Chapter 5

Archipelago Europe: On Creolizing Conviviality

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l’Europe se créolise. Elle devient un archipel. Elle possède plusieurs langues et littératures très riches, qui s’influencent et s’interpenètrent, tous les étudiants les apprennent, en possèdent plusieurs, et pas seulement l’anglais. Et puis l’Europe abrite plusieurs sortes d’îles régionales, de plus en plus vivantes, de plus en plus présentes au monde, comme l’île catalane, ou basque, ou même bretonne. Sans compter la présence de populations venues d’Afrique, du Maghreb, des Caraïbes, chacune riche de cultures centenaires ou millénaires, certaines se refermant sur elles-mêmes, d’autre se créolisant à toute allure comme les jeunes Beurs des banlieues ou les Antillais. Cette présence d’espaces insulaires dans un archipel qui serait l’Europe rend les notions de frontières intra-européennes de plus en plus floues.1

Le Monde (February 4, 2011)

1 English translation (EGR): ‘Europe is getting creolized. It has become an archipelago. It has several languages and very rich literatures that are interlinked and mutually influence each other. All the students learn them, they speak several of them and not only English. And then, Europe is composed of several regional islands, becoming more and more vibrant, more and more present in the world such as the Catalan, Basque or even Breton islands. Without counting the present populations from Africa, the Maghreb, the Caribbean, each drawing on centuries and millennia old cultures, some remain amongst themselves, others become immediately creolized like the Young Beurs or Antillians of the suburbs. This presence of spaces configured by islands in the archipelago that will be Europe renders the notion of intra-European borders increasingly fluid.’
Introduction: ‘L'imprévisible’: the philosophy of the unforeseeable

In 2011, Édouard Glissant shared with the journalist Frédéric Joignot his observation on the fluidity of Europe’s borders and its Archipelagian Becoming.² Bringing Europe closer to the epistemic grounds of ‘Antilleanity’ (Glissant, 1981; Wynter, 1989), Glissant discusses this latter not as a Caribbean singularity but as a forceful episteme (Wynter, 1989), through which the world can be thought in the Gestalt of creolization. This understanding of creolization introduces us to a notion of ‘living together’ departing from a critical race and decolonial perspective (Gutiérrez Rodríguez, 2010). Although creolization emerges within the semantic context of racial classification, it goes beyond it by opening the possibility of thinking the fuzziness and uncertainty of mixing. As Glissant (1996, 18–19) notes in Introduction à une poétique du divers:

La créolisation exige que les éléments hétérogènes mis en relation ‘s’intervalorisent’, c’est-à-dire qu’il n’y ait pas de dégradation ou de diminution de l’être, soit de l’intérieur, soit de l’extérieur, dans ce contact et dans ce mélange. Et pourquoi la créolisation e pas le métissage? Parce que la créolisation est imprévisible.³

Creolization represents the ‘unforeseeable’, a new way of thinking. It engages with new ways of understanding the world as relational and interconnected. Although creolization emerges from the specific historical context of the Caribbean, marked by colonialism, slavery, indentured labor and imperialism, for Glissant it represents a universal proposal for ‘Tout-monde’ (Glissant, 1997a, 2010). Translated to the European context, Glissantian creolization invites us methodologically into an analysis of the ‘poetics of relation’ and the conceptualization of ‘transversal’ Becomings (Glissant, 1990, 1997b), as well as contributing to theorizing an ethics of conviviality.

This chapter discusses the epistemological implications of Glissantian creolization in Europe. It first explores the relationship between creolization and the Caribbean philosophical framework of ‘Antilleanity’. In order to

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³ English translation (EGR): ‘Creolization requires that the heterogeneous elements set in relation “inter-valorize” themselves, that means that there should not be any degradation or diminishing of the Being coming from the inside or the outside, while they are in touch and in a process of mixing. And, why is creolization not “métissage”? Because creolization is unforeseeable.’
understand the context of the translation of this concept to Europe, it then looks at current political debates in Europe on cultural mixing, focusing in particular on the discourse on integration in Germany and the United Kingdom. Third, the chapter addresses the limits of integration by drawing on interviews on ‘making homes’, conducted with members of Spanish and Latin American networks in Manchester between 2010 and 2013.4 Let us first move to considering Antilleanity.

‘Antilleanity’: an epistemological model for creolizing Europe?

As an expression of ‘Antilleanity’, creolization denotes a Being and Becoming in the World characterized by Du Boisian (2005) ‘double consciousness’. This consciousness derives from the experience of oppression, on the one hand, but, on the other, it is also driven by the struggle for liberation. As Glissant (2008) stresses in his struggle for the acknowledgment of slavery in France and the commemoration of the abolition of slavery (Manifeste pour l’abolition de tous les esclavages), creolization emerged within the colonization of the African continent, the enslavement and forced displacement of its people, and loss of social identity. Glissant (1997b, 17) argues in the Poetics of Relation that this has led to a long history of oppression in the Antilles, as for ‘more than two centuries whole populations have had to assert their identity in opposition to the processes of identification or annihilation triggered by […] invaders’.

