NOTES

Introduction


2. In their book *Wittgenstein’s Vienna*, Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin take issue with the translation of the German word *Bild* or “picture” in the sense of a mental image or snapshot. They argue that what Wittgenstein had in mind with the use of the word *Bild* was something that is constructed, an artifact, making his propositions “linguistic *Bilder,*” or verbal constructions. Nevertheless, the idea of Wittgenstein’s “picture theory” negotiating between inner and outer image and model is widely held by those who write about his work. Allan Janik and Stephen Edelston Toulmin, *Wittgenstein’s Vienna* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996), 182–83.

3. I have constellated this synopsis with the help of Gary L. Hagberg, *Describing Ourselves: Wittgenstein and Autobiographical Consciousness* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 158, 189, 191, 199. Wittgenstein’s “I’ll teach you differences” is from *King Lear* (1, 4); Hagberg, 221 n. 50. Ray Monk has suggested that Wittgenstein considered using the line “I’ll teach you differences” as the epigraph for *Philosophical Investigations*. This was in keeping with Wittgenstein’s belief that the lesson his philosophy offered was “that things which look the same are really different.” Ray Monk, *Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius* (New York: Free Press, 1990), 536–37. See also J. A. DiNoia, “Teaching Differences,” *The Journal of Religion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 61.


8. Kant aimed “to map the overall scope of boundaries of the ‘reason’ by showing them from within, in a way that avoided all reliance on external metaphysical assumptions; and then not merely to assert, but to show, that metaphysics is—rationally speaking—concerned with the ‘unknowable,’ because its questions lie
at or beyond the boundaries of the reason so mapped.” Janik and Toulmin, *Wittgenstein’s Vienna*, 22, 66, 87, 90, 122, 146, 195.


10. Ibid., 31.

11. Ibid., 267.


13. For specific treatment of Wittgenstein’s anxiety of influence upon the arts, see Marjorie Perloff, *Wittgenstein’s Ladder: Poetic Language and the Strange-ness of the Ordinary* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); and John Gibson and Wolfgang Huemer, eds., *The Literary Wittgenstein* (New York: Routledge, 2004). These and other books like them discuss Wittgenstein’s influence on other artists, particularly modern writers, but do not focus upon Wittgenstein and performance, even as a performing artist. Judith Genova, whose brief and background are philosophical, not theatrical, does state that “like many artists of today, I think he [Wittgenstein] is best seen as a performing artist playing with language.” Judith Genova, *Wittgenstein: A Way of Seeing* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 128. Other practicing media artists, such as filmmaker Peter Forgacs (*Wittgenstein Tractatus*, 1992), have physically expressed their indebtedness to Wittgenstein in their own work.


15. Ibid., 205.

16. Ibid., 196.

17. Ibid., 219.

18. Ibid., 53.


21. “Indeed, I confess, nothing seems more possible to me than that people some day will come to the definite opinion that there is no copy in either the physiological or the nervous systems which corresponds to a particular thought, or a particular idea, or memory” (*LWI* §504); Klagge, *Wittgenstein in Exile*, 100, 194 n.7.


23. Ibid., 23 and n. 35.

24. In chapter 5, I discuss these ideas in relation to dramatic literature as its own event under the rubrics of “Infrastructure” and “Infrareading.”


26. Stern, *Wittgenstein on Mind and Language*, 3. Klagge likewise encourages Wittgenstein’s readers and interpreters “to resist the inclination to give a version of his attitudes that we can enter into ourselves.” While Klagge’s caution is not without value, it is offered in order to support his own book’s thesis that Wittgenstein must be defined by his difference: “We must allow Wittgenstein to be an exile.” That is, he must not be like us, and he is allowed to do things that we are not. Klagge, *Wittgenstein in Exile*, 196 n. 16. Consider too this counter-statement: “Wittgenstein is probably the philosopher who has helped me most
at moments of difficulty. He is a kind of saviour for times of great intellectual distress—as when you have to question such evident things as ‘obeying a rule.’ Or as when you have to describe such simple (and, by the same token, practically ineffable) things as putting a practice into practice.” Pierre Bourdieu, “Fieldwork in Philosophy,” interview with A. Honneth, H. Kocyba, and B. Schwibs, Paris 1985, in Pierre Bourdieu, In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1990), 9.

27. I discuss this in chapters 2 and 7.


29. Wetzel, ibid., 4, 11, 22–23, 35 n. 27. Norman Malcolm, Wittgenstein: A Memoir (Oxford: Clarendon, 2001), 59–60. Marjorie Perloff argues that in Wittgenstein’s writing, “I’ is denied by the text the power to act as a vehicle for confession. (Wittgenstein never talks about his personal life), the watchword being that language can never relate ‘what is hidden.’ ” I agree with Perloff’s assessment insofar as Wittgenstein’s personal life goes, but I will argue in this book that Wittgenstein’s writing confesses itself in the way that he obsessively introduces return into his expressed thought, effectively writing against the possibility of systematizing, ordering, and completion. Likewise, the interlocutory nature of this structure makes Wittgenstein work harder to show the reader the difficulty, even the impossibility of such completion except as a myth perpetrated by philosophy and advanced but also subverted in the arts. Perloff, Wittgenstein’s Ladder, 78.


32. This famous proposition recalls Guy de Maupassant’s statement that man’s thought “goes around like a fly in a bottle.” Pirandello interpreted this to mean that “all phenomena either are illusory or their reason escapes us inexplicably. Our knowledge of the world and of ourselves refuses to be given the objective value which we usually attempt to attribute to it. Reality is a continuously illusory construction.” Luigi Pirandello, “On Humor,” trans. Teresa Novel, Tulane Drama Review 10, no. 3 (Spring 1966): 48.


Chapter 1


3. The question of whether or not Wittgenstein meant the Tractatus to be self-repudiating has caused a rift among contemporary philosophers. The pro and contra arguments, the New Wittgensteinians or “Therapeutes” (who say Wittgenstein wanted to cure philosophers of obscurantist philosophical expression) versus the so-called “establishment,” hinge upon what Wittgenstein means when
he refers to his own book as being “nonsense.” Did he mean the word to be “discriminatory” (i.e., nonsense as the demarcator of sense), as Danièle Moyal-Sharrock suggests, or “pejorative” (i.e., gibberish)? Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, “The Good Sense of Nonsense: A Reading of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus As Nonself-Repudiating,” Philosophy 82 (2007): 147–48.


