Kafka and Wittgenstein

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NOTES

Introduction

1. Franz Kafka, *Gesammelte Werke in zwölf Bänden*, ed. Hans-Gerhard Koch and Malcolm Pasley, vol. 7, *Zur Frage der Gesetze* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2004), 163. This edition of Kafka’s collected German works will hereafter be cited in text with the abbreviation GW followed by the volume number and the page number. Unless otherwise noted, all translations into English are my own.


3. This popular view of the relationship between Wittgenstein and Nestroy is most often attributed to the eminent Wittgenstein scholar David Stern. See specifically the first three chapters of *Wittgenstein’s “Philosophical Investigations”: An Introduction* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

4. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung/Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1963). As is customary in the philosophical community, here the *Tractatus* will be abbreviated *TLP* and referenced parenthetically in text by remark number, e.g., “Was gezeigt werden kann, kann nicht gesagt werden” (*TLP* 4.1212).

5. Although the invention of first-order logic as a notational language is usually attributed to Gottlob Frege, the phrase “the New Logic” is most often attributed to the early logical philosophy of Bertrand Russell, specifically his *Principia Mathematica* (1910), coauthored with Alfred North Whitehead.

6. Hans Sluga makes the same comparison between architectural (and literary and artistic) and philosophical modernism in the *Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein*, which he coedits with David Stern (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Sluga writes that the Stonborough House is “indubitably a specimen of cultural modernism and, specifically, of the formalist modernism evident in Mondrian’s paintings, in Bauhaus architecture, and in the assumptions of French structuralism” (“Ludwig Wittgenstein: Life and Work,” 11). Additionally, Peter Galison’s is likely the best-known critique to explore the connection between philosophical and architectural modernism, specifically the early modernism characterized by Adolf Loos or the Bauhaus group and the logical positivism that came directly out of—and, Wittgenstein insisted, as a misunderstanding of—the publication of the *Tractatus*; see Galison, “Aufbau/Bauhaus: Logical Positivism and Architectural Modernism,” *Critical Inquiry* 16, no. 4 (Summer 1990): 709–52.


9. See again Sluga, “Ludwig Wittgenstein,” in Sluga and Stern, Cambridge Companion: “Wittgenstein’s later rejection of the Tractarian philosophy can be assimilated, for similar reasons, to the antiformalist tendencies within modernism, most notably the emergence of abstract expressionism, action painting, and informalism in postwar art whose later expression in architecture, literature, and philosophy has found recognition under the label of postmodernism” (12).


12. For an extensive discussion on why it is permissible to perform a logical analysis on fiction, see the preface to part 1.


15. The following characterization of the differences between the “two Wittgensteins” is my own, but in the philosophical community would be considered a “Sternian” take after the work of David G. Stern.


17. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen/Philosophical Investigations: Dritte Auflage mit englischem und deutschem Register, ed. and trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1968), §116. As is customary in the philosophical community, references to the Investigations will hereinafter be cited in text with the abbreviation PI, the section symbol §, and section number. Unless otherwise noted, all translations to the English are Anscombe’s.

18. As I have noted before (see Schuman, “Unerschütterlich,” 170), there is no record of any awareness on Kafka’s part of Wittgenstein’s work (unsurprising, given the Tractatus was published only two years before Kafka’s death), and the sole mention of Kafka in Wittgenstein biographical lore comes from Ray Monk, who relates an occasion on which Wittgenstein’s translator and protégé G. E. M. Anscombe recommended Der Proceß, and Wittgenstein dismissed it with this telling remark: “This man gives himself a great deal of trouble not writing about his trouble.” Monk, The Duty of Genius, 498.


20. In large part due to this faction, Stern contends, “much of what passes for interpretation of Wittgenstein is really a discussion of other interpreters’ readings, so that a forbidding and intricate secondary literature has taken on a life of its own” (“The Availability of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy,” in Sluga and Stern, Cambridge Companion, 443). This literature includes the work of non-Pyrrhonian views such as that of P. M. S. Hacker, who argues that Wittgenstein advocates the view that philosophical investigation is “a therapy for diseases of the understanding, for the conceptual entanglements to which we are prone.” And, further, philosophical investigation is “a quest for a perspicuous
representation of a segment of our language that is a source of philosophical puzzlement, achievement of which is part of the method of resolution of philosophical problems. The two aspects are the two faces of the pursuit of conceptual clarity.” See Hacker, “Philosophy,” in Wittgenstein: A Critical Reader, ed. Hans-Johann Glock (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 324.

