegger’s claim that nowness is always “otherness, being-other” (BPP 248)—the now is a paradoxical structure in that it is a context of sameness that nevertheless expresses difference. The type of ecstatic relation to otherness characteristic of the now is not only the temporal reference to past/future or to worldly event, however, but also involves an intrinsic ecstatic relation to the multiple voices saying now, the many Dasein engaged in expressing their originary temporality:

There is no need to mediate between the individual egos through an [act of] reflection as if they said “now” separately and only subsequently agreed with each other that they were referring to the same now. Therefore, the “now” is neither something first found in the subject, nor is it an object which can be found among other objects, as for instance this table and this glass. Nevertheless, at any given time the spoken “now” is immediately received-perceived jointly by everyone present. We call this accessibility of “now” the publicness [Öffentlichkeit] of “now.” (ZS 48)

The ecstasis definitive of making present, then, cannot be understood simply as a “standing out” from future and past, but must be characterized in terms of the ecstatic encounter with the other Dasein’s originary temporality. This allows Heidegger to escape a criticism that Fleischer puts forth in Die Zeitanalysen in Heideggers ‘Sein und Zeit’; namely, that Heidegger’s turn to temporality is unnecessary since the analysis of care essentially already accounts for Dasein’s way of being: “Wird Zeitlichkeit dem Dasein nicht
als sein Sein zugrunde gelegt, dann entsteht nach meiner Auffassung, wie ausgeführt, für die Ganzheit der Sorge kein Schaden.”

Contrary to Fleischer’s claims, however, the move from care to its underlying basis in temporality demonstrates the manner in which the encounter with other selves—the being-with dimension of care—is always operative despite the inauthentic tendency to misconstrue the otherness that defines this encounter. The ecstatic nature of the now has its vector of ecstasis not simply in terms of the temporal extension of my own being, but primarily in terms of the others with whom the intersubjectivity of world time is established and maintained. Thus Heidegger notes that the publicity of the now cannot be understood as the contingent accomplishment of isolated egos—rather, Dasein’s individual now-saying is always already an openness to the now-saying of other Dasein.

Heidegger seems to recognize this social nature of the establishment of world time: “Fellow humans . . . join in constituting the world” (BPP 297). This shared and yet individuated nature of expressed time is what allows for the constitution of intersubjective world time: allowing Heidegger to ask—though he does not pursue—“How is the simultaneity of different things possible?” This question is, he recognizes, “more precisely, the question of the possibility of an intersubjective establishment of simultaneous events” (BPP 237). Though the intersubjective nature of world time is not explored in detail, it nevertheless accounts for his move from originary temporality to ordinary time. As Heidegger notes, “‘Public time’ turns out to be the time ‘in which’ innerworldly things at hand and objectively present are encountered. This requires that we call these beings unlike Dasein beings within-time” (BT 412/378). Beings like Dasein, however, are the ones who constitute public time—or “the” time that provides an “objective” context within which things can be encountered. This objectivity is established through intersubjective encounters with others whose basic ontological structure is also originary temporality speaking-itself-out.

Heidegger’s failure to elaborate on this essentially public nature of originary time may explain Blattner’s failure to recognize its import. In order to support his claim that Heidegger cannot account for the shift from originary to ordinary time, Blattner must show that the move through world time will not provide the sequentiality that is present in ordinary time, but absent in originary time. By ignoring the role of publicity, however, Blattner misses Heidegger’s solution to this problem. Namely, that the first step in achieving sequentiality is in recognizing that though Dasein’s primordial temporality is not itself sequential, through the encounter with other Dasein its expression is limited and relativized. Sequentiality depends on the recognition of times other than my own—
nows other than this now. The bringing into relation or taking account of time in terms of the temporality of other Dasein—which we will examine further in our analysis of significance—is essential for the arrangement or ordering of Dasein’s temporal expression and thereby a necessary precondition for the completely ordered arrangement of sequential “vulgar” time.27

Blattner focuses, instead, on what he calls “pragmatic temporality,” which is intended to link originary time and world time: “Dasein’s experience of world-time is grounded in its originary temporality . . . First, one understands world-time by reckoning with time. Time-reckoning is the mode of understanding in virtue of which Dasein is able to encounter and to understand world-time. Second, time-reckoning depends upon pragmatic temporality . . . Third, pragmatic temporality depends upon originary temporality” (HTI 135–36). This relationship is due, Blattner believes, to the fact that “pragmatic temporality makes possible Dasein’s understanding of world-time, because world-time is based on its understanding of the pragmatic Now” (HTI 149). Thus “pragmatic temporality turns out to be an elaboration of originary enpresenting” (HTI 161) which somehow collapses or expresses the three dimensions of originary temporality within the present: “The entire pragmatic framework belongs to the originary Present” (HTI 162).

