Notes

Introduction

1. Among them most importantly are Judith Butler, Rebecca Comay, Eva Geulen, Frederic Jameson, Catherine Malabou, John McCumber, Jean-Luc Nancy, Terry Pinkard, Tilottama Rajan, and Slavoj Žižek. Rebecca Comay’s *Mourning Sickness: Hegel and the French Revolution* was published after this book had been submitted to Northwestern Press. Comay puts behind us the topos of Hegel as grand unifier focusing on “nonrecognition, nonproductivity, noncommemoration, nonredemption” (80) and analyzing “absolute knowledge” as the exposition of the constitutive yet traumatic untimeliness of consciousness (5–6). The book is a brilliant reading of the “Spirit” section of the *Phenomenology* that foregrounds the role of emotion in Hegel and thoroughly thickens our understanding of this text by applying the tools of literary criticism (in addition to exploring the historical context of the French Revolution and situating Hegel in the history of ideas as close to Nietzsche and Freud). Comay offers an example for the constitutive self-reflection of emotion that I explore in this book, when she describes how “the bad infinite of suspicion makes terror both reflexive . . . and in turn self-reflective” (82).

2. I quote from Pinkard’s new translation of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, available online at http://web.mac.com/titpaul/Site/Phenomenology_of_Spirit _page.html. From here on this translation of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is referred to by paragraph numbers only (using the section sign). When referring to a specific figure of the protagonist/s I use the neuter pronoun, unless Hegel gives this figure a masculine designation. In this case, I follow Hegel in the use of masculine pronouns. In doing so, I don’t mean to suggest that the positions of master and servant, for example, or of any other figure of consciousness he renders masculine, cannot be occupied by female subjects.

3. For an argument for the use of “emotionality” as the term of art for emotion studies, see Pahl, “Emotionality: A Brief Introduction.”

4. Compare Pinkard, “Symbolic, Classical, and Romantic Art,” 19: “In modern . . . art, the characters . . . not only worry about what they in fact feel, but also worry if what they feel is real, worry about how they should feel, and constantly offer explanations to each other about all these things in an effort to determine what it is that is going on ‘within’ themselves.”

5. Compare Illouz, who argues in *Cold Intimacies* that we currently participate to an unprecedented degree in the staging of personal authenticity, a highly
paradoxical and embattled practice that extends into the spheres of corporate
business and politics.

6. The term “transport” safeguards against conceiving of emotions as
“states.” Compare Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy, 53: “Feelings thus in Hegel’s
language are also said to be ‘modes of negativity’—or non-identity, where this
means a mode of self-relation within an experience, not merely . . . just being in . . . a state.”

7. Speight accurately describes the Phenomenology as “quasi-literary” in his
cogent analysis of the essentially literary shape of Hegel’s philosophy of agency.

8. On the Phenomenology as bildungsroman, see Royce, Lectures on Modern
Idealism, 147–56; and Abrams, Natural Supernaturalism, 225–37. Even though
Speight addresses how the different literary genres of tragedy, comedy, and the
novel inform Hegel’s philosophy of agency (by modeling the practices of retro-
spectivity, theatricality, and forgiveness), he reduces the differences between
these genres to the one overarching notion of “narrative” and describes the Phe-
omenology as “Hegel’s novel.”

9. I agree with Altieri’s preference for adverbial over adjectival treatments
of the emotions (The Particulars of Rapture, 9–16). See also Pfau, Romantic Moods,
31: “Emotions thus are not ‘owned’ by an individual as some discrete representa-
tion but, instead, are experienced as a dynamic or mood by which the quotidian
practice of representation and cognition is suffused.”

10. I use “sympathy” as the translation of the German Nachempfindung
rather than of Einfühlung, because the latter (literally: “feeling oneself into”)
reinscribes interiority and because I appreciate the temporal lag and supplement-
tarity of Nachempfindung (“having an afterfeeling” or “imitating a feeling”). For
more on sympathy, see chapter 4.

11. Nussbaum seems to appreciate disruption when she describes emotions
as “acknowledgements of neediness and lack of self-sufficiency” (Nussbaum, Up-
heavals, 22). Unfortunately, this aspect of emotional ethics gets lost in her overall
normative treatment that differentiates between ethical and unethical, good and
bad, or healthy and sick emotions. See also Altieri’s critique of Nussbaum in The

12. The quotation marks are in Hegel’s text and indicate quotations from
Goethe’s translation of Le neveu de Rameau. Hegel at times condenses vastly dispa-
rate parts of the dialogue and he does not always quote correctly.

13. Hegel combines here a quote from “Moi” reacting to “Lui” with a quote
from another performance of the nephew.

14. Taylor has addressed some of the asocial and apolitical effects of being
absorbed in the quest for individual authenticity in The Ethics of Authenticity. Trill-
ing ends his discussion of sincerity and authenticity in a strong critique of the
intellectual tendency to see the ultimate promise of authenticity in madness.
He finds the “belief that human existence is made authentic by the possession
of a power, or the persuasion of its possession, which is not to be qualified or
restricted by the co-ordinate existence of any fellow man” “appalling” precisely
because it exalts “ultimate isolatedness” at the expense of social relations (Trill-
ing, Sincerity and Authenticity, 171).
15. Discourse ethics could help to de-dramatize and to externalize emotion, but its proceduralism paints a rather fragile picture of democracy. Proceduralists see democracy “founder” if rational agents do not adhere to the sincerity principle. See Anderson’s paraphrase of Rawls: “If citizens do not undertake to present their views sincerely, and if those in power do not sincerely believe in the reasons they themselves offer for their actions, then the entire project of political liberalism founders” (Anderson, The Way We Argue Now, 168). Given the highly paradoxical character of sincerity (not to mention the tricks that language plays on us) and the various possible ways to conceive of truthfulness, the sincerity principle seems a rather tall order. In light of these difficulties, proceduralism must define the rules of communicative action with such exaggerated strictness that making everybody adhere to its rules verges itself on the unethical.

16. Compare Hamacher on philology as affection for language as affection (Hamacher, Für—Die Philologie).

17. Trilling, Sincerity and Authenticity, 16.

18. Compare Altieri on plasticity (The Particulars of Rapture, 205–7). Altieri identifies three aspects of affective states that bring satisfaction as ends in themselves: intensity, involvedness, and plasticity. He insists that these are “conative,” not ethical, values, but qualifies this statement, announcing that he is “most interested in the possibility of demonstrating how an emphasis on conative states is compatible with immediate and sustained attention to the situations of other human beings” (182).

19. To take Hegel’s disparagements at face value is often misleading and only gets one trapped in resentful stupidity. Geulen’s brilliant reading of the Hegelian verdict of the end of art is an excellent case in point. She shows that when Hegel draws the line around ancient Greek art as the consummation of the aesthetic ideal, he does, in fact, not ring the death knell for art in general, but both points to the dubious and ambivalent ending of the prehistory of classical art and opens the floor for the specific vitality of modern art. See Geulen, “Hegel ohne Ende.”

Chapter 1

1. Compare Redding, Logic of Affect, 130: “Hegel was rather concerned that a wedge not be driven between feeling and concept in mental life such that feeling would thereby become sequestered in an inaccessibly private subjective realm.”


3. See § 9: “Whoever seeks mere edification, who wants to surround the diversity of his existence and thought in a kind of fog, and who then demands an indeterminate enjoyment of this indeterminate divinity, may look wherever he pleases to find it. . . . However, philosophy must keep up its guard against the desire to be edifying.”

4. See Nietzsche, “Ecce Homo,” 777: “In the history of the quest for knowl-
edge the Germans are inscribed with nothing but ambiguous names; they have always brought forth only ‘unconscious’ counterfeiters (Fichte, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Hegel, and Schleiermacher deserve the epithet as well as Kant and Leibniz: they are all mere veil makers [alles blosse Schleiermacher]).”

5. Hegel mocks the rejection of rationality as a misplaced frugality that results in spiritual impoverishment rather than philosophical superiority: “Even to a lesser extent must this kind of science-renouncing self-satisfaction [Genügsamkeit] claim that such enthusiasm and obscurantism is itself a bit higher than science” (§ 10).

6. For example, by the politically influential Rosenkreuz Orden.

7. Compare Pfau, Romantic Moods, 12: “Kant had shown . . . the essentially nonpropositional status of feeling.”

8. See, for example, Rousseau, “Origins of Inequality,” 202: “The imagination which causes such ravages among us, never speaks to the heart of savages, who quietly await the impulses of nature, yield to them involuntarily, with more pleasure than ardor, and, their wants once satisfied, lose the desire.” Rousseau’s valorization of natural needs and feelings hinges upon their involuntary character; they are unaffected by the will and the imagination, and thus escape the perils of reflection.

9. Among the wealth of cognitive philosophy on emotion that emphasize the world-structuring and salience-giving faculty of the emotions, the most significant are perhaps De Sousa’s The Rationality of Emotions and Nussbaum’s Upheavals of Thought.

10. Another worry with Enlightenment rationality stems from a more jaded reaction to the rule of reason as generating not so much a crisis of values and beliefs but a cold objectivity that levels first-person experiences and investments. This position also seeks recourse in emotion but usually requires more heat for emotion than those who battle disorientation and undecidability with “the intelligence of emotions” (subtitle to Nussbaum’s Upheavals of Thought). Compare Fisher, The Vehement Passions, 248–49: “The passions, as I have tried to define them . . . insist on . . . the differential reality of life in time. Time’s distinct parts . . . are details not to be surrendered or blended somehow into any objective, larger abstraction of time . . . . The passions are evidence in us for the prior importance of my own world over the world.” Even though Fisher mentions “the guiding Kantian ideals of reciprocity and universality” in his conclusion as one of several important victories of objectification, he spends the bulk of his book dismantling these Kantian ideals (246).

11. Chapter 7 circles back to the question of how to respond to skepticism. There, I discuss despair as a transport that, rather than protecting against skepticism, radicalizes it, exposing the self to its negativity from which it emerges lightheartedly.

12. Compare Hegel, Encyclopedia, § 438: “The essential and actual truth which reason is, lies in the simple identity of the subjectivity of the concept with its objectivity. . . . The universality of reason, therefore, whilst it signifies that the object . . . is now itself universal, permeating and encompassing [das Ich durchdringend und befassend] the ‘I,’ also signifies that the pure ‘I’ is the pure form
which overlaps the object and encompasses [über das Objekt übergreifend und es in sich befassend] it” (trans. modified).

13. Compare Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 14.

14. They deplore the fact that “humanity . . . does not live in the gratifying unity of the law and the heart. Rather, it either lives in dreadful separation and suffering, or it at least lives as being deprived in taking pleasure in itself when it obeys the law” (Phenomenology, § 371).

15. Russo discusses how the French philosophes of the late Enlightenment, despite their taste for the serious and the sublime, inadvertently fall into the frivolity and irony of the goût moderne they so despise. Hegel certainly makes a similar argument when he claims that the proponents of the “law of the heart” are simply unaware to what extent they reproduce the pleasure principle that ruled the previous dialectic. I agree with Russo when she points to the political suspiciousness of conceiving of feeling as a unifying force: “Emotion became a weapon in the philosophical struggle, applied in order to control and unify an audience that until then had been insubordinate, scattered and unresponsive to truth” (Russo, Styles of Enlightenment, 12).

16. Compare Žižek, Parallax, 206: “Hegel’s thesis that ‘subject is not substance’ has thus to be taken quite literally: subject . . . is something that exists only insofar as it appears to itself. This is why it is wrong to search behind the appearance for the ‘true core’ of subjectivity: behind it there is, precisely, nothing . . . A Self is precisely an entity without any substantial density, without any hard kernel that would guarantee its consistency.”

17. See the next section for a more detailed discussion of the alienating experience of self-realization.

18. Against this organismism of self-expression, Žižek argues that the self emerges as “a violent rupture of organic homeostasis” (Žižek, Parallax, 210).

19. “Instead of attaining its own being, it therefore attains within being the alienation [Entfremdung] of itself from itself” (§ 374, trans. modified).