21. In the words of Robert Fogelin, philosophers are “led into confusion because they are antecedently disposed to view various uses of language in ways inappropriate to them.” See Sluga, “Ludwig Wittgenstein,” 34.

22. Ibid., 35.

Preface to Part One


6. See Bertrand Russell, Philosophy of Logical Atomism, ed. David Pears (Chicago: Open Court, 1985), 35–40. I am referring in particular to the assertion that “the logic which I shall advocate is atomistic, as opposed to the monistic logic of the people who more or less follow Hegel. When I say that my logic is atomistic, I mean that I share the common-sense belief that there are many separate things; I do not regard the apparent multiplicity of the world as consisting merely in phases and unreal divisions of a single indivisible Reality” (36).


10. My own translation; while TLP 1 is identical to every major English iteration, with TLP 7 I have chosen to translate as literally as possible, thus ending rather inelegantly with a preposition.

11. TLP 1.1. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. C. K. Ogden (Minneola, N.Y.: Dover, 1999). Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent renderings of the Tractatus in English are Ogden’s, with modifications where noted.


14. My own translation; most English translators of Wittgenstein shy away from neologism, as he did not use any, but in English we have no equivalent for sinnvoll in this context, other than the neologism “sensical” (possible extant words, such as “sensible” and “meaningful,” have inappropriate connotations).

15. Although I acknowledge, throughout this book, the philosophical and literary importance of the “new” or “resolute” readings of the Tractatus (most notably attributed to Cora Diamond and James Conant), unless otherwise identified, all exegesis of the end of the Tractatus will assume a mainstream or “metaphysical”
reading. Although many literary scholars who use the *Tractatus* assume the Diamond/Conant view is dominant or even well represented in philosophy, this is actually not the case. The “new” reading is a minority reading and, though quite compelling, also flawed in ways that are outside the scope of this project. Operating under the influence of the eminent philosopher and judicious Wittgenstein reader David Stern, I do not find it particularly productive to take a “stand” on “which Wittgenstein” is “correct”—I believe it is contrary to the spirit of the project, and the spirit of Wittgenstein himself, who took great pains in his entire career to dismantle the conceit of “correct.”


21. Ibid., 54.

22. Ibid., 2.


28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.


36. Zumhagen-Yekplé writes: “Our coming to understand what the parable has to teach us depends upon our ability to pay careful attention to the ways in which the point of the parable emerges, unstated, from a gap inhering between the two extremes of experience it depicts: that of everyday facticity on the one hand and of a fictive and fantastic pure transcendence (represented by the calls to ‘cross over’ to the fabulous beyond and to ‘become parables’) on the other.” See Zumhagen-Yekplé, “The Everyday’s Fabulous Beyond,” 430.

37. Ibid., 431.


45. Diamond and Conant warn: “There should be no substitute for the hard task of working through the book on one’s own. A resolute reading does not aim to provide a skeleton key for unlocking the secrets of the book in a manner that would transform the ladder into an elevator, so that one just has to push a button (say, one labeled ‘austere nonsense’) and one will immediately be caused to ascend to Tractarian heights without ever having to do any ladder-climbing on one’s own.” Cora Diamond and James Conant, “On Reading the Tractatus Resolutely: Reply to Meredith Williams and Peter Sullivan,” in *Wittgenstein’s Lasting Significance*, ed. Max Kölbel and Bernhard Weiss (London: Routledge, 2004), 47.


49. Ibid., 16.

50. Ibid., 19–20.


53. Ibid., 52.

54. Ibid., 58.

55. I would like to “thank” the brilliant Kata Gellen, my onetime editor, fellow Kafka scholar, and friend, for bringing up this crucial question and thus forcing me to address it in print.

Chapter 1

1. An earlier draft of this chapter appeared in *The German Quarterly* 85, no. 2 (Spring 2012): 156–72. I would like to thank James Rolleston for permission to revise and republish and Kata Gellen for a tremendous job of editing.