Glissant defines the epistemic matrix underpinning this process of colonization as the ‘Philosophy of the One’. This philosophy has evolved on the grounds of the ‘duality of self-perception’, which he sees articulated in Mediterranean myths:

Mediterranean myths tell us, thinking about One is not thinking about All. These myths express communities, each one innocently transparent to self and threateningly opaque for the other. They are functional, even if they take obscure or devious means. They suggest that the self’s opacity for the other is insurmountable, and, consequently, no matter how opaque the other is for oneself (no myth ever provides for legitimacy

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4 The interviews were conducted in the research project ‘Latinizing Manchester’, which was part of the research network, ‘Diasporic Pathways for Aspiring Cosmopolitan Cities’ at the University of Manchester. We conducted fifty interviews with individuals and organizations forming part of Spanish and Latin American networks in Manchester, Liverpool and Hebden Bridge. For further information on this network, please consult (archived page) https://web.archive.org/web/2011105011428/http://www.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/ricc/projects/researchprojects/index.html.
for the other), it will always be a question of reducing this other to the transparency experienced by oneself. Either the other is assimilated, or else it is annihilated. That is the whole principle of generalization and its entire process. (Glissant 1997b, 49)

The perception of colonized regions and their people as the ‘Other’ of Europe (Spivak, 1987; Dussel, 1995) was grounded on this ‘principle of generalization’ operating on the epistemic grounds of the ‘duality of self-perception’. Despite anticolonial struggle attempting to put an end to this system of devaluation, this pattern of thinking persists. As Glissant writes, most:

of the nations that gained freedom from colonization have tended to form around an idea of power – the totalitarian drive of a single, unique root – rather than around a fundamental relationship to the Other. Culture’s self-conception was dualistic, putting citizens against barbarians. Nothing has ever more solidly opposed the thought of errantry than this period [colonization] in human history when Western nations were established and they then made their impact on the world. (Glissant, 1997b, 14)

The project of creolization aims to decolonize this pattern of thinking. Opposing a model of identification based on dichotomies, creolization recognizes the limits of a model defined as the ‘Philosophy of the One’ (Glissant, 1997b, 47–49). Thus as Glissant (47–49) notes, decolonization ‘will have done its real work when it goes beyond’ the limitation imposed by the colonizers. In particular, Martinique and the other French Antilles needed to face the effects of the French model of assimilation. Thus, ‘Antilleanity’ denotes resistance to French imperialism, and goes beyond mere ‘opposition’. Going beyond the French imperative of assimilation imposed on the population of the Antilles during colonial times (Wynter, 1989) and still present in state programmes in Europe on migration (Chamoisseau and Glissant, 2005), Glissant proposes that we think identity formations beyond mimesis or opposition. Emulating the colonizer or the hegemonic Self, or accentuating a counter-identity to this, reinforces the duality of self-perception. As he notes, ‘the duality of self-perception (one is citizen or foreigner) has repercussions for one’s idea of the Other (one is visitor or visited; one goes or stays; one conquers or is conquered)’ (Glissant, 1997b, 17).

extended through a relationship with the Other’. The ‘Other’ is not presented in fixed opposition to the Self, but as an ‘aesthetic constituent’ (Glissant, 1997b, 129) of the relational character of our Being.

This idea of identity challenges any notion based on the assumption of a single root (‘racine unique’) by emphasizing the experience of ‘transphysics’, the emergence of a paradoxical state of a subject which remains-in-place (rester au lieu), while branching out in different directions. It is this ‘specific oikumene of the Antilles’, its diasporic nature (Wynter, 1989, 638), that nourishes the knowledge, imaginary and subjectivities shaped within the context of the Antilles. Departing from this premise, creolization foreshadows an understanding of the world as a ‘kaleidoscopic totality’ (Glissant, 1997b). Thus, it relies on ‘multiple, rather than singular, roots and foundations that, when taken as a whole, aim at the dual objectives of liberation and of setting foundations for freedom beyond the trappings of the dialectics of asymmetrical recognition’ (Gordon and Roberts, 2009, 6). As such it outlines a perspective that invites us to understand society as an ensemble of continually changing transversal social relations. As an expression of ‘Antilleanity’, creolization opposes the politics of assimilation by asserting ‘the need to recapture but also transcend a vanished unrecorded history’, by creating a ‘mode of imaginary’, ‘a sense of cultural identity’ emerging out of the struggle against a ‘present governing order of discourse and its related episteme of a global order of knowledge’ (Wynter, 1989, 638). Interrupting this global order of knowledge, presupposed by the epistemic grounds of the ‘Philosophy of the One’, creolization insists on the interrelational, interconnected and interdependent character of our Being, opening the space for thinking about the ethics of conviviality.

