This chapter presents some modest relief from the authors’ voice (though we do not exactly exit stage left and head outside for a cappuccino). Here we provide case studies of public values leadership, reported in the words of the leaders we interviewed. Our only intrusions include some editorial abridgement and, in a few cases, some modest paraphrasing when needed to provide clarification. We do provide comments at the end of each case, and we invite the reader to reflect and “comment” as well, comparing his or her own experiences. The only conspicuous exception to the lapse in the authors’ voice is a mini-case from coauthor Crow.

Most of our public values leaders have a relatively low political profile, and only one of them has significant experience as an elected official. But we begin with a case that shows that elected officials, mixed agendas notwithstanding, can in some cases provide public values leadership. The discussion below focuses on Governor Jeb Bush’s work on mental health programs in Florida. As we shall see below, this is to some extent a Bush family legacy, with both Presidents George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush also having been very much concerned with mental health policies and goals.
The other four leadership cases in this chapter include Freeman Hrabowski (UMBC and the Choice Program), Brian and Kelly Swette (founders of Sweet Earth foods), Steve Zabilski (St. Vincent de Paul and the development of a downtown Phoenix Human Resources Campus), and Ed Zuercher (Phoenix city manager who presided over the city’s light-rail public transit initiative). After each of the cases, we present a few discussion questions and then conclude with some overall observations about the similarities and dissimilarities among the leadership styles and approaches in the respective cases.

**Leadership Case. Jeb Bush and Florida Policies for Disabilities**

One of President George H. W. Bush’s proudest accomplishments was his role in developing and signing into law the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (Berkowitz 2017). Likewise, the second Bush president, George W. Bush, was active in legislation for physical and mental disabilities, including his “New Freedom Initiative” in 2001, featuring a variety of community-based service programs for individuals with disabilities. Governor Jeb Bush’s legacy in disability policies is based on his leadership as governor of Florida, beginning his work at the onset of his first term in 1999. The case below describes the shambles of disabilities policy that greeted him and the steps he took to achieve public values–based policies.

**Bush:** Let me tell you about what greeted me my first week in [the Florida governor’s] office. I was summoned from Tallahassee to Judge Ferguson’s court in Miami. Judge Ferguson had started to take over the program for the developmentally disabled in our state, which was under federal court review because public officials had chronically mismanaged it. At that time, I didn’t know that the federal judiciary could take over a state program. But Judge Ferguson had threatened to do it because there were about 30,000 families whose loved ones were not receiving any services—services the state was duty bound to provide. Certainly, for me at least, it’s a public value that the most vulnerable in our society should be in the front of the line, not the back. Yes, there are many people that don’t need help of government, and
they should patiently wait their turn. But there are others, including adults with mental and physical disabilities, who cannot live a life of dignity without assistance. In the case of the developmentally disabled, it’s easy to argue that someone who cannot take care of themselves should be institutionalized, but the cost is high (it could be up to $120,000, depending on the severity of the person’s challenges). In many cases, institutionalizing them means putting them in a warehouse somewhere and letting them languish.

Yet, we had families who wanted to care for their loved ones and could do it at a lower cost. What’s the value of human dignity? It is high. I acted on that belief and convinced the judge not to take over the program.

I went to the legislature, and together we funded and redesigned the programs, building on a public leadership lesson I learned from Rahm Emanuel, who said, civically, you never want a serious crisis to go to waste. What he meant is if you have a crisis, take advantage of it to do something that needs to be done—like redesign a program. There is so much inertia in our institutions today, and so many people defending their own economic interests or political interests, with not much thought to public values. You really do have to take advantage of crises to illustrate challenges in terms that draw people toward the cause.

People who have intellectual and physical disabilities have the highest unemployment rates in the United States. We considered that in designing a new program. Because we began to provide the opportunities, we also got more engaged with the family members. Their big challenge was that the government-funded makeshift work programs were not real work. The government was warehousing people and claiming they were working. A whole lot of disabled people actually could work, and they added a vitality to the workforce because of the unique nature of who they were.

What I’ve learned about all these public values programs is that you must be actively engaged in these issues. As you act, it creates other opportunities to act. It becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy—once you build a new model or have some success in fixing a mess, it creates a new opportunity.
We discovered we had a lot of work to do with managing disabilities in our school systems. We tore down all the silos and changed the relationship we had with a very important group of people. We began to make schools more accountable for people with disabilities.

We developed a community-based care model where families were empowered. And then the same thing applied to our child welfare system. Florida had a disastrous child welfare system. It was underfunded, totally static in its approach, and very cautious, because the only time that the child welfare system creeps into people's life is when it's in a headline of a tragic case of abuse. They were constantly in defense mode.

We were the first state in the country to create a community-based model for our foster care system. Now people consider it a model for other states, and other states are applying it. It's the same principle—who's the most vulnerable in society? A child who's been abandoned, neglected, or abused. I don't know how it was in other places, but in Florida there was an epidemic of families abandoning their beloved children either because they were being abused or because of drug or alcohol abuse. There were many reasons why it happened and we weren't good at solving it.