20. We might be more familiar today with the more recent critiques of sentimentalism offered by Berlant (in The Female Complaint), by Baldwin (who contends that “sentimentality . . . is always . . . the signal of secret and violent inhumanity” [“Everybody’s Protest Novel,” quoted in Berlant, 33]), and by Trilling (who traces the convoluted itinerary from Rousseau’s sentimental idealization of the savage to Conrad’s story of civilization’s paradoxical embrace and contempt for the “heart of darkness” [Trilling, Sincerity and Authenticity]). But Hegel was one of the first to articulate this critique, and despite the differences between eighteenth-century and twentieth-century forms of sentimentalism, the gist of his critique still holds.


22. The figure of the “heartless rebel” is rather common in late eighteenth-century German literature. In addition to Schiller’s The Robbers, see, for example, Hölderlin’s Hyperion, second vol., book 1. Hyperion participates in the Greek war of liberation against Turkey in hopes of establishing the reign of the law of the heart: “wo einst in unser Gesetzbuch eingeschrieben werden die Gesetze der
Natur, und wo das Leben selbst, wo sie, die göttliche Natur, die in kein Buch geschrieben werden kann, im Herz der Gemeinde seyn wird” (Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke, 3:116). But he soon realizes that his companions in battle are less than excellent: “Es ist aus, Diotima! Unsere Leute haben geplündert, gemordet, ohne Unterschied . . . es war ein außerordentliches Project, durch eine Räuberbande mein Elysium zu pflanzen” (ibid., 3:117).


24. In the Encyclopedia, Hegel describes madness (Verrücktheit) as a situation where the subject “remains fast in a particularity of its self-feeling [in einer Besonderheit seines Selbstgefühls beharren bleibt]” (§ 408).

25. As is necessarily the case, according to Hegel, since “individuality, which entrusts itself to the objective element, makes itself vulnerable (gibt preis) to being altered and turned topsy-turvy” (§ 322).

26. Schiller, “Sprache,” published in Musenalmanach 1797 under the title “Tabulae Votivae.” The full text is: “Warum kann der lebendige Geist dem Geist nicht erscheinen? / Spricht die Seele, so spricht ach! schon die Seele nicht mehr” (Why does the living spirit fail to appear to the spirit? / When the soul speaks, alas, it is no longer the soul that speaks). My translation.

27. Schiller’s distich is of course set in verse, but he mangles the rhythm; instead of maintaining the trochaic meter he opts for the cursive. The trochaic version—“Spricht die Seele, so spricht ach! die Seele schon nicht mehr”—would have kept the phrase “spricht die Seele” intact, with the exception of the then even more dramatic interjection “ach!” while the rules of meter would have put the stress on Seele.

28. Indeed, the expressionist premise shows a lack of spirit. See § 340: “it has spiritlessly [auf diese geistlose Weise] grasped cognition as ‘The outer is supposed to be an expression of the inner.’”

29. Taylor ties back to Herder the idea of (holistic) expression that he finds in Hegel (see Hegel and Modern Society). Taylor describes German Romanticism as driven by attempts to reconcile the expressive unity emphasized by Herder with the philosophy of radical autonomy developed by Kant. In his view, it is Hegel who eventually solved the problem. Pippin draws on Kant to make an argument for spirit’s self-legislation. He calls this model of self-actualization an “expressive” one, in distinction to the “causal” model of natural self-making that is derived from Aristotelian teleology. See Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy, 17: “The key and very controversial point to be defended is: Hegel’s self-making model is not derived from Aristotelian notions of natural growth and maturation into some flourishing state, but from a claim about the self-legislated character of all normativity.” Menke pursues a very interesting program. He argues for a rejuvenation of the tragic (in the strictly Hegelian sense of two irreconcilable but equal values) where self-expression and justice are recognized as equal yet conflicting values.

30. The foremost example of spirit’s textual relation to itself is of course the Phenomenology of Spirit itself. Within the Phenomenology, it is the chapter on spirit, in particular, that both thematizes and performs the text model of self-realization. Speight has convincingly made the important argument that the Phe-
nomenology takes a “literary turn” in the transition from the chapter on “Reason” to that on “Spirit” and that the three sections of the “Spirit” chapter together offer a complex account of the textual character of action and agency that is intrinsically tied to this chapter’s engagement with literary works (Hegel, Literature and the Problem of Agency, 18).


32. Compare Müller-Sievers, Self-Generation, 4: “Organic’ indeed became the ultimate praise in philosophical and aesthetic judgment in the period of the epigenetic turn [around 1800], a status the word has not lost since.”

33. Moyar argues the same in his article on “Self-Completing Alienation.” While Moyar establishes (self-)transparency as a necessary condition for non-alienated life, he concludes with the strong claim that “alienation is not simply an enemy to be stamped out, but rather the very background tension that maintains modern societies in their imperfect freedom” (172).

34. Pinkard proposes “emptying oneself” as a translation of Entäußerung. He points out that Hegel quotes with this term Luther’s German translation of the Greek kenosis—“God’s becoming flesh by virtue of renouncing large parts of his own divinity” (Pinkard, “Shape of Spirit,” 120).

35. Pippin comes close to understanding actualization as utterance when he compares agency with being a speaker of a natural language. But he doesn’t have a textual notion of language. For him, the comparison with natural language serves to evince the collective social construction of rational agency, that is to say, he relies on the idea of a transparency of language. His argument is that one can function as a rational agent only if one adds another thread to the safety net of mutual recognition, just as “vocalizations count as speaking the language only within a language community” (Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy, 197). Hegel’s conception of action as exposure, on the other hand, emphasizes the Verkehrung, Verfremdung, and transformation of any deed by others, rather than a collective construction of mutual transparency.

36. In fact, Außerung is not the privilege of the human subject. Any force—including those of the natural world—is bound to exert itself (sich äußern). See the chapter in the Phenomenology on “Force and the Understanding.”

37. With The Inoperative Community Nancy had not yet embarked on his extraordinarily interesting and novel reading of Hegel that he offered in Hegel: The Restlessness of the Negative. In the earlier work, Nancy still treats Hegel as a thinker of the state—and even equates Hegelian philosophy somewhat flipantly with the state (see Nancy, Inoperative Community, 32: “it is no longer Hegel. It is no longer the State”). Because of the consistency of his thought of the community’s unworking with his reading of the restlessness of the negative, I find it nevertheless useful to also draw on Nancy’s earlier work to illuminate Hegel’s model of textual utterance.

38. See § 62: “thought, instead of getting any farther with the transition from subject to predicate . . . finds the subject also to be immediately present in the predicate.” For a more detailed discussion of the speculative proposition, see chapter 4 (“Juggle”).

39. I agree with Terada’s conclusion of the impersonal textuality of emo-
tion and fully endorse her project to dislocate emotion from the human subject. But, with Hegel, I describe textual (self-)reference as (non-human) subjectivity. Thus foregrounding impersonal subjectivity in Hegel, I agree with Nancy’s notion of the subject: “the self is what does not posses itself” (Nancy, Hegel, 36).

40. “What will later come to be for consciousness will be the experience of what spirit is, that is, this absolute substance which constitutes the unity of its oppositions in their complete freedom and self-sufficiency, namely, in the oppositions of the various self-consciousnesses existing for themselves: The I that is we and the we that is I” (§ 177).

41. Following Žižek, Egginton correctly identifies the operative fiction of absolute knowledge as one of Hegel’s most important lessons. See Egginton, The Philosopher’s Desire, 103.

42. The passage I just analyzed is a good example of “the complicated footwork” of the Phenomenology that Jameson appreciates because it allows the Phenomenology “to avoid taking positions at the same time that it expounds them” (Jameson, Hegel Variations, 7). Not only the “heterogeneity of the book” has prevented its various themes and textual passages from being transformed “into pure or coherent philosophical positions, into identifiable ideas or concepts, . . . about which we can say that they represent Hegel’s official thoughts,” as Jameson has recently observed, but also, and more specifically, Hegel’s use of free indirect discourse has done so (ibid.).

43. Pfau identifies this kind of epistemological paranoia as one of the three moods constitutive of Romanticism.

44. See again Hegel’s discussion of the power of the understanding in the preface to the Phenomenology, § 32: “Spirit only wins its truth when it finds its feet [sich selbst findet] within its absolute disruption [Zerrissenheit].” For further discussion of the understanding as the self-lacerating mode of spirit, see chapter 7 (“Broken”).

45. See § 32: “to keep and hold fast to what is dead requires only the greatest force”—it requires the strength and the labor of the understanding.

46. Arguing against my reading, one might propose that when Hegel writes “it turns out that behind the so-called curtain, which is supposed to hide what is inner, there is nothing to be seen unless we ourselves go behind it,” the “we” refers to the phenomenologist/s who can fill the empty space with their superior knowledge. The phenomenologist/s—such objection would suggest—play the role of Goethe’s Turmgesellschaft in Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre, who providently guides the protagonist on its path of Bildung. It is true that the “we” is ambiguous here; it can refer to both the phenomenologist/s over and against the protagonist/s, as well as to a narrative identification with the protagonist. In the following, I will make the case for the latter.

47. See § 303: “Observational psychology . . . discovers all sorts of faculties, inclinations, and passions, and since in its recounting of this collection, the recollection of the unity of self-consciousness does not allow itself to be suppressed, it follows that observational psychology must at least get to the point of being astonished that in spirit so many sorts of things and such heterogeneous things
without connection can exist alongside one another in the way they would in a sack [*wie in einem Sacke.*]"

48. Around 1800, the pit is widely used as a metaphor for interiority. One particularly interesting example is to be found in Schiller’s *Wallensteins Tod* (Werke II, 3): “Des Menschen Thaten und Gedanken, wisst! / Sind nicht wie Meeres blind bewegte Wellen. / Die innre Welt, sein Microcosmus, ist / der tiefe Schacht, aus dem sie ewig quellen.” Quoted after Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob und Wilhelm Grimm, s.v. “Schacht.” Schiller’s use of the metaphor shows particularly well what its function was and wherein its appeal lay, namely to stabilize emotional and mental life against the unpredictable fluidity of “blindly stirred waves” (*blind bewegte Wellen*).

49. See Hegel, *Encyclopedia*, § 453: the “inability to grasp a universal [as] intrinsically concrete [yet] simple, is what has led people to talk about special fibres and areas as receptacles of particular ideas.”

50. Of course any perceptual image can serve as a sign, and perhaps even a kind of writing. But this is not Hegel’s concern here.

51. Derrida shows that Hegel cannot maintain this distinction. See “The Pit and the Pyramid: Introduction to the Semiology of Hegel.”

52. “Acquired habit subsequently effaces the peculiarity by which alphabetic writing appears . . . , it makes them a sort of hieroglyphic to us” (*Encyclopedia*, § 459, Zusatz). The note suggests that Hegel considers reciting by heart as writing in Derrida’s sense. Derrida doesn’t use this passage for his argument.

53. Compare Nancy, *Hegel*, 34–35: “To penetrate negativity demands ‘another language’ than the language of representation. The latter is the language of separation: the language of concepts in their fixity, of propositions and their copulas; it is the language of signification. . . . The language of philosophy is language itself spoken in its infinity; which is to say, at each instant, at each word, at each signification, language is put outside itself, insignificant or more-than-significant, interrupted and strained toward its own negativity—toward the ‘vitality’ of ‘the self.’”

54. About the “*an sich*” as an ingredient in experience, see McCumber, “The Temporal Turn,” 44–59.

55. In the context of agency, this double movement takes the form of internalized habits that form a second nature. For a brilliant discussion of “second nature” in Hegel, see Malabou, *The Future of Hegel*, part 1.

56. The beautiful soul appears in literary texts usually as feminine (see “Bekenntnisse einer schönen Seele” in Goethe’s *Wilhelm Meister* and Henriette in Jacobi’s *Woldemar*). On the other hand and quite predictably, this female figure is used to treat questions of male friendship (in particular the friendship between Jacobi and Goethe themselves). Hegel, as usual, uses the neuter or a strictly grammatical gender (in this case: *die Seele* is feminine).

