Part IV

Comparisons
The Moravian Origins of Kierkegaard’s and Blake’s Socratic Literature

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Alastair Hannay asserts in his introduction to Kierkegaard and Philosophy, “Not everyone looks for philosophy in Kierkegaard, let alone arguments. And if they do look, especially if they are philosophers like me trained in the Anglo-American analytic tradition, they will be hard put to find either.” Kierkegaard’s “psychological acuity” and “huge literary talent” are to blame in Hannay’s account, as he wryly apologizes for discussing Kierkegaard in a philosophical context before explaining his own project. Hannay’s difficulties originate of course in the demands of the analytic tradition, for Kierkegaard’s literary qualities come from the Socratic nature of his philosophical task, which favors dialogic contemplation of significant questions over the systematic, discursive presentation of conceptual truths. More advanced forms of a Socratic methodology represent philosophical points of view in characters who embody them, which requires not only dialogue but character development as well. This essay attempts to illuminate the significance of the literary qualities of Kierkegaard’s authorship by comparing him to the English poet and printmaker William Blake (1757–1827), who was similarly engaged in a Socratic project, and then demonstrates how their view of Socrates was particularly inflected by Moravianism through Zinzendorf. This comparison of both authors’ approach to Socrates via their Moravian backgrounds accounts for many details of their deeply ambivalent relationships both with Plato’s works and with their own state churches.

Kierkegaard’s books (as opposed to his letters or journals and papers) are typically divided into two groups: works that he signed with his own name, such as Concept of Irony and Works of Love, and works attributed to pseudonyms, such as Either/Or, Concept of Anxiety, Philosophical Fragments, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, The Sickness unto Death, Repetition, and Fear and Trembling. These pseudonymous works are conceptually sophisticated and often linguistically dense prose considerations of philosophical subjects, so it may seem odd to refer to them as “literature” rather than “philosophy.” However, Kierkegaard himself very often referred to these works as forming his “poetic” authorship, primarily because he does not identify himself as their author. Employing an older definition of “poetic” that is closer in
meaning to the word “fictional” today, he presents himself instead as having created fictional characters representing different points of view, and these fictional characters are the authors of these works. And since later works draw from, critique, and develop ideas in earlier works, all of them together form an extensive Socratic dialogue in which different characters are speaking to one another, but only one of them is Kierkegaard. It is in this sense that Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous authorship might be thought of as “literature” comparable to the poetry and mythology of Blake, a point I will develop in more detail.

In addition to sharing literary form, the two authors shared literary influence. Any elaboration of Blake’s and Kierkegaard’s shared intellectual history could emphasize Kierkegaard’s engagement with European Romanticism in general and English Romanticism particularly, which may well have included Blake. Blake could not have been familiar with Kierkegaard, who had only turned fourteen the year of Blake’s death, but Crabb Robinson’s brief essay about Blake, accompanied by a selection of Blake’s poetry, had been available to German audiences since 1811. Unfortunately, there is no indication in Kierkegaard’s writings that he was familiar with Blake’s works. He seems not to have encountered Robinson’s translation during his time in Germany, or if he did, it did not make enough of an impression for him to comment on it. Kierkegaard had read Shakespeare, Byron, Shelley, and Edward Young in German translations, the last being particularly significant because Blake illustrated an edition of Young’s Night Thoughts, so Kierkegaard did find British literature appealing and fertile. The figure of Socrates and the writings of Plato are, however, much more important to both Blake and Kierkegaard than were any of Blake’s Romantic contemporaries or literary predecessors.

Blake and Kierkegaard are mutually illuminating figures not only because they similarly appropriated Socratic thought but also because their works respond to very similar, and mutually influential, cultural milieux. Because both were raised by Moravian parents, it is likely that their views of the figure of Socrates are partially if not profoundly influenced by the founder of the modern configuration of the Moravian Church, Nikolaus Ludwig von Zinzendorf (1700–1760), who fashioned himself a Socratic figure in a series of early pamphlets. So after situating Zinzendorf within the history of Moravian religion, I will describe the conception of the figure of Socrates that emerges from his pamphlets and extend this history to the connections that both Blake’s and Kierkegaard’s families had to the Moravian Church. However, our understanding of each author’s approach to Socrates must be nuanced by the observation that their religious backgrounds also resulted in some ambivalence about the figure of Socrates, an ambivalence that I will later define as a form of Kierkegaardian anxiety.

Understanding each author’s Moravian background, therefore, is necessary to understanding the religious component of each author’s thought as well as the profile of Socrates in their thinking.
Kierkegaard, Blake, and the Moravian Church

The Moravian Church, in brief, traditionally divides its history into three eras: the “Ancient Church,” from the year 1457 to 1656 . . . that of the ‘Hidden Seed’ . . . from the year 1656 to 1722 . . . [and] the ‘Renewed Church’ from the year 1722 to the present.”¹⁴ J. Taylor Hamilton, however, in his account of Moravian Church history for the introduction to third edition of *The Moravian Manual*, begins in 863 C.E. with Prince Ratislaw’s request of Emperor Michael to send for Cyril and Methodius of Constantinople to preach the Gospel in Moravia. In 871 Borivoj, the Prince of Bohemia, and his wife, Ludmilla, visited the Moravian court and converted to Christianity as well. Cyril and Methodius spent some time preaching around Moravia and Bohemia, developing local rituals and, most important, translating the Bible into Slavonic. This early missionary work established regionally specific forms of Christianity that were significant predecessors to the Protestant Reformation and resistant to Roman Catholic impositions of uniformity even though the area became officially Roman Catholic in 1080. Jan Hus (1369–1415) originated in southern Bohemia; his religious consciousness was formed in part by this social and religious milieu.