The old model was a top-down model that didn't respect families, basically. The state had a binary choice: take the child out of the family or leave them in. Nobody asked, “What are the issues that drive this abuse? Is there a way for us to look at this in a broader context, and how do we keep families intact, and make them healthier, and more wholesome, so a child can live there?”

In the child welfare system, there were many 18-year-olds leaving the system. The previous system was, “You're 18. You're out. There's no more support.” Well, if you're an 18-year-old kid in America today and you have no family, what do you do? They didn't have many options.

So, we got private-sector support to work on this problem. We matched it with government money to build a bridge for access to college, but also a bridge to provide support, so that these young people who graduated out of the foster care system could at least receive some support by living together between 18 and 21.
Ultimately, the waiting list for services went away. That outcome required being all in on the subject and mobilizing support from many places.

**B&C:** Most people agree that disabled people need support and opportunity. How did things get so bad for values that most people agree on? What happened for things to reach a point that a federal judge was about to step in?

**Bush:** I think the legislature didn't agree with how my predecessor was administering the program. If they don't agree about what's being done with a program, they don't fund it. With no funding, things got worse, even though everyone agreed helping the disabled is a public value. The legislature saw what they viewed as mismanagement, that drew their ire, they withheld funding, and things got worse and worse.

**B&C:** How did you go about putting together a team and bringing people together to solve the disabilities program problem? Who did you bring together and why?

**Bush:** It began when I was running for office. Running for office is not my idea of fun, to be honest with you. So, I told my team I was happy to do all of the fundraising and campaign work, but I also want to learn something. Learning is what really got me fired up. One of the things I did was visit 250 schools.

During one of my school visits, I met a woman named Berthie and her daughter Lucy, who is now probably 35. Berthie told me in front of about 800 people that her biggest fear was outliving her child. The system she was experiencing had big shortfalls and no access to care. She asked what I was going to do about it. She was so angry that I couldn't smile my way through it or schmooze my way out.

Instead, I said, “In the next few months, I'll give you four full days, and you teach me so I can understand what it is to have a child with an IQ of 20, and who lives in a wheelchair with physical ailments that are awful, and yet is not able to express what is happening.” And then I went to group homes, I went to these industrial facilities. I listened and I learned.

By the time I met with Judge Ferguson regarding the court order, I knew a lot about the program because I took the time to meet with
families in group home settings and work environments. And I had ideas on what to do about it because I had listened to the people directly impacted.

Community by community, we organized, and I found some leaders for these changes. Publix [supermarket chain] was a big supporter, as was Holland and Knight [international law firm established in Polk County, Florida]. In every community, we would have an organizing event where someone from the private sector would take the lead in providing job opportunities to disabled people who were otherwise getting little help and few services.

There are many things about the chance to be in a leadership position that are gratifying, but that’s one I will not forget. It wasn’t as big a deal as some of the other fights we had, but it’s perhaps the most gratifying. Berthie is probably 72 years old now, and she’s not as worried about Lucy. Lucy is now in better care, and even when Berthie is no longer around, Lucy will still get good care.

I use the term stolen from [business writer] Jim Collins, the idea of the Big Hairy Audacious Goal (BHAG). Once you create that and you begin to build toward it, it creates the chance for little mini-BHAGs. People get enthusiastic about engagement, to be able to be a part of it. I know that’s what you do at ASU too, lots of Big Hairy Audacious Goals.

**B&C:** How do you sustain progress?

**Bush:** You have to improve outcomes, but also measure it, engage people, and be all in. You also have to accept the fact when something is not working. You adjust, and just keep going forward. I’ll give you an example. The largest gathering for the developmentally disabled in Florida, and maybe the United States, is an event that takes place in June called Family Café. Literally 10,000 people come to the convention center in Orlando. I went all eight years of my terms to show my respect. I gave them the State of the Union for the developmentally disabled, and we’d have a Q and A. I probably spent an hour and a half taking pictures with people.

There’s so much cynicism that people will ascribe bad motives to your actions, but you can’t worry about that. You have to just constantly
show your heart in a public leadership position, or any leadership posi-
tion if you believe in these things. You can't be passive. You can't be
watching your peripheral vision. You have to be fully engaged, that's
the key. Because if you are a leader, you have to know that you can't
do 20 things well at the same time. You have to do a few and do them
really intensely. I believe success will sustain the programs.

Bozeman and Crow Comments

As we reviewed the Jeb Bush case, it seemed to us to raise many ques-
tions that transcended the particular experiences with mental health
programs in Florida and provided lessons that add to the ideas pro-
vided in mutable leadership. We loved the BHAG acronym, and, more
importantly, Governor Bush makes the crucial point that it is often eas-
ier to motivate people with an enormously difficult problem than a
significant but relatively low stakes problem. The reason we here so
much today about “Grand Challenges,” a term so common as to have
become hackneyed, is that others well understand that grand chal-
lenges have more allure than middling challenges. Does the motivation
of the BHAG or the Grand Challenge contribute much to accomplish-
ment? That is not so easy to determine. It seems likely that focusing
on the big prize will at least provide some initial impetus and perhaps
attract some parties who would not otherwise have been attracted. But
the BHAG is hairy even when people are motivated, and a key is to use
the motivation in productive ways.