57. “This created world is its *speech*, which it has likewise immediately heard and whose echo returns only to it [*deren Echo nur zu ihm zurückkommt*]” (§ 658; trans. modified).

58. See chapter 3 (“Release”) for a discussion of speculative friendship, i.e., of the idea that friendship includes aggression, enmity, difference, and negativity.
59. One of the principal literary examples of the beautiful soul, Jacobi’s Woldemar, has drawn criticism by others than Hegel for its generalization of personal experiences and its lack of awareness for differences. Schopenhauer, for example, in his preface to Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, mockingly describes Jacobi as a great philosopher “welcher wahrhaft rührende Bücher geschrieben und nur die kleine Schwachheit hat, Alles, was er vor seinem fünfundfünfzigten Jahre gelernt und approbiert hat, für angeborene Grundgedanken des menschlichen Geistes zu halten.”

60. “The content that language has acquired here is no longer the inverted and inverting, disrupted self of the world of cultural maturation [Welt der Bildung]. Rather, it is spirit which has returned into itself, is certain of itself, certain within itself of its truth, that is, certain of its recognition and certain as the spirit which is recognized as this knowledge” (§ 653). This certainty (Gewissheit) that constitutes conscience (Gewissen)—the certain knowledge of recognition accomplished or guaranteed, rather than incipient (Anerkennen) as a process requiring struggle—is the last unbroken bone, as it were, in the Phenomenology’s otherwise completely broken protagonist. It is the most solid bastion against alienation and tears (Zerrissenheit). But the hard heart will break without violence (more on that in chapter 7, “Broken”).

61. “The articulation of this assurance sublates the form of its particularity, and it therein recognizes the necessary universality of the self. In that it calls itself ‘conscience,’ it calls itself pure self-knowledge and pure abstract will, i.e., it calls itself the universal knowledge and willing” (§ 654).

62. Kant seems to evoke a kind of conatus of aesthetic pleasure when he insists that “this pleasure is in no way practical. . . . But yet it involves causality, viz. of maintaining without further design the state of the representation itself and the occupation of the cognitive powers. We linger over the contemplation of the beautiful because this contemplation strengthens and reproduces itself” (Critique of Judgment, § 12).

63. Sokolsky has argued that sentimentalism might subscribe less (and more) than usually assumed to the values of honesty, purity, naïveté, natural feeling, and (self-)transparency. In her reading, the sentimental mocks the declaration of sincerity by being more than sincere. She thus uncovers an irony through excess in sentimentalism. See also epilogue.

64. Despite using “virtual” and “notional” here, Pfau more precisely argues that, after Kant’s account of the sublime, feelings become essentially literary. That is to say, from then on we need literature—especially its most complex configurations (Pfau’s examples are Novalis’s Bildungsroman and Hölderlin’s triadic hymns)—to produce feelings and to communicate them to ourselves and to others.

Chapter 2

1. See Nietzsche, Gay Science, section 317: “Retrospection.—While we are living each phase of our lives we rarely recognize its true pathos, but always see
it as the only state that is now possible for us and reasonable and—to use some words and a distinction of the Greeks—thoroughly an ethos and not a pathos.”


3. I draw on Malabou’s notion of “plasticity” to bring out the layered quality of theatrical pathos and to spatialize Aufhebung.

4. Large and influential traditions of moral philosophy have thought of the passions as by definition immoral. For the Stoa, for example, páthe are not only “alogical,” but against nature and by the same token unethical.

5. Hegel does not explicitly reference Aristotle in the *Phenomenology*, but he studied Aristotle intensely for his first course on the history of philosophy in 1805. Ferrarin has demonstrated the influence of Aristotle on Hegel’s substantial changes in his systematic conceptions around 1805, especially on the changes in his concepts of subjectivity and self-realization (Ferrarin, *Hegel and Aristotle*, esp. 408–11). I think that it is safe to assume that Aristotle’s critique of Socratic intellectualist moral philosophy had already informed Hegel’s notion of ethics by the time he was writing the *Phenomenology* (around 1806). It allowed him to project his own critique of Kant’s intellectualist moral philosophy on a different screen.

6. Here I quote from the 1817 version of the lectures on the history of philosophy (*Heidelberger Niederschrift*). An English translation of the 1825–26 version has been published. Where the two versions overlap, I quote the published translation; otherwise the translations are my own and the page numbers in parentheses refer to the German original.

7. “Passion (love, ambition, thirst for glory) is the universal not in the realm of insight, but in the realm of agency and . . . as self-actualizing” (Hegel, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, 474, my translation).

8. These two views are only different sides of the same coin: the acknowledgment that personal intentions are subjected to ironic reversal.

9. Hegel often uses both terms interchangeably. Yet, in contexts where he wants to draw a distinction between self-serving passions and passions for a cause of ethical substance, he uses *Leidenschaft* for the former and reserves Pathos for the latter.

10. With the emergence of tragedy in the history of Athenian theater, the number of characters a play featured was extended from one to two.

11. With this link that Hegel draws between ethics and tragedy, we are reminded of Aristotle’s *Poetics*. In the *Poetics*, Aristotle uses the word páthos to refer to the grave suffering that the tragic heroes experience. Aristotle mentions “death on stage, severe pain, and injuries” (chapter 11). The qualification “on-stage” páthos here refers to physical suffering in the presence of spectators.

12. See chapter 1 (“Heart”).

13. The heroes of Greek tragedies often insist on the existential weight of their pathos and resist the attempts of the chorus or of other characters to diffuse the crisis. See Butler on Antigone’s refusal to dissociate the deed from her person (Butler, *Antigone’s Claim*, 8); and Menke on the excessive self-judgment of Oedipus in Menke, *Gegenwart der Tragödie*, 13–101, in particular 40–46.

14. In line with Hegel’s own merging of the ethical and the theatrical realms, Speight draws attention to the fact that the actors of Athenian tragedy
wear masks (Hegel, Literature and the Problem of Agency, 64). The character of their persona is thus fixed in advance.

15. We have recently witnessed a renaissance of arguments in favor of a tragic worldview. For the best among them, see Connolly and Menke. I appreciate the humbling effect of the tragic worldview on notions of human agency and autonomy (Connolly) as much as I appreciate the argument in favor of sustaining the fundamental conflict between different normative perspectives (Menke). My contribution to this discussion on the tragic lies in drawing attention to the fact that tragedy creates pathos as much as pathos creates tragedy. This cannot be good news since pathos in the dramatic sense, as Hegel defines it, does not do much to humble human agents or to make them appreciate the equal relevance of irreconcilable normative values.

16. Hegel clarifies that the genre of tragedy requires that the law that is violated must be apparent to the one who violates it. The fault of the tragic hero lies in not taking seriously what, in principle, is known to him.

17. Hegel discusses tragic pathos twice in the Phenomenology; first in the context of issues regarding communal life and ethical conduct (“Spirit” section), and then again as part of his discussion of the religious worldview of the Greeks (“Religion” section). His later Lectures on the Philosophy of Art expand on the second perspective. Hegel never published his lectures on art and aesthetics. At this point, there are three editions of the lecture notes: (1) Hotho’s 1835 compilation of notes taken by various students from the four different times Hegel gave the lecture in Berlin—this text is widely used and has been translated into English (and is referred to as “Hegel 1975” in this study), (2) the critical edition of Hotho’s notes from the 1823 lecture (referred to as “Hegel 1998” in this study), and (3) the critical edition of Pfordten’s notes from the 1826 lecture (referred to as “Hegel 2005” in this study). Because of the dubious authorship of Hotho’s compilation, I have, whenever possible, avoided using this text.


19. I translate Anerkennen as “acknowledging,” rather than “recognition.” For the reasons, see chapter 5 (“Acknowledging”).

20. The auxiliary verb sollen (“should”) makes all the difference. Hegel does not say that Leidenschaft is base, but that “‘passion’ carries the connotation of something that should be . . . base.”

21. He speaks of the “depopulation of heaven” (Entvölkerung des Himmels, § 741).


23. Speight describes Antigone’s acknowledgment of error as an expression of amor fati (Hegel, Literature and the Problem of Agency, 64–67). In his view, she
accepts the partitiveness of ethical action as necessary, rather than relativizing her pathos.

24. In Antigone’s and Oedipus’s insistence on their guilt we can see the auto-aggressive and suicidal streak bound up with the self-important streak of Pathos. See note 13.

25. See Pinkard, Sociality of Reason, 146: “Because the Greeks (or at least the adulated, idealized Greeks) conceived of their ethical life as quasi-natural, as something that naturally restored itself to a happy and just equilibrium, they could not understand that their success depended not so much on a naturally self-restoring form of life as on their own actions.”

26. Nobody since Jean Wahl has analyzed this structure of Hegel’s dialectic as an emotional economy.

27. It is important to note that Hegel doesn’t find this comparison very productive. See § 66: “It would . . . be expedient to avoid the name, ‘God,’ because this word is not immediately the concept but is rather . . . the fixed point of rest of the underlying subject. . . . Even when speculative truths are stated about that subject, their content lacks the immanent concept because that content is only present as a motionless subject, and in these circumstances, speculative truths easily take on the form of mere edification.”

28. Without us, the readers, spirit would have comprehended itself only once: in Hegel’s mind, one would assume. But an unacknowledged singularity doesn’t count in Hegel’s world.

29. For a more extensive discussion of Bildung as torture, see chapter 7 (“Broken”).

30. I have already discussed that the world of “ethical order” doesn’t learn from the tragic crisis, but considers justice done when the initial calm is restored. Another example is the “unhappy consciousness” who, even though it hears from the “mediator” the true meaning of action and agency, insists that “for itself, action and its actual activity remain impoverished, its enjoyment in consumption remains sorrowful, and the sublation of these in any positive sense continues to be postponed to an other-worldly beyond” (§ 230, trans. modified).

31. The Phenomenology has its moments of authorial boasting as well. I discuss one of them in chapter 6 (“Tremble”).

32. I discuss Hegel’s strategies to draw the reader into the textual process in chapter 4 (“Juggle”). They are rather complicated and sometimes counter-productive.

33. Hegel would chastise such repudiation as spiritless: “Spirit is not this power which . . . avoids looking at the negative, as is the case when we say of something that it is nothing or that it is false, and then, being done with it, go off on our own way on to something else” (§ 32).

34. While Žižek (On Belief, chapter 4) and Malabou (The Future of Hegel, 91–94 and chapter 7) have shown the importance of kenosis in Hegel’s thought, they have not discussed God’s suffering as an instance of Pathos.

35. Hegel’s critique of Schlegel’s notion of irony is certainly motivated by Hegel’s strong position in favor of actual self-abandonment. For his critique of irony, see Philosophy of Right, 147–49, and Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, 64–68. The
passage on irony is part of Hotho’s compilation of the lecture notes of various students of Hegel’s various lectures on aesthetics; it is not part of his own notes taken during Hegel’s 1823 lecture on fine art. Due to Hotho’s compilation, we might thus have a skewed sense of the actual importance for Hegel of the critique of Romantic irony. The same holds for the Philosophy of Right, where some of the more derogatory discussion of irony is to be found in the “additions” (lecture notes of questionable origin). It is important to note that Hegel did not dismiss all forms of irony. As part of the lectures on aesthetics, he speaks positively of the irony of the Greek gods. He also appreciates Solger’s notion of irony (see his “Review of Solger’s Posthumous Writings and Correspondence”). In fact, I will use the remainder of this chapter to argue that Hegel’s speculative philosophy embraces irony.

36. De Boer offers a very interesting version of the argument that “Hegel’s conception of tragic conflicts is not bound to his analysis of Greek culture, but constitutes the very heart of his philosophical method,” because she foregrounds and appreciates the “entanglement” of the terms in conflict, rather than the conflict’s resolution (De Boer, On Hegel: The Sway of the Negative, 180).

37. I want to thank Rüdiger Campe for the opportunity to co-teach two sessions on Hegel’s theory of tragedy at Johns Hopkins University. During these sessions, he drew my attention to the word Handlung.

