Chapter 9

NATO, Public Opinion, and the Next Generation: Remaining Relevant, Remaining Strong

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For over seventy years, NATO has existed as the strongest military alliance in history. From its inception in 1949 to the post-Cold War Era and today, allies within NATO, together with their global partners, have worked and stood together in times of challenges and difficulties. As Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said during his joint address to the US Congress in spring 2019: “It is good to have friends.” Indeed, a group of likeminded allies who share common values is a good thing. In the long run, however, it is not enough to keep NATO relevant and strong. Going forward, NATO will have to contend with a challenge that it has not faced in the past: emerging generations of Americans and Europeans who largely came of age in the Post-Cold War era. With these new generations come major shifts of opinion on foreign policy.

Millennials (those born between 1981-1996) and Generation Z (those born between 1996-2010 and referred to as “Gen Z” or “zoomers”) have differing views of security, defense, and cooperation than the generations who came before them. Young people in the United States differ from their older counterparts over the US’s role in the world, and young people around Europe have shifting views about their relationship with and to the United States. Millennials and Generation Z on both sides of the Atlantic are less militaristic. Instead, issues such as climate change, sustainability, human security, and technological interconnectedness are at the forefront of their minds as foreign policy priorities. The next generation of foreign policy thinkers, composed of both millennials and zoomers, is already taking up staffing, and in some cases, decision-making positions within governments in Europe and the United States. With them, they are bringing new ideas, opinions, and lived experiences shaped by forces largely unfamiliar to previous generations.
NATO in particular, with its three-pillar focus on cooperative security, crisis management, and collective defense, must think hard about how to ensure the next generation understands its utility. Too often, NATO is, at best, not well understood by younger Americans and Europeans. At worst, it is viewed as a relic of the Cold War, especially to those who do not focus on foreign policy. The Soviet threat—the reason behind NATO’s creation—dissolved decades ago, so for young people, the questions follow: why does NATO still exist? And why should they care about it? Those reasons must be made abundantly clear.

During the 2019 NATO London Summit, Alliance leaders tasked the Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, with undertaking a “forward-looking reflection process to assess ways to strengthen the political dimension of the NATO Alliance” over the next ten years.3 The group charged with undergoing this reflection process (and comprised of individuals all between the ages of forty and seventy-three3) recently released its final report entitled NATO 2030: United for a New Era.4 One of the principal subjects is “the question of how NATO should go about this task of enhancing political cohesion and convergence for the challenges of a new era.”5 The drafters lay out topics to help the Alliance approach the key challenges for the next decade, like Russia’s destabilizing activities, the threat of terrorism, sophisticated cyberattacks, disruptive technologies, as well as the rise of China. However, there is one glaring omission from the NATO 2030 Report: the term “next generation.” Instead of including next-generation opinions in the primary reflection group, the Alliance enlisted a group of new and emerging thinkers from both sides of the Atlantic to undertake their own reflection process alongside the well-established luminaries.

This approach—separating the two groups—is problematic because the views and opinions of emerging foreign policy practitioners today will translate into the real-world policies and strategies of tomorrow. A better approach would’ve been to integrate the two groups of thinkers. As Sofie Lilli Stoffel from the Global Public Policy Institute so eloquently wrote, creating “channels for meaningful youth participation, as opposed to creating ‘kids’ tables’, will be crucial for the success of the NATO 2030 initiative’s central goals.”6
Thus, NATO must determine how to integrate today’s new leaders without thinking of them as a separate constituency. To do so, it is important to take stock of how NATO is viewed and supported by the public in allied nations, how the next generation thinks about foreign policy writ large, and how NATO must adapt to these changes of vision and opinion without being less effective at its core mission.

When writing the NATO 2030 report, the authors stated that from the beginning NATO was much more than just a military alliance, “it also embraced a political role in unifying Allies behind a common strategic vision, a community of shared values, shared interests, and shared destiny.” Given current trends, it seems that this message of community, humanity, and interconnectedness at all levels is the message that will resonate with the next generation. NATO’s monumental task ahead is thus to continue strengthening its core missions of defense and deterrence against state actors like Russia and, increasingly, China; tackling new and emerging challenges like cyber, hybrid warfare and disruptive technologies; and, at the same time integrating ideas of the emerging generations on shared values, shared interests, and shared destiny.