The quotation about not squandering a good crisis is one that we
have heard before, not only from Jeb Bush and Rahm Emanuel but also
in several biographies of leaders. It is well understood that times of cri-
sis are also particular times of opportunities. When things are not
going well, people are much more receptive to new approaches. By the
same token, innovation often falls on deaf ears when there is a general
perception that all is well. We do not imply that walking into a crisis is
necessarily a key to success.

In the case above, Governor Bush was, at least with respect to mental
health, a turnaround artist. He obviously had many of the requirements
needed for such crisis events, including, perhaps most importantly, listening to other people. He notes that he spent a good deal of time soliciting ideas and visiting group homes. Doing so has many values, including engendering trust and blunting cynicism.

Finally, the problem of cynicism resonates with us (especially Crow). Nearly every leader who is also an executive in an organization faces suspicions of careerism, looking for the next job, or payoffs to friends and supporters. Perhaps some are exempt. Few people manage a food bank, a group home, or an elementary school because doing so is a strong career move or enhances their power or personal fortune. But most leaders, including public values leaders, are subject to suspicions and doubts, especially among those who do not know them well or personally. Cynicism is perhaps strongest in relation to elected officials. In the first place, few win elections with as much as 60% of the vote, and that means that at least 40% of the people being represented have their doubts even before the winner assumes office. What many skeptics miss is the point we made earlier in the book—being a public values leader is not necessarily a full-time, everyday focus. It is quite possible to be committed to and to achieve public values even while pursuing other objectives, such as job advancement, reelection, professional status, or profit.

Most college presidents continually face some degree of skepticism, especially early in their service. Consider the following example of cynicism facing Crow during his effort to make changes at ASU.

Mini-case. Michael Crow on Cynicism and the New American University

Anyone committed to public values–based leadership and management will almost certainly face skeptics and cynics. If a public values focus is combined with a commitment to innovation, then the old guard will see it as its holy duty to combat the new and the fractious.

Here I am going to give just a few anecdotes about how, as a disruptive president of a disruptive institution, I have learned to expect cynicism about most everything our institution holds dearest. I also have a few
ideas about how one can deal with cynics and doubters and sometimes, not often, even win them over.

One of the organizations that seemed to me well aligned with my own public values objectives and those of Arizona State University was the Pew Charitable Trust, a foundation that has supported a great many initiatives one might view as public values projects. Thus, I approached them when we were developing support for a program in responsible innovation for our Consortium for Science, Policy and Outcomes (CSPO). We approached Pew about this, and they invited us to meet. Their basic reaction was, “Well you’re not one of the top research universities or one of the top research institutions, it looks like you just want to muck up the science policy system and there is nothing wrong with it.” Pew, or at least the people we met with, had completely bought into the “Republic of Science” idea that science policy needed no social or cultural guidance and that all would work out for the best if scientists were just given money to pursue their curiosity. So, they were not at all interested in funding us, and they seemed hopeful that CSPO would not survive. They were not just uninterested; they thought what we were doing was inimical to science.

This was just one of the first of many types and purveyors of cynicism aimed at what we were trying to achieve with a new sort of university, one we refer to as the New American University. Public values–based institutions are not without enemies, and the enemies’ views are most often rooted in doubt and cynicism. In our case, the overarching criticism has been this: “If you make your university large and inclusive it can’t be any good.” The Pew experience was just one of many where institutions doubted the mission in part because of who was performing it.

A potentially more significant example was an experience we had with an ASU accrediting authority. We have all kinds of accrediting, and most of them are quite important. We have topic accrediting, unit accrediting authorities, and university accrediting, among others. In our last full university accreditation we were confronted with the extreme skepticism of one member of the team, a professor who was focusing on our mathematics education. He said, baldly, “I know you are cheating. I just don’t
know exactly how." His view: we could not possibly be getting the reported math test scores from our students, many of whom were “only” B students in high school and had had little previous exposure to math.

Our measured response: “Yes, the scores are really good, but we changed the entire method of teaching; we changed its structure and design.” We had developed a computationally based adaptive learning system, with teachers who went from 20 or 30 students in each math section to 50–150 students. It was this increase in size that drew fire. Our reviewer said, “That’s impossible, this data cannot be true. You cannot expand class size in math and get better results. There is something wrong with the way you are reporting this.” We walked him though the data and our teaching system in great detail. He was never fully convinced; he still thought that there must be some way we cheated, and that we were just very clever about it. Cynicism in the face of innovation. Fortunately, the entire accreditation committee, when they examined our data, came to the conclusion that not only were the numbers honest but also we had shown the possibility that learning technology can improve math performance even at a larger scale.

This is not much different from a similar problem we encountered when reporting our NSF HERD (Higher Education Research and Development Survey) numbers. We received a complaint from a high-level politician saying that our numbers cannot be correct because they exceed the research performance of some of the nation’s top research universities, the often experienced “new kid on the block” sort of skepticism. We provided the data in a greater level of detail, showing that our data sources were the same as all 10 of the universities in the University of California system and, most gallingly to our critics, that these numbers exceeded every campus but one. The response from the official: “You must be fudging; you must be making stuff up.”

