The Fabulous Future?

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For my money, the most penetrating insight into the future of religion in twenty-first-century America came from a Canadian scholar writing about South Asia in the 1940s. Wilfred Cantwell Smith was teaching at a Christian missionary college in Lahore (then a part of an undivided India under British rule, now located in Pakistan) and one day woke up to a realization both remarkable and obvious: most of his faculty colleagues were Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims, as were the majority of his students. For Cantwell Smith, both a committed Presbyterian and a budding scholar of comparative religions, it was an observation that set off a series of questions. How might frequent and intense interaction between people of various faiths impact everything from the religious identities of individuals to the theologies of religious traditions to the self-understanding and social cohesion of increasingly religiously diverse societies?

Such questions were underscored by the larger context in which Cantwell Smith lived. After all, it was not just the microenvironment of that missionary college in Lahore that was religiously diverse; the entire subcontinent was roiling with religious energies. Gandhi’s Hindu-based satyagraha movement was poised to liberate India. Jinnah’s push for a
separate state for Muslims was gaining steam. Chapters of inspiring inter-religious cooperation alternated regularly with spasms of religiously motivated slaughter. The worst of the violence took place at the time of partition, when a million people murdered one another in hand-to-hand combat, most of them Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims, members of the very same communities teaching and studying together in Cantwell Smith’s college.

One of the most interesting parts of Cantwell Smith’s essay is the section he includes on the cities of North America. From his perch amid the diversity of 1940s Lahore, he couldn’t help but see Louisville and Los Angeles as an “oversimplified religious society . . . partial and unrepresentative.”1 He cautioned that they would not remain so for long. The seemingly exceptional diversity he was experiencing in the subcontinent would soon become the norm around the world. “The religious life of humankind from now on, if it is to be lived at all,” he wrote, “will be lived in a context of religious pluralism.”2

I thought of Cantwell Smith as I stood on the National Mall on a cold January day in 2009, listening to President Barack Obama declare in his first inaugural address:

For we know that our patchwork heritage is a strength, not a weakness. We are a nation of Christians and Muslims, Jews and Hindus, and non-believers. We are shaped by every language and culture, drawn from every end of this Earth . . . we cannot help but believe that the old hatreds shall someday pass; that the lines of tribe shall soon dissolve; that as the world grows smaller, our common humanity shall reveal itself; and that America must play its role in ushering in a new era of peace.3

The first African American president of the United States, staring out at the Lincoln Memorial as he addressed the nation and the world, chose to highlight the religious dimensions of the country’s diversity. He could have added to the list of American faith communities Sikhs, Jains, Buddhists, and practitioners of indigenous traditions. The United States has sizable communities of all of the above, and many more religious groups as well. In the words of Harvard scholar Diana Eck, the United States has gone from a Christian country to the most reli-
giously diverse nation in human history. Much of this change has occurred in the past fifty years and went largely unnoticed until the events of September 11, 2001.

Like Cantwell Smith’s Christian missionary college in Lahore, the United States is a relatively peaceful island in a world of clashing religious energies. Most certainly, faith-fueled violence has impacted these shores—9/11, Fort Hood, the Boston Marathon, the murderous rampage at the Oak Creek Gurudwara—but it is a far cry from the regular violence that marks daily life in countries like Iraq, Egypt, Afghanistan, Syria, and even Northern Ireland and India. Yet diaspora groups from all sides of those conflicts live here in the United States, and American foreign policy has a hand (and in some cases an army) involved in each of the countries above. Our religious diversity can become barriers of division, bubbles of isolation, bombs of destruction, or bridges of cooperation. This chapter explores what that broad religious diversity and intense interaction mean for the future of the United States. But before hazarding guesses about the quarter century ahead, I want to take a quick look back. The recent past presents the themes we ought to be exploring and the trend lines we should be watching. Good stuff, in other words, to argue about.