However, divisions among these local Christianities soon forced the Brethren to practice their faith secretly, alongside and within state-recognized churches. The followers of Hus divided into two groups: the Calixtines, who eventually won legal recognition after their acceptance of the Council of Basel in 1431, and the Taborites, who rejected the Council of Basel. The Calixtines came to constitute the national church of Bohemia. In 1457, reform-minded followers of Hus from both groups composed a formal declaration of principles, establishing an association called the Unitas Fratrum, or Unity of the Brethren, often shortened to “the Brethren.”⁵ They did not seek at that time to establish a separate church but rather to “form a society within the National Church,”⁶ one dedicated to reform and to an emphasis on Scripture as the principal guide for faith and practice over twenty years before the birth of Martin Luther. As early as 1461, however, persecutions against the Brethren began, but they managed to thrive until the Smalcaldic wars (1546–47), when persecution became more intensely targeted against those who were neither Roman Catholic nor Calixtine. The rise of Counter-Reformation activity in this area specifically targeted evangelical groups, so that by 1627 “the evangelical party in Moravia and Bohemia ceased to exist.”⁷

The Brethren found another opportunity to surface publicly with the rise of Philipp Jakob Spener in Germany, who as the author of *Pia Desideria* (1675) is often identified as the father of the Pietist movement. This movement was not initially separatist but rather viewed its members as “little churches within the church.”⁸ specifically the Evangelical Church of Germany. Spener emphasized an orientation against intellectualism in religious belief and practice,
criticism of the state church, and sincere faith defined by an inwardness that is manifested in action and decision. One of Spener’s disciples was the Baroness von Gersdorf, who married Count von Zinzendorf, giving birth to Nikolaus Ludwig in May 1700. Nikolaus Ludwig became the Zinzendorf who, working with like-minded clergyman, resuscitated the Brethren when he agreed to donate part of his estate in Berthelsdorf to a settlement of Brethren. These Brethren had been gathered together by a working-class Moravian evangelist named Christian David when he converted from Roman Catholicism to pietist Christianity. That settlement grew into Herrnhut; within five years, over three hundred people occupied it. Internal divisions in the new community led Zinzendorf to retire from court, acquire documents and literature from a more active period of the Brethren’s history, and then settle disputes by meeting with community leaders and drawing up statutes. By the age of twenty-seven, Zinzendorf was the figurehead and leader of the revived Unitas Fratrum.

George Forell calls Zinzendorf the “most influential German theologian between Luther and Schleiermacher.” Similar in stature to John and Charles Wesley in England or Grundtvig in Denmark, Zinzendorf helped revive and eventually lead the movement that was continuous with a nine-hundred-year tradition of Christianity at the borderlands of traditional structures, sometimes practicing freely, sometimes working within existing structures, and sometimes suppressed by them, but never comfortable and often adopting a stance of principled critique and reform from within. Zinzendorf’s followers in both England and Denmark, like those of the Wesleys in England (who helped establish the first Moravian mission in England), were encouraged to practice their religion both as members of the Unitas Fratrum and as members of state-recognized congregations.

Joakim Garff explains that Kierkegaard’s family had been associated with a congregation of Brethren at Stormgade in Copenhagen that was established in 1739, following Zinzendorf’s Herrnhut model. Michael Pedersen Kierkegaard, Kierkegaard’s father, had a leading role in rebuilding the meeting hall to accommodate the congregation’s growth in the early nineteenth century. The Moravian community in Denmark lived the same history there that it did elsewhere, existing outside the state church and occasionally suffering persecution. However, Kierkegaard’s family, again consistent with Moravian patterns, participated simultaneously in Moravian and state-recognized Danish Lutheran religious services. Bruce Kirmmse explains that Michael Pedersen, “while retaining his rural pietist connection to the Herrnhut Congregation of Brothers,” also “made Jacob Peter Mynster his pastor.” Mynster eventually rose to the position of Bishop and became the leading figure for the socially mobile Danish Lutheran rationalism of the day. Kirmmse observes that by “attending the Herrnhut congregation for evening prayer during the week and Mynster’s Church of Our Lady on Sunday mornings, Michael Pedersen expressed the tension between independent peasant religiousness and respectable Copenhagen piety.”
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Kirmmse elsewhere describes this tension as “a tension in the religious life—and certainly in the social self-understanding as well—of the Kierkegaard family, a tension between rural and urban religion, between peasant pietism and Golden Age oratory.” Johannes Climacus, the pseudonymous author of Kierkegaard’s *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, reflects this division as he considers his audience: “What is developed here by no means pertains to the simple folk, whom the god will preserve in their lovable simplicity (although they sense the pressure of life another way), the simplicity that feels no great need for any other kind of understanding, or, insofar as it is felt, humbly becomes a sigh over the misery of this life, while this sigh humbly finds comfort in the thought that life’s happiness does not consist in being a person of knowledge” (SKS 7:158n1 / CUP 1:170n). Climacus (and most likely Kierkegaard) did not consider the reflective complexity of his work relevant to Denmark’s rural population; instead, he leveled his critique at urban Copenhageners who imbibed Danish Hegelianism from pulpits and periodicals and who were therefore alienated from their roots of rural simplicity.

But Climacus’s description of his audience is rife with tensions. At the same time that a simple faith is being idealized, it is treated condescendingly (as a “lovable simplicity”). Furthermore, this dichotomy between urban and rural subjectivity is not the whole issue. Kierkegaard extends A. G. Rudelbach’s contention that the state church contributed to the rise of the modern proletariat in a moral direction: “What is unchristian and ungodly is to base the state on a substratum of people whom one totally ignores, denying all kinship with them—even if on Sundays there are moving sermons about loving ‘the neighbor’” (SKS 22:217–18, NB12:124 / KJN 6:124). It is not coincidental that Kierkegaard used the language of kinship in this passage, which was written in the year of Denmark’s transition to a constitutional monarchy, as these divisions existed within the home of his birth.

Blake’s Moravian background follows many of the same patterns. Keri Davies and Marsha Keith Schuchard have succinctly summarized previous assumptions about Blake’s religious background and the history of and evidence for the actual Moravian background of Blake’s family. Both Schuchard and Davies took Nancy Bogan’s 1968 suggestion that “Blake and his family were Anglicans and at the same time maintained a connection with the Moravian Church” seriously enough to seek out archival support for this claim, which they found. Schuchard and Davies report that the Moravian Church in England in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century occupied an unusual position, being “recognized by an Act of Parliament as an episcopal church and therefore a sister of the church of England” but still “required to have their places of worship licensed as Dissenting chapels,” so that they both “were and then again were not Dissenters.”

The Moravian Church in England, furthermore, encouraged its members to maintain their Anglican membership and identity while still participating in Moravian services, so that “one could be an Anglican and a Moravian at
the same time—and it turns out that a majority of the English Brethren were and remained loyal members of the Church of England.”

Schuchard’s and Davies’s archival work reveals that Blake’s mother and her first husband were members of the same Fetter Lane church in London that Zinzendorf visited on more than one occasion, their petition to join falling between Zinzendorf’s visits of the late 1830s and early 1850s. Schuchard later asserts that their attendance extended through the 1850s, during at least one of Zinzendorf’s visits. She explains in a follow-up to her 2004 article that while Blake’s mother was married to her first husband, Thomas Armitage, it is very likely she knew John and James Blake, who were William Blake’s uncle and his father, respectively, as James eventually became Catherine’s second husband. Because they also attended Fetter Lane at the same time, both sides of William Blake’s family had connections with the Moravian Church in London and were directly influenced by Zinzendorf.

