Notes

INTRODUCTION

1. C. Witke, “Prudentius and the Tradition of Latin Poetry,” Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association, vol. 99 (1968): 516, argues that in this passage, Prudentius is not concerned, like Horace, with the power of the text to achieve immortality, but rather with the process of praising God which ultimately will promote salvation. In Witke’s view, Prudentius writes poetry to praise God, which facilitates personal salvation. Witke sees this passage in relation to the programmatic strophes of Cathemerinon 3 in which Prudentius’ pronouncements on poetry’s function and purpose is limited to hymns—i.e., poetry of praise. Witke’s article is full of important observations and analyses, but in this case his discussion is overly narrow, neglecting the other poems’ concerns with textuality, empire, and theology.


5. F. Young, L. Ayres, and A. Louth, eds., Cambridge History of Early Christian

6. See notes 3 and 4 for recent articles. These are important lines of inquiry that yield interesting results.


9. D. Quint, Epic and Empire: Politics and Generic Form from Virgil to Milton (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), 8–9. Quint develops the idea that two traditions of epic, the Vergilian epic of winners, and the Lucanian epic of losers, work their way through European literary history (Quint 1993, 8). The former represents imperialism, empire, and monarchy, while the latter more oligarchic and Republican notions—still including imperialism. Regarding the losers, Quint adds, “[T]he defeated hope for a different future to the story that their victors may think they have ended once and for all” (Quint 1993, 9). The Marxist critic Fredric Jameson, in his The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1981), comments that the focus on “codes in structuralist and post-structuralist theory envisions history as a repository for ‘clear’ communication from the past offering a master narrative under whose aegis the occult meanings of texts can be solicited and allegorically rewritten.” Quoted in G. Spiegel, The Past as Text: The Theory and Practice of Medieval Historiography (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 20.


11. C. Conybeare, Paulinus Noster: Self and Symbols in the Letters of Paulinus of Nola (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 132, comments regarding Augustine’s Confessions that “what has come to constitute our vocabulary of personhood is . . . nascent in this period.” D. E. Trout, Paulinus of Nola: Life, Letters, and Poems (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 79, similarly comments, “[A]s a shared poetic and literary sympathies bound men in intellectual community and provided a language for social relations, so a new poetics was required to articulate a new relation to the world and God.” It is time to include Prudentius in this ongoing discussion of the important intellectual issues having to do with self and community.

12. Prudentius was born under the consulate of Salia in 348 CE (Praef. 24). He claims three cities as his own: Caesaraugusta (modern Saragossa) (Pe. 4.141), Calagurris (modern Calahorra) (Pe. 1.116, 4.31), and Tarraco (modern Tarragona) (Pe. 6.143). There are two further references to his homeland at Pe. 2.537 and 6.145.


14. Prudentius equates his education to learning how to falsa loqui (Praef. 8).

15. M. Smith, Prudentius’ Psychomachia, 38 and 70 says, “Not that he ever was a Pagan, but for most of his lifetime he may have been a nominal Christian, unbothered by the spiritual implications of Christianity and comfortably at home with traditional Pagan culture” and that Prudentius had a “conversion of spirit.” Palmer, Prudentius on the Martyrs, 11, imagines Prudentius’s “causus scribendi as a ‘conversion’ from a worldly career to a single-mindedly Christian way of life.” Roberts, Poetry and the Cult of the Martyrs, 2 further asserts that, in agreement with Fontaine, it is likely that Prudentius had a conversion experience, withdrew to his own estate, and devoted himself to the life of the conversus—i.e., “lay convert to an ascetic way of life.” Roberts parallels Paulinus of Pella and Paulinus of Nola’s correspondent, Sulpicius Severus.


18. At Ham. 852–62, the soul returns to the bosom of Fides. In fact, Prudentius refers to the soul as the “nursling” of Fides (Alumnam, 853).

19. The verb form invenies is common in patristic prose for reading and studying scripture. Pagan prose writers use the form mostly of persons and inanimate objects. An exception is Seneca who uses invenies in connection with quoting a comic poet (Ep. 9.21) and reading philosophers (Ep. 64.3, Nat. Quaes. 6.17.3). But at Helviam Matrem de Consolatione 6.4 he uses invenies with percense, just like Prudentius, but not concerning the reading of texts but rather concerning the viewing of islands. The difference between pagan and Christian is clear since Prudentius and his fellow Christians see all literature as based on a quotable, citable sacred text, whereas the pagans cited authoritative texts much less frequently. Christian literature has a heavily textual orientation.

20. L. Edmunds, Intertextuality and the Reading of Roman Poetry (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 32–33, refers to S. Levin, The Semantics of Metaphor (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), which theorizes that poems begin with a submerged sentence that has both illocutionary and perlocutionary effects: “I imagine (myself in) and invite you to conceive of a world in which (I say to you).” The
establishment of the poet with empirical credibility helps to engender a suspension of disbelief in the reader thus granting the poem a truth-value.


22. Reinhart Herzog has briefly pointed out that late fourth-century poetry took an exegetical turn. See Charlet, “Aesthetic Trends,” 82–84.

23. T. Whitmarsh, “‘Greece Is the World’: Exile and Identity in the Second Sophistic,” in *Being Greek Under Rome*: *Cultural Identity, the Second Sophistic and the Development of Empire*, ed. Simon Goldhill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), concerning the relationship of Greek writers to the Roman Empire says that the “process of self-definition against the classical past extends from literary fashioning to political revisionism; that the writers under examination strategically reorientate the language of self-definition which was current in that earlier period, configuring (sometimes explicitly) the relationship between self and polis in terms more appropriate to the enormous world empire of the Roman Principate.” Christian writers between the rise of Constantine in 312 CE and the sack of Rome in 410 CE appear to follow the pattern Whitmarsh finds in the Second Sophistic.

24. Goodspeed and Grant, *A History of Early Christian Literature*, 191: “[Eusebius’s] *Chronicle* provided a skeleton for the *Church History*, which is more a history of early Christian literature than a real history of deeds or of thought.”

25. White, *Early Christian Latin Poets*, 7, argues that Paulinus of Nola “rejects the literary and aesthetic ideals of his mentor Ausonius,” having the view that poetry is not “something essentially lightweight, a form of amusement rather than a vehicle of serious truth.” The general proposition about literature does obtain in Paulinus’ case, but it remains to be seen if Paulinus has poetry specifically in mind as a vehicle of truth. The case is clearer with Prudentius. It is suggestive that White’s selection of early Christian Latin poets is published under a series entitled *The Early Church Fathers*. Are we to understand these poets, some of whom fall under the traditional category of “church fathers,” as now being included in the category?

26. Paulinus of Nola was known in his time not as a poet (notwithstanding his famous poems on St. Felix), but as a prominent interpreter of Plato.

27. See McGill, *Virgil Recomposed*.


29. Witke, “Recycled Words,” 128, comments that Vergil “corrected and deconstructed by Prudentius could offer a framework of reference for the follower of Christ who is also a Roman citizen educated, critically aware, and often highly placed.” See also Witke 2004, 135, 138–39.


35. Criticism of Prudentius over the past decade or so has put aside the question of his contributions to the history and theory of allegory, preferring to see the Psychomachia in particular as merely an incipient or limited stage of allegorical writing.

One: An Epic Successor?

1. M. Smith, Prudentius’ Psychomachia: A Reexamination (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 234, makes the claim that one in ten lines of Prudentius borrow from Vergil. A. Mahoney, Vergil in the Works of Prudentius (Cleveland: J. T. Zubal, 1934), gathers together and categorizes the linguistic and thematic commonalities between the two authors.

2. Thus, Smith, Prudentius’ Psychomachia, chapter 4, for instance, discusses his reading of the Aeneid as a whole, employing his interpretation of Vergil to reveal how Prudentius read Vergil. Prudentius’ reading of the Aeneid directly effects the composition and meaning of the Psychomachia. This kind of approach still informs the reception of Christian epic in literary history. As P. Hardie, The Epic Successors of Vergil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 57, asserts, Vergil had “ensured that the epic genre had a vigorous afterlife; through the transposition of the theme of universal power from the terrestrial to the celestial plane the Virgilian epic easily became the Christian epic.” For good or for ill the Aeneid and the Psychomachia have been and remain closely linked.

3. S. G. Nugent, “Ausonius’ ‘Late-Antique’ Poetics and ‘Post-Modern’ Literary Theory,” in The Imperial Muse. Ramus Essays on Roman Literature of the Empire II, ed., A. J. Boyle (Victoria: Aureal Publishers, 1990), 39. R. Thomas, Reading Vergil and His Texts: Studies in Intertextuality (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 1–2, confirms intertextuality as a starting point that “functions as a larger receptacle” for the process of allusion where there exists an “active collaboration between poet and learned reader.” Thus, in my approach both parties, the poet and the (implied) reader, play active roles in the construction of meaning. The alluding poet is the “first reader of allusive incorporation,” who focalizes the allusive account (S. Hinds, Allusion and Intertext: Dynamics of Appropriation in Roman Poetry [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998], 103. The reader is expected to recognize the poet’s allusive activity, especially in the case of an allegorical poem like the Psychomachia in which “hidden meanings” form the basis of an interpretation and are designed to persuade. It is unnecessary to become mired in a debate about the theoretical efficacy of isolating what the poet wants to communicate and what the reader comprehends. While in theory a reader-oriented intertextuality combined with an intentionalist view of the poet presents areas of slippage, in practice the approach suits the Psychomachia, because it dovetails with the assumptions behind the work. More generally, however, this approach facilitates a productive analysis of the shared discourse between the Psychomachia and the Aeneid. See Hinds, Allusion and Intertext, 50.

5. Smith, *Prudentius’ Psychomachia*, 164–66, sees the relationship in adversarial terms, arguing that “not at all does it [the *Psychomachia*] value epic’s basic idea” (Smith 1976, 166, and 236). For Smith, warfare and temple worship are biblical metaphors divorced from the pagan epic tradition. Hence, Smith can speak in terms of “the hard and agonizing death of epic” spawning “the birth of a new genre of spiritual allegory” (Smith 1976, 165). A. Dihle, *Greek and Latin Literature of the Roman Empire: From Augustus to Justinian* (London: Routledge, 1994), 583, subordinates epic to allegory. My approach does not envision such literary antipathy between Prudentius and the Latin epic tradition. Although Prudentius’ nurturing of the “spiritual allegory” does indeed constitute a major innovation to be imitated in the Middle Ages, the *Psychomachia* falls squarely in the Roman epic tradition. In this chapter, I trace several defining characteristics of Roman epic to show that the *Psychomachia* is a serious and successful attempt to perpetuate and revivify epic’s literary role in the Christian state. Later authors such as Dante and Milton are the direct inheritors of Prudentius’ work. When Smith views the poem in the context of the Roman epic, he concludes that the *Psychomachia*’s effect is comic (Smith 1976, 184 and 214), ironic (5), and mock-classical (236). In his approach, the Christian and the pagan are separate: “The mingling of the two literary systems is too obtrusive not to be spiritually shocking. The contradictions between Vergil and the Gospels are not smoothly resolved or synthesized—yet the display of these contradictions is morally instructive” (237). Smith assumes an opposition between the two traditions that may have not existed for Prudentius’ audience. To write epic in fourth-century Rome was to engage Roman epic tradition. This engagement is not completely oppositional nor contradictory.


7. In a brief but suggestive paragraph, M. Von Albrecht, *Geschichte der römischen Literatur*, vol. 2 (Munich: K. G. Saur Verlag, 1992), 1077, asserts that Prudentius was competing with epic poets and that the anti-Vergilian element should not be overemphasized. Rather, and in addition, the Christian poet is “striving” after the epicists like Lucretius and the Presocratic poets. Von Albrecht sees Prudentius seeking a valid mode of expression through the use of Vergil.

(Leiden: Brill, 1999). Whereas the *Psychomachia* is recognized as epic in studies dedicated exclusively to that work, the aforementioned epic histories include Claudian as the only fourth-century representative. Perceptive critics such as M. Smith, *Prudentius’* *Psychomachia*, 105–106, while acknowledging the *Psychomachia*’s epic features, sees Prudentius’ contribution to the genre as its ultimate destruction: “Unlike Juvencus, Prudentius does not compose epic; he uses epic to compose allegory. The history of medieval literature will verify that while allegory grew to vigorous life, epic never fully recovered from Prudentius’ treatment of it.” Perhaps this sort of conclusion underlies Prudentius’ exclusion from the canon of Latin epicists, for, in his hands, epic was transformed, rather than used only as an instrument of allegory. Moreover, the new epic Prudentius creates could be said to be responsible for the survival of epic, rather than the conventional epic productions of contemporaries such as Claudian. The literary phenomenon of biblical epic is certainly a new direction in Latin epic, but it does not engage the pagan Roman tradition as directly as Claudian and the *Psychomachia*. D. Quint’s *Epic and Empire: Politics and Generic Form from Virgil to Milton* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993) convincingly shows that epic lived a vibrant life long after the end of the Roman Empire in the vernacular forms.

9. The claim that Prudentius programmatically engages *Aeneid* 6 means that he is actively reworking the purpose, content, form, and inspiration for epic poetry. This is accomplished by a systematic allusive program that primarily concentrates on *Aeneid* 6. Allusion as “systematic” reads an individual case of allusion not locally, that is as “[privileging] the individual highly wrought moment,” but within a broad pattern of narrative allusion (S. Hinds, *Allusion and Intertext*, 140–41).

10. L. Gosserez, *Poésie de lumière: une lecture de Prudence*, Bibliothèque d’études Classiques 23 (Louvain: Peeters, 2001), 95–103, suggests connections between the *Psychomachia* and *Aeneid* 6. She pursues the relationship between asceticism and *kataphasis*, which she argues is figured in terms of the imagery of light and darkness. She does not treat the allusive relationship systematically, nor is her focus Prudentius’ status as an epic successor to Vergil.

11. In analyzing this intertextual relationship, the question arises: why prioritize the *Psychomachia*’s allusions to *Aeneid* 6 over the rest of the Vergilian allusions? The answer has two parts. First, it is well known that the *Psychomachia* takes most of its allusions from the second half of the *Aeneid*, especially the fighting language and imagery. On the surface, this is because the series of battles in the “Iliadic half” of the *Aeneid* provide a handy source of descriptions for the battles between the virtues and the vices. I argue in chapter 4 that these descriptions of fighting and death exploit Epicurean and Platonic discourse that is associated with the defeated vices. In effect, these Vergilian allusions do not function programmatically, but within a hierarchy of allusive associations, whose preeminent member is pagan philosophical imagery. The allusions to the *Aeneid* found in battle sequences point to pagan thought which is associated with the losers, the vices. Second, and, most important, Prudentius’ allusions to *Aeneid* 6 are systematic, in that they occur at the very beginning, middle, and end of the poem forming a clear set of connections that drive the poem. And often, when allusions to other books of the *Aeneid* occur near allusions to *Aeneid* 6, they directly recall the context and tone of the underworld narrative. It is the presence of this system of allusions to *Aeneid* 6, which expresses the *Psychomachia*’s central purpose of describing the fate of a soul and its place in the Christian city. Therefore, beginning with *Psych.* 1 and continuing...
throughout the poem, many of the allusions to Aeneid 6 tend to function program-
atically, not hierarchically; that is, they indicate the poem’s content and epic ambi-
tions. See Thomas, Reading Vergil and His Texts, 196, for the notion of primary and
secondary references.

12. Dihle, Greek and Latin Literature of the Roman Empire, 584 and 586: “Prudentius
was also the first herald of a Christian idea of Rome . . . as being at the head of the
empire which united civilised humanity . . . [this] was at the core of their [i.e., educated
people of the Imperial Age] political and cultural consciousness.” Rome can then “truly
exercise its cultural mission as described already by Virgil.”

13. Texts and Translations for the Aeneid with minor adjustments are from: Virgil,
(Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999); for the text of Prudentius, see M. P.
Cunningham, ed., Aurelii Prudentii Clementis Carmina, Corpus Christianorum: Series
Latina 126 (Turnhout: Brepol Press, 1966) and for translations with adjustments, see
vard University Press, 1949).

14. See Apoth. 402–21, where Prudentius in the context of his critique of the Jews
attacks the notion of Apollo as a source of poetic inspiration.

15. In another programmatic passage, Paulinus of Nola (Carm. 15. 30–33) replaces
Apollo with Christ as the source of poetic inspiration, but he does not allude to Vergil.
Non ego Castalidas, vatum phantasmata, Musas / nec surdum Aonia Phoebum de rupe
ciebo; / carminis incantor Christus mihi, munere Christi / audio peccator sanctum et
caelestia fari. “I shall not summon Castalian Muses, the ghosts of poets, nor rouse deaf
Phoebus from the Aonian rock. Christ will inspire my song, for it is through Christ’s
gift that I, a sinner, dare to tell of his saint and heavenly things.” (P. G. Walsh, trans., The
Press, 1975]). Paulinus alludes directly to Aen. 6. 56 at Carm. 18. 261 (Natalica 6) in
which Apollo is replaced by Saint Felix: Felix sancta, meos semper miserate labores.
This is said by a poor farmer who blames Felix for the theft of his only two oxen. Of course,
the oxen are returned to the farmer through the miraculous power of Felix. Earlier in
the poem (18. 67–70), Paulinus the narrator says that Felix is equivalent to Christ in
terms of his ontological status after death. R. Green, The Poetry of Paulinus of Nola
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), views the use of Aen. 6. 56 as mock epic humor.
Walsh, trans. The Poems of Paulinus of Nola, 376, note 19, sees Paulinus’ use of Vergil as a
temporary elevation of style for a sophisticated audience. There is no hint of the
programmatic purpose Prudentius employs at Psych. 1. The contexts of each Christian
poet’s usage could not be more different, save for the replacement of Christ for Apollo.

16. R. Thomas, Reading Vergil and His Texts, 198, says that Vergil’s single purpose is
“subsuming or appropriating an entire literary tradition” and that Vergil’s use of
“reference” conflates, corrects and renovates Greece and Rome. My argument concern-
ing the Psychomachia’s use of Aeneid 6 implies a similar consumptive literary and
ideological purpose.

17. A. J. Boyle, “The Roman Song,” in Roman Epic, ed. A. J. Boyle (London: Rout-
ledge, 1993), 5. Statius provides a twist on this construction of literary history when he
engages Vergil through the trope of self-effacement, unabashedly announcing that he
could never live up to Vergil (. . . nec tu divinam Aeneida tempta, / sed longe sequere et

18. G. B. Conte, The Rhetoric of Imitation: Genre and Poetic Memory in Vergil and


20. Hinds, Allusion and Intertext, 115, says that Greco-Roman epic has a “unified literary system,” in which occur moments of negotiation between timeframes of narrated worlds and timeframes of the poetic traditions.

21. Abraham entertains the triple-formed image in his home and he gathers all his home-related resources to fight the battle to save Lot.

22. Ham. 553–636 states that the soul gives birth to its own sins and it is fruitless to blame the world. Prudentius recalls the story of David and Absalom in which the son attempts to kill the father. This biblical story is an allegory for human beings’ tendency to give birth to accursed children (Ham. 569–70); we give birth to Absaloms who wish to kill us (Ham. 579–80). The section ends with a well-known tale from “the moralists” of infant snakes who kill their mother shortly after birth.

23. Dihle, Greek and Latin Literature of the Roman Empire, 585, suggests this line of thought: “[O]utward victories which cast nations of the globe down at the feet of Rome are finally succeeded by inner victory, through which Rome itself is freed from the rule of the demons, and now becomes the haven of true civilization.”

24. Yet, in a different sense, the world is a source of suffering to be endured on the inside—by the soul, borne to keep the soul pure and ready for the communion with the divine.

25. Also, the word labores may possess the Alexandrian notion of the difficulties in perfecting a poem, further reinforcing Christ’s inspirational role in literary creativity.

26. Prudentius uses the term in other places primarily to refer to Old Testament prophets. Cath. 4.96, 9.25; Apoth. 219, 234; Ham. 343, 574; and Pe. 10.625, Pe. 12.28 refers to Saint Paul in the capacity of prophet and the only use of the vates signifying a pagan god (i.e., Apollo) is Symm. 2.525.

27. Where she is mentioned in two places in the Prudentian corpus (Apoth. 440, Sibyllinis . . . libris, and Symm. 2.892) they are both extremely negative representations of pagan prophecy.

28. The effect adds nuance to the conventional wisdom on the position of the Christian poet vis-à-vis his work. Scholars have assumed Christian poets’ aversion to explicit promotion of their originality and poetic skills, a marked difference from the statements on the matter by, for instance Horace (Odes 3.30). C. White, Early Christian Latin Poets (London: Routledge, 2000), 10–11, discusses Christian poets’ views on literary immortality and the importance of poetry. M. Malamud, “Making a Virtue of Perversity: The Poetry of Prudentius,” in A. J. Boyle, ed., The Imperial Muse. Ramus Essays on Roman Literature of the Empire II, 68–69, decodes the last line of the Hamartigenia into an anagram in which Prudentius claims glory for himself as a poet. Although this is not the place to undertake a discussion of such a rich topic, we can conclude from the first line of the Psychomachia that even though Prudentius never says so explicitly, he has simultaneously elevated the status of the Christian poet and eliminated, what may have seemed to him, the profane pronouncements of originality of past pagan poets.

