Imperial Emotions

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CHAPTER FOUR

The Anatomy of Imperial Indignation: Ramiro de Maeztu’s Hacia otra España

Anger and Indignation

In 1899 Ramiro de Maeztu published Hacia otra España, a collection of newspaper and journal articles that stands out as a remarkable contribution to regenerationism, the fin-de-siècle intellectual movement that reflected on the theme of national decadence and offered practical proposals for reforming Spain. Like other regenerationist (and modernist) texts, such as En torno al casticismo and Idearium español, Hacia otra España follows some of the conventions of the essay form and displays a basic opposition between what is old or decadent and what is new, emerging and vigorous. This polarity, which has an unequivocal social dimension in Maeztu, symbolizes a distinction between an illusory Spain (made up of imperial legends and conquering myths, of unproductive classes and destitute peasants, of corrupt politicians, the state, and the Church) and a real one (made up of the industrial bourgeoisie, the working classes who valued hard work, and the intellectuals, a handful of “individualidades sensatas y energéticas” [sensible and energetic individuals] who were lucid enough to anticipate the nation’s illnesses (Hacia otra España 149).

Maeztu’s enthusiasm for the values of a new Spain – this otra España to which his essay aspires – springs from a deep sense of dissatisfaction with traditional social agents and values. Notorious as an eccentric nonconformist, Maeztu did not hesitate to express his anger over the way in which noble values in Spanish society (discipline and hard work, the ethic of conflict, the will to power) were corrupted by the influence of the State and the Church. “Maeztu, en aquella época,” recalls Pío Baroja, “era muy agresivo” [Maeztu, at that time, was very aggressive] (169). This aggressiveness manifested itself in relation to the things Maeztu both loved and hated. For instance, when he saw Benito Pérez Galdós’s Electra, a controversial play that had become a symbol for anticlericalism, he was so enthused that he cried out “¡Abajo los jesuitas!” [Down with the Jesuits!] (P. Baroja 209). Later, when
Maeztu read a tepid review of the play, he was so flabbergasted and enraged at the author, Azorín, that he insulted and physically threatened him (P. Baroja 209–10). Other contemporaneous anecdotes corroborate the notion of Maeztu’s exuberant personality. Ricardo Baroja (Pío’s less famous brother) wrote that “Ramiro de Maeztu era entonces de carácter violento” [Ramiro de Maeztu had a violent character then] (37) and he gave the following proof: “le pegó dos palos a un tontaina que había escrito un artículo desagradable para [su amigo] Valle-Inclán” [he walloped an idiot who had written an article that [his friend] Valle-Inclán disliked] (37). José María Salaverría stated, with more than a tinge of resentment, that Maeztu’s “furia epiléptica” [epileptic fury] was a self-conscious, cultivated pose (Nuevos retratos 64). These brief anecdotes allude to the fact that emotional excess was a fundamental part of Maeztu’s life. Importantly, it was also a decisive aspect of his writing, as he himself indicates: “Se escribe […] no con reglas y fórmulas, sino con las entrañas, con el temperamento, con la sangre, con el cuerpo” [One writes {...} with one’s guts, with temperament, with blood, with the body, not following rules and formulas] (Artículos 261).

Clearly, it is hard to understand Maeztu without considering emotions. Maeztu’s impassioned, almost maniacal character has led José Luis Villacañas Berlanga to describe him as an energúmeno, an expression that in Spanish refers to someone possessed by the Demon, someone seized by an overwhelming fury or frenzy (“El carisma”). According to Villacañas, Maeztu’s condition as an energúmeno (what in English could be described as a lunatic) goes a long way in explaining his fall from critical favor. While his contemporaries Unamuno and Ortega – both of whom established an intellectual dialogue with Maeztu at some point in their careers – enjoy a positive reception (the former is valorized as a genuine interpreter of the “Spanish soul” and the latter is revered as a towering figure of modern Spanish philosophy), Maeztu is, by and large, a forgotten intellectual figure (Villacañas Berlanga, “El carisma”). At best he is remembered as an eccentric, ideologically inconsistent minor writer and at worst as a delusional journalist who traded his youthful Nietzschean enthusiasm for the most reactionary elements in the Spanish cultural tradition.

Even the story of his death in front of a firing squad does not garner sympathy. After the proclamation of the Second Republic in 1931, Maeztu relentlessly labored to radicalize the social forces of the right by plotting against the government and by attempting to revive the cause of the imperial, sixteenth-century Catholic Monarchy in the years preceding the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939). This led to his arrest and subsequent execution in the early hours of November 1, 1936. Right before his execution, he is supposed to have addressed the firing squad in the following terms:
“¡Vosotros no sabéis por qué me matáis, yo sí sé por qué muero, porque vuestros hijos sean mejores que vosotros!” [You don't know why you are killing me, but I know why I will die: I will die so that your children will be better than you] (qtd. in González Cuevas 359). To be sure, neither Maeztu's self-description as a sacrificial lamb, nor the fact that his more traditionalist works were lionized by some sectors of the Francoist cultural establishment (see Villacañas Berlanga, Ramiro 413–79), have made his critical reception any easier. As a result, Maeztu figures in the tradition of Spanish literature as an inconvenient intellectual figure, one whose writings project an emotional excess that is not easily assimilated by the institutional structures of canon-formation. After all, who wants to preserve and valorize the works of an angry energúmeno, of someone whose faith in his ideas was so extreme that he verged on delirium?

And yet, I believe that it is precisely this emotional excess in Maeztu's writings that provides us with invaluable insights into the emotions attached to empire in Spain's early twentieth-century national imaginary. When directed toward empire, Maeztu's legendary anger takes the form of indignation in the pages of Hacia otra España. Succinctly put, Maeztu is outraged by the actions of the representatives of Spain's nineteenth-century empire in the Caribbean and the Pacific and by the weight that the early modern Spanish Empire had in contemporary society. Taking my cue from Nietzsche's reflections on the role of historical knowledge, I will argue in this chapter that Maeztu is a critical historian who views the imperial past with indignation and who seeks to replace the old-fashioned, pre-industrial glories of the Spanish empire in America with the industrial bourgeoisie's conquest and colonization of the Castilian plains. In other words, Maeztu is not indignant at the idea of empire in itself, but rather at how the empire was administered in the late nineteenth century in terms of both the actual colonies and the ever-revered myths of empire.