It is not difficult to imagine the place that the figure of Socrates might take among Brethren familiar with him, for both critiqued the social structures within which they lived, sometimes gathering a following and sometimes suffering persecution. Zinzendorf’s own appropriation of the figure of Socrates took place in a series of biweekly pamphlets first published under the name “The Socrates of Dresden” and then gathered into book form, more ambitiously, under the title *The German Socrates*. Over thirty of these pamphlets were originally distributed in 1725–26, around the time that Zinzendorf first welcomed the earliest community of the Brethren onto his estate. Zinzendorf envisions a Socratic figure engaged in socially provocative polemic designed to lead his readers and listeners to self-examination. According to August Gottlieb Spangenberg’s biography of Zinzendorf, “the Count’s object in the publication of this periodical work was (to use his own words) ‘to bring, like Socrates, his fellow-citizens to reflect upon themselves, and by his example to show them the way to the attainment of real and lasting contentment.’”

Harold Steffe asserts that both “authors [Kierkegaard and Zinzendorf] harness Socrates to inquire into whether and how Christianity and philosophy can be united, and into the meaning of passion for the understanding,” and in this union we should observe an emphasis on existential self-reflection. Both Zinzendorf and Kierkegaard also share an early publication history in which they concealed their authorship, Zinzendorf initially leaving his pamphlets unsigned just as Kierkegaard published his most important early philosophical works pseudonymously.

While Spangenberg claims that Zinzendorf’s pamphlets avoid satire and irony—that Zinzendorf merely spoke “freely”—they still provoked a rather hostile response. By the third issue, according to Spangenberg, “Some were enraged at it, and caused the confiscation of the third Number; the reason assigned for which was, that the author’s name was not given; until the Count at length avowed himself as the author. He continued this publication till the thirty-fourth Number.” After the last issue, Zinzendorf collected the
pamphlets and republished them in book form. Kierkegaard felt similarly compelled to step forward and identify himself as the author of his pseudonymous philosophical works prior to and including *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* in a signed but unpaginated appendix attached to that book, which again warrants a comparison to Zinzendorf's unpaginated introduction to *The German Socrates*.

However, the most important parallels to Kierkegaard's thought relate to the pseudonymous authorship itself, which comprises a Socratic dialogue among different characters around the topics of faith and inwardness. Similarly, Blake's mythological works, especially the later ones, are not so much narrative as dialogue among mythological characters representative of different points of view. Both writers' commitment to dialogue rather than to a systematic presentation of conceptual truths, as we might find in analytic philosophy, commits them likewise to specific literary forms emphasizing either character development or, at least, characters engaging one another in some type of conflict. Both authors hope to serve maieutic purposes in their works, believing that the development of their fictional or mythological characters will be paralleled in their readers, bringing to birth a new “soul” in their readers, a psychology that de-emphasizes environmental and social influence in favor of what Kierkegaard's Vigilius Haufniensis calls in *The Concept of Anxiety* an “acquired originality.”

Furthermore, Christopher Barnett describes Zinzendorf's pamphlets as seeking “to interrogate a new generation of philosophers, whose elevation of reason threatened to reduce Christianity to a series of rational principles.” This task resonates with both Blake's and Kierkegaard's critique of the effects of rationalism upon Christianity. Thus, the literary form of each author's work is integral to his philosophical task and inherent to its nature. Both authors sought to combat intellectual abstractions with personalities embodied in literary dialogues, and perhaps most of all to frustrate reason itself with the sheer complexity of their projects, a goal consistent with Spener's marginalization of intellect.

“Socrates,” however, is not necessarily a single entity for either of these authors. Kierkegaard came to the Socratic tradition and its variants through his own theological study and his reading in the German Romantics, in German philosophy, and in a number of different traditions from the early medieval period to his own day, while Blake read a number of figures who were themselves influenced by Plato's writings. Eric Ziolkowski's *The Literary Kierkegaard* begins his review of Kierkegaard and literature with the figure of Socrates, reminding his readers that Kierkegaard's dissertation, *The Concept of Irony*, carefully and complexly negotiates the conflicting portraits of Socrates presented by Aristophanes, Plato, and Xenophon. The presence of options means that the figure of Socrates invoked or suggested by Blake's and Kierkegaard's works is a matter of conscious decision: they not only chose to engage in a Socratic task, but they also needed to choose which
Socrates to emulate. The nature of this choice will be made apparent in the ensuing, brief review of the position that Socrates and Plato’s writings have in Blake’s and Kierkegaard’s respective corpuses.

Kierkegaard, Blake, and Socrates

Any review of how each author perceived his Socratic task perhaps best begins with Plato’s Seventh Letter, where he describes feeling compelled to revisit Sicily to instruct its ruler, Dionysius, in philosophy.25 Dionysius’s character, such as it was, would not take no for an answer to his requests that Plato return to Sicily. Plato describes Dionysius as a vain character who “made it absolutely a point of honor that no one should ever suppose that I had a poor opinion of his natural gifts” (Letter 7, 338e–339a, CDP 1586). Plato further questions the motives behind Dionysius’s desire for instruction in philosophy and comports himself accordingly, hoping to see whether Dionysius truly loved philosophy or was instead “stuffed with secondhand opinions,” having “only a superficial tinge of doctrine” (340b, CDP 1588).

Plato’s account of Dionysius is hardly flattering, especially as he demeans Dionysius for composing a philosophical “handbook of his own” (341b, CDP 1588) following Plato’s first visit. In Plato’s opinion, those who systematically organize the philosophy of others into written handbooks have “no real acquaintance with the subject [of philosophy]” (341c, CDP 1589) because the insights provided by philosophy cannot be communicated directly through language. Only after “a long period of attendance on the subject” does acquaintance with the insights of philosophy ignite “like a blaze kindled by a leaping spark [which] is generated in the soul and at once becomes self-sustaining” (341d, CDP 1589). This process is necessary, Plato argues, because of the fundamental difference between any reality and the words or images used to describe it. Direct instruction presents words and images to the learner but can never present the reality itself. At best, instruction can only be the occasion through which individuals perceive the truth for themselves after a long period of their own contemplation and reflection. Plato therefore idealizes a dialectical and dialogic philosophical method rather than a systematic and expository one. The dialogue communicates philosophical truth indirectly by articulating several points of view without being exclusively devoted to any single one, prompting reflection and engagement on the part of the listener.