38. For Speight’s worry about theatricality, see, for example, 70: “If desire and motivation . . . have instead a socially mediated or ‘theatrical’ character, is there a notion of self that can escape the alternation between hypocritical imitation or role playing on the one hand and reflection about it on the other?” For his discussion of forgiveness, see his chapter 4 (“Forgiveness and the Romantic Novel: Contesting the Beautiful Soul”). For Pinkard’s stipulations for free agency, see Sociality of Reason, 188.

39. Antigone refers to her pathos as the gods’ “unwritten and unchanging laws” (v. 554). Creon has the positive laws of the polis to draw on.

40. See § 467 (trans. modified): “In universal ethical life . . . it is not this individual who acts and is guilty, for as this self . . . he exists merely as the universal self. Individuality is purely the formal moment of doing anything at all, and the content of action are the laws and mores, and those are determined for the individual by his station in life. . . . As part of a people, self-consciousness descends from the universal only down to the point of particularity; it does not get as far as the point of individuality.”

41. See Aristotle, Poetics, chapter 19.

42. Derrida offers relever as the equivalent in French (not the French translation) of aufheben. He thereby displaces aufheben and introduces a shift within the logic of Aufhebung to the logic of différance. Expanding on one of the meanings of relever (to lift again), Nancy presents Aufhebung as a repetitive plasticity (in the sense that the product of Aufhebung precedes its own production) rather than a linear progression. According to Nancy’s analysis, Aufhebung, thus, both has already passed and is still to be performed (through the work of reading). The reader finds herself in the midst of an ongoing procedure without knowing its rules: “we must—à la commedia dell’arte—improvise, and without know-
ing our lines we must make progress through the plot” (Nancy 2001, 18). Coming from a different theoretical perspective but also with a sense for the paradoxes of Hegelian logic, Redding offers an evolutionary account of *Aufhebung* and proposes “bootstrapping” as a synonym (*Logic of Affect*, 150–58). Even though they dispute the reductionism of linear time, all of these accounts still envisage *Aufhebung* as temporal.

43. See my discussion of the chapter transitions in chapter 6.

44. For the logic of this identity of identity and difference, see Hegel on division (*Unterschied*) at the end of the chapter on the understanding in the *Phenomenology*, the section on “Contradiction” in “Book Two: The Doctrine of Essence” in the *Science of Logic*, and sections 115–22 of the *Encyclopedia*.

45. In chapter 7 (“Broken”) and chapter 6 (“Tremble”), respectively.

46. Female irony takes the form of intrigue because women are not supposed to act. “The feminine has its pleasure” in the “brave youth” (*tapfre Jüngling*) because he is ready for action (§ 474). This gendered distribution of action and inaction is rather heteronormative. Hegel queers Spirit when he calls for dissolving (*aufheben*) the pathos of natural gender in transgender performances: “ethical action has the moment of crime in itself because it does not sublate [*aufhebt*] the natural allocation of the two laws to the two sexes[, but] rather [persists] within natural immediacy” (§ 467). I don’t agree with Jagentowicz Mills’s reading that Hegel “confin[es] women to the family” (“Hegel’s Antigone,” 84) or with Lydia Rainford’s statement that “Hegel’s portraits of the position of ‘woman’ place her firmly within the lower strata of being and consciousness” (Rainford, *She Changes by Intrigue*, 87).

47. See § 730: “the invincible elasticity of its unity extinguishes the point-like singleness of the actor and his figurations.”


49. See § 746: “The force of dialectical knowledge . . . puts weapons of deception into the hands of preoccupied and anxiety-ridden old age.” Creon belongs to the category of “old age”; he positions himself in opposition to Haeemon’s youth (see Sophocles, *Antigone*, v. 725ff.).

50. See § 747: “Rather, the genuine self of the actor coincides with the persona he plays, just as the spectator is perfectly at home in what is represented to him and sees himself playing a role therein . . . It is the return of everything universal into the certainty of itself, which . . . is, on the part of consciousness, well-being and letting-onself-be-well [*Sich-wohlselassen*], which is no longer to be found outside of this comedy.”

51. I am referring here to the pit (*Schacht*) of the intellect in which memory deposits its images. See the previous chapter.

52. Among the several descriptions of irony Hutcheon offers, the following is particularly useful for the context of my concern with an emotional ethics: “[Irony] undermines stated meaning by removing the semantic security of ‘one signifier: one signified’ and by revealing the complex and inclusive, relational and differential nature of ironic meaning-making” (Hutcheon, *Irony’s Edge*, 13). I’d like to rephrase this description for my context as: the plasticity of emotion in Hegel undermines the substance of pathos and the security of “one individual:
one god/law” by revealing the complex and inclusive, relational and differential theatricality of emotional meaning-making.

53. See Altieri’s “A Plea for ‘Generous Irony’ in Interpreting Affective Experience” (Particulars of Rapture, 228–30), in particular, p. 229: “We do not have to repudiate all . . . intimacies . . . in order to approximate the forms of freedom provided by more bitter ironic stances.”

Chapter 3

1. Pfau argues the same. He locates the historical emergence of this conception of feeling with Kant’s third Critique (in particular, with Kant’s analysis of the sublime). See my discussion at the end of chapter 1 (“Heart”). Terada encounters the idea that emotions require theatricality already in Rousseau (read through Derrida). In fact, one can move back further in time. Medievalists submit that feelings were commonly authenticated theatrically in the Middle Ages (see, for example, Eming, “On Stage: Ritualized Emotions and Theatricality in Isolde’s Trial,” 555–71). And scholars of rhetoric argue that the practice of affection and auto-affection common in Greek and Roman rhetoric relied on a notion of theatrically produced affect (see Campe, Affekt und Ausdruck).


3. See also Agamben, Language and Death, 78: “The metrical-musical element demonstrates first of all the verse as a place of memory and a repetition. The verse (versus, from verto, the act of turning, to return, as opposed to prorsus, to proceed directly, as in prose) signals for a reader that these words have always already come to be, that they will return again, and that the instance of the word that takes place in a poem is, for this reason, ungraspable” (ibid.).

4. Even after correcting the reading from a parallel to a chiasmic syntax, the very chiasm of the stanza’s third and fourth line gives Verzweiflung a prominence that counteracts the explicit mood of the poem.

5. Both Miller and Pinkard shift to the masculine pronoun in the last two lines (Miller even capitalizes “Him”), after referring to spirit by the neuter personal pronoun throughout their translation of the Phenomenology. This decision unnecessarily forces the entire passage into a Christian horizon of meaning.

6. To my knowledge, Hegel uses the word Schädelstätte in only two other passages; both are to be found in his lectures on aesthetics. In the first instance, Schädelstätte refers to the passion of Christ; in the second, it signifies lifeless, non-self-reflective matter. See Hegel, Werke in zwanzig Bänden, 14:152: “Der eigentliche Wendepunkt in diesem Leben Gottes ist das Abtun seiner einzelnen Existenz als dieses Menschen . . . , die Schädelstätte des Geistes, die Pein des Todes”; Hegel, Werke in zwanzig Bänden, 14:370 (on the beautiful form of sculpture): “Freilich darf dabei nicht in der Weise Galls verfahren werden, der den Geist zu einer bloßen Schädelstätte macht.” Note the questionable authorship of the compilation of lecture notes published as Hegel’s aesthetics.

7. See Meyers, s.v. “Golgatha” (“schädelförmiger Hügel bei Jerusalem”).

9. Grimms Wörterbuch defines “Schädelstätte” as “stätte, wo schädel liegen” and cites Jean Paul’s Dämmerungen with an example of this general and non-religious use of the word: “Wir hätten von Glück im Unglück zu sagen, . . . hätte man für die gefüllte Schädelstätte eines Schlachtfeldes stets einen groszen Kopf erkauft.”


12. Note the challengers of Scarry’s understanding of pain. Ahmed, for example, explores the mediatedness and the sociality of pain in The Cultural Politics of Emotion, 23–31. Lethen identifies an inability to even feel pain in the face of the absolute lack of an (ideological, cultural, or religious) superstructure (Überwölbung) serving as a sound board (“Die Evidenz des Schmerzes”).

13. See Terada, Feeling in Theory, 47.

14. One can also describe this emotionality as an aesthetic relationality where the parties and/or states inaccurately replicate one another. Such a description would draw on Bersani’s work with Dutoit in Forms of Being and with Phillips in Intimacies.

15. See Cixous, Déliue, 14: “As soon as the dark song starts, nobody can resist drinking . . . We are all ancient children dying of thirst / Ah! I was thirsty! Let’s cry / For dozens of years, I so felt like crying!” (my translation).

16. This is not the only instance where the Phenomenology breaks into verse. Hegel quotes four lines from Goethe’s Faust at the beginning of “Pleasure and Necessity” (§ 360), and two lines, in Hegel’s own translation, from Sophocles’ Antigone in the section on “Ethical Life” (§ 436). In both cases Hegel does not quote verbatim, and these two insertions of verse can also be read as performances of personal friendship. His reference to Faust easily gives away Hegel’s regard for Goethe, while the lines from Antigone hide the interlocutor more thoroughly. It is in dialogue with Hölderlin—beginning when they were both students at the Tübinger Stift—that Hegel reads, translates, and even attempts a metrical rendering of Antigone.

17. McCumber observes that “the lonely Master of Worlds, independent of his creation, is gone: absolute Spirit, Spirit which knows itself, is result only. And what it results from, the series of shapes of consciousness which ‘foams forth’ to it, is not the set of all possible shapes—the ganze realm of shapes of consciousness. It is merely this realm . . . Its self-determining unity is not infinitude itself, die Unendlichkeit, but the infinitude immanently determined by that specific whole: seine Unendlichkeit” (McCumber 2000, 56–57).


19. See, for example, § 795: “the knowing of pure knowledge not as abstract essence . . . , but the knowing of this pure knowledge as an essence which is this knowing, this individual pure self-consciousness.”
20. See Blanchot, *The Infinite Conversation*, 75: “The fact that speech needs to pass from one interlocutor to the other in order to be confirmed, contradicted, or developed shows the necessity of interval.”

21. Blanchot distinguishes three overlapping modes of interruption: “to interrupt oneself for the sake of understanding,” “to understand in order to speak,” and “speaking . . . only to interrupt oneself and to render possible the impossible interruption” (Blanchot, *The Infinite Conversation*, 79).

22. *Nur* is anticipated and echoed by the *ohne* (without) in the previous phrase.

23. In chapter 4, I will analyze in more detail what it means that Hegel considers his philosophical prose to be affected by verse. Specifically, I argue there that he wants the philosophical proposition to be read not only in one direction, but forward and backward, as it were.

24. See § 95: “In order to put the truth of sense-certainty to the test, a simple experiment will suffice. We write down this truth; a truth cannot be lost by being written down no more than it can be lost by our preserving it, and if now, this midday, we look at this truth which has been written down, we will have to say that it has become rather stale.”

25. Chase notes that “it is as material occurrences not amenable to conceptualization that history may have to be conceived once the concept of progression or regression has been dissolved” (Chase, “Getting Versed,” 136). When spirit gets versed, the concept of progression or regression does indeed dissolve, and what Chase claims here for history counts also for Hegel’s future.

Chapter 4

1. As in Mikhail Baryshnikov’s performance *HeartBeat: mb*.


3. Derrida, *Glas*, 1a: “Those who still pronounce his name like the French (there are some) are ludicrous only up to a certain point: the restitution (semantically infallible for those who have read him a little—but only a little) of magisterial coldness and imperturbable seriousness, the eagle caught in ice and frost, glass and gel.”

4. Derrida offers *hérisséon* or *istrice* as answers to the question of an Italian poetry journal: “Che cos’è la poesia?”—“What kind of thing is poetry?” He found this answer in the work of Friedrich Schlegel, who uses the hedgehog as simile for his favorite incarnation of Romantic poetry: the fragment. Athenäum Fragment 206: “Ein Fragment muß gleich einem kleinen Kunstwerke von der umgeben den Welt ganz abgesondert und in sich selbst vollendet sein wie ein Igel.”