**NATO and Public Opinion: A Short History**

Before focusing specifically on the opinions of next generation thinkers and why they matter for NATO, it is important to take stock of how NATO has dealt with public opinion more broadly throughout history. In reality, NATO is not special in this regard; every country, multinational organization, and company must contend with the reality of public opinion. From technology behemoths like Google and Facebook, to small, family-owned enterprises in rural towns, public opinion shapes the way organizations and institutions think, act, and strategize—as the saying goes, people “vote with their feet,” which means that individuals express their preferences through their actions. In today’s interconnected world of endless options, institutions can lose customers or supporters if they fail to offer a service that people think is necessary or important.
NATO is no different. Throughout its history, the organization has experienced ebbs and flows in the way it is viewed by allied publics. Many polling organizations and think tanks on both sides of the Atlantic have taken the pulse of citizens of NATO countries on questions ranging from the role of NATO within and beyond its borders, opinions on specific NATO actions such as in Libya, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, and support for NATO’s foundational tenants like Article 5. For example, according to the Eurobarometer Public Opinion and European Defence Survey taken in 2000, “more than four Europeans out of ten (43 percent) consider[ed] that the decisions concerning European defense policy should be taken by the European Union. Only 17 percent of the respondents [thought] that NATO should take them.” Ten years later, the United States and NATO were mired in the seemingly never-ending and unwinnable conflict in Afghanistan. The 2010 transatlantic trends survey conducted by the German Marshall Fund of the United States showed that publics on both sides of the Atlantic were growing war-weary, but that “majorities or pluralities in all countries surveyed still supported NATO being prepared to act outside of Europe.” In fact, when asked whether or not NATO should be prepared to act outside of Europe to defend members from threats to their security, 62 percent of Europeans said “yes,” as did 77 percent of Americans. As these polls show, even within a short ten-year timeframe, allied publics shift in terms of what they believe NATO’s role is, and how they believe NATO should act.

NATO has also undertaken its own polling efforts in recent years. According to the NATO Secretary General’s 2019 report, “81 percent of people across the Alliance believe that the collaboration between Europe and North America on safety and security is important (…), 76 percent agree that other NATO Allies should defend them if attacked and 71 percent agree that their own country should act in defense of another Ally.” In addition, “a clear majority—64 percent—would vote to remain in NATO in a referendum.” According to the Secretary General’s 2020 Report, nearly two-thirds of citizens in NATO member states polled “would vote for their country to remain a NATO member (62 percent), with only 11 percent stating they would vote for their country to leave the Alliance.” Additionally, “79 percent of allied citizens continue to believe that “the collaboration between North
America and Europe on safety and security matters.” This means that even amidst COVID-19, which has broadened the aperture of traditional security paradigms for member states and shifted the focus for many leaders and citizens toward post-pandemic recovery, support for NATO remains strong.

It is also helpful to further break some of these numbers down by country. According to a Pew Poll from November 2020, 79 percent of those surveyed in Denmark, 66 percent of those in the UK, 59 percent of those in Italy, and 58 percent of those in Germany held positive views of the Alliance. On the other hand, Poland and Hungary’s democratic backsliding has created real headaches for internal alliance cohesion, and the two countries seem to have gone in opposite directions in terms of public support for NATO: it is steady in Poland, with 82 percent of its population viewing the Alliance positively. But only 48 percent of Hungarians have positive views of NATO. In that same vein, NATO experiences continuing fluctuations in public opinion in other allied nations. In Pew’s latest poll of NATO member states, only 21 percent of Turks favored NATO, while 55 percent had an unfavorable view. Similar results were found in Greece, where 55 percent of its population viewed NATO unfavorably. Obviously, these polling results are not separated by generation and cannot be boiled down to generational shifts of opinion. Whole of society issues like press freedom, rule of law, Russian and Chinese influence, and anti-Americanism contribute to broader sentiment toward NATO in these countries.

The good news is that within NATO’s unofficial anchor, the United States, there has traditionally been broad general support for the Alliance, which continues to this day. In Pew’s spring 2021 Global Attitudes Survey, 61 percent of Americans had a favorable view of NATO. Even after four years of Donald Trump’s America First campaign and attempts to sully the US relationship with NATO, public opinion did not necessarily follow suit. Unfortunately, support for NATO has, at the same time, been a victim of the politically divided atmosphere in the United States today and the anti-NATO faction seems to have taken hold within the Republic party. In the US, 77 percent of Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents have a positive assessment of NATO, whereas only 44 percent of Republicans or Republic-leaning independents hold that view. Throughout Donald Trump’s pres-
idency, in addition to divides between Republicans and Democrats regarding the benefits of NATO, there was an increasing number of Republicans who said the United States should withdraw from the Alliance completely. According to YouGov in March 2016, 48 percent of Republicans wanted to remain in NATO, while 17 percent wanted the US to leave. Interestingly, in a July 2018 poll “Republicans were deadlocked on the question, 38 percent to 38 percent.”