This is in keeping with our earlier discussion of the datability of the now and the manner in which Dasein’s practical projects—including their future and past ecstases—are expressed in the now. Blattner’s problem arises when he notes that “the structure from the awaiting to the retaining is the understanding of the Now. But it is essential to the Now that it is part of a sequence of Nows. An understanding of a sequence, however, is in no way represented in the structure depicted here. To get the understanding of a sequence, Dasein must interpret the structural unit that ranges from the awaiting to the retaining as iterated” (HTI 162). With his emphasis on the pragmatic Now, however, Blattner overlooks the feature of Dasein’s temporality that allows this iteration: its publicity. The iteration required for sequentiality cannot be accomplished from within the private parameters of a pragmatic temporality but depends on the recognition of a multiplicity of temporalities—of times that are not my own. Without the other Dasein speaking out their “nows” it would not be possible to recognize a now other than the one within which my own originary temporality is always expressed.28

That the role of other Dasein has essentially dropped out of consideration is evident in Blattner’s interpretation: “How can world-time be the way in which time shows up in our ongoing, everyday activity, if it is a sequence of Nows, and if everyday activity is a form of absorption
in work? After all, if one is absorbed in work, one does not confront a sequence of Nows. Other Nows are not at issue. As Brown lectures, absorbed in her task, there is only the Now, when she lectures, and its boundaries, the former and the then” (HTI 149). Note Blattner’s claim that “other Nows are not at issue.” The fundamental feature of temporality’s publicity, I argue, is precisely the fact that in encountering other Dasein it is “other nows” that are at issue. Indeed, the example Blattner uses is precisely one of conflicting interpersonal now-saying—the disruption that is caused when the significance of the now of one person comes into conflict with the significance of another’s, when the other’s desire for a coffee break interrupts Brown’s lecture—but Blattner fails to recognize its import for Heidegger’s position. Though he emphasizes the datability, spannedness, and significance of Brown’s now, all he says of its publicity—its temporally intersubjective dimension—is that “finally, all this is public, humorously available to all the students in the class” (HTI 151).

According to Heidegger, however, temporality’s essential publicity is not as superficial as such a reading indicates. That Blattner overlooks the crucial importance of the intersubjective dimension in Heidegger’s account is evident in his virtual dismissal of Heidegger’s account of discourse, which is, as we will discuss further in the following chapter, the mode of disclosure specific to being-with. According to Blattner, “Heidegger offers nothing distinctive to say about the temporality of discourse,” since he “passes this project off into a promissory note” (HTI 122). This “promissory note” is Heidegger’s claim that our analysis of the temporal constitution of discourse and the explication of the temporal characteristics of language patterns can be tackled only if the problem of the fundamental connection between being and truth has been unfolded in terms of the problematics of temporality. Then the ontological meaning of the “is” can be defined, which a superficial theory of propositions and judgments has distorted into the “copula.” The “origination” of “significance” can be clarified and the possibility of the formulation of concepts can be made ontologically intelligible only in terms of the temporality of discourse, that is, of Dasein in general. (BT 349/320–21)

Heidegger’s explicit commentary on the temporality of discourse is admittedly sketchy and does seem to arbitrarily defer its analysis—but not that of the temporality of understanding or attunement—until after the being/truth connection has been clarified. The reason for this is Heidegger’s own failure to fully elaborate on the intersubjective dimension on which his account is based. Whether he was unwilling or unable to
acknowledge the complexity demanded of his account if it were to fully accommodate world-constituting encounters with other temporality-defined Dasein, or whether he simply failed to recognize the essential supporting role that this intersubjective dimension was playing in his own account is unclear. It is evident, however, that this role is overlooked by Blattner—as well as many others. Thus he interprets Heidegger’s claims that “discourse does not temporalize itself primarily in a definite ecstasy” and that “making present has, of course, a privileged constitutive function” (BT 349/320) as being evidence that Heidegger “does not say much, after all” (HTI 122). On the contrary, I believe that discourse’s mode of temporalizing is not limited to a determinate ecstatic because it is the mode in which other Dasein qua temporalizing beings—that is, beings unlimited to one definite ecstasy—are disclosed.

