NOTES

Introduction

   2. Ibid., 151.
   3. Ibid., 154.
   9. From 1963 to 2003 Kenya African National Union (KANU) was the political party in power, having assumed leadership after the departure of the British colonialists. Following the general election of 2002 KANU was removed from power by the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC).
   14. For these views, see Sunday Nation, August 24, 2003, 36; and Daily Nation, September 4, 2003, 6.
15. Interview with Sheikh Ali Shee, a strong critic of the Kenyan government, at Junda mosque, Mombasa, on February 24, 2005.


19. See also OP/1/497, Kenya National Archives.


24. Ibid.


26. Ibid.


28. As quoted by Yetman, Majority and Minority: The Dynamics of Race and Ethnicity in American Life, 1.


35. As quoted by Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim Politics, 49.

42. Monshipouri, Islamism, Secularism and Human Rights in the Middle East, 11.
43. For more on how the tension between secular power and religious authority has been resolved in Muslim societies, see Hunwick, “Secular Power and Religious Authority in Muslim Society: The Case of Songhay,” 175–94.
44. Monshipouri, Islamism, Secularism and Human Rights in the Middle East, 13.
48. Mandaville, Global Political Islam, 121.

Chapter One

2. PC/COAST/1/22/22, Kenya National Archives.
6. According to Ibadis, their political system was viewed as imamate. The sultanate was actually a concession to Ottoman traditions of government in the eleventh century. See Randall Lee Pouwels, Islam and Islamic Leadership in the Coastal Communities of Eastern Africa, 1700 to 1914 (London: University Microfilms International, 1979), 363.
7. Pouwels, Islam and Islamic Leadership in the Coastal Communities of Eastern Africa, 1700 to 1914, 363.
8. Ibid., 394.