The 1950s and 1960s

One hallmark of the 1950s and 1960s was greater acceptance for Catholics and Jews in American life. The notion of America as a “Judeo-Christian” nation was a creation of this period. In 1948, 20 percent of Americans told pollsters they would not want a Jew for a neighbor. By 1959, that number had fallen to 2 percent. In 1960, the nation elected its first Catholic president in John F. Kennedy, and fears of the pope taking up residence in the White House did not come to pass. A central theme in Will Herberg’s 1955 book Protestant–Catholic–Jew, perhaps the era’s most influential work in the sociology of religion, was that the United States had become a nation of three religions, each viewed as equally American. It was a message reinforced by statements from President Eisenhower—“Whatever our individual church, whatever our personal creed, our common faith in God is a common bond among us”—and in national campaigns such as Brotherhood Week.
It was not just the nation adapting to diversity: the church was changing as well. The early 1960s saw the most important theological shifts in Catholicism in centuries. In the Second Vatican Council conferences that took place from 1962 to 1965, the Roman Catholic Church (influenced in no small part by the American Jesuit theologian John Courtney Murray) articulated clear support for religious freedom and highlighted its commonalities with other religious traditions. Georgetown scholar John W. O’Malley says that one of the main themes of Vatican II was reconciliation with other faiths: “For the first time, Catholics were encouraged to foster friendly relations with Orthodox and Protestant Christians, as well as Jews and Muslims, and even to pray with them. The council condemned all forms of anti-Semitism and insisted on respect for Judaism and Islam as Abrahamic faiths, like Christianity.”

Just as the United States was growing comfortable with understanding itself as a Judeo-Christian society, a whole new set of people were landing on these shores. The Immigration Act of 1965 opened America’s doors to immigrants from Asia, Africa, and Latin America. À la Cantwell Smith, Lahore was literally coming to Los Angeles and Louisville. The people who arrived brought with them not only their advanced degrees in medicine and engineering (the law had strong preferences for people trained in the applied sciences) but also such Eastern religions as Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism. It’s interesting to note that significant Catholic and Jewish immigration to the United States occurred largely in the mid-to-late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It took American society approximately eighty years to fully adapt its national identity from a Protestant country to a Judeo-Christian nation. We are now at about the fifty-year mark from the beginning of large-scale immigration of Muslims and communities outside of the Abrahamic traditions to the United States.

Religion played a prominent role in the era’s politics in its influence in the civil rights movement. African American churches were central organizing hubs for demonstrators, and African American preachers were the movement’s most important leaders. Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. once said: “I am many things to many people, but in the quiet recesses of my heart, I am fundamentally a clergyman, a Baptist preacher. This is my being and my heritage . . .”
The 1970s and 1980s

The 1950s was a high point for religiosity in the United States. Between 1950 and 1957, for example, weekly church attendance skyrocketed from 31 to 51 percent for young adults (in their twenties). Also in 1957, 69 percent of Americans told pollsters that “religion is increasing its influence on American life” and presumably saw it as a good thing.\(^7\) The crash came quickly. In 1962, the percentage of Americans who saw religion’s influence growing fell 24 percentage points from its high in 1957 to 45 percent. In 1965, it was 33 percent; in 1968 it was 18 percent; in 1969 and 1970 it was 14 percent.\(^8\) No doubt such statistical trends encouraged a set of scholars to advance secularization theory (the idea that as societies modernize, they necessarily become less religious) and justified *Time* magazine’s famous “Is God Dead?” cover in 1966.\(^9\)

American religiosity defied the predictions and made a comeback in the 1970s. The percentage of Americans who told pollsters that religion’s influence was growing jumped from the low of 14 percent in 1970 to 44 percent in 1976.\(^10\) That same year the United States elected its first avowedly “born-again” Christian president, Jimmy Carter.

Two forms of evangelical Christian religiosity grew prominent in the 1970s and 1980s. The first was the rise of “megachurches,” defined by sociologists as churches with more than two thousand members in average weekend attendance. The archetypal institutions of this movement include Willow Creek (founded in the suburbs of Chicago in 1975) and Saddleback (founded in the sprawl of Southern California in 1980). The second form that defined the religiosity comeback of the 1970s and 1980s was the rise of the religious right. The archetypal figures here are Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson. They also ran huge and highly effective organizations, but were both more overtly political and gleefully polarizing than their megachurch brethren. The religious right’s biggest victory was helping to bring Ronald Reagan to power in the 1980s. Jimmy Carter, though born-again, was not sharply enough to the right for them.