Even in other key states, like France, leaders have used NATO as a political football. French President Emmanuel Macron famously stated in late 2019 that NATO was experiencing brain death. That same year, support for the Alliance throughout the country fell to 49 percent, from 60 percent in 2017 and 71 percent in 2009. Marine Le Pen, leader of the far-right party National Rally (formerly National Front), is also strongly critical of NATO, and blasts it in a similar way to Donald Trump. Support for Le Pen’s party has grown throughout France, and although National Rally had a poor showing in France’s June regional elections, there is still the potential for a significant increase in popularity before next year’s presidential election. Similar results are occurring in other states—right-wing parties in the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, and Germany have all used anti-NATO language and used the Alliance as an example of corrupt American influence throughout the European continent.

Overall, the broad picture painted by various polls throughout the years is the belief in NATO is strong, and its mission broadly supported by the citizens of allied countries. However, as we have seen over the last decade, internal developments within NATO countries—like shifting societal norms, changing governments, and rising populism—do play a significant role in alliance cohesion. Even if broad support remains steady, the rise and continued popularity of political parties across the Alliance who are critical of NATO, create a broad risk to alliance effectiveness. As the NATO 2030 Report states, “Divergences in threat perception cannot simply be wished away, since they are an expression of a state’s own unique interests, geography, and national-political outlook. But arriving at a convergence of political and strategic priorities is possible, necessary, and entirely in keeping with the traditions of the Alliance.”
The Next Big Challenge: Shifting Generational Views on Foreign Policy

Clearly, NATO has succeeded in navigating shifting public opinion throughout the years and is still successfully balancing swings of public opinion. Unfortunately, the Alliance is about to experience another challenge with which it does not have previous experience: remaining relevant during a time when foreign policy views among emerging generations differ vastly compared to their older counterparts.

While it is true that we should expect new opinions and ideas to emerge with each generation, the key difference with millennials and zoomers is that many of them no longer the have same personal connections to the other side of the Atlantic as the generations who came before them. Fewer Americans are first- and second-generation immigrants from Europe, and fewer young people in both the United States and Europe have living relatives who fought and/or died in World War II. To take it one step further, no millennial or zoomer has personally experienced life in which the United States and Europe are not each other’s closest allies, and today, war between the two sides is next to unthinkable. This has not always been the case. Because personal history plays an outsized role in one’s identity, as time goes on, the importance of the transatlantic relationship may not be as obvious to those without the personal identity or experiences upon which to build and strengthen it. Thus, without concerted care and effort of those in the field today, the multinational institutions which comprise the transatlantic relationship could be at risk of suffering.

The generations of zoomers and millennials are more focused on the less conventional aspects of security, and they simply do not view the world the way their predecessors did. As a consequence, NATO risks being misunderstood by younger people today. Perhaps, worse than being simply misunderstood, some young people in member countries are completely unaware of NATO’s mandate. For instance, take a 2018 Ipsos poll conducted on behalf of the NATO Association of Canada, in which a group of Canadians were asked to identify NATO by its mission from a list of international organizations; a striking 71 percent of millennials answered the question incorrectly.21
Millennials are a fascinating generation. They not only bore the brunt of the 2008 financial crisis both in the US and Europe but now they are also crushed under the weight of billions of dollars in college debt (in the United States, specifically), and must now deal with the fall-out of COVID-19 in their 30s, an age that previous generations have marked with a sense of financial and professional security. This comes after earlier years shaped by security measures following the September 11th terrorist attacks in the United States, the Iraq War, seemingly endless conflict in the Middle East, and the constant “fear” of terrorism throughout the 2000s perpetuated and overblown by the proliferation of 24-hour cable news. Generation Z is even more unique. Young people today have lived their entire lives online and are now making careers as “influencers” and “digital nomads” with millions of followers on social media apps like YouTube and TikTok. They have either never experienced or have very little memory of a pre-9/11 world. Together, these two generations have never experienced life (more particularly, adult life for millennials) without every bit of information one could ever imagine at their fingertips. These generations grew of age alongside the internet; Twitter, Instagram, Snapchat, TikTok, and YouTube have played an integral role in how this generation is shaped and, in turn, has shaped society.