But perhaps the most significant aspect of Plato’s Seventh Letter is that he defines the personality of Dionysius by his engagement with a text: those who seek to produce systematic expositions are vain and shallow, while those who inwardly contemplate are truly philosophical. Plato’s Seventh Letter develops ideas considered by Socrates in the *Phaedo*, in which he defines the goal of philosophy as separation of the soul from the body, drawing a sharp distinction between those who “regard the body with the greatest indifference
and spend their lives in philosophy” (68c, CDP 51) and those incapable of philosophy, whose souls are “permeated by the corporeal, which fellowship and intercourse with the body will have ingrained in its very nature through constant association and long practice” (81c, CDP 64). Plato believes that Dionysius’s vanity drives his misunderstanding of philosophy, as his thinking seems to proceed from a bodily incursion upon the soul rather than a philosophically attained freedom from the body. The bodily person in Plato’s thought believes that truth lies in the text; the philosophical person finds truth within her soul. The text may prompt the philosopher’s discovery of soul truth but cannot instruct the soul directly.

By the time of Origen (ca. 185–254), the ideas circulating in Plato’s dialogues and letters had developed into an informal taxonomy of personality types intimately associated with hermeneutic strategies, a development Origen reflects in book 4 of On First Principles (ca. 215 c.e.): “One must therefore pourtray [sic] the meaning of the sacred writings in a threefold way upon one’s own soul, so that the simple man may be edified by what we may call the flesh of the scripture, this name being given to the obvious interpretation; while the man who has made some progress may be edified by its soul, as it were; and the man who is perfect . . . may be edified by the spiritual law. . . . For just as man consists of body, soul and spirit, so in the same way does the scripture.”26 If human beings exist as body, soul, and spirit, so does Scripture, therefore an interpreter’s hermeneutics reflect the state of his or her soul in its preference for one approach to a text rather than another. Socrates makes a similar but less differentiated judgment in the Phaedrus, advising Phaedrus to have a “discernment of the nature of the soul, discover the type of speech appropriate to each nature, and order and arrange your discourse accordingly, addressing a variegated soul in a variegated style that ranges over the whole gamut of tones, and a simple soul in a simple style” (277c, CDP 523).

One might see this progression in Plato’s allegory of the cave in a movement from a bodily existence whose knowledge is compared to the sight of shadows on a wall, to a soulish existence whose light is represented by a humanly generated fire, and finally to a spiritual existence whose light is represented by the sun (Republic 7.514a–520e, CDP 747–52). And one might see the same progression in the Symposium in Diotima’s description of the different ways men seek immortality—through the body (procreation), through the soul (social institutions and one’s place in community), and through the spirit (the self alone before God; 206e–212a, CDP 558–63). More important, the body, soul, and spirit relationship in this tradition does not imply a fixed self but rather makes possible different phenomenologies, some oriented toward the body, some toward soul, and some toward spirit. These phenomenologies give rise to potentially conflicting hermeneutics that in Origen become distinct markers of one’s spiritual development. Origen associates literal or obvious interpretations with the body and spiritual interpretations with spirit, placing between them a soulish interpretation.27
Kierkegaard appropriated this model, with all of its assumptions, starting with the two parts of *Either/Or* and its two basic personality types, the Socratic-ethical and the Romantic-aesthetic. As he proceeded through his career, he published his best-known philosophical works under pseudonyms representing a variety of personality types and points of view, each author quoting, engaging, and exceeding the next. Kierkegaard’s model of existential development begins when the author of *Either/Or I*, an aesthetic personality identified only as “A” within the text, suggests a developmental pattern within aesthetic personalities in an essay titled “The Immediate Erotic Stages.” Clearly influenced by Hegelian and other German Idealist models, this essay divides the aesthetic sphere of existence into “immediate” and “reflective” poles, developing the characteristics of each pole in some detail. “A’s” reader, the ethical personality “B,” or Judge William, “reads” “A’s” work and, in true Hegelian fashion, “goes beyond” him. *Either/Or II* is his response, in which he argues that there is something more than the aesthetic: the ethical. The ethical contains the aesthetic but is higher than it, as the judge argues for the aesthetic validity of an ethical relationship: marriage. Following a pattern derived from Hegel’s *Science of Logic* (*Wissenschaft der Logik*, 1812–16), the judge sees the ethical as a synthesis comprising the “negation of the first immediate,” which in this case is the aesthetic.

Sometime the following year, Vigilius Haufniensis “read” *Either/Or I* and *II*, like many other Copenhagen intellectuals, and felt the need to explain how a transition from the innocence of the aesthetic sphere to the guilt consciousness of the ethical sphere is possible, casting the question in terms of a theological reflection upon the sinlessness of Adam and Eve and their subsequent fall, suggesting a psychological answer for this dilemma. He “writes” *The Concept of Anxiety* in response and “publishes” it in 1844. Kierkegaard’s Johannes Climacus, encompassing the insights of “A,” “B,” and Haufniensis in his reconsideration of his own previous (pseudonymous) work, *Philosophical Fragments*, completes the work they began in his own *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* by adding a religious sphere, which he divides into religiousness A and B. In addition to this pseudonymous activity, Kierkegaard published other works bearing his signature at the same time, so that his major philosophical works and his signed religious works comprise a vast dialogue among his pseudonymous authors in which he himself is engaged. This dialogue also illustrates his debt to Hegel, for each author synthesizes the insights of the previous ones into a new thesis.

Kierkegaard’s use of a Hegelian model, combined with his attention to classical thought, leads his major philosophical works to present a series of developmental stages consisting of sequential differentiations of the self from its natural environment (or bodily existence), its social environment (“the crowd,” or ethical existence), and then facets of its mental environment produced by the first two. Kierkegaard calls these stages the aesthetic, the ethical (like Schiller), and the religious. Religiousness A is the subjectivity of
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allegory, seeing through nature to the infinite beyond it, while religiousness B is an anagogical subjectivity, or a self that stands alone before the Divine. These are existential stances, however, not simple classifications of religious thought or hermeneutic strategies: it is possible to identify oneself as a Christian in belief and upbringing but still be an aesthetic, ethical, or religiousness A personality.

The indebtedness of Blake to the Socratic-medieval tradition most clearly surfaces in his anagogical study of innocence and experience as states of the human soul. Blake’s notion of innocence corresponds to Kierkegaard’s aesthetic stage, as his innocent characters tend to have bodily and environmentally determined subjectivities, such as Thel. Blake’s experience corresponds to Kierkegaard’s ethical stage, as experienced characters have developed a social consciousness and an ethical ideal and have subsequently become bitter, as is the case with Blake’s chimney sweep of The Songs of Experience. Blake’s visionary subjectivity compares well to features of Kierkegaard’s religiousness A and B, though primarily A: when Blake sees the world in a grain of sand, he reveals a religiousness A subjectivity. To illustrate better how important the classical tradition was to Blake’s thought, I will examine the complex profile Plato’s works have in Blake’s authorship through his direct statements about them, recalling also that in Origen hermeneutic strategies were closely linked to spiritual maturation and personality development.