13. Ibid.


15. Ibid., 23.


24. PC/COAST/1/1/178, Kenya National Archives.


26. On the historical racial issues among Muslims, see Kindy, *Life and Politics of Mombasa*.


29. Ibid.

30. Ibid., 8.


33. As quoted by Pouwels, *Islam and Islamic Leadership in the Coastal Communities of Eastern Africa, 1700 to 1914*, 537.
34. “Administrative Relations Between Arab Officials and Headmen,” PC/COAST/1/22/22, Kenya National Archives.
37. This view is also shared by Kindy, Life and Politics in Mombasa.
39. Ibid., 4.
40. Ibid., 5.
41. Ibid., 6.
42. Pouwels, Islam and Islamic Leadership in the Coastal Communities of Eastern Africa, 1700 to 1914, 518.
43. “Hamid” bin Thuwain has also been spelled “Hamed” and “Hamad” in different sources. For consistency, “Hamid” will be used throughout this book.
44. See the “The 1895 Agreement Between Great Britain and Zanzibar” (made on December 14, 1895).
45. Pouwels, Islam and Islamic Leadership in the Coastal Communities of Eastern Africa, 1700 to 1914, 92.
49. Ibid.
50. Mijikenda is a term used to refer to the nine ethnic groups living on the coast. They are believed to have a common ancestral origin, and they include Chonye, Digo, Duruma, Giriama, Jibana, Kabe, Kauma, Rabai, and Ribe.
52. “Administrative Relations Between Arab Officials and Headmen.”
53. See the earlier quotation attributed to Sir Arthur H. Hardinge.
58. Pouwels, Islam and Islamic Leadership in the Coastal Communities of Eastern Africa, 1700 to 1914, 516–73.
59. Mombasa has been the homeland of Islam in Kenya since the precolonial era. The large presence of a Muslim population has made it appear like a part of the Muslim world.
60. Pouwels, Islam and Islamic Leadership in the Coastal Communities of Eastern Africa, 1700 to 1914, 523, 538.
61. The term White Highlands describes an area in upland Kenya in which several Europeans settled during the colonial period.
63. Ibid., 78.
64. “Administrative Relation Between Arab Officials and Headmen,” PC/COAST/1/22/22, Kenya National Archives.
66. Pouwels, Islam and Islamic Leadership in the Coastal Communities of Eastern Africa, 1700 to 1914, 536.
69. For more discussion on the remuneration of Muslim officials, see Mwakimako, “Politics, Ethnicity and the Jostling for Power: The Evolution of Institutions of Muslim Leadership and Kadhiship in Colonial Kenya, 1895–1965.”
70. Haynes, Religion and Politics in Africa, 2.
71. Pouwels, Islam and Islamic Leadership in the Coastal Communities of Eastern Africa, 1700 to 1914, 538.
72. Ibid., 550.
74. “Administrative Relations Between Arab Officials and Headmen,” PC/COAST/7/22/22, Kenya National Archives.
75. See report of Education Commission of EAI, 1919.
77. Ibid., 173.
78. “Administrative Relations Between Arab Officials and Headmen,” PC/COAST/1/22/22, Kenya National Archives.
80. Ibid.
84. Ibid., 25.
87. Kindy, Life and Politics in Mombasa.
88. Nimtz, Islam and Politics in East Africa: The Sufi Order in Tanzania, 34.
90. The Tisa and Thelatha Taifa are collectively known as the Twelve Tribes, which are Swahili groups that include the Wa-Mvita, Wa-Kilifi, Wa-Mtwapa, Wa-pate, Wa-Shaka, Wa-Gunya, Wa-Katwa, Wa-Faza, Wa-Jomvu, Wa-Kilindini, Wa-Changamwe, and Wa-Tangana.
92. Kindy, Life and Politics in Mombasa, xii.
94. Ibid.
96. AP/1/504, Kenya National Archives.
103. Ibid., 266.
104. DC/MSA/2/1/93, Kenya National Archives.
105. Ibid.
108. The Bajunis is one of the Swahili groups living on the Lamu Island.
110. Ibid., 231.
111. DC/MSA/2/1/93, Kenya National Archives.
112. Ibid.
114. DC/MSA/2/1/91, Kenya National Archives.
115. By the time Kenya was attaining independence there were around nine bodies
formed by Muslims of the coast that were engaged in the political discourse of the time. Apart from the Kenya African Muslim Political Union, all the other organizations indulged in sectarian and secessionist politics.

116. DC/MSA/2/1/105, Kenya National Archives.
118. CG/2/60, Kenya National Archives.
120. CG/2/60, Kenya National Archives.
122. DC/MSA/2/1/93, Kenya National Archives.
123. Ibid.
130. Ibid., 224.
131. Ibid., 242.
132. Ibid., 243.
134. See the “Kenya Coastal Strip.” Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom, His Highness the Sultan of Zanzibar, the Government of Kenya and the Government of Zanzibar, Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Colonies by Command of Her Majesty, October 1963.
135. Makokha, “The Islamic Factor in Somali Irredentism: Towards Rationalizing the Kenya Government’s Stand against Islamic Political Association,” 82.
138. P. E. Walters, NFD Annual Report 1960, PC/NFD/1/1/12, Kenya National Archives.
140. Makokha, “The Islamic Factor in Somali Irredentism: Towards Rationalizing the Kenya Government’s Stand against Islamic Political Association,” 89.
144. Makokha, “The Islamic Factor in Somali Irredentism: Towards Rationalizing the Kenya Government’s Stand against Islamic Political Association,” 91.
145. For the debate on majimboism, see *Saturday Nation*, November 17, 2001, 1–2; *Sunday Standard*, November 18, (2001), 8; *Daily Nation*, November 19, 2001, 6; *Sunday Nation*, August 30, 2001, 8–9, among others.