5. I wish to clarify that I don’t defend an idealistic notion of poetry that sees in poetry a particularly personal and emotional mode of expression. I rather agree with Chase when she shows the disconcerting and decomposing effects of
Hegel’s notion of language, especially his understanding of the sign. I also agree with Riley, who introduces us to impersonal passions, as well as with Terada, who argues that “we would have no emotions if we were subjects” (Terada, Feeling in Theory, 4).

6. This as a nod to John McCumber, who writes in the introduction to his superb book on Hegel’s philosophy of language: “The most forgotten need, the one that cuts us open and makes us human, cries at us unspoken from the pages of . . . Hegel. It is the need for a company of words” (McCumber, Company of Words, xv).

7. Through exemplary readings, Nägele has shown how attention to echoes and echolalia (over and against the syntax of logical meaning) productively “breaks up the integrity of the individual text” (Nägele, Echoes of Translation, 16).


9. Versions of this argument can be found in such different accounts of emotion as Nussbaum, “Emotions as Judgments of Value and Importance”; De Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion; and Sartre, Esquisse d’une théorie des emotions.

10. See also Nussbaum, “Emotions as Judgments,” 237: “What, then, makes the emotions in my example unlike the thoughtless natural energies I have described? First of all, they are about something; they have an object.”

11. This is why Hegel usually uses “concept” in the singular. Since the logic of the concept turns fixed separations into permeable differences, it creates an ontological immanence where all differences can be viewed as differences within the concept and not between distinct concepts. While this singular doesn’t exclude the plural (the singular actually pluralizes), the use of the phrase “the concept” certainly lends itself to (mis)understandings of the concept as a metaphysical entity.

12. “This disruption of the concept into the difference of its constituent functions [Momente]—a disruption imposed by the concept’s own activity—is the judgment” (Encyclopedia, §166 Zusatz, trans. modified).

13. Compare McCumber on bivalence and degrees of truth in Reshaping Reason, 40–49.

14. The predicative judgment belongs to what Hegel calls “the old science [die alte Wissenschaft]” (Hegel’s Science of Logic, 92, trans. modified). Hegel does not offer a full-fledged theory of the speculative proposition. As Nancy notes, “the yet necessary speculative theory of syntax is dispersed and is disarticulated from text to text; it goes absent where one was expecting it, and it is brought out in unpredictable contexts—never in the pure style of theory” (Nancy, Speculative Remark, 75–76). Further explanations of the relation between speculative syntax and predicative judgment are to be found in Hegel’s Science of Logic, 90–92.

15. For a more detailed explanation of the logic of the predicative judgment, see Hegel’s Science of Logic, 622–30.

16. The pejorative word Räsonnieren connotes superficiality in combination with a know-all attitude.
17. See Hegel’s *Science of Logic*, 630: “What the judgment enunciates to start with is that *the subject is the predicate*; but since the predicate is supposed *not* to be what the subject is, we are faced with a *contradiction*.”

18. The German language makes it clear that in order to speak about (über) something, one has to be above (über) it. The fact that the predicate, as the more general term, gives meaning to the particular or individual and thus undefined subject distinguishes the logical judgment from any other grammatical sentence. See Hegel’s *Science of Logic*, 625: “We may take this opportunity of remarking, too, that though a *proposition* has a subject and predicate in the grammatical sense, this does not make it a *judgment*. The latter requires that the predicate be related to the subject . . . as a universal to a particular or individual.”

19. See Plato, *Symposium*, 176e (Eryximachus): “I would like now to make a further motion: let us dispense with the flute-girl . . . ; let her play for herself or, if she prefers, for the women in the house. Let us instead spend our evening in conversation.”

20. The manifesto continues: “mythology must become philosophical in order to make the people rational, and philosophy must become mythological in order to make the philosophers sensible [sinnlich zu machen].” Note that the text uses the same phrase with respect to the philosophers that we find in Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* with respect to the abstract concept, the object of Hegel’s critique: *einen abgesonderten Begriff sinnlich zu machen* (*Critique of Pure Reason*, B299).

21. Nancy perceptively observes a sort of tai chi move in Hegel when Hegel takes his leave from “clever argumentation” by yielding to rather than opposing attacks that come in the form of complaints about the unintelligibility of philosophical writing: “Through the singular logic of a reply that does not answer, Hegel has already subtracted his text from the logic of argumentation, from the play of the *Gegenreden*, of discourses of opposition” (Nancy, *Speculative Remark*, 11).

22. For further explanation of why the speculative doesn’t agree with the demand for expression, see chapter 1.

23. Marking and remarking (on) the language that is available to him in order to let resonate the speculative through juggle and syncopation, Hegel thus pursues something akin to what Derrida has explored in *Monolingualism of the Other*.

24. Pinkard aptly translates *spekulativer Satz* as “speculative judgment,” thus underlining that Hegel does not invent a new syntax but rhythmizes the existent syntax of the judgment by accentuating its internal contradictions.

25. Malabou elaborates the double meaning and thus speculative character of the word “plastic” (*Future of Hegel*, 5–12). When something is said to be plastic, this can mean that it easily receives form or that it gives form. Plasticity moves between the complete fixity of form (in sculpture) and malleability to the point of formlessness.

26. Lecturing on art, Hegel observes in Greek sculpture an “air of lifelessness, an aloofness from feeling, and that tranquil trait of mourning.” Quoted from Pinkard, “Symbolic, Classical, and Romantic Art,” fn. 28.

27. Jameson has recently argued with similar exasperation against the three-step scheme. See Hegel *Variations*, 18: “We need to . . . forestall one of the
most notorious and inveterate stereotypes of Hegel discussion, namely the thesis-
antithesis-synthesis formula. . . . For even if the tripartite rhythm happens to do justice to this or that local Hegelian insight, it still reifies that insight in advance and translates its language into purely systemic terms.”

28. Nancy notes that the word *aufheben* appears in the *Science of Logic* first as part of the expression *ein Aufhebens machen*, “to make a fuss” (Nancy, *Speculative Remark*, 34).

29. “Since the predicate itself has been articulated as a subject . . . as the *essence* which exhausts the nature of the subject, [thought] finds the subject also to be immediately present in the predicate. Now, instead of having returned into itself in the predicate [*im Prädikate in sich gegangen*], and instead of having preserved the free status of clever argumentation [*des Räsonnierens*], it is still absorbed in the content, or at least the demand to be so absorbed is present” (§ 62, trans. modified).

30. The same shift happens in the other example Hegel offers: “In that way when it is said, ‘The *actual* is the *universal,*’ the actual, as subject, vanishes into its predicate. The universal is not supposed to [*soll nicht*] have merely the meaning of a predicate such that the proposition would state that the actual is universal; rather, the universal ought to express the essence of the actual” (§ 62, trans. modified). Note the use of the modal auxiliary *soll* (“is supposed to”) in both examples. It implies that the speculative reading of these propositions is not the only reading possible. The proposition can always be read as an abstract judgment.

31. Compare § 58: “To deny oneself the right to insert one’s own views into the immanent rhythm of the concept [*sich des eignen Einfallens entschlagen*] and not to interfere arbitrarily with that rhythm by means of wisdom acquired elsewhere, this abstinence is an essential moment of attentiveness to the concept” (trans. modified).

32. Compare § 57: “[An assertion to the contrary] is usually the first reaction on the part of knowledge when something unfamiliar appears to it. It usually resists it in order to save both its freedom and its own insight and its own authority against alien authority, since that is the shape in which what is now apprehended for the first time appears: as alien—knowledge also stages its resistance in order to rid itself . . . of the kind of shame which supposedly lies in something’s having been learned” (trans. modified).

33. In the next chapter, I will more closely discuss Hegel’s (and Hölderlin’s) thoughts on “bearing shame” as part of the process of “acknowledging,” which is the mode of knowing that is characteristic of the phenomenological approach.

34. Compare § 58: “It is supposed to let . . . [it] move itself by its own nature, which is to say, to let it move itself by means of the self as its own self and to observe this movement” (trans. modified).

35. The current discussion about empathy is carried on within and sometimes across many disciplines, including psychology (simulation theory), neuroscience (mirror neurons), psychotherapy, moral philosophy, feminist philosophy, political theory, philosophy of law, and literary studies. For a helpful critique of empathy from the perspective of rhetoric, see Rüdiger Campe, “An Outline for
a Critical History of Fürsprache: Synergia and Advocacy.” An example for the modernist literary tradition’s strong resentment toward calls for empathy provides Rainer Nägèle’s somewhat undertheorized comment: “Neither writing nor political analysis can emerge from empathy and public concern. The latter are the sites of a misplaced moralization that blocks analysis on every level and provides the fertile ground for any rhetorical seduction that appeals to resentment” (*Echoes* of *Translation*, 4). Wendy Brown (States of Injury) and Lauren Berlant (“The Subject of True Feeling”) have provided much more thorough and informed critiques of the politics of compassion. Another scholar of literary modernism, Charles Altieri, advocates a version of “feeling one’s way in” that relies on reflective judgment (*Particulars of Rapture*). Stanley Cavell emphasizes the reality and everyday experience of our “mutual attunement” (*The Claim of Reason*).

36. David Depew’s “Empathy, Psychology, and Aesthetics” helpfully distinguishes the different historical valences of the concept of empathy.

37. In fact, as Campe points out, Theodor Lipps was the pivotal figure not only in that he gave rise to the discourse on empathy as we know it today, but also in that his own work pivoted from “the broader—and older—notion of perceptual Einfühlung in the world and, with it, the aesthetics of empathy” to “the narrower—and new—concept of empathy with the human body and the other” (Campe, “An Outline for a Critical History of Fürsprache,” 356). Depew focuses on Lipps’s early work in aesthetics when he strengthens the critical (anti-idealist and anti-Romanticist) gist of Lipps’s theory of Einfühlung. Depew clarifies that Lipps was then not concerned with the possibility to feel somebody else’s feeling, but rather understood Einfühlung as akin to animation: as a projection of one’s own feelings into external objects. In this context, Einfühlung is very closely related to expression (if I find that the weeping willow expresses my sadness, this is an example of Einfühlung). This notion of Einfühlung maintains a radical difference in experience between subject and object (the willow does not feel sad). In that way, it is very different from the kind of sympathy Hegel propagates. Hegel’s epistemological sympathy can be traced back to Herder, who makes the—then novel—argument that peoples of different historical periods and cultures have radically different concepts, beliefs, perceptions, and so forth. He uses the phrase sich einfühlen (feeling one’s way in) in an unsystematic way to elaborate his hermeneutics that consist in an arduous process of historical-philological inquiry.

38. Literary scholars tend to be suspicious of empathy because it psychologizes textual relations. My aim here is to propose a textual (and non-psychological) notion of sympathy.

39. Only a retrospective assessment, an afterfeeling, or a reflective judgment can establish—but also only in a transitory way—a sense of the self in transport. Here Altieri’s use of Kant’s reflective judgment meets with Pippin’s notion of agency as retroactive credit. See Altieri, *The Particulars of Rapture*, 14: “For example, where determinative judgment would conclude that Othello is jealous because his behavior is governed by particular traits, reflexive judgment can attend to Othello as bringing together a set of traits that in the future would have to be considered part of our model for what jealousy might be.”
40. Throughout this book, I discuss examples of such word twists—from Schiller’s verses that end the *Phenomenology* to Hegel’s ventriloquizing of phrenology.

41. § 57: “That is the shape in which what is now apprehended for the first time appears: as alien” (see note 31).

42. The verb *übersieht* means “overlooks” in the double sense of “surveys” and “ignores.”


45. Consider Hegel’s aphorism, “The questions which philosophy does not answer are answered in that they should not be so posed” (“Aphorisms from the Wastebook,” 248).

46. I agree with Hirt when he suggests that Hegel “fut avec Platon, du point de vue de la visée de la constitution d’un discours proprement philosophique, à la fois le plus grand ennemi de la poésie et le plus grand poète de la philosophie” (Hirt, *Versus: Hegel et la philosophie à l’épreuve de la poésie*, 15). Chase offers a similar argument when she insists that for Hegel the philosophical idea appears only in a language “susceptible of memorization and inscription,” that is, in verse (Chase, “Getting Versed,” 135).