29. S. G. Nugent, “Ausonius’ ‘Late-Antique’ Poetics, in The Imperial Muse. Ramus
Essays on Roman Literature of the Empire II, ed. A. J. Boyle, 41–45, sees a similar relationship between the poet, Ausonius, and the reader: “Ausonius plays with the possibility of the text as an open space into which both author and reader may enter” (42). Moreover, while articulating a reader-response approach to Ausonius Nugent comments, “Ausonius may well be capable of seeing his own text as a transaction between author and reader, because that is the way that he, in his turn, approaches the text of Vergil (or Plautus or Ovid). It should not surprise us that the ‘reader reading’ consciously writes for the ‘reader reading’ like himself,” (44). In *Ham.* 624–26 Prudentius directly addresses the reader: *Sanctum, lector, percense volumen: / quod loquor invenies dominum dixisse profanes / vera obiectantem mortalibus.* In these lines there is a pact struck between poet and reader. Both are part of making meaning from the words on the page. In this didactic and persuasive formulation of the relationship between reader and poet, the poet interprets scripture and the reader is persuaded by the poet’s interpretation. The poet realizes the limitations of his position by appealing to the reader to look for herself if she does not believe the poet’s version of scripture. The reader, on the other hand, is in a position of power, able to discard or accept any part of what the poet offers. There is, however, a balance of power maintained between the reader and poet. Both parties, active and engaged, are required to achieve “true” (*vera*) interpretation of scripture.

30. At *Aen.* 5.730–31, *gens dura atque aspera cultu/ debellanda tibi Latio est,* the context is similar to *Aen.* 6.853. In the *Aeneid* 5 passage Anchises is telling Aeneas what he must do to settle his people in the destined place. At *Aen.* 7.651, *Lausus, equum domitor debellorque ferarum,* the context is the catalogue of Italian kings and their soldiers. The noun form of *debellare* is used in a quintessentially epic moment that lists the combatants, in this case the doomed ones, before the final battle takes place.


32. Mahoney, *Vergil in the Works of Prudentius,* 64 and 68, isolates these allusions.

33. The phrases *dubia sub sorte duelli* and *insani . . . pericula belli* recall, according to a strict philological standard, the dark and uncertain environment created in the *Psychomachia*’s invocation. Vergil’s language is used: *sed dubius mediis Mars cerrat in armis* (*Geo.* 2.283), *Martis sorte* (*Aen.* 11.110), *pugnae conterrita sorte* (*Aen.* 12.54); *saevit amor ferri et scelerata insania belli* (*Aen.* 7.461), *accendamque animos insani Martis amore* (*Aen.* 7.550), *temptare pericula belli* (*Aen.* 11.505).

34. The allusion to *Aen.* 11.505 reinforces this warfare context by conjuring up Camilla’s words to Turnus as she is going off to meet the army of Aeneas. Like Turnus, she will meet a violent death.

35. The effect of this phrase in Vergil is at once surprising and real because it portends of the torturous history of civil war that Rome was to endure. In addition, being placed in the Sibyl’s speech and in the second invocation of the *Aeneid* where the poet is summoning the inspiration to tell of internecine wars, marks this phrase as one of the most important signifiers of an idea in the epic.

36. For further details on Vergil’s allusion to this temple see R. G. Austin, *P. Vergili Maronis Aeneidos Liber Sextus* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 64 on line 69.

37. *Psych.* 9’s *praesidium* may be a resonance of *Aen.* 6.10’s *praesidit,* though the meanings are different in the two passages. *Psych.* 9’s *pro libertate* clearly recalls similar Vergilian language, for example at *Aen.* 8.648, the tone of which is dark because it refers to the Brutus of the early Republic who had his sons prosecuted and eventually ex-
executed. The Vergilian context further contributes to the uncertain, foreboding tone that both the beginning of the Psychomachia and Aeneid 6 posses. Both poems occupy the stage of the epic narrative right before the big battle. No matter what god one prays to, the uncertainty of future human events remains in the background. Thus, there is tension over the conquering of Italy in Aeneid 6 and over the victory of the virtues over the vices in the invocation and the epilogue of the Psychomachia.


39. Otis, *Virgil*, 308, says that Aeneas undergoes the death of “his old Trojan and erotic self” and has “an experience of death and resurrection or its psychological equivalent, and emerges from the underworld as a new man.”


42. M. Malamud, *The Poetics of Transformation: Prudentius and Classical Mythology* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989), 104–10, in analyzing Pe. 11, calls attention to Prudentius’ description of Hippolytus’ tomb as labyrinthine, thus connecting it to Aen. 5.588–91. She rightly concludes, as she cites Fitzgerald’s article, that Prudentius’ description is nether-worldly, emphasizing the “ease of access” to the underworld and its “strange illumination” found at Aen. 6.126–28 and 6.268–72. Also Malamud mentions the connection between the mind and the labyrinth (100).

43. See R. G. Austin, Aeneid VI, 210 on line 665 for references.

44. Statius *Achill. 1.11 has tempora vittis in the same line position. The poet is wearing the headdress as he seeks the grove of the Muses to tell his story. Statius’ use of the phrase reinforces the poet as sacred communicator and vates.*

45. Mahoney, *Vergil in the Works of Prudentius*, 59–75.

46. We may detect a comment on Vergil’s regifico luxu (Aen. 6.605) at Psych. 97, which says that the bodies of Christians should “be kept clean for their own king.” Is this a Prudentian glance at regifico luxu? After all, the divine monsters, who recline in luxury in the Vergilian passage are also dining sumptuously (epulae). Note later in the Psychomachia, Sobrietas’ description of those who follow Luxuria as reclining at nocturnas epulas (Psych. 367).

47. Psych. 92 also has a resonance with Aen. 4.25’s language of shades and night: vel pater omnipotentis adigat me fulmine ad umbras, / pallentis umbra Erebro noctemque profundam. This is an important passage in Aeneid 4 because these are the words of Dido who is foreshadowing her own death. Prudentius is concerned to reconstitute the Aeneid’s environment of death, both in the characters that experience death and the
landscape of the underworld with its diverse inhabitants. This picture ultimately becomes psychological, signaling a crucial, allusive maneuver from the underworld landscape of *Aeneid* 6, which is suggestive of psychological categories, to the explicitly spatiopsychological terrain of the *Psychomachia*.

48. The words *Tartara* and *Averno* are used by both pagan and Christians—though in this passage *Tartaro* is used of the place where Christian souls go to hell; and *abyss* is exclusively Christian in usage taken directly from the Greek, ἄβυσσος. Despite its occurrence on several Christian inscriptions (*Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*, vol. 8, 298), *manes* appears to be used primarily by pagan authors and when rarely occurring in Christian writers, signifies the pagan underworld. In addition, *Tartarus* and *Avernus* commonly evoke both Christian hell and the pagan underworld. The effect of all these words in the Prudentian passage is to characterize Christian hell in a decidedly pagan manner. A. Blaise, *Dictionnaire Latin-Français des Auteurs Chrétiens* (Belgique: Brepols, 1995), 513, lists only two Christian readings for *manes*, both from the translation of Eusebius’ *Chronicle* by Jerome (1.20.4 and 1.20.3). The evocation of the pagan underworld at the *Psych.* 89–97, in addition to key sections of the poem, which recall *Aeneid* 6, advance the case for the *Psychomachia’s* dependence on *Aeneid* 6.


50. See also *Aen.* 6.429 and 11.28, both of which refer to the gates of the underworld and whose contexts are the deaths of infants and Aeneas’ friend Pallas, respectively. *Geo.* 4.481–84 contains yet another Vergilian description of the gates and *Tartarus*.

51. Biblical epic marginalizes itself by its openly hostile stance against Roman pagan epic tradition. It may use the language, but avoids dialogue with the literary, historical, and political authority of Roman epic. Prudentius engages Roman epic at many levels, including, metaphysics, politics, the status of the hero, and other epic categories. He enters the “literary system” as for instance Walcott does when he engages Homer, Vergil, and Dante in his epic, *Homeros*. Biblical epic refuses to engage in this way.

52. On this and other invocations in Vergil, see Austin, *Aeneid* VI, 115 on lines 264–67.


54. This is M. Smith’s position. Nugent, *Allegory and Poetics*, 39–40, views Prudentius’ use of Vergil as an appropriation rather than a subversion. Prudentius is more interested in “transferring Roman excellences to Christian contexts” (40).

55. The adjective *malesuada* (*Aen.* 6.276), with which Vergil describes *Fames*, is used by Prudentius with a different personification, *Luxuries* (*Psych.* 404–5). This is an epic word used by Statius at *Theb.* 11.656 to modify *amor* and by Silius Italicus at *Pun.* 14.501 to modify *gloria*. Prudentius is clearly recalling the Vergilian usage.

56. On the Platonic context of *Aeneid* 6, see D. Feeney, “History and Revelation in

57. *Aen.* 8.362, contains similar language and part of Aeneas’ dramatic entry to the palace of Evander, a descendent of the Greeks, who exhorts Aeneas to enter only if he disdains wealth. The tension of the scene resides in the fact that Aeneas has just entered a hostile land, expressed clearly by Venus who appeals for help to Jupiter just as Aeneas enters the palace.

58. The epilogue, however, may be read as simply a rehashing in miniature of the successive battles of the body of the poem. The alternation between virtue as victorious in the soul and vice as triumphant, appears to mark the element of choice in the battle within the soul, for while we are on earth humans can never believe that the battle against vice is won. But in the epilogue both sides receive nearly equal time, suggesting that the choice is always before us.

59. Lactantius uses *ore pio* once (*De Ave Phoenice* 127); Ambrose once (*Hex.* 6.4.18); Augustine once (*Serm.* 51); Paulinus of Nola three times (*Carm.* 21.62—407 CE, *Carm.* 28.311—404 CE, and *Ep.* 33.2).

60. The expression is found eleven times in Cicero, fourteen times in Livy, and once in Caesar, Sallust, Vergil, Valerius Flaccus, and Silius Italicus. Prudentius, like his fellow Christian writers, “Christianizes” the expression, but given the connections to *Aeneid* 6 I have established, the claim to epic identity of the *Psychomachia*, a second reference to Aeneas’ meeting with Deiphobus in the underworld and the substantial pagan usage of the expression, we can confidently read this expression, as Mahoney does, as an allusion to *Aeneid*.

61. A. Mahoney, *Vergil in the Works of Prudentius*, lists *Aen.* 12.140–41 as another allusion at *Psych.* 889, but it is difficult to see what the connection is between the two passages.

62. The history of the *Aeneid*’s reception has vacillated between two views. On the one hand, there is the melancholic, elegiac view that the tragedy of Turnus’ death, as well as perceived ambiguities in the pageant of heroes and the shield passage, dominates whatever the propagandistic and ideological content of the *Aeneid* may be. On the other hand, the confident, imperial view understands the work as cosmic in reach, wherein the advent of Roman Empire confirms a universal order, inevitable and ultimately for the good. Rather than two detailed, opposing views, these readings represent general and beginning assumptions according to which a reader approaches language, scenes, and characters in the *Aeneid*. It does not mean, for instance, that each side’s reading of a character or a scene is exclusive of the other side’s reading. More accurately, the optimistic and pessimistic assumptions lead a reader to emphasize one aspect of the work at the expense of another; for instance, the *Aeneid*’s characters over its universal implications or *vice versa*. On the “voices” in the *Aeneid*, see M. C. J. Putnam, “Foreword,” and S. Quinn, “Introduction: Why Words,” in *Why Vergil? A

63. Smith reads pessimistically, seeing the Aeneid overlain with a tragic gloom that Prudentius reacts to with the grand universal vision of the Psychomachia. For Smith, the mortal characters of the Aeneid have “no salvational desire,” a phenomenon indicated by the work’s tragic tone. This is a reading heavily influenced by Christianity’s emphasis on individual salvation (Smith, Prudentius’ Psychomachia, 241). Aeneas, Dido, Turnus, and other characters do not see their purpose as personal salvation, but are clearly focused on the salvation of their peoples, whatever the cost to them individually. Prudentius understands this broader sense of salvation and recasts it as a consequence of individual Romans adopting Christian values and beliefs. The more individuals there are who adopt completely Christianity, the more likely will Rome’s greatness survive. In addition, the point is frequently made in the Aeneid that the coming of Rome may not represent salvation to the actors in the narrative, but certainly does to the generations that follow Aeneas, Lavinia, and Ascanius; this salvation can be felt most pointedly by the original reader himself who was the beneficiary of Roman citizenship in the first century BCE. The tragic fates of Dido and Turnus represent the exact opposite of salvation, namely, generational and national extinction. So, if we read the Aeneid in this way, the Psychomachia takes on a different meaning from what critics have said of it in the past.

64. H. J. Thomson “The Psychomachia of Prudentius,” Classical Review 44 (1930): 109–12, and W. T. H. Jackson, “Allegory and Allegorization,” Research Studies 32 (1964): 161–75, with whom Smith disagrees, read the Aeneid optimistically and thus emphasize the idea that the Psychomachia represents a cosmic vision, mirrored on earth as a “civilizing struggle.” Thomson argues that the Aeneas/Turnus conflict informs the Psychomachia, especially as expressed in “the contest of the divinely commissioned Trojans with the present inhabitants of their promised land under ‘proud Turnus.’” Thomson further argues that “Prudentius conceived the war of Aeneas as in a way ‘prefiguring’ the moral warfare of the soul, divine law and peace subduing ungoverned selfish passions” (112). Jackson says, “The Psychomachia assumes, as does the Vergilian epic, a struggle between two opposed views of existence—the new Trojan and the old Italian in the Aeneid, the combats between the brothers in the Thebaid of Statius, and it assumes also the possibility of the resolution of the struggle between these forces by the outcome of one titanic conflict. . . . By using these epic techniques, Prudentius lends to the Christians’ daily struggle with evil the grandeur and majesty as well as the authority of epic. . . . The implication of an epic struggle dignifies the effort to make virtue conquer vice and universalize it” (quoted in Smith, Prudentius’ Psychomachia, 165). In Jackson we witness a forerunner of Hardy’s focus on epic’s universalizing tendency and the transmission of this from Vergil to the proceeding Roman epicists.


66. Smith, Prudentius’ Psychomachia, 190. In note 18, Smith wonders whether these lines are “a central miniature of the action of the Psychomachia” (192). And Smith comments on the end of the Psychomachia, “Through the process of defeating the vices, of experiencing reversals in the moral struggle, of maintaining a watchful guard against the Barbarian attackers of Satan, the virtues have gained a glimpse of Hell and have passed on to their reward” (204). Smith does not develop these perceptive observations into a coherent view.
67. The scene of the virtues surrounding Discordia recalls the scene of the Greeks surrounding Sinon at Aen. 2.67ff. Specific linguistic references are as follows: Psych. 685/Aen. 8. 702–703; Psych. 700/Aen. 11.746 Psych. 703/Aen. 11.812. Other linguistic references for Psych. 699–715 are as follows: Aen. 12.662–63, 2.333, 2.449, 11.746, 11.812.

68. Hardie, The Epic Successors of Virgil, 4–11.

69. In Vergilian and Flavian epic, the hero has a synecdochic or metonymic quality where “Rome,” and its attendant metaphysical, political and historical connotations, is reduced to one man. The hero is “the individual who stands for the totality of his people present and future, part for the whole” (Hardie, The Epic Successors of Virgil, 4). Hardie comments further that the succession of such heroes in epic leads to the Adam and Christ of Milton (4–10). This standard theme of the unus homo takes different forms in the Flavian epicists but is radically altered in Prudentius. Regarding terminology, “synecdoche” can work in two directions, either the part for the whole or the whole for the part. In addition, “metonymy” is a one-to-one relationship where one name stands for another name. The two can be used interchangeably, though in certain cases, the whole/part relationship is instructive.

70. The only time when the virtues engage in self-destructive behavior (Psych. 328ff.), they are figured according to the description of the vice Luxuria. The winners in epic “experience history as a coherent, end-directed story told by their own power,” while the losers, “experience a contingency that they are powerless to shape to their own ends” (Quint, Epic and Empire, 9). The virtues and vices parallel this idea directly, and if we further understand them as representing Christian and pagan doctrine respectively—the connection to the political is not far. For, as the Contra Symmachum explicitly shows, Prudentius deeply engages the struggle that, although all but settled politically by the end of the fourth century, remains ideologically and spiritually in play. Each individual must be fought for, each person convinced or persuaded that immortal life is only possible through faith in the Trinity.

71. M. Smith, Prudentius’ Psychomachia, 275. Smith does not mention nor discuss the further parallels the text encourages and I give in the rest of the paragraph.

72. Hardie, The Epic Successors, 75, says of Milton’s Paradise Lost, “The contrasting claims of God and Satan for the admiration of the reader arise out of the thematization within the epic narrative of the need to make a choice (my italics), intellectual and moral, between good and evil, such being the condition of our fallen selves once the apple has been tasted.” Moreover, as Hardie mentions, Milton problematizes the choice by making good and evil similar. In the Psychomachia, this is also the case. See S. G. Nugent’s discussion of fraus in the Psychomachia in her Allegory and Poetics, 87–93. Good cannot be discerned because evil is disguised as good—i.e., the wolf in sheep’s clothing. And good becomes assimilated to worldly goods that are temporary and cater to humans’ desire for pleasure. Prudentius deserves credit for transposing Roman epic dualism from political and historical issues to the individual. What is left of the political and the historical mission of Rome is syncretized in a universal history that includes pagan Roman history. In addition, the mechanism for the problematization of the individual reader is the doctrine of free will which I will treat more comprehensively. The reader becomes part of the Psychomachia’s typological architecture as the final term in the series and thus epic’s ultimate purpose, which consisted of national and heroic concerns, becomes personal. Yet, since this “personal” epic is a product of the Roman epic tradition, it maintains a political point of view.

73. The final prayer of the Hamartigenia portrays the poet/narrator in the abject
position of a believer undeserving of a place in heaven and full of sin. This is not the heroic confidence and active stance of the virtues in the *Psychomachia* and the martyrs in the *Peristephanon*.


75. Yet the *Punica* seems to reconfirm traditional Roman values in the guise of Scipio. Valerius Flaccus’ *Argonautica* is shot through with references to contemporary Roman customs in order to show the origins of imperial institutions. The voyages of the Argo set in motion historical cycles of civilization that lead to the Roman Empire (1.536–41). Statius’ *Thebaid* revisits themes of political power and civil war but is not as directly concerned with Rome’s imperial and cosmic roles.


77. Nugent, *Allegory and Poetics*, 40, extrapolates from the historical context that the religious and the political are in conflict: “The battle fought in the soul of man has repercussions also for the confrontation between the body politic and the mystical body of the church.”

78. Nugent, *Allegory and Poetics*, 61, suggests one interpretation of the *Psychomachia*’s new temple as a triumphal military arch of the Roman Empire. The temple signifies the founding of a civilization.

**Two: Christian History and the Narrative of Rome**

1. See D. Quint, *Epic and Empire*, chapters 1 and 2 on the *Aeneid* in which “narrative itself” is “ideologically charged” and the reason for “historical identity” (45). The *Aeneid* “is the struggle not of the individual psyche but of a collective political nation” (51). The *Psychomachia* combines both the individual psychological struggle with political definition by using the latter as a resolution to the former.

2. See H. White, *The Content of the Form* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), on the idea that allegoresis is the fundamental way to describe what the narrative historian is doing. D. Quint, *Epic and Empire*, 43 comments on how “epic shapes a master narrative of history.” In the preliminaries to his postmodern critique that the metanarrative of the Enlightenment eliminates “little narratives” in the modernist quest for emancipation from history, J.-F. Lyotard, “Universal History and Cultural Differences, in *The Lyotard Reader*, ed. A. Benjamin (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), 321, aptly describes the authority of grand or master narratives: “The power of the narrative mechanism confers legitimacy . . . being diachronic and parachronic, it ensures mastery over time, and therefore life and death. Narrative is authority itself. It authorizes an unbreakable ‘we,’ outside of which there can only be ‘they.’” For the definitions of and relationship between “metanarrative” and “little narratives” see B. Readings, *Introducing Lyotard: Art and Politics* (London: Routledge, 1991), 63–64.

3. J. Burckhardt, *The Age of Constantine the Great*, trans., M. Hadas (New York:
Pantheon, 1949), 283, sees Eusebius as “the first thoroughly dishonest historian of antiquity” who participated in the creation of an imperial theology by not revealing “Constantine’s true position” and “uttered no word of displeasure against the murderous egoist who possessed the great merit of having conceived of Christianity as a world power and of having acted accordingly” (293). See also A. Momigliano, “Pagan and Christian Historiography,” in Essays in Ancient and Modern Historiography (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1977), 108–19; T. Barnes, Constantine and Eusebius (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981), 105; and A. Cameron and S. G. Hall, Eusebius: Life of Constantine (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 46 (Cameron and Hall represent current approaches which situate Eusebius as a biblical scholar and Christian apologist and not as a “scientific” historian); and, finally, E. Breisach, Historiography: Ancient, Medieval, and Modern, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 82.