Megachurch Christians smiled and hugged while religious right Christians scowled and scolded, but both leaned the same way on key social and political issues, especially issues that revolved around the politics and practice of sex. In fact, as social scientists Robert Putnam and David Campbell convincingly show in *American Grace*, views on the practice
and politics of sexuality have been the key dividing line in American religion for the past half century.\textsuperscript{11} To put it somewhat crassly, a critical mass of young people rejected the traditional religious strictures around premarital sex in the 1960s and chose sleeping in each other’s beds on Saturday nights over sitting in the pews on Sunday morning. In the 1970s, the pews fought back, reasserting their views around traditional sexual practice in the broader culture. They were especially galvanized by the 1973 \textit{Roe v. Wade} ruling that legalized abortion, essentially angered into political action by their view that the Supreme Court was siding with the sexual libertines.

The prominence of sexual politics was the reason behind one of the most remarkable shifts in the socioreligious landscape in American history: the alignment of Catholics with evangelical Protestants. Evangelicals had long been the loudest anti-Catholic voices in the United States. In the election of 1960, even such mainstream evangelical preachers as Billy Graham overtly organized against Kennedy. Starting in the 1970s, evangelicals and Catholics (the largest two religious communities in the country) decided to put aside their differences and past prejudices and made common cause on everything from abortion to homosexuality to the “coarsening” (read: too much sex) of Hollywood movies and rock music. It is a fascinating example of how shifting politics can catalyze interesting new alignments.

As religion’s influence in American politics grew in this period, so did its role in world affairs more generally. Pope John Paul II galvanized the Solidarity movement in Poland. Archbishop Desmond Tutu played a key role in the struggle against apartheid in South Africa. The Mujahideen (with U.S. backing) ejected the Soviets from Afghanistan. And, most remarkably, a movement of religious zealots overthrew the Western-backed dictatorship of the Shah in Iran and installed their version of a Shia Muslim theocracy under Ayatollah Khomeini.

One of the hottest theories about religion in the 1980s is that it had become “privatized,” meaning essentially that faith might stay alive in people’s hearts and homes but would no longer play a role in politics or the public square. Like the secularization theories of the 1960s, the facts on the ground simply spoke louder than the books of the scholars. The bottom line was that religion refused to be quarantined. Instead, in various ways, it demanded to be heard, frequently with the sound of an explosion.
The 1990s to Now

Religion continued to play a powerful role in world affairs in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, most prominently in the form of violence and conflict. The Taliban, a totalitarian Muslim group, emerged from the post-Soviet civil war in Afghanistan to rule that nation, oppressing women and other Muslim groups along the way. One of their policies was to give shelter to the leadership of a global Muslim extremist movement called Al Qaeda, which, one year, nine months, and eleven days into the new century, changed the world in the most violent and vicious fashion. The attacks of 9/11 set in motion the American-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. They also made a clear statement about the continuing influence of religion in world affairs.

The international headlines of the past quarter century seem to be one long commercial for Samuel Huntington's clash-of-civilizations theory (first advanced in a 1993 *Foreign Affairs* article), which posited that violence rooted in religious identity would play a key role in the post–Cold War world order. Slobodan Milošević’s Serbian army, holding up three fingers (meant to signify the Trinity), ran roughshod over Muslim-majority areas in Bosnia in the early 1990s. In 1998, India elected the Hindu-nationalist BJP, which tested a nuclear device and named it “the Hindu bomb.” Pakistan responded with its own nuclear test, dubbed “the Muslim bomb.” Homegrown Christian terrorists have murdered people in dramatic fashion in the United States, most prominently at the Atlanta Olympics. The hope of the Oslo Accords for peace between Israelis and Palestinians dissolved in the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin and the disappointment at Camp David.