One last case. The Association of American Universities (AAU) is a sort of club composed of the top research universities in the United States. If you are going to climb up to the top tier, then AAU membership is considered, well, maybe not a prerequisite but the icing on the cake. At one point I petitioned one of the officers of the AAU, a distinguished
educator who was former president of Cornell University, former president of the University of Iowa, former president of the AAU. I wrote him and said, essentially, “Hunter [his actual first name], you know we made a lot of progress as a research university and we’re performing at a level very similar to a lot of the AAU schools, I hope you and your colleagues will take a look at us for possible membership.” He writes back and says, “We’re not going to take a look at you, we’re not ever going to take a look at you. You are so large and have so many faculty, your research funding should be in the billions.” I write back and I say, “Well, we have so many faculty because we decided to serve the state and region by admitting all qualified students. We have some faculty that are very much focused on research, some on teaching, and some equally on both. But we not only produce a great deal of research and research funds but also do quite well on a per faculty basis.” Hunter wrote back and said, “Well, that’s your problem.” So I wrote again and said, “We’ve gone and looked at the output of all your more than 60 AAU member universities, and we have comparable research output while at the same time producing more Native American graduates than all the AAU universities combined, we produce more Hispanic graduates than your entire list of universities, and only three AAU members produce more African American graduates than we do.” He gets back to me and says, “Well, so you are playing the race card.” I write back and tell him, “No, we are not playing the race card, I’m trying to show you that we are developing an entirely new type of university, one that is inclusive and at the same time high quality.” He communicated with me one last time and said, “The process is the process, we will vote and you will not make it.” Again, public values and innovation—dual threat.

Cynicism and doubt are inevitable when combining public values and innovation. How does one combat it? Having a thick skin is a good start, but not enough. You have to keep your eye on the prize, focusing on doing quality work on quality goals, and if the accolades come, they come. If others fail to recognize innovation and quality and question service to public values, then the best approach is to develop indisputable evidence and then challenge doubters to dispute it.
Leadership Case. Steve Zabilski and the St. Vincent de Paul’s Human Services Campus

This story focuses on a major initiative headed by Steve Zabilski, executive director of the Phoenix St. Vincent de Paul, to develop a “Human Services Campus,” located in downtown Phoenix. From the outset, moving the services facility from its long-time location generated controversy, and the project faced particular resistance from the business community. While there are many lessons to be learned from this case, one of the most important is that it is often possible to overcome resistance to change, provided that one is prepared to listen and to accommodate and negotiate among multiple interests. One of several questions to ponder in this case is this: to what extent was Zabilski’s leadership effective because, unlike top officials at nonprofit organizations, he has extensive business experience and considerable experience dealing with business executives?

Zabilski: St. Vincent de Paul’s downtown office had its genesis in our Human Services Campus. Before we developed the Human Services Campus, we had been operating a dining room for the poor and homeless in a south Phoenix building for about 50 years. When we first moved into our original building, we thought we would be there for about a year, not 50 years. The building was very old and broken down, and it wasn’t designed to be a dining room.

About 15 years ago, we were able to convince the state legislature to give us a permit to build a new dining room. There was opposition from the business community; no business really wants a dining room for the poor and homeless next door to them. But we were already there operating our other programs. When we received the permit, people got interested, including some who had been opposed. We tried hard to focus on shared values rather than differences.

At that time, there was almost no dialog between the business and nonprofit communities. Some of the nonprofit community viewed the business leaders as greedy capitalists who only cared about their selfish interest. At the same time, the business community viewed
the nonprofit community as naive do-gooders who don't understand anything about building an economy. While there may have been some truth to each of those views, those extreme views were the exception. Most did not have such extreme views. However, the point is there were these stereotypes and there wasn't any dialogue.

I think if there was anything I brought to St. Vincent de Paul, it was the notion that we have that dialogue. We met with three stakeholders—Jerry Colangelo, who had a more positive view about what we were trying to do, but also Marty Shultz and some people from the Phoenix Community Alliance, and they were more skeptical, at least initially. Through our dialog, the business stakeholders began to understand that we, too, want businesses to be successful. We want them to have high return. That said, we also believed there were some things they needed to do to help homeless people.

After many discussions and some shared leadership, the results were very beneficial. What was originally going to be just a single dining room in a new building ended up being this beautiful campus that we have today, one that houses seven nonprofits. Both the county and business community took a leadership role. Today this development is a model for the whole country. People from all around the country come to Phoenix to visit and learn from the Human Services Campus. Some people focus on the buildings. While buildings are nice and impressive, good building design wasn't the secret. The secret was that there was a real dialogue. There was conversation, there was a focus on shared public values about how to help people.

It wasn't easy, and it wasn't just businesspeople who were opposed. Some of the St. Vincent people were very much opposed to moving from our old building. They felt comfortable there because they had been in it for so long. They said, “We're not moving, we're not moving an inch, this is sacred ground.” But then there was compromise and a good outcome for all.