5. One can discover a prototype for Wittgenstein’s interlocutory discourse in Diderot’s Paradoxe sur le comédien (1773–77), which Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe characterizes as being “an interior dialogue that is spoken ‘aloud.’ ” This dialogue contains questions that the questioner in reality answers for himself. In that Wittgenstein pursues a similar gambit, stretching answers into further questions, into self-questioning via the use of his interlocutor, one might ask, as Lacoue-Labarthe does of Diderot, “Who takes, or can take, the responsibility for saying: ‘I am the subject of this statement, a paradox?’ ” Here the “I” is paradoxical in the sense that it is a subjectless subject. Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Typography, ed. Christopher Fynsk (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998), 248 and 249.


7. “We must be prepared for the possibility that the variations in the text of Hamlet are not alternative versions of a single original but representations of different stages in the play’s development.” Philip Edwards, ed., Hamlet, in New Cambridge Shakespeare (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 8.


13. Ibid., 96.


15. Sophocles, Oedipus at Colonus, 160.


17. Nancy, Corpus, 149.


25. Ibid.


27. Ibid., 163.

28. Ibid.


30. Ibid.


34. Ibid.

35. Ibid., 57.

36. “In the *Tractatus*, tautologies and contradictions are said to ‘lack sense’; they are not nonsensical [unsinnig] (4.4611), but senseless [sinnlos] (4.461). They say nothing about the world, but ‘show the logic of the world’; they are ‘part of the symbolism’ (4.4611). The propositions of logic are all tautologies (6.1); they display the logical form inherent in ordinary language, and so ‘represent’ the ‘scaffolding of the world’ (6.124).” Moyal-Sharrock, “The Good Sense of Nonsense,” 157.

37. “Terms like world, fact, object are terms of our language which, on the *Tractatus* view, have a peculiarly fundamental role in the description of language. . . . What the opening sentences of the *Tractatus* do is to establish certain fundamental features of ‘the logical syntax’ of these terms by exhibiting their use in relation to each other in sentences. This process is subsequently extended to include such terms as picture, proposition, thought, name.” Peter Winch, “Language, Thought and World in Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus,”* in *Trying to Make Sense* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 9.

38. A calligram is “a poem whose words are arranged in such fashion as to form a picture of its ‘topic.’” Michel Foucault, *This Is Not a Pipe*, trans. and ed. James Harkness (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 20, 60 n.2.

39. Ibid., 21.

40. “To say then that something is unsayable (in Wittgenstein’s technical sense) is not to say that it cannot be spoken. We can use words; indeed, sentences; indeed, perfectly well-formed sentences, and yet not be saying anything; not be making sense.” Moyal-Sharrock, “The Good Sense of Nonsense,” 173.
42. Ibid., 75.
43. Ibid., 76–77.
44. Ibid., 85.
45. “Sentences are pictures of reality that are true or false in virtue of their agreement or disagreement with reality.” Ricketts (here paraphrasing Wittgenstein), “Pictures, Logic,” 87.
46. In the 1920s, André Breton adopted Comte de Lautréamont’s (Isidore Ducasse’s) richly allusive coinage in Les chants de Maldoror (1869) as a working definition for surrealism.
49. Ibid., 197.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid., 207–8.
55. “‘Acknowledgement’ . . . derives from the Middle English word for admit or confess,” tying it to a faith-based knowing without certainty. “Unlike the other states [of knowing], acknowledgement is wrung from one like an apology at gunpoint.” Genova, Wittgenstein: A Way of Seeing, 196 and 197.
56. Wittgenstein wrote more than half of the remarks that constitute On Certainty during the final seven weeks of his life, when he was dying from prostate cancer. I mention this fact at this juncture because he was possibly experiencing a heightened awareness of what and how much a terminally ill person wants to know about his condition and what he wants those close to him to know. Also, I would argue that Wittgenstein’s ongoing discussion of the idea of knowing can be related to a pessimistic temperament that we see inflected in all of his writing and in the subjects to which he gravitated. Klagge, Wittgenstein in Exile, 153.
57. In his fictional biography of Wittgenstein, The World As I Found It, Bruce Duffy imagines the philosopher turning his pianist brother’s maiming in the war into a proposition. “Paul, a pianist, loses his right arm to a bullet / while here I have two. (I could philosophize as well with one).” Bruce Duffy, The World As I Found It (New York: NYRB Classics, reprint edition, 2010), 307.
58. A well-known scientific-philosophical sign of the “both/and,” “Schrödinger’s cat” is the “celebrated animal introduced by the Austrian physicist Erwin Schrödinger (1887–1961) in 1935, in a thought experiment showing the strange
nature of the world of quantum mechanics. The cat is thought of as locked in a box with a capsule of cyanide, which will break if a Geiger counter triggers. This will happen if an atom in a radioactive substance in the box decays, and there is a chance of 50 percent of such an event within an hour. Otherwise the cat is alive. The problem is that the system is in an indeterminate state. The wave function of the entire system is a ‘superposition’ of states, fully described by the probabilities of events occurring when it is eventually measured, and therefore ‘contains equal parts of the living and dead cat’. . . . quantum mechanics forces us to say that before we looked it was not true that the cat was dead and also not true that it was alive.” Simon Blackburn, ed., “Schrödinger’s Cat,” in Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy; http://www.answers.com/topic/schr-dinger-s-cat.

60. Ibid., 108.
61. “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent” (TLP §7).

Chapter 2
The chapter epigraph is from William Gaddis, The Recognitions (New York: Penguin, 1993), 300.
2. In this sense, Kaspar resembles without actually being one of Handke’s “speak-ins” (Sprechstüke), defined as “spectacles without pictures, inasmuch as they give no picture of the world . . . the words of the speak-ins don’t point at the world as something lying outside the words but to the world in the words themselves.” This reversal of agency and context between world and words addresses the problem of thinking in pictures and the attendant implications of language-making that was central to Wittgenstein’s philosophy and to this book. Handke, “Note on Offending the Audience and Self-Accusation,” in Handke, Kaspar and Other Plays, ix.


10. Sass likens the solipsist’s action to “someone who tries to measure his own height not by using an independent reference system but by placing his own hand on top of his head.” Sass, *Paradoxes of Delusion*, 56.


12. Ibid., 19 and 29.

13. Martin was a philosophy major in college and has a penchant for Wittgenstein.


15. G. E. Moore recalls Wittgenstein saying in one of his Cambridge lectures that “the student who asked him whether he meant that the meaning of a word was a list of rules would not have been tempted to ask that question but for the false idea (which he held to be a common one) that in the case of a substantive like ‘the meaning’ you have to look for something at which you can point and say ‘This is the meaning.’” Moore also recalls that Wittgenstein identified as a mistake “the view that the meaning of a word was some image which it calls up by association—a view which he seemed to refer to as the ‘causal’ theory of meaning.” Moore, “Wittgenstein’s Lectures in 1930–33,” 52 and 54.