Reckoning with Time

According to Heidegger, the profound publicity of time that is articulated in discourse “does not occur occasionally and subsequently” (BT 411/378)—rather, the intersubjective nature of temporality’s expression structures all of Dasein’s comportments: “Since Da-sein is always already disclosed as ecstatic and temporal and because understanding and interpretation belong to existence, time has also already made itself public in taking care. One orients oneself toward it, so that it must somehow be available for everyone” (BT 411/378). This “orienting toward time” such that “time taken care of” is made intersubjectively available, occurs when Dasein “reckons” with time—a reckoning that is essentially “time measurement” (BT 415/381). In this reckoning time-orientation, Dasein “initially discovers time and develops a measurement of time. Measurement of time is constitutive for being-in-the-world. Measuring its time, the discovering of circumspection which takes care of things lets what it discovers at hand and objectively present be encountered in time. Innerworldly beings thus become accessible as ‘existing in time’” (BT 333/305–6).

It is this time-measure that establishes world time—the shared arena of significance, datability, and duration necessary for innerworldly beings to become accessible. Dasein submits itself to standards of temporal ordering that are available to all and thereby establishes a public “arrangement” of time—a point essential for the transition from ecstatic original temporality to sequential ordinary time. Through measure, the multiplicity of nows are brought into an ordered alignment. In developing these orienting measures that are available for everyone, Dasein
essentially builds on its intersubjective co-temporality to create an established context that is more explicit, efficient, and inclusive by looking for objects or events (such as sunrise) by which it can engage in shared “datings” of the simultaneous now-saying. In such cases, Heidegger claims, “That which dates is available in the surrounding world and yet not restricted to the actual world of useful things taken care of . . . everyone can ‘count on’ this public dating in which everyone gives himself his time. It makes use of a measure that is available to the public” (BT 413/379). Note that the event or thing chosen for public dating is not restricted to the practical projects of a particular Dasein’s understanding, contrary to the emphasis that Okrent, Blattner, and others place on the essentially pragmatic nature of expressed temporality. Indeed, Heidegger explicitly claims that “that which dates is available in the surrounding world and yet not restricted to the actual world of useful things taken care of” (BT 413/379). Instead Dasein establishes a measure for indexing its originary temporality that is in a certain sense independent of its pragmatic abilities-to-be. Indeed, Heidegger clarifies that datability must be understood primarily in terms of this “reckoning” mode of dating, the mode of dating characteristic of temporality’s publicity:

Although taking care of time can be carried out in the mode of dating that we characterized—namely, in terms of events in the surrounding world—this always occurs basically in the horizon of a taking care of time that we know as astronomical and calendrical time-reckoning. This reckoning is not a matter of chance, but has its existential and ontological necessity in the fundamental constitution of Da-sein as care. Since Da-sein essentially exists entangled as thrown, it interprets its time heedfully by way of a reckoning with time. In this reckoning, the “real” making public of time temporalizes itself so that we must say that the thrownness of Da-sein is the reason why “there is” public time. (BT 411–12/378)

Dasein dates the now primarily in light of the others with whom it must share time by developing an ecstatic relation to public norms or standards of time-reckoning according to which all Dasein orient and order their different temporalities. Dasein is “heedful” of the others by submitting itself to measures that allow for a shared temporal space.