The ethics of conviviality: cultural mixing and reversing integration

Departing from a planetary humanist vision, based on the relational and transversal character of a living together, creolization derives from ordinary encounters and practices as well as emotional networks of support, fueled through human needs, desires and affects. In my ethnographic research on ‘Latinizing Manchester’, everyday encounters reveal the complexity of interdependent social relations. People are constantly in touch with each other, although these encounters do not always happen on a voluntary basis. Encounters happen on the basis of the social organization of needs, relying on the work, services and products, provided and delivered. This societal network of interdependent relationships, characterized by neighborhood, friendship and kinship models of relationality, emerges within the logic of social (re)production (Gutiérrez Rodríguez, 2010). This means that relationality cannot be thought outside of the circuits of production and
consumption. It is in this context that interdependencies are created, conditioning the relational character of our Being. Yet, as Glissant concedes, relationality is also created through the poetics of relation, the numerous creative and affective crossings within which our lives meet and evolve.

In current official political, media and scholarly debates and governance directives on migration, this sense of being that people create through everyday connections is ignored. Instead, the matrix of the ‘Philosophy of the One’ is steadily revived through the rhetoric on integration, operating with the dichotomy of ‘Us’ and ‘Them’. On this basis the nation’s Other is imagined as circumscribed by impenetrable ethnic, racial, national or religious boundaries and constructed as impediments to national social cohesion. For Glissant

on peut se métisse sans toucher a quelque sort – métissage peut être mécanique – petite pois blanc & petite pois noir – pratiqué de manière mécanique – l’idée que le colonisateur et la culture du colonisateur est supérieur s’est maintenue pour longtemps. Autant que cet idée est maintenue, le métissage ne peut pas qu’être mécanique.5

Glissant develops here the concept of creolization in opposition to a notion of cultural mixing (‘métissage mécanique’) which reinforces the assumption of society as organized by sealed ethnic and racial units. As he emphasizes, the notion of ‘métissage’ relies on the perception of cultural differences fixed in space and time, reproducing a normative script of racial and ethnic classification. Current state discourses on diversity and integration in Western Europe operate within this paradigm.

As Glissant and Chamoiseau noted in their open letter in 2005 to the French Minister of Internal Affairs, Nicolas Sarkozy,6 models of living together in migration societies in Western Europe are organized around two dominant paradigms: (a) the French model of ‘integration’ and (b) the British model of ‘communitarism’. While the French model sets a universal notion of ‘citizen’ as the organizing principle of political and social integration, the British model is rooted in a liberal understanding of personal freedom, acknowledging the individual’s right to cultural difference

5 This is an extract from two radio programmes, ‘Itinéraire, territoire et histoire’ and ‘Odyssées immigrées: créolisation et décolonisations’, broadcast on June 18 and July 16, 2010 on the French radio station Aligre FM. This extract is from the second programme. See www.edouardglissant.fr/mediatheque.html. English translation (EGR): ‘one can mix without being touched at all – mixing can be mechanical – white peas & black peas – it can be practiced in a mechanical manner – the idea that the colonizer and its culture is superior holds on for a long time. As long as this idea persists, mixing can’t be other than mechanical’.
and its expression. This particular perspective has informed multicultural agendas in the 1980s and 1990s in the United Kingdom.

Numerous studies have demonstrated (Lash and Featherstone, 2002; Gilroy, 2004; Parekh, 2005; Lentin and Tetley, 2011; Ahmed, 2012), how multicultural politics articulated by anti-racist groups aiming at transforming society and working towards social justice in the United Kingdom and the USA in the 1970s, have been transformed into devices for managing diversity in institutions in the 1980s and 1990s. In the United Kingdom, anti-racist struggles in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s represented the driving force pushing multiculturalism onto the political agenda. Its institutional translation onto local council agendas resulted in more or less radical local policies and strategies of black and minority ethnic (BME) inclusion (Parekh, 2005). In other European countries, ‘multiculturalism’ has played a rather insignificant role in state politics.

For example, in Germany multiculturalism has been mainly a marginal topic on the state agenda. However, in her speech to the Christian Democratic Youth (Junge Union) in Postdam on October 16, 2010, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel conceded that the ‘concept of Multikulti has failed, it absolutely failed.’ Interestingly, Merkel avoided spelling out the concept of multiculturalism by using the abbreviation ‘Multikulti’. Defining ‘Multikulti’ as ‘happily living side by side’, she concludes that ‘Multikulti’ has never worked in Germany. She goes on to suggest that the multicultural lens focusing on the promotion (‘fördern’) of migrants needs to change to that of requesting (‘fordern’) migrants to integrate into German cultural values, laws and rules. Merkel’s speech is quite paradoxical especially if we consider that ‘multiculturalism’ was never on the German government’s agenda and that this country only officially recognized its long-standing history of immigration in 2005. Yet, her speech is symptomatic of the shift from multiculturalism to integration within the EU region.

In 2008, the European Immigration and Asylum Pact (EIAP) established a five-year programme for the justice, freedom and security sector. This pact instituted ‘immigration control’ (security), ‘economic immigration’ (migration management) and ‘integration’ as necessary priority targets for the consolidation of EU migration and asylum directives. ‘Integration’ in

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8 In 2004, the German government passed the Zuwanderungsgesetz (Immigration Act) that came into force in January 2005. This Act represented the first official recognition of Germany as a ‘pluri-cultural’ society.
9 This pact is based on a previous communication, ‘A Common Immigration Policy for Europe: Principles, Actions and Tools’ (European Commission, 2008) and the ‘Policy Plan on Asylum: An Integrated Approach to Protection across the EU’ (European Commission, 2007).
this context refers to the imperative of ‘cultural assimilation’. Interpellating post/migrants and refugees as ‘culturally different’ and imagining the nation in monocultural/monolingual terms, integration demands that these groups succumb to a national dominant culture. Thus, post/migrants and refugees are subjected to a disciplinary agenda of national domestication through integration programmes that are forcefully monitored by language and citizenship tests (Ha, 2010).