17. Ibid., 33.

18. Ibid., 40.

19. Ibid., 54.

20. Ibid., 177.


23. Ibid., 92.


25. Ibid., 132–33.

26. “Reality always is in each instant, from place to place, each time in turn, which is exactly how the reality of the *res cogitans* [“thinking thing”] attests to itself in each ‘ego sum,’ which is each time the ‘I am’ of each one in turn [*chaque fois de chacun à son tour*].” Nancy (p. 149) is citing René Descartes, *Meditations and Other Metaphysical Writings*, trans. Desmonde Clarke (London: Penguin, 2003), 152–54.


28. Ibid., 129.

29. Ibid., 7.

30. Ibid., 33.


34. Ibid., 199–200.
35. Nancy, Corpus, 7.
40. “I have seen a person in a discussion on this subject strike himself on the breast and say: ‘But surely another person cannot have THIS pain!’” (PI § 253).
41. Mulhall, Wittgenstein’s Private Language, 73.
43. Ibid., 13.
44. This tendency in Wittgenstein’s writing is more or less officially acknowledged in the title of Alain Badiou’s book, Wittgenstein’s Antiphilosophy, whose central argument I will discuss in chapter 3. Alain Badiou, Antiphilosophy, trans. Bruno Bosteels (New York: Verso, 2011).
45. Mulhall, Wittgenstein’s Private Language, 58.
46. Mulhall is here referring to PI §251. Mulhall, Wittgenstein’s Private Language, 59 and 64.
47. Duffy, The World As I Found It, 361 and 363–64.
52. Consider as a limit-example, “The beetle in the box,” a thought experiment Wittgenstein uses to disprove the possibility of there being such a thing as shared private experience. He writes (in PI §293): “Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a ‘beetle.’ No one can look into anyone’s box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle.—Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing.” In fact, Wittgenstein argues that one should “assume that it [the object in the box] constantly changes, but that you do not notice the change because your memory constantly deceives you.” My point in citing this thought experiment is to note how Wittgenstein again offers a physical model for mental constraint within which, imaginatively, the mind becomes unknowable in the sense of unmanageable, not only to others but to itself. (PI, part 2, §207/§218); Klagge, Wittgenstein in Exile, 33–34, 37.
56. Maurice Blanchot, *the one who was standing apart from me*, trans. Lydia Davis (New York: Barrytown, 1997), 92.
62. “One day when Wittgenstein was passing a field where a football game was in progress the thought first struck him that in language we play games with words. A central idea of his philosophy, the notion of a ‘language-game,’ apparently had its genesis in this accident.” Malcolm, *Wittgenstein: A Memoir*, 55.
64. This, of course, recalls Wittgenstein’s notion of the ascribed meaning of numbers and names in *TLP* §1.
66. Ibid., 10 and 11.
67. Ibid., vii, ix, 1, 15.
70. I will discuss *Rear Window* in detail in chapter 3.
71. The patient Oliver Sacks has occasion to remark to his physiotherapist, “I think you are talking good sense indeed and I wish more doctors thought as you do. Most of them have their heads in a cast.” One immediately thinks here of Jack’s psychiatrist, who may in turn be likened to the philosopher who Wittgenstein maintained had cast philosophy (a patient recast as an illness) as a fly trapped inside a fly-bottle. Sacks, *A Leg to Stand On*, 42.
72. Ibid., 27, 71, 84–85, 180–81.
73. The original French lyrics of *La mer* actually offer no time frame or instance of traditional romance beyond the organic wholeness that the sea provides. But the English-speaking audience for whom the film was made does not hear the French lyrics in their head. They hear the lyrics to “Beyond the Sea,” which borrowed the melody from *La mer* but recast the content of the song as a more traditionally and prosaically romantic tale of lovers dreaming of the day when
the sea that separates them will bring them back together. “La mer,” music and
lyrics by Charles Trenet (1943). “Beyond the Sea,” music by Charles Trenet, lyrics
by Jack Lawrence.
74. Sacks, A Leg to Stand On, 184.
75. “The peril of awareness” is Nicholas Hern’s term cited in June Schlueter,
The Plays and Novels of Peter Handke (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh
Press, 1981), 76. Patricia Pearson, A Brief History of Anxiety . . . Yours and Mine
76. Pearson, ibid.
77. Quoted in Lucy Fisher, “Sick Jokes,” in Enfant Terrible: Jerry Lewis in
78. Mikitia Brottman, “The Imbecile Chic of Jerry Lewis,” in Enfant Terrible,
130.
80. “Now what would it mean to advise Hamlet, or for him to have taken
measures, to avoid his skepticism, his avoidance of existence, call this his making
himself into a ghost.” Cavell, Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow, 26–27.

Chapter 3

The first chapter epigraph is from Handke, The Weight of the World: A Journal,
15 and 111. The second epigraph is from G. W. Leibniz’s 1714 essay, “Principles
of Nature and Grace Based on Reason.” The third epigraph is from Heidegger,
Introduction to Metaphysics, 5.
1. Pearson, A Brief History of Anxiety, 6.
3. Nancy, Corpus, 129.
4. “A body is also a prison for the soul. In it, the soul pays for a very serious
crime whose nature is hard to discern.” Ibid., 151.
5. Ibid., 124–25.
6. Tom Cohen, Hitchcock’s Cryptonomies, Volume II, War Machines (Minne-
apolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 44.
8. Ibid., 166.
9. “What the pupil will always lack unless she becomes a schoolmistress herself
is knowledge of ignorance—a knowledge of the exact distance separating knowl-
edge from ignorance.” Jacques Rancière, The Emancipated Spectator, trans.
10. Ibid., 3.
11. Ibid., 2.
12. Handke describes Kaspar as being “the incarnation of astonishment.”
Handke, Kaspar, 63.
13. Mac Wellman, Cat’s Paw, in Cellophane: Plays by Mac Wellman (New
14. Ibid., 349.
15. Peter Handke, “Die Dressur der Objekte,” in Ich bin ein Bewohner des
Elfenbeinturms (Frankfurt, 1972), 145; cited in Sebald, “Strangeness, Integration
and Crisis,” 56.
17. Wellman, *Cat’s Paw*, 343 and 348.
18. “... so I made two rules, and two rules only. ...” Wellman, *Cat’s Paw*, 337.
19. Ibid., 348.
20. Ibid., 369.
21. Ibid., 339.
22. Ibid., 340.
27. Ibid., 19 and 22.
28. Ibid., 33, 58, 62–63.
30. Ibid., 82.
31. The speaker, the daughter who dislikes her name, here calls her mother by her first (i.e., given) name, Hildegard. Wellman, *Cat’s Paw*, 384.
32. Ibid., 366.
34. Wellman, *Cat’s Paw*, 365 and 381.
40. “You ask, and what next / and / after that, / what is next and / all that matters is a / slide, side-ways, through the apparent’s / customary view-finder and so / one forgets what the question was.” Wellman, “Heywood the Hungry,” 55.
42. Wittgenstein, who asks whether the mind carries out the special activity of inferring according to laws, says it is important “to look and see how we carry out inferences in the practice of language; what kind of procedure in the language-game inferring is” (RFM §17).