Some observers wondered whether there could be a clash of civilizations in the United States. Given the prevalence of Arabic prayer as the soundtrack to so much of the violence on the international news, the spotlight turned to Muslims in the United States. Was Islam—which Huntington famously said “had bloody borders”—a fifth column within the country? It was a question that many people were not too shy to ask. Conservative talk show host Glenn Beck’s opening line to his guest Keith Ellison, the first Muslim ever elected to the U.S. Congress, was, “Sir, prove to me that you are not working with our enemies.”
The concern around Muslims in the United States came to the fore when a prominent Sufi imam named Feisal Abdul Rauf tried to start a Muslim community center near New York City’s Ground Zero in 2010. Imam Rauf initially called the project Cordoba House, a name meant to evoke a Muslim civilization in medieval Andalusia marked by cooperation between different religions. He described it as a sort of Muslim YMCA with programs that would benefit the whole neighborhood. The growing U.S. anti-Muslim movement saw a ripe target. Imam Rauf and his supporters (of which I was one) found themselves under constant attack by claims that Cordoba House was intended as a victory mosque to honor the extremists of 9/11 and would be used as a terrorist command center. The “Ground Zero Mosque” story dominated the news that summer and became a prominent theme in many of the political races in 2010. Truth be told, the opposition won the battle. The grand designs for Cordoba House had to be shelved; its operations and programs went forward but are far more modest than originally hoped.

Partly as a result of controversies like the one surrounding Cordoba House and the rising prejudice against Muslims and other religious minorities in the United States (Sikhs have experienced vicious attacks, with the turbans observant Sikh men wear often mistaken as a symbol of Islam), mainstream civic and political institutions have started engaging religious diversity in the United States. One part of this engagement is examining the sources of prejudice. The Center for American Progress issued a report entitled Fear Inc., which revealed that the anti–Cordoba House movement was not so much spontaneous citizen activism as a network of well-funded organizations waiting for a ripe opportunity to marginalize Muslims. Another part is promoting religious pluralism as a central American value. As think tanks such as the Aspen Institute issued reports calling the religious diversity of the United States an important national resource, scholarly research on religious diversity grew, as did the number of interfaith nonprofit organizations, and the White House got involved by launching the President’s Interfaith and Community Service Campus Challenge, which engaged five hundred college campuses in interfaith action.

The other big theme of the last quarter century was the sexual abuse crisis in the Roman Catholic Church. Not only was priest after priest in country after country found to have molested children, but bishops the
world over were involved in covering up the scandal, reassigning accused priests to other parishes rather than referring them to the civil authorities. As might have been expected, the clerical abuse and cover-up crisis caused a drove of Catholics to leave the church. As people examined the exodus, they discovered that Catholics leaving the church was not just a recent trend, it was a consistent process that had been taking place since the 1960s. Since that time, 60 percent of white Catholics have either switched to another faith or lapsed. This means that roughly 10 percent of all Americans are former Catholics. Many of the pews abandoned by white Catholics have been filled by Latino Catholics, but even there the story is not all good for the church as an increasing number of Latinos convert to charismatic Protestant communities or become “religious nones.”

Catholics are not the only ones affected by decline. Roughly 60 percent of mainline Protestants have switched or lapsed since the 1960s. Unlike with Catholics, no new immigrant group is replacing the people who have left those Protestant churches. Jewish decline appears equally steep. While only 7 percent of “greatest generation” Jews (born between 1914 and 1927) call themselves “Jews of no religion,” 32 percent of millennial Jews (born after 1980) say that’s the case.

This growth in the category of “religious nones” is one of the most important religion stories of recent times. The number has risen in dramatic fashion in a brief period, from about 7 percent of the total American population in 1990 to about 20 percent today. Most alarming, one out of three eighteen- to twenty-nine-year-olds checks the “none” box on surveys of religion.

There is a tendency to conflate the increase in religious nones with the growth of “aggressive atheist” voices in public life, but the data do not bear out such a connection. For all the attention that writers such as Christopher Hitchens and Sam Harris have gotten in the past few years, their views represent a fairly small percentage of Americans as a whole, including the “nones.” In the United States, it turns out that two-thirds of our self-described nonreligious people believe in God and about one-fifth report praying on a daily basis. Some even go to church on occasion.

If a principled absence of religious belief does not explain the rise in the nones over the past quarter century, what does? Putnam and
Campbell again point to sex. As culturally conservative religion flexed its muscles in public life in the 1970s and 1980s, a whole new generation of young people responded by leaving the pews. If religion meant condemning homosexuality and refraining from premarital sex, they decided it was not for them.

The Future

If religion were a stock and you were the betting type in 1957, you would have probably bought. All signs pointed up. Ten years later, the last thing you would have wanted in your portfolio was religion. And so it goes in the volatile world of predicting religion. Sometimes the line goes straight and sometimes it zigzags. Before hazarding my guesses about the future, let me say that I’m a moderately progressive American Muslim who has a doctorate in the sociology of religion and runs an interfaith organization that works largely in higher education. I’m also an optimist. No doubt my predictions are colored by those various lenses.