Integration programmes disregard the fact that people form part of a society in the moment at which they enter. The idea of a fragmented compartmentalized society in which people and collectives live in cocoons, which inform integration discourses and policies, does not correspond to social realities. People are relational beings immersed in webs of affective, pragmatic and productive relations. It is in this regard that Peggy Levitt and Nina Glick Schiller (2004) suggest that we understand connections to places and people through ‘Ways of Being’ and ‘Ways of Belonging’. The first asserts a more spontaneous connection that people establish through ordinary practices while the second refers to the conscious identification with systems of beliefs and values. Discourses on integration obfuscate the social dynamics of creating ties. Further, the perception of the migrant and refugee as being ‘unable to integrate’ erases the fact that European colonialism and imperialism spread languages and cultural codex as well as artistic, intellectual, legal and governance traditions to the colonized territories. Thus, most postcolonial migrants arriving in Europe speak one European originated language (for example, English, French, Dutch, Spanish, Portuguese or Italian).

While the ‘integration’ rhetoric has become the dominant explanatory model for addressing ‘social cohesion’ in Europe, its institutional translation has regional specificities. Germany has followed EU initiatives by establishing a National Integration Plan, with integration offices, officers and programmes (see discussion in Gutiérrez Rodríguez, 2010). Other EU countries, like Spain, have adapted the integration agenda to regional needs. This has led to different outcomes – for example, in Catalonia or the Comunidad de Madrid in regard to the pursuit of the cultural and political agenda (Gil Araújo, 2010). Despite the British anti-racist movement’s (1970s–1980s) critique of the ‘integration’ paradigm and the current official representation of the United Kingdom as a ‘multicultural nation’, as exhibited in the closing event of the 2012 London Olympics, ‘integration’ has found its way back onto the UK state agenda.

When we consider current political migration discourses in Britain, the tension between integration and multiculturalism becomes apparent. For example, this was reflected in the British Prime Minister David Cameron’s ‘immigration speech’ on April 14, 2011.10 Addressing two different

communities of ‘immigrants’, the ‘rooted communities’ and the ‘newcomers’, he differentiated between those who are either ‘integrated’ or ‘unwilling to integrate’ by focusing on the economic contribution of different groups. For example, the ‘teachers from all over the world […] inspiring our young people’; or the doctors and nurses ‘from Uganda, India and Pakistan who are caring for our sick and vulnerable’; or the ‘entrepreneurs from overseas who are not just adding to the local economy but playing a part in local life’; but also the new immigrants ‘on occasions not really wanting or even willing to integrate’.11

Whilst acknowledging migrants’ contributions to society, this multicultural-integrationist approach ignores the fundamental character of contemporary societies as creolized. Instead, it paradoxically insists on society as divided into compartments. Disregarding peoples’ connections, affective ties, intellectual and creative relations, state programmes on ‘integration’ reduce people to targets of control and management. In times of public spending cuts, precarization of labor, extending poverty and rising antimigrant nationalism in Europe, we need an approach that acknowledges peoples’ strategies and pathways for ‘making homes’.

Making homes: Latin American/Spanish networks in Manchester

Stories of ‘making homes’ complicate political discourses on ‘integration’. These discourses, based on Émile Durkheim’s (orig. 1893, 2013) concept of ‘social integration’,12 conceive society as divided into different entities. As such the stress is on ‘living in parallel societies’ or ‘the lack of social cohesion’. This perspective can only be produced if people’s everyday practices and connections are disregarded. Integration rhetoric tends to ignore the creolized fabric within which we live. The state’s integration perspective has no interest in people’s activities, or their affective and cognitive ways of making sense of and connecting to the world they inhabit. Converting people into ciphers of control and management, integration overlooks the fact that society is made and transformed by our activities and networks. Narrations of post/


12 Émile Durkheim’s (2013) concept of ‘social integration’ was based on his study of middle European societies in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Durkheim develops his paradigm of ‘integration’ within an analysis of industrial societies in Europe. Attending to the impact of industrialization on social relations, in particular on the system of affiliation and kinship, Durkheim is concerned with the loss of solidarity structures. He considers that society needs to have organizations that guarantee ‘social integration’ in order to stabilize the social order.
migrants’ ‘making homes’ in the host country reveal the tension in which individuals find themselves, when attending on the one hand to the claims of ‘integration’, and, on the other, to their own ways of ‘making homes’. In contrast to an abstract notion of ‘integration’, stories of ‘making homes’ evidence a complex understanding of the spatial and affective dimensions of subjects’ relationships to the places they frequent and inhabit. People start to feel at home in the environment in which they live, when they know where to shop, when they finally have a job, when they know which school or nursery their children can attend, when they sit in a café with friends or as one of our research participants from the research project Latinizing Manchester, Carmen, told us, when you know how to navigate the city on a bicycle.