4. Just as the careers of Sallust’s Jugurtha and Marius can be understood as analogies or metaphors for the decline of Rome, and therefore the corruption of a Republican Romanitas.

5. Pe. 11.1–22; and in the first twenty lines of Pe. 9 Prudentius portrays himself interviewing the caretaker (aedituus) of Saint Cassian’s tomb.

6. Symm. 2.343–46: ipsum / sanguinis Hectorei populum probo tempore longo / non multos coluisse deos rarisque sacelli / contentum paucas possuisse in collibus aras; they ignored crucial events to defend their position: e.g., Symm. 2.309–11: quid mihi tu ritus solitos, Romane senator, / objectas cum scita patrum populique frequenter / instabilis placiti sententia flexa novari? It is especially noteworthy that Prudentius feels no compunction about lecturing Symmachus on the history of Roman pagan religion. In addition, at Symm. 2.312–15 (nunc etiam quotiens solitis decedere prodest / praeteritosque habitus cultu damnare recenti, / gaudemus conpertum aliquid tandemque retectum, / quod latuit), Prudentius augments his critical and teleological views of history by arguing that the study of history allows humans the flexibility in the present to change and adapt. Old ways that do not work must be discarded for new ones. Roman history is rife with such examples, but the poet does not reject altogether the old ways.

7. M. Smith, Prudentius’ Psychomachia, chapter 3, skillfully discusses typology and history in the Psychomachia from an exclusively Christian perspective without a major consideration of the pagan Roman contribution.

8. Quint, Epic and Empire, 30, relates the use of history to universal historical narrative and “the principle of history—whereby identity and power are transmitted across time in patrilineal succession.”


10. This trope’s effect is best measured as “a literary device” that constructs a “sacred story.” N. Frye, The Great Code, The Bible and Literature (New York: Harcourt, 1982),
explains that of the many figures used in writing narratives causality and typology move in time. Whereas causality is past-oriented, based on reason and observation, typology is forward-looking, future-oriented, and based on faith and hope. Frye sees typology as a metaphorical language of proclamation, the basic expression of which is “this is that.” This language is applied within the historical frame of salvation history, which Frye understands as a series of revelations. Thus, typology plays a central role in salvation history. In Prudentius’ work, the correspondences that define typology are the means for the construction of his historical narrative, which enacts an allegoresis—that is, it means something other than what it literally says. Typology is necessary but not sufficient to form a Christian theory of history; it may participate in forming such a theory by playing the role of creating a historical narrative that, when taken as a whole, results in a meaning different from its constituents (events)—i.e., salvation history. The Psychomachia in particular operates in this manner, but the same can be said to a lesser degree of the Peristephanon by itself and when juxtaposed with the Psychomachia. F. Young, “Typology,” in Crossing the Boundaries: Essays in Biblical Interpretation in Honour of Michael D. Goulder, eds. S. E. Porter, P. Joyce, and D. E. Orton (Leiden: E. J. Brill Press, 1994), 48. T. Fabiny, in his The Lion and the Lamb, writes eloquently about Frye’s views of typology worked out in The Great Code. The intertextual element is expressed in typology’s correspondences between personages, events, words, and concepts derived from historical circumstances that constitute particular manifestations of the broad category of allegory. See M. D. Goulder, Type and History in Acts (London: SPCK, 1964) and Young, “Typology,” 39.

11. This typological method is part of a poetics of history in which the past, as a construction of writing, is, “pregnant with the future”—i.e., the Fall prefigures salvation—Fabiny, The Lion and the Lamb, 20.

12. Prudentius’ historical narrative in both the Psychomachia and the Peristephanon manifests itself through the distribution of allusions from the three major historical traditions he controls: the pagan, Christian, and Hebrew traditions. In other words, the construction of the historical narrative is represented through a series of organized and carefully chosen allusions from these traditions. In the Psychomachia, the historical narrative is not the surface narrative of the battle between the virtues and the vices and is assembled from allusions to “real” events that happened “in time.” The surface narrative is straightforward, and perhaps monotonous, summed up as merely a series of set piece battles with the victory of the virtues and the building of a temple. The bridge which connects the surface narrative of virtue/vice battles and the subnarrative of historical allusions is the comprehension of these two narrative levels by readers themselves. For the Psychomachia assumes that they experience the struggle between the virtues and the vices, and, hence, the readers’ own time, the present, becomes intertwined with the history, the past, constructed through Prudentius’ allusive technique. The argument of the poem is that the present individual is part of salvation history. In this way sub- and surface narratives merge, the present becomes bounded to the past. A similar argument can be made for the Peristephanon. The surface narrative of this series of poems is the deaths of martyrs that took place in the near past, but a subnarrative, made up of events even further in the past, I submit, results in the conjoining of Roman and martyr historical traditions. Prudentius sprinkles each poem with allusions to Rome’s pagan past in order to merge the surface narrative of the martyr with the bulk of Roman history.
13. R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 50, sums up the Christian approach to historical events: “[Providential history] . . . will attach a central importance . . . to the historical life of Christ,” and discusses Eusebius’ *Chronicle* as a universal history “where all events were brought within a single chronological framework . . . inspired by a new purpose, the purpose of showing that events thus chronicled formed a pattern with the birth of Christ in its center” (51).

14. The discourse of Christian personhood takes different forms according to its theological, ethical, political context. In this chapter, I move freely between these contexts but always assume, as I believe Prudentius does, that the portrayal of the soul determines how one talks about the Christian person. My use of the term “self” functions as a locus for the theological, ethical, and political discourses of the individual.

15. Augustine *De Doct. Chr.* 2.28.42–44 says that profane, worldly history does give useful knowledge for understanding scripture since it is under God’s control—i.e., somehow divinely directed. The notion of history is also part of Augustine’s radical theory of subjectivity in which time is synchronic and the past and the future exist only as a “present of things past, a present of things present and a present of things future because these temporal entities exist in the mind and nowhere else. Memory therefore is the present of things past.” See J. Coleman, *Ancient and Medieval Memories* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 97 and *Conf.* 11.8. In “early” Augustine, then, sacred and profane history are combined into a synchronic view in which human memory, as it distinguishes the past and the future in the now, sees the past as “ever present and ever relevant” (J. Coleman 1992, 100). Likewise, when looking to Prudentius’ use of typology, it is clear that past events merge into the present and future through the development of a person’s ability to hold simultaneously in her mind past, present, and future events. This is the point at which a person constructs meaning.

16. Charlet, “Prudence et la Bible,” 93, lists the New and Old Testament books alluded to in the *Psychomachia* and the *Peristephanon*.

17. Spiegel, *The Past as Text*, xiii, refers to N. Frye’s notion of emplotment, which accounts for the creation of a (historical) narrative: “a text’s structural characteristics and narrative economy, as the submerged vehicle of meaning.” See also White, *The Content of the Form*, 51.

18. Prudentius uses *fabula* to indicate a general idea of lies and falsity at *Symm.* 2.50, when he blames the poets (*poetica fabula*) for propagating false gods. See also *Pe.* 10. 956–58 where stories about Christ are not “fictional,” *fabulosa* and *Symm.* 1. 191, which gives a typical literary meaning of the word as stories about heroic men. But in other passages there are signs of Prudentius expanding the meaning of the word. For instance, at *Apoth.* 294–309, *fabula* at first glance is set in opposition to historical sources which he deems as false. But in *Apoth.* 295–96, true stories, history, can only come from god via an intermediary like Moses or Christ whom, in this passage, Prudentius argues has always been with God (*orbis principio*, *Apoth.* 303) including the time when he instructed Moses. Prudentius projects a Platonist ontology onto storytelling. The stories of history occupy the realm of the divine, Human stories are one level removed from this absolute truth because they admit of falsity. Thus, they must be carefully scrutinized. *Fabula*, however, is a general word for narrative story, the form in which all information, whether of God or not, is communicated. For human beings to receive true stories, they must put their trust in
Christ as the mediator of divine history. The notion of story then spills over into the human world because of our relationship to God as having been created in his own image. We are in a typological relationship (Apoth. 309) with God and Christ, which not only proves our relationship to the Father, but also bespeaks our ignorance of true fabulae without the mediation of Christ. For Prudentius, typology, history, and narrative (fabula) have a necessary and complicated relationship. Apoth 1018–19 again uses fabula to connote a human life in which Christ takes part yet is clearly beyond. For a more direct association of fabula with typology see Ham. Praf. 25–31, which associates Marcion the heretic with the fratricide Cain. Pe. 2. 313–20 links fabula with figura, but in service to a mocking and false type of storytelling—namely, automime.

19. Prudentius has a literary sense of fabula in mind at Apoth. 1017–18 and preserves this sense at Pe. 9. 17–20 and Praef. Ham. 25–26 to link fabula with a typological notion of history. His usage differs from Livy Ab Urb. Cond. 1.11.8, for instance, where he describes a fabula about the Sabines that describes their bracelets. Prudentius does not have in mind an ornamental notion of fabula as pithy legend. Augustine uses the word in its range of senses in his earlier works. For fabula as fables, untrue stories, or wondrous accounts see Conf. 5.10, De genesi contra manichaeos 2; as gossip, Conf. 5.9, Paulinus Carm. 11.45; as trivial Greek literature, Conf. 1.14, Paulinus Ep. 16.7, 23.30, 49.8, Carm. 10.34; as lies, Conf. 4.8, De Genesi Contra Manichaeos 1, and De Doct. Christ. 2.25; as literary deception engaged in by poets, orators, philosophers, and heretics, Conf. 5.3 and De Doct. Christ. 2.35, Paulinus Ep. 13.24, 16.4, 40.6.

20. M. Currie, Postmodern Narrative Theory (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 88 summarizes S. Greenblatt’s claim that “history has to renew itself by moving away from ‘realist’ assumptions about the meaning of a historical text toward the recognition that history and literature are discourses which construct rather than reflect, invent rather than discover, the past.” Although it is almost certain that Prudentius understood his poetic composition as reflecting and discovering history, from the point of view of the early twenty-first-century critic, his literary activity falls under Greenblatt’s characterization. Even Prudentius himself would have to admit, along with postmodern narratological conventions, that the reader plays an active role in the constructing of the historical narrative allegorically expressed in the Psychomachia. A literary work that depends on the proper understanding of allegories, relies heavily on the reader to construct meaning, but nevertheless retains the presence of the author who furnishes a carefully presented and structured set of literary data which guides the reader’s understanding.


22. Currie, Postmodern Narrative Theory, 2: “[N]arrative is central to the representation of identity, in personal memory and self representation or in collective identity of groups such as regions, nations, race, and gender.”

23. In Apoth. 1017–18, the allusive twist on the Homeric motif of human lives as leaves is unmistakable. Like Homer, Prudentius’ metaphor of the winds reflects the
futility of mortality. The epic *fabula* of great men’s deeds is feeble in itself. The story becomes great only when the typologies of salvation history are applied to a human life, to that person’s story, with the result of true immortality. The old epic (pagan) *fabula* remains a piece of writing as part of this world and of nothing beyond.

24. J. D. Dawson, *Christian Figural Reading and the Fashioning of Identity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 86, appeals to Auerbach’s three features of figural (i.e., typological) reading: that there be two persons or events from different historical periods, that there be a relation between them, and that an act of interpretation expose the relationship between them. Dawson extends this idea of figural reading by commenting that figural meaning “describes the intelligibility discovered in the relation between two events comprising a single divine performance in history.” Dawson, similar to his readings of Auerbach and Origen, is concerned to preserve the historicity of both the figure and its fulfillment, a task that flies in the face of, he believes, modern and postmodern notions of meaning with their preoccupation with the textual signifier. Rather than meaning as abstraction or allegory, Dawson, 87, understands figural meaning as a relationship between real (historical) entities. Meaning is the literal relationship between two historical events or persons that preserves the historical reality.

25. Dawson, *Christian Figural Reading*, 96, in agreement with both Auerbach’s and Boyarin’s idea that allegorical reading “reduces objects of its interpretation to abstractions,” comments that figural reading regards the object of interpretation as simultaneously text and history. According to Dawson, this has the further effect of preserving historical reality and its textual representation. Allegorical reading disregards historical reality by viewing texts as collections of signs independent of historical events. This may be the case, but Dawson, in my view, has not satisfactorily shown that figural reading itself does not participate in a comparable maneuver that an allegorical reader performs when interpreting a “historical” text. Figural meaning as a relation between \( x \) and \( y \) still is an add-on in the same way an allegorical meaning originating from a textual signifier is. Dawson, while discussing Origen (chapter 5), admits to the generally allegorical character of figural meaning but maintains his stance that figural reading must not become figurative—i.e., nonliteral. A figural interpretation perhaps is more closely tied to the content of events \( x \) and \( y \), but, as a result, \( x \) and \( y \) do not gain “more” historicity than a semiological interpretation of \( x \) and \( y \) as expressed in words. Figural interpretation remains in the realm of words that are signs to be interpreted according to a human projection of the world onto them.

26. *Apolo. 1017–18* and *Praef. Ham. 25–26* contain a literary series of connections, events—story—typology—history/allegory, all of which help to define an individual human life. For the view of self typology underwrites see the epilogue.

27. Dawson, *Christian Figural Reading*, 133, shows that Origen accepts the proposition that events may alter the character of prior events; a good example being the notion that Christ’s arrival transforms what has come before into “gospel.” Origen signals this view by describing the Old Testament prophets and patriarchs as “initiated in types.” See Dawson, 128–31.

28. Poetry is surely implied by *recto . . . pede*.


30. Hence the reader’s role in the process of allegory is to make this correct application. But the author plays a central role in guiding the reader’s response, though he can not ultimately control the reader’s response.
31. We can tell that Prudentius has an interest in Rome, the imperial state, because he connects the adoption of correct doctrine to the health of the state (e.g., Pe. 10. 402).

32. The first two lines of Pe. 11 refer indirectly to Prudentius’ “archival” research: *Innumeros cineres sanctorum romula in urbe / vidimus, o Christi Valeriane sacer* (Pe. 11.1–2).

33. Prudentius’ use of *apices*, “letters,” reinforces the notion that the genre of history is invoked here through the writing of historical events. But the word does even more work. M. J. Roberts, *Poetry and the Cult of the Martyrs*, 151–56, acknowledges Prudentius’ historiographical mission and focuses on *apices* as “the strokes that make up an individual letter” (151), which emphasize “the element of decipherment” and an investigator’s actual search for a martyr’s remains (153–54). “Traces (*apices*)” of the inscriptions on the tombs are parallel to “traces of past events (*rerum apices veterum*).” In a less developed view of the passage, Palmer, *Prudentius on the Martyrs*, 116 mentions Prudentius’ “insistence on his personal observation and experience” as well as on “autopsy.” It is possible to push the polyvalency of the word even further. In addition, an *apex* is also a felt tip of a roman priest’s cap, as well as a crown of victory. It is not a giant leap, especially considering the poet’s careful use of language in programmatic parts of his poetry, to see *apices* as a pivotal programmatic word. This word alone alludes to three separate but connected categories: history (written letters), religion (an accoutrement of a priest), and major Christian heroes (the crowned martyrs).

34. As I argued in chapter 1, both poet and reader are subsumed under the category of “reader.”

35. Examples abound in the *Natalicia* in which Felix is compared to Old Testament figures—e.g., 15.84ff., 26.195ff., 26. 246ff.—and for a more generalized moral exemplar see 16.129ff. Because this set of poems by Paulinus is often concerned with the *res gestae* of Felix—i.e., miracles and achievements—Paulinus is able to think of himself as a historian as well. But his two main historical activities in these poems are recounting the events of Felix’s life and retelling the narrative of the Old and New Testaments. The most fascinating statement of this project is at Carm. 20. 28–61, where Paulinus draws the classical and now Christian distinction between the “truthfulness of the historian” and “the deceit of the poet,” saying that his poetry will be a version of the former without the latter (20.28–29). The passage goes on to exploit the metaphor of the lyre, a sophisticated typological device that stands for the body. But here it is the body of a mortal person, David, Christ, and the unified body of the people of the world under Christian doctrine of immortal life. The lyre of course stands for poetry as well. Thus, like Prudentius, Paulinus sees a new poetry whose inspiration is the figure of Christ that cuts across and unifies all geographical and temporal boundaries. What Paulinus manifestly lacks is a detailed and systematic vision of how Old Testament, New Testament, Roman pagan, and Roman Christian historical traditions come together to form universal salvation history. Prudentius undertakes this project and makes his task even more difficult by trying to include Rome’s political and literary successes in that vision. Paulinus simply does not go this far.

36. The “T” (tau) represents the cross and the capital “I” (iota) and “H” (eta) are the first two letters of Jesus’ name.

37. I understand “Christian doctrine” as distinct from “Christian ideology.” The former refers to the religious ideas that drive the definition of Christian religion such as the doctrines of the soul and Trinity, canonized—to some extent—at the Council of
Nicaea in 325. The latter is a concept in which Christian doctrine is exploited for the creation of a Christian historical memory to advance a political program, such as a divine Roman empire.


39. Here defined as the doctrine itself or the sacrament.


41. Compare *Titulae Historiae* 31.21, where a stone of the old temple is used for the foundation of the new temple.

42. This is the reading of scripture and history that Dawson, *Christian Figural Reading*, 7 wishes to avoid. He seeks rather a “Christian figural reading that can remain true to its vocation of fashioning Christian identity while simultaneously cherishing human diversity.”

43. See notes 3 and 9.

44. This is not to say that both pagan historians did not have a bias or that the populations regarding whom they produce historical discourse separate religion from politics.

45. A salient example of Eusebius’ and Christian historiography’s practice of wedging the political and the religious is at *Vita Constantini* 1.2.1, where Eusebius claims he will not treat Constantine’s military campaigns but will focus only on his religious actions. Yet throughout the *Vita* he does indeed narrate and linger over the emperor’s military exploits. Rome’s peace and prosperity are inseparable from God. Eusebius presents Constantine’s victories as a divine endorsement that binds together Rome’s imperial mission and Christian identity. See A. Cameron and S. Hall, *Eusebius: Life of Constantine* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 45–47.

46. The word *saeculum* is primarily a word of historical discourse rather than of typology. As we shall see, however, it is inseparable from Prudentius’ typological language and thought. *Conbibere* as well is not a technical, typological term but the way Prudentius uses it in this passage and others indicates a strong typological sense of the word—unique to Prudentius.


49. The literal meaning of the passage is about a golden headband drinking up spikenard. Thus the meaning of “drinking up doctrine” requires the reader to make an allegorical leap. If one’s dress or appearance depends on the consumption of such luxury products, one’s character is easily corrupted. *Ham.* 608 contains another occurrence of the verb in which the soul is depicted as “drinking up” snake venom, again the idea of corruption is present on a figurative level. Still another usage at *Pe.* 10. 1040 is a part of the famous description of the *taurobolium* ritual in which the priest, while standing in a pit below a bull as it is slaughtered, “drinks up” the sacrificial animal’s blood. Such imbibing leaves the pagan priest “defiled” (*inquinatum*). The reader again can infer that bad doctrine has been taken into the body and as a result, pollutes the soul. *Conbibere* is doing significant work in these passages.
50. Tertullian at *De Baptismo* 4 speaks of various bodies of water that can be employed for the sacrament of baptism because they “imbibe” the power to sanctify through the Holy Spirit: *Igitur omnes aquae de pristine originis praerogativa sacramentum sanctificationis consecutur invocato deo: supervenit enim statim spiritus de caelis et aquis superest sanctificans eas de semet ipso et ita sanctificatae vim sanctificandi conbibunt.* Arnobius (*Ad. Nat.* 5.10) criticizes a pagan theory of creation in which stones “absorb” semen and create humans.


52. This is P. G. Walsh’s translation of *tristi . . . crapula*.

53. Interestingly *conbibere* is not associated with the eucharist in Christian writing of the fourth century.


55. Saint Jerome uses the word very often. It appears that he is more interested in the usage that has to do with naming something, at least in his *Epistulae*. In his textual criticism, he uses it to obelize a phrase or word; however, the typological usage is present in his works as well.

56. Paulinus is discussing the basilica at Nola: *Omne cubiculum binis per liminum frontes versibus praenotatur, quos inserere his litteris nolui.*

57. It is surprising that late fourth-century Latin church fathers use forms of *adumbrare* infrequently. The use of the participial form in a typological sense is very rare. Augustine uses the verb the most, but, more surprisingly, Tertullian never uses the typological sense. Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustin all use the term in its technical, typological sense: e.g., Jerome, *Comm. In Ez.* 1.4; Ambrose, *De Spiritu Sancto* 1.7; Augustine, *Civ.* 16.3 and 17.5. For *adumbrare* as “obscure” or “counterfeit, see Tertullian, *De Pudicitia* 17; Ambrose, *De Fuga Saeculi* 4.18; Jerome, *Adv. Iovanian.* 2.14; Augustine *Conf.* 6.7.