43. “Can Kaspar, the owner of one sentence, begin and begin to do something with this sentence?” This is the first phase of “Kaspar’s Sixteen Phases” (preface to Kaspar), 55.

44. Handke, Kaspar, 114.

45. Peter Handke, The Innerworld of the Outerworld of the Innerworld, 73.

46. Eighteenth-century Irish Enlightenment political philosopher Edmund Burke wrote, among other works, A Philosophical Enquiry, which “argued that no compound abstract nouns suggested ideas to the mind at all readily, and that in many cases they did not correspond to any idea at all, but instead produced in the mind only images of past experience connected with these words.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, online at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/burke/.

47. Jalal Toufic, Distracted (Barrytown, N.Y.: Station Hill, 2003), 217.


52. Ibid., 144.


54. Orr, Panic Diaries, 7.

55. Badiou also places Wittgenstein’s work in the sophist tradition, “the principal sophistic operation—here defined as the reduction of truth to an effect of language,” as Badiou’s translator says. Edmond practices his own brand of sophistry. Badiou, Wittgenstein’s Antiphilosophy, 68; Bruno Bosteels, “Translator’s Introduction,” Badiou, Wittgenstein’s Antiphilosophy, 18.

56. Badiou, Wittgenstein’s Antiphilosophy, 75, 80 and 82.

57. Ibid., 63. Ockham’s razor, also spelled Occam’s razor, also called law of economy, or law of parsimony, principle stated by William Ockham (1285–1347/49), a scholastic, that Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate; “Plurality should not be posited without necessity.” http://www.britannica.com.
60. Ibid., 4.
61. Ibid., 9, 10–11.
64. Ibid., 21.
66. Monk, *Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius*, 490. In his screenplay for the 1987 film *The Untouchables*, Mamet has policeman Jim Malone tell his mentee federal treasury agent Eliot Ness: “You just fulfilled the first rule of law enforcement: make sure when your shift is over you go home alive. Here endeth the lesson.” It is perhaps Mamet’s clearest and most dramatic example of the authoritative syntax of pedagogy as being the Word.
68. Ibid., 163.
69. Ibid., 106. Wittgenstein, says Badiou, entertains two meanings of the word-concept “sense”: “the sense of the proposition (which is the eternal foundation of the possible) and the sense of the world, or its value, which can only be shown in the unsayable ordeal of an archiaesthetic (or which is the same, archiethical) act.” Ibid., 167.
73. The obstacles that von Trier sets for Leth are consistent with the rule-following behavior of filmmaking limits articulated in Dogme 95, which von Trier co-signed. Of the superficial actions that must not occur in the film, murders and weapons are specifically mentioned.
78. Google web definition of “iteration.”
81. Ibid., 82.
82. Ibid., 70.
84. Ibid., 208.
85. Ivone Margulies writes, “By creating for her protagonist the precarious position of embodying both agency and automatism [which Margulies elsewhere calls “obsessive-compulsiveness”], Akerman manages to respond both to the cliché (Jeanne as feminist victim/heroine) and to its overthrow.” Margulies refers to Jeanne’s repetitive actions and activities as “pragmatic amnesia—the lack of personal and historical awareness that is necessary to keep women functioning.” Ivone Margulies, Nothing Happens: Chantal Akerman’s Hyperrealist Everyday (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1996), 141 and 146.

86. Handke, Kaspar, 89.
87. Cavell, Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow, 253.
90. Cavell, Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow, 255.
91. Markson, Wittgenstein’s Mistress, 58.
92. Ibid., 87.
93. Handke, Kaspar, 85.
94. Handke, Kaspar, 84 and 87. Alternatively, the open cupboard and hallway doors in Jeanne Dielman might be likened to the “recalcitrant cupboard door” in Kaspar, symbolizing not a forgetfulness on the part of the protagonist so much as a loss of rational control, or even further, a showing (up) of “the illusion of rational control” that results in the subject’s going mad in the end in both cases (Kaspar and Jeanne). M. Read, “Peter Handke’s Kaspar and the Power of Negative Thinking,” Forum for Modern Language Studies 29, no. 2 (1993): 135, 136, 141–42.
95. Wellman, A Chronicle of the Madness of Small Worlds, 50.
98. An alternative version of this story is told by Norman Malcolm: “This idea [picture theory] came to Wittgenstein when he was serving in the Austrian army in the First War. He saw a newspaper that described the occurrence and location of an automobile accident by means of a diagram or map. It occurred to Wittgenstein that this map was a proposition and that therein was revealed the essential nature of propositions—namely, to picture reality.” Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir, 57. G. H. von Wright, “A Biographical Sketch,” quoted in Stern, Wittgenstein on Mind and Language, 35.
100. Ibid., 299. In Kaspar, Handke goes even farther, telling the reader “the objects [that we see on stage] are situated without any obvious relationship to each other; they stand there tastelessly, so the audience recognizes a stage in the objects on display” (Kaspar, 61).
101. Handke, Kaspar, 59 and 60.
102. Wellman, A Chronicle of the Madness of Small Worlds, 12.
Chapter 4

The second chapter epigraph is from Aldous Huxley’s The Doors of Perception (New York: Harper Perennial, 2009), 55.


7. Ibid., 74.

8. Ibid.


13. Ibid., 146.

14. Ibid., 143.

15. Ibid., 144.

16. Ibid., 146.

17. Ibid., 148.

18. Ibid., 158. The Freudian reference constellating “cigar” with meaning or not-meaning (i.e., the possibly misattributed or apocryphal Freudian quote, “Sometimes a cigar is just a cigar.”) is clear here and made transparent at the end of the play. The cigar box “joke” pays off when PORTEN shouts, “I ONLY WANTED TO TAKE A CIGAR!” having already repeated this sentence three times.