To describe the main features of Maeztu's indignation at certain aspects of the Spanish Empire, I will focus on his essay Hacia otra España and several of his lesser-known articles belonging to the same period, which are collected in the volume edited by E. Inman Fox Artículos desconocidos (1897–1904). On a first read, Hacia otra España's starting point parallels that of Unamuno's En torno al casticismo and Ganivet's Idearium español: the pain felt when faced with the image of a defeated, broken nation. Referring to the motives behind the book, Maeztu confesses in the prologue that “mueve mi pluma el dolor de que mi patria sea chica y esté muerta y el furioso anhelo de que viva y se agrande” [my pen is moved by the pain caused by my shrinking, dying fatherland as well as by the overwhelming desire that it live and grow larger] (48). Shortly thereafter, in the first section, titled “Páginas
sueltas” [Loose pages], he turns this pain into open hostility as he provides a sarcastic critique of contemporary Spanish society in terms of its paralysis, a diagnosis that recalls Unamuno’s reflections on the nation’s marasmo. In the second part, titled “De las guerras” [On wars], Maeztu addresses the Spanish-Cuban-American War of 1898 and the question of imperialism in a fragmentary manner, producing a rare, first-hand analysis of its causes, development, and consequences. In a tone that alternates between precise, objective observations and utopian, impassioned commentaries, Maeztu interprets the war in Cuba as an economic conflict between business owners of Spanish origin and workers, peasants, and landowners of criollo origin. According to Maeztu, Spain had no chance of perpetuating its sovereignty over the island and thus, like a handful of other intellectuals such as federalist republican Francesc Pi i Margall and socialist Pablo Iglesias, he was opposed to the colonial wars even though he was enlisted in the Spanish Army. Maeztu takes pride in explaining that his anti-war stance was not the result of a dogmatic application of certain political principles, but rather of his intimate knowledge of Cuba’s economic situation:

> los azares de mi vida han formado mi educación en Cuba y Norteamérica, en los ingenios azucareros, en el comercio y las fábricas de Tabaco.

[the ups and downs of my life have meant that my education has taken place in Cuba and North America, in the sugar refineries, in commercial activities, and in tobacco factories]. (Hacia otra España 94)

Claiming the authority that comes from experience and objective analysis, the third and most optimistic part of the text, “Hacia otra España” (Toward another Spain), lays out Maeztu’s vision for Spain’s redemption, one that can be summarized as a call for the simultaneous creation of a strong national bourgeoisie and working class through a vigorous industrialization of the nation.

Within Hacia otra España’s general argument, Spain’s nineteenth-century empire in the Pacific and the Caribbean embodies everything that is wrong in Spain. As an outrageous “sistema de expoliación” [system of plunder] (Artículos 245), the nineteenth-century empire is the product of the corruption of the State, the dogmatism of the Church, and the irresponsibility of Spanish capitalists: “El régimen colonial era un pacto entre los políticos de Madrid, las Comunidades religiosas y los grandes especuladores de toda España” [The colonial regime was a pact between Madrid politicians, religious communities, and great speculators from all over Spain] (Artículos 244). Maeztu’s sense of outrage at the colonial system is further revealed in another passage where he writes that “Nosotros no teníamos para América
y Asia, sino ladronzuelos de la política y órdenes religiosas” [We only had political crooks and religious orders for America and Asia] (*Hacia otra España* 107).

A regime made up of crooks, speculators, and pernicious religious orders is a fundamentally unjust political system. For this reason, in *Hacia otra España* Maeztu relentlessly attacks those who fought for the perpetuation of the empire during the colonial wars of 1898, even if his general opposition to the war is occasionally muddled by a sense of patriotic honor (*Hacia otra España* 114–15, 119–21). According to Maeztu, the social agents intent on prolonging the colonial injustice were the successive Spanish governments that mismanaged the war, which for him “son y han sido siempre malos” [are and have always been bad] (*Hacia otra España* 140); the weak yet ambitious members of the military, like General Ramón Blanco, who followed the war strategy dictated by the press at the expense of tens of thousands of lives:

*[Blanco] todo lo sacrifica hoy para obtener la efímera corona con la que premian los periódicos a aquellos que les sirven en sus campañas; lo sacrifica todo, hasta su vida, que es la vida de los 100.000 soldados que le acompañan en la heroica agonía de Cuba española.*

*[Blanco] sacrifices everything to obtain the ephemeral crown awarded by newspapers to those who serve them well in their campaigns; he sacrifices everything, even his life, which is the life of the 100,000 soldiers who accompany him in the heroic agony of Spanish Cuba.*

(*Hacia otra España* 130)

Finally, he criticized the irresponsible press, who ignored its duty to inform its readers and instead

*[nos lanzó a la guerra con los Estados Unidos […] suponiendo que pervivía en el país el espíritu del Cid Campeador y el concepto calderoniano del honor.]*

*[threw us into the war against the United States […] assuming that the Cid’s spirit and Calderón’s concept of honor were still prevalent in the country.]* (*Hacia otra España* 160)

Maeztu’s allusions to the “crooks,” “speculators,” and irresponsible journalists that were sustaining Spain’s imperial dreams, together with his generally irate tone, are a good indication of the annoyance, anger, and indignation aroused in him by the colonial crisis of 1895–1898. Maeztu’s annoyance at the empire is beyond doubt, but is it appropriate to label his response as angry or indignant? To what extent can we even distinguish
between annoyance, anger, and indignation? Are they not very similar emotions involving the expression of dissatisfaction with a given situation?

If we take annoyance as the baseline emotion for anger and indignation, then annoyance could be defined as simply registering dissatisfaction without attributing blame or making any other kind of judgment (Solomon 208). This then leaves us with the rather more complex task of defining anger and indignation. While some do not distinguish between them (Nussbaum, Hiding 99–107), others see these two emotions as having quite different cognitive structures. One of the first to point out important differences between the two was Aristotle, in Book II of Rhetoric. For Aristotle, anger (orge) is a desire for retaliation “because of an apparent slight that was directed, without justification, against oneself or those near to one” (116, 1378a). One is always angry at a particular individual or category of individuals, for instance those “who speak badly of, and scorn, things they themselves take most seriously” (119, 1379a). By contrast, one is indignant (to nemesan) if one is “distressed at the evidence of unworthy success” (143, 1387a), even when such success has no direct effect on one’s wellbeing. Simply put, although Aristotle considers anger and indignation related emotions, they are distinct in that anger involves a personal slight while indignation does not, for it is an impersonal emotion.