It thus follows that their views of foreign policy, and their ideas of how states and societies should interact with each other differ broadly from that of their older counterparts. In 2018, for instance, polling from the Charles Koch Institute and the Chicago Council of Global Affairs showed stark differences in millennial views on foreign policy within the United States. In response to the Chicago Council’s standard survey question “do you think it will be best for the future of the country if we [the United States] take an active part in world affairs or stay out of world affairs?” each successive generation since the Silent Generation, i.e., those born between 1928 and 1945, showed less support than the last for active roles of the United States in world affairs. To illustrate, 78 percent of the Silent Generation showed support for the US taking an active role in world affairs, whereas only 51 percent of millennials agreed with that question. In the same poll, millennial respondents were asked to highlight their top five foreign policy goals: 70 percent said protecting American jobs, 64 percent said preventing the
spread of nuclear weapons, and 59 percent said safeguarding adequate supplies of energy.

While these priorities are all well and good, they do not obviously include NATO’s main priorities of “safeguard[ing] the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means.” In fact, according to a YouGov poll, when asked whether or not NATO continues to serve an “important role in the defense of Western countries,” only 35 percent of American millennials agreed with that statement. Compared to their older counterparts, millennials are much less militaristic as “only 44 percent of millennials [in the US] believe maintaining superior military power is a very important goal (…). They also are less supportive of increasing defense spending.” More broadly, “[y]oung Americans want their country to become more ‘European,’ favoring tuition-free education, single-payer health care, and an increased role for the state in the economy.”

The divergences of Generation Z are even starker. According to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Gen Z will be forced to walk a policy path that it did not chart and repair damage that it did not create.” Additionally, “as a generation, zoomers missed both the highs of America’s post-Cold War triumphalism and the lows of its post-9/11 stumbles in the Middle East. Instead, Gen Z came of age as America’s dominance waned, as its society and economy splintered, and as its challenges abroad multiplied, diversified, and intensified.”

Further, Generation Z has never lived under the threat of a peer adversary, a truth highlighted by the fact that according to a poll by the Center for American Progress, only 12 percent of zoomers polled said the “US should focus on countering Chinese aggression.” As NATO’s mandate becomes broader and the Alliance starts thinking more clearly about how it should deal with the rise of China, a generation of people ambivalent toward China seems like it could eventually pose a problem.

At the same time, young Europeans are also shifting the balance in their respective states. In September 2019, millennials and zoomers across Europe packed plazas and parks during Greta Thunberg’s “Fridays for Future,” one of the largest pro-climate demonstrations in history. Perhaps unsurprisingly, nearly 30 percent of Germans under thirty voted for the Greens in the 2019 European elections, and mil-
Millennial Germans rank the environment, climate, and energy as the most important foreign policy challenges. The same can be said for Britain. According to a YouGov poll, 63 percent of British zoomers between ages of 11 and 18 said “the environment and climate change” is the most important issue for their country.29 Only months after the pro-climate demonstrations in September 2019, many of those same young people marched in the streets again for racial justice in response to the murder of George Floyd in Minneapolis, Missouri. Much like young people in North America, these European generations are driven by aspects of security that fall beyond traditional definitions. Some of the polling is particularly stark: only 33 percent of German millennials, for instance, think that the US military bases in the country are either important or very important, compared to 61 percent of Germans over age 50. A striking 62 percent of German millennials think they are less important or not important at all.30 In fact, today, more millennials in Germany support reducing the German defense budget than any other group.31 Political scientist, Ulrike Franke, highlighted in her recent War on the Rocks article: “German millennials struggle with the military—specifically the idea that the military is an element of geopolitical power.”32

These numbers, both in North America and Europe, show a clear shift away from “hard” security issues. This could pose an eventual challenge for NATO as it attempts to integrate different types of security over the next ten to twenty years.

NATO and the Next Generation

The driving question is: how does NATO deal with the fact that shifting generational views on foreign policy priorities could eventually come home to roost in the Alliance? Ultimately, while NATO must continue its focus on Russia, China, conventional deterrence, and other hard security issues—after all, the Alliance is a military one—it must also successfully balance the more intangible sides of security, which are more relevant and salient to the next generation of foreign policy thinkers, such as climate change, human security, and technological interconnectedness. The primary difficulty is that NATO cannot pick and choose which of these issues it faces, it must tackle all of them at once. The paradoxical difficulty is that NATO then risks doing too
much, which could decrease the Alliance’s overall effectiveness as it tries to simultaneously tackle a multitude of global threats.