47. See § 61: “The nature of judgment . . . which includes within itself [*in sich schließt*] the distinction of subject and predicate.”

48. For clarification about how logic is bound up with ontology, and for an argument in favor of transforming logic by accommodating the flexible and contextual use of different ontologies, see McCumber, *Reshaping Reason*.

49. Mieszkowski argues that Hegel views language as “a dynamic whose transgressive potential paradoxically depends precisely on its essentially finite character” (Mieszkowski, “Derrida, Hegel, and the Language of Finitude,” § 2).

Chapter 5

1. After the somewhat extradiegetic description of the ideal movement of mutual acknowledging, the protagonist/s of the *Phenomenology* do fall back to treating each other and themselves as objects. In the dialectic of lordship and bondage, the bondsman does not acknowledge and is not acknowledged but “retrieves” (*wiederfinden*) himself in the objects of his labor (§ 196). *Anerkennen* has here regressed into *Wiederfinden*. See my discussion of *Wiederfinden* in the next section.

2. Compare Butler, *Account of Oneself*, 44: “Recognition cannot be reduced to making and delivering judgments about others.”

3. There is only one mention of *Anerkennung* in the *Phenomenology*: in the spirit chapter when Hegel discusses Antigone’s relation to her brother (§ 456).

4. Hegel apparently liked this poem. Hotho’s compilation of different students’ lecture notes, published under the title *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik*, includes
the following assessment: “Besonders unterscheiden sich Goethes Gedichte im *Divan* wesentlich von seinen früheren. In ‘Willkommen und Abschied’ z. B. ist die Sprache, die Schilderung zwar schön, die Empfindung innig, aber sonst die Situation ganz gewöhnlich, der Ausgang trivial, und die Phantasie und ihre Freiheit hat nichts weiter hinzugebracht. Ganz anders ist das Gedicht im *West-östlichen Divan*, ‘Wiederfinden’ überschrieben. Hier ist die Liebe ganz in die Phantasie, deren Bewegung, Glück, Seligkeit herübergestellt. Überhaupt haben wir in den ähnlichen Produktionen dieser Art keine subjektive Sehnsucht, kein Verliebthein, keine Begierde vor uns, sondern ein reines Gefallen an den Reimen und künstlichen Versmaßen, und dabei eine Innigkeit und Froheit des sich in sich selber bewegenden Gemütes, welche durch die Heiterkeit des Gestaltens die Seele hoch über alle peinliche Verflechtung in die Beschränkung der Wirklichkeit hinausheben” (Hegel, *Werke in zwanzig Bänden*, 14:241). Since this is not one of Hegel’s published texts, I don’t want to make too much of the wording—but the use of “peinlich” here (“peinliche Verflechtung in die . . . Wirklichkeit”), in contrast to Goethe’s “Freiheit” and “Heiterkeit des Gestaltens,” is certainly an interesting echo to Hegel’s description of his own writing style and of the labor of the concept (see my discussion in the next section).

5. The phrase “a reading of love” is borrowed from Hamacher, *Pleroma*, 89. Hamacher uses the phrase to describe a mode of reading that seeks to maintain a movement of multiple differences within the unity of the text.

6. Ormiston argues that the knowledge of love (even though at first dim and subconscious) drives the development of the *Phenomenology*. She intends only the genitive of the object in the phrase “knowledge of love.” Throughout her study, she perpetuates the dichotomy between a supposedly unifying love and what she calls reflective consciousness. See, especially, Ormiston, *Love and Politics*, 36.

7. In his review of Clark Butler’s and Christiane Seiler’s English edition of Hegel’s letters, John McCumber calls to our attention that we have, to this day, avoided penetrating the depths of Hegel’s text: “We have not yet learned how to read Hegel closely; doing so will require, not merely logic and common sense, but appropriating the still foreign techniques of deconstruction and hermeneutics. It will take time” (McCumber, “Hegel: Life, Letters and System,” 641).

8. Clark Butler points out in his commentary to Hegel’s letters that “by the time he replied on November 2, Schelling had read only the Preface. This reply was the last recorded correspondence between the two philosophers. In his letter, Schelling exposes his refusal to grasp Hegel’s basic concern when he writes: ‘Thus I confess I do not yet understand your sense in opposing “concept” to intuition’” (*Hegel: The Letters*, 80).


10. Hegel’s mention of a “multi-sided and multi-meaning intertwining” (*vielseitige und vieldeutige Verschränkung*) shows that what he reduced here, for ana-
lytic purposes, to a double relation really expands into a multitude (Phenomenology, § 178).

11. In chapter 2 (“Pathos”), we have discussed that knowledge in the mode of acknowledging can come at the expense of great physical suffering, even death.

12. Hegel dramatizes duplicity throughout the Phenomenology by using free indirect discourse and by having different sections of the narrative figure other sections while slipping in and out of explicit distinctions. One section might render as inner difference what another section has described as a difference between subjects (the internalized lordship and bondage of the unhappy consciousness, for example), or one section makes a difference explicit that was implicit in the previous one (conscience splits into various configurations of the beautiful soul, for example).

13. I am not as convinced as most commentators on the hard heart seem to be that a final reconciliation of the two final figures of spirit does indeed take place.

14. This is Pinkard’s argument in “Reason, Recognition, and Historicity,” 47–66.

15. Goethe surely knows a thing or two about Begierde (appetite, animal desire, or hunger). His Faust immortalizes the image of man who can get no satisfaction. In the Phenomenology’s section on “Pleasure and Necessity,” Hegel offers his own version of a Faust-like figure bent on proving that he is bound to nothing in his pursuit of pleasure. He comes to realize that he is bound to his own actions.


17. Taylor insists that recognition has become a problem in modernity. While in premodern cultures recognition was built into the socially derived identity by virtue of the very fact that it was based on social categories that everyone took for granted, moderns value authenticity in the sense of an inwardly derived, personal, and original identity. The authentic qua original identity does not enjoy recognition a priori but has to win it, and the attempt to win recognition for one’s authentic self can fail (Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” 34–35).

18. See Pippin on agency, in Hegel’s Practical Philosophy.

19. Pinkard argues as much in “Symbolic, Classical, and Romantic Art.”

8. I am sympathetic to the solution he identifies in Hegel, which, abstractly put, consists in everyone being both master and slave to one another. This would be one version of the mutuality of acknowledging.

20. Kojève comes too close for my taste to glorifying death.


22. See my article on “Andenken” for a brief synopsis of the perspectives taken and the directions identified in the most influential readings of this poem (“A Reading of Love in Hölderlin’s ‘Andenken,’” 194).

23. Mancher can mean both “many” and “some.” Chadwick translates: Some / are reluctant to go to the source.

24. See Baumann,Das Geheimnis wird Licht, 17.
25. About the rarity of the northeasterly in the region of Bordeaux, see Baumann, *Das Geheimnis wird Licht*, 17–18.

26. Baumann extends the cryptonym to D.S.G. (*Die schöne Garonne*).

27. Compare Butler, *Account of Oneself*, 43–44. Butler also warns of the potentially deadly violence of recognition: “As we ask to know the other, or ask that the other say, finally or definitely, who he or she is, it will be important not to expect an answer that will ever satisfy. By not pursuing satisfaction and by letting the question remain open, even enduring, we let the other live, since life might be understood as precisely that which exceeds any account we may try to give of it.” I don’t see the problem in the satisfaction of desire. On the contrary, satisfaction keeps desire alive because, as Hegel shows, it can never be final. Rather, I see the problem in the aim of this desire. The desire for self-sufficiency and the correlating desire to be completely captured by the other’s address destroy the fragile life of mutuality.

28. In “Sober Recollections: Hölderlin’s De-Idealizations of Memory in ‘Andenken,’” Santner affirms the additive rather than adversative use of the conjunction *aber* as liberating and as a sign of Hölderlin’s new, more relaxed style. See esp. 19.


30. In his letter from June 30, 1802, informing Hölderlin of Gontard’s death, Sinclair tries to remind Hölderlin that she survives her death: “Du glaubtest an Unsterblichkeit, da sie noch lebte, Du wirst gewiß jetzt mehr denn vorher glauben... Und was ist größer und edler, als ein Herz, das seine Welt überlebt” (*Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke*, 7:170).

31. See Heidegger, “Remembrance.”

32. See Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, v. 9–11: “And men, content with food which came from no one’s seeking, gathered... acorns fallen from the spreading tree of Jove... and yellow honey was distilled from the verdant oak.”


34. In “The Oak Trees” (“Die Eichbäume”), Hölderlin, mobilizing anti-French sentiments, describes oak trees as Titans who refuse to subject themselves to the cultivated garden of society (*gesellige Leben*). Hölderlin uses the Semele myth in the sixth stanza of “As on a holiday...” Semele, the mortal mother of Dionysus, asked her lover Zeus to show his true shape. When he appeared to her as the god of thunder, she was struck by lightning and died.

35. Hölderlin uses the word *Scheue* while Hegel opts for *Scham*. Hegel often prefers the more carnal term to the more refined connotation Hölderlin chooses.

36. *Darüber hinschauen* extravagantly extends the basic phrase *überschauen*, which by itself already carries a similar ambiguity as “to overlook” in English, meaning both to survey and to fail to notice. The *hin-* of *hinschauen* accentuates the focusing aspect of looking, while *daraüber* emphasizes the movement beyond such focus.

37. I am not as confident as Hamacher is that we can neatly distinguish between Hegel’s intention (which is supposedly to give shame the task of work-
ing in the service of unity) and the way he presents his ideas (which Hamacher sees as undermining Hegel’s intention). In any case, it is the presentation that counts, also and especially for Hegel.

38. See Hamacher, *Pleroma*, 89.

39. In the same fragment, Hegel calls this identity of love that preserves its difference within, a “vollendete Einigkeit” as opposed to the “unentwickelte Einigkeit” which is only the seed of life but not life itself. The unity of love is mature precisely because it preserves difference between the lovers while eliminating “allen Charakter eines Fremden.” That love does not kill otherness in favor of an abstract identity is of foremost importance to Hegel already in the early writings.


41. In “Secluded Laurel—Andenken,” Haverkamp traces a rhetorical tradition from the New Testament through Augustine and Petrarch to Hölderlin that uses the fig tree as a figure for conversion. As the figure of conversion, the fig tree also figures the vacillation and anxiety involved in such a turning, as well as the brave cowardice that is open to and endures such fear.

42. While in the prose form of the phrase the word *daselbst* stands in the middle between the two terms *die braunen Frauen* and *auf seidnen Boden*, the layout of the poem invites the reader to draw the chiasmic exchange between the parallel structures:

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braunen Frauen
seidnen Boden
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with *daselbst* standing off center at the upper right corner of this imaginary X.

43. See Butler, *Subjects of Desire*, 20: “We do not merely witness the journey of some other philosophical agent, but we ourselves are invited on stage to perform the crucial scene changes.”

44. Compare Butler et al., *Contingency*, 19–20: “Hegel’s own persistent references to ‘losing oneself’ and ‘giving oneself over’ only confirm the point that the knowing subject cannot be understood as one who imposes ready-made categories on a pregiven world. . . . We do not remain the same, and neither do our cognitive categories, as we enter into a knowing encounter with the world. Both the knowing subject and the world are undone and redone by the act of knowledge.”

45. Appiah argues for the importance of continuous transformation (i.e., determinate negation) of identity over the protection of identities in the interest of their survival in “Identity, Authenticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies and Social Reproduction.”

Chapter 6

1. In Hegelian terminology, “abstract” means exclusive of the opposite, while “absolute” means encompassing the opposite. “Abstract negation” thus merely negates whereas “absolute negation” negates and affirms.
2. “Everything hangs on apprehending and expressing the truth not merely as *substance* but also equally as *subject*” (§ 17).