6. Ibid., 228–35.

7. Ibid., 231.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.


13. I am deeply indebted to Waldemar Rohloff, who has discussed with me with incomparable thoroughness the nuances of both Wittgenstein’s logic in the *Tractatus* and contemporary first-order logic. I would also like to thank Janek Wassermann of the University of Alabama for a patient and crucially edifying read of the original version of this chapter, which appeared as an article in the *German Quarterly*. See Schuman, “Unerschütterlich.”


15. *Sachverhalt*, as Wittgenstein describes it, is the logical relationship between objects in the world that create the presence of all facts, *Tatsachen*. See *TLP 2*: “Was der Fall ist, die Tatsache, ist das Bestehen von Sachverhalten” (“What is the case, the fact, is the existence of states of affairs”).

16. K. has not yet maintained innocence, but Franz has maintained it for him, and in the world of the Court official articulation of any kind seems to equate proof (see, for example, Clayton Koelb’s excursus on the “rhetorical gap” in the warders’ “Sie sind ja gefangen.” “Kafka’s Rhetorical Moment,” *PMLA* 98, no. 1 [1983]: 40).

17. Technically “not guilty and not not guilty,” which is logically equivalent to \( \neg (G \lor \neg G) \), “not (guilty or not guilty).”


19. Two remarks from the *Tractatus* that have a markedly logocentric foundation but are often assigned metaphysical (mis-)reading are 4.1212 (“Was gezeigt werden kann, kann nicht gesagt werden” [“What can be shown, cannot be said”]) and 5.6 (“Die Grenzen meiner Sprache sind die Grenzen meiner Welt” [“The limits of my language are the limits of my world”]). In the former remark, the “was” that “gezeigt werden kann” is “die logische Form . . . der Wirklichkeit,” or “the logical form . . . of reality;” and in the second, the limits Wittgenstein speaks of are indeed the limits of logic (*TLP* 4.18, 5.61).

20. Goebel also has a compelling take on this contradiction, though he prefers to view it as “allegorical details” that “do not form a unified whole” rather than details that contradict each other. He also points out that the painting “eludes
the hermeneutic desire to establish a determinate coherent meaning—in other words, it says nothing,” which I again argue is as a result of it containing a major contradiction. See Goebel, “Exploration,” 53.


23. Ibid., 155–60, with particular attention to the review of the rule “⊥ Elimination” (159).

24. Ibid., 159 (emphasis mine).

25. This example is about a logical relationship between two sentences in a larger derivation whose intricacies we do not know; therefore it is imperative that the two sentences in the example not have an obvious relationship of logical consequence to muddy the demonstration of the rule (such as the premise being “Yesterday was the thirtieth of November”). The point here is that in logic, one can indeed get from “That man is wearing shoes” to “Today is the first of December” with enough steps, some of which can indeed include a contradictory premise. In fact, many logicians will introduce a contradiction into a derivation on purpose simply to use ex falso quodlibet and be able to introduce something new that might help.


27. Sokel, Myth and Power of the Self, 228–35.

28. In addition to making it so that the validity of K.’s case does not make us rest any easier about it, this realization also sheds some very peculiar and Wittgenstinian light on the oft-discussed final sentence of The Trial, in particular the assertion that K., at least according to his own conception, dies “Wie ein Hund!” What separates man from the animals is, presumably, among other things the ability to communicate—so without the ability to communicate what is most important of all, logical structure, both K. and the Law are essentially inhuman.

Chapter 2

1. An earlier version of this chapter appeared in Modern Austrian Literature 44, no. 2/4 (2001): 19–32. I would like to thank Craig Decker for permission to republish.


3. Ibid., 64.


5. Greenberg, Terror of Art, 68.

6. Ibid., 68.


10. An exception to this is Sussman’s *Afterimages of Modernity*, wherein he offers an analysis of the *Tractatus*—itself as literature—alongside Kafka’s work, primarily as an example of what he terms the anorexic aesthetic in both writers’ work (rather than the “obese” discourse he associates with Derrida; this is discussed at greater length in my introduction). What is *unsaid* in the *Tractatus*—the “metalinguistic acts” that include “spareness of expression,” “numerical code,” and “unmarked transitions that undermine the numerical code”—becomes equally as important as what is said, an argument Wittgenstein made himself in regard to his own necessarily unsayable ethical corpus. For example: “In reading Wittgenstein, in the *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* and less pointedly in later works, one confronts a series of significant gestures whose place is beyond the narrative, that is, beyond the specific contemporary problems and issues within the history of philosophy that Wittgenstein is addressing.” My analysis, though indebted to Sussman’s, differs in that it reads the *Tractatus* in a far more philosophically standard way and seeks structural similarities in both texts on a purely textual level. See Sussman, *Afterimages of Modernity*, 50–59.