At times, Blake seems to validate Platonic idealism with few qualifications, as in “A Vision of the Last Judgment,” which presents an explicit condemnation of nature as well as Blake’s strongest affirmation of idealism: “This World <of Imagination> is Infinite & Eternal whereas the world of Generation or Vegetation is Finite & [for a small moment] Temporal There Exist in that Eternal World the Permanent Realities of Every Thing which we see reflected in this Vegetable Glass of Nature.” It is very easy to read a Platonic idealism into these words: everything has a dual existence, one in the world of imaginative vision and the other in the world of generation in which all living things experience birth, growth, death, and decay. The “Eternal Image & Individuality” of a living thing never dies while its physical form does, requiring that imagination or vision serve as the capacities by which the artist sees everything in its eternal form. In addition to his affinities with idealist thought, Blake seems to validate Plato’s use of dialogue in his letter to the Rev. John Trusler of August 23, 1799, saying, “The wisest of the Ancients considered what is not too Explicit as the fittest for Instruction because it rouses the faculties to act. I name Moses Solomon Esop Homer Plato.” Like Plato, Blake is not so much concerned with a simple presentation of the truth as he is with rousing his readers to apprehend the truth for themselves after doing the work of reflection.

Blake’s mythology often takes the form of a series of narrative dialogues among subjectivities representative of components of human personality, so it has a great deal in common with both Plato’s method as explained
in the Seventh Letter and Kierkegaard’s indirect communication, described above. *The Book of Thel*, *The Marriage of Heaven and Hell*, *Visions of the Daughters of Albion*, *The Four Zoas*, *Milton a Poem*, and *Jerusalem* could be described as primarily dialogic works in that a significant proportion of their content depicts characters engaged in self-defining dialogue with one another. *America a Prophecy* and *Europe a Prophecy* might be viewed as mixed narrative and dialogic works, while *The [First] Book of Urizen*, *The Song of Los*, *The Book of Los*, and other prophecies might be considered primarily narrative mythologies. Even in these cases, however, a single speaker often ejaculates a cry of suffering or domination. *The Songs of Innocence and of Experience* at times take on a dialogic nature, “The Tyger” and possibly “The Fly” responding to “The Lamb,” “The Blossom” possibly being answered by “The Sick Rose,” in addition to the presence of both innocence and experience versions of the poems “Holy Thursday” and “The Chimney Sweeper.”

As S. Foster Damon explains, Blake organizes his mythology around a fourfold view of the human person: “Blake identified [the four Zoas] with the four fundamental aspects of man: his body (Tharmas—west); his reason (Urizen—south); his emotions (Luvah—east); and his imagination (Urthona—north).”32 Blake’s divisions represent body, soul, and spirit, emphasizing soul as emotion (on the east-west axis with body) and spirit as reason and imagination (occupying the north-south axis), mirroring the fourfold hermeneutic of the medieval period. In his letter of July 6, 1803, to Thomas Butts, Blake seems to identify his allegorizing with Plato’s, saying (probably) of *Jerusalem* that he considers “it as the Grandest Poem that This World Contains. Allegory addressed to the Intellectual powers while it is altogether hidden from the Corporeal Understanding is My Definition of the Most Sublime Poetry. it [sic] is also somewhat in the same manner defind by Plato.”33 Blake qualifies his identification with allegory in Plato with the words “somewhat in the same manner,” which signals ambivalence toward Plato. Blake feels that his allegory shares some features in common with Plato’s, but he does not want to identify the mode of his work with Plato’s either.

Blake, like Kierkegaard, emphasizes that Platonic knowledge is recollection and considers this knowledge inferior to the Christian or prophetic mode, so that both he and Kierkegaard are simultaneously attracted to but disagree with Plato. For example, in “A Vision of the Last Judgment,” Blake explicitly critiques Platonic allegory, associating the “Hebrew Bible & the Gospel of Jesus” with “Eternal Vision or Imagination of All that Exists,” while associating Greek literature with an inferior “Fable or Allegory” that is really the product of memory.34 Plato is particularly and repeatedly condemned for his rejection of poets and prophets and his support of the “Moral Virtues.”35 Blake juxtaposes Platonic idealism against apocalyptic convention in the vein of Ezekiel and Revelation, clearly and consistently associating himself with the latter in “A Vision of the Last Judgment” and elsewhere.
A pattern therefore emerges of a mixed or ambivalent vision of Socrates in both Blake and Kierkegaard. Blake’s view of Socrates and Plato’s works see them both as sublime allegory and as inferior to Christian revelation at the same time. Barnett similarly describes Kierkegaard’s view of Socrates, specifically as it was influenced by Johann Georg Hamann (who was in turn influenced by Zinzendorf): “As ‘the greatest humorist in the world,’ Hamann brings Socratic irony to the point where it touches, but does not cross into, Christianity. Thus his efforts are commendable, even essential, but not ultimate.” The very works in which Kierkegaard is most engaged in his philosophic project constitute his poetic, but not Christian, authorship. This ambivalence toward Socrates closely follows the patterns of Kierkegaardian anxiety.

Conclusion: Anxiety and Literary Form

I should begin this section with further consideration of Plato’s own ambivalence about literature, including his famous expulsion of poets from his ideal republic, especially Homer. Mirroring the concern of scholars over the relationship of Kierkegaard to his pseudonymous writings, one recurring question in scholarship on Plato concerns the relationship between Plato and his works. The literary form of Plato’s dialogues complicates this question for contemporary scholarship in philosophy because the dialogues distribute different conceptual possibilities among different characters and, especially in the early dialogues, often leave questions unresolved. This structure makes it difficult to identify any given concept in Plato’s dialogues with Plato’s own position. Kierkegaard’s reading of Plato and of the figure of Socrates in The Concept of Irony and Vigilius Haufniensis’s commentary in The Concept of Anxiety, for example, assume that while the dialogues present a range of conceptual options they also present, intentionally or not, a range of phenomenologies associated with those conceptual structures, so that a dialogue not only articulates ideas but creates the kinds of character who would assert them. Philosophy in literary form, such as Plato’s and Kierkegaard’s, works out individual existential and phenomenological struggles, modeling these struggles for its readers, who, as they read along, engage in these struggles themselves. Debates about the specific philosophical concepts that are the presumed reasons for the dialogue are the stage upon which existential struggle occurs.