3. This and all the following quotations from Cixous’ *L’ange au secret* are my translations.

4. The servant is subordinated to the master because, in his rapid development, he has learned the lessons of the value of life and of the essentiality of the body much quicker than the master has. The step that he seems to have skipped is the realization of the pure negativity of the “I.” This negativity will have been realized in absolute fear. The judgment on the servant is passed from the perspective of the master, that is, from the perspective of the consciousness that went through the life-and-death struggle untouched and unshaken by any experience. The master does not learn the lesson of life’s essential value, and that is why he considers the insight of the servant to be a failure. Only at the very end of the chapter does the phenomenological account turn to an examination of the servant according to the logic of the servant’s own experience: “We only saw what servitude is in relation to mastery. However, servitude is self-consciousness, and thus what it is in and for itself is now up for examination” (§ 194).


6. I am not making an argument against masturbation or for coital intercourse here. Nor do I think that this part of Hegel’s text can be used to make a sexual argument along normative lines. We will see in a moment that the valorized term in this dialectic—the practice that is being avoided through masturbation—is the orgy.

7. For further clarification about Hegel’s notion of the concept, see chapter 4 (“Juggle”).

8. The perceptual consciousness’s fear of the other’s pleasure prefigures the hunger (*Begierde*) for objects that arises when consciousness develops into self-consciousness (in the dialectic of master and slave). This hunger, which Hegel describes as the desire to incorporate all objects and to thereby destroy objecthood in general, is symptomatic of a categorical paranoia vis-à-vis the object, the first traces of which we have caught here.

9. Lorde, “Poetry Is Not a Luxury,” 38. See also Žižek, *Parallax*, 210: “A free Self not only integrates disturbances, it *creates* them, it explodes any given form or stasis. This is . . . the ultimate traumatic Thing the Self encounters in the Self itself.”

10. I draw here on the ambiguity of *ausstehen*, meaning both “to withstand” and “to like.”

11. See chapter 2 for a discussion of the proximity of stubbornness and pathos and its role in Hegel’s examination of tragedy.

12. Here I disagree with Nancy who, in “Identity and Trembling,” an essay that continues to importantly inform my work, writes: “The freedom that speculative spirit grasps is self-determined, and so sublates all determination. . . . Speculative spirit prefers not to think [that freedom could be given by another]. It designates heteronomy as pathology” (21).

13. Cixous explores the ambivalent pull of fear with *L’ange au secret*: “The wind that never abates in this book, the spirit that whispers without interruption,
it’s her: My fear, who is my mystery, the force that pushes me to take to my heels, in what direction? In her direction” (73). I will discuss Cixous’ exploration of fear in more detail in the next part of this chapter.


15. Butler has shown that the servant’s attachment to the stability of the fashioned thing is based on an illusion. What she calls the “bondage contract” supports the illusions and denials of both parties. It allows the master to deny his bodily existence; and it allows the servant to forget that what he reads as his own signature on his works is always only the proxy of the master’s signature. See Butler, “Stubborn Attachment, Bodily Subjection: Rereading Hegel on the Unhappy Consciousness,” 31–62.

16. Later in the course of the Phenomenology, when Bildung has become a self-alienating rather than self-immortalizing process, we encounter a notion of work as work of art (Werk), which operates with a greater awareness of the overlap of negation and affirmation: “The work is, i.e. it exists for other individualities, . . . their interest in the work . . . is something different from this work’s own peculiar interest, and the work is thereby transformed into something different. The work is thus something utterly transitory which is effaced by the counter-play [Widerspiel] of other forces and interests and which exhibits the reality of individuality itself to an even greater degree to be something transitory rather than something achieved” (§ 404, trans. modified). Rather than immortalizing the artist, the work of art gives rise to the artist’s experience of finitude, non-mastery, and interdependence with others. The author’s signature is perverted by those who receive the work and make it their own. Their affirmation of the artwork is the negation of the artist’s intention. While pursuing its own will, the authorial consciousness is co-opted by the will of others. The self-alienated spirit of the world of culture or Bildung knows that self-will is negated precisely in its realization.

17. For a more extended discussion of how rational analysis furthers emotionality, see chapter 7, the section on “Desperate Analysis.”


19. Stoic consciousness is the figure immediately following the dialectic of master and servant.

20. For an excellent discussion of the unhappy consciousness’s self-subjection as a defense against absolute fear, see Butler, “Stubborn Attachment, Bodily Subjection,” 31–62.

21. I am referring here to the self-negation of consciousness by way of working, giving thanks, sacrificing, fasting, and castigating (§ 222–28). In all these forms of self-negation, the unhappy consciousness continues to cultivate the pleasures of the body.

22. The Phenomenology has six major parts (“Consciousness,” “Self-Consciousness,” “Reason,” “Spirit,” “Religion,” and “Absolute Knowledge”). They vary in length, with “Reason” and “Spirit” being the longest and “Absolute Knowledge” the shortest. In our discussion of absolute fear, we have skipped the entire section on “Reason” and are now analyzing the dialectic of “Absolute Freedom and Terror” at the end of the second third of the part on “Spirit.”
23. In the first chapter of _Déluge_, entitled “C’était l’entre deux,” Cixous stresses our disappearing ability to live the moments of the _entre-deux_. For her, as I will show in the next part of this chapter, transitions are intervals of fear and grief whose claim on us for voice and volume is fading: “Bientôt on pourra naître sans crier, ensuite ce sera sans crier faire l’amour, perdre un enfant, mourir. Non, je ne suis pas folle. On va vers le silence. . . . Nous allons vers le _Monde sans Transition_. Autrefois à la strophe 988 l’époux de Kriemhild s’effondrait parmi les fleurs, on voyait le sang s’écouler à flots de sa blessure. . . . Sigfrid ne voulait pas mourir sans avoir dit tout ce qu’il pensait. Le mourant parlait tour à tour aux amis et aux traîtres et à chacun, mortellement blessé, le mourant dit ce qu’il avait à dire. A la strophe 999 les fleurs à la ronde étaient mouillées de sang. A la fin le mourant prenait encore la peine de souffrir à la place de son père, de sa mère et de ses barons. N’ayant plus la force de parler il repoussait à la fin une terrible strophe encore. Il avait une si furieuse pitié de ceux qui attendaient longtemps son retour. C’était l’agonie de ceux qui l’attendraient en vain qu’il voulait pleurer avant de mourir. Maintenant dès que Sigfrid s’effondrera, ils vont couper, paraît-il. On ne va plus laisser aux gens le temps de crier, l’heure du violoncelle, c’est terminé. / Je ne veut pas qu’il arrive, ce meurt-petit, - moi dont la moitié de vivre est mourir, je vis de vivre et mourir enchevêtrés en sonate. / Je ne veux pas le monde à un oeil et une seule dimension, non, notre vie n’est pas sèche et plane, mais au moins cinq fois accidentée, torte, convulsée.” Cixous, _Déluge_, 15–16.

24. Throughout the sections on “Consciousness,” “Self-Consciousness,” “Reason,” and “Spirit,” the _Phenomenology_ traces various figures of finite consciousness. Hegel treats the same subject matter, but from the perspective of the divine substance, in the chapter on “Religion,” and he addresses the synthesis of both perspectives (finite consciousness and divine substance) in the chapter on “Absolute Knowledge.”

25. See § 439: “Spirit is . . . the self-supporting, absolute, real essence. All the previous shapes of consciousness are abstractions from it; they are just this, that spirit analyses itself, distinguishes its moments, and lingers at each individual moment. . . . As so isolated, these moments seem as if they were to exist as isolated. However, their advance and retreat into their ground and essence points to the way in which they are merely moments or vanishing magnitudes, and this essence is this very movement and dissolution of those moments.”

26. Schmidt, “Cabbage Heads and Gulps of Water: Hegel on Terror,” 23. Even though instrumental for his subsidiary argument that the Hegel of the _Phenomenology_ found no solution to the problem that drove the French Revolution into terror, the quoted statement does not play a central role in Schmidt’s essay as a whole. Schmidt offers an illuminating analysis of the historical changes in Hegel’s thought on the Terror from his earliest notes on the subject to his lectures on the philosophy of history.

27. Hegel’s use of the term “certainty” is counterintuitive to a modern scientific understanding. In Hegel’s text, certainty is not what consciousness arrives at after a process of verifying a hypothesis, but it is what consciousness starts out with and loses in the process of verifying or actualizing what it holds to be
true. The loss of one certainty immediately produces a new one, which will have to be verified again. Certainty, thus, corresponds to a subjective need, rather than an objective reality.

28. As I discussed in chapter 2 ("Pathos"), the pathos of each figure in the *Phenomenology* is to live and die for its certainty.


30. Compare Nancy, *Hegel*, 42: "Self-knowing in negativity and as negativity is therefore no more a knowing than it is a victory that would subdue or domesticate pain, death, the other, or joy. It is not knowing of an object; it is self-knowing—but only to the extent that, in this knowing, self does not become its own object... The subject is—or makes up—the experience of its being-affected as the ordeal of what dissolves its subsistence."

31. See Nancy, *Hegel*, 44: “It is always the trembling of the finite seized by the infinite: it is the sensibility of the infinite in the finite.”

32. This explains the melancholy tone of the *Phenomenology*’s last chapter. See chapter 3 ("Release").

33. I use “authors” in the plural because of the ambivalence within the authorial position between insisting on continuity and marking the transitions as leaps.

34. Compare Nancy, *Hegel*, 42: “The subject does not reappropriation its other and its contradiction: that it knows this contradiction to be its own, and that this knowing is exactly what constitutes it as subject, does not make its own contradiction become its subsistence. It remains its contradiction, just as my pain, my death, and my other, or my joy, remain outside of me: outside of me—what, being mine, makes me go out of myself.”

35. By switching pronouns in this paragraph I mimic and thus foreground how Hegel’s text moves fluidly and often ambiguously between its different subjects (consciousness, spirit, author, readers).

36. See § 545: “the communication between them [the enlightener and the naive believer] is immediate, and their giving and receiving is an undisturbed flow [ungestörtes Ineinanderfließen] of the one into the other.”

37. “It is thereby entangled in this contradiction as a result of having both let itself get into this quarrel and thinking of itself as doing battle with something other” (§ 548).

38. “This world [of the enlightenment] still contains in it the aspect of the spiritual kingdom of animals [geistiges Tierreich], where in mutual violence and disarray, they fight and deceive each other over the essence of the real world” (§ 536, trans. modified).

39. Nancy plays on the French phrase *faire une experience*, which also exists in German (*eine Erfahrung machen*) and which means “to have an experience” but also, literally, to create an experience (Nancy, *Hegel*, 42).

40. See Nancy, *Hegel*, 41: “Reconciliation is in the point, or in passage.”

41. Note that it was the problem of the unhappy consciousness that it gained from each mortification.
Chapter 7

1. Chase foregrounds the “disarticulation of the figure of progression” in her rapprochement of Hegel with Baudelaire in “Getting Versed,” 113–38.

2. Ngai suggests that Lispector’s Passion According to G.H. could be read as a religious parody (Ngai, Ugly Feelings, 346). If parody consists in an act of mimetic repetition that draws on the need for iteration of a power configuration (in this case Christian dogma) to introduce a shift in meaning, then I don’t see why we couldn’t extend her suggestion to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit.

3. “Throughout the changing flux of everything which would be secure for it, skeptical self-consciousness thus experiences its own freedom . . . the unchangeable and genuine certainty of its own self” (§ 205).

4. Skepticism engages only in a “shaking of this or that alleged truth which is then followed by the disappearance of the doubt, and which in turn then returns to the former truth in such a way that what is at stake is taken to be exactly what it was in the first place” (§ 78, trans. modified).

5. “The fear of truth may lead consciousness to conceal itself both from itself and from others and to take refuge behind the appearance that holds that its fiery enthusiasm for the truth itself makes it more difficult or even impossible to find some truth other than the individual truth of vanity itself—that of being at any rate cleverer than any of the thoughts one might get from oneself or from others” (§ 80, trans. modified).