It made sense to me that the businesspeople did not want a homeless shelter anchoring the main thoroughfare between the state capitol and downtown. It’s not like they were asking us to move to the middle of the desert 100 miles from here. They wanted us to move three
or four blocks from the main business district. We did. We compromised. We found shared values, and we built something that none of us could have built by ourselves. The county and the business community and foundations provided more than $25 million. We have a beautiful facility, but, more importantly, we serve more than a thousand people every day. Every day. I watched the Super Bowl with more than 500 homeless people in our dining room downtown.

**B&C:** The case of the Human Services Campus is a great focal project for showing how public values organizations operate, how public values leadership works. When you were just getting this off the ground, what were some of the processes that you and others employed in order to generate trust and to get buy-in right at the beginning?

**Zabilski:** We got to know people. We met with David Smith, the county manager, every week for 18 months. The meeting wasn't simply to talk about what kind of table to put in the new room, or what color to paint the wall. It was really about building trust and understanding. That's the hard part. People who visit our Human Services Campus sometimes think, “Oh I’m just going to do the same thing that the Human Services Campus did. I’m going to get a lot of money and build some nice buildings and then good things will happen.”

They’re missing the point. It’s never about the buildings. The mistake is that people want to see quick value. Our response is, “Well, I wish it was that simple, like instant pudding or a magic formula, but unfortunately it’s not like that.”

We were very fortunate to have people of goodwill on all sides: Jerry Colangelo, Marty Shultz, and Don Keuth, public officials such as Jan Brewer and [County Supervisor] Mary Rose Wilcox. These community and business leaders were all terrific people who came together from different sectors and different political parties.

**B&C:** Staying in that era, the start-up period, were there any major obstacles that required some creative solutions?

**Zabilski:** Very much so. There was a real concern on the part of the local community that our programs would make downtown Phoenix a magnet for every homeless person in North America or the western United States. We had to work hard to convince people that helping
the homeless was a good idea. Their concerns were legitimate, and we had to convince them that we could accomplish our goals without completely changing the character of downtown Phoenix. Even today, there are still concerns about impacts on property values, and we have to worry about this as we expand. There is still the view “I am all for expansion but do the expansion somewhere else.”

We understood the concerns. We didn't want every homeless person in North America to be there either. That’s the last thing we want. We can’t help everyone. What we wanted to be able to do was effectively help people who were already in Phoenix, and especially to help them transition out of poverty, to give them a chance to have a home. That was the big message we had to convey, that our programs are not about attracting homeless people to come live in Phoenix, but to help those already here to get their life back together.

Bozeman and Crow Comments

There are many lessons in the Human Services Campus case—focusing on shared values rather than divisive issues, meeting face-to-face and regularly to engender trust, fighting against stereotypes based on institutional type—but of particular interest to us is one that does not exactly jump out. Zabilski noted that many of his dedicated and loyal staff were just as opposed to the move as were some of the businesspersons. This special kind of inertia does not receive enough attention. It is easy enough to chalk such reluctance up to obstructionism or lack of commitment, but that is rarely what is going on in staff opposition to massive changes entailed in relocation. Few people find it easy to give up the familiar, especially a comfortable familiar, for the unknown. Moves are personally disruptive. In addition to the obvious problems of just moving offices and physical assets, perhaps habits are disrupted. Commuting patterns change. One suddenly does not know the best places to go to lunch. The longtime office neighbor may no longer be a neighbor.
Leadership Case. Brian and Kelly Swette and Sweet Earth Natural Foods

Throughout the book, we emphasize the idea of sector agnosticism, the proposition that no sector owns public values (and the less delightful proposition that any sector can thwart public values). However, relatively few private-sector firms are premised on public values, even when the firm includes public values among its motivations. The case of Brian and Kelly Swette’s Sweet Earth Natural Foods shows that it is possible and can even be profitable to have public values at the forefront.9

We provide a little more background here than for some of the other cases because Brian and Kelly Swette have an especially interesting path to public values work. Brian grew up in Lake Havasu, Arizona, and attended Arizona State University, majoring in economics. He later entered a special training program at Procter & Gamble and then began working for PepsiCo, where two life-changing events occurred: becoming vice president for marketing and, more importantly, meeting his future wife, Kelly, an industrial engineer knowledgeable about production.

Brian went on to become the chief operating officer at eBay, at a time when the company was taking off, and earned a bunch of money, enough to make the family financially independent. One of his interests after leaving eBay was environmental sustainability, and, as an ASU alumnus, he became engaged with ASU’s new Sustainability Institute, joining its board of advisors. He and Kelly invested in ASU and helped create what is now known as the Swette Center for Environmental Biotechnology, focusing on fundamental science related to biological engineering and genetic engineering to produce solutions related to sustainability.

After working as CEO of Burger King, he learned a great deal about the realities of how food systems work, a long-standing interest of Kelly’s, and when Brian left the position at Burger King, he and Kelly decided to start a new company, one dedicated to improving food and food services and committed to environmental sustainability.

Swette: We established Sweet Earth to advance two of the large challenges in the country, which are sustainability and health. In our
view, a good strategy in helping move those goals forward is plant-based eating. Our strategy to make plant-based eating appealing was to find culinary, globally inspired foods that we could provide to the mainstream of America. We like to say it was the democratization of culinary food that is good for you.