Richard Kraut describes Plato’s relationship to his own works in his introduction to the Cambridge Companion to Plato in terms of two possibilities: first, Plato wanted to obscure what he believed in order to get readers to think for themselves; second, he used the dialogues to express his own beliefs, which are voiced by Socrates or other interlocutors. This question can serve as a starting point for a historicized reading of Plato, as Kraut’s arguments
fail to consider a third possibility developed within the Seventh Letter and implied by the dialogues themselves. Readers of Plato who assume that the point of a dialogue is to work out a conceptual problem will ignore that in Plato’s works acquiring truth is an activity of the soul, not just of the mind. While this claim may seem like another way of stating Kraut’s first possibility, for Plato the word “soul” was not merely a metaphor, so that to understand his relationship to his works and to his own philosophy we need to take seriously his developmental model, which is based upon his tripartite view of the self, described above.

Members of Plato’s own family were part of the oligarchy that briefly suspended Athenian democracy in 404 B.C.E. at the end of the Peloponnesian Wars. Reliance on democratic governance during times of war can be frightening. When the Athenian city-state under a democracy expressed a political will or committed to a course of action, it subjected each decision, including every court case, to the governing body or to a section of it that had to be convinced of the best decision in any given situation. Oratory skills therefore grew in importance under Athenian democracy, and with them the importance of language generally. In the case of Socrates, the effectiveness of oratory was literally a matter of life and death. Within this context, how might Plato be positioned in relation to his works? His Republic, a later dialogue that many scholars believe employs Socrates as a mouthpiece for Plato’s ideas, advocates for an oligarchy in which leaders, who are called “guardians,” are divested of self-interest in their governing. They are not allowed to own land, possess wealth, or even have children or families of their own, as children among the ruling class are communally raised with no clear identification of paternity. Leaders who possess great wealth and a lineage, in Socrates’s opinion, resemble statues with purple eyes: purple may well be the most beautiful color, but as an eye color it is grotesque (Republic 4). Plato’s Socrates has rejected democracy but has divested his oligarchy of self-interest, so that these new rulers may be philosopher-kings guided by reason in their pursuit of the interests of the state. Socrates’s goal for his ideal republic is the attainment of the most beautiful form of the state, one in which the whole should be made harmonious and beautiful rather than just a part, so that the state is one rather than divided into the rich and the poor.

It is not difficult to read these passages in Republic against the background of Plato’s life, however speculative that activity may be. He could be read as defending the principle of oligarchy while establishing the conditions necessary for it to work. But the most important emphasis of Republic is not the efficacy or implementation of such a government; it is the educational emphasis of Socrates’s ideal republic and the desired outcomes of that educational emphasis: “Neither could men who are uneducated and inexperienced in truth ever adequately preside over a state” (Republic 7.519b–c, CDP 751). This passage follows the allegory of the cave, which is the primary educational allegory in the Platonic corpus and which describes education in terms
of different existential orientations, each one creating a different kind of soul. In this light, the Socratic irony of Plato’s early dialogues, as well as the pronouncement about Socrates made by the oracle at Delphi, may be implicit critiques of democratic governance and of oratory only to be made explicit by the later dialogues: if Socrates alone is wise because he alone is aware of his ignorance, how can we trust the judgment of a democratic body? Plato’s concern for education, therefore, is implicated in his tripartite view of the self, and the two of them together are bound up in his conception of the ideal republic, all of which converge on his desire to ban poets from his ideal republic. All of these ideas seem to be heightened in importance because of the succession of two major wars and the stresses upon Athenian democracy caused by these wars.

But the place of literature itself in Athens must also be considered. To be educated during Plato’s lifetime was to be taught to read Homer, who was used as a source text for a variety of subjects, such as knowledge of the gods, of government, of war, and of history. Socrates’s complaints about Homer and the poets in Republic focus primarily on the bad behavior of Homer’s gods and heroes and on their management of emotions, but to Socrates the worst element of Homer’s presentation of the gods is its emphasis on feeling over reason. Socrates’s argument in Republic therefore criticizes the erotics of literature to replace them with rational instruction provided by philosophy, as Penelope Murray argues in Plato on Poetry. The philosopher’s progression toward death in Phaedo consists of an increasing separation from the body that has been carried out over the course of the philosopher’s entire life, while Crito effectively rejects public opinion as a valid repository of truth in favor of one’s own rational contemplation of the subject, so that between these two dialogues body and soul are rejected in favor of rational spirit as the basis of governance. The tripartite view of the soul, therefore, serves instrumental and political purposes in Plato’s works. It identifies differing elements of the individual in order to establish a hierarchy extensible to the organization of a polis: body, then soul (which can be defined as societally conditioned thought and feeling), should be subject to spirit (divine reason). Only philosophy finally disciplines the body and teaches its adherents to live above society to be guided only by divine light, and it is by means of this progression that persons attain full individuality. For that reason, only a community of philosophers who have subjected themselves to continual symbolic deaths in the form of the loss of possessions and of family can be trusted to govern, and only an educational system that places philosophy above literature can develop a worthy oligarchy.

Ion establishes the fundamental existential oppositions guiding reading practices in Plato against this background. Socrates closely cross-examines Ion in order to determine if Ion’s recitations proceed from skill, technē, or only from inspiration. The dialogue concludes that Ion does not know what he is doing, so he must be reciting Homer only under a kind of divine inspiration.
Albert Rijksbaron’s *Plato, “Ion,” or: On the “Iliad”* suggests that *Ion* was composed around the same time as *Republic*, that Plato did not anywhere express the possibility of a *technē* of poetry, and that he believed pursuing the origins of poetic inspiration was a waste of time. The real opposition here, I would argue, is between the possibility of a *technē* opposed to the erotics of poetry distributed across appetitive and rational responses to literature. If neither Socrates nor Plato desired to establish a *technē* of poetry, Aristotle’s *Poetics* filled that gap, suggesting uses for the erotics of literature that go beyond mere imitation into the management of emotions themselves: both aesthetically via catharsis and then, in book 2 of *Rhetoric*, instrumentally, as a tool for functioning effectively in a democracy.