Contrary to many interpretations of the normalizing role that these public measures play in Heidegger’s work, this self-subsumption to shared norms is not inherently inauthentic. Heidegger notes that reckoning with time does not necessarily result in an inauthentic now: “the pure now, cut off in its complete structure” (BT 426–27/391). Rather, Heidegger explicitly claims that in such a measuring orienting-toward-time, “The now is always already understood and interpreted in its complete structural con-
tent of dataility, spannedness, publicness, and worldliness” (*BT* 416/382). Nevertheless, temporality’s self-expression in terms of measure is conducive to Dasein’s understanding of the now in a truncated and distorted way—that is, inauthentically—since such ordered now-saying involves encountering a temporality other than one’s own, and thereby opens the possibility of interpreting temporality as completely unowned. This may explain Heidegger’s tendency to elide fallenness and being-with. This distortive consequence is not a necessary result of Dasein’s tendency to orient itself toward time in terms of publicity and measure, however. Such distortion occurs only when Dasein loses sight of the nature of its measure-taking, subsuming itself to interpretations appropriate to intratemporal, thingly being.

Properly understood, however, “reckoning” or time measure does not involve Dasein subsuming itself to thingly being—the clock or the sun—but to some intersubjectively shared making-present that establishes parameters for temporality’s self-expression in dating the now. Thus “what is ontologically decisive” in measuring lies not in the thing against which something is measured, but

in the specific making present that makes measurement possible. Dating in terms of what is objectively present “spatially” is so far from a spatialization of time that this supposed spatialization signifies nothing other than that a being that is objectively present for everyone in every now is made present in its own presence. Measuring time is essentially such that it is necessary to say now, but in obtaining the measurement we, as it were, forget what has been measured as such so that nothing is to be found except distance and number. (*BT* 418/383–84)

What is definitive is not the thing measured or used to measure, but the shared measuring. Thus Heidegger will claim in *The Zollikon Seminars*: “We say ‘now’ when we speak to each other. In so doing, the ‘date’ is used in the original sense of the word as ‘that which is given’; in our discussion the ‘now’ refers to this ‘givenness’” (*ZS* 47). Indeed, in a discussion of Leibniz from *History of the Concept of Time*, Heidegger indicates the necessity of the “compresence” of multiple Dasein for measuring (*HCT* 235).

Significance

Throughout his work we see Heidegger arguing that the making-present accomplished through the co-giving of measure includes an implicit acknowledgment of the other Dasein engaged in temporalizing
now-saying—others with whom Dasein establishes shared (present-for-everyone) standards by which Dasein can orient itself. These shared standards against which Dasein can “signify to itself its ability to be” (BPP 295–96) is what “we call significance . . . the structure of what we call the world in the strictly ontological sense” (BPP 295–96). The world is the normatively structured public context defined by significance: the fourth feature of expressed originary temporality. As Kisiel notes, “The dynamics (and so the temporality) of this signifying milieu will tend to be obscured by an abstractive categorizing when it is reiterated over the years that meaningfulness, significance, is the central and primary character of being of the world.” Early on, however, Heidegger more clearly recognizes the dynamic temporalizing of the many Dasein involved in constituting this signifying milieu. This context of appropriateness relations is co-constituted by the many Dasein who orient themselves in terms of communal measures of temporal expression. The world—this shared normative space—is accomplished through temporality’s ecstatic speaking itself out through the now’s relation to the temporal ecstases, to worldly things and events, to others defined by temporality, and to the norms of measure according to which multiple Dasein can orient themselves. It is for this reason that Heidegger can claim that “time is essentially a self-opening and expanding into a world” (MFL 210). Primordial temporality expresses itself in an intersubjective time of shared significance through reckoning, measuring, and ordering with the others—thereby constituting the context of sequentiality and significance in which Dasein finds meaningful standards for orienting its way of being in the world. “We see then the peculiar productivity intrinsic to temporality, in the sense that the product is precisely a peculiar nothing, the world” (MFL 210). This “product” is co-constituted with the others through shared measures that accommodate the temporal way of being of many Dasein. “If the time we take care of is ‘really’ made public only when it gets measured, then public time is to be accessible in a way that has been phenomenally unveiled” (BT 414/380). To understand this making-public through measure, Heidegger demonstrates its rootedness in norms of appropriateness and inappropriateness:

When the “then” that interprets itself in heedful awaiting gets dated, this dating includes some such statement as: then—when it dawns—it is time for the day’s work. The time interpreted in taking care is always already understood as time for . . . The actual “now that so and so” is as such either appropriate or inappropriate. The “now”—and thus every mode of interpreted time—is not only a “now that . . .” that is essentially datable, but is at the same time essentially determined by the
structure of appropriateness. Interpreted time has by its very nature the character of “time for . . .” or “not the time for . . .” The making present that awaits and retains of taking care understands time in its relation to a what-for, that is in turn ultimately anchored in a for-the-sake-of-which of the potentiality-of-being of Dasein. With this relation of in-order-to, time made public reveals the structure that we got to know earlier as significance. It constitutes the worldliness of the world. As time-for . . ., the time that has been made public essentially has the nature of world. (BT 414/380)