**B&C:** Well, that certainly sounds like clear-cut public values motivation.

**Swette:** People tend to look at the really big problems, like poverty, world hunger, poor health, greenhouse gases, and global climatic change and assume there’s nothing they can do. Our view is there is one behavior everyone engages in that affects all of these problems: the choices all of us make every day when we choose what to eat. By changing what we eat, we can change the groceries supermarkets sell, and the produce grown in the area, and actually, little by little, shape food policy in the United States and in the world.

For us, a first step in the right direction was starting this little plant-based food company. We took all the things that we’ve learned in our years of business experience and focused our company on a niche of consumers who were environmentally focused but had great expectations for healthier and, at the same time, more interesting culinary food. If we started small, and moved out from there, wouldn’t that be a nice little business? It turned out there were a lot of people that felt the way we did. Yet, there weren’t products on the market that really addressed what they were looking for, products speaking to them about a broader lifestyle, the concerns they had as individuals, and their ability to make changes.

We’ve been advocates for what we call the “art of mindful eating.” It’s an attempt to encourage people to become more knowledgeable and self-aware. You take into account how your actions affect every level. Our feeling is, why would you not do that with food? So even if you’re just making a frozen meal, why wouldn’t you want to have beautiful color and texture and flavors that make you think of, or connect you to, other cultures and traditions? Why would you not want aroma? Even if you’re eating alone, all of these things elevate the meal, the mood,
your personal stance, and your view of the world and allow you to appreciate a very humble, simple thing. That was the approach we took to everything. Every dish needed to be special and worthy and include all those elements of connection—taste, texture, aroma, flavor, and a story. Just as important was the desire to contribute to sustainability.

We also wanted to enable people to make a living off of their passions. So we had hundreds of thousands of indigenous people in Mexico selling things they cared about. We were interested in helping establish open, democratized markets that had social good because people could get economic remuneration and freedom from that, but also pursue things they cared passionately about, namely, high-quality agricultural products. Our partners produce everything from tortillas to fungi.

**B&C:** How do you choose your partners? What were your criteria for good partners and partnerships?

**Swette:** We have standards as part of our mission to promote more organic and non-GMO foods. Right now, only 1% of the agriculture in the United States is organic, and yet if you asked people whether they want to eat pesticides and want added hormones and preservatives in their food, they would say no. Presented with a choice, many consumers are choosing more organic. They don't want to have their food genetically modified to accept pesticides. We thought if we made the use of organic, non-GMO foods part of our sourcing policy and bundled it into the price, that makes the choice simpler. So, we use the Far West Fungi people, who have a small business right around the corner from us. We also use Monterey Mushroom because they're local and they produce a great product.

We wanted to support some new emerging and Hispanic businesses, so we helped the tortilla supplier you see on our website [https://www.sweetearthfoods.com/] qualify as a business. We helped them bring their standards up to what they needed to supply our excellent food. We worked with them on custom recipes that were superior quality and allowed us to offer our customer a unique product. It's possible to help simplify choices for consumers. We help consumers make smart food choices that also honor and sustain the land.
Bozeman and Crow Comments

The Sweet Earth case is notable for many reasons, but not least for providing evidence that a private-sector company can thrive while being strongly committed to achieving public values. As we have mentioned many times, a great many businesses contribute to public values, but most often as secondary to their primary objectives of profit and growth, and typically the amount of resources put into the public values effort is a relatively small fraction of the resources going to the main lines of business. Such is not the case for Sweet Earth. The company was begun with public values in mind, and the company founders are very much self-conscious about the public values mission and supportive of it.

In addition to providing strong evidence that for-profit businesses can have central public values missions while making a profit, the case is important because it illustrates a strategy that is frequently and often effectively followed by public values leaders: achieving your organization’s objectives by helping others achieve theirs. Almost all the cases and anecdotes in our book show the importance of organizational partnership, but the Sweet Earth strategy is a different sort of partnership. Not only do they choose organizational partners on the basis of shared values, but they also seek to achieve public values by helping strengthen and sustain businesses that share their values. If one starts a business having primary public values objectives, then it is natural to seek like-minded partners, and then it is only a short step to helping sustain a network of organizations with shared public values. Sweet Earth is in many ways a template for how people who are strongly committed to public values can succeed and flourish and help others, all within the framework of markets and profit making.

Leadership Case. Ed Zuercher and Light-Rail to Phoenix

In the early 1980s, Phoenix was one of the largest US cities that still sorely lagged behind in its public transportation, a vital concern in a city with sometimes dangerous heat in the summer, as well as one that is spread out and has low density. The face of public transit began to
change in 1985 when the Arizona State Legislature passed legislation allowing citizens of Maricopa County (greater Phoenix) to vote on a sales tax that would be earmarked for funding regional improvements in transportation and would also create the Regional Public Transportation Authority (RPTA). The sales tax was approved, and, significantly, other revenue measures were passed in regional cities, including Tempe and Mesa, during the early 1990s. After the RPTA had established an extensive bus service by 2003, Phoenix and surrounding cities looked to develop a light-rail, which began operation in 2008. Unlike the bus service, the light-rail was accompanied by some significant challenges, especially the fact that street construction requirements were extensive and disruptions unavoidable. Further, rail service is inherently limited in its coverage; thus, the politics of rail service proved complex. Ed Zuercher was city manager of Phoenix for much of the time during the development of the light-rail and played a key role in its establishment. This case focuses on the rigors of developing this public values–focused project.