This simple distinction is confirmed by current literature on the subject, which draws heavily on and extends Aristotle’s definitions. Glossing Aristotle’s views, Marlene Sokolon writes: “by definition, indignation concerns circumstances that can in no way affect the indignant subject himself. Indignation cannot be self-motivated revenge but is a response to attempts to achieve or obtain what is not suitable” (149). Robert Solomon agrees and complicates Aristotle’s definition by introducing moral judgments into the cognitive structure of indignation. According to Solomon, anger “is a judgment that someone has wronged me (or one of my friends), but it has no evident suprapersonal meaning” (208), while indignation “contains, as part of its conceptual structure, the moral judgment that this is morally wrong” (207; emphasis in orig.). He goes on to add that such wrongness “need not have anything in particular to do with me, my tastes, or my personal values” (207). Solomon’s insight about the moral claims embedded in indignation is echoed by Victoria Camps, for whom indignation produces “una reacción general, no referida a nadie en concreto, frente a ciertas actitudes que se desaprueban” [a general reaction, which is not referred to anyone in particular, in the face of certain attitudes of which one disapproves] (162). Finally, Antonio Valdecantos further refines the above insights by taking them in two slightly different directions. He argues that indignation, even if it is impersonal, nonetheless involves an attribution of responsibility
for, as Valdecantos puts it, one cannot be indignant when it rains or when one is stung by a wasp; one is only indignant at an event or a state of affairs produced by a human agent (78). He also observes that indignation is an “inquisitive, reflexive” emotion that is based on a set of reasons that the indignant individual expects others to share (80).8

Combining Aristotle’s rather narrow understanding of indignation with current contributions on the subject, we can loosely approximate a concept of indignation that reflects its customary usage in the Spanish (and English) language: (i) indignation involves an evaluation of a state of affairs or, more narrowly, of whether a person deserves his or her situation; (ii) the evaluation embodies a suprapersonal judgment, which is based on a set of publicly articulated reasons, that such a state of affairs is morally wrong; and finally (iii), there must exist an attribution of responsibility. All of these elements are at play when Maeztu uses the word indignación in Hacia otra España. In fact, he only explicitly uses the term three times, each when he is reacting to when businessmen of Santiago de Cuba, who declared themselves to be fervent Spanish patriots, refused to pay customs duties according to Spanish tariffs. Maeztu writes: “Indignó el hecho a los periódicos que ofician de patriotas. Compartamos por una vez su indignación” [the newspapers that claim to be patriotic became indignant at this fact. Let us for once share in their indignation] (Hacia otra España 135). He then adds:

Nuestra indignación llegará a la cólera si pensamos en que de comerciantes se formaba aquel partido titulado español incondicional (sic).

[Our indignation will reach the level of fury if we think that those who formed that unconditionally Spanish political party were the same businessmen [who refused to pay customs duties]. (Hacia otra España 135; emphasis in orig.).

But, as we shall see, indignation is also at play more generally in Maeztu’s reaction to the prominence achieved in national life by the agents of the Spanish Empire and its supporters. The first requirement for an indignant response concerns an evaluation of a given state of affairs. We have already mentioned that Maeztu saw the colonial regime as a pact between corrupt politicians, greedy speculators, and the religious orders. Immediately thereafter, he goes on to specify that such social agents attained their comfortable position by means that were morally (if not legally) reprehensible:

Los políticos de Madrid enviaban a Ultramar a sus deudos, con permiso especial para enriquecerse; las Comunidades religiosas respetaban
el secreto de nuestra mala administración [de las colonias] a cambio de que les consintiéramos, prácticamente, la plena soberanía sobre Filipinas; los grandes especuladores se callaban cuanto sabían de la mala política y la mala gestión religiosa, a cambio de que se les respetaran sus monopolios bancarios y el sistema de explotación mercantil creado por unos aranceles irritantes. En realidad, políticos, especuladores y Comunidades religiosas formaban un solo organismo explotador.

[Madrid politicians sent their relatives overseas with a special permit to get rich; the religious communities kept the secret of our mismanagement [of the colonies] in exchange for practically having full sovereignty over the Philippines; the great speculators kept silent about both the political and religious mismanagement provided that their banking monopolies and the system of mercantile exploitation created by outrageous tariffs were respected. In truth, politicians, speculators, and religious communities were part of a single exploitative organism]. (Artículos 244)

The moral condemnation embedded in the above description, which constitutes the second requirement for indignation, is amplified on three distinct yet related levels. Maeztu uses each of these levels to persuade his readers to share in his indignation. On one level, Maeztu observes that those who profited from the colonial regime did not defend the colonies when they were under attack: “nuestras clases directoras no dieron un solo voluntario a los ejércitos de Cuba y Filipinas” [not a single member of the ruling classes volunteered in the armies of Cuba and the Philippines] (Artículos 245). And then he adds that those who sacrificed their lives pertenecían a esa inmensa mayoría del pueblo español que nada ganaba con el sistema de expoliación a que políticos, frailes y especuladores habían reducido las colonias.

[belonged to the great majority of the Spanish people who gained nothing from the system of plunder to which politicians, friars, and speculators had reduced the colonies]. (Artículos 245)

Significantly, Maeztu considers the harm done by the agents of empire not as a personal offense, but rather as an issue of “trascendencia nacional” [national import] (Artículos 245), making such harm a suprapersonal question and thus confirming that he is indignant, not simply angry, at the representatives of the colonial regime.
On another level, Maeztu's condemnation of the privileged situation enjoyed by the agents of empire is part of a larger moral conflict that was having momentous consequences for Spain as a nation. According to Maeztu, Spain's gravest problem resided in the fact that

ha prevalecido, erigiéndose en directora y dominadora, la raza de los inútiles, de los ociosos, de los hombres de engaño y de discurso, sobre la de los hombres de acción, de pensamiento y de trabajo.

[the prevalent race, which is made up of good-for-nothing men, idlers, cheaters, and charlatans, rules and dominates the race of men who act, think, and work]. (Hacia otra España 65)

The prevalence of corrupted values and the disregard for discipline and hard work was so widespread within Spanish society that Maeztu thought that Spaniards looked more like the colonized than the colonizer: “No parece sino que España es la colonia y el archipiélago [filipino] la metrópoli” [It looks like Spain is the colony and the {Filipino} archipelago the metropolis] (Hacia otra España 99). Thus, Maeztu condemns the colonial regime not only because its representatives (the politicians, the religious orders, and the speculators) were weak, hypocritical individuals who did not dare defend their own interests but also because their mere existence was the result of a series of detrimental values that Maeztu, much like Nietzsche in On the Genealogy of Morals, sought to criticize and revaluate.9

The third level of Maeztu's moral condemnation of the undeserved privileges of imperial officials has to do with the fact that their actions violated the moral principles put forth in Hacia otra España. Generally speaking, these principles can be described as a commitment to a new Spain, a nation where strong, life-affirming, self-made individuals would flourish. But what exactly are the values of this otra España, this new Spain that is supposed to do away with both the harm done by those who profited from the colonies and their corrupted values? What is it, specifically, that Maeztu wants his readers to envision for the future of their nation?