58. *Instructionum Libri* 1.36.4–5: *Rex aeternitatis per crucem diros adumbrat, / ut sibi non credant.* The passage is difficult to translate because the meaning of *adumbrat* is unclear, or at best, extremely abstract. The text is from J. Martin, *Commodiani Carmina. Corpus Christianorum: Series Latina* 126 (Turnholt: Brepols, 1960).


61. The other occurrences come from Tertullian, Pseudo-Jerome, *Historia Ecclesiastica Tripartita*, and Cassiodorus. The Tertullian passage (*Adv. Valent.* 27) contains the two words, but they are syntactically distinct. The church father is describing the Valentinian heretical view of Christ’s nature and thus there is no typological usage implied here. Pseudo-Jerome (*Expositio Evangelii Secundum Marcum* 15) uses the expression to indicate how in nature the form of the cross is present; for instance, a bird takes on the shape of the cross when it flies. The occurrence at *Historia Ecclesiastica Tripartita* 6.1 refers to the famous sighting of the cross by Constantine before the battle
of Milvian Bridge. And Cassiodorus (Expositio Psalmorum 21) describes how the body looks like the shape of the cross when stretched out on it. It is clear that Prudentius is the only writer in late antiquity to use the expression in a historical typological fashion.


63. See Walsh’s helpful notes and bibliography which explains the iconography behind the fourth-century church’s representation of the cross (P. G. Walsh, Ancient Christian Writers 40, 383–84 with notes 77–84). The written symbol encompasses Greek letters, chi, rho, iota, sigma, tau, and omicron.

64. Dawson, Christian Figural Reading, 91 and see also 84–91.

65. The word principes at Pe. 10.626, as well as virtute and bellis of line 627, are markers of Roman pagan historical characters and events. Paulinus of Nola at Carm. 24. 475 uses principes as clearly referring to Roman pagan rulers.

66. Here “historical” has to do with the unification of seemingly disparate narratives. The political aspect lies in the idea that with the inclusion of pagan Rome in salvation history, Christian Rome’s identity infuses the individual reader.

67. There are 168 occurrences of forms of saeculum in Paulinus’ corpus; of them, 38 are in the Carmina.

68. There are of course various criteria for categorizing an author’s use of a term. Many times the subject and purpose of a poem determines how an author will use a term; for instance whether the word occurs in a poem about St. Felix, is addressed to Ausonius, or a paraphrase of scripture; however, we have enough of a sample, and will sufficiently contextualize each member, that clear and accurate patterns of usage do result. Thus, for example, Paulinus is fond of saeculum’s meaning as “this contemporary age” or “this world” (e.g., Carm. 7.44; 21.179, 208; 24.473, 481, 508, 719, 754, 823, 824, 929, 930; 17.173; 31.387).

69. I list the senses of saeculum and the passages in Paulinus’ Carmina: a lifespan (16.299, 21.116, 22.119, 31.385); a past age(s)/generations (6.250, 323; 9.37, 21.231, 558, 574, 800; 22.152); new or old age of immortality (6.171, 10.180, 328; 22.63; 23.25; 26.15; and 6.241); a space of time (11.50, 18.161); and all ages taken together (6.329; 22.53).

70. P. G. Walsh, Ancient Christian Writers 40, 414, note 37, comments that Paulinus is thinking “of such utterances as the ‘Sibyllic’ prophecy mentioned by Augustine (cf. Civ. 18.23), which foretold the Final Judgment, and which has been immortalized in the Dies Irae (teste David cum Sibylla).”

71. See note 35 for examples from the Natalicia, which are concerned with comparing the extraordinary qualities of Felix to past personages in scripture.

72. Walsh, Ancient Christian Writers 40, 387 note 29, corroborates that the term mysticus is part of typology’s semantic field.

73. For other examples of moral exemplar typology see also the passages that surround saeculum/saeclum at Carm. 6.250 and 6.323.

74. At Carm. 239ff. Paulinus offers himself and his ancestor as a parallel case in which freedom of choice is mentioned.

75. The semantic extension of typological terms through their juxtaposition with historical markers does not occur in Paulinus, nor in other fourth- and early fifth-century poets.
Notes to Pages 71–73


77. Although Paulinus uses *saeculum* and *crux* in another passage, there exists no relationship as seen in the Prudentian passage: *Huic iam et potentes saeculi curvant genu / Deduntque cevices deo, / Regemque Christum confitentur principes / Et sceptra submittunt cruci* (*Carm.* 24.473–76). The meaning of *saeculi* in this passage is “of this age,” not “past ages”, and is tangentially related to *cruci* of line 476 because the “powerful ones of this age” —i.e., the *principes*, are submitting to the doctrine of the cross. This is a statement about the contemporary state of affairs, even perhaps about current political conditions in Roman territories, rather than any sort of historical or typological approach directed at the reader’s spiritual condition. Absent in this passage of Paulinus is typological language and *saecula* as referring to past historical periods within the context of a grand metaphysical and historical vision.

78. For example, *Symm.* 2.682–83; *Pe.* 2.581–84, 14.94–111, 5.5–8, 10.86–89, 10.386, 10.541. As in the case of Paulinus, Prudentius frequently means “this age of corruption” or human imperfection.

79. Paulinus does this once in his poetry at *Carm.* 24.473–76, when he also speaks of *potentes saeculi* (i.e., *principes*), except Paulinus means here the men who hold political power in Rome.

80. See also *Symm.* 1.511–13 (Rome, the age of martyrs) 1.652–55 (post-Constantinian age of peace) and *Symm.* 2.428 (the republican period of Rome).

81. For Greed see *Psych.* 522–23 and for the soul see *Ham.* 889–90. Compare *Ham.* 922–27, where the soul is trapped in hell for the eternity of ages.

82. M. P. Cunningham brackets *Cath.* 5.161–64 as an add-on. Because the lines are in the major manuscripts and do not display any disruption of sense, bracketing amounts to speculation.

83. See M. M. Van Assendelft, *Sol Ecce Surget Igneus: A Commentary on the Morning and Evening Hymns of Prudentius* (Groningen: Bouma’s Boekhuis B. V., 1976), 197, on the expression *saecula saeculis*. She mentions that the meaning of *continuat* (line 163) is “extend in time” where Christ’s *bonitas et pietas* extend in time his kingdom, but she says nothing about *texens* and its historiographical significance.

84. Other passages in which Prudentius uses a form of *saeculum* to promote unification of various ages of history are as follows: *Cath.* 9.112–14, *Cath.* 11.25–32, and *TH* 31.121–24. The last passage binds the history of the Old and New Testaments together through the building of the new temple with a remaining rock of the Jewish temple (*structus lapide ex illo, TH* 31.122).

85. What theological explanation does the poet possess for such a literary and historical strategy? An answer to this question begins with the benefits of a typological construction of history in which Christ and the cross, for instance, function as interpretative markers of the passage of time. God stands outside of this unified chronological expanse, imposing himself through the intervention of Christ. Thus, it would seem that the unification of all *saecula* for Prudentius takes place from the theological perspective of God outside of time. Other passages show Prudentius’ theological perspective of Christ as intervener in world history. At *Symm.* 1.278–96 we encounter *saeclis* as the ripeness of time, when all past ages reach the climax of God’s intervention through Christ. This is expressed in a vivid poetic metaphor at *Cath.* 11.57–64, where Christ is envisioned as coming into history as if coming out of a womb and thus ushering in a new age (*novellum saeclum*).
86. For *imperium sine fine*, see *Symm.* 1.542–43: *imperium sine fine docet* [Cicero], *ne Romula virtus / iam sit anus, norit ne gloria parta senectam*. Compare *Symm.* 2.640–47, where the ages of history correlate to Rome’s political power. Prudentius wants this legacy for Christian Rome.

87. Reinforced in the passage by humans’ status as *Christo procreati* (*Pe.* 1.58).

88. See F. Heim, *La théologie de la victoire de constantin a théodore* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1992), 269, who argues for the assimilation in Prudentius’ poetry of the love of glory and the allegorical notion of humility herself; and C. White, *Early Christian Latin Poets* (London: Routledge, 2000), 6–11. Whereas White argues for the notion that early Christian poets viewed poetry as a medium of serious ideas, she holds the view that poetry is an offering to God and mere window dressing for the communication of doctrine. I am arguing that Prudentius, consciously or not, presents his poetry as a sacred text that informs, converts, and contains all other sacred texts.

89. A. Palmer, *Prudentius on the Martyrs*, 126, points out that in *Pe.* 2, Prudentius “wants to make an optimistic statement about the conversion of Rome which has been ‘officially’ completed in his own day and about his Christian view of this as the climax of Rome’s imperial history.” This Christian view is expressed in what Palmer calls a “spiritual triumph represented by the victory of martyrdom [as] an extension of traditional Roman values of courage, glory and achievement” (127). Palmer (128–29) fleshes out this position by arguing that the pageant of heroes at *Aen.* 6.756ff. forms the basis of *Pe.* 2.1ff. and *Pe.* 2.417–32, a set of allusions that functions to replace Augustus with Christ as founder of Rome, just as for Vergil, Augustus replaced Romulus. Palmer’s argument is compelling and raises further issues of the use of history. Her concern is to show that through the replacement of Augustus with Christ, for instance, Prudentius constructs a new Christian patriotism. Because of this original contribution, she recognizes Prudentius’ value to the history of Latin poetry: “Prudentius’ originality lies in his translation of his own involvement in martyr cult and its literature into a poetic form which represents both a revivification of the forms and language of the secular poetic tradition, and a new departure in the development of martyr literature” (205). But my concern is broader, consisting in the negotiation or lack of compromise between the historical traditions that Prudentius combines. My interest in these passages is in the way Prudentius uses the names of Romulus, Remus, Numa, and Quirinus to unify the disparate historical narratives of pagan and Christian Rome. Rather than seeing what appears to be at first glance a paradoxical usage of these Roman names as an unintended result of Prudentius’ poetic program, we should take the phenomenon more seriously. The mention of Roman kings as possible Christians is a historical use of typology that “absorbs” the figures of Roman history and the narratives of these figures into salvation history by means of Christian doctrine. In carrying out this project, he again reasserts poetry’s narrative, historical, and political function.

90. *Symm.* 1.102, 193, 2.45; and as a pagan who nevertheless had some common sense, *Apoth.* 215. The only mention of Numa in Paulinus of Nola’s poetry is *Carm.* 19.64, where he refers to Rome as a Christian city. Compare *Ep.* 13.15 and 29.13.

91. It is instructive to compare Prudentius’ and Paulinus’ use of the name “Romulus” in their poetry. Nowhere in the *Carmina* of Paulinus do we encounter a comparison between Romulus and Christ as in Prudentius. Before Augustine’s *City of God*, Tertullian appears to be the only church father who compares the two directly (*Adv.*
Marc. 4.7): Indignum denique, ut Romulus quidem ascensus sui in caelum habuerit proculum adfirmatorum, christus vero dei descensus de caelo sui non invenerit adnuntiatorem, quasi non sic et ille ascenderit isdem mendacii scalis. Sicut et iste descendit. The ascent of both figures is compared, the difference being that Christ’s ascent has no witness. Paulinus uses the adjectival form of “Romulus” six times, all of which refer to the city of Rome. Three occurrences have no significant historical or political meaning (Carm. 10.257, 19.483, 538). At Carm. 19.334 Paulinus refers to Rome (Romuleam . . . urbem) in order to hold it up as a standard to which the new imperial city, Constantinople should aspire. At Carm. 26.273 Felix is portrayed as able to calm the city of Rome (Romuleis . . . terris), which is suffering from anxiety over the Barbarian invasions of 402 CE. Carm. 21.32 once again refers to the city of Rome, but this time the adjective Romuleos is set within the context of history where the martyrs, especially Peter and Paul, have aided in “the continuance of Roman safety and existence of the state.” This poem was written in 407 CE after the battle of Faesulae (406 CE) in which a Christian Roman force under Stilicho destroyed the invading barbarian army of Radagaisus—though the barbarians were allowed to overrun northern Italy for six months. Paulinus is asserting that Christians could contribute to the preservation of Rome and, in fact, Felix did. Prudentius uses the words “Christ” and the adjectival form of “Romulus” in close proximity three times. At Apoth. 444 the juxtaposition is hostile with the poet urging that pagans mourn Roman emperors’ antipagan laws. God is running Romulus’ city now. At Pe. 11.1–2, Prudentius is keen to make the points that martyrs are buried in Romulus’ city and that the political ruler in that city is a servant of Christ, Valerian. Each one of the thirteen other occurrences of a form of “Romulus” is either in the Contra Symmachum or the Peristephanon, two works that are overtly concerned with history. Some arresting examples are the following. At Symm. 1 praef. 80, Christ is fashioned as the savior of Romans (salvator generis Romulei). Symm. 1.181, 542, and 2.298 clearly use the name in Prudentius’ argument for history as developmental. Symm. 2.767–72 contains Romuleas and Christus and is a clear statement of imperial theology where Christ is the ruler, whom the forts of Romulus follow and thus they are protected by good government. The Peristephanon passages with a form of “Romulus” add more ideological and historical depth to the previous examples by emphasizing the syncretism of the pagan and Christian traditions. For instance, both Pe. 12.57 and 14.1 force together unlikely partners: in the first case it is the “people of Romulus” on their way to a festival of Peter and Paul; and in the second case (in line 1!) Agnes is described as buried Romulea in domo. At Pe. 10.411–13 Prudentius asks the question to which the subsequent 200 lines or so of the poem, and, indeed, much of what I have been describing in other poems, is a response to: Ubi iste vester tunc erat summus deus, / divum favore cum puer Mavortius / fundaret arcem septicollem Romulus? He certainly has this question in mind at Pe. 10.611–12 when he says, Antiquitatem Romuli et Mavor- tium / lupam renarras primum et omen vulturum. Prudentius’ attitude in the Peristephanon, while hostile to paganism in this passage, focuses on the unification of the two opposing historical traditions. These examples pose the problem of syncretism and the extraordinary passage at Pe. 2.443–44 offers a bold answer worked out through typological connections that establish a continuous historical narrative.

92. O’Daly, Augustine’s City of God, 22. O’Daly sees Prudentius’, Ambrose’s, and Augustine’s version of the Christian apologetic in both Theodosian and post-Theodosian contexts as a “new articulation of Roman values” (38), which, in Prudentius’ case, takes the form of a renewal of Rome’s greatness through martyrdom.
93. Compare *Symm.* 1.566–77, where again Prudentius emphasizes the senators as Christians whose characters will thus serve the country well.

94. The parallel to keep in mind here is Hippolytus (*Pe.* 11) who, as we saw earlier, put himself on the righteous path after disastrous beginnings. The responsibility of choice colors both of these examples (i.e., Hippolytus and Judas/Achar).

95. See White, *The Content of the Form*, 48 and 53, on Ricoeur’s notion of historical narrative understood as “always a figurative account” and “an allegorization of the experience of within-time-ness.” Also, White says, “narrative figurates the body of events, that serves as its primary referent and transforms these events into intimations of patterns of meaning that any literal representation of them as facts could never produce” (45). Dawson, *Christian Figural Reading*, would take issue with such an analysis of biblical historical narrative. Regarding the relationship between typology and history, Dawson asserts we must assume the historicity of biblical texts in order to understand their theological relevance. He says, “[A]ny effort to understand Christian figural reading as fundamentally a matter of texts and the presence or absence of meaning, rather than a matter of rendering God’s historical performances intelligible, is doomed to theological irrelevance, however much contemporary theoretical sense it may make” (6). For those readers and writers “in the fold” the veracity of events contributes to the theological view that God by acting in history, transforms it. White’s approach, however, does not contradict Dawson’s, for even Dawson, when pushed, will admit that figural reading constructs a narrative with meaning, albeit relational. Ultimately, the reader, whether a believer or not, is an interpreter of words even though he may believe those words to represent or be equivalent to real events. The crux of the distinction Dawson wishes to preserve between reading for meaning and reading for relations between historical events performed by God (i.e., figural reading) ultimately depends on a pronounced theological assumption that God is actually acting in history. Dawson’s nuanced, but dogmatic (see Dawson, “Acknowledgments,” x) view of theology is preserved regardless of whether the sensible appearance of both the figure and fulfillment is assumed.

96. H. White, *The Content of the Form*, 53. Hence typology is a form of allegory with historical reality as a defining characteristic. It is possible to isolate two levels of allegory in Prudentius: The first is more typological and is clear in the formulation $x = y$, where an event, character, or object $x$ corresponds to another event, character, or object $y$ by means of an overarching idea. See Goulder, *Type and History in Acts*, and Young, “Typology,” 39. The idea can be described in doctrinal terms as, for example, Christ as God who is the bringer of immortal life. The second level of allegory can be expressed as $x + y = z$, where $z$ is equivalent to a narrative, or in the case of the *Psychomachia* and *Peristephanon*, a historical narrative. When combined, the $x$ and $y$ form a narrative that subsumes both terms; for example, understanding Passover as prefiguring the passion of Christ. The blood on the doorposts is the type for the antitype of Christ’s blood. This would be the level of $x = y$, where the two terms are related in the first place because of doctrinal assumptions having to do with the status of Christ. The further effect of marrying the two historical phenomena, $x$ and $y$, is the formation of a continuous narrative $z$ from the Old to the New Testaments, i.e. $x + y = z$. Salvation history itself is formed; but, again, the assumption of Christ’s extraordinary function lies behind this formulation as well. The allegorical process begins and ends with doctrine, a circular exercise presenting no logical difficulties for Christians. Augustine is well known for his approach to exegesis where in order to understand the
“truth” of scripture, one must already be a believer—i.e., have faith. One brings the assumption of Christian doctrine to the interpretation of texts.


98. A. Momigliano, ed., The Conflict between Paganism and Christianity in the Fourth Century (Oxford, 1963) draws the differences between pagan and Christian historiography. A. Cameron, “Remaking the Past” Late Antiquity: A Guide to the Post-classical World (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 1–20, glosses over the uncritical nature of Christian historiography by setting the Christian’s unnostalgic view of Rome’s past within the context of an unselfconscious Christian’s abiding need to connect with the past. One of pagan historiography’s qualities, political and moral critique, perhaps can be traced to the tradition’s lack of a metaphysically authoritative set of texts that anchor the origin and destruction of the world.

THREE: Christian Theology and the Making of Allegory

1. M. Quilligan, The Language of Allegory: Defining the Genre (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1979), 19, says that Prudentius was the first to make allegory a narrative genre; and J. Whitman, Allegory: The Dynamics of an Ancient and Medieval Technique (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987), 85, gives Prudentius credit for expanding personification into a continuous narrative. J. J. Paxson, The Poetics of Personification (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 70, says that Prudentius’ originality lies in his use of personifications that speak and narrate. Quilligan, The Language of Allegory, 19, in a general statement says, “No doubt that the late rise of narrative [compositional] allegory is due to the effect Christian theology had on notions of classical rhetoric; by adding historical dimension to the classical Greek logos, Christianity gave to classical rhetorical figures . . . a capacity for massive narrative extension.”


3. W. Harmon and C. H. Holman, A Handbook to Literature, 8th ed. (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2000), 12, comment that a literary allegory has “a dual interest, one in events, characters, and setting presented, and the other in the ideas they are intended to convey or the significance they bear.” According to Frye, for the interpreter of the allegorical text, there is a tension between the consistency and importance of the fiction presented—in the Psychomachia, for example, the virtue/vice battles and temple building—and the poem’s additional historical, moral, and religious meanings. Frye, “Allegory,” 12, mentions this tension as a function of simple as opposed to complex allegory, which possesses an ironic tone because it pretends to discuss one series of events as it really is focusing on another. This issue is treated by K. Glau, “Allegorie als Reflex der Origenischen Hermeneutik der Psychomachia des Prudentius,” in Hortus Litterarum Antiquarum: Festschrift für Hans Armin Gärtner zum 70 Geburtstag, ed. A. Haltenhoff and F.-H. Mutschler (Heidelberg, 2000), 166–67, who summarizes the views of Ch. Gnilka, Studien zur Psychomachie des Prudentius (Weisbaden: O. Harrassowitz, 1963), 9–18; R. Herzog, Die Allegorische Dichtkunst des Prudentius (Munich: Beck, 1966); P. F. Beatrice, “L’allegoria nella Psychomachia di Prudenzio,” Studia


5. It is curious that C. Whitehead, *Castles of the Mind: A Study of Medieval Architectural Allegory* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2003), 5, says that she does not treat “the construction of the temple at the close of the Psychomachia,” because this poem and others cannot “be shown to have exercised some kind of influence upon the academic allegorists of the twelfth century, or the vernacular allegories of the later Middle Ages.” She does acknowledge the Psychomachia’s role as one of the first architectural allegories and its connection with allegorical poems such as the Ancrene Wisse (thirteenth century) and the Castell of Perseverance (c. 1405–25). In her chapter entitled “Knowledge” (Whitehead, *Castles*, 201–29), she admits that the Psychomachia “is probably the earliest example . . . of extracting the house in Proverbs from its biblical surroundings and subjecting it to a process of imaginative elaboration . . . [with] more examples . . . to follow.” These admissions seem to fly in the face of her pronouncement in her introduction.