The good news is that NATO already has solid ideas that will help shape how the Alliance moves forward. In fact, many of the same European polling sentiments mentioned above were reflected in a report by the NATO 2030 young leaders’ group entitled NATO 2030: Embrace the Change, Guard the Values. This group was tasked with “providing a set of ambitious ‘moon-shot’ ideas on the future of the Alliance, particularly on the future of defense and deterrence, NATO’s values, climate security and green transition, NATO’s partnerships, and emerging technologies.” Right off the bat, the group highlighted the need for NATO to “broaden and re-conceptualize security,” and also acknowledged the fact that “NATO should feature non-traditional security challenges more prominently on its agenda. Hard power alone is already insufficient to respond to today and tomorrow’s challenges.”

1. A New Strategic Concept

During the June 2021 NATO Summit in Brussels, the Allies invited the Secretary General to lead the development of the next Strategic Concept. The last Strategic Concept, released in 2010, is outdated and does not include roles and responsibilities to match today’s security environment. No doubt, drafting a new Strategic Concept will not be easy, and there is a real likelihood that frictions and disagreements between members will bubble to the surface. Countries like Turkey, Hungary, and Poland, who already feel as though NATO is too involved in their internal issues will likely make the process difficult for the entire Alliance. This is expected, and it is not something from which NATO should shy away. In fact, NATO should meet these challenges directly. The opportunity to draft a new Strategic Concept gives it the opportunity to incorporate the views of the next generation into the Alliance’s strategy. The suggestions from the NATO young leaders report should feed directly into the new Strategic Concept. For example, it could include a statement that says, “climate change presents an existential threat and a fundamental security risk to the Alliance.” The Strategic Concept could also include a section that highlights the need to have an “annual discussion on democratic principles, working towards a written Values Pledge outlining norms and responsibilities that Allies strive to
live by at home and abroad.” As Rachel Ellehuus and Pierre Marcos note, “an inattention to the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law in a member country creates societal vulnerabilities that competitors can exploit.”35 These two specific issues are those upon which all generations should be able to agree, but that NATO’s Young Leaders, in particular, have placed near the top of their priority list.

2. Subnational Diplomacy

NATO should also greatly increase its efforts at subnational diplomacy, a strategy that “involves state/provincial and/or local leaders claiming political authority in foreign affairs.”36 In fact, the Biden administration’s focus on a “foreign policy for the middle class” will lean heavily on subnational diplomacy efforts to understand the views and opinions of those who live far beyond the Washington, DC beltway.

This strategy could be one that NATO emulates. Within its office of Public Diplomacy, and under the guidance of the Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy, NATO should add a Director for Subnational Engagement. This position would also play a key role within NATO’s Committee on Public Diplomacy (CPD). The CPD has a few aims: it “analyses the current and long-term challenges in encouraging public understanding of, and support for, the aims of Alliance,” and it “co-ordinate(s) national actions to raise public awareness and understanding of NATO’s policies and objectives.”37 At the same time, it also coordinates with non-governmental organizations like the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA), one of the main goals which is to connect with young professionals and students to further the values set forth in the North Atlantic Treaty.38

Together these groups and organizations led by a Director of Subnational Engagement could reach out throughout the United States, Canada, and Europe to focus on bringing NATO leaders to different cities to meet with individuals who have established themselves as leaders within their local communities. These conversations should have a next-generation component to them in which NATO officials reach out to local high schools and universities to discuss foreign policy issues with young thought leaders. These conversations could focus on
the issues that the next generation believes are most important, such as human security, climate change, and other hybrid issues.

At the same time, NATO must also discuss issues that do not resonate as much with the next generation according to current polling, e.g., the rise of China, Russian aggression, and military presence throughout Europe. This way, NATO will have a better idea of how to market itself with the next generation. This team should also take this opportunity to make sure people understand how NATO functions and why it is important. This subnational diplomacy effort will ensure that targeted outreach will allow next generation views to be integrated into alliance priorities. NATO could also undertake similar efforts with young thought leaders within the countries in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, the Mediterranean Dialogue, and members of Partnership for Peace. The results of these meetings should be highlighted at each NATO Summit by the Secretary General and by the Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy. In addition, NATO could also host side events alongside each NATO Summit and extend invitations to young leaders who have taken part in these local discussions so that they can firsthand how NATO functions and why it is important.