19. Ibid., 126.

20. Ibid., 75–76, 78–79.
23. Ibid., 82.
24. Ibid., 75, 77, and 87.
27. Ibid., 123.
28. I further illustrate and explain the idea of the object’s withdrawal in chapter 8.
35. Cavell writes, “I will call inordinate knowledge knowledge that can seem excessive in its expression, in contrast to mere or bare or pale or intellectualized or uninsistent or inattentive or distracted or filed, archival knowledge, an opposite direction of questionable, here defective, or insipid, or shallow, or indecisive expression.” Cavell, “The Touch of Words,” 84.
36. “One simply tends to forget that even doubting belongs to a language-game. . . . A person can doubt only if he has learnt certain things; as he can miscalculate only if he has learnt to calculate” (*RIPPII* §§342–43).
37. Godard said this in reference to his use of color in the film *Pierrot le fou* (1965).
45. Foreman has said that he thinks of all of his characters as being himself. And furthermore, with the oft-sounded non-appearing VOICE in mind, Kate Davy writes: “Often, a line spoken by a character is actually Foreman’s reaction to the line he had just written.” Davy, ed., *Richard Foreman: Plays and Manifestos*
Notes to Pages 103–107

(266) It is Foreman’s voice we hear when a VOICE is written into the play—inside our minds when we read the play and on tape or over a microphone when we see the play in performance. Foreman, Place + Target (Luogo + Bersaglio), in Reverberation Machines, 71.


47. David Pears writes that Wittgenstein expresses non-factual things using factual language. And, by Wittgenstein’s own admission (especially in the Tractatus), this factual language cannot fully or accurately express the “metaphysic of experience” that we deduce from this factual language. The operative question, especially in Wittgenstein’s early philosophy, then becomes, as stated by Pears: “Why is it impossible for factual language to express the fundamental condition of its own existence?” Pears, The False Prison, 5, 6–7.


49. Ibid., 15.

50. Ibid., 14.

51. Ibid.


57. Ibid., 28.

58. In his play The Cure (1986), Foreman plays with scale in terms of the word “word” itself. By employing the spiritual sense of the hidden/revealed word, he gestures toward a truth that is so enormous yet elemental, so universal in import and yet so intimately focused in faith as to defy any known (experientially based) scale of bigness and smallness. The character of “Kate,” a member of an occultist society, speaks to this while (the stage directions say): “(She moves about the room looking high on the walls for written words that may or may not be there).” Richard Foreman, The Cure, in Unbalancing Acts: Foundations for a Theater, 132; Richard Foreman, “Directing the Actors, Mostly,” in Unbalancing Acts: Foundations for a Theater, 50; Pears, The False Prison, 1:27 and 27 n. 17.


63. Actually, American psychologist Joseph Jastrow’s duck-rabbit figure, meant to illustrate the relationship of perception to mental activity, preceded
Wittgenstein’s use of it (http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~khlstrm/JastrowDuck.htm.). Foreman says that in his plays, “the walls of the stage were always striped or checked to suggest that level of energy” echoing the “energy trails” or “lines of force” represented by the strings that were suspended across the playing area, attaching an actor to an object or else to a part of the set. Foreman, “Visual Composition, Mostly,” 61.


67. “This is certainly true, that the information ‘That is a tree’, when no one could doubt it, might be a kind of a joke and as such have meaning” (OC §463).


69. Pears, The False Prison, 1:36, 37, and 38.

70. Ibid., 39.

71. Foreman, Paint(t), in Richard Foreman: Plays and Manifestos, 206.

72. Foreman, Total Recall: Sophia=(Wisdom), 40.

73. Ibid., 133. The circulating anxiety of the clock/phone in Hitchcock’s films is cited in the Hitchcock mash-up Double Take (dir. Johan Grimonprez, 2009), which double-tracks the real Hitchcock and a Hitchcock double. The clearest example of the clock-phone axis of anxiety in Hitchcock’s own work is certainly Dial “M” for Murder, which I will discuss in chapter 7.


76. Foreman, Hotel China, in Richard Foreman: Plays and Manifestos, 112.

77. Foreman, Vertical Mobility (Sophia=(Wisdom): Part 4), 171.

78. Foreman, Total Recall (Sophia=(Wisdom): Part 2), 35.

79. Ibid., 33.

80. Ibid., 113.

81. A DVD now exists of the production so that the door’s literal movement need no longer be imagined, although its figurative movement still can. Richard Foreman, Ontological-Hysteric Theater, Vol. 1 (New York: Tazdik, 2009).


83. Foreman, Total Recall, 37; Foreman, Angelface, in Richard Foreman: Plays and Manifestos, 1.

84. Foreman, Angelface, 1 and 5.


86. Foreman, Vertical Mobility, 171.


88. Ibid., 210–11.

89. Ibid., 208 and 212.

90. Ibid., 214 and 216.

91. Ibid., 218.
92. Ibid., 214 and 222. Foreman has read his share of Wittgenstein but denies this has influenced his work. Foreman did tell me he is interested in the fact that Wittgenstein ate cereal obsessively. Private conversation with Foreman, Brown University, fall 2011.


94. In the film’s parallel story, a man who is smuggling illegal immigrants into Paris in a truck instructs them not to make any noise and to be careful where they defecate: “They smell you, it’s like they hear you!”

95. Haneke forced the actress who played the character Anna in his earlier film *Funny Games* (1997) to perform multiple takes of a highly emotional scene in which she had to pray for her life at the hands of her tormentor(s). Haneke finally printed the take when he saw that the actress was too exhausted to act and just reacted to the reality of the situation at hand. Information drawn from the film’s DVD commentary. I will discuss this film in chapter 5.


Chapter 5


1. Wittgenstein’s idea that we should think of language as an activity, as a game that has rules, derived in part from the Viennese journalist Fritz Mauthner. Fritz Mauthner, *Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Sprache* 1: 25, translated from the German and quoted in Janik and Toulmin, *Wittgenstein’s Vienna*, 126.

2. Haneke says he told his producer if his film *Funny Games* was a great success it would be due to misunderstanding on the part of the audience. Michael Haneke interview with Serge Toubiana, *Funny Games* DVD of original German-language version (Kino Video, 1998).