Chapter Two

5. Ibid., 89.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., 70.
10. Ibid., 69.
11. Ibid., 72.
14. This is an umbrella body of about sixty churches most of which are affiliated with the United Evangelical Churches of America.
27. Ibid.
43. See Quran 17:31, 32.
54. Ibid.
59. Shifta is the name given to the guerrilla warfare that was being led by the Somalis of the northeastern region in their bid to secede.
60. See the research report by Hassan Mwakimako, Justin Willis, and Hassan Ndlovu, “Trends in Kenyan Islam,” 2009, funded by the British High Commission, Kenya.
61. Muslim leaders here refer to individual people and organizations representing the Muslim community, irrespective of their ethnic, racial, and sectarian background.
62. Christian-owned broadcasting stations in Kenya include Baraka FM (interdenominational Christian), Biblia Husema, Family FM (interdenominational), Hope FM (Pentecostal), Imani FM, Sayare FM (interdenominational), and Waumini FM (Catholic).
63. See Mwakimako, Willis, and Ndlovu, “Trends in Kenyan Islam.”
64. “Appeal for Unity at Pumwani Mosque Harambee,” in The Friday Bulletin: The Weekly Muslim News Update, September 18, 2009, 1; Najib Balala was the minister for tourism in President Kibaki’s administration.


74. The term *shifta* is originally an Amharic word meaning “bandit.”


83. Quran 4:11.


85. Ibid., 39.


88. Ibid., 87.

89. Ibid., 108.


93. Ibid., 13–14.

94. This view is shared by Billow Kerrow, member of parliament for Mandera Central; Kassim Bakari Mwamzandi, former member of parliament for Msambweni; Abdulrahaman of Jamia Mosque, Nairobi; Khelef Khalifa, commissioner, Kenya National Commission of Human Rights; and Abdulrazak M. Bunu, teacher at Serani High School, Mombasa.


96. Interview with Sheikh Juma M. Ngao, former chairman SUPKEM Mombasa branch, at Mombasa, on March 7; Ahmad Awadh Yafie of MUHURI at Mombasa on August 2, 2004.

98. Mazrui and Shariff, The Swahili Idiom and Identity of an African People, 158.


100. Interview with Khelef Khalifa at Nairobi on September 29, 2004.


105. In Kenya most of the private universities are sponsored by Christian religious organizations. These universities include Day Star University, Catholic University of Eastern Africa (Catholic Church), University of Eastern Africa, Baraton (Seventh-day Adventist Church), Kenya Methodist University (Methodist Church), Kabarak University, Strathmore University (Catholic Church), and St. Paul’s United Theological College, among others.


Chapter Three


5. Some of the Muslims political associations that were formed are Coast Arab Association (established in 1921 to defend the welfare of Arab Muslims); Afro-Asian
Association (formed in 1927 with the desire to represent Swahili and other African communities, thereby overcoming their differences); Mombasa Muslim Political Union (founded in 1958 with the goal of advocating the political interests of Muslims of Indian origin); Kenya Protectorate Nationalist Party (founded in 1960 was also seen to be championing the Arab cause); Kenya African Muslim Political Union (registered in 1962 with the aim of promoting the political consciousness of African Muslims); the Digo Mwambao Party (formed around the early 1960s to articulate the political position of the Digo); the Bajuni Federal Front (founded in 1963 to work for the political advancement of the Bajuni), among others.


8. Ibid.


10. Interview with Kassim Bakari Mwanzandi, former member of parliament for Msambweni from 1963 to 1997, at Msambweni, on September 15, 2004.

11. According to SUPKEM’s brief prepared by the national chairman, Abdulghafur Al-Busaidy. See appendix A.


13. Interview with Munir Mazrui, SUPKEM, vice chairman, national office, in-charge of Coast Province, at Mombasa, on January 26, 2005.

14. The short message was shown to me during an interview with Munir Mazrui, SUPKEM, vice chairman, national office, in-charge of Coast Province, at Mombasa, on September 26, 2005.

