CHAPTER 1

1. For good treatments of the capacities of special forces that at the same time do not overstate their realistic roles or falsely imply the obsolescence of major combat units, see Phillip Lohaus, *A Precarious Balance: Preserving the Right Mix of Conventional and Special Operations Forces* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 2015); and Brian S. Petit, *Going Big by Getting Small: The Application of Operational Art by Special Operations in Phase Zero* (Denver, Colo.: Outskirts Press, 2013).


10. John Quincy Adams, address to the U.S. House of Representatives, July 4, 1821.


42. See Micah Zenko, *Between Threats and War: U.S. Discrete Military Operations in the Post–Cold War World* (Stanford University Press, 2010); and Derek
Chollet and James Goldgeier, *America between the Wars: The Misunderstood Years between the Fall of the Berlin Wall and the Start of the War on Terror* (New York: Public Affairs, 2008).


46. For two very good treatments of this subject, see Krepinevich, “From Cavalry to Computer”; and Boot, *War Made New*.


52. For a similar view, see David W. Barno and Nora Bensahel, “New Challenges for the U.S. Army,” in *American Grand Strategy and the Future of U.S.*


55. Posen, Restraint, pp. 135–75.


57. See, for example, Chollet and Goldgeier, America between the Wars, pp. 7–8.

58. See, for example, Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens, Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2002); and Adekeye Adebajo, U.N. Peacekeeping in Africa: From the Suez Crisis to the Sudan Conflicts (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2011).


65. On some of these possibilities, see Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton University Press, 1976).


68. Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict (Cambridge University Press, 2004); and Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild,
Notes to Pages 26–27

and Elizabeth M. Cousens, eds., Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2002).


78. See, for example, John M. Owen IV, Liberal Peace, Liberal War: American Politics and International Security (Cornell University Press, 1997); Shadi Hamid, Temptations of Power: Islamists and Illiberal Democracy in a New
Notes to Pages 28–29


85. On these issues, see, for example John D. Steinbruner, Principles of Global Security (Brookings, 2000); Bruce Jones, Carlos Pascual, and Stephen

86. For example, Richard Betts of Columbia (and a number of others) argued strongly against NATO expansion in the 1990s on the ground that it could isolate, embitter, and provoke Russia—though few if any of those scholars have gone so far as to assert that the U.S./NATO decisions of that era provided a legitimate rationale for Vladimir Putin to act as he did in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine in 2014. See Richard K. Betts, *American Force: Dangers, Delusions, and Dilemmas in National Security* (Columbia University Press, 2012), pp. 189–98. More recently, Barry Posen has argued that U.S. alliance commitments, generally viewed as stabilizing because they help reassure many countries that might otherwise build up large militaries or acquire nuclear weapons to ensure their security, may embolden some of these countries to behave more assertively and thus more dangerously than they otherwise would. But his main concern is that the United States pays excessive costs because of primacy, not that the world has become fundamentally more dangerous as a result of U.S. actions. See Posen, *Restraint*. See also Campbell Craig, Benjamin H. Friedman, Brendan Rittenhouse Green, and Justin Logan, as well as Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth, “Correspondence—Debating American Engagement: The Future of U.S. Grand Strategy,” *International Security* 38, no. 2 (Fall 2013): 181–99.


**CHAPTER 2**


2. On Chechnya, see, for example, Carlotta Gall and Thomas de Waal, *Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus* (New York University Press, 1998).


6. For a similar argument about the importance of the passage of time in Russia, though one written before the crises of 2014, see Jeffrey Mankoff, “Russia, the Post-Soviet Space, and Challenges to U.S. Policy,” in *The Policy World Meets Academia: Designing U.S. Policy toward Russia*, edited by Timothy Colton, Timothy Frye, and Robert Legvold (Cambridge, Mass.: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2010), p. 49.


10. Robert Legvold, “Russian Foreign Policy During Periods of Great State Transformation,” in *Russian Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century and the*
Notes to Pages 47–52


17. For a good depiction of how Communist threats influenced U.S. policy toward the Philippines during the cold war, see Stephen J. Solarz, Journeys to War and Peace: A Congressional Memoir (Brandeis University Press, 2011), pp. 112–29.


30. Swaine indicates that as a matter of official policy, the scope of “core interests” as applied to territory has been limited. A close examination of the historical record, along with personal conversations with knowledgeable senior U.S. officials, confirms that at least through the time of Swaine’s writing, the Chinese government has officially, and repeatedly, identified only three closely related issues as specific core interests: the defense of China’s sovereignty claims regarding Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang. See Swaine, “China’s Assertive Behavior.” See also Dingding Chen and Jianwei Wang, “Lying Low No More? China’s New Thinking on the Tao Guang Yang Hui Strategy,” China: An International Journal 9, no. 2 (September 2011), available at http://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/china/v009/9.2.chen.html; Andrew Scobell, China and Strategic Culture (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002), p. 11; Kenneth D. Johnson, China’s Strategic Culture: A Perspective for the United States (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009), p. 10; and Thomas J. Christensen, “Chinese Realpolitik,” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 5 (September/October 1996), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/52434/thomas-j-christensen/chinese-realpolitik-reading-beijings-world-view.