7. See also Robert Pfaller and Slavoj Žižek’s notion of “interpassivity,” according to which belief, conscience, guilt, but also pleasure and enjoyment, are . . . delegated to others, so that one can participate in ‘life’ by proxy (a solution . . . to the problem . . . of knowing too much and not being able to take responsibility and action).” Thomas Elsaesser, “Performative Self-Contradictions: Michael Haneke’s Mind Games,” in *A Companion to Michael Haneke*, ed. Roy Grundmann (Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 60.
11. Wellman, *Bitter Bierce: or the Friction We Call Grief*, in *The Difficulty of Crossing a Field*, 171 and 177.
15. Wellman, *The Difficulty of Crossing a Field*, 152.
16. Ibid. 126 and 130. Unlike Foreman, who claims not to have been much influenced by Wittgenstein, Wellman readily acknowledges the influence and has taught a course on Wittgenstein and writing at Brooklyn College in New York.
17. Ibid., 159.
18. Ibid., 123 and 140.
20. Wellman, *The Difficulty of Crossing a Field*, 149.
25. Ibid., 159.
26. Ibid.
29. This argument may be analogized to the language poet’s direction that “we must learn to read *writing*, not read *meanings*. The reference here is to reading Gertrude Stein—“The question is not ‘what’ she means but ‘how.’ ” This “how” returns us to what language does, not what it means. Wittgenstein introduced the notion of “doing philosophy” into the modern philosophical vocabulary, an idea that likewise speaks to the “how,” the grammar and the *techne* of knowing. At the same time, though, Wittgenstein spoke from a place that applied what he knew by logical intuition, speaking, as it were, in the voice of the philosophical “I.” Michael Davidson, “On Reading Stein,” in *The L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Book*, ed. Bruce Andrews and Charles Bernstein (Carbondale: University of Southern Illinois Press, 1984), 198.
31. Ibid., 181–82.
34. Ibid., 195. On pp. 198–99, Wellman alludes to the hanging man narrator/protagonist of Bierce’s short story, but as a scene that the dramatic character “Bierce” witnessed and not as something that the writer Bierce invented. One might here say: “‘Bierce,’ noun. Someone who wrote and is written about without attention being paid to which function is being performed at any given moment.”
36. Ibid., 119 and 120.
38. Ibid., 181.
39. Ibid., 214 and 224.
40. Ibid., 191.
42. Ibid., 75.
45. Ibid., 7.
46. Ibid., 10 and 13; Nancy, *Corpus*, 67.
50. Ibid., 277.
51. Ibid., 277, 278, and 279.
52. Ibid., 285.
53. Ibid., 287.
54. Ibid., 290.
55. Ibid., 288.
56. Ibid., 289.
57. Ibid., 286.
59. Ibid., 30 and 40.
60. Ibid., 44 and 47.
61. Ibid., 43.
62. “If $p$ follows from $q$ and $q$ from $p$ then they are one and the same proposition” (*TLP* §5.141).
64. Ibid., 99.

67. Ibid., 137.


70. For a very clear and concise treatment of the development of Wittgenstein’s thinking along the lines described, see Judith Genova, *Wittgenstein: A Way of Seeing* (New York: Routledge, 1995). The quoted passage can be found on page 117.

71. “When language is functioning, it is performing; it is alive.” Genova, *Wittgenstein: A Way of Seeing*, 118; a play, a script quote, 124.


73. Lautreamont’s famous quote is to be found in his book of prose fragments *Les chants de Maldoror*, 1869.


75. I take up this theme in greater detail in chapter 9.

76. Foreman, *Pearls for Pigs*, 216.


79. Ibid., 130.

80. Ibid.


82. Foreman’s “Author’s Note,” which is composed of a series of propositions that are consistent with the body of the play text that follows, functions in the same way that Wittgenstein’s “Analytical Table of Contents” does in relation to the *Philosophical Remarks* that follow. Foreman, *Maria del Bosco*, 84–87 and 97.


85. Ibid., 144 and 166.

86. Ibid., 143.

87. Ibid., 148 and 149.

88. Ibid., 153.

89. Ibid., 145. Nuns judged me likewise as a high school debater. This was around the time a kid asked to see the horns growing out of my curly Jewish head in a swimming pool in Oklahoma.

96. Ibid., 158.
100. Ibid., 113.
103. Ibid., 150 and 163.
104. Ibid., 171.
109. Ibid., 156.
111. Ibid., 167.
112. dictionary.reference.com/browse/aporia.

Chapter 6
The chapter epigraph is from Handke’s *Kaspar*, 93.


23. Helen Hayes was allergic to stage dust.

24. “One of the things people generally admired about Van Gogh, even though they were not always aware of it, was the way he could make even a chair seem to have anxiety in it. Or a pair of boots.” Markson, *Wittgenstein’s Mistress*, 138, 221.

25. Ibid., 185–86.


27. Ibid., 147.

28. Ibid., 182.

35. I kept my dissertation in the refrigerator for the same reason, and there was a fire. Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir, 49.
37. Cameron Diaz, the actress who played Julie in Vanilla Sky, has said that she (the actress, not the character) has OCD.
40. Janik and Toulmin, 4.
43. Ibid., 8.
44. The idea of the meaning-body, linked to Platonic theory, “leads us to move unwittingly from talking about meanings as they actually operate in our daily lives to talking about them like physical objects.” Braver, Groundless Grounds, 59.
45. Ibid., 85 and 132.
46. The catastrophe of being next is matched by instances of someone being “next” behind me, even if that someone is only anticipated/imagined. The two “nexts” express the bipolarity of the worst-case scenario of waiting for and being waited for—the articulated moment of decision.
47. I have drawn upon Sass’s The Paradox of Delusion (89–90, 106–7, 110–11) for the description of the specific psychological categories of thinking described above and to some of their evocative correspondences to Wittgensteinian motive and thought.
48. The actual ornate metal building at 72 Greene Street in SoHo, in which Kiki and Marcy live, houses a shop called “Alice’s Antiques,” another echo of Wonderland’s illogical place setting in the film’s dreamscape.
49. Nigel Bruce’s bumbling Dr. Watson did the same thing in the film Sherlock Holmes and the Pearl of Death (1944; adapted from Conan Doyle’s “The Adventure of the Six Napoleons”), while pasting a newspaper clipping in a scrapbook. I recall this as a personally paradigmatic moment.
53. Saul Bellow, Mr. Sammler’s Planet (New York: Penguin, 1995), 190.
54. Ibid., 171 and 192.
55. Ibid., 171.
59. Ibid., 3 and 93.
60. Ibid., 82.
61. Ibid., 77 and 78.
62. Ibid., 74–75.
63. Glock, A Wittgenstein Dictionary, 120 and 123.
68. Ibid., 87.
69. Roubaud, The Loop, 16.
72. Stern, Wittgenstein on Mind and Language, 137.
73. Ibid., 135.
74. Ibid.