Finding their way around new places was an immediate concern for all the research participants. One of them, Pablo, who lived in Asunción, Paraguay and Madrid, Spain before settling in Manchester in 2007, told us about his Facebook page ‘ComeToManchester’. The idea for this project emerged in 2009, after he noticed the increase in Spanish speakers arriving in the city. Most people he met were young and interested in learning English. The Facebook page ‘CometoManchester’ provided this group of users with information on language schools and accommodation. In the last two years, however, the use of the page has expanded as Latin Americans used the site in search of jobs, English courses and/or accommodation.

Since 2008, Spain has been experiencing an acute economic crisis and working conditions have worsened dramatically for nationals and migrants alike. A study conducted by Colectivo Ioé in 2012 reveals that in 2011 21.8 percent of the migrant population worked in precarious conditions as compared with 11.8 percent of the Spanish population. In terms of unemployment in Spain in the same year, Spanish citizens had a rate of 18.4 percent, African migrants 39.1 percent, other non-EU residents 49.3 percent and Latin Americans 28.5 percent (Colectivo Ioé, 2012). Since this study was conducted, the total unemployment rate has skyrocketed to approximately 27 percent in February 2013. The average salary in the Spanish population has increased by 0.8 percent and the average salary in the migrant population has decreased by 10.6 percent. Amongst young people, the unemployment rate for Spaniards (46 percent) and migrants (49 percent) is almost the same. The poverty rate in migrant households is 31 percent, while it is 19 percent in Spanish households under 65 years; 6.7 percent of the Spanish population live in extreme poverty as do 10.8 percent of non-EU migrant households (Colectivo Ioé, 2012). This desperate situation might explain why,

after decades of high immigration, Spain has begun to experience a decrease in immigration and an increase in emigration.¹⁴

Contrary to numerous media reports on the ‘brain drain’ of highly skilled young Spaniards, our study *Latinizing Manchester* argues for a more heterogeneous picture of current Spanish emigration. It is not only Spaniards who are leaving the country: the highest emigration is of Latin American migrants. During our research we met dual Spanish citizens with a Latin American background. For them returning to their or their parents’ country of origin is not an option. Instead they opt to continue their journey to other countries in Western Europe. Very often this journey, as in the case of other Spanish migrants, leads to France, the United Kingdom, Germany and Switzerland.¹⁵ This development is also noticeable if we consider the figures for Spanish nationals registered in the 2011 census of Spaniards residing abroad *Censo de Españoles Residentes Ausentes* (CERA).¹⁶ A close look at these figures reveals an increase in Spaniards living abroad. For example, between 2008 and 2011, the Spanish population in Switzerland increased by 6.9 percent (70,532 to 75,354); in Germany by 6 percent (83,041 to 88,248) and 16.4 percent in the United Kingdom (46,646 to 54,321). There has been a similar movement of Spaniards emigrating to Ecuador, Argentina, Cuba, Peru, Bolivia and Brazil in the same period of time.¹⁷

More recent figures (González Enríquez, 2012) on the Spaniards registered abroad (PERE) published by the *Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas* (INE) (2013) confirm this trend. In 2012, 157,933 Spaniards were registered abroad, representing an increase of 6.3 percent on the previous year. Of these newly registered citizens, 43,671 were born in Spain. In total, 1.9 million Spaniards are registered abroad, but 1.25 million of them were not born in Spain. Of the total figure, 1.21 million Spaniards abroad reside in Latin America, while 656,841 live in Western Europe. The highest increase in Spanish immigration

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¹⁴ In 2011, 457,650 people emigrated to Spain (42,127 were returning Spaniards), while 507,740 left Spain (González Enríquez, 2012). In 2010, Spain took in 90,489 migrants. These figures do not just include the number of Spaniards leaving the country: in 2011, of the 507,740 emigrants, only 62,580 were Spanish citizens. The largest group leaving the country were former migrants.


¹⁷ In Ecuador, the number of Spaniards registered in the CERA increased from 2,884 (2008) to 7,236 (2011). This represents a 150 percent increase. In Peru, the number of Spaniards increased by 54 percent, from 6,903 (2008) to 10,600 (2011). Meanwhile, between 2008 and 2011, in Bolivia, the number of Spaniards increased by 46 percent, from 2,647 to 3,876, and in Brazil by 30 percent, from 67,128 to 87,128 (*La Vanguardia*, January 22, 2012).
in the previous year has been to Ecuador (51.6 percent), Chile (16.42 percent), Peru (13.81 percent) and Colombia (12.06 percent) (PERE, 2013), but France and Germany have also had a noticeable increase. Argentina, France, Venezuela and Germany have the largest numbers of Spanish nationals.