Notes to Pages 63–66


Notes to Pages 69–71


105. See Messner and others, *Fragile States Index 2014*.


124. See Ted Piccone and Harold Trinkunas, “The Cuba-Venezuela Alliance: The Beginning of the End?” (Brookings, Latin America Initiative, June


128. See, for example, Diana Villiers Negroponte, ed., *The End of Nostalgia: Mexico Confronts the Challenges of Global Competition* (Brookings, 2013).


130. See, for example, Paul Griffith Garland, *A Businessman’s Introduction to Brazilian Law and Practice* (New York: Chase Manhattan, 1966).


**CHAPTER 3**


4. See, for example, Michael O’Hanlon and Jeremy Shapiro, “Crafting a Win-Win-Win for Russia, Ukraine, and the West,” *Washington Post*, December
Notes to Pages 82–85


5. For intriguing thinking along these lines, see Richard H. Ullman, Securing Europe (Princeton University Press, 1991).

6. For a related discussion of the difficulty of using nuclear threats or attacks to roll back aggression, this time in a cold war context, see Richard K. Betts, Surprise Attack (Brookings, 1982), pp. 244–45.

7. See, for example, McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Vintage Books, 1988), pp. 236–70.


9. Treaty commitments themselves have been shown to have a powerful deterrent effect, but forces permanently stationed on land contribute significantly as well. See, for example, Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Brookings, 1978), pp. 525–30.


15. On the importance of meeting this standard against a credible threat, see John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Cornell University Press, 1983).


26. See, for example, Christopher J. Bowie, The Anti-Access Threat and Theater Air Bases (Washington: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2002); and Michael J. Lostumbo and others, Overseas Basing of U.S. Military Forces: An Assessment of Relative Costs and Strategic Benefits (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2013).

27. Dupuy, Attrition.

28. For more on these various factors, see Dupuy, Attrition, pp. 146–52; see also Betts, Surprise Attack, pp. 3–8.


44. Comments by Professor Andrew Erickson of the Naval War College, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, D.C., July 30, 2012, used with Erickson’s permission.


48. The Schlieffen Plan envisioned using close to 90 percent of the German army for an attack to the west; because of China’s much greater size, the ratio would likely be significantly smaller in this case, but perhaps still quite large. See John Keegan, *The First World War* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), pp. 28–32.


54. China has more force structure than this for amphibious assault or air assault—at least two full divisions for each—but its actual lift capacity appears closer to one division of each type of capability. See International Institute for
Notes to Pages 107–13


55. See Steinberg and O’Hanlon, *Strategic Reassurance and Resolve*, pp. 139–49.


59. Indeed, the Army considers a tailored brigade to be the right unit for the air and missile defense mission alone, though the size of such a formation may be less than for a standard brigade combat team. See Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3.0: Operations* (Washington, 2008), p. C-12, available at http://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-0.pdf.

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CHAPTER 4


7. On this subject, see, for example, the comments by Strobe Talbott and Shivshankar Menon in “India’s Role in the World: A Conversation with


13. For a prediction that the conflict could in fact last decades more, see Stephen P. Cohen, *Shooting for a Century: The India-Pakistan Conundrum* (Brookings, 2013).


15. See, for example, ibid., pp. 91–93.


19. For a discussion of this concept, though one focused on a different case, see Martin Indyk, “A Trusteeship for Palestine?,” *Foreign Affairs*, May/


32. Some argue that Turkey is likely to be a long-term nemesis of the United States and point to the disagreements over Syria policy between Washington and Ankara in recent years, as well as the overall policies of President Erdogan, to make the case. Some, like George Friedman, even forecast an adversarial
relationship over the longer term. However, while Turkey may have certain “Gaullist” tendencies, as scholar Omer Taspinar has noted, and while it is deeply frustrated by Washington’s reluctance to do more to unseat President Assad, it does not appear to have core strategic aims fundamentally at odds with those of the United States. See Omer Taspinar, “Turkey’s Strategic Vision and Syria,” Washington Quarterly, Summer 2012, available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2012/08/turkey-taspinar; and George Friedman, The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century (New York: Doubleday/Anchor Books, 2009).


35. On the difficulties that one of the world’s best militaries has had in attempting to quell unrest in the Levant, see David E. Johnson, Hard Fighting: Israel in Lebanon and Gaza (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2011); and Daniel Byman, A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism (Oxford University Press, 2011).


37. For discussion of some of these kinds of missions, see Dana Priest, The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America’s Military (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), pp. 175–94.


47. See, for example, Micah Zenko, Between Threats and War: U.S. Discrete Military Operations in the Post-Cold War World (Stanford University Press, 2010), pp. 114–19.