For Heidegger, then, world is the context in which Dasein enacts its ability to be according to public norms or measures. These measures are characterized by reliability—they are something “everyone can ‘count on’” (BT 413/379) and they are uncontroversial and accessible—they are “for ‘everyone’ at any time in the same way so that within certain limits everyone is initially agreed upon it” (BT 413/379). Indeed, Heidegger will claim that “the idea of a standard implies unchangingness” (BT 417/383) and thus is available “at every time for everyone” (BT 417/383). The public measuring that constitutes world is normative not only because the standards it institutes are unchanging and universally accessible, however, but because they are constraining; they are “binding for everyone” (BT 417/383). The other is a necessary condition for the possibility of the world qua context of normative significance, then, insofar as the measures of appropriateness in terms of which I orient my temporalizing would not achieve obligating force if the others did not require me to accommodate my temporalizing to their time through the establishment of binding public standards: “One orients oneself toward it, so that it must somehow be available for everyone” (BT 411/378). This point allows us to recognize that Heidegger’s account makes room for a claim that the other makes on me prior to and as a condition for these public norms. Though he fails to examine the implications of this—especially the ethical implications—his position clearly involves such a moment of claim: all of Dasein’s time-reckonings, regardless of its care-driven projects, “must still be in conformity with the time given by the others” (BT 418/384). We will discuss this issue in greater detail in the following chapters.

Despite this ethical moment at work in his account, however, the primary arena in which Heidegger analyzes the normativity of the public sphere is in the functionality of tools and equipment, where the being of the tools used is determined by their “specific equipmental function” (BPP 292). Things encountered in the world are understood in terms of what they are for—an understanding with an inherent recognition of the normative possibilities of succeeding or failing. “Each individual piece
of equipment is by its own nature equipment-for—for traveling, for writing, for flying. Each one has its immanent reference to that for which it is what it is. It is always something for, pointing to a for-which” (BPP 163–64). Dasein’s everyday immersion in things cannot obscure the fact that their meaning is determined by normative functionality relations and that these functionality relations are themselves grounded in Dasein’s way of being qua originary temporality—which includes the ecstatic relation to the other Dasein.

Letting-function, as understanding of functionality, has a temporal constitution. But it itself points back to a still more original temporality. Only when we have apprehended the more original temporalizing are we able to survey in what way the understanding of the being of beings—here either of the equipmental character and handiness of handy equipment or of the thinghood of extant things and the at-handness of the at-hand—is made possible by time and thus becomes transparent. (BPP 294)

The emphasis on the role of the others in co-constituting the world should not obscure the emphasis that Heidegger places on the for-the-sake-of grounding the world’s context of significance, however. Though the others are essential for establishing the publicity and bindingness of worldly significances, the commitment with which Dasein submits itself to them is rooted in its way of being qua mineness. In “On the Essence of Ground,” for example, Heidegger explicitly claims that interpreting being-in-the-world requires “starting from the ‘for-the-sake-of’ as the primary character of world.” This point returns us to chapter 2 and the nature of Dasein as a being defined by a mineness that drives it to seek objective standards according to which it may measure its success at existing. “If temporality constitutes the primordial meaning of being of Dasein, and if this being is concerned about its being in its very being, then care must need ‘time’ and thus reckon with ‘time.’ The temporality of Dasein develops a ‘time calculation’” (BT 235/217). We note here how deeply this way of being runs—Dasein does not simply establish this or that standard of measure, but always expresses itself to and with the others such that world time and the corresponding context of normative significance—world—can be. This urge to measure—the very manner in which time becomes public—is, according to Heidegger, the essential structure of all of Dasein’s comportments: “All measuring is not necessarily quantitative. Whenever I take notice of something as something, then I myself have ‘measured up to’ [an-messen] what a thing is. This ‘measuring up’ [Sich-anmessen] to what is, is the fundamental structure of human comportment toward things. In all comprehending of some-
thing as something, for instance, of the table as a table, I myself measure up to what I have comprehended” (ZS 100). Underlying the norms and measures characterizing world is Dasein’s nature as a being-entrusted with its own being, a self-responsibility that manifests itself in the commitment to these norms and measures. Recall the discussion from chapter 4, where it was shown that the interruption of the Zuhanden could be overcome in a principled manner insofar as Dasein is committed to getting itself right—and therefore cares about getting its encounters with things right. This existential self-responsibility is a necessary condition for understanding the world as normative context of significance, since Dasein must care about how it is to be in heeding the other’s temporal claim and committing itself to shared measures. The appropriateness relations definitive of the public arena depend on the fact that this appropriateness matters to Dasein. Thus speaking itself out into world—Dasein’s mundanizing temporal self-expression—must be understood as directed by the mineness of the way in which this self-expression is accomplished.