An answer to these questions can be found in those articles that discuss the profound economic and social transformations that were taking place in Spain at the time.10 For Maeztu, “la latente solidaridad española” [the latent Spanish solidarity] (Artículos 144) is above all an economic – as opposed to a historical or cultural – phenomenon, one that is readily evident in the more advanced, industrialized regions of Spain, such as the Basque Country and Catalonia. The path toward Maeztu's otra España is thus the path toward material prosperity, economic success, and the ability to compete on a global market, three things that were sorely lacking in the colonies.
Ramiro de Maeztu’s Hacia otra España

Maeztu’s new national imaginary is constituted by a fully modern, economic community that has broken free of the State’s and the Church’s grip, that has done away with the corruption of the colonial regime, and that is ruled by a strong national bourgeoisie and proletariat, two social forces resulting from the momentous changes that were transforming Spanish society at the beginning of the twentieth century. Among such transformations, which were enthusiastically embraced by Maeztu, the following stand out: the acceleration of urban expansion in Spain’s main cities (surely Madrid and Barcelona, but also Valencia and Bilbao), the collapse of the traditional agrarian sector, and the correlative growth in the industrial, financial, and service sectors.¹¹

As argued in Chapters 2 and 3, these changes were registered as catastrophic events in En torno al casticismo and Idearium español, two essays that greatly idealized rural, pre-industrial life (think of Unamuno’s identification of intrahistoria with the silent life of Castilian peasants or of Ganivet’s diatribes against modern political and economic institutions, including nineteenth-century European empires). The contrast with Hacia otra España could not be greater in this respect: rather than masking and displacing the development of world capitalism, Maeztu will embrace it, making it a central component of his discussion of Spain’s historical burdens, among which the empire in the Caribbean and the Pacific figures prominently.

Now, let us turn briefly to the third and final aspect of our definition of indignation. We have seen how Maeztu fulfilled the first and second requirements for indignation, for he performed an evaluation of whether imperial officials deserved their privileged situation and he made a suprapersonal judgment, based on a set of publicly articulated reasons, that such a situation was morally wrong. It is now time to explain how Maeztu related to the third requirement for indignation, the attribution of responsibility. This is a rather straightforward endeavor for the attribution of responsibility is already implied in the fact that Maeztu is indignant at the actions and omissions of the representatives of empire. Certainly, it is possible to imagine an instance in which it might prove more difficult to attribute responsibility for the state of affairs leading to an indignant response.¹² In the case of Hacia otra España, however, it is clear that imperial officials are the ones responsible for creating the deplorable situation at which Maeztu becomes indignant. In the aftermath of the crushing defeat of 1898, the attribution of responsibility for the Disaster was something of a national pastime in which several social groups were targeted, from the military, the government, and the Queen Regent to the press and the Masonic lodges (Balfour, The End 50–51). Beyond the above implicit
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... attribution of responsibility to imperial officials for their amoral conduct at the helm of the colonial regime, Maeztu reflected on the larger issue of the responsibility for the Disaster in an article entitled “Responsabilidades,” where he declared all of Spanish society responsible for the defeat (Hacia otra España 139–41).

Maeztu’s indignation at the representatives of the colonial regime is ultimately concerned with the harm done by their undeserved privileges, which can be calculated in both economic and symbolic terms – imperial officials certainly got rich, but they also held politically relevant posts and their view of Spain as an imperial power was the dominant one up until the colonial crisis of 1895–1898 (for this last point see Chapter 1). Succinctly put, Maeztu’s indignation is a response to the question of what those leading the nation merited. In Book II of his Rhetoric, Aristotle notes that “those who think themselves deserving of things they do not believe others deserve are prone to indignation toward the latter and about these things” (144, 1387b). Maeztu certainly belonged to this category of indignant people. As an intellectual, he saw himself as being one of those...

... individualidades sensatas y enérgicas, perspicaces y estimuladas por una ambición noble, que en público y en privado venian advirtiendo a la nación el gran engaño de que era víctima al juzgarse y las grandes enfermedades que la debilitaban.

... [sensible, energetic, and shrewd individuals motivated by a noble ambition who, both in public and in private, warned the nation of the delusion it was under and of the great ailments that debilitated it]. (Hacia otra España 149)

... Because of their noble ambitions and analytical insights, the intellectuals’ task was to “conservar la vida nacional y perpetuarla” [conserve and perpetuate the life of the nation] (Hacia otra España 65). The reality, however, was that intellectuals occupied a marginal, precarious position in fin-de-siècle Spain. Maeztu himself confessed to his impotence when he wrote: “somos literatos, gentes sin poder y sin dinero” [we are men of letters, people without power or money] (Hacia otra España 103). When one thinks of himself as the creator or the leader of a new, regenerated nation, and when one judges those in power as undeserving of their privileged position, indignation seems an appropriate response. That it was the dominant response employed by Maeztu when writing about the colonial regime in Hacia otra España speaks as much to his individual personality as to the insecure social standing of intellectuals at the time.
Nietzsche's Critical History

In addition to the unjust workings of the colonial system, there is another source of indignation related to the Spanish Empire in *Hacia otra España*. More specifically, Maeztu is indignant at the excessive weight of the traditions associated with the early modern Spanish Empire at the turn of the century. For instance, in the article entitled “Un suicidio,” he refers to Spain’s imperial history from the beginning of the sixteenth century up until the end of the nineteenth as “el fracaso de cuatro siglos” [a four-hundred-year failure] (*Hacia otra España* 106). The use of the term “failure” to depict four hundred years of imperial history already suggests that Maeztu is condemning that part of the nation’s past which had, as recently as 1892, been the object of numerous celebrations (see Chapter 1). In another passage in the same article, he bitterly complained that Spain “mírase siempre en la leyenda, donde se encuentra grande” [looks at herself in the mirror of legend, where she sees herself as grand] (*Hacia otra España* 107).

This type of self-delusion, which came at the end of a crescendo of national vices that included the corruption of politics, the hypocrisy of religion, the poverty of the nation, and the irresponsibility of the press, allows us to catch a glimpse of Maeztu’s indignation because it implies a suprapersonal judgment that imperial myths were morally wrong. But because the reasons for this judgment are not explicitly explained, the condemnation of the myths of empire can only be considered the inchoate stage of indignation. To understand Maeztu’s reasons for his moral condemnation of imperial myths, it is important to bear in mind that in *Hacia otra España* Maeztu’s discomfort with the imperial past extends to the past more generally. Indeed, one striking aspect of the essay is that there are only a handful of references to Spain’s past, a feature that is even more extraordinary when one compares it with the writings of fellow regenerationists Joaquín Costa, Miguel de Unamuno, and Ángel Ganivet. Costa, who was arguably the most notable regenerationist intellectual, legitimized his programs for social and political reform by presenting them as having illustrious historical precedents. He fashioned the Catholic Kings (111–55) and the seventeenth-century *arbitrista* tradition of economic thought (157–79), among others, as forerunners to his programs for national regeneration. In 1898 he famously used the figure of the Cid to speak against imperialism and militarism, summoning Spaniards to “[echar] doble llave al sepulcro del Cid, para que no vuelva a cabalgar” [double-lock the Cid’s sepulcher, so that he does not go riding about again] (254). Similarly, Unamuno’s *En torno al casticismo*, arguably also a regenerationist essay, can be read through and through as an attempt to overcome Spain’s conservative and militaristic traditions, as...
an attempt to supersede the merely historical manifestations of the Spanish people by recalling their “intrahistorical” roots, which lie in the past and are symbolized by the quiet life of Castile’s peasants. And finally, Ganivet’s *Idearium español* is nothing but a historical exegesis of the Stoic, Christian, and Arabic roots of the Spanish “territorial spirit” in order to advocate a return to the nation’s native spirit of independence. In all of these accounts, the lessons that Spain could derive from its past to remedy its present ills figure prominently. This is not at all the case, however, with *Hacia otra España*.

In contrast to his fellow regenerationists, Maeztu sees history as part of the problem, not the solution. His claim is that the history of the Spanish Empire is particularly loathful because it hinders the nation’s future development by creating a false image of national grandeur. As he puts it,

Arrastra España su existencia deleznable, cerrando los ojos al caminar del tiempo, evocando en obsesión perenne glorias añejas, figurándose ser siempre aquella patria que describe la Historia.

[Spain drags along its pitiable existence, closing its eyes to the passing of time and obsessively evoking ancient glories, always imagining itself to be that nation that History describes. (*Hacia otra España* 107)]

Possessed by the image of its past glories, Spain is, for Maeztu, a nation that needs to cure itself by coming to terms with the fact that “la Historia expansiva y conquistadora de nuestra patria ha de acabarse con la centuria” [our fatherland’s expansive and conquering History should come to an end with the century] (*Hacia otra España* 123). According to Maeztu, to focus on the present challenges of modern life, Spain has to renounce its imperial past because it led both to the corrupt colonial regime of the late nineteenth century and to the misguided aspirations of what he called “el [régimen] burocrático-teocrático-militar que ahora impera” [the bureaucratic-theocratic-military {regime} that prevails today] (*Hacia otra España* 100) – in other words, the Restoration system. These are, in a nutshell, Maeztu’s reasons for condemning the imperial past (and they are also the cause of his indignation).

Now that we have seen Maeztu’s reasons for judging the myths of empire immoral, we should explain who is responsible, in his eyes, for the hypertrophy of the imperial past in public life. In contrast to Maeztu’s indignant reaction to the corruption of the colonial regime, in this instance it is not as easy to make an attribution of responsibility. Who can be considered responsible for the circulation of the myths of empire among the Spanish public? As Chapter 1 has argued, those responsible were the
State and its organic intellectuals. This is not, however, the answer given by Maeztu. At one point, he seems to be indirectly blaming the founders of the Spanish Empire when he considers them responsible for the colonial defeat. He writes:

Tienen la responsabilidad de la derrota nuestros antepasados, que fueron un imperio colonial tan grande que para sostenerlo hubo de despoblarse el suelo patrio, el verdadero suelo patrio.

[[The responsibility for the defeat] belongs to our ancestors, who created a colonial empire so big that they had to depopulate the native land, the authentic native land, to maintain it]. (Hacia otra España 140; emphasis in orig.)

This attribution of responsibility would go something like this: by founding an overstretched colonial empire, the Spaniards of the sixteenth century weakened the Spanish nation and made it possible for the myths of empire to be endlessly repeated by “la corriente patriota de los periódicos” [the jingoistic current of the press] (Hacia otra España 140).

But even if, as Maeztu suggests, the hypertrophy of the imperial past in public life can be seen as one of the causes of the colonial defeat, insofar as it fueled the press’s jingoism and convinced the Spanish public to support the colonial war (Hacia otra España 140, 154–55), it surely does not seem reasonable to blame a series of long-dead historical actors for the continued presence of the imperial traditions. There must be other agents, contemporaries of Maeztu, who were more clearly responsible for the promotion of the imperial past. Their identity is revealed in Hacia otra España when Maeztu argues that the polemic between the supporters and the adversaries of the Cuban War is in fact a polemic between two incompatible instincts: the traditional and the critical. He claims that while supporters of the war have fallen into the ideological trap of tradition and are only able to look backwards to perceive past greatness, the adversaries of the war, by perceiving the actual weaknesses of the country, are able to look forward and have hope in the country’s future (Hacia otra España 134). Those guided by the traditional instinct, Maeztu continues, are incapable of making a distinction between

la España que soñaban, la España de la tradición, y la España que los hechos revelan. Han formado sus almas en el culto a las cosas muertas, embellecidas por la pátina de los siglos. Han mirado a su patria bajo la luz esplendorosa del pasado. Y la quieren así [...] o no la quieren de ningún modo.
[the Spain they dreamt of, the Spain of tradition, and the Spain revealed by facts. They have shaped their souls by worshipping dead things embellished by a patina of many centuries. They have looked at their fatherland through the magnificent lens of the past. And they want their fatherland to reflect this image [...] or they do not want it at all].

(Hacia otra España 133–34)

From this it is clear that those responsible for the circulation of imperial myths are the traditionalists, those that Maeztu calls the “defensores del sentido histórico nacional” [defenders of the national historical sensibility] (Hacia otra España 134). Their emotional investment in the imperial past, which is made up of complacency and satisfaction, is for Maeztu morally reprehensible because it idealizes the nation's immoral past and it makes the nation act under the delusion of strength. Their weakness, which is precisely what gravely disqualifies them in Maeztu's eyes, is that they do not believe in their nation's future. For this reason, he adds, “aspiran a embellecer su presente modesto y humilde, con el cumplimiento de su modo de ser legendario” [they seek to embellish the nation's modest and humble present by observing its legendary existence] (Hacia otra España 134).

Opposed to the traditionalists are those guided by the critical instinct, which Maeztu describes as follows:

El instinto crítico, que ya en tiempos de nuestros padres juzgó el pasado frente al tribunal de la razón, y hubo de condenarlo al conocer la gran debilidad interna que ocultaban los esplendores de otros siglos, se rebela hoy contra esa joroba de heroísmo suicida que nos legó por toda herencia aquel pasado y aspira a conquistarse libremente, la parte de sol que aún reserve el destino a nuestra España.

[The critical instinct, which already in our fathers’ times made the past stand trial before the court of reason and ended up condemning it because it was aware of the internal weakness concealed by the splendors of other centuries, rebels against the burden of suicidal heroism handed down by that past as our only inheritance, and aspires to freely conquer for itself those sunny spots that destiny might still have reserved for Spain]. (Hacia otra España 134; emphasis in orig.)

It is fascinating to note here the significant analogies between the critical instinct and the emotion of indignation, for they will allow us to provide a richer, more theoretically informed description of Maeztu's disposition toward the myths of empire. Both the critical instinct and the emotion of indignation perform an evaluation of a state of affairs based on a set of
reasons (here the past is made to “stand trial before the court of reason”); the content of the evaluation is in both cases a moral condemnation of the given state of affairs (here the critical instinct condemns the past “because it was aware of the internal weakness concealed by the splendors of other [one might add imperial] centuries”); and they both feed off of the commitment to a more just reality (here Maeztu is indignant in the name of “those sunny spots that destiny might still have reserved for Spain”).

From a theoretical viewpoint, Maeztu’s opposition between a traditional and a critical instinct recalls Nietzsche’s discussion of the antiquarian and the critical uses of history in “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,” the second of his Untimely Meditations (1874). Nietzsche’s influence on the young Maeztu is easy to establish for not only did he devote a long article to Nietzsche in 1899 entitled “Nietzsche y Maquiavelo” (Artículos 117–22), but he also repeatedly quoted him in Hacia otra España (see, for instance, 153, 202, 206). Critics of different persuasions have also remarked on this influence (Blanco Aguinaga 169; Fox, “Ramiro de Maeztu” 31–34; Sobejano 318–37; Villacañas Berlanga, Ramiro 57–65). But what, to my knowledge, has not been noted is the way in which Nietzsche’s reflections on the uses of history and Maeztu’s indignant reaction to the myths of empire are mutually illuminating.

It is true that in “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,” Nietzsche does not dwell on the emotional dispositions of the critical historian. He only mentions that the critical historian “wants to be clear as to how unjust the existence of anything – a privilege, a caste, a dynasty, for example – is, and how greatly this thing deserves to perish” (76). The critical historian thus seems dissatisfied with things as they are and he aspires to destroy them in the name of justice. Like the indignant person, the critical historian seeks to right a wrong. The means he will employ to do so also involve, as in the case of indignation, a judgment: in a language that recalls Maeztu’s above description of the critical instinct, Nietzsche argues that critical history, in opposition to the antiquarian sense of continuity and veneration of the past, possesses and employs

the strength to break up and dissolve a part of the past […] by bringing it before the tribunal, scrupulously examining it and finally condemning it; every past, however, is worthy to be condemned – for that is the nature of human things: human violence and weakness have always played a mighty role in them. (75–76)

In the light of Nietzsche’s description of the critical use of the past, Maeztu’s indignation at the imperial past in the name of Spain’s future can be
properly characterized as the task of a critical historian. Conversely, Maeztu has shown that the core sentiment that animates the critical historian is indignation.

The Conquest of the *meseta* as a Second (Imperial) Nature

Maeztu followed two distinct strategies to assuage his indignation at the imperial experience. First, he attempted to diminish its importance, making it one of the Spanish people's traits, but certainly not the most valuable or determining one. Whereas in 1892 the Restoration had hailed Columbus as a symbol of the Spanish state's imperial powers, a mere seven years later Maeztu sought to downplay the conquering deeds of the Spanish people:

Podrán los cañones yanquis cerrar el libro de nuestra historia colonial; podrán poner término provisionalmente a nuestras gloriosísimas conquistas; pero la conquista ha sido sólo uno de nuestros múltiples destinos; quizás por haber consagrado a ella nuestras iniciativas hemos sufrido la decadencia agrícola, la comercial, la artística.

[The Yankee cannons can close the book on our colonial history; they can put a provisional end to our most glorious conquests; but conquest itself has been but one of our multiple destinies; perhaps because we devoted so much of our energies to it we have endured a period of decadence in agriculture, commerce, and the arts]. (*Hacia otra España* 127)

The second way in which he let go of his indignation at the historical Spanish Empire involved the idea of an internal colonization. Indeed, Maeztu replaced the source of his indignation (the actual Spanish Empire and its myths) with the fiction of a modern, bourgeois empire contained within Spain's borders. Much like Nietzsche's critical historian, he wielded his indignation to passionately fight the legacies of what for him was a dead past (the imperial one) so as to replace it with a new past, one that would hold the promise of prosperity and modernity for the future. As Nietzsche wrote,

The best we can do is to confront our inherited and hereditary nature with our knowledge, and through a new, stern discipline combat our inborn heritage and implant in ourselves a new habit, a new instinct, a second nature, so that our first nature withers away. (76).

Maeztu looked for these new habits and instincts in a variety of traits that were already present in the Spanish people but that were either
underappreciated or underdeveloped. Thus, hope resided for Maeztu in the inborn qualities of the Spanish people: “la española es una raza sobria, fuerte, fecunda y sana” [the Spanish race is a sober, strong, fecund, and healthy one] (126); in the beautiful bodies of Spanish women: “En esas caderas arrogantes cabe otra España, si acaso ésta se hundiera” [In those arrogant hips there is room for another Spain, if this one were to sink] (121); or in the vitality and joie de vivre of certain urban public spaces: “nada más lujoso, nada que dé mejor idea de la alegría de vivir que el aspecto de nuestros paseos y de nuestros teatros” [nothing is more luxurious, nothing gives a better sense of our zest for life than the look of our avenues and theaters] (Hacia otra España 144).

But these new habits and instincts, which were designed to inform Spain’s new imperial adventures, found their most clear expression in Maeztu’s panegyric to the entrepreneurial capacities of Bilbao – a synecdoche for the more advanced, industrialized regions of Spain, namely the Basque Country and Catalonia. Maeztu certainly admires Bilbao’s material prosperity, but he finds even more commendable the set of values and attitudes that made it possible: the drive for economic success, the will to work hard, and the search for material pleasures (Hacia otra España 88). Indeed, Maeztu’s argument offers an economic thesis where the historical conquest of the Americas (a glorious yet ultimately failed and misguided endeavor in his eyes) is refigured as the internal conquest of the dry, barren, unproductive meseta castellana by the industrialized, capitalist periphery. In Maeztu’s industrial imagination, the old dream of conquering territories in the Americas gives way to the new dream of conquering the plateaus of Castile:

¿Quién duda de que las nuevas Indias, y consiguientemente la nueva España, están en esas llanadas hoy estepas, en esos montes preñados de minerales, en esos ríos que se pierden miserablemente?

[Who doubts that the new Indies, and therefore the new Spain, reside in those plains that today are steppes, in those mountains full of minerals, in those rivers whose waters are miserably lost?]. (Hacia otra España 215)

The new heroes of this industrial conquest are not the famous conquistadors of America who, lest we forget, were still hailed in 1892, but rather Basque and Catalan businessmen. And their ideals are not those of a patriotism inextricably linked to monarchy and religion, but rather those associated with economic gains:
Se hará esta industrialización no por patriotismo, ni por equidad, sino por espíritu de lucro, para asegurar mercados a las fábricas, como se hizo con la colonización de las praderas del Far West por los industriales yanquis del Este a mediados del siglo.

[This industrialization will not be achieved on account of patriotism or equity, but rather profit; it will be done to secure markets for the factories, much in the same way that Yankee, east coast industrialists colonized the Far West’s prairies in the mid-nineteenth century]. (Hacia otra España 172)

In contrast to Unamuno’s En torno al casticismo, where the quiet life of Castilian peasants is appropriated (and mythified) as the expression of Spain’s intrahistoria, in Maeztu, Castile appears as a backward, exhausted community that was misguided into believing in the glories afforded by imperial, military conquests:

Yo bien sé que Castilla, madre pródiga y poco calculadora, se ha quedado sin sangre por darla a un mundo nuevo, por regarla con soberbia grandeza en todos los confines del planeta.

[I am well aware that Castile, a generous and uncalculating mother, was left without blood when it gave it to a new world, spraying it with superb greatness around the four corners of the world]. (Hacia otra España 165)

Maeztu may well pay lip service to Castile’s historical achievements, but there is no doubt that for him there is no future for the region unless it renounces the dreams of conquest that elicited his indignation and accepts instead to be conquered. Without the capitalist colonization of Castile, prosperity will never be achieved in Spain:

La colonización de Castilla es un doble negocio de importancia suprema para el litoral. Colócanse los ociosos ahorros y se agrandan mercados a las industrias.

[The colonization of Castile is a double deal of the utmost importance to the coastal regions. It allows them to put their idle savings to good use and to increase the markets for their industries]. (Hacia otra España 167)

In this context, the intellectuals’ task is to celebrate and further this new conquest by writing what he calls “la epopeya del dividendo y del negocio”
Ramiro de Maeztu’s Hacia otra España

[the epic of dividends and business deals] (Hacia otra España 167). When he emphasizes how support for his vision of “another Spain” will produce great economic benefits for all, Maeztu leaves aside his indignation and presents himself as a worthy representative of the young, radical intellectuals that were attempting to create a modern, dynamic people. Read in Gramscian terms, Hacia otra España is a text that constructs Maeztu as an “organic” intellectual in search of his social class – at times he appears as an organic intellectual of the industrial bourgeoisie while at others he seems to side with the working class.15

For Gramsci, the distinctive features of “organic” intellectuals come into view when they are contrasted with those of “traditional” intellectuals. According to the binary scheme in his famous essay “The Intellectuals,” “organic” intellectuals accompany (and to a certain extent, make possible) the emergence of a new social class by giving it “homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields” (5). In contrast, “traditional” intellectuals are tied to the previous economic structure without their being aware of this dependence, putting “themselves forward as autonomous and independent of the dominant social group” (7). What Maeztu most definitely is not is a traditional intellectual. In fact, Hacia otra España shows, time and again, Maeztu’s disdain for traditional intellectuals. For him, these intellectuals are the ones who represent the interests of everything that is wrong with Spain: the interests of the Church, of the State, and of Castilian landowners. They are the oft scorned “bohemia leguleya que ha venido gobernando desde hace un siglo” [pettifogging, bohemian lawyers who have been ruling the nation for the last century] (Hacia otra España 166).

What is not so clear, however, is what kind of an organic intellectual Maeztu aspires to be. Certainly, it is not difficult to discern the directive function of organic intellectuals that Gramsci describes in Maeztu’s auroral rhetoric, in his passion for bringing about a new historical era. He confidently exclaims: “Comienza para España la época del trabajo y la reconstitución” [Spain is starting a new epoch of work and of reconstitution] (Hacia otra España 161). But when Maeztu simultaneously shows enthusiasm for the industrial bourgeoisie’s conquest of the Castilian plains and the strengthening of the working class, he muddles Gramsci’s clear-cut scheme, where social class rigorously determined the social function of an intellectual. One was either an intellectual of the bourgeoisie or the working class. However, in Maeztu’s reasoning there is no contradiction in fighting for the emergence of both a strong national bourgeoisie and a strong national proletariat because he knows that none will exist lest the nation rapidly industrializes itself. As he puts it: “de la España del período burgués que ahora se está incubando
saldrá una formidable agitación obrera” [out of the Spain of this brooding bourgeois period will come a formidable working class unrest] (Hacia otra España 172–73).

As the writer of the 1898 Generation most influenced by Nietzsche, Maeztu’s emotional response to the imperial defeat was mediated by a series of Nietzschean motifs such as the heroic pathos of the overman, the superiority of noble morality over slave morality, and the affirmation of a Dionysian sense of life (Sobejano 318–37). To these themes we could also add the indignant assessment of both the late nineteenth-century colonial regime and the imperial past, a necessary precondition to judge the events of 1898 not as the end of Spain’s glorious history but as a new beginning, as the possibility of an optimistic future ruled by a strong national bourgeoisie and working class.16 In sum, Hacia otra España can tell the economic, Social-Darwinist story of Spain’s participation in a new era of expanding economic activity because it subjected the imperial experience to two distinct operations: first, through its author’s indignation, it condemned it as a dark period of damaging political and religious domination that generated even more pernicious historical myths about Spain’s power and capacities for conquest; and second, it resignified the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century conquest and colonization of the Americas as the early twentieth-century conquest and colonization of the Castilian plains by the emergent industrial bourgeoisie. It is only after this double transformation that Hacia otra España incorporates the imperial past into the constitution of Spaniards as a modern political people.

Readers familiar with Maeztu’s writings will readily note that this indignant, modernizing disavowal of the imperial experience contrasts sharply with his later work, especially his deeply traditionalist, utopian essay Defensa de la Hispanidad (1934). While in the late 1890s Maeztu sees the early modern Spanish empire in the Americas as a foreclosed historical epoch whose pernicious effects nonetheless survived in its last colonial possessions, by the early 1930s he views the imperial project (especially the legacies of Rome and of Catholicism) as a weapon against the liberal humanist tradition which inspired the proclamation of the Spanish Second Republic (1931–1939). Emphasizing the Catholic ideal of salvation, he writes in 1934 that “La Hispanidad es el Imperio que se funda en la esperanza de que se puedan salvar como nosotros los habitantes de las tierras desconocidas” [Hispanidad is the Empire founded upon the hope that the inhabitants of unknown lands save themselves as we did] (Defensa 240), a statement that squarely contradicts the young Maeztu’s socialist and anticlerical views. What at the end of the nineteenth century was judged with indignation and was considered an unusable repository of archaic national values that
paralyzed the will to live (the empire), thirty years later was given a radical new life – something that testifies as much to the inconsistency of Maeztu’s normative commitments as to the theocratic, conservative drift of both his social views and political positions.

Notes

1 Regenerationism sought to unite the middle classes and the bourgeoisie by proposing, among other measures, “the setting up of agrarian credit schemes, the extension of communication and distribution networks (more canals and railway lines), the decentralization of government, investment in training and basic education, the reform of the judiciary and the introduction of social security benefits […] All this had to be accompanied by electoral reform to eliminate fraud and dismantle the cacique system” (Balfour, The End 70). For an account of the different ideological tendencies within regenerationism, see Cerezo Galán’s El mal del siglo (221–54).

2 The book is divided into three parts: “Páginas sueltas” [Loose pages], “De las guerras” [On wars], and “Hacia otra España” [Toward another Spain]. Of the thirty articles in the first two parts, only fifteen are dated: they were written between August 1896 and September 1898. In the third part, only one article is dated (“La asamblea de Zaragoza,” November 1898). One can read this decision to date the articles as Maeztu’s attempt to give us a glimpse of the evolution of his thoughts on the “problem of Spain” before, during, and after the Spanish-Cuban-American War.

3 For an engaging account of the polemic between Maeztu and Azorín, see Fox’s Ideología y política en las letras de fin de siglo (65–93).

4 As José Luis Villacañas points out in “El carisma imposible,” Maeztu is an energúmeno who nonetheless provides us with the paradigmatic ethos of early twentieth-century Spanish intellectuals.

5 For a clear formulation of Maeztu’s position regarding the Spanish-Cuban-America War, see the article “¿Qué se debe hacer de Cuba? Cuatro palabras con sentido común” in Artículos desconocidos (59–64).

6 The early Maeztu was violently anticlerical because, among other things, he saw the influence of the Catholic Church as a burden on Spain’s capitalist modernization. As he put it in “El dinero frente a la iglesia,” an article published on March 26, 1899 and collected in his Artículos desconocidos, “No se puede citar un solo caso de un self-made man (hombre enriquecido por sí mismo) educado por religiosos” [One cannot name a single case of a self-made man educated by religious institutions] (81). To understand Maeztu’s thoughts at the turn of the century, I have found the following primary and secondary sources useful: Maeztu, Artículos desconocidos; Blanco Aguinaga, Juventud del 98 (157–75); Fox, “Ramiro de Maeztu”; Villacañas Berlanga, Ramiro de Maeztu (57–105).


8 With respect to reasons for indignation, see also Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity (100–01).
As I will make clear, Nietzsche’s thought was crucial for the young Maeztu’s intellectual development.

See, for instance, the three-part article “Solidaridad española” in *Artículos desconocidos* (137–48), or the article “Bilbao” in *Hacia otra España* (87–89).

A native of Bilbao, Maeztu was particularly proud of the new work ethic that was emerging from the iron mines surrounding the city. For a useful overview of these economic changes, see García Nieto and Yllán 192–202; for an excellent study of the cultural and social changes that occurred around 1900, see Salaün and Serrano.

As Antonio Valdecantos notes, a more complicated case would be when indignation takes as its object not the actions of a person, but rather a more elusive object such as the absence of indignation itself (82).

Maeztu approvingly alludes to Costa’s dictum in *Hacia otra España*: “Dejemos al Cid en su sepulcro, bajo la custodia de tan celoso carcelero como debe serlo el señor Costa” [Let us leave the Cid in his sepulcher, under the custody of such a diligent warden as Mr. Costa must be] (184).

Unamuno responded to Maeztu’s call for the conquest of the Castilian *meseta* in a two-part article titled “La conquista de las mesetas” and published in *La Estafeta* on June 5, 1899 and November 11, 1899 – both of which are collected in *Obras completas*, Vol. 4 (1051–65). In these articles, Unamuno argues that if capital has not colonized the unproductive lands of Castile yet, it is because it is against its self-interest to do so. He also labels Maeztu “[un escritor de una] inteligencia brillante e impetuosa, envuelta en un yanquismo tan generoso como poco maduro aún” [a writer with a brilliant and impetuous intelligence, one that is enveloped by a yankeeism that is as generous as it is immature] (1057). Perhaps as a result of Unamuno’s criticism, Maeztu softened his acerbic characterization of Castile, going so far as to affirm that “Por la admiración que sus hombres inspiran acaba uno enamorándose de la misma tierra castellana” [As a result of the admiration that [Castile’s] men inspire, one ends up loving the Castilian land itself]. See “La meseta castellana: retractación” in *La Correspondencia de España*, December 29, 1901. For a lucid analysis of the polemic, see Fox’s *La crisis intelectual del 98* (93–111) and Villacañas’s *Ramiro de Maeztu* (75–83).

Carlos Blanco set out a Marxist interpretation of *Hacia otra España* in *Juventud del 98*. Needless to say, my characterization of Maeztu as an “organic intellectual” of the industrial bourgeoisie and the proletariat is at odds with this Marxist interpretation of the text. See Villacañas Berlanga, *Ramiro de Maeztu* (83–89) for a more nuanced interpretation of Maeztu’s early thought as it evolved from socialist to more modernizing positions. Villacañas Berlanga’s interpretation is more congenial to my own characterization of Maeztu’s early thought.

For the importance of bourgeois ideals for Maeztu’s thought, see José Luis Villacañas Berlanga’s excellent study *Ramiro de Maeztu*.