6. J. Pelikan, *Christianity and Classical Culture: The Metamorphosis of Natural Theology in the Christian Encounter with Hellenism* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1993), 40–74 and 200–31, has shown the importance of negative theology to the Cappadocian Fathers’ notions of the relationship between pagan philosophical views of rationality and Christian doctrines of faith, the Trinity, and the soul. Although the Cappadocians did not reject reason, they realized that apophatic theological language limited rational inquiry because it set proper limits to human inquiry (Pelikan, *Christianity and Classical Culture*, 50). Human rational inquiry simply cannot produce knowledge of the divine because it is impossible to explain the divine, as pagan philosophy purported to do, in human terms or in affirming human language. Thus, the Cappadocians employed a large amount of negative prefixed words in their discourse about God—a much larger amount than their Latin Christian counterparts. The only thing comprehensible about God’s nature is that it is indeed incomprehensible and infinite. Human language about earthly things and human language about the Creator are superficially similar, but the latter, through apophatic restrictions, has “at one and
the same time, a human sound but not a human meaning [ἀνθρωπίνη συνήθεια]” (J. Pelikan, 207, quoting Gregory of Nyssa, Eun. 1. 300–301). Dawsen, Allegorical Readers, 91–92, commenting on Philo, De Mutatione Nominum 15, asserts that humans’ inability to know God originates in our inability to establish determinate correspondances between words, meanings and objects. Because we are functioning under such an epistemic limitation there are meanings hidden in normal language. Allegory assists the epistemic project because it allows expression of the extraordinary meaning embedded in the normal, inadequate language of the sacred text. Thus, Philo justified his practice of subjecting biblical language to τὸ καταχρήσις/abusio, which forces words away from their customary usage. Concerning terms such as God, the Son, the soul, and the Trinity, which in Cappadocian exegetical literature are defined according to apophatic language and assumptions, it is difficult to avoid the practice of allegorical interpretation, which locates meaning not in the literal sense of words but in a different or sometimes completely unrelated sense of the words.

7. Also, Apoth. 564–71 exploites the language of negation in a discussion of Christ’s birth.

8. M. Smith, Prudentius’ Psychomachia, 231, describes Prudentius’ achievement in using the De Abraham of Ambrose as “[accepting] the typological connection between Scripture and detailed psychology.”


10. Prudentius refers to biblical people, stories, and passages throughout his works, but systematically so in the Psychomachia. The literary use of biblical material in the poem presupposes an interpretation of the biblical passage/story—that is, an exegesis, formed (and recoverable) from the placement, context and effect of the story and words in the poetry. Charlet, “Prudence et La Bible,” 3–149, gives a comprehensive list of the biblical passages used in each work and general comments on tendencies of usage within each work. His main emphasis, however, is the Cathemerinon for which he undertakes a useful investigation on Prudentius’ allusive and exegetical techniques. My concern is with the Psychomachia, and my conclusions represent a different investigative emphasis and direction—namely, how the exegesis of biblical texts and stories in the Psychomachia reveals fundamental aspects of Prudentius’ allegorical and poetic techniques and purposes.

11. The late fifteenth-century humanist E. Antonio de Nebrija, Aurelii Prudentii Clementis V. C. libelli cum commento Antionii Nebrissensis, ed. F. Gonzalez Vega (Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, 2002, emphasizes Abraham as the stand-in for faith. On line 1 of the Praefatio, he comments on Prudentius’ striking use of via as referring to a person, Abraham, Quam credituri debemus imitari. Commenting on line 62, he says of Abraham’s role, per quem intelligimus victorem vitiorum.
12. Although I discuss the role of reason, I leave several important issues to the discussion of reason in chapter 4, where I show how Prudentius uses pagan philosophy to help construct the poem’s allegorical universe.

13. Gregory of Nyssa cites Gen. 14:18 and Hebr. 7:1 at Eun. 1.39 in the middle of a discussion about the transferability of substance between persons and their progeny, what he calls “a kinship of substance.” He employs apophatic language to describe the Son as already existing in the Father. At Eun. 8.1, Nyssen uses Heb. 7:3 as part of a series of apophatic expressions that describe the Son’s status. In another usage of Heb. 7:3 Nyssen criticizes Eunomius for employing affirming names of “him who, as the Apostle says, has neither beginning of days nor end of life.” Rather, the vocabulary that must be used of the godhead is “anterior to all beginning un-generate, and again that which is circumscribed by no limit, immortal, and indestructible.” It is clear that the most important meaning of these biblical passages revolves around apophatic conceptions of the godhead and its constituents. Gregory of Nazianzus at Or. 28.18 (Second Theological Oration) cites Gen. 18:18 (the Faith of Abraham; Praef. 1, senex fidelis) and Gen. 18:2 (visitation of the three men to Abraham) in a context of apophatic language concerning knowledge of God. The latter passage indicates to Nazianzen that Abraham saw God not as God but as a man. This has to be the proper interpretation of the biblical passage, according to Nazianzen, because God cannot be known any other way by humans. This passage has apophatic language, the interpretation of the tripleformed angel as a vision of one, and the prefiguring typology, all of which Prudentius expresses in his usage of the biblical passage. At Or. 38.2 Nazianzen uses Heb. 7:3 to draw the typology of Christ and Melchisedec. Although this typology is common among the church fathers, nearly the same words are used by Augustine at Tract. In. Joann. 8. Lactantius, who predates both Nazianzen and Augustine, at Div Inst. 4.13 adopts the typology and has very similar language. In Ep. 101, (“Against the Apollinarians”), Nazianzen cites Gen. 18:2–5 once again to make the point that God can only be known to us as a man. Knowledge of God is again the topic of discussion and the citation is preceded by apophatic language. With regard to Prudentius and Nazianzen, the point is that the apophatic themes and language are foregrounded in their usage of these scriptural texts. This trend is not to be found in the Latin Fathers, though there is one notable exception, Ambrose’s De Fide 3.88. Like Nyssen, Nazianzen, and Prudentius, Ambrose understands Gen. 14:18 and Heb. 7:1–3 in an apophatic and typological way in order to explain the unity of the godhead. The rest of the Latin patristic literature does not overlap with Prudentius in these particular ways. A good example of this difference is Jerome’s Ep. 46.2 (386 CE), which makes use of the typology but does not mention or foreground apophatic language and concepts, nor does it mention the triple-formed angel. Jerome follows a similar approach with regard to Gen. 18:1 and Heb. 7:3 in four other places. Ep. 46.11; Ep. 108. 11; Ep. 122.1; and Adv. Jovianian. 1.23. Jerome mentions the triple-formed angel at Ep. 46.11 and Ep. 122.1. These passages show how consistent Jerome was throughout his life concerning the exegesis of these texts. Ambrose uses Gen. 18.1 three times to show that Abraham is rewarded for his entertaining of the angel and to assert that Abraham saw three but “adored one” (De Officiis Ministerorum 2.21.104, 2.21.107 and De Fide 1.13.80). Tertullian uses Gen. 14:18, Gen. 18:1–2, and Heb. 7:1–3 to discuss Melchisedec as a type and Abraham’s vision of the angel (Adv. Jud. 2; De Carne Christi 3; and Adversus Omnes Haereses 7). He does quote the apophatic language
directly from *Heb.* 7:1–3 but does not elaborate or display awareness of its relationship to faith and knowledge of God. Instead, he sees such language as meaning that Melchisedec is superior and ends his exegesis.

14. Prudentius is retrojecting the figure of Christ into the Old Testament story by comparing Melchisedec, who provides food for the triumphant Abraham, to Christ who brings food for the *beatis . . . victoribus*. The Old Testament story prefigures the concrete events of later Christian history. Most important, though, the Old Testament story prefigures Christ when the *triformis angelorum trinitas* visits Abraham (*Praef.* 45). The method of typology, which both Latin and Greek exegetes engaged in, is here exploited by Prudentius.

15. These lines have been isolated as having textual problems. *Praef.* 41–42 do not appear in the oldest manuscript, A, but are in B, the second-oldest manuscript. Bergman and Lavarrene bracket them as interpolated. H. J. Thomson and M. P. Cunningham keep the lines preferring to have a parallel with *Praef.* 60. *Praef.* 60 is problematic because the major manuscripts are faulty. Thompson prints *parente inen- narabili atque uno satis*, acknowledging that even the line that he prints is “abnormal.” Cunningham and Lavarrene print *parente natus alto et ineffabili*, and Cunningham comments, “*aliquot litterae rescriptae sunt in B, sed de lectionibus non est dubitandum.*” I assume that *Praef.* 41–42 are not interpolations. Whichever reading one chooses for *Praef.* 60, there is apophatic language.

16. Another interesting example is *Apoth.* 782–951, which this time discusses the nature of the soul. *Apoth.* 797, 799, and 800 refer to the soul as an *umbra* (e.g., *umbra deis, Apoth.* 797), a word that participates in Prudentius’ typological discourse and once again suggests the typology God—Christ—Human. That is, the soul has a dual nature. Even though it is typologically related to God and is immortal and wise (*Apoth.* 803), nevertheless the soul is describable unlike God (*Apoth.* 809–10, 814, 872–78). The soul’s divinity is not of the same metaphysical level as that of God (*Apoth.* 879–82) and is created in time (*Apoth.* 823–29); however, because the soul is incorporeal and immortal one cannot describe it in a straightforward manner. At *Apoth.* 834–36 Prudentius asserts that we can nevertheless gain knowledge of the soul: *In corpore discas / rem non corpoream sollers interprete Christo, / qui patrem proprium mortali in corpore monstrat.* This passage confirms the soul’s quasi-apophatic status by asserting its incorporeality and relationship to the Father, but it nevertheless leaves open the possibility of describing the soul. In these lines Prudentius indicates what I claim to be actualized in the *Psychomachia*’s allegory of the soul: a description of the soul.

17. J. Pelikan, *Christianity and Classical Culture*, 216 and 220, cites Gregory of Nyssa *Vita Mos.* 1 (J. 7-I:22) and *Eun.* 2. 91–93. Faith, as seen in the *Praefatio* to the *Psychomachia*, is an individual human response to the “unknowability” of divinity and provides a fertile ground for allegorizing about such entities. Faith stands outside of the idea that the universe in all its facets is to be explained through reason and language. And, thus, the realm of faith is where divinity locates itself, a place exclusive of human reason and language, but not of knowledge. This exclusion of language and reason would have presented a predicament to Prudentius, a practitioner of poetic discourse, whose purpose in the *Psychomachia* is to celebrate God and describe the content and workings of the soul (*Praef.* 36: *saltem voce deum concelebret*). J. D. Dawson, *Allegorical Readers*, 2–3, finds a partial parallel of religious allegory’s connection to apophatic theology to the deconstructionist approach to allegory: “... for the ancient inter-
preters . . . (in contrast to postmodern readers), apophatic assumptions are not hermeneutical (or rather, antithermeneutical) ends in themselves, designed to foster an unending thrill of indeterminate interpretation. Instead of reveling in the absence of meaning, these ancient allegorists tended to use apophatic claims rhetorically, as a way of justifying their own application of allegorical readings that were designed to show what the real meanings were (p. 3).” One can readily see that the author’s intentions are central to the practice of ancient allegorical interpretation and for that matter, ancient allegorical composition. So J. D. Dawson, Allegorical Readers, 7; P. Rollinson, Classical Theories of Allegory, 19; M. Quilligan, The Language of Allegory, 224; N. Frye, Anatomy of Criticism, 90. For the reader as producer of meaning, see again Quilligan, 21, and 67–68.

18. If one says that the Son is “begotten” (γεννητος) of the Father, the word “begotten” does have its normal literal human meaning, but, because God cannot be represented concretely in human terms such as this, the word takes on a transcendent meaning. As J. Pelikan, Christianity and Classical Culture, 207, says of Gregory of Nyssa, “Only then could such language become a ‘symbol’ for transcendent reality, containing a deeper meaning than the literal one.”

19. Thomson translates the verb formet, “it takes some tempering shape.” The noun moderamen is a political word used of government managing (Ovid Met. 6.677), but in the Code of Theodosius 11.30.64 it stands for “a means of moderating.” The expression as a whole is vague and under apophatic assumptions this is indeed deliberate. It is not clear what aspect of the Father humans are seeing. On the other hand, one can see the connection between moderamen and Christ in his role as mediator between the Father and humans.

20. D. J. Nodes, Doctrine and Exegesis in Biblical Latin Poetry (Wiltshire: Francis Cairs, 1993), 30, says that the argument of Apotheosis 28–30 reflects in part an argument in Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho 56, Origen, Commentary on John 2.144, and Novatian, De Trinitate 18.13, that the Father cannot be seen, and, therefore, references to seeing God are really references to seeing the Son. Compare Tertullian Adv. Marc. 3.9. Of course, Tertullian was almost directly translating Justin’s work of the same name. Nazienzen as well makes the same argument.

21. See Nodes, Doctrine and Exegesis, 30–33.

22. Some examples are dogmata . . . prodita (Apoth. 2); species et imago / nulli visa umquam; nec enim comprendier illa / maiestas facilis sensuve oculve manuve. (Apoth. 6–8); haud umquam testata deum potuisse uideri. (Apoth. 10); nulla acies . . . tuendo / . . . penetravit (Apoth. 11–12); immensum (Apoth. 14); numquam visa (Apoth. 16); vis intacta (Apoth. 17); inspiciendum (Apoth. 24); and infinita (Apoth. 26). Apophatic language continues through Apoth. 127, where Prudentius takes up God’s apophatic ontology and the paradox of the father becoming flesh. Prudentius then through Apoth. 177 posits Christ as the mediator between the father and the human world.

23. At Apoth. 362–75 Abraham is taken for a Christian because he is able to see God, unlike the Jews, who ignore God in the form of Christ. Note fidelis (Apoth. 363), creditus (Apoth. 365), and fide (Apoth. 366), all of which are directed toward Abraham. Just as in the Praefatio to the Psychomachia, Abraham remains the quintessential human symbol of faith.

24. These first two examples have the language of Genesis 15:6, Credidit Abraham Deo. On Praef. Psych. 1, see note 11.
25. I owe this translation to Christopher Francese.
26. The sacrificial language is revisited at the end of the poem as part of a typological line of thought that posits Christ as the type for peace in the city and the soul.
27. One witnesses the great flexibility of Prudentius’ typologies with the association of Isaac with human flesh as regarding Christ being born from miraculous origins, and with the association of the reader of the Psychomachia, the every day Christian, with human flesh in the person of Abraham who is rewarded because of his faith.
28. The other necessary condition for a successful life, a capacity to reason, is hinted at in vigilandum (“keeping watch,” using one’s human capacities of sense and reason to recognize danger) and is clarified in the story of the visitation of the three angels (Praef. Psych. 45–46), as well as in the phrase vicendi praeans ratio est of Praef. Psych. 18 of the main text of the Psychomachia. As for the latter example, the important word is ratio. Throughout the Psychomachia the notion of reason and its personification is integral to the victory over the vices (e.g., Psych. 501ff.). At Psych. 502 ratio is described as una / semper fida comes. Faith and reason are an essential pair. In the Praefatio we have seen that Prudentius understands faith, if alone, as vulnerable, but, if the capability of “keeping watch,” in the guise of reason, is joined with faith, success is assured. Reason alone is insufficient for the successful life. Although the vicendi . . . ratio may be before our eyes (praesens), it is only the first step. Abraham represents to our common sense a credendi via, that is, we understand faith as the next step after our recognition of Abraham’s example through our faculty of reason. Reason must be the preliminary phase to the life of faith. It is reasonable for individuals to join the battle between the virtue and the vices. The rewards—immortality, for instance—constitute reasonable goads to action.
29. Et Melchisedec rex Salem protulit panem et vinum fuit autem sacerdos dei summi. For each biblical allusion I have tried to give the Latin Prudentius most likely was reading. When the old Latin text is not available, I give the text in English. There are three editions of the Vetus Latina, which I have used. For Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John I have used A. Jülicher, ed., Itala: Das neue Testament in altlateinischer Überlieferung (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1938, 1940, 1954, and 1963); for Genesis, Fischer, ed., Vetus Latina: Die Reste der altleinischen Bibel (Freiburg: Verlag Herder, 1951–54); for 1 Thessalonians, 1 Timothy, Philemon, and Hebrews, H. J. Frede, ed. (Freiburg: Verlag Herder, 1981–87); for Ephesians, H. J. Frede, ed. (Freiburg: Verlag Herder, 1962–64); for Philippians and Colossians, H. J. Frede, ed. (Freiburg: Verlag Herder, 1966–71); for 1 Corinthians, U. Frölich, ed. (Freiburg: Verlag Herder, 1995–96). For the rest of the biblical passages, I have used P. Sabatier, Bibliorum Sacrorum Latinae Versiones Antiquae Seu Vetus Italica (Remis: Apud Reginaldum Florentain, 1743).
30. I give verses 1–3: sic enim Melchisedech rex erat Salem sacerdos dei altissimi qui obviavit Abrahae regresso a caede regum cumque eum benedixisset et Abraham benedictus ab eo; (2) qui et decimam omnium divisit primum quidem qui interpretatur rex iustitiae deinde autem et rex Salem quod est rex paci; (3) sine patre sine matre sine genealogia neque initium dierum neque vitae finem habens simulatus autem filio dei manet sacerdos in perpetuum.
31. I give verses 1 and 2: (1) visus est autem ei deus ad ilicem Mambre sedenti illi ad ostium tabernaculi eius medio die adlevatis; (2) autem oculis suis vidit et ecci tres viri stabant super eum et cum vidisset occurrit in obviam illis ab ostio tabernaculi sui et adoravit super terram.
32. I give verses 1–6: (1) et dominus visitavit Saram sicut dixit et fecit deus Sarae sicut
locutus est; (2) et concepit et peperit Sara Abrahae filium in senectute sua et in tempore sicut locutus est illi dominus; (3) et vocavit nomen filii sui qui factus est ei quem genuit ei Sara Isaac; (4) et tunc circumcidit Abraham puerum die octava sicut praeceperat ei deus; (5) Abraham autem erat annorum centum quando genuit Isaac; (6) dixit et Sara risum mihi fecit dominus quicumque enim audierit congratulabitur mihi.

33. Paul develops this argument in his Letter to the Hebrews. Compare Psalm 110:4, “You shall be a priest for life, a Melchisedec, because of me.”

34. The mystic union achieved in the final lines of the Praefatio has a Christian neo-Platonic ring to it. The neo-Platonic notion of θεότης, union with or knowledge of God achieved through mystical strategies, is evoked. Prudentius sees such a union implicit and incomplete in the stories of Melchisedec and Sara, but attainable through the agency of Christ who provides the necessary knowledge. See further chapter 4.

35. I give here Matth. 25:7: tunc surrexerunt omnes illae virgines et acceperunt lampades suas. It is clear that Prudentius has assumed the other twelve verses of Matthew in his text, just as he has assumed Judith 13 and 14.

36. The Prudentian reference to the specific verse of Matth. 25:7 can be seen in lampades and famulos famulasque (compare virgines of 25:7).

37. The Cappadocians nowhere cite this passage and Latin patristic literature fails to employ the passage in a context similar to that found in Prudentius.

38. [D]ixit autem maria ad angelum: quo modo fiet istud, quod virum non novi.

39. [E]t verbum caro factum est et habitavit in nobis et vidimus gloriam eius, gloriam quasi unigeniti (filii) a patre plenum gratia et veritate. Prudentius writes, Verbum quippe caro factum non destitit esse (Psych. 78).

40. Jerome does not use John 1:14 and Luke 1:34 often. Two references indicate that Jerome understands the former as merely a statement of the actualization of Christ’s birth; and the latter as a passage which raises the issue of Joseph’s status (Ep. 108.10, 404 CE) and Adversus Helvidium 4). Ambrose, on the other hand, uses these biblical texts often and for a consistent purpose. He employs John 1:14 eight times in the treatise De Fide to explore themes of the unity of the godhead (De Fide 3.4.26), the meaning of the names and descriptions given to Christ (De Fide 2 intro. 2; 1.2.16; 1.8.56—“was,” repeated three times, is equivalent to “eternal” and “infinite”; 1.14.89), the distinction between the Father and the Son (De Fide 1.7.50 and 4.9.102), and the uncompromised nature of the godhead after the incarnation (De Fide 4.8.87–88). In another treatise, the Bishop quotes the biblical passage to prove the unigeniti gloria, et perfecti hominis natura (De Fide Resurrectionis 2.103). Ambrose pays close attention to the words used of Christ, which he understands as affirmations of him more than as expressions of the human limits of knowledge of the godhead, but Ambrose does possess apophatic awareness; for example, at De Fide 4.8.87 he understands the “begetting” activity of the godhead as an exercise of authority that produces the Son nata generationis arcano.

41. Language of purification indicates the idea of proper preparation for meeting the godhead. In addition, as I discuss later in this chapter, such language at the end of the Psychomachia suggests a trial that the human soul must undergo.