12. A canonical example of the former is, of course, Sokel’s *Myth and Power of the Self*; in terms of the latter, see Adorno, “Aufzeichnungen zu Kafka.”
18. Ibid., 137.
21. Ibid., 283.
22. Ibid., 276.
23. Ibid., 281.
24. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
29. Ibid., 13.
31. Ibid., 284–86.
32. Ibid., 285.
33. The fact is that it *is* an actual *Tierstimme*—this metaphor works on two levels, as both a “successful” metaphor and a collapsing one; the first level is what we are exploring currently; the second is explored at more length in section 2 of this chapter.
35. See “Ein Landarzt” (“A Country Doctor”), GW 1:200–204: “Ich bleibe bei Rosa” (“I'm staying with Rosa”) says the amorous stableboy, giving a name that sticks to the heretofore nameless servant girl; “Rosa” is the word with which the doctor then begins to describe the boy’s odd wound; “an dieser Blume,” he says to the boy, “gehst du zugrunde” (“This flower will be the death of you”). The repetition and morphing of roses and flowers calls up not only the “commonplaces” of fragility and feminine beauty, but also the well-known “Rose” poems of the German canon, including Goethe’s “Heidenröslein.”
38. Although the intellectual affinity between The Metamorphosis and the Tractatus may not yet be apparent, the temporal affinity is: the Tractatus was composed while Wittgenstein was a soldier during World War I (though published in 1921, the bulk of it was written from 1916 to 1918), almost exactly concurrent with the composition of The Metamorphosis (1915).
39. This is the distilled trajectory of TLP 2–2.11, 3.001.
40. See note 11.
41. Black, Companion, 3.
42. As we will see, however, Wittgenstein’s use of the word unsinnig (and not simlos) in 6.54 gives resolute readers ample reason to believe that “throwing away” the saying/showing distinction is not at all antithetical but instead totally faithful to the text. (Although, to be fair, the fact that Wittgenstein has provoked a difference at all between simlos and unsinnig belongs to the 4s, to the text of the Tractatus, and an employment of that distinction in order to strengthen the “resolute” reading actually destroys it. This, and many other reasons, is why the “resolute” reading remains largely contested.)
43. Cora Diamond argues quite convincingly that unlike Bertrand Russell, who places great emphasis on category error being distinguishable from pure gibberish, Wittgenstein believes all attempts at expressing philosophy in language fall, more or less, into the same category as “I am going to the readily.” See Diamond, “What Nonsense Might Be,” Philosophy 56, no. 215 (1981): 5–22.
45. Ibid., 155.
46. Ibid., 156.
47. Ibid.
52. Ibid., 84.
53. Ibid., 85.
57. Ibid.
60. Ibid., 34.
61. Ibid., 43.
62. Ibid., 45.
64. Corngold, “Thirteen Ways,” 79.

**Chapter 3**

14. This is, interestingly, also the main characterization of how language works in one of Martin Greenberg’s classic pieces of criticism of “The Judgment,” although he puts it in nonlogical terms: “Language tries symbolically to bridge the split between consciousness and existence, between our thinking and

15. According to Greenberg, we learn these “main facts” during Georg’s “rev-erie” after sealing the letter. For James Rolleston, these same passages present “facts only slightly colored by Georg’s viewpoint.” And later in the story, Stern is confident that “it is a fact that Georg has been neglecting his friend.” Greenberg, “Literature of Truth,” 10; Rolleston, “Strategy and Language,” in Flores, *The Problem of “The Judgment,”* 137; Stern, “Guilt,” 125.