15. The translation is mine.

16. These were the views of most people interviewed during the research.

17. According to SUPKEM’s brief. See appendix A.


28. Many scholars and newspapers writers have been referring to Khalid Balala with the title of sheikh. But during my discussion with him, Balala indicated that while in Saudi Arabia he never enrolled in any institution of learning to study. During his free time, he just had informal contacts with renowned sheikhs of Arabia who were able to impart some Islamic knowledge to him. Based on this information, I have decided not to use the title of the sheikh in reference to Balala.


32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.


36. Interview with Sheikh Omar Salimin, at Junda mosque, Mombasa, on February 22, 2005, confirming the allegation of IPK supporters seeking asylum abroad.

37. Due to leadership crisis within the original FORD, it split into the two factions of FORD-Kenya and FORD-Asili, led by Jaramongi Oginga Odinga and Kenneth Matiba, respectively.


44. Ibid., 28.
48. This was the situation during the 1990s. There have been shifting changes as new alliances keep on being formed in Kenya’s politics.
50. Both parties were not officially registered with the government, but they had supporters and in a short while they had succeeded in instilling political and racial tension in the country. Also see Oded’s book for a discussion on the UMA.
52. Ibid., 38. Maitha repudiated the statement and its contents, saying he had never been involved with UMA or Masumbuko. Sajjad denied he had financed UMA, and also denied that Kulei had been linked to Maitha. However, a statement by Masumbuko does not support these denials and instead confirms the information in the statement attributed to Maitha concerning high level political involvement in the violent UMA campaign.
54. Interview with Sheikh Omar Salimin at Junda mosque, Mombasa, on February 22, 2005.
55. *Kaya* is a Digo word that is commonly used to refer to the ancestral homes, which were fortified villages in the midst of certain forests.
58. During the interview, Juma Ngao was the SUPKEM chairman, Mombasa Branch, and presently he is the chairman of Kenya Muslim National Advisory Council where he also engages as a Party of National Unity (PNU) activist.
59. On views on Islamism, see Olivier Roy, “Has Islamism a Future in Afghanistan?” in *Fundamentalism Reborn?: Afghanistan and the Taliban*, ed. William Maley (Lon-

60. See the research report compiled by Hassan Mwakimako, Justin Willis, and Hassan Ndzovu, *Trends in Kenya Islam: A Study of Current Influences and Debates*, 2009.


62. Some of the projects that have been undertaken by CIPK are acting as a verifying board that scrutinizes school children’s applications for bursary and recommends them to donors and helping orphans by providing financial assistance, clothing, and food; and in 2001 the organization was able to conduct civic education among Muslims through the assistance of National Civic Education Project (NCEP).


64. Interview with Sheikh Mohammed Dor, secretary, Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya, at Mbaruk mosque, Mombasa, on January 31, 2005.

65. These views could be found in a research report compiled by Mwakimako, Willis, and Ndzovu, *Trends in Kenya Islam: A Study of Current Influences and Debates*.


69. National officials of the CIPK are chairman, Sheikh/imam Mohammed Idris; secretary, Sheikh/imam Mohammed Dor; treasurer, Sheikh Hassan Omar; and organizing secretary, Sheikh Khalifa Mohammed.


71. See the NAMLEF official site on http://namlef.org/.

72. Ibid.


74. For the detailed MOU, see the appendix C. This MOU was posted by the

75. CIPK is a member of NAMLEF.


Chapter Four


6. Interview with Hussein Khalid, program coordinator, Muslims for Human Rights, at Mombasa, on September 15, 2005.

7. Interview with Mbarak Abdulkadir, education officer, Fort Jesus, at Mombasa, on July 14, 2005; Saady Rashid, education officer, Fort Jesus, at Mombasa, on July 14, 2005; Fatma Muslim, School for International Training, at Mombasa, on September 16, 2005.

8. For instance, this was the view of Hussein Khalid, program coordinator, Muslims for Human Rights, who was interviewed at Mombasa on September 15, 2005. Other Muslims who were involved in informal discussions held the same view.