The measured expression into world—in which Dasein both expresses the mineness of its being, and accommodates that of the others—is neither chosen nor avoidable: “This reckoning is not a matter of chance” (BT 411/378). Rather, such mundanizing temporalizing is an essential consequence of Dasein’s way of being: “The fact that transcendence temporalizes itself as a primordial occurrence, does not stand in the power of this freedom itself. Yet impotence (thrownness) is not first the result of beings forcing themselves upon Dasein, but rather determines Dasein’s being as such. All projection of world is therefore thrown” (“OEG” 135). The unique structure of world is such that it is both constituted by Dasein and yet first provides it a context for being: in “On the Essence of Ground” Heidegger defines Dasein’s temporalizing transcendence as “that surpassing that makes possible such a thing as existence in general” and as that which “constitutes selfhood” (“OEG” 108); he further claims that “‘Dasein transcends’ means: in the essence of its being it is world-forming, ‘forming’ [bildend] in the multiple sense that it lets world occur, and through the world gives itself an original view (form [Bild]) that is not explicitly grasped, yet functions precisely as a paradigmatic form [Vor-bild] for all manifest beings, among which each respective Dasein itself belongs” (“OEG” 123).

We can see here echoes of our earlier discussion of Heidegger’s indebtedness to Kant and Husserl: the active-passive structure of the fundamental horizon of intuition—expressed temporality’s world-forming—is evident here. Dasein speaks itself out in a responsive, relational transcending toward the world that is both constituted by, and makes possible, Dasein’s way of being. Though such a structure may appear to be
somewhat paradoxical, it is important to be clear that this is a transcendental claim and cannot be understood as a type of occurrence that takes place in time: “‘Time’ is neither objectively present in the ‘subject’ nor in the ‘object,’ neither ‘inside’ nor ‘outside,’ and it ‘is’ ‘prior’ to every subjectivity and objectivity, because it presents the condition for the very possibility of this ‘prior’” (BT 419/384–85). There is not first a worldless, originary temporal Dasein and then, through its temporalizing, world is formed. Rather, Dasein is always already worldly and as such it is always already sharing this world with the others. What is being articulated is the condition for the possibility of a shared intratemporal world within which the finitude and mineness of Dasein’s originary temporality are nevertheless expressed. Husserl faces this same problem in the fifth of his Cartesian Meditations insofar as he starts from the immanence of the transcendental ego and attempts to demonstrate how it is always already intersubjective. There are serious difficulties with Husserl’s approach, however, insofar as he clings to the essential solipsism of the “primal ego.” Though the details of Husserl’s account cannot be addressed here, it seems clear that Heidegger is both indebted to Husserl’s account and attempts to escape its difficulties by reversing the order of precedence. He starts with our worldly, intersubjective way of being and attempts to demonstrate that the finitude and mineness of originary temporality is a condition for its possibility.