Chapter 7

1. Davis, Obsession, 7.
2. Hagberg, Describing Ourselves, 94.
3. Wittgenstein’s brief here has more to do with thinking than it does with language. In his view, thinking is no more synonymous with language than mental image is. Oswald Hanfling, “Thinking,” in Wittgenstein: A Critical Reader, 144.
5. “Money is always a sign, certainly when it is a medium, but also when it is a ‘thing,’ a commodity, being bought and sold.” Rotman, Signifying Nothing, 95.
6. Ibid., 53.
7. Ibid., 53, 88–89, 93.
8. Ibid., 95.
15. Ibid., 5. I also suffer from cynophobia and have walked down the centers of many streets to equidistance myself from imagined dog attacks.
16. The reference of course being to Booth’s “*Sic semper tyrannis!*” (“Thus always with/to tyrants!”) as well as to my *Richard III*-inscribed dagger.
19. Borden refers in this moment to “the speech act of the gun,” which suggests a blended agency between subject (Ford) and object (weapon). Borden, in Kane, *Weasels and Wisemen*, 241. Gun in hand, the previously robotic Ford warms to her task, and subject and object anthropomorphize one another.
24. In considering the appearance of the stage inside the film from a vertical perspective, I am reminded of Bellow’s Mr. Sammler, who states: “In literature I think there are low-ceiling masterpieces—*Crime and Punishment*, for instance—and high-ceiling masterpieces, *Remembrance of Things Past.*” Bellow, *Mr. Sammler’s Planet*, 151. Hitchcock used the psychologically strategic overhead shot to great effect and affect in his earlier London-based film *Murder!* (1930), which goes much further in literally citing/sighting both the stage and theater as text. For an excellent analysis of this film, specifically as it relates to camera P.O.V., see William Rothman, *Hitchcock: The Murderous Gaze* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984), 57–107.
28. The interruptive telephone plays a central role in Mamet’s 1992 play (and 1994 film) *Oleanna*, in which it is a materialized metonym for the language and power of interruption in dialogue—in particular, dialogic overlay. The ringing of a telephone is, of course, always overlaid upon something. Even when it is not always an imposition, it demands and distracts attention from something else, the ringing doing a fair imitation of insistency and, in a sense, rewarding distraction by focusing attention elsewhere.
33. Ibid., 38 and 45.
36. Ibid., 59.
42. Philosophers point to Wittgenstein’s change regarding the articulation of fact and rule. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein seemed to believe that “whereas any fact can be described falsely, the rules that make it possible to describe the facts cannot be described in any way at all.” Later, in the Investigations, Wittgenstein dispensed with description in favor of application and the meanings that ensued from following a rule. Donna M. Summerfield, “Fitting Versus Tracking: Wittgenstein on Representation,” in The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein, 132–33; Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, 7–18.
45. Jean Cocteau’s 1934 play The Infernal Machine is a retelling of the Oedipus myth, which, of course, involves the denial and then discovery of one’s true identity and the burden of bearing a fateful name.
46. “The visual field. (Not to be confused with visual space)” (PO 221).
47. Hitchcock also shoots his actors through the liquor bottles we earlier saw on a side table pushed against one of the apartment’s interior walls. This impossible shot or way of seeing puts the spectator in mind of the stage’s imaginary “fourth wall” through which he can view the action of the play as if he were seeing into the room that is scenically represented.

Chapter 8
1. Martin and Lewis Colgate Comedy Hour: 16 Classic Episodes (La Crosse, Wis.: Echo Bridge Home Entertainment, 2005).
3. Ibid., 594.

5. Ibid., 166.

6. The live nightclub act with which Martin and Lewis began their partnership opened with Lewis pretending to be a waiter in/for the audience, while really being a stooge who soon takes his rightful place as a co-headliner on the stage.


10. At the same time, Hagberg points out that “Wittgenstein’s observations, since they are significant for self-interpretation, tell us with ever increasing precision, or with increasing conceptual magnification, what not to think.” This suggests not only a traditional mode of argument by exclusion but also the poet John Keats’s notion of “negative capability,” in which acceptance of the uncertain and unresolved as a modus operandi actualizes incapacity as a positive thought application. Hagberg, *Describing Ourselves*, 51, 158, 181.


16. On another occasion in another psychiatrist’s waiting room, a receipt that disappeared right from under my nose was discovered inside a closed umbrella (its closedness being anxiety’s sign of catastrophic non-prevention/-intervention) that I had leaned against a chair on the opposite side of the room to wait for me. The anxiety of (self-)discovery, my mental unreadiness to be seen in a psychiatrist’s waiting room folded memory like a hidden note on which was written, “the umbrella moves from one side of the room to the other, while following your psychiatrist’s appointment you are anxiously waiting (not) to be seen.” Recall as well Markson’s mad Kate’s observation regarding a stick: “Then again it is quite possible that the question of loss had not entered my mind until I was already in the process of looking back, which is to say that the stick was
already not lost before I had worried that it might be.” Markson, *Wittgenstein’s Mistress*, 58.


19. Ibid., 6 and 33.


22. Ibid., 99.


25. Herbert’s trauma-induced runs from young women (producing multiple running Herberths) morph into a young woman’s three contrasting trauma-forestalling runs (in which she races to save her boyfriend from a named and visible catastrophe) in Tom Tykwer’s 1998 film *Run Lola Run*. The missing commas or pauses (in)visible in the film’s title sign a word-palindromic reading of an inexhaustible thought-as-action loop. Tykwer begins his film with the Wittgensteinian epigraph: “After the game is before the game (S. Herberger).” Josep “Sepp” Herberger was a German footballer (like Handke’s anxious ex-goalie Bloch), whose coaching career began during the Nazi regime.

26. In this same film, Lewis performs a comic *sparagmos* on fellow comedian Buddy Lester’s suit, tearing it (and figuratively him) apart.

27. The real Stan Laurel, who was seventy years old at the time and no longer performing, advised Jerry Lewis on this film.

28. *Run Lola Run*’s other epigraph is from T. S. Eliot’s “Little Gidding”: “We shall not cease from exploration . . . and the end of all our / exploration will be to arrive where we started / . . . and know the place / for the first time.”


31. Charles Travis characterizes Wittgenstein’s position on this, beginning with Wittgenstein’s problem with naming: “What words name (by way of concepts and objects), and the structured way they do *that*, does not determine uniquely when they would be true. What is missing is the sort of *consequences* of thinking, or saying, something—what may be done with what is said.” Charles Travis, *Thought’s Footing: Themes in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 2–3.