As I said at the beginning of this chapter, I think the most important theme in American religion is wider religious diversity and more frequent interaction between people who orient around religion differently, including the nones. That diversity can take four major forms: bubbles of isolation, barriers of division, bombs of destruction, or bridges of cooperation.

I believe that in 2040 American religious diversity will be defined largely by bridges of cooperation. I also believe this will be fairly unique in the world. The reason for this is that the most organized groups in the large number of new democracies across the world (which includes not only majority-Muslim countries such as Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan but also countries such as Myanmar, where the Muslim minority faces violence from an extremist Buddhist movement) are organized along ethno-religious fault lines (Sunni/Shia/Kurd in Iraq, secular versus Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt). The battle for the levers of government in these countries is unlikely to be entirely peaceful for a long, long time. Whether another Osama bin Laden will emerge and build an Al Qaeda–like global network that tilts the axis of world affairs is not beyond the scope of possibility, but the fact that governments are now on the lookout for such a group makes it somewhat less likely.
Religious Diversity in the United States

I believe that by 2040 the United States will proudly view itself as an interfaith country, much the way we take pride in our multiculturalism today. History is a useful guide here. A century ago, the United States was both profoundly antisemitic and anti-Catholic. Today, Catholics and Jews are among the most favorably viewed religious communities in the country.

I think the same forces that propelled Catholics and Jews into the American mainstream are at work with newer religious minorities such as Muslims. The first is a growing interfaith movement in civil society. In the early twentieth century, organizations such as the National Conference on Christians and Jews (NCCJ) ran programs and campaigns that helped create both the civic fabric and the public consciousness of the United States as a “Judeo-Christian” nation. The NCCJ emerged in large part to fight the anti-Catholic forces that came to the fore against Al Smith in the 1928 presidential campaign. As religious prejudice has grown in recent years, a twenty-first-century version of this movement is doing the same for the nation’s wider religious diversity. The general pattern in American history is that the forces of prejudice strike first and win a few battles, and then the forces of pluralism go into action and win the war. We are already seeing this pattern emerge once again.

Since the events of September 11, there has been a dramatic growth in interfaith activities and organizations. Generally speaking, there is little quality control or sense of focus regarding these activities. That will change in the next twenty-five years. Civic sectors focused on education, public health, and poverty alleviation have been transformed by the scientific use of data and the application of management techniques. As interfaith becomes a thriving sector, it will have to employ the same approaches—naming what it hopes to achieve and showing progress toward specific goals.

The second force at work propelling Muslims into the American mainstream is the national narrative about integrating newcomers into the American fabric, welcoming their contributions and appreciating their differences. We take pride in the motto *E Pluribus Unum*—out of many, one. This narrative is deeply woven into the American psyche and has practical consequences. Think of the way Barack Obama ran his first
presidential campaign. Ralph Ellison aptly captured this arc in the following way: “The irrepressible movement of American culture towards integration of its most diverse elements continues, confounding the circumlocutions of its staunchest opponents.”

The final force at work is the Americanization of religious minority groups. I mean this entirely positively, and I see it happening with Muslims in the United States in real time. When Muslims from South Asia and the Middle East started immigrating in the 1960s and 1970s, they largely balkanized along different ethnic, national, and theological lines (different mosques for different groups) and sought to bubble themselves off from American culture, just as recently immigrated Jews and Catholics did in their day.

And similar to the second and third generations of those communities, American Muslims are going from an attitude of balkanization to a “big tent” mentality and from trying to bubble themselves off from the culture to building bridges to the broader society. There might still be separate mosques for the first generation, but the children of Shias from Iran and Sunnis from Egypt pray together in the same campus Muslim student associations and, generally speaking, have two words for each other: fellow Muslims. Moreover, even as they were raised with stories (hugely mythologized) of their parents’ homelands, they cannot help but view the United States as the country where they will raise families and make careers, and so they begin to set about not only wholeheartedly building their lives here but also shaping their nation. We see this process at work with the impressive growth in an American Muslim civil sector, with organizations such as the Inner City Muslim Action Network in Chicago proudly declaring its Muslim inspiration to serve all. This process is accelerated by the fact that the most important scholars in American Islam are emphatic that it is a Muslim duty to enrich the society in which you live rather than focusing only on what is happening “back home.”