If we take into consideration Carmen González Enríquez’s (2012) observations regarding the figures based on the residential categories (Estadística de Variaciones Residenciales) and the local registration figures of Spaniards abroad (Padrón de Españoles Residentes en el Extranjero), both statistics reveal that the highest number of Spaniards living abroad were not born in Spain. As she argues, this has to do with the ‘ius sanguini’ and ‘ius solis’ principles to which Spanish citizenship is tied. This means that it is not only citizens with Spanish ancestry who can apply for Spanish citizenship: the children of migrants born in Spain are also Spanish. Also, nationalization laws for Latin Americans in Spain enable them to apply for Spanish citizenship after being resident for two years. This has created a diasporic and creolized Spanish population.

The current migration of Spaniards to Latin America and other European countries reveals the intricate character of a creolized Europe, and Spain in particular. In Latinizing Manchester, we encountered a high number of Spanish-Latin Americans, mainly Ecuadorian-Spanish, Peruvian-Spanish and Colombian-Spanish. Similar observations have been recorded by studies on Latin American networks in the London region (see McIlwaine, 2011; Martin Rojo and Marquez Reiter, 2011). These communities are also increasing in the north of England, and particularly in the Greater Manchester area. Though Latin American and Spanish migrants opt primarily for London as their first destination, the precarious working and living conditions they encounter in the south drive them to consider the north as an option. Manchester cannot offer the employment opportunities in the service and hospitality sectors as does London. Nonetheless, Manchester is an international transportation hub and has a local labor market based on expansive health, education, entertainment, media and football industries offering new arrivals some job opportunities.

Migration from Spain and Latin America to the United Kingdom and particularly to the north-east of England is not new. Immediately after the Spanish Civil War, some Spanish exiles found refuge in Britain.18 In the late 1950s and 1960s, they were followed by a labor migration (Pozo-Gutiérrez, 2009). Yet, the traces of this migration that settled in the north of England, predominantly in the Liverpool and Manchester areas, seem to have been erased from local history.19 It would not be until the 1980s that a new Spanish

18 See, for example, the Basque Children of ’37 Association (www.basquechildren.org) and International Brigade Memorial Trust (www.international-brigades.org.uk).
19 In an interview with Instituto Cervantes representatives in Manchester, we were told that the first Instituto Cervantes initiative was created at the beginning of the 1990s.
immigration to the United Kingdom was triggered through study exchange programmes such as ERASMUS and romantic liaisons, predominantly of Spanish women with British citizens (Bravo-Moreno, 2006). Some of the research participants that we met in different cultural events in the Instituto Cervantes or the Cornerhouse in Manchester, and at a Spanish ‘parents–toddlers’ group, evidence this migration background. Despite this mostly professional migration in the 1980s and 1990s, current Spanish migration to Manchester is more heterogeneous.

During our study we met people from different professional and working backgrounds, from a fifty-year-old builder to a twenty-year-old hairdresser, as well as lawyers, doctors and entrepreneurs. Some of the Latin American migrants we met told us about their entrepreneurial ventures in Spain. Two of the participants owned call centers that they needed to close immediately after the first impact of the global economic crisis. Remigration represented one of the options for coping with the crisis. Returning to their country of origin was not an option as they felt at home in Spain. Their affective and in some cases material ties to Spain persist. Also, some have acquired Spanish citizenship and are now dual citizens. Thus, the question of belonging and settlement has been complicated through the experience of migration. They have become ‘creolized’ citizens, coping like other Spanish citizens with the disastrous effects of the crisis. On arrival in Manchester, this group of migrants has needed to start anew. Due to the lack of awareness of this migration, the support service in place for migrants provided by the city council is limited. Advocacy groups such as the Latin American Support Group or Migrants Supporting Migrants20 in Manchester are working towards establishing public awareness of this migration and working with local authorities in producing information and services for these new arrivals in Spanish.

Yet, as the example of Pablo’s Facebook page ‘CometoManchester’ demonstrates, Spanish and Latin American migrant networks rely first on other migrant and diasporic networks in the city. Being new to the city brings people of different social and cultural backgrounds closer. As Oihane from the Basque Country told us, she finds it, ‘a bit easier to make the connection to people who are not British. I find it easier with foreigners’. Viviana from Venezuela spells out the fact that this connection is related to the experience of becoming migrants: ‘I connect with other migrants because we share something even the difficulties with language, or being cut off’.

While these feelings of proximity relate to everyday fleeting encounters or the engagement with local networks, the workplace is one of the main spaces in which connections to the city are established. The strategy of branding Manchester as the ‘cosmopolitan hub’ in the north of England

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since the late 1990s (Peck and Ward, 2002) has attracted investment to the transport, education, health and entertainment sectors. The expansion of the International Airport, increasing rail connections to London and the flourishing leisure industry connected to football, music, weekend events and festivals has put Manchester on an international map. This has attracted international capital, professionals, students as well as international workers for low-paid jobs in the entertainment, hospitality and cleaning industries, mainly from Africa, South Asia, Latin America, South and Eastern Europe. Most of the newly arrived Latin American and Spanish migrants found a job in one of the numerous ‘Latino’ establishments: Spanish, Brazilian and Mexican restaurants or salsa clubs. For example, a Brazilian participant who works in the kitchen of an Argentine restaurant told us that his colleagues come from ten different countries, amongst them Argentina, Colombia, Poland, Rumania, Nigeria and São Tomé.