32. I am here consciously twisting the meaning of Gordon Baker’s statement, drawn from Wittgenstein, “We might say that changing one’s way of seeing things is difficult because it is voluntary, *because* one has to surrender what one has always *wanted* to see.” Baker, *Wittgenstein’s Method: Neglected Aspects*, 46. The behavior I am describing persists in the performance of not surrendering its desire in spite of or even because of the voluntary self-incapacitation that it manifests (as performance).

33. My example is drawn from Ryan Larkin’s 1968 animated short *Walking*, which not only studies the ways people walk but which imposes the animator’s
face upon the walking subject who is radiating anxiety in the lines with which he is drawn. My thanks to Hans Vermy for referring me to this source.

34. "Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end;—but the end is not certain propositions’ striking us immediately as true, i.e., it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game" (OC §204).


37. Following an operation on his heart, Jean-Luc Nancy noticed that he had previously not noticed the rhythmic beating of his heart, which was “as absent as the soles of my feet while walking.” Nancy, Corpus, 163.

38. “Knowledge’ and ‘certainty’ belong to different categories. They are not two ‘mental states’ like, say ‘surmising’ and ‘being sure’” (OC §308). Handke observes that “for children there seems to be no gap between knowledge and existence,” which, if you concur with this assessment (which I do), suggests the truth of Wittgenstein’s assertion that you have to be taught doubt. (“The child learns by believing the adult. Doubt comes after belief”) (OC §160). Handke, The Weight of the World, 123.

39. See Markson’s tetralogy, consisting of the novels Reader’s Block (1996), This Is Not a Novel (2001), Vanishing Point (2004), and The Last Novel (2007), all of which present a litany of historical and literary deaths carefully ordered by a generically named “Writer” or “Reader” (or his equivalent) so as to convey his own inner narrative.

40. “And in fact, isn’t the use of the word ‘know’ as a preeminently philosophical word altogether wrong” (OC §415)?

41. “One is often bewitched by a word. For example, by the word ‘know’” (OC §435).


44. Handke, The Weight of the World, 47. As regards dreaming and clarity, Wittgenstein wrote: “‘When you are talking about dreaming, about thinking, about sensation—don’t all of these things seem to lose the mysteriousness which seems to be their essential characteristic?’ Why should dreaming be more mysterious than the table? Why should they not both be equally mysterious?” (RPPI §378).


46. Ibid., 94.

47. “How does thought (that things are thus and so) get footing? How can it make its success beholden to the way things are in a way determinate enough that the world (in its normal course) may, obligingly, be as thought, or precisely not? For a start, what might such a dependency on things look like? What form might it take?” Travis, Thought’s Footing, 2.

48. Ibid., 93.

49. Ibid.


52. Ibid., 98.

53. Ibid., 99.

54. Ibid., 101, 102, and 103.

Chapter 9

The second chapter epigraph is from Handke’s *The Weight of the World*, 155.

1. Aaron is the name of Moses’s brother in the Bible who dwelled in the borderland while Moses was away.


4. Wayne actually appears to have used “pilgrim” for the first time in Ford’s later valedictory western *The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance*, 1962.


8. Lingis, *The Imperative*, 201.


11. Handke’s play epigraph cites Dante’s *La vida nueva*: “These pilgrims walked deep along in thought.../ These pilgrims seemed to come from far.”


13. Ibid.


17. Ibid., 5.

18. “In a letter to [Ludwig] von Ficker (FL 10.11.19), Wittgenstein proclaimed that the *Tractatus* ‘consists of two parts: of the one which is here, and of everything
which I have not written. And precisely this second part is the important one.”

21. Handke, *Voyage to the Sonorous Land*. Of course, I am referring here to the famous scene in Luis Buñuel and Salvador Dali’s surrealist short film *Un chien Andalou* (1929), in which ants inexplicably emerge from a hole in the palm of a young man’s hand. This same hand is later placed in a box by the police. The possibly censored and censorious hands and head had already gone missing from the splayed female nude displaying its dark hole in Gustave Courbet’s *L’origine du monde* (1866).
28. “Wanting to be what we are not, we come / to believe ourselves something other / than what we are, and this is how we /become mad.” Jean-Jacques Rousseau, preface to *La nouvelle Héloïse*, quoted in Lacoue-Labarthes, *Typography*, 47, 258–59.
31. Ibid., 180.
33. Ibid., 21.
34. Ibid., 22.
35. Ibid., 24 and 25.
36. Ibid., 26.
41. Ibid., 28.
42. Ibid., 28.
43. Markson, *Wittgenstein’s Mistress*, 15. “I would appear to be more upset by that carton of grass that is not real than I realized. By which I imagine what I mean is that if the grass that is not real is real, as undoubtedly it is, what would be the difference between the way grass that is not real is real and the way real grass is real, then?” Markson, *Wittgenstein’s Mistress*, 193. For a more complete analysis of vision in *Blue Velvet*, and more specifically the unseen and what I call “the
unscene” (the unrepresentable, ineffable), see the chapter “Ghost Light,” in my book *Infinity (Stage)* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 143–69.

44. Lingis, *The Imperative*, 27, 34.


46. Roy Orbison’s first wife and later his older brother died in motorcycle accidents. Two of Orbison’s three small children died in a house fire while he was on tour.


48. Ibid., 50–53.

49. Ibid., 70, 77, 78.


51. Ibid., 119.


53. “Say, not: ‘We have formed a wrong picture of thinking’—but: ‘We don’t know our way about in the use of our picture, or of our pictures.’ And hence we don’t know our way about in the use of our word” (*RPPI* §549).

54. Gordon Baker cites the influence of the mathematically trained Vienna Circle linguistic and analytical philosopher Friedrich Waismann on Wittgenstein regarding the topic of philosophical questioning as the manifestation of intellectual disquiet. “A philosophical problem is an individual’s internal conflict” is how Baker reads Wittgenstein’s proposition. “A simile that has been absorbed into the forms of our language produces a false appearance which disquiets us. ‘But this isn’t how it is!’—we say. ‘Yet this is how it has to be!’” (*PI* §112). Gordon Baker, *Wittgenstein’s Method*, 146.


58. “Has it [pain] the shape of the part of the body that hurts” (*RPPI* §695)? “I feel my arm and, oddly, I should like to say: I feel it in a particular position in space: as if, that is, my bodily feeling were distributed in a space in the shape of an arm, so that in order to represent the matter, I would have to represent the arm, say in plaster, in the right position” (*RPPI* §784).

59. My thanks to Charles Pletcher for his alternate readings of the aporia.

60. “Wittgenstein’s writing is more than performative; it is scriptive, encouraging the reader to act.” Daniel Ruppel, “‘And Now’ Presenting Wittgenstein: Time, and the Tension of Thinking Through It All,” unpublished paper, 7.