42. Dawson, Christian Figural Reading, 122–23, shows how deeply ingrained typological reading is in ancient Christian readers.

endeavors to apply “the types of the Old Testament to the interior life of the Christian.” (287). The *Psychomachia* falls squarely in this tradition thereby granting a significant nonliteral meaning to biblical stories and passages.

44. Examples include Chastity/Judith, Pride/Adam, Lowliness/David, and Greed/Judas.

45. D. L. Madsen, *Rereading Allegory: A Narrative Approach to Genre* (New York: St. Martins Press, 1994), 58, defines in part Christian figuralism as the continuity between the text, its interpretation, and the interpreting subject through shared participation in the word. The reader is a potent part of this allegorical process.

46. Job begins this series of three Old Testament, typological figures as primarily an instantiation of the virtue *Patientia*. This one-to-one correspondence is so strong because, unlike Adam and David, who are to follow, Job is actually a character in the narrative of the *Psychomachia*—though admittedly he appears at the end of the battle and is an add-on. The poet-narrator provides details of his story, whereas for the stories of Adam and David it is the vice *Superbia* and the virtue *Spes* who narrate.

47. Gen. 3:21: *et (tunc) fecit dominus deus Adae [Adam] et mulieri eius tunicas pellicias et induit illos.*

48. Again, the reader’s ethical choice is present in the binary opposition of the clothed Adam and the naked Adam.


50. See J. Danielou, *From Shadows to Reality*, 40–43.

51. Other works of Prudentius mention the Adam/Christ typology directly. At *Apoth.* 687–91, 911–26, and 1004–19 a series of themes emerges from the typology. Christ remakes us into the “new Adam” who possesses the purity of prelapsarian Adam. We are like the “old Adam,” whose original sin we carry deep within our souls. All flesh after the Fall is therefore “insubstantial,” mere “aether.” Christ corrects this state of affairs by taking on original sin, not as we humans do, but in a way that does not affect his divine being. *Cath.* 3. 113–40, 181–90, 9.17, 92 continue the theme of Adam as standard bearer for original sin, and particularize further Christ as a *nova progenies* (3.136) and an *alter homo* (3.137) who puts on human nature—but only to a certain degree. Christ’s divine breath (*oris opus*, 3. 186) refashions the clay that went wrong in Eden. Typology stretches as far back as creation in the person of Adam and in the circumstances of paradise. These passages emphasize the making, shaping, and fashioning of a human being in the likeness of something else. Note the language of typology at *Apoth.* 689–91 (*figuram . . . finxerat*) and *Apoth.* 1010 (*figuram . . . finxerat*) and *Apoth.* 1010 (*figuram . . . finxerat*).

Typology appears to be a fundamental force in the divinely inspired and created universe.


53. Both *Luke* 1:52 ( . . . *disparsit superbos mente cordis ipsorum. Deposuit potentes de sede et exalta vit humiles*) and *Matth.* 23:12 (*Qui autem se exaltaverit humiliabitur; et qui se humiliaverit exaltabitur*) work together in the *Psychomachia* (*Psych.* 285–86, 289–90) to illustrate what should be learned from the story of David and Goliath, which occupies *Psych.* 291–301. *Luke* 1:51–52 portrays Mary speaking in a lyrical exchange with Elizabeth whom she meets after the Holy Spirit has visited her. To paraphrase: for those who believe, God’s power can accomplish great things such as making Mary pregnant. Prudentius puts Mary’s words in the mouth of *Spes* as she vaunts over *Superbia*, who
has been made headless by Mens Humilis, who herself was encouraged by Spes to inflict the death stroke. The words of Matth. 23:12 are spoken by Christ in a public attack on the Pharisees. Certain narrative choices Prudentius makes bind the story closely with the New Testament aphoristic assertions; Goliath taunting the Jewish battle lines (1 Sam. 17:26 and 36), young David achieving victory only with a sling and a stone (1 Sam. 17:50), and David beheading Goliath with the Philistine’s own sword (1 Sam. 17:51). Prudentius also includes Goliath’s awesome appearance (1 Sam. 17:4) while having Spes take credit for David’s victory (Psych. 301). The irony is pronounced as Spes taunts a dead Superbia with this story of a taunter—i.e., Goliath.

54. The speech introduces the terms in a clear progression from the beginning, to the middle, and to the end: puerilis, pueri, puer (Psych. 292, 298, 300); me, mea, mihi, meque (Psych. 300, 301, 302, 303) and victores (Psych. 304).

55. Prudentius appears to have employed Spes as a surrogate for Fides. Hope’s importance is emphasized in the poem. Operatio at Psych. 606–28 exhorts all human beings to cultivate spem . . . invitiabilis aevi (Psych. 626). See Apoth. 372–74 where Hope and Faith are strongly associated.

56. For Christ as culmination of a royal succession epitomized by David, see TH 20; Ham. 787; Cath. 12.49, 96; Apoth. 418, 999, 1012. Apoth. 1012 adds the nuance that David, though a king, is empty and flawed flesh that Christ took on. TH 19 gives a highly abbreviated summary of David’s life. Cath. 9.4 portrays David as an epic poet and prophet who narrates and predicts the coming of Christ. Psych. 386’s mention of David speaks to the issue of biblical history. Ham. 563 interestingly refers to the story of David and Absalom in which David is the father of an accursed child just as a human soul gives birth to “diros . . . natos” (Ham. 569). The language of inwardness here typologically connects David and events in his life to the activity of the soul, in this case an undesirable activity with an immoral result.

57. Psych. 545–46 distinguishes between two kinds of typological relationship; either between two figures (exemplum generis) or two sets of events (forma exitii). Typology is most recognizable in a “historical” figure regarding what they did and the qualities that motivated them to act. But, in addition, certain events and their sequence also serve as typological markers. The “form of one’s end” focuses directly on the structure of a story that is to be repeated in the present or future. These lines with their aside quality and commenting tone parallel Sobrietas’ comment on the story of Jonathan: Sed quia paenituit. nec sors lacrimabilis illa est. / nec tinguit patrias sententia saeva secures (Psych. 401–402). In this formulation of typology, Prudentius uses the “this is that” language (illa est) that N. Frye isolates as fundamental for allegorical exegesis. Moreover, the words tinguit and patrias are typological vocabulary that Prudentius employs here. With the negative nec, the fate of Jonathan the son is reversed, as if it were a typology unrealized. Jonathan’s completely free-willed action of repenting—though, in the biblical version, Jonathan does not appear to be repenting, but merely admitting his guilt—reverses what seemed inevitable. And, what is more, the people come to his aid and plead for his life to his father Saul. Prudentius sees human choice everywhere and expresses it through the flexibility of typology—implied, explicit, unrealized, realized. Some scholars have attributed Prudentius’ statement that Jonathan had a regni . . . voluptas (Psych. 399) to a confusion with Absalom’s desire to depose King David (2 Sam. 15:7ff.). Absalom, however, never repents and, as we have already seen, Prudentius is not adverse to embellishing in order to confirm his Christian
assumptions. Thus, 1 Sam. 14:29–30 could be interpreted as Jonathan expressing a desire for power. In fact, given Prudentius’ penchant for indirect associations between various biblical figures, personifications, and the reader, I would argue that Absalom is being recalled through the figure of Jonathan typologically since both are sons and both disobey their royal fathers. In these ways, the personifications’ asides shed light on typology’s flexibility in the Psychomachia, a flexibility that expresses possibility, dramatic tension, and finally, human free will.


59. Psych. 642–643, et Christum gaudere suis victoribus arce / aetheris ac patrium familus apere profundum, is an echo of Rev. 3:21: vincenti dabo sedere mecum in throno meo: sicut et ego viri, et sedeo cum patre meo throno eius. In the patristic literature I have found only three very indirect references to Rev. 3:21 in Tertullian (De Idololatria 18, Adversus Praxeam 30, and De Paenitentia 8). He discusses the status of Christ in one of the passages, but not too thoroughly. There is nothing about being victorious or victory.

60. At Psych 650 J. Bergmann, Aurelli Prudentii Clementis Carmina, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, vol. 61 (Lipsiae: Hoelder-Pichler-Tempsky A.G.), 1926, has Ex. 15:14–15, whereas Cunningham has 15:1 and 15:20–21. Thomson rightly thinks that through Psych. 662 Ex. 15:1–21 is evoked. Cunningham lists Ex. 15:20 for Psych. 658. I give here all twenty-one verses: (1) tunc cantavit Moyses et filii Israel canticum hoc Domino, et dixerunt dicere: cantemus Domino: gloriose enim magnificatus est, eadem et ascensorem deiecit in mare; (2) adiutor, et protecto factus est mihi in salutem: iste Deus meus, et glorificabo eum: Deus Patris mei, et exaltabo eum; (3) Dominus conterens bella, Dominus nomen est ei; (4) currus Faraonis et exercitum eius proiecit in mare: electos ascesitores ternos stantes demersit in rubro mari; (5) pelago cooperavit eos, devenrunt in profundum tamquam lapsis; (6) dextra tua, Domine, glorifica est in virtute; dextra manus tua, Domine confregit inimicos; (7) et per multitudinem gloriarum tuae contribulastis adversarios: misisti iram tuam, et comedit illos tanquam stipulam; (8) et per spiritum irae tuae divisa est aqua: gelaverunt tanquam murus aquae, gelaverunt fluctus in medio mari; (9) dixit inimicus: persequearis comprehendam, partibor polia, replebo animam meam: interficier gladio meo, dominabitur manus mea; (10) misisti spiritum tuum, et cooperuit eos mare: descenderunt tanquam plumbum in aquam validissimum; (11) quis similis tibi diis Domine? quis similis tibi, gloriosus in sanctis, mirabilis in maiestatibus, faciens prodigia?; (12) extendisti dexteram tuam, et devoravit eos terra; (13) gubernasti in iustitia tua populum tuum hunc quem redemisti: exhortatus es in virtute tua, in requie sancta tua; (14) audierunt gentes, et iratae sunt: dolores comprehenderunt habitantes Philistiai; (15) tunc festinaverunt duces Edom, et principes Moabitarum; apprehendit illos tremor: fluxerunt omnes habitantes Chanaan; (16) cecidit super eos timor et tremor, magnitudine brachii tu: fiat tanquam lapsis, donec pertranseat populus tuus, Domine, usquedum transeat populus tuus, Domine, hunc quem adquisistis;
(17) inducens plantato eos in montem haereditatis tuae, in praeparatam habitationem tuam quam praeparasti Domine: sanctificationem Domine, quam paraverunt manus tuae; (18) Domine, qui regnas in aeternum, et in saeulum, et adhuc; (19) quia introit equitavus Pharaonis cum curribus et ascensoribus in mare: et adduxit super eos Dominus aquas maris: filii autem Israel transierunt per siccum in medio mari; (20) sumpsit autem Maria prophetis, soror Aaron, tympanum in manu sua: et exierunt postea omnes mulieres cum tympanis et choris; (21) praecedebat autem eas Maria, dicens: cantemus Domino, gloriose enim honorificatus est, equum et ascensorem proiecit in mare.

61. Danielou, From Shadows to Reality, 207–12, has traced this tradition in connection with Ex. 15:4, Matth. 6:34, and Deut. 8:3. The dominant tradition in the Fathers is the sacramental exegesis of the Exodus, which sees Baptism and the Eucharist indicated. In the west, Ambrose, De Myst. 3.13 (PL 16.393) and De Sacr. 1.4.12 (PL 421), typify the sacramental interpretation; however, the tradition that Prudentius emphasizes portrays “the journey through the desert now . . . as a type of the soul’s passage, progressively casting aside all the relics of the passions which remain in it; a passage which is continually enlightened by logos” (Danielou, 209). Some of the passages Danielou has gathered are: Philo, Leg. All. 2.86, 11.102, De Sac. 62; Origen, Hom. Ex. 5, 5, Hom. Num. 26; Gregory of Nyssa, Vit. Mos. PG 44, 361C. Although Prudentius is not averse to the sacramental tradition of interpretation, in Cathimerinon 5 and the Psychomachia, he foregrounds the soul-journey exegesis.

62. See also Apoth. 711, where the same story of Christ feeding the multitudes is mentioned and interpreted as spiritual teaching (dogmate).


64. Prudentius is familiar with the range of exegeses of the Exodus episode from both the patristic and catechetical traditions. Cath. 12.134–204 gives a litany of such interpretations and typologies: Jewish Passover/ the newborn Christ escaping Herod’s decree/baby Moses abandoned and saved implied (134–35); Moses/Christ as protector of the people (143–44), as God’s priest (153), and as transmitter/fulfiller of law (155–56), as slayer of Egyptians and liberator of Israel (150–60); Egyptians/enemy/sin (161–64); Red Sea episode/Baptism (165–67); Moses’ outstretched arms to subdue Amalech/the cross (169–72); Joshua/Jesus (173); 12 stones of the River Jordan/12 Apostles (177–80). Prudentius sums up at 183–84: cum factura priscorum ducum / Christi figuram pinxit.

65. For other instances of the Moses/Christ typology see Apoth. 32–35 and Cath. 7.36–45. At Apoth. 51, Moses’ antitype, Christ, is described as figura hominis and similarly at Apoth. 309 (nos Christi forma et image). Human beings constitute the final term in the typology Moses/Christ/humans. As we have seen in Chapter 2 Prudentius understands Moses as a historicus, the writer of universal history (Apoth. 294–304, 315, Ham. 340). In light of Christ’s central role as Prudentius’ muse and poetic inspiration, Moyes historicus of the Old Testament may prefigure Christus Musa of the New Testament and Prudentian corpus.

66. J. Danielou, From Shadows to Reality, 184–85, quotes the Persian sage Aphraates, Demons 12.8.

67. At Pe. 6.86 Prudentius recalls Ex. 3:5, where Moses takes off his shoes in preparation to meet God at the burning bush. In typological fashion the martyr Fructuosus takes his shoes off before his death, which includes walking through fire. At Pe. 6. 97–99
a spirit from heaven says, *Felices animae, quibus per ignem / celsa scandere contigit Tonantis, / quas olim fugiet perennis ignis!* Note that in this passage there is the same expression for “blessed souls” as at *Cath.* 5. 121, blessed souls whose opposite number, the souls from hell, are about to be described. In addition, at *Cath.* 5. 135 these accursed souls, which become progressively assimilated to the blessed souls in the passage and get relief from their punishment are described in a group that includes all souls as *populus liber ab ignibus.* The only other direct reference to the escape through the Red Sea in the corpus of Prudentius describes Moses after the collapse of the sea onto Pharaoh and the Egyptians in the following way: *patuit via libera Moysi.* The word *liber/libera* in these two passages is used to denote the state of a person’s freedom after an extraordinary trial. Both the souls of heaven in *Cathemerinon* 5 and Moses just after the escape through the Red Sea are described in the same way. This set of textual associations shows that Prudentius understands the soul’s journey to include a trial of fire; and that through Prudentian intratextual connections of language and Prudentius’ association of the Vergilian underworld with the Exodus story, we can conclude that Prudentius associates the Exodus episode with a souls’ trial by fire. See *Pe.* 2.363, where Moses’ visage is completely changed after undergoing the trial of facing directly the burning bush. Also, *Cath.* 7.36–45 recalls Moses in the desert for forty days and nights, a trial that Christ was to undergo as well. *Cath.* 12.169–72 and *TH* 12 allude to Ex. 1:10–13 and Num. 21:8–9, respectively, where Moses’ outstretched arms and hanging of a serpent on a cross prefigure Christ’s death on the cross.

68. *Matth.* 6:34 and 6:26 assert God’s ability and willingness to take care of everyone’s basic needs and thus individuals should not worry about the future. God will provide. The allusion to *Matth.* 6:11 is from the Lord’s Prayer and serves to add to the speech of *Operatio* not only the assurance that God will provide bread but also the instruction that one must pray for it.

69. *TH* 21 gives a sketch of the same typology for the new temple: Wisdom-Solomon’s temple/Christ’s temple. But, more important, these lines envision the new temple as a *templum hominis sub pectore,* a clear precedent for the temple as soul in the *Psychomachia.* M. Smith, *Prudentius’ Psychomachia,* 232, gives a typological series for the temple: Solomon’s temple/temple of the pure heart/temple of the New Jerusalem/temple of *Sapientia.*

70. The temple has several possible allegorical meanings, including a model of the soul, the concrete expression of the new Christian age in terms of a change in the soul’s status, and the example of the harmonious hierarchy and relationship of a soul/city and God. The poem permits all of these meanings to stand.

71. 1 *Kings* 5:3–5: Solomon says, (3) *tu scis voluntatem David patris mei, et quia non potuerit aedificare domum nomini Domini Dei sui propter bella imminents per circuitum, donec daret Dominus eos sub vestigio pedum eius; (4) nunc autem requiem dedit Dominus Deus meus mihi per circuitum: et non est satan, neque occursus malus; (5) quamobrem cogito aedificare templum nomini Domini Dei mei, sicut locutus est Dominus David patri meo, dicens: Filius tuus, quem dabo pro te super solium tuum, ipse aedificabit domum nomini meo. 1 *Chron.* 28:2–6 (Vetus Latina is unavailable): David says, ‘I had prepared to build it, but God said to me, ‘you shall not build a house for my name for you are a man of wars and shed blood.’ . . . Now of all my sons . . . he has chosen Solomon . . . and he (the Lord) has said to me, ‘Solomon your son shall build my house and my courts.’ ” Bergman does not list the 1 *Chronicles* allusion, but Cunningham is correct to see it as an alternative to 1 *Kings* 5:3–5.
72. [N]ihilque erat in templo quod non auro tegeretur: sedet totum altare oraculi texit auro.

73. Et intulerunt sacerdotes arcam foederis Domini in locum suum, in oraculum templi, in sanctum sanctorum, subter alas cherubim.

74. Apoth. 512–552 recall the destruction of Solomon’s temple by Titus in 70 CE and announce a new Christian temple fabricated from the Word itself (Apoth. 524).

75. Pelikan, Christianity and Classical Culture, 45.

76. (45) Iterum simile est regnum caelorum homini negotianti quaerenti bonam margaritam; (46) Inventa autem (una) pretiosa margarita abit et vendidit omnia quae cumque habuit et emit eam. Cunningham and Bergman list only verse 46, but Thomson lists both verses 45 and 46. Prudentius must have been looking at both verses.

77. Sapientia aedificavit sibi; domum, et subdidit columnas septem. Patristic literature typologically connects Sapientia to the word of God and Christ. See Smith, Prudentius’ Psychomachia, 195.

78. By exploiting Gal. 5:17, Prudentius brings into clear relief the oppositions of flesh/soul and light/dark (viscera . . . animam, Psych. 904–905; lux atque tenebrae, Psych. 908).

79. Eph. 4:26: irascimini et nolite delinquere. sol non occidit super iracundiam vestram. Eph. 5:2: et ambulate in caritate; sicut et Christus dilesit nos et tradidit semet ipsum pro nobis oblationem et nostiam deo in odorem suavitatis. Psych. 782–86 expands the conceptual range of this biblical passage with the opposition between venia and iram.

80. [F]requent die regressus invenit germinasse virgam Aaron, in domo levi: et turgentibus gemmis eruperant flores, qui, foliis dilatatis, in amygdalas deformati sunt.

81. [A]ureum habens altare et arcam testamenti tectam undique auro in qua aurae habens manna et virga Aaron quae floruerat et tabulae testamenti.

82. Smith, Prudentius’ Psychomachia, 216, connects Melchisedec with Sapientia because Sapientia fulfills the Levitical order of Aaron’s priesthood. Smith does not discuss the apophatic language used of Melchisedec in the Praefatio.

83. Note decoro . . . solio at Psych. 914–15. At Ham. 264 decor is said of a woman who is not content with her “grace” (trans. Thomson).

84. Cunningham lists three biblical passages as allusions in the final lines of the poem Psych. 889–915: Gal. 5:17 nam caro concupiscit adversus spiritum: spiritus autem adversus carmen: haec enim invicem adversantum ut nonquaequamque vultis, ista faciatis (Psych. 908); Ps. 46:10 (Vetus Latina text is unavailable) “Be still and know that I am God; I am exalted among the nations, I am exalted in the earth” (Psych. 915); and 1 Cor. 1:24 ipsis autem vocatis Iudaes, et Graecis, Christum Dei virtutem, et Dei Sapientiam (also a possible source of Psych. 915). Bergman does not acknowledge Ps. 46:10 and 1 Cor. 1:4 as allusions. He does recognize Gal. 5:17 but includes Psych. 904–908 as the referring lines. Cunningham also says to compare Augustine’s Enarr. in Ps. 46:10: dicit scriptura . . . animi iusti sedes sapientiae.. It is not difficult to see why Bergman left out two of the three references. The linguistic parallel is weak at best, but regarding the connection of wisdom to Christ, these texts are canonical.

85. The temple, which has been created for the soul, that is, as the soul, is a result of a trial (spectamine morum, Psych. 913).