Also, when it comes to the sharing of leisure and sacred spaces, our research participants reported frequenting bars and dance locations along with migrants from different backgrounds. In a visit to the Portuguese Church, we encountered Portuguese and Brazilians alongside Lusophone migrants from Angola and Mozambique. Despite the sharing of workplaces, sacred, educational and leisure spaces between European and non-European migrants, it is worth reiterating that the European Economic Area (EEA) migrants hold a privileged legal status in comparison to non-EEA migrants. Also, white Western Europeans are not targets of racist attacks and discourses or policies preventing them from entering or settling in Europe. The divide between EEA and non-EEA migrants is indicative of the unequal treatment EU migration policies established between these two groups in matters of employment, health, education and family reunification rights.

For example, the requirements for non-EEA citizens seeking to study or work in the United Kingdom have increased in the last few years because of the government’s five-tier points system for immigration. More recently, in order to regulate the settlement of families, new measures have been introduced increasing the income threshold and asking spouses to complete English tests prior to their arrival in the country (Travis, 2011). As Carmen, a Spanish citizen married to a Mexican citizen, told us, migration rules can produce desperation and separation. She told us how, despite her husband being invited as a visiting professor by one of the universities in the northwest, he and her child, both Mexicans, ran the risk of not getting their visas extended as they were required to have private health insurance. As a Spanish citizen, Carmen did not need to fulfill this requirement. Thanks to a support network they were able to obtain private insurance.

21 For further discussion of the role of sacred spaces in migration networks, see Evans et al., 2011; Liebelt, 2011; Souza, Kwapong and Woodham, 2012.
After studying in Manchester and returning to Brazil, which led to the loss of her five years’ work visa, Zurema encountered several hurdles in her attempt at settling anew in Manchester. At the moment of our interview, she was applying for citizenship. She shared the following observations with us:

For each visa you have different difficulties. The highly skilled migrant visa is very difficult to get. You have to collect many papers. But the fees are also very high. If you apply with a solicitor or without it is a different thing. If I remember it right I spent £1,000 for the residency, or £1,500, with a solicitor that will be another £1,000. For all the documents you also have to spend a lot of money. Money is an issue. For the residency alone I spent £2,000. And for the citizenship by the end of the year I will have to spend another £2,000.

Denise, a successful Brazilian entrepreneur, told us how after living thirteen years in the United Kingdom she is still struggling to be recognized as an entrepreneur as she needs to reach the capital threshold of £250,000. She decided to apply for a skilled migrant visa and enrolled in MA studies to fulfill the points’ system requirements. At the time of the interview, she had a residency permit for two years. Other research participants being made aware of these potential difficulties have obtained their residency permit before arriving in the United Kingdom. Octavio, a Mexican man who worked in the tourism industry in Cancun and who was married to an English woman from the northwest of England, started to work immediately after his arrival in a factory in order to acquire an independent visa.

Thus, the experiences of ‘making a home’ in Manchester are severely curtailed by migration policies which privilege EEA nationals. Most migrants are not able to work in the sectors they were employed in previous to their immigration to the United Kingdom. Both EEA and non-EEA migrants experience devaluation of their educational qualifications and experiences. Their university degrees are often not recognized by the state, and their lack of English proficiency as well as familiarity with local employment networks determined their access to precarious and low-paid work sectors such as cleaning, caring, hospitality and catering services. EEA citizens do not struggle as do non-EEA migrants with visa requirements and the threat of being forced to leave the country if they lose their residency status or become ‘undocumented’.

As the examples of Spanish and Latin American networks in Manchester have shown, creolization does not only articulate ‘rhizomatic’ forms of belonging, emerging from different affective, pragmatic and material ties to places and social networks. Rather, creolization is experienced in a context where people are subjected to remnants of colonial practices of racial classification (Quijano, 2000, 2008). As such, while creolization entails going beyond a racial matrix of social stratification, it emerges within the dynamics of racialization. Stories of ‘making home’ evolve within the
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juncture of subjugation by and liberation from governance technologies and practices operating on the basis of the ‘citizen’/ ‘migrant’ divide. At the same time, stories of ‘making home’ tell us about the creolized fabric of our everyday encounters. As some of our research participants told us, this view is often missing when Europe is imagined as the primary locus of immigration. As our research participants remind us, if we consider European migration to the Américas, a missing but significant link for the conceptualization of creolizing conviviality is uncovered.