Religion, Sex, and Politics

The headlines of the day suggest the continued intersection of sexual politics and religion, especially with respect to gay marriage and contraception. This intersection has been hugely divisive and is the primary reason
for the exodus of young people from religious communities over the past twenty-five years. This is one key reason that I don’t believe sexual issues will dominate religion’s role in politics in the next quarter century. Many of the older people who oppose gay marriage now simply will not be around. Those who are will find that they have a gay grandson or granddaughter whose wedding they would like to attend. My guess is they will go, party like rock stars, and change their minds about homosexuality.

I believe that in 2040 the big issues on which religious communities will carve out a major role will be climate change and poverty alleviation. I think there are several reasons for this. The first is that climate change and poverty alleviation touch on deep-rooted values across religious traditions (stewardship and justice, to name two), and in a quarter century they will be genuine social crises on which religious communities will have a powerful opportunity to cooperate and unique standing on which to speak.

The best recent example of this involvement is Pope Francis. The approach he’s carved out early in his papacy is the road that most American religious communities will be taking in a quarter century. In his own words, “it is not necessary to talk of these things [abortion, contraception] all the time.”20 He famously likened the church to a field hospital and said that when a doctor treats someone on the battlefield, it’s not the patient’s cholesterol level that is the doctor’s primary concern. Right now, religious communities are the walking wounded, and if they hope to thrive in the next quarter century, they will choose to emphasize matters of cosmic significance (as climate change and inequality are) without being flagrantly divisive, either between generations or between religions.

I think there is a larger lesson to the positive attention Pope Francis has received: religious figures still have remarkable power. If an ordinary person is asked how he or she feels about gay people and responds by saying, “Who am I to judge?” it is entirely forgettable. When a major religious leader says the same thing, it makes headlines for months. When a home health care aide washes the feet of his or her patients and the aide and the patient happen to be of different religions, it’s just a part of the job. When a pope washes people’s feet and two of those people happen to be Muslim, it changes the atmosphere between huge communities. There is a deep hunger, in the United States especially, for religious figures who lift people up.
The Religious Nones

Will Pope Francis or anyone else shift what is probably the single largest religious phenomenon in the United States—namely, the blasé attitude toward faith communities? Religious innovators in the form of mega-church pastors such as Bill Hybels of Willow Creek and Rick Warren of Saddleback emerged in the 1970s to recapture some of the religious none of their era. I’m confident that the tradition of American religious innovation will continue, and new leaders and institutions will emerge to bring some of the none back into various religious folds. However excellent these leaders may be, they will be battling the broader cultural wind. The growth of individualism, the continual erosion of confidence in institutional structures, the delaying of adulthood markers (such as marriage) associated with churchgoing, the ease with which one can sit in bed and get what one wants with the touch of a button (and soon, when Google Glass becomes standard, with the twitch of an eye) makes any kind of community that asks things of its members hard to form and maintain. My own guess is that, like today, there will be a lot of churn—switching between religious communities, leaving for a while and then going back, and so on. The upshot is that the number of none will remain largely the same twenty-five years from now—20 percent of Americans as a whole, 33 percent of younger people.

Frankly, this keeps me up at night, not out of concern for the souls of the none (I believe God’s mercy and welcome are wider than we can ever imagine) or the moral character of the nation (I’ve met enough religious jerks to know that belief in God does not necessarily make a good person) but for the future of American social capital. In American Grace, Putnam and Campbell find that people involved in faith communities give money and volunteer time more frequently, to more places and in larger quantities, than their secular counterparts do. And they don’t just direct their energies toward their own faith communities but also to secular causes that benefit a broad range of people. In fact, at least half of American social capital—our volunteerism, our philanthropy, our civic institutions from hospitals to social service agencies—is related to religious communities. We take for granted the crucial role they play in our nation. As religious communities lose members and vitality, there seems no way of avoiding an adverse impact on civil society.
Notes

2. Ibid.
8. Ibid., chapter 3.
9. Ibid., 95.
10. Ibid., 100.
11. Ibid., chapter 4.
15. Ibid., 141.
18. Ibid.