Because Plato’s literary form, the dialogue, exists in a kind of tension or anxiety in relationship to literature itself, it should not be surprising that this anxiety is reflected in those influenced by his thought. Kierkegaardian anxiety involves a simultaneous attraction and repulsion to the same object without establishing fixed and opposite poles on a clearly defined spectrum. In Vigilius Haufniensis’s words, it is “a sympathetic antipathy and an antipathetic sympathy” (*SKS* 4:348 / *CA* 42, emphasis in original). Individuals experiencing Kierkegaardian anxiety face a simultaneous attraction to and repulsion from each element of the tension, feeling repulsion within their attraction and attraction within their repulsion, leaving them in a state of “psychological ambiguity” (*SKS* 4:348 / *CA* 42). In this case, the same Christian commitments that led each author to see himself as a type of Socrates standing in critique of a state church also caused him to distance himself from the figure of Socrates, who as a pre-Christian philosopher lacked visionary insight, in Blake’s terms, or the apostolic authority of revelation, in Kierkegaard’s.

Anxiety arises when no clear conception of how one’s life could be different is possible—when the change involves a leap into a complete unknown—so that this unknown future state is only a “possibility of possibility.” We should keep in mind that the context of Vigilius Haufniensis’s discussion of anxiety and its relationship to freedom in *The Concept of Anxiety* is a consideration of the psychology of the fall from innocence to experience, Adam and Eve serving both as ideal paradigms of innocence, being the only two human beings in the world with no examples of moral transgression before them yet illustrating the pattern that we all must follow. Anxiety, therefore, is a particularly heightened reaction to our ignorance of the future and of the changes the future may bring. Kierkegaard compared this feeling to the vertigo experienced while standing on the edge of an abyss. This dizziness forces decision as those experiencing it feel compelled to cling to an immediately available concrete option, something known and understood, thereby provoking a self-defining choice.

This self-defining choice in Blake’s and Kierkegaard’s respective cases began with the decision to pursue a Socratically defined task and then to choose an image of Socrates as the outsider within, one communicated to
them through their Moravian upbringing. Anxiety, in their cases, prompted them to grasp a concrete option in the guise of literary form. However, these choices were made against the backdrop of unknown possibility in the form of a new conception of the human brought to birth by the incursion of contemporary thought upon religious faith. In Blake’s case, hostile contemporary thought took the form of the mechanical philosophers—Bacon, Newton, and Locke—while in Kierkegaard’s case it took the form of Danish Hegelianism. So while contemporary philosophy became either speculative or mechanical, as did the human beings who followed it, Blake’s and Kierkegaard’s thought became humanly concrete.

Danish Hegelianism seems an unlikely phenomenological counterpart to the mechanical philosophy in England, as it has little directly in common with the empirical sciences. One scholar of Hegel asserts that Hegel’s very value lies in his critique of the mechanical philosophers, explaining that he believes “Hegel’s general criticism of philosophers such as Descartes, Leibniz or Locke to be powerful and insightful; this is one reason why we are Hegelians.” However, Blake’s and Kierkegaard’s critiques of the mechanical philosophers and the Hegelians, respectively, parallel one another by showing that each system provides seemingly transcendent constructs that remove the human being to a vantage point outside human existence. In their view, transcendent philosophies, whether empirical or speculative, attempt to circumvent anxiety by falsely positing the human observer as standing outside of existence as he or she views it in its entirety through the system.

So Kierkegaard’s Climacus feels compelled to assert that “existence itself is a system—for God, but it cannot be a system for any existing [existerende] spirit” (SKS 7:114 / CUP 1:118). Similarly, Blake’s mythological works react to the social and cultural contexts that he and Kierkegaard held in common by consistently assuming the monstrosity of the new human born from these interrelated tensions as well as the monstrosity and fallenness of the mythological creator of these constructs, Urizen. This assumption is in part Blake’s critique of Enlightenment conceptions of the human. In response to these tensions, both Blake and Kierkegaard appropriated models of personality derived, originally, from Plato’s writings in order to counteract the effects of the new philosophies upon their contemporaries’ understanding of what it meant to be a human being. Since the human being was their subject, so was the human being their object, so that their deeply philosophical responses to contemporary philosophical currents had to be expressed through characters engaged in dialogue, or literary in nature.

The influences of Plato’s works, the figure of Socrates, and Moravian religion upon both Blake and Kierkegaard are complex and perhaps overdetermined: each author was influenced directly by Plato as well as by other authors who were in turn influenced by Plato, just as each author was influenced by the Moravian movement along with a variety of other religious movements and perspectives, some of them contributing to or influenced by
Moravianism. However, their respective projects are simultaneously literary and philosophical, a philosophy presented in literary form. As literature, they involve dialogue among characters representative of human faculties and developmental stages. As philosophy, they participate in a philosophical tradition that emphasizes the growth of the soul through reflection leading to enlightenment. As religious authors, they were committed to the Moravian goal of reform, a call to a return to a primal Christianity that preexists and takes precedence over state-sponsored forms of Christianity, and one that specifically invokes the figure of Socrates as a critic and reformer, the outcast within our midst who speaks to us about ourselves, showing us the way both out of and back to ourselves. These intersecting tensions drew both authors to Socrates as a leading figure and repelled them from him at the same time, and their response to this anxiety was to grasp the concrete option of literary form itself. For that reason theirs is a literary philosophy and a philosophical literature. It examines how persons define themselves by their ideas rather than explaining persons by a system of ideas—while still confronting the humanly created artifact, whether literary or philosophical, in all of its danger and its allure.

Notes

2. See James Rovira, Blake and Kierkegaard: Creation and Anxiety (London: Continuum, 2010). I observe in that book’s first chapter that Blake and Kierkegaard share much in common in terms of their social, political, and intellectual histories. Tensions between and among monarchy and democracy, science and religion, and nature and artifice took much the same shape in each author’s respective countries, particularly during their most productive and creative periods. These competing sociocultural elements are fairly commonplace to anyone familiar with the period, but in my bringing together of Blake and Kierkegaard they serve the function of gridlines on a playing field, defining the space within which the action takes place. The action, in this case, is psychological, and the space provided represents a range of self-defining options that provoke anxiety by their mere presence. Chapter 2 then describes each figure’s relationship to Plato, and chapter 3 their appropriation of his model of personality, extending those ideas into Blake’s and Kierkegaard’s similar critiques of generation in chapter 4. Blake’s critique of generation leads directly into creation anxiety in the figure of Enion in The Four Zoas, which in chapter 5’s analysis of The [First] Book of Urizen is grounded in the cultural tensions described in chapter 1 and explained as a manifestation of Kierkegaard’s concept of the demonic as found in The Concept of Anxiety. The book does not directly link Blake’s and Kierkegaard’s social and historical contexts to their Platonism, which is the work performed by this essay.
3. Zinzendorf’s full name has been variously rendered in English using Nicholas, Nicolas, Nicolaus, Nikolas, Ludwig, Louis, and Lewis. Many thanks to Eric Zolowski for his work tracking down the spelling in German sources, which
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will be the preferred spelling used throughout this paper. The spellings of Zinzen-
dorf’s name in quoted and in bibliographic material will, however, stay true to
source spelling.