Zuercher: When I was in graduate school [public administration at University of Kansas], I learned that public policy entails balancing competing American values of representation or responsiveness, equity, individual rights, and efficiency. What I often find is that when you decide which of those values predominates, it provides a signpost as to what you should be doing. When I was in school, we were in the middle of the whole Gaebler and Osborne Reinventing Government stuff. Efficiency was presumed to be the driving force in government. It often became the predominant value. The problem is that efficiency values don't help much when we are considering public transit systems and accessibility for people with disabilities.

In Phoenix, the Americans with Disabilities Act conversation drove much of public transit development. We had to find better measures than just efficiency if we were going to have accessibility. At that time, I remember having many conversations about money and the costs of accessibility. Of course, 20 years later, there's not even an efficiency argument that gets made when it comes to the Americans with Disability Act—people no longer even question the value of a wheelchair-accessible bus or a light-rail system that's built at levels where disability
access is prominent. The value that triumphed in this case was not efficiency, but the rights of individuals.

But public transit is not only about accessibility and rights. That’s sort of the framework I come to it from—balancing values, pointing out value traps where people may be too focused on the value that they are exalting, not considering other competing values. Where we get in trouble is when we think there’s only one value and that anybody who disagrees with that is wrong.

**B&C:** Who was responsible for formulating the vision behind Phoenix public transit?

**Zuercher:** Early on it was the political leadership. Skip Rimsza (former Phoenix mayor) recognized that the differentiation and the viability of central Phoenix was going to depend, in the long term, on improved mobility. We had to expand our concept of mobility from mobility equals freeways to mobility equals people moving in many different ways—how long it takes you to get from one place to another and not how many miles of freeway you have between this point and that point. We felt that if you’re depending on freeways to be able to build your way out of congestion and intensity of development, you’re going to fail. You can’t expand the arterials without destroying the very places that people are trying to get to.

Light-rail was seen as the way for mobility to happen. That was built into a transit tax proposal by a conservative Republican mayor who understood the value of mobility for the survival of the central part of his city. There were objections, but they had to be overcome. Light-rail provides mobility but also spurs development. When a developer looks out their window and sees tracks on the ground, they believe there’s going to be transit there for 50 or 80 years. They don’t have the same feeling about a bus. All those things played into the ability to get the public to tax themselves to build this system. Once the system was built, the momentum built. They saw the ASU development downtown and the downtown campus, the light-rail link to Tempe and the Tempe ASU campus, the route along north Central Avenue, and they began to think “Where’s mine?” as opposed to “Why are you doing this?”
When this project began, there was opposition. What was the nature of the opposition? To what extent were people like you who were committed to this set of public values able to win them over or at least accommodate the opposition?

I think the nature of the opposition had to do with a very narrow focus on what money means in the “right now.” How much is it going to cost us to build this today? And there was a lack of imagination about a world where ever-expanding lanes of road aren’t possible. The transportation answers for a long time had been, “Everybody should have their own car and we should have enough freeways so that everyone can get in their car and easily travel to wherever they wish to go.” Of course, it’s just not possible in a rapidly growing and urbanizing environment. People didn’t have the imagination to see something other than a freeway or a street. That took political vision.

Changing minds and changing values was a long process. We first tried in 1997 and lost. The voters weren’t ready to embrace a tax increase for a heavy investment in rail. By 2000, the freeways were built and traffic to central Phoenix was intensifying. How were we going to continue this growth? By then the construction interests started understanding that pouring concrete for light-rail is the same as pouring concrete for roads. It’s the same kind of business for the contractors; they’ll make the money with steel and concrete, just a different way of doing it. People began understanding what urbanization meant here in Phoenix and began to see that more freeways in the urban center was not the answer.

As I said, it took political leadership to bring together a diverse group of people. It was the mayor and the council that understood that diverse leadership was important; in building the plan, we had to have the private sector, the nonprofit sector, and the city all together. We also had the Chamber of Commerce and specific and individual businesses that had an interest in mobility. We had interest groups like the disability community for whom mobility does not necessarily mean a freeway. Then we had government, which ultimately built this thing.

The key was bringing the right people together and then letting them organize the plan themselves and find that common ground. It had to
be convened by the government. I think that’s an important role that we play now—we’re a convener, not the ones with all the ideas. That’s part of a change in Phoenix, I think, in the last 20 years.

**B&C:** Among those people who were not actively engaged or supportive, how did you accommodate them? What about the people who were initially opponents and who remained opponents?