86. See Ambrose’s use of 1 Cor. 1:24 at De Fide 2.16.141–43 where in a discussion on faith in Christ we encounter the military metaphor of Christ as the leader of an army. To believe in Christ as “power and wisdom” is to “win the prize of victory for (one’s) faith.”
87. Dawson, *Christian Figural Reading*, 12–13, comments that Hans Frei’s approach to Origen “[places] allegorical reading on a spectrum with typology, rather than casting allegory and typology as simple binary oppositions, Frei admits that figural reading is, in effect, a kind of allegorical reading, one properly governed by allegiance to the gospel’s literal sense.” Auerbach, for example, takes a strictly historicist view of typology which preserves the reality of the historical figures and narratives. For him, this is undermined by allegorical reading which he takes to be the Origenist way of reading scripture.

FOUR: Pagan Philosophy and the Making of Allegory

1. C. Gill, *The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), on the representation of character and emotions in literature, says that there is a “direct influence of philosophical ideas on other aspects of the culture . . . that helps to shape . . . the presentation of figures in works of literature” (408); and on the Aeneid that “philosophical themes . . . are integral with intertextual and political or ideological factors” (438). M. Colish, *The Stoic Tradition From Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages*, vol. 2 (Leiden: Brill, 1990), 107–108, describes the last twenty-five lines of the *Psychomachia* as possessing “a decidedly Neoplatonic coloration.”

2. I use the term “Platonic” to refer to works authored by Plato and his ideas directly attributable to Plato. “Neo-Platonic” refers to the texts and ideas of Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus, and their followers. “Platonist” is an umbrella term that includes Platonic, middle Platonic, and neo-Platonic images and ideas.


7. Jerome, who maintained a strong rhetorical position against the use of the pagan literary inheritance, never gave up his favorite Roman authors and freely borrowed from pagan philosophers and poets. See M. Vessey, “Jerome and Rufinus,” in *The Cambridge History of Early Christian Literature*, 320.


translated by Harry E. Wedeck. Late Latin Writers and Their Greek Sources (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), 72–77, documents how Jerome uses without attribution Porphyry’s *Isagoge* and *De abstinentia*.


15. We are limited in our certainty as to the identity of Calcidius. He is a fourth-century figure, but our choices are between two personages. Either he lived in the first half of the century, as the dedication of the commentary to a certain Hosius, thought to be bishop of Cordoba (who lived between 296–357), might indicate; or he could have been a high Milanese official of 395 AD whose epitaph survives. For the arguments see S. Gersh, *Middle Platonism*, vol. 2, 421–25.

16. Gersh, *Middle Platonism*, vol. 2, 426 says, “There seems little doubt that Calcidius had direct access to the original texts (Plato) when composing his treatise since . . . he is found quoting at length from the dialogues in his own accurate . . . translations.”

17. For references, see Gersh, *Middle Platonism*, vol. 2, 442–84.


19. Gersh, *Middle Platonism*, vol. 1, 25, has classified the indirect tradition further into five areas: pagan ancient Platonic, Christian neo-Platonic, and pagan neo-Platonic, middle Platonic, and Christian middle Platonic. Plato, Marius Victorinus, and Porphyry/Plotinus are examples of the first three of these categories, respectively. There are many names missing from this list, including church fathers and Macrobius. See chapter 2 for the former; and for the latter, references to *On the Dream of Scipio* will follow. For a useful distinction between Platonic and neo-Platonic see Gersh, *Middle Platonism*, vol. 2, 26–39. Note that late antique authors did not distinguish between Plato and the neo-Platonists such as Porphyry and Plotinus. They were subsumed under the category of “Platonists.”

20. See J. J. O’Donnell, *Confessions*, vol. 2, 415. This raises issues of negative theology. Platonist theory and language do not provide knowledge of God, but the very fact of the Incarnation does. We know and do not know God simultaneously.

Writers, 415, “The master mind was Porphyry.” In the same pages Courcelle rightly states that Iamblichus was not known in the West until the end of the fourth century, and the major testimony, Augustine at Civ. 8.12, seems to have known him by name only.


25. See Conf. 7 and Civ. 10. O’Donnell, Confessions, vol. 1, i, xli comments on Augustine’s interplay of images and patterns as “a feat possible in the fourth century only for someone who had read Plotinus, and read him very well”; and O’Donnell states that Augustine found in Porphyry “a Platonism that led him toward Christianity and that he would criticize mainly for not going far enough in that direction” (xlv).


27. O’Donnell, Confessions, vol. 2, 423, represents the tide of scholarly opinion when he says that Plotinus and Porphyry came to Augustine as a package most likely in the form of Porphyry’s Sententiae attached as a preface to selections from Plotinus. The most recent edition of the Sententiae is by E. Lamberz, trans., Porphyrius Sententiae ad Intelligibilia Ducentes (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner Verlagsgesellschaft, 1975). It is probable that we do not possess the complete text.


29. See Courcelle, Late Latin Writers, 74–76.

30. Traditionally this work has been dated at 399/400, but O’Donnell, Confessions, vol. 2, 422, wishes to push the date up, possibly to 415. Certainly by Ep. 82.2.22 (c.405) Augustine knew Against the Christians.

31. Thus, Augustine’s acknowledged debt to the platonicorum libri for helping him to arrive at his Christian vision, and especially Porphyry’s De Regressu Animae; also Jerome’s wholesale plagiarizing of Porphyry, though he vilified him. For references see Courcelle, Late Latin Writers, 417 and 72–76, respectively.

32. This crossover must be approached with caution, since it is often difficult to attempt to disentangle pagan from Christian ideas. Consider sapientia. At times, Prudentius distinguishes two notions of sapientia; one pagan, and one Christian. But often, the Psychomachia settles on a syncretist and Christian Platonist construc-
tion of the concept. Sometimes he juxtaposes Sapientia and Deus, referring to them now as fellow creators and now as apophatic divine beings with no discernable origins (Ham. 345, 164). In another passage the poet invokes Sapientia as an offspring of the Father and therefore an ontological equal of Christ (Hymn on the Trinity 2). In all three passages, a Christian context is clear, but their debt to pagan metaphysics is clear from their concern with the ontology of the godhead. Conversely, the pagan Sapientia is sometimes clearly marked by Prudentius’ pejorative language and attitude. At Ham. 378–405 Sapientia is a pagan personification carrying a Herculean club and is a direct cause of evil in the world. Here Sapientia is the ally of vice whose doctrines are arrogant and whose eloquence thunders to no good purpose. The vision of the temple and its inhabitants in the Psychomachia, by contrast, eschews the hard and fast distinction between pagan and Jewish-Christian Sapientia, preferring to combine the two.

33. Smith, Prudentius’ Psychomachia, 232.


36. Eph. 21:18–22 (with Psych. 840): (18) quia per ipsum habemus consecuti simul in uno spiritu ad patrem; (19) iam peregrini at adventae sed concives sanctorum sed domestici dei; (20) superaedificati super fundamentum apostolorum et prophetarum cum sit summus angelaris Christus in quo omnis aedificatio compacta crescit in templum sanctum in domino, in quo et vos coaedificamini in habituatione dei spiritu.

37. Prudentius exploits two meanings of templum: the meaning derived from ναός, “dwelling place” (Latin habitatio), and the meaning of templum, as a holy place formed by apportioning off a piece of land (Psych. 830). The phrase purgati corporis urbem implicitly possesses both meanings and establishes the temple as the soul itself through the suggestion of the city/soul analogy. We can see a similar ambiguity in Basil’s usage of ναός at Ep. 8.11 (To the Caesareaeans, 360AD). He is interpreting 1 Cor. 6:19; “[Y]ou are the temple of the holy spirit which is in you.” Basil says, πας δε ναος Θεο το ναος. Ει δε ναος εσμεν του Πνευματος του αγιου, Θεα το Πνευμα το αγιον, λεγεται δε και ναος Σολομοντος αλλ ας κατασκευασαντος. Ει δε ουτως εσμεν ναος του αγιου Πνευματος, Θεα το αγιον Πνευμα. Ο γαρ παντα κατασκευασας Θεος. Ει δε ως προσκυνουμενοι και ονοικουντος εν ημιν, ομολογησωμεν αυτο ειναι Θεον. Basil moves comfortably from the temple as an actual artifice to the body as the temple of the Holy Spirit. The same distinction can be seen in Gregory of Nazianzus’ Or. 8.11 (On His Sister Gorgonia), where he says of his sister: τις δε ήτον εφθεγματο εν τοις γυμαικιους όροις της ευσεβειας μεινασα; δε ουν οφειλετο τη γε αληθος ευσεβειν εγνωκιν, και ου καλη μονον η απληστια, τις μεν αναθημασιν ουτω ναους κατεκοσμησεν αλλους τε και τον ουκ οιδε ει μετ έκεινην κοσμηθησομενον;
μᾶλλον δὲ, τίς οὖτις ναὸν ἐαυτὸν τῷ θεῷ ζώντα παρέστησεν; Nazianzen shifts from the literal structure of a temple in a city to the temple as a human being. Latin Patristic literature does not engage in the dual level discussion of “temple.” But none of the Patristic literature uses the particular Old Testament texts as Prudentius does. He is original in this respect.


39. Praef. Symm. 1. 46 personifies Sapientia on a boat as the storm of the world passes over. The ship stands for the Christian ship of state (Praef. Symm. 1. 59), which Sapientia commands and whose holy law (lex pia, Praef. Symm. 1. 51) is wounded, probably referring to the Altar of Victory conflict which the Contra Symmachum addresses. Note the association of Sapientia with the religious state of Rome. Sapientia in Prudentius is associated both with the individual person and the state.


42. B. Mitchell and J.R. Lucas, An Engagement with Plato’s Republic (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 27. Plato establishes the metaphor of internal psychological battle a few lines later: “Injustice . . . must be some sort of civil war between these three elements, a refusal to mind their own business, and a determination to mind each other’s, a rebellion by one part of the soul against the whole . . . the disorder and straying of the three elements produce injustice, indiscipline, cowardice, ignorance—evil of every kind, in fact.” (444b1–8)

43. Mitchell and Lucas, An Engagement with Plato’s Republic, 27. B. A. O. Williams, “Analogy of City and Soul,” parses Plato’s city/soul metaphor as a kind of confusion between the concepts of analogy and membership. The connections between the character of the polis and the soul are developed in a particular direction in the Psychomachia’s own expression of the pair soul/city.

44. In his failure to understand the dynamic of resemblance and membership, G. B. Ladner, God, Cosmos, and Humankind: The World of Early Christian Symbolism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 186 makes the misguided assertion that “in Prudentius the battle between virtues and vices does not take place in the soul, but outside.” Ladner goes further, arguing that in Prudentius “the personifications of the virtues and vices that appear here are not only pure fabrications, they also lack the persuasive reality of major poetic inventions” (188). My project has been to show precisely the opposite of Ladner’s position. Figurative reading in the form of typological allegory defines the essence of Prudentius’ personifications, which produce a “persuasive reality” regarding the reader.

46. Although Augustine does not explicitly express the connection between salvation history and Roman *imperium*, his willingness to use the power of the Roman Christian *imperium* to spread and preserve orthodox doctrine reveals a relationship between the Roman state and Christian doctrine.

47. The ephratic presentation of two cities, one at war and the other at peace, dates all the way back to *Iliad* 18 in which the political and ethical condition of humankind is depicted as a relief on Achilles’ massive shield.

48. Philo, *De Posteritate Caini* 183–84; *De Gigantibus* 51; and *De Confusione Linguarum* 46. D. T. Runia, “The Idea and the Reality of the City in the Thought of Philo of Alexandria,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 61.3 (2000): 370, comments that for Philo, “in the allegorical context, the city above all illustrates the inner workings of the soul.” Also Runia says that the city is an “exegetical and allegorical theme” (377) and “the method of allegory enables [Philo] to bring forward the more theoretical and philosophical aspects of the theme [of the city]” (362).


50. Philo, *De Confusione Linguarum*, 107–108, with Runia, “The Idea and Reality of the City,” 369. Compare *De Somniis* 2.249: “The City of God is not only the cosmos but also the soul of the wise man. Its name Jerusalem means ‘vision of peace.’ This city should not be sought in the regions of the earth, for it is not made of wood and stone, but rather in the soul which sets for itself the goal of the life of peace and contemplation.”


53. Dvornik, *Early Christian and Byzantine Political Philosophy*, 697, notes that Eusebius gives a biblical rationale for the empire as the guarantor of peace through his interpretation of Isaiah’s messianic prophecy. Isaiah claimed that peace would come with the messiah and this peace Eusebius identifies with the Augustan *Pax Romana*. Given his emphasis on the typological allegory of peace at the end of the *Psychomachia*, Prudentius appears to recognize this association between the messiah and Roman peace.


57. O’Donnell, *Confessions*, vol. 1, xl. In the *Confessions*, Augustine expresses his most developed Platonist scheme of ascent. He lays out a seven-stage scheme of ascent, all of which depends on an acceptance of the Incarnation—for Augustine, a crucial
lacuna in the schemes of Porphyry and other neo-Platonists. See O’Donnell’s comments with references on Conf. 7.17.23 and 7.18.24.

58. See Plotinus, Enn. 4.8(6).5 and 8. These two views seem incompatible with the pictures produced in the Timaeus and the Republic. The Timaeus envisions the soul’s first incarnation, effected by the divine Demiurge, as a blameless event; and the Republic understands the embodiment of the soul as a result of universal necessity. It is possible to see how the notion in the two former dialogues of the soul’s coming-to-be as a failing and resulting pollution could be in conflict with the explanation in the latter two dialogues of the soul’s coming-to-be as a result of necessary and hence, blameless event, but Plotinus saw no contradiction and wanted to eliminate the language of falling which has connotations of deterioration. Rather, he thought that the soul remains as it was, divine and unseparated from Intelligence, but that the process of embodiment has somehow made the person unaware of this hidden life of the soul. This is not an equivocation on the problem presented by the Platonic texts, but Plotinus does manage to take both an optimistic and pessimistic view of the soul’s coming-to-be. Optimistically, this is seen as an emanation that flows outward, therefore preserving a connection to the hypostasis of Intelligence. Pessimistically, the soul’s emanation is still viewed as a fall implying the existence of the will and the punishment that such an instrument of choice necessitates.


60. Echoed by Porphyry at Ad Marc. 1.112. Augustine, like most Christians of his age, understands descent in a more moralistic and will-oriented way—that it is contingent on humans’ chosen failure.

61. Enn. 1.1; 1.8; 2.4; 4.3.

62. For a detailed account of the differences and similarities between Plotinus and Porphyry see A. Smith, Porphyry’s Place in the Neoplatonic Tradition (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), 1–78. On page 70, Smith names two of the most glaring differences. Porphyry decided that eternal transmigration of souls was irrelevant and should be eliminated from his theory of soul. Also, Porphyry, unlike Plotinus, recognizes the importance of the concepts of time and history which impose a beginning and an end to salvation. Both of these modifications were especially attractive to fourth-century Christians who despised the notion of reincarnation and saw the history of the world as a kind of progression to the incarnation of the savior.

63. Sent. 29.18.14 (τὸ βαρὺ πνεῦμα) and Sent. 29.19.16 (βαρεῖςθεα). Compare Macrobius’s pondus at In Scip. 1.11.11 and 1.12.13; also Augustine Conf. 13.7.8 (pondere cupiditas) and 13.9.10 (pondus meum amor meus). Gersh, Middle Platonism, vol. 2, 585–87, says that Macrobius is following Numenius through Porphyry.

65. De Antr. Nymph. 11.14.1–12,14,24; Sent. 29.18.14–19; In Tim Fr. 13. At In Scip. 1.12.8 Macrobius ascribes “intoxication” (ebrietatem) to the soul.


67. Ad Marc. 6.112–14. For the soul as sleepy see also De Abstin. 1.28 (referring to Homer Odys. 24.12), De Antr. Nymph. 75; and in Plato see Rep. 571c–72b.


69. Sent. 29.19.9–10 and Gersh, Middle Platonism, vol. 2, 583.

70. Dawson, “Christian Teaching,” 224, refers to Plato’s conception of mimetic poetry as being caught in “a labyrinth of narrative desire,” the withdrawal from which was necessary in order to become an autonomous person whose actions are based on reasons.

71. Or, as Plotinus sometimes explains it, the body approaches the soul. See O’Meara, Plotinus, 27.

72. Ad Gaur. 13.53.2–27 and Sent. 37,43.11–16. At In Scip. 1.12.6 Macrobius writes per hominis membra diffunditur.

73. Ad Marc. 18.307–308, 17.291–92, 6.111–14, 34.523–25, and 7.115–20, respectively. For ignorance as a disease of the soul see Plato’s Republic 609c–11a. Regarding shackle and chain language, the Platonic inheritance is significant: Phaedo 59e–60a and Republic 514a–17c. Chains are connected with the Orphic idea of the body as the prison of the soul. See Cratylus 400c and Phaedo 62b. For much of the Porphyrian language in Plotinus see Enn. 4.8.1.


75. Ad Marc. 11.191–98; 19.316–20

76. Ad Marc. 11.201–202; 19.322; 21.333 (both of God and evil spirits); 21.338. Note that in sections 11, 19, and 21 Porphyry delineates the two-sidedness of the soul. It can either house God/reason or evil spirits.


80. Ad Marc. 24.381–82. This passage in context (376–83) discusses the τέσσαρα of which faith and hope are integral constituents of a knowledge of God. At 23,362–63 Porphyry appears to make a negative comment about faith as ἀλόγος. But his point is that faith alone can not provide the neccessary divine knowledge. It must be supple-

81. Ad Marc. 25.384–86.

82. See O’Brien Wicker’s notes on these three categories of law: Ad Marcellam, 111–12.

83. Ad Marc. 20.331 and 26.417–18. 331 is paralleled in Pythag. Sent. 16 and Sent. Sext. 430.

84. Quoted in Eusebius Praep. Ev. 14.10.5.

85. Quoted in Augustine Civ. 10.32 (De Regressu Animae, fr. 12 J. Bidez, Vie de Porphyre avec les fragments des traités per περὶ οὐκαλύματον et De Regressu Animae, Recueil de Travaux publiés par la Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres, xliii (Université de Gand, 1913).

86. See also Ep. Ad Aneb., quoted in Iamblichus De Myst. 10.1 and fr. 12 Bidez.
87. Ad Marc. 521–25. Porphyry employs chain and binding language of the soul at 7.114–20 and 33.506–11. The former passage has to do with women weighing themselves down with the shackles of jewelry, while the latter equates chains with the various pleasure-seeking and fear-behaving organs of the body.

88. Socrates at Phaedo 59e–60a is released from his chains in the prison when his wife Xanthippe and his child briefly visit; also Phaedo 82d6: λύσει τε καὶ καθαρμῷ.

89. See Porphyry Ad Marc. 7.122.

90. Psych. 8, 29, 33, and 55.

91. I do not include vernulas (line 22) and vernularum (line 56) since these are household slaves, which are part of the family and are not intended to contribute to the bondage of the soul metaphor.

92. See also Psych. 591–92 and 595.

93. This is explicitly stated in lines 14 (cordis servientis) and line 52 (in armis pectorum fidelium). Note as well the language of home which foregrounds the soul: domi (the place where we gather our forces, line 55), casam (of the chaste soul, line 62), domum (the house of the Father, line 68). Abraham’s domus is where he entertains the triple formed image of the Trinity.

94. See Plato, Phaedo 81c8–9 for the language of heaviness (βαρὺ, βαρύνεται).

95. Compare Macrobius In Scip. 1.9.1: manare de caelo.

96. Prudentius constructs this Christian Platonist conceptual scheme in the lines surrounding and including Psych. 68 in order to make clear his exegesis of the Judith story, which prefigures the Incarnation.


98. Psych. 89–95 contain striking descent language, much of which seems to be overtly Christian or possibly pagan epic in its origin; however, besides having its directional orientation, the expression ad mortis iter (Psych. 89) picks up the earlier language of credendi via (Praef. 1) and vicendi . . . ratio (Psych. 18). All these nouns can be translated as “way”. The soul gets submerged into Tartarus, animas in Tartara mergis (Psych. 90). Pudicitia commands the soul of Libido to “thrust into the dark depths of night” (ingue tenebrosum noctis detrudere fundum, Psych. 93). Psych. 94–95 picks up fluxit of Psych. 68 with volvant subter / vada . . . vada . . . / rotet per stagna sonantia vertex. The context certainly consists of Christian notions of hell, but even here, certain signs of Platonist descent language can be seen.

99. Ovid Amores 1.2.15, asper equus duris contunditur ora lupatis; Horace Carm. 1.8.6, lupatis temperet ora frenis. Prudentius employs allusions to pagan Latin poets to construct a broader, Platonist resonance.

100. Note also Prudentius’ use of libertate, which recalls neo-Platonic language of release from earthly bonds.

101. Compare the winged charioteer, ὑποπτέρου . . . ἡνιόχου, of Phaedrus 246a7.


103. D. Shanzer, “Allegory and Reality,” 353, note 38, speculates that Prudentius may have gotten the notion of winged hope directly from Hesiod. Indeed, this assumes either Prudentius’s knowledge of Greek or the availability of a Latin translation.
104. R. Hackforth, *Plato’s Phaedrus* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 107, says of 253c–56e: “The most that we can say is that continence is conceived as in one aspect intellectual, its source being knowledge or recollection of ideal beauty, and in another as emotional.”