Inauthentic Temporalizing

The role that others play in this shared world-constituting—the finitude and mineness of their way of being qua co-constitutors—can be acknowledged to varying degrees. It is possible to encounter other Dasein not only in terms of their originary temporality to which I must accommodate my own, but also as innerworldly, intratemporal beings. Indeed, this is how the distinction between Mitsein (being-with) and Mitdasein (co-Dasein) is best understood—not as a difference between a category and a particular, but as a difference between dimensions of intersubjective encounter—world-constituting and innerworldly. Thus Heidegger claims that “we must not overlook the fact that we are also using the term Mitdasein as a designation of the being to which the existing others are freed within the world” (BT 120/113). Mitdasein refers to the mode of being of other Dasein insofar as they can be considered worldly, the “everyday innerworldly Mitdasein of others” (BT 121/114). Though others can be encountered as co-constitutors of the world—insofar as they have a unique
now-saying to which I must accommodate my now-saying—they can also be encountered in terms of the innerworldly context that is established through these measures. Heidegger’s comments indicate that the term *Mitdasein* designates only the latter, innerworldly mode of being and encounter. So, for example, Heidegger will claim that *Mitdasein* is a kind of being of “something encountered within the world” (*BT* 140/131–32)—a worldly encounter that depends on a more primordial *Mitsein* way of being: “Only because it has the essential structure of being-with, is one’s own Da-sein *Mitdasein* as encounterable by others” (*BT* 121/113). *Mitdasein* is the innerworldly or intratemporal manifestation of the other’s being, which is made possible by the very world that presupposes—and is established on the basis of—*Mitsein*: “Our analysis has shown that being-with is an existential constituent of being-in-the-world. *Mitdasein* has proved to be a manner of being which beings encountered within the world have as their own” (*BT* 125/117). He elaborates further on *Mitdasein* as the innerworldly manner of being-with: “The world not only frees things at hand as beings encountered within the world, but also Da-sein, the others in their *Mitdasein*. But in accordance with its own meaning of being, this being which is freed in the surrounding world is being-in in the same world in which, as encounterable for others, it is there with them” (*BT* 123/115).

Like the others, I too am encountered as *Mitdasein* when I am encountered as an innerworldly entity, and such innerworldly being is made possible by the world. What this means is that I am encountered—and I encounter others—in terms of the public norms and measures that define this intersubjective sphere. Dasein’s everyday way of encounter with others is delineated by public, worldly roles and meanings: “One’s own Da-sein, like the *Mitdasein* of others, is encountered, initially and for the most part, in terms of the world-together in the surrounding world taken care of” (*BT* 125/118). What this does not entail, however, is that I only encounter other Dasein as “innerworldly”—intratemporal and public—though the fallen tendency to focus solely on the innerworldly tends to this interpretation. It is the more primordial dimension of intersubjective encounter—a mode forgotten and yet operative in everydayness—that establishes and maintains the “world-together” that is presupposed in all innerworldly *Mitdasein* encounters.

To what extent does this account of Dasein’s intersubjective temporalizing overcome Sartre’s critique? Though the fact of Dasein’s being-in-the-world indicates that there must be other Dasein with whom such a world is co-constituted, to what extent are these others encountered as *individuals*? Have we answered Sartre’s worry, or have we merely reiterated being-with as an a priori category—though complex and tempo-
nal—under which individual Dasein are subsumed? Recall that in order to avoid the conclusion that the shared nature of the world is only experienced when concrete others are present—the problem that afflicted Sartre’s account—it must be the case that the world itself contains references to the others with whom I share it. Once a public, shared time has been established based on communal standards of measure, the intratemporal things encountered therein will point to the other Dasein who can potentially encounter or use a thing. Thus Heidegger claims that “in the kind of being of these things at hand, that is, in their relevance, there lies an essential reference to possible wearers for whom they should be ‘cut to the figure’” (BT 117/111).

This characterization of things as defined by a type of horizon of reference to possible others is deeply reminiscent of Husserl’s analyses of the intersubjective nature of the objectivity of objects. Every perception of an object refers to a horizon of anticipations of further possible perceptions, including perceptions that belong to other possible perceivers. A difficulty arises, however, when we recognize that for Husserl, this horizon of reference is anonymous and unlimited. As Dan Zahavi notes,

As a transcendent object, it possesses an infinite diversity of coexisting and compatible profiles, and my experience of it naturally does not presuppose that each of its profiles is simultaneously perpetually intended by a subject, which would presuppose an infinite plurality of foreign I’s who are currently actually perceiving it (and who are perceived by me as so doing). Although not only the appresentation but also the horizonal givenness of the object (i.e., the appearance of the object) seem to presuppose some sort of relation to foreign subjectivity, it is neither a matter of the relation to one foreign I alone, nor a matter of the relation to the factual existence of several I’s.33