**Zuercher:** Some of them couldn’t be accommodated because they weren’t interested in rational dialogue, facts, data, or anything other than their political position. You have to identify that motivation and then just move on from those people. It’s important to find the rational spokespeople from the nontraditional sectors. For example, the president of the Chamber of Commerce stands up and says, “This is important because it’s going to make it possible for our workers to get to work,” or the disability community says, “This is important because it’s going to make it possible for our folks to get to jobs.” You frame the discussion not about social service, but about economic development, jobs, and education. The school districts stand up and say, “This is about getting our children to school.” You begin to change the dialogue. The opponents wanted the dialogue to be about, “You’re wasting money on something that other people are going to use.”

Our job was to put a face on who the people using the light-rail are and to make everyone understand that maybe they were going to use the light-rail themselves or, if not, their administrative staff would use it or their minimum-wage employees, or people wanting to get to the airport. We had to convince people there would be a competitive advantage for them because their employees would have a better way to get to work than if they just depended on streets and freeways.

**B&C:** During this process of developing support for the light-rail, was there any sort of racial or economic class problems that had to be confronted?

**Zuercher:** It’s not an absolute no or an absolute yes. There were pockets. There were places we knew the line would never go. There would just be too much opposition. It wasn’t particularly feasible. But, in general, there really wasn’t much division on the basis of race and income, not nearly to the extent that you see in many other cities.
Those sorts of divides are much less intense in Phoenix than in some other places.

**B&C:** I would imagine given the nature of this project that you had certain cleavages that were based largely on geography. If so, how do those play out?

**Zuercher:** Interestingly enough, some of the best voter support for the transit program came from parts of Phoenix that weren’t going to be on light-rail for years or maybe ever. North Phoenix, east Phoenix, north-central Phoenix. It was the people who recognized the value of mobility for their city generally, and who also understood the argument about students and low-income workers having mobility, who could see their way to support it.

**Bozeman and Crow Comments**

“Where we get in trouble is when we think there’s only one value and that anybody who disagrees with that is wrong.” Ed Zuercher’s statement is very much in line with our pragmatism proposition, and we observe, again and again, that people are more likely to accomplish large-scale objectives, including public values–based objectives, if they have some ability to see others’ values, acknowledge their legitimacy, and work toward a compromise solution. That does not mean that public values projects thrive only through compromise. Sometimes the power of the zealot rises to the fore, such as with the single-minded public values leader John van Hengel, who began the world’s first food bank. But on most occasions, and especially when there are many and diverse conflicting values and needs, an ability to empathize with others and to work with them is an absolute necessity.

Zuercher also noted that sometimes people do not have the imagination to see the finished product and the changes it makes in the status quo. This is entirely understandable, especially in a disruptive technology that has far-reaching social, economic, and public values implications. But part of being a public values leader is to have the vision and make other people see it as well—if not the entirety of the vision at least the part that will most strongly affect them.
Leadership Case. Freeman Hrabowski and the UMBC Choice Program

In the extensive commentary provided below, Dr. Freeman Hrabowski, long-time president of the University of Maryland–Baltimore County (UMBC), focuses on a university program that many view as a model for university engagement with the surrounding community. The UMBC Choice Program works with “at-risk” children in the Baltimore area, not as a direct effort to enroll them in their university, or necessarily any university, but to give them knowledge and support that increases the likelihood of their becoming productive citizens, improving their socioeconomic prospects and their individual safety and well-being. One of the many notable things about this public values project is the extensive buy-in of many diverse groups, some of which do not typically interact with one another.

Hrabowski: The Choice Program is a signature program at UMBC involving civic engagement, and we have been doing this since 1989. It began when Sargent Shriver called his former deputy Adam Yarmolinsky, who was provost of UMBC at the time, and my boss (I was vice provost). Sargent Shriver asked Adam to help his son, Mark Shriver, who was beginning a program in inner-city Baltimore involving first-time offenders. Keep in mind that UMBC is near the BWI Airport, a suburban area with almost 600 acres that is about five miles from the inner city. We had always been focused on what happens in the suburbs and in Washington, DC, and less so on inner-city Baltimore. But Adam asked me to support Mark.

We came up with the idea for a program working with the families of first-time offenders of nonviolent crimes between the ages of 8 and 17, mainly boys of color. We included a few low-income white kids and a few girls, but mainly black and Hispanic boys. When the boys go to court, the judge gives the parent or grandparent a choice of either having the child go to jail for six months to a year or coming to the UMBC Choice Program.

Mark and I went to a major community meeting to talk about it. The community was all African Americans. The community members at the
meeting wanted to know why they would trust what they called “that big white school out there in the Catonsville suburbs” to take their kids in. Fortunately, I had worked at an inner-city college and knew enough people in inner-city Baltimore that I could just be frank. I said I’m not a politician; I’m not here to promise you anything. Think about why we would want to do this. We’re not getting any money out of this. I mean why would we want to do this for any reason other than because we care? You either believe that or not, but I hope you will give us a chance. But if you want us to go away, that is up to you.

I wanted them to know we were not afraid to speak the truth. The truth is this was not about money. This was about helping children. It was about building trust, but I had to use the tone that they had used with me. They had to know I was no-nonsense, and I was not a politician trying to sell them something in return for votes. The key is that I was able to use my street cred, as the kids would say, in inner-city Baltimore. I