3. Diversifying NATO Recruitment Efforts

NATO must also make itself, i.e., its headquarters staff as well as staff at other NATO outposts around the world, more diverse. This not only means welcoming in a new generation of foreign policy thinkers to help shape the Alliance in decision-making positions, but also reaching out and recruiting amongst historically underrepresented communities on both sides of the Atlantic. One of the problems that permeates the foreign policy space is one of legacy, networking, and connections. Too often, the individuals who make up the next wave of policymakers are those who have connections thanks to their access to top universities in Belgium, France, the UK, and the United States, among others that frequently serve as feeder schools for eventual careers in foreign policy. NATO must undertake a concerted effort to break that cycle, and again, it could use its efforts at subnational diplomacy as a recruiting tool to ensure a more diverse applicant pool. In addition, NATO should specifically advertise its job postings to diverse communities within allied nations and keep job postings open until there are at least
50 percent of applicants, especially at early and mid-career level, who come from an underrepresented community.

4. **Utilizing social media**

NATO has done a relatively good job at utilizing social media to its advantage. At the time of writing, the Alliance has almost 800,000 Twitter followers, and almost 520,000 Instagram followers. Unfortunately, those numbers are relatively low when compared to the populations of all NATO countries combined, which is close to one billion. In 2018, the Alliance began a campaign called #WeAreNATO, which is “designed to bring together many new elements—including a modernized, simplified funding structure for projects—to ensure that people can see NATO as the essential guarantor of security for all NATO countries and their citizens.”\(^39\) NATO has utilized this campaign well, with videos, tweets, and personal stories under the #WeAreNATO moniker, including funding for think tanks, universities, and influencers in this space in 2018. NATO should thus undergo another round of #WeAreNATO funding, this time focusing specifically on millennials and Generation Z. To put it bluntly, if young people are to think NATO is “cool,” then other young people need to be the ones selling the NATO message to other young people, which means NATO must have tools available to make this a reality. This project could clearly seek out millennial and Generation Z views on hard security issues that NATO currently faces, including Russia, China, cyberwarfare, and the Arctic as well as security challenges in the Baltic, and Mediterranean regions. NATO should then publicize the results of these projects on its social media accounts and at its meetings at universities and high schools around the United States and Europe.

**Conclusion**

Overall, NATO has an array of tools at its disposal that it should utilize to ensure the Alliance’s continued relevance and resonance with the general public. One of the Alliance’s top priorities for the foreseeable future should be creating a strategy and purpose that makes the next generation public opinion a key component of its planning and prioritizing. As the NATO 2030 Young Leaders’ Group said:
NATO also should not risk becoming a victim of its own success: reaching for the hearts and minds of younger generations is imperative. Therefore, NATO needs to double down on smart communication and meaningful engagement about the Alliance’s role in ensuring freedom, security and prosperity across the Euro-Atlantic region.\(^{40}\)

This does not mean that NATO should shift the focus away from its three core pillars of cooperative security, crisis management, and collective defense. Moreover, it definitely does not mean that NATO try to change its own identity or should shirk its responsibilities of deterrence and conventional means to be strong in the face of Russia, and an ever more global China. However, it does mean that in creating policies that support those three pillars, NATO must seriously take into account the views of new and emerging thinkers. It is important to be upfront about the fact that this could get uncomfortable. Bringing in the views and opinions of thinkers whose lives and experiences are shaped so fundamentally differently than many of the Cold Warriors who still inhabit important posts in government on both sides of the Atlantic will require deftness and understanding on behalf of all generations. This is good for everyone since more diverse voices mean the Alliance is better represented, and thus will be able to continue the broad support that it has enjoyed throughout the years. At the end of the day, the next generation is the future, and with them will come new and innovative ideas, passions, and opinions. Those should be welcomed in the halls of NATO.

Notes


5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Article 5 of NATO’s founding document, the Washington Treaty, “provides that if a NATO Ally is the victim of an armed attack, each and every other member of the Alliance will consider this act of violence as an armed attack against all members and will take the actions it deems necessary to assist the Ally attacked.” It is the key article which undergirds the Alliance’s goal of collective defense.
11. Ibid.
13. Ibid.


27. Ibid.


Part III

Evolution in Warfare