11. Interview with Masad M. Omar, program officer, Muslim Civic Education Trust, at Mombasa, on August 3, 2005; Mbarak Abdulkadir, education officer, Fort Jesus, at Mombasa, on July 14, 2005; Saady Rashid, education officer, Fort Jesus, at Mombasa, on July 14, 2005; Fatma Muslim, School for International Training, at Mombasa, on September 16, 2005.

13. Quran 4:3.
20. Ibid., 256.
22. Quran 2:231.
26. This is the view of most of the sheikhs and imams with whom I had informal discussions on the subject.


41. See Part III, Section 11 (2) of The Suppression of Terrorism Bill, 2003.


43. The Suppression of Terrorism Bill, 2003, 455.


45. Around seventy people have so far been arrested on charges of terrorism and coincidently are all of them are Muslims. There is yet no evidence to link them with terrorist activities that were witnessed in Kenya. This is according to the interview with Sheikh Mohamed Dor, secretary, Council of Imam and Preachers of Kenya, on January 26, 2005, Mombasa; also, two of the four suspects who had been arrested in connection with the bombing of Paradise Hotel were acquitted. Aboud Rogo and Muhammed Kubwa, who had been in custody for more than two years, were cleared by the court after lack of evidence to incriminate them. See East African Standard, June 14, 2005.

46. Interview with Sheikh Dor, secretary, Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya, at Mombasa, on January 26, 2005.


49. This view was also emphasized by Sheikh Dor, secretary, Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya, during an interview with him at Mombasa on January 26, 2005.


56. Interview with Sheikh Ali Shee at Junda mosque, Mombasa, on February 24, 2005.

57. Sheikh Dor is another strong critic of the Kenyan government and American policies.

58. Mazrui, “Human Rights, Constitution-Making and Comparative Terrorism: The View from Kenya,” 5; Mazrui, “Terrorism and the Global Image of Islam: Power, Passion and Piety”; though the identity of the three perpetrators is not known, there has emerged an allegation that Mossad plotted the attack to assist Ariel Sharon to win nomination for the elections that were to be held in 2003. For more information on this report, see Gesamba Antikristo, “Mossad Plotted Kikambala Bomb Attack to Win Poll,” Dispatched Weekly, July 11, 2004, 11.


60. Kamau, “How Mossad Threw Kenya into the Line of Terrorist Fire.”


66. Ibid.


70. Ibid.


76. Ibid.
81. Interview with Mohamed Hyder, at MCET offices, Mombasa, on March 12, 2005.
82. Seesemann, “East African Muslims After 9/11.”
84. Ibid., 12.
85. The U.S. secret agent operations harassed not only those people alleged to have planned terrorist activities, but also the family members of these suspects. See Bakari, “A Place at the Table: The Political Integration of Kenyan Muslims, 1992–2003,” 21.
86. Seesemann, “East African Muslims After 9/11.”
95. Ibid.; Eagle, August 2004, 8.
100. See the Bomas Draft Constitution.
101. Abdulkader Tayob, “The Demand for Shariah in African Democratisation Pro-
cesses: Pitfalls or Opportunities?,” in Comparative Perspectives on Shariah in Nigeria, ed. Franz Kogelmann et al. (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd., 2005), 41.

102. Ibid.
105. See East African Standard, April 8, 2004, 16, for the sentiments of U.S. influence, which were echoed by Rev. Timothy Njoya during a National Convention Executive Council conference in Mombasa (NCEC). Others who also see American interference in the kadhi saga are Sheikh Mohamed Dor, secretary, Council of Imams and preacher of Kenya, interviewed at Mombasa on January 26, 2005; Munir Mazrui, interviewed at Mombasa on January 26, 2005.
109. Ibid.
110. Ibid.
114. Ibid.

Chapter Five

4. “MoU Was Reached to Safeguard Muslim Interests,” 1.
5. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
29. Ibid.