6. Zweifel is etymologically related to Zweifalt (twofold) and thus signifies a doubling. In its vanity, the skeptic doesn’t hesitate to assume contradictory positions for the sake of always negating its opposite party: “If parity [Gleichheit] is pointed out to it, it points out disparity [Ungleichheit], and if it is reproached with the latter (about which it had just spoken), it quickly shifts over into pointing out parity. Its talk is indeed like that of a squabble among stubborn children, one of whom says A when the other says B, and says B when the other says A. By being in contradiction with himself, each of them purchases the delight of remaining in contradiction with each other” (§ 205). Enacting these contradictory roles, the skeptic can scarcely go on pretending to be a pure self-identical being-for-self. It must realize that, instead of one, it is (at least) two: “In skepticism, [self-consciousness] . . . it doubles itself to an even greater degree, and is in its own eyes now something twofold [ein Zweifaches]” (§ 206). Skepticism (Zweifel) splits consciousness in two (zwei) and thereby initiates the absolute movement of despair (Verzweiflung). The prefix ver, in that it means both consummation and negation, adds an additional speculative twist to the word.

7. Compare this restless consciousness in despair to the stoic consciousness who “maintain[s] the lifelessness which consistently withdraws from the movement of existence, withdraws from actual activity as well as from suffering” (§ 199).

8. Malabou has developed the concept of “plasticity” that aptly captures both the power to shape and the capacity to self-differentiate, self-negate, or self-distance (see Malabou, The Future of Hegel). With my notion of a rubber subject or a rubber tumbler subject I take her concept to a playful extreme.
9. Its wobbling motion (which would be Taumeln in German) is an effect of the bacchanalian revel (Bacchantischer Taumel) of truth. See § 47: “The truth is the bacchanalian revel where no member is not drunk.”

10. While “absolute knowledge” might be considered the end, it has no positive content beyond its function to ruin the natural certainty of each shred, figure, or shape of the whole.

11. For my spatial interpretation of Aufhebung, see chapter 2 (“Pathos”).

12. For the importance of deriving the concept of truth from the consciousness one observes, instead of judging that consciousness based on an external standard of truth, see § 81–85.

13. § 168–76.

14. Hamacher, Bahti, and Clark find Hegel eating flesh to be ethically, epistemologically, politically, and aesthetically appalling. See Hamacher, *Pleroma*, 230–95; Bahti, *Allegories of History*, 80 and 109ff.; and Clark, “Hegel, Eating,” 124–30. I see eating in Hegel instead as a physical form of communication that engages with the other at the cost of (also) ruining the self. I thus agree with Rajan when she argues that “in Hegel’s lurid figuration of nature as spirit and thus of mind as (human) nature or psyche, such organisms also consume themselves” (“(In)digestible Material,” 222). Rajan considers the physiological details of Hegel’s discussion of digestion and illness in the *Encyclopedia*’s “Philosophy of Nature” as “the logical organism’s rethinking of its subjectivity” as “inability to digest nature” (ibid., 220, 218).


16. See chapter 1 (“Heart”) and the beginning of this chapter’s section on “Narrative (Dis)organization.”

17. Lispector, *The Passion According to G.H.*, 64: “Eating of living matter would expel me from a paradise of adornments”; and 107: “learn from this one who has had to be laid completely bare and lose all her suitcases with the engraved initials.”

18. So much attention has been paid to the all-devouring character of Hegelian thought that the inverse relation between eating and thinking has been overlooked.


20. Müller-Sievers’s vehement critique of epigenesis is based on the premise that “epigenesis is . . . the condition of the possibility of any claim to absoluteness, be this a philosophical or literary absolute” (Self-Generation, 4). Hegel shows how epigenesis undoes the absolute.

21. See my discussion of the interiority of reason in chapter 1 (“Heart”).

22. See my discussion of Hegel’s half-sympathetic speech acts in chapter 4 (“Juggle”).

23. See, for example, the following passage where the phenomenologist moves from observing the phrenologist’s stance to identifying with his position to speaking in his voice: “However, the observing consciousness is not concerned with how to determine this relation. This is so because, in any event, it is not the
brain that stands on one side of the relation as an animal part. Rather, it is the brain as the being of self-conscious individuality. This individuality, as settled character and self-moving conscious activity, exists for itself and within itself. Its actuality and its existence for others stand in opposition to being-for-and-within-itself. This being-for-and-within-itself is the essence and subject, which has a being in the brain, but this being, the brain, is subsumed under the former, and it receives its value merely by way of the indwelling meaning. However, the other side of self-conscious individuality, namely, that of its existence, is being as self-sufficient and as subject, that is, as a thing, namely, a bone. The actuality and existence of man is his skull-bone” (§ 331; trans. modified).

24. This is an example of Hegel performing what Riley calls “hate’s work” (Riley, Impersonal Passion, 24). By “hate’s work,” she means the long and laborious process of neutralizing hateful speech. See Impersonal Passion, 9–27, in particular p. 22: “I’ll ignore the utterer, the better to dissect the utterance. To isolate the word as thing, to inspect it and refuse it, demands a confident capacity to act unnaturally toward language, which normally functions as an energetic means of exchange.”

25. Compare Žižek, Parallax, 206: “If we penetrate the surface of an organism, and look deeper and deeper into it, we never encounter some central controlling element that would be its Self, secretly pulling the strings of its organs. The consistency of the Self is thus purely virtual; it is as if it were an Inside which appears only when viewed from the Outside, on the interface-screen—the moment we penetrate the interface and endeavor to grasp the Self ‘substantially,’ as it is ‘in itself,’ it disappears like sand between our fingers. Thus materialist reductionists who claim that ‘there really is no self’ are right, but they nonetheless miss the point.” Žižek offers these thoughts in the context of a discussion of neuroscience. Brain science is the twenty-first-century version of “observing reason.” That is to say, the infinite judgment that Hegel distilled from the phrenologist stance must be reformulated today as “the mental is the neuronal” or “the being of spirit is ‘the piece of meat’ that is the brain” (Parallax, 211).

26. See § 346: “The infinite judgment as infinite would be the fulfillment of self-comprehending life, whereas the consciousness of the infinite judgment which remains trapped within representational thought conducts itself like piping” (trans. modified).

27. The infinite judgment is the one judgment of existence that can be called true in a reasonable kind of way. The other judgments of existence are the positive and the negative judgment (The rose is red. The rose is not red.) They can be correct statements of facts, but not Vernunftwahrheiten. See Hegel, Hegel’s Science of Logic, 630–43.

28. In the case of “The rose is a plant,” the rose, as the particular term, is subordinated to the general category of plant. In the case of “The rose is red,” the general characteristic of color is subordinated to the individual rose, which combines many characteristics in addition to color.

29. For my discussion of the beautiful soul as a figure that refuses pleasure, see chapter 1.

31. If it is confusing that Hegel here claims that existence and judgment are not acknowledged, let me add that acknowledging always comprises a negative element. Acknowledging is always split into affirmation and negation. When the acting consciousness says *Ich bins*, it both agrees with the other’s judgment and reveals the inherent hypocrisy of this judgment.

32. Malabou argues that there is an anticipatory structure to subjectivity as Hegel conceived it. Her speculative notion of this structure—which she calls *le voir venir*—actually enables us to say that consciousness can anticipate its future while specifying that this anticipation consists in an openness to surprise. See Malabou, *The Future of Hegel*, 13: “It is an expression that can thus refer at one and the same time to the state of ‘being sure of what is coming’ and of ‘not knowing what is coming.’ It is on this account that the ‘voir venir,’ ‘to see (what is) coming,’ can represent that interplay, within Hegelian philosophy, of teleological necessity and surprise.”

33. “The truth is the whole. However, the whole is only the essence completing itself through its own development” (*das Wahre ist das Ganze. Das Ganze aber ist nur das durch seine Entwicklung sich vollendende Wesen*, § 20).

34. Malabou articulates the tension between the relativity and the independence of the figures of consciousness as one between two notions of time that are both put to work in Hegel’s narrative: a Greek sense of time that emphasizes synthesis and a modern sense of time that emphasizes the independence of moments along the line of Kantian hypotyposis (translation of the concept into the form of the sensuous). See *Future of Hegel*, 18 and 125–30.

35. Compare Pinkard, *Sociality of Reason*, 11: “When confronted with self-generated skepticism, a reflective form of life seeks reassurance in the accounts that it gives itself of what is authoritative for it. One of two things happens: either the reassurance is successful, and there is a renewal of that form of life; or it fails, and a new conception of what is authoritative—and thereby a new form of life—is required.” “Self-generated skepticism” is Pinkard’s paraphrase for “self-negation.” He thus attends to the double pull of self-affirmation or self-reassurance and self-negation or self-doubt that consciousness experiences.

36. Hegel is well aware of the historical link of Christianity to the Greek cults of Demeter and Dionysus.

37. According to Greek myth, Dionysus was taken out of the burnt body of his mother Semele (first birth) and inserted into his father Zeus’s thigh, out of which he was born again once fully developed. (See Hederich, *Gründliches Mythologisches Lexikon*, s.v. “Bacchus.” Hederich’s lexicon was the authoritative source on Greek mythology during Hegel’s time.) According to an Orphic version of the myth, Dionysus was the child of Zeus and Persephone. Zeus’s jealous wife, Hera, incited the Titans to lacerate the child. Athena saved his pulsating heart and brought it to Zeus, who made a potion of it and gave it to Semele to drink. From this, she became pregnant with Dionysus (second birth) (see Tripp, *Crowell’s Handbook of Classical Mythology*, s.v. “Dionysos”). Under the entry
“Dithyrambus,” Hederich explains that one epithet of Dionysus was Dithyrambus (“double door” or “twice-born”) because he was torn apart by the Titans and then put back together by Ceres. Dionysus’s dismemberment as a child is repeated in the stories of raving female followers (Maenads) who lacerate those who refuse to worship Dionysus.

Like all her siblings, Ceres was eaten by her father Kronos, but he vomited her out again after Metis had given him an emetic (see *Gründliches Mythologisches Lexikon*, s.v. “Ceres”). During the time of her grief for Persephone, Ceres hides in a cave. According to Hederich, this was meant to symbolize the seed in the earth, before it sprouts or comes to light (symbolized by Pan’s disclosure of Ceres’ dwelling place to Jupiter). Persephone spends part of the year in the underworld and part of the year with her mother Ceres above ground. Her name has been taken to mean “concealed fruit,” which can refer to the seed in the ground or to the harvest stored in the barn during winter (see *Gründliches Mythologisches Lexikon*, s.v. “Proserpina”).

38. Hartman quotes Derek Walcott.
39. See Žižek, *Tarrying with the Negative*, 122–24, for an excellent explanation of why the Hegelian synthesis is not based on complementarity.
40. Fragment 719 (Dind.), quoted from Lawson, *Modern Greek Folklore and Ancient Greek Religion*, 563.
41. Each piece of Dionysus is Dionysus himself.
42. Compare Grosz, “Animal Sex.”
43. Nobody since Wahl has analyzed this structure of Hegel’s dialectic as an emotional economy.
44. See the previous section, “Come Break My Heart.”

Epilogue

1. By violence, I mean here the unambiguous destruction or forceful eclipse of other realities. Determinate negation—even in its most bodily form, that is, as “eating alive”—is a different animal altogether. The ambiguity of eating alive—the fact that it gives life to the extent that it gives death (or takes death to the extent that it takes life)—creates interdependence.

2. Altieri prefers it when “dialectical reconciliation seems impossible because there is no mediating principle” (*Particulars of Rapture*, 206).

3. “The truth is the whole. However, the whole is only the essence completing itself through its own unfolding [Entwicklung]” (§ 20).

4. The French original perhaps even more clearly highlights the fabricated quality of experience: “Le sujet est, c’est-à-dire fait, l’expérience de son être affecté” (Nancy 1997, 63). Nancy dismantles here the phrase faire l’expérience (“to have an experience,” literally: “make an experience”), which also exists in German (eine Erfahrung machen).
5. Transports both propel and slow down the development of the Phenomenology.

6. Hegel’s Aesthetics, 1035; for complete reference, see chapter 4.


8. Sokolsky, “The Resistance to Sentimentality,” 83: “The sentimental may be described as something more which subtly mocks the declaration of sincerity by being more than sincere.”

9. Most of the more interesting French readings of Hegel in the twentieth century have read his work through the paradigm of the unhappy consciousness. See Baugh 2003. That is to say, they didn’t get the levity of taking tears excessively seriously.