105. J. Bergman cites Vergil *Aen.* 9.14, *dixit et in caelum paribus se sustulit alis,* and Tibullus 4.1.209, *per liquidum volucri vehar aëra penna,* as parallels to *Psych.* 305 and 306. These allusions form but a small part of the *Phaedrus* language and imagery employed throughout the *Psychomachia.* And thus, as is the case with bits and pieces of scriptural texts used by Prudentius, such allusions take on a life of their own and are constituent of a broader allusion, in this case to Platonic imagery.


107. Motifs of weight and heaviness of the soul were adopted by Plotinus/Porphyry (see note 63) from Plato.


109. *Psych.* 231–34 is a brief criticism of *Spes* put into the mouth of *Superbia.* She says that thinking which includes hope encourages idle expectation (pigro rerum meditatis, *Psych.* 234). She uses words of sluggishness and idleness (lenta, desidiam) that emphasize stagnation. Hopes are likened to “silly dreams of empty talk” (vacuae frivola famae) and are things “believed in” (creduntur). At *Psych.* 235 she calls hope lazy (*spes palpet iners*) and accuses her of not being able to rouse up the virtues. The metaphor of ascent is conspicuously absent in the vice’s portrayal of the virtue.

110. See note 67 in Ladner, *God, Cosmos, and Humankind,* who mysteriously understands the battles of the virtues and vices in the *Psychomachia* taking place only on the outside.

111. See also *Ham.* 56–59, *in cerebro . . . ebrio . . . / madens.* Macrobius, in his neo-Platonic excursus on the soul, describes the descending soul as being in a state of drunkenness (ebrietatem; *In Scip. 1.12.8*).


113. The word *electrum* can mean either “amber” or an “alloy of silver and gold.” In this case, the color amber (and thus the material) is meant, especially considering the modifying adjective *pallens,* which is applied to the pagan underworld. The color of a sick and weakened person is foremost in the present context. See Lewis Short, *A Latin Dictionary,* A & B.


115. *Psych.* 448–49 is another example of *Luxuria*’s dissipation, this time in terms of the things which were on her person: *damna iacent: crinalis acus redimicula vittae / fibula flammeloum strofium diadema monile.*

116. D. J. O’Meara, *Platonopolis: Platonic Philosophy in Late Antiquity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 74, illustrates the Plotinian use of the story of Minos, the legendary legislator, who, after communion with Zeus the monarch of the universe (equivalent to the divine intellect), legislates in the image of his union.

117. O’Meara, *Platonopolis,* 90.


120. Apoth. 449–54: Principibus tamen e cunctis non defect unus / me puero, ut memini, dux doctissimus armis, / conditor et legum, celeberrimus ore manuque, / consulutor patriae, sed non consulutor habendae / religionis, amans ter centum milia divum. / Perfidus ille deo quamvis non perfidus orbi.


122. See M. B. Simmons, “Julian the Apostate,” in *The Early Christian World*, ed. P. E. Esler, vol. 2 (London: Routledge, 2000), 1252, for sources regarding Julian’s daily ritual sacrifices. Libanius, *Or. 12.82*, says that Julian’s fingers were stained red with the blood of sacrificed animals.

123. Lactantius, *Div. Inst.* 4.27 asserts that no pagan ritual will work nor a priest be able to read entrails when a Christian with an image of a cross on his forehead is present.

124. The passage makes it clear that the pagan gods are not non-existent, but rather are defeated by the one, true god whose authority consigns pagan gods to the status of demons or evil spirits.

125. On Iamblichus’ influence on Julian, see M. B. Simmons and his references, “Julian the Apostate,” 1252.

126. D. J. O’Meara, *Platonopolis*, 121–22. M. B. Simmons, “Julian the Apostate,” 1254 emphasizes the idea that Julian’s program of appointing pagan clergy is an anti-Christian maneuver above all else and parallels church structure with its regional clergy who have the authority to appoint priests with varying responsibilities in each city.


128. O’Meara, *Platonopolis*, 147; for Eusebius’ post-Constantinian, pre-Alaric triumphalism, see *HE* 4.26.7ff. and *Contra Celsum* 2.30; for the patristic literature’s support of the close relationship between Roman imperium, the pax Romana, monothelism, and monarchy, see Van Oort, *Jerusalem and Babylon*, 156 with further references and Dvornik, *Early Christian and Byzantine Political Philosophy*, 676–96.


131. Roberts examines the various *topoi* associated with martyr narratives including a sequence of *tormenta*, exhaustion of the torturer, the growing enthusiasm of the martyr as he/she is tortured, the elements of a martyr death, etc. I would go even further. At *Pe.* 1006–50 Romanus describes in detail a pagan sacrifice of an ox only to deride it as senseless mutilation in the name of the “gods.” Romanus goes on to accuse
pagans of being polluted by immersing themselves in such blood and gore. At Pe. 1091–1100 Prudentius explains that in the martyr narrative the polluting pagan ritual of blood and gore (i.e., sacrifice) is played out in reverse. That is, Christians in the time of persecution, and as represented in Prudentius’ martyr narratives, turned this barbarity into a triumph. Thus, the violence is exclusively pagan since it derives from pagan sacrifice; and when pagans attempt to turn this violent behavior against Christian bodies, it is ineffectual. The idea is that Christians will live on no matter what happens to the body. Just as pagan sacrifice to false gods is futile, so violence done to a Christian of unshakable faith results in a glorious immortality.


138. Other examples are *Psych.* 153–54, 506–509, 589–97, 672–77, and 691–93. I also include *Psych.* 506–509, 672–77, and 691–93, even though little blood is spilled, because they are failed attacks. The goal of the attempts is the same type of death. In these cases the attempts fail because the intended victims are virtues. These contrasting results in an otherwise parallel situation express a picture of the Christian soul, which is distinct from the picture of the soul full of a vice. The latter dies, while the former attains eternal life.

139. Christian salvation history envisaged the coming of Christ as a turning point in the history of mankind. Before this event, humans were part of a pagan age in which God and salvation remained for the most part unacknowledged. In fact, the Roman Empire is understood as part of the evolution toward the age of Christianity, which commences with the birth of Christ and offers humanity an opportunity for eternal life. My implicit claim is that the souls of vices are relegated to a past time before the birth of Christ, a time when souls were indeed mortal owing to the false religious beliefs of the people and adherence to a pagan philosophical doctrine that simply does not apply in this new age of salvation history.


142. Text and translation are from Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, sect. 14A.


147. A similar pattern holds for throat words and words for things that penetrate and break. Regarding the vices, we encounter the following words: gutturis (Psych. 34), iugulum (Psych. 49), gulam (Psych. 424), guttura (Psych. 425), gulture (Psych. 590), gulam (Psych. 591), gladio (Psych. 50), cuspside (Psych. 153), saxum (Psych. 421), pilo (Psych. 717), and cuspide (Psych. 718). As for the virtues, the list is as follows: iugulis (Psych. 509); cuspis (Psych. 508), tela (Psych. 509), mucronem (Psych. 673), acumen (Psych. 675), and ferrum (Psych. 696). In the vice death scenes, Prudentius portrays throats, the seat of speech and the passage way for breath, damaged by weapons. But, in the virtue attack scenes, the poet renders these weapons impotent by virtue of the fact that the figures’ precious throats are unharmed or slightly grazed. The throat as part of the protective vessel for the breath and soul remains contained, whereas, in the cases of the vices, the soul escapes through wounds or is trapped.

148. At Psych. 58–59 Pudicitia says to the dying Libido: Tene, o vexatrix hominum, potuisse resumptis / viribus extincti capitis recalescere flatu. And when Avaritia’s javelins are ineffectual against the sacerdotes Domini, she complains that no human used to be able to reject (sperneret, Psych. 516) or was impenetrable to (inpenetrabilis, Psych. 516) her influence. And then she explicitly states the mortality associated with herself as a conceptual vice: ingenium omne neci dedimus (Psych. 517).

149. I have quoted three of these passages above in the main text.

150. A section of Concordia’s speech at Psych. 750–87 is a literal panegyric in praise of peace. The poem has clearly shifted from the hardship and brutality of the war with the vices to the Christian ideal of peace and social harmony. This condition sets the stage for the building of the Christian temple in which Sapientia holds sway.


153. Because humans are made in the image of God, their souls reflect this divine ternary. But, since the human soul is created in time and exists logically posterior to the Father, it can never attain the level of being that the Father represents. Thus, the soul is defined more by its life and intelligence, both of which are consubstantial with being, but a lesser form of being than the being of the creator, which is incomprehensible and transcendent.


159. *Signacula* means a seal or stamp at Tertullian, *Apologia* 21; Apuleius *Flor.* 2, sign of the cross; Tertullian *Marc.* 3.22 mark on forehead made at baptism. *Psych.* 360–61, *post inscripta oleo frontis signacula per quae/ unguentum regale datum est et chrisma perenne*, reinforces the meaning of *signacula* as “signs” that connect worldly phenomena to transcendent divine mysteries; in this case, sacramental signs to Christ’s power.

160. For Scripture as *dei signacula* see Augustine’s semiotic explanation for the exegesis of scripture at *De Doct. Christ.* 1.2.2 and 2.1.1.


162. Compare *Apoth.* 402–21, where Prudentius substitutes Christ for Apollo as an inspiration for poetry. The pagans appear to have understood the truth of this substitution—and thus have converted to Christianity, whereas the Jews have not. Christianity is the ultimate goal in the progress of religions.


**EPilogue**

1. Dawson, *Christian Figural Reading*, 11, relying on Erich Auerbach (see “Conclusion”) understands figural reading as, “a method of discerning the intelligibility of a
divine performance in history without relying on a conception of meaning as a concept
signified by a textual signifier. The intelligibility of biblical narrative for the figural
reader lies in the perception of divinely constructed figural relationships between
persons and events in the world . . . preserving historicity means reading in such a way
as to allow the text to have an appropriate ethical impact on the present-day reader.”
F. Young, “Typology,” in Crossing the Boundaries: Essays in Biblical Interpretation in
Press, 1994), 36, draws a connection between typology and allegory that suits the work
of Prudentius: “[T]he production of correspondences, whether or not the word ‘type’
actually appears, is what may constitute ‘typology’ as a particular definable form of the
broader category ‘allegory.’” See further, 39–40, for the variations of typological corre-
spondences.

2. C. Gill, Personality in Greek Epic, Tragedy, and Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1996), 9–16, refers to individualist and relational concepts of the self as
“subjective-individualist” and “objective-participant” respectively. In the former no-
tion, the self (or personhood) is defined as “a unified locus of thought and will,”
autonomous, legislating its own moral principles, and abstracted from “localized inter-
personal attachments.” This summarizes what I mean by an “individualist” self. The
latter notion envisions the self as a moral-reasoning entity that expresses its “reason-
ruled” moral principles as a consequence of, and through, a shared “interpersonal and
communal engagement.” This encapsulates my idea of a “relational” self.


4. The linkage between God, Christ, and human implies a physical and psychologi-
cal connection. Humans issue directly from God. Moreover, as one reads the Psycho-
machia, one looks into oneself to discover Christ for a connection to God.

5. In the Praefatio to the Psychomachia, the story of Lot appears once again, though
it focuses on Abraham’s earlier rescue of Lot.

6. Symm. 1.407–12 is another strong statement of free will.

7. See chapter 4, note 57.


10. Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self, 39: “God is not only within the soul
but also above it. In the interval between the turning in and the looking up one finds
oneself in a new place, never before conceived: an inner space proper to the soul
different from the intelligible world in the Mind of God. The soul becomes, as it were,
its own dimension—a whole realm of being waiting to be entered and explored.”
Compare Taylor, Sources of Self, 134: “By going inward, I am drawn upward.”

11. Conf. 7.10.16: Et inde admonitus redire ad memet ipsum, intravi in intima mea
duce te, et potui, quoniam factus es adiutor meus. Intravi et vidi qualcumque oculo
animae meae supra eundum oculum animae meae, supra mentem meam, lucem incommutabilem . . . ita erat supra mentem meam . . . sed superior, quia ipsa fecit me, et ego inferior, quia factus ab ea. Qui novit veritatem, novit eam, et qui novit eam, novit aeternitatem (“By the Platonic books I was admonished to return into myself. With you as my guide I entered into my innermost citadel, and was given power to do so because you had become my helper. I entered and with my soul’s eye, such as it was, saw above that same eye of my soul the immutable light higher than my mind . . . It transcended my mind. . . . It was superior because it made me, and I was inferior because I was made by it. The person who knows the truth knows it, and he who knows it knows eternity”). Translated by H. Chadwick (Saint Augustine: Confessions [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991]); Another key passage for Taylor, Sources of the Self, 129, is De Vera Religione, 39.72: Noli foras ire, in te ipsum redi; in interiore homine habitat veritas (“Don’t go outward; return within yourself. In the inward man dwells the truth”).

12. Taylor, Sources of Self, 133.

13. Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self, 55, cites Augustine’s Ep. 18.2 as evidence for a hierarchy of being: God-soul-bodies. Although not typological in its conception, this triad shows Augustine’s preoccupation with an ascent to God through the connection of the immaterial to the material. His ontology maps on to the typology of God—Christ—human.

14. At Conf. 8.22 he comments on the source of his inner conflicts: et ideo non iam ego operabar illam, sed quod habitabat in me peccatum de supplicio liberioris peccati, quia eram filius Adam (“And so it was ‘not I’ that brought this about ‘but sin which dwelt in me’ [Romans 7:17, 20], sin resulting from the punishment of a more freely chosen sin, because I was the son of Adam”). See K. Stendahl, “The Apostle Paul and the Introspective Conscience of the West,” in his Paul among the Jews and Gentiles (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976), 78–96.

15. [I]n illo homine qui primus peccavit, in quo et omnes mortui sumus et de quo omnes cum miseria nati sumus. C. Harrison, Augustine: Christian Truth and Fractured Humanity (Oxford University Press, 2000), 28, recalls Augustine’s phrase, massa peccati, to refer to a human being after the Fall.

16. The tension between the individualist and relational sides of the self are manifest in the ways of reading the fall of Adam.

17. Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self, 117: “Without sin there could be no separation of souls and therefore no inner privacy.”


19. The quotes are about Augustine from Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self, 78. Cary cites Augustine’s Soliloquia, a dialogue with Reason as the interlocutor.


22. Sed ubi manes in memoria mea, domine . . . quale sanctuarium aedificasti tibi? Tu dedisti hanc dignitatemem memoriae meae, ut maneas in ea . . . nec ibi tu eras; and Whitehead, Castles of the Mind, 32.

23. Magna vis est memoriae . . . profunda et infinita multiplicitas . . . et hoc ego ipse sum.

24. K. Smolak, “Die Psychomachie des Prudentius als historisches epos,” La poesia
tardoantica e medievale (2001): 125–30, discusses how Vergil, Lucan, Juvenecus, and Prudentius connect history with the individual. Smolak deftly explains the interaction of Lucretian didactic epic and Vergilian narrative epic in the Psychomachia. He also argues that Prudentius’ personification allegories are partly rooted in Greek philosophy.


28. Conybeare, Paulinus Noster, 149.


30. Dawson, Christian Figural Reading, 104, is analyzing the degrees of historicity of the biblical figure Joshua, who prefigures Jesus, and Vergil, who is fulfilled by Dante’s Vergil.


32. Dawson, Christian Figural Reading, 104–105, assumes Auerbach’s view of the centrality of Dante for the history of figural realism in order to highlight Auerbach’s paradoxical assertion that Dante’s Virgil becomes more historically real than even the historical Virgil because of his fulfillment in the otherworld as portrayed in the Divine Comedy.


36. See Ziolkowski, “Foreword” to Auerbach, Literary Language and Its Public, xvii, note 24, for references concerning the frequency of citations of Curtius.

37. S. Lehrer, ed., Literary History and the Challenge of Philology: The Legacy of Erich Auerbach (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1996), “introduction,” 8, says, “[F]ifty years after the composition of Mimesis, Auerbach still stands as a touchstone for contemporary academic debates on the place of historical criticism in the construction of literary history, on the relations between intellectual activity and political action, and the function of the critic in reading—or effecting—social change.” Auerbach’s construction of literary history is, in general, assumed in many of these debates. Of particular interest on the ideas of sermo humilis and figura are the articles by Luiz Costa Lima, Stephen G. Nichols, Jesse Gellrich, Hayden White, Brian Stock, and Kevin Brownlee. For example, Nichols, “Philology in Auerbach’s Drama of (Literary) History,” 72, says of Mimesis, chapter 7, “It is a brilliant and subtle Ausformung of figura and sermo humilis, the two principles by which Auerbach transformed medieval studies generally and Dante studies in particular.” For a more poststructuralist reading of Auerbach see E. Apter, “Saidian Humanism,” Boundary 2, 31:2 (2004), who examines

38. Auerbach, Literary Language and its Public, 25–66 treats the sermo humilis style adopted by early Christian writers (especially Augustine) in which there are no absolute levels of subject matter and “the highest mysteries of the faith maybe set forth in the simple words of the lowly style which everyone can understand” (37).

39. B. Stock, “Literary Realism in the Later Ancient Period,” in Literary History and the Challenge of Philology, ed. Lehrer, 155. But Stock does note the limitations of Auerbach’s preoccupation with Augustine as a literary wellspring for the Middle Ages—though Stock still pigeonholes Prudentius and other authors under the category of allegory: “The obvious weakness lay in the field of allegory, as witness his [Auerbach’s] insufficient attention to writers like Prudentius, Johannes Scottus Eriugena, or Allen of Lille, who were all important influences on the medieval vernacular literature” (144). Curtius, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, 28, like Auerbach, asserts that the Middle Ages as the continuation of Rome originates in Augustine’s philosophy of history—i.e., his notion of salvation history. Curtius moves from this point to Dante (29) who, he claims, has an Augustinian notion of history. In fact, on page 30 Curtius relates the two authors with the phrase “Augustinian and Dantean historical thought.” Yet later, on page 371, note 57, Curtius says that, “Augustine . . . is systematically passed over by Dante.” He does not attempt to reconcile these two statements. J. C. Warner, Augustinian Epic, Petrarch to Milton (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005), also falls in line with the Augustinian dominated notion of literary history by arguing that renaissance epics employ Augustine’s idea of the spiritual ascent to God as a mainstay of their poetic program. Even the notion that through allegory Roman Christian epic furnishes knowledge of God and the soul, and thus achieves a communion with God, all of which I have argued as part and parcel of Prudentian poetics, is given over in Warner’s study to Augustine’s Christian purpose. I hope to have added a competing perspective to this view of medieval and early modern literary history.

40. In his essay, “Figura,” trans. R. Manheim, in Scenes From the Drama of European Literature, ed. Wlad Godzich and Jochen Schulte-Sassa (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 37, Auerbach focuses on Augustine’s typological view of history put forward at Civ. 20:14; see also Dawson, Christian Figural Reading, 95 and 245, note 27. Auerbach, Latin Literature and its Public, 309, says, “Dante was the first and the last to undertake on the basis of his own historical existence a total view of the universe with the political life of man on earth as its arena an center.” And see Auerbach, Dante: Poet of the Secular World, trans. R. Manheim (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), 17.


42. Stock, “Literary Realism,” 149, posits Augustine as a central source for Auerbach’s idea of literary realism, “in which distant persons and remote models of virtue are gradually replaced by those nearer at hand, that is, by individuals whose lives are recorded within the living memory of Augustine’s own time.” The martyrs and the role of the reader in the Peristephanon and Psychomachia function in a similar fashion. By being invited to come along on the Vergilian katabasis of Christian rebirth, the reader
of the *Psychomachia* inserts himself into the text, thereby collapsing the temporal and special distance between him and the “remote models of virtue.” Prudentius’ narratives of third-century Spanish martyrs close this distance as well.


45. Curtius, *European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages*, 358: “The conception of the *Commedia* is based upon a spiritual meeting with Virgil. In the realm of European literature there is little which may be compared with this phenomenon.”


50. Both Auerbach and Curtius praise Prudentius. For example, Curtius, *European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages*, 23, calls Prudentius “the first great Christian poet” and “the most important, artistic, and universal early Christian poet” (49). Auerbach, *Literary Language and its Public*, 336, includes Prudentius in a list of authors whom he calls “a heritage from antiquity.” These compliments, however, are always in the context of Prudentius as an innovator in personification allegory and, more important, as only a Christian poet. Auerbach, *Latin Literature and its Public*, 195, makes this clear: “he far more than Claudian must be put down as a Christian writer, and we may prefer not to deal with Christian literature in the present context.” For Auerbach, Prudentius is at best, “a transitional phenomenon” (195).

51. Auerbach, “*Figura*,” 54, quoted by J. M. Gellrich, “*Figura*, Allegory, and the Question of History,” in Lehrer, *Literary History and the Challenge of Philology*, 119–20. Gellrich, like Dawson, *Christian Figural Reading*, explores the “strangeness” or “in-betweenness” of Auerbach’s *figura*, which “postulates neither the truth of abstraction nor the disclosure of the accomplished fact . . . and thus kept alive the history he read and the history he was living” (123).