In other words, the horizonal reference to other subjectivities implicit in the encounter with worldly things seems to be a reference to a type of thematic or a priori other—the other “in principle”—and not to the factual experience of this or that other concrete subjectivity. According to Zahavi, Husserl’s account therefore demands that one distinguish between several types of experiences of others. On the one hand, perception’s anonymous structural reference to possible others points to “an infinite plurality of possible others, which Husserl occasionally characterizes as the open intersubjectivity.”34 On the other, “it is only the concrete experience of others that permits the self-mundanization of the transcendental I and the thematic experience of validity-for-everyone.”35 In this regard, one could characterize being-with as Heidegger’s version of this type
of open intersubjectivity—a conclusion that would force us to conclude that Heidegger’s account does not escape Sartre’s criticisms. This interpretation seems to be implied in comments such as Heidegger’s claim that “the Dasein is, as such, essentially open for the co-existence of other Daseins” (BPP 296).

In light of such claims, should all of our everyday encounters with other Dasein be characterized as a type of primal co-constitution of world, or simply as innerworldly, anonymous encounters that merely rely on the previously established intersubjective realm? There are a number of points that must be kept in mind here. First, the “openness” and anonymity of the intersubjective reference at play in the thing’s referral to possible others is dependent on the concrete encounter with another Dasein’s temporal particularity. The reason for this is that the recognition of another now that is simultaneous but transcendent to my own—the type of transcendence essential for establishing a shared world time—could not be accomplished as a type of imaginative variation on my own now. Acknowledging another now is inherently acknowledging a foreign temporality-defined self. The initiation into co-temporality must be accomplished in the concrete encounter with other Dasein expressing their originary temporalities. A similar point is made by Tugendhat in regard to Husserl’s account of intersubjectivity; namely, that if others were not encountered as foreign co-constituting subjectivities, their role as co-constitutors would be impossible.

On the basis of this inaugural encounter with another subjectivity, the transference of this co-presence to other encounters may occur in terms of the shared world that results—in other words, the world may refer to a type of open intersubjectivity, such that the trace of some other Dasein is present in the cultivated field or the encountered artifact. Nevertheless, the order of precedence prioritizes the inaugural encounter with concrete foreign temporalities. Though the presence of other Dasein can be encountered through anonymous worldly roles and norms, then—a situation necessary to account for the publicity of worldly things and spaces—the condition for this possibility is the primal encounter with the foreign now that evokes or initiates shared roles and norms. The category Mitsein is operative qua category, but it is characterized by a temporal responsiveness to the concrete encounter—as our discussion of Heidegger’s debt to Husserl and Kant in this regard has indicated. Like the other existentials, being-with is in the service of temporal intuition; but in this case, intuition does not give intratemporal things, but foreign originary temporalities—other Dasein.

Since Dasein’s way of being is temporalizing, encountering another Dasein involves encountering a temporalizing being expressing itself in
time. The “with” of being-with is a constant speaking out of my now to the others such that we come to share a particular temporal now and thereby establish a common space of measured meaning. And because my encounter with the other who says “now” is a direct experience of her originary temporality—the fundamental expression of her concrete care-defined way of being—such encounters are not simple subsumptions of the other to an a priori category, as Sartre claims. Simultaneous “speaking out” of temporality into world time—expressions that first institute the possibility of simultaneity—are concrete encounters with others unmediated by abstract categories or worldly interpretations. Other Dasein are given in the particularity of their temporal self-disclosure—their expressive now-saying—and it is only thus that we can co-constitute the world. Though our fallen tendency to take our understandings from intratemporal things encourages distorted characterizations of the condition in which we find ourselves, the fact that the shared space of world time and significance is accomplished in the co-now-saying of multiple Dasein cannot be completely elided: “Somewhere and somehow time breaks through, even if only in the common understanding or misunderstanding of it. Wherever a Da, a here-there, is intrinsically unveiled, temporality manifests itself” (BPP 307).

The manner in which the other’s temporalizing way of being is experienced as such will be elaborated in much greater detail in the following chapter. There I will demonstrate that, for Heidegger, the recognition of others as co-constituting the world is always present in and through every innerworldly encounter.