16. Greenberg argues: “From the ‘It was a Sunday morning’ of the beginning, the reader is led to expect an omniscient narrator discussing the object of the story, Georg, his subjectivity and his objective standing in the world. The first paragraph shifts quickly from the narrator’s view of the row of houses to Georg’s perspective, the landscape across the river. This perspectival disruption is continued, alternating between objectifying description and subjective point of view, when the narrator and the reader appear to be aligned with Georg’s subjectivity itself, particularly through the use of indexical terms [such as ‘here’ and ‘later’].” Greenberg, “Literature of Truth,” 9.

17. Ibid., 15.
18. Ibid., 15.
20. Ibid., 92–93.

21. There is of course no singular “standard” or “metaphysical” reading of the *Tractatus*, but three of the most canonical interpretations that more or less fit into that school of thought are Mounce’s *Wittgenstein’s “Tractatus”: An Introduction*, Black’s *A Companion to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus*, and Hacker’s *Insight and Illusion*. My summary of the “standard” reading of the *Tractatus*—as with much work that deals with Wittgenstein—is based on the broad interpretive goals of these three texts: how the picture theory is represented in language, how thoughts put into words are said to express reality, how things can be shown and not said, the importance of truth-functionality, and, most importantly, that in the penultimate remark, 6.54, the “unsinnig” to which Wittgenstein relegates the *Tractatus* does not preclude it from showing with its logical form. Specific concrete interpretations by these philosophers are cited when appropriate.

23. Ibid., 7.
24. Ibid., 8.
25. Ibid., 9–10. Diamond arrives at this resoluteness through a protracted interaction with Frege (and Russell), whose work Wittgenstein studied intensely in the years before he wrote the *Tractatus*. Unlike what Wittgenstein would later argue, Frege believed that sentences were “complex names” made up of a proper name and a function; the simple proper name was complete on its own (for example, Mein Vater), but the function (ist immer noch ein Riese) was not. The function needed the proper name (by proper name, *Eigenname*, Frege meant any name that signified an object) for completion. The problem was that in natural (as opposed to logically perfect) language the logical distinction between the sign for a proper name and a sign for a function was, as Diamond puts it, “not marked in a way that [was] easy to see.” Frege first attempted to express the inadequacy
of describing this distinction in ordinary language (using ordinary language), and then used that very inadequacy to justify the creation of a logically perfect language (the Begriffsschrift) where ambiguity was no longer an issue. In the logically perfect language, there were finally distinct signs for function and object, thus making it possible to dispose of the prior complaint about the inadequacy of ordinary language to make the function/object distinction. And thus, to Diamond, “‘There is a distinction between functions and objects, and it comes out in the clear difference between signs for functions and those for objects in a well-designed notation’” is “what you could call a ‘transitional’ remark.”

26. Ibid., 22.
27. See Zumhagen-Yekplé, “The Everyday’s Fabulous Beyond.”

Preface to Part Two


Chapter 4

1. John Zilcosky, “Surveying the Castle: Kafka’s Colonial Visions,” in Rolleston, A Companion, 281. Zilcosky argues very interestingly that the choice of alleged profession is actually quite important for the novel, and effectively departs from established metaphorical critiques of “land surveying” in favor of a concurrent exploration of a 1914 memoir about an actual colonialist land surveyor.
2. Mark Harman, “Making Everything ‘a Little Uncanny’: Kafka’s Deletions in the Manuscript of Das Schloss,” in Rolleston, A Companion, 329, 333. An interesting example Harman offers is that in an early draft K. had a mysterious decisive deed; in deleting these and other clues to what K. “really” wants Kafka instead “buried the workings of his hero’s psyche in the interstices of his writing.”
3. Elizabeth Boa, “The Castle,” in Preece, The Cambridge Companion to Kafka, 62, 72. For Boa the key to the puzzle is in an exploration of the notion of Heimat from the perspective of exclusivity and insider-ness—evident, for example in the behavior of the village natives, in which “communal identity crystallizes around the exclusion of scapegoats,” especially those, like K., perceived as “urban.”
5. PI introduction, 1; see also this book’s introduction.
8. Dowden argues: “We have reason to believe that K. may be lying about being a surveyor (he is dressed shabbily and, like a hobo, has only a knapsack and walking stick with him, no surveying equipment), so we have little ground to suppose he could have expected anything more than a night’s lodging at the inn.” Kafka’s Castle, 50.
9. Ibid., 36.
10. The initial instance of alleged self-naming—“daß ich der Landvermesser bin”—is again the primary instance, and its phrasing as a subordinate clause should bring to mind two eminent critics whose conception of Kafka’s writing tricks lend credence to K. being, or at any rate beginning as, an impostor, James
Rolleston and Clayton Koelb. Rolleston’s early work described Kafka’s characters as play-actors narrating the theater of their own destinies as they went along, whereas Koelb’s previously cited concentration on the “rhetorical moment” of *The Trial* in which K.’s arrest is covertly legitimized without ever actually taking place also applies to this situation—here it is a *dass* and not a *ja* that creates the rhetorical gap, presumably leading K.’s interrogators to refute an act of engagement that has already taken place. See James Rolleston, *Kafka’s Narrative Theater* (State College: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1974); Koelb, “Kafka’s Rhetorical Moment.”