Moravian Church, or the “Unitas Fratrum,” 3rd ed. (Bethlehem, Pa.: Times,
1901), 9.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., 8.
7. Ibid., 15.
8. Ibid., 21.
9. George Forell, ed. and trans., Nine Public Lectures on Important Subjects in
Religion Preached in Fetter Lane Chapel in London in the Year 1746 (Iowa City:
11. Bruce H. Kirmmse, “‘Out with It!’: The Modern Breakthrough, Kierke-
gaard and Denmark,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, ed. Alastair
Hannay and Gordon D. Marino (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press,
1998), 23.
12. Ibid.
13. Bruce. H. Kirmmse, Kierkegaard in Golden Age Denmark (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1990), 260.
14. Keri Davies and Marsha Keith Schuchard, “Recovering the Lost Moravian
Background of Blake’s Family,” Blake: An Illustrated Quarterly 38, no. 1 (2004):
36–43. Robert Rix’s William Blake and the Cultures of Radical Christianity also
provides a careful exploration of the influence of Blake’s Moravian origins upon
his later thought. His description of the difficulty in doing so is worth consider-
ing: “How much Moravianism did Blake’s mother pass on to her son? To answer
this question demands that we can distinguish between strict Moravianism,
the fluid mix of other religious believers who met at Fetter Lane and the more
intense manifestations of evangelical mainstreams” (11). Rix identifies parallels
between Moravianism and Blake’s work in an emphasis upon the “immediacy of
religious experience” leading to “a millennial time of peace and brotherhood”
(11). To these characteristics Rix adds Moravian appreciation for the arts, espe-
cially song, which was unique among Pietist movements. Earlier commentators
observed parallels between Blake’s poetry and Moravian hymns. See Robert
Rix, William Blake and the Cultures of Radical Christianity (Aldershot, U.K.:
Ashgate, 2007).
15. Davies and Schuchard, “Recovering the Lost Moravian Background,” 38.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Marsha Keith Schuchard, William Blake’s Sexual Path to Spiritual Vision
(Rochester, Vt.: Inner Traditions, 2006), 28.
19. Abbreviated title for Nikolaus Ludwig (Graf von) Zinzendorf, Der Deutsche
Socrates, Das ist: Auffrichtige Anzeige verschiedener nicht so wohl Unbekannter
Anfänglich in der Königl. Residentz-Stadt Dreßden, Hernach aber, dem gesam-
ten lieben Vaterland teutscher Nation zu einer guten Nachricht nach und nach


22. Spangenberg, *The Life of Nicholas Louis Count Zinzendorf*, 62. Steffes, “Kierkegaard’s Socrates Sources” emphasizes the suppression of this text to the extent that he believes Kierkegaard was unlikely to have read it, but he does not provide any evidence of this suppression. Spangenberg’s account implies that only the third issue was suppressed and that Zinzendorf was able to publish the pamphlets freely after he stepped forward as the author. However, Spangenberg does indicate that Zinzendorf later feared retaliation against the community at Herrnhut because of the pamphlets.


25. A significant part of this section is drawn from Rovira, *Blake and Kierkegaard*. Used with permission. All quotations from the works of Plato are taken from CDP.


27. I would like to add at this point, however, that belief in a tripartite self was rejected no later than the late ninth century in the Eighth Ecumenical Council, Constantinople IV, a rejection reaffirmed by Aquinas in the *Summa Theologica*, who articulated what is Roman Catholic belief today, that the distinction between soul and spirit is an error proceeding from a misunderstanding. Nevertheless, a belief in a tripartite self persisted among some believers from Irenaeus to Erasmus and persists in minority Catholic opinion and among some Protestant groups.

Kierkegaard clearly believes in a tripartite self, as the opening pages of *The Sickness unto Death* make apparent, while Blake’s devils in *The Marriage of Heaven and Hell* sound very traditionally Roman Catholic in their beliefs about the soul. For example, where the modern Catechism asserts, “The unity of soul and body is so profound that one has to consider the soul to be the ‘form’ of the body; i.e., it is because of its spiritual soul that the body made of matter becomes a living, human body; spirit and matter, in man, are not two natures united, but rather their union forms a single nature” (par. 365), Blake’s Devil similarly asserts, “Man has no Body distinct from his Soul for that calld Body is a portion of Soul discerned
by the five Senses. the chief inlets of Soul in this age.” The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, pl. 4, in William Blake, The Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake, new and rev. ed., ed. David V. Erdman, commentary by Harold Bloom (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 34. All quotations from Blake’s works hereafter are taken from this edition, which reproduces the idiosyncrasies of Blake’s spelling and punctuation exactly. Erdman’s practice continues to be conventional in Blake studies. Quotations here will do the same without comment. Erdman represented textual variants within Blake’s works with the following conventions: “Italics within square brackets [thus] indicate words or letters deleted or erased or written over. Matter in Roman type within square brackets [thus] is supplied by the editor. Angle brackets <thus> enclose words or letters written to replace deletions, or as additions, not including words written immediately following and in the same ink or pencil as deleted matter” (xxiv).

Remnants of belief in a tripartite self persist, however, in Aquinas’s hermeneutic, which reveal elements of Origen’s description of interpretation based upon the body, soul, or spirit of Scripture. Aquinas divides the senses of Scripture into two broad categories, the literal and the spiritual, and then divides the spiritual into the allegorical, moral, and anagogical senses. Origen would locate the allegorical and anagogical senses in the spiritual and associate the moral with the soul. Aquinas validated a similarly tripartite approach to hermeneutics as a legitimate alternative, identifying it with Hugh of St. Victor.

28. For another recent discussion of Plato’s influence on Blake in addition to my own, see Laura Quinney, William Blake on Self and Soul (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009).

30. Ibid.
31. Ibid., 7.
33. Blake, Complete Poetry and Prose, 730. Susanne M. Sklar’s Blake’s “Jerusalem” as Visionary Theatre: Entering the Divine Body, Oxford Theological Monographs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) identifies Blake’s notion of a sublime allegory with “the way of reading described by St. Augustine, who enjoins us to read Scripture on four levels: the literal, the allegorical, the moral, and the anagogical” (41).
34. Blake, Complete Poetry and Prose, 554.
35. Ibid., 664.