49. For one assessment of Mexico’s hopeful but limited progress to greater stability under President Nieto, see Felbab-Brown, “Changing the Game or Dropping the Ball?”

50. See, for example, Michael E. O’Hanlon, Peter R. Orszag, Ivo H. Daalder, I. M. Destler, David L. Gunter, James M. Lindsay, Robert E. Litan, and James B. Steinberg, Protecting the American Homeland: One Year On (Brookings, 2002), pp. 6–8; and Anthony Lake, Six Nightmares: Real Threats in a Dangerous World and How America Can Meet Them (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 2000).


CHAPTER 5


16. The First Armored Division from Fort Bliss, Texas, was in Afghanistan, and the First Cavalry Division from Fort Hood, Texas, was in Korea. See http://www.army.mil/article/132943/1st_Cavalry_unit_selected_for_South_Korea_deployment. The First Infantry Division from Fort Riley, Kansas, was in the CENTCOM/Persian Gulf theater. See http://www.army.mil/article/134543/1st_Infantry_Division_HQ_deploying_to_Iraq. The Second Infantry Division was as usual at Camp Casey in South Korea; see https://www.facebook.com/2IDKorea. The Third Infantry Division, from Fort Stewart, Georgia, was in Afghanistan; see http://www.army.mil/article/137188/3ID_HQ_to_deploy_to_Afghanistan_as_drawdown__retrograde_continues. The Fourth Infantry Division, from Fort Carson, Colorado, was not deployed (https://www.facebook.com/MountainWarriorBrigade). The Tenth Mountain Division, from Fort Drum, New York, was in Afghanistan (http://www.drum.army.mil/news/Home.aspx). The Twenty-Fifth Infantry Division, from Schofield Barracks in Hawaii, was headed to Korea in 2015 (http://www.army.mil/article/139140/). The Eighty-Second Airborne Division, from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, was heading out to the CENTCOM/Gulf theater shortly (http://www.armytimes.com/story/military/pentagon/2014/12/01/about-250-fort-bragg-soldiers-deploy-support-iraq-operations/19741789/). The
101st Airborne Division, from Fort Campbell, Kentucky, was in Liberia (http://www.military.com/daily-news/2014/09/30/101st-airborne-troops-headed-to-liberia-in-ebola-fight.html).


33. This was a key emphasis of Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, among others. See the discussion of his June 2012 speech on building partnerships in Richard L. Kugler and Linton Wells II, *Strategic Shift: Appraising Recent Changes in U.S. Defense Plans and Priorities* (National Defense University, 2013), pp. 67–75.


38. See, for example, Rosa Brooks, “Portrait of the Army as a Work in Progress,” *Foreign Policy*, May/June 2014, pp. 43–51.


40. For a good example of a well-written article by Army officials that nonetheless is short on quantitative specifics, see Kimberly Field, James Learmont, and Jason Charland, “Regionally Aligned Forces: Business Not as Usual,” *Parameters* 43, no. 3 (Autumn 2013): 55–63.


47. See, for example, John D. Ellis and Laura McKnight Mackenzie, Operational Reservations: Considerations for a Total Army Force (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2014), p. 28.


50. See also Newsome, Made, Not Born.


59. For estimates of the same broad magnitude, or perhaps somewhat more ambitious, see Mackenzie Eaglen, “Shrinking Bureaucracy, Overhead, and Infrastructure” (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, March 2013), available at http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/-shrinking-bureaucracy-


69. On many of the problems with the Future Combat Systems, a program that assumed more radical progress in various technologies than proved feasible, and that was ultimately canceled in large measure, see Frances M. Lussier, The Army’s Future Combat Systems Program and Alternatives ( Congressional Budget Office, 2006).

70. See, for example, Dan Byman and Jeremy Shapiro, “We Shouldn’t Stop Terrorists from Tweeting,” Washington Post, October 9, 2014, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/we-shouldnt-stop-terrorists-from-tweeting/2014/10/09/106939b6-4d9f-11e4-8c24-487e92bc979b_story.html.

71. See, for example, Adam Talaber, Options for Restructuring the Army (Congressional Budget Office, 2005), pp. 1–12.

APPENDIX A


12. On Africa’s resources, see, for example, David E. Brown, *Africa’s Booming Oil and Natural Gas Exploration and Production: National Security Implications for the United States and China* (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2013).


20. Ibid., pp. 28–29.

21. Ibid., pp. 42–43.

22. Ibid., pp. 46–47.

23. Ibid., pp. 50–51.


25. Ibid., pp. 110–11.

26. Ibid., pp. 120–21.

27. Ibid., pp. 160–61.


29. Ibid., pp. 172–73.

30. Ibid., pp. 174–75.


32. See Kingwell and others, Global Strategic Trends—Out to 2045, p. xvi.


40. Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “Global Warming and Hurricanes: An Overview of Current


43. For a thoughtful treatment of this question, see Diamond, *Collapse*, pp. 486–96.