11. As Stern points out, he will then turn around and do the same thing with logic (*PI* §§65–133). Stern, Wittgenstein’s “Philosophical Investigations”: Introduction, 108–32.


13. Mark E. Blum, *Kafka’s Social Discourse: An Aesthetic Search for Community* (Bethlehem, Pa.: Lehigh University Press, 2011), 170–71. The crux of his argument is that “Kafka’s intention in K.’s interactions with the Castle officials is to reveal the complexities of the societial Weberian iron cage as it conditions the character and quality of temporality imposed by public authority.”


15. See Rolleston, *Kafka’s Narrative Theater*.


17. As Jacob Burnett has written: “Attempting to establish meaningful contact with the castle through modern means proves impossible. When K. does get through, the conversation is filled with contradictions and deceptions and ends with a firm and seemingly eternal rejection. Not only the modern fails to reach the center: the dubious messenger Barnabas appears the moment K. hangs up the phone, as if to insist on the point that premodern devices like letters and messengers, too, are ineffectual to reach a central grounding core of being.” Burnett, “Strange Loops and the Absent Center in *The Castle*,” in Corngold and Gross, *Kafka for the Twenty-First Century*, 111.

18. Although aside from Frieda, who “knows” him in the biblical sense and the landlady, who “knew” him in the same, this “knowing” consists largely of peeping at Klamm through a hole in the wall of the inn where he keeps an office—the idea of “to know” here being yet another instance of a common gesture not meaning what we think it should mean.

7. Ibid., 6.
9. Ibid., 90.
15. Ibid., 67.
18. Ibid., 140–50.
19. Ibid., 146.
23. Ibid., 434.
29. Ibid., 55.
30. Ibid., 61.
33. Ibid., 8–9.
34. Ibid., 9–20, 60.
37. Ibid., 78–79.
38. Ibid., 101.
43. Ibid., 179.

Chapter 6

2. Chris Danta posits that the story is in fact about “the artist’s own fatal descent into silence,” about “the death of the artist—the real rather than the metaphorical death.” See Danta, “Kafka’s Mousetrap: The Fable of the Dying Voice,” *SubStance* 37, no. 3 (2008): 152.
5. Gross has argued that Josefine’s musicality represents a femaleness in opposition to the maleness of Kafka’s writing, and that in the story Josefine “has no defenses, and her name, as we have seen, is merely a patriarchal trope. She is not more, not less than her song. When she sings, she sings herself: When she ceases to sing, she must herself disappear.” Further, Kafka’s narrator comes in the form of the “paternal care” of someone who understands Josefine well enough to explain her ineffability properly. Ruth V. Gross, “Of Mice and Women: Reflections on a Discourse in Kafka’s ‘Josefine die Sängerin, oder das Volk der Mäuse,’” *The Germanic Review* 60, no. 2 (1985): 61–65.
17. Robertson, Kafka, 279.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
23. Minden, “Kafka’s ‘Josefine,’” 299.
25. Robertson, Kafka, 279.
27. Robertson, Kafka, 273.
28. Ellison argues: “From the very beginning of the story there is a fundamental narrative skepticism about music—about its ‘essence’—as well as an interesting indifference to the efforts of Josefine, which tends to complicate the assertive tone of the remainder of the paragraph.” On one hand she’s the exception; on the other hand “it is not clear from the first paragraph whether the mouse folk has enough interest in music or in the performance activities of Josefine to accept or receive this potentially mediated song.” Ellison, “Narrative and Music,” 200–201.
29. Robertson, Kafka, 279.