Creolizing conviviality

Engaging with the idea of creolizing Europe means that we set Europe in relation to its colonial, slavery and imperialist past. It also means challenging the myth of ‘ethnic’ and ‘racial’ purity evoked in numerous historiographies of modern nation building (cf. Bhabha, 1990; Anderson, 1991). As I previously mentioned, migration policies continue to operate on the basis of a territorialisizing logic incessantly reinstating the territorial borders of the nation and the inscription of the national community as based on a ‘single’ ethnic, racial and cultural root. The research participants in Latinizing Manchester contest this perception of Europe by recalling the connections between Europe and the Américas. The perception in official discourses of Europe as the center of international migration begins to crumble, not only when the colonization of the Américas is considered but also when the emigration by Europeans to the Américas in the seventeenth, eighteenth and the late nineteenth/early twentieth centuries is recalled (Altman and Horn, 1991; Baines, 1995; Moch Page, 2003). As Zurema (see above) reminds us, this part of history cannot be ignored when it comes to understanding conviviality in Brazil, and particularly in São Paolo:

If we see São Paolo, the way that São Paolo has been populated, the way relationships went in terms of cosmopolitanism is very different from the way that Manchester has done. For example, we have the biggest Japanese colony outside Japan, the biggest Syrian-Lebanese colony, the biggest Jewish community. There are of course Portuguese, Spanish people, there are indigenous people in São Paolo, there are black people. But when people relate to each other the reference is not, oh, you are Italian, you are Russian, you are French, you are Jewish. You are here. It is a city of twenty million people. At the end of the day you are in the middle of an unknown place. While in Manchester I see this in a rather different way. You can see the Pakistani people living in Manchester, they have maybe been living there for 100 years, three generations. They will still be Pakistani people. They won’t be British.

Zurema tells us about migration as a normalized process – in fact, the founding ‘myth’ of a Eurocentric discourse of modern nation state building
in Brazil. European migration to Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Argentina in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was linked to a process of modern nation-building in these countries, presupposing Europe as the cradle of modernity (Germani, 1966; Marschalck, 1976). Industrialization, technological advancement and political progress were associated with economic, political and intellectual developments mainly in England, France and Germany. Without going in detail into the complex relationship between modern nation state building and migration in this region, European migration was foundational for the process of colonization of the Cono Sur in the nineteenth century, contributing to the whitening and Europeanization of this territory. Yet, as Zurema reminds us, this project was criss-crossed not only by other migratory movements from Asia and the Middle East but also by the Présence africaine and américaine (Hall, 2003) of the Afro-descendent and indigenous populations. Despite this country’s admission of its pluri-cultural heritage, the logic of ‘interior colonialism’ (González Casanova, 1996) favoring the white European-descendent population, marginalizing the Afro-descendent population and excluding the indigenous population, still prevails in Brazil (Telles, 2006). Nonetheless, as Zurema points out in comparison to Britain, Brazil ambivalently acknowledges its multicultural, multiracial and multilingual heterogeneity, while Europe neglects its own history of colonialism, slavery and imperialism. Thus, immigration to Europe is perceived as a unique process detached from any historical connections and devoid of the memories of its own histories of intercontinental emigration throughout the last centuries. Despite multicultural politics, insisting on the pluri-cultural/lingual composition of the nation, this historical background is omitted from official representation of the nation, contributing to a vacuum in peoples’ knowledge about their connections to former European colonies.

As the narratives of the research participants illustrate, diasporic groups contest foundational myths of the nation based on an ‘imagined homogenous community’, very often thought as monolingual/mono-cultural. Further, diasporic groups remind us of the historical connections to their former colonized territories, which have led to the movement of Europeans to the African, Asian and American continents. Thought from this angle, creolization is not just related to the Caribbean nor is Europe’s creolization a recent one brought about by post-1945 immigration. Rather, as Glissant asserts, creolization represents the basic foundation of all societies. It defines the condition of existence of ‘Tout-monde’.

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22 Brazil did not abolish slavery until 1888. Initially, the Portuguese authorities promoted miscegenation as a way of ensuring a Portuguese presence in underpopulated regions. But, fearing the increasing black population, Brazil subsequently opened its doors to white immigrants, who were given preference over black people in jobs, housing and education (cf., Twine, 1997; Telles, 2006).
Conclusion

As the conversations with the research participants exemplify, our connection to places and people are shaped by accidental, undomesticated and dispersed encounters. Considering the spontaneous and relational character of our lives, but also our emotional and material dependence on others, makes us realize that we constantly transgress the imagined boundaries set by mono-cultural/monolingual prescriptions. Relationalities are guided by needs, feelings, affects and desires that bring us together in unexpected ways. It is in this regard that our relationships unfold in transversal ways, converging and diverging at different points.

Creolization is informed by transversal vital forces moving us in different directions and embracing the principles of interconnectedness and interdependence (Glissant, 1996). Attending to the rhizomatic movement of our lives, the concept of creolization proposes an ethics of ‘living together’ driven by the unexpected and resulting from the multiple encounters and connections in our lives (Glissant, 1997b, 15). Creolization speaks about an affective being in the world – the sensibility that nourishes the potential of conviviality. In this sense, creolization stands at the heart of a political and ethical project of conviviality.

Works Cited


23 Comment raised by Glissant in an interview with Sophie Haluk for the French radio programme 'Odyssées immigrées: créolisation et décolonisation' (n. 5, above). English translation (EGR): ‘Creolization is the movement of the world – why would you like to go against the movement of the world? The movement of the world is first to create a kind of being and collective – which are not based on affiliation, legitimation and the unique root – sure, the whole movement is a liberation movement and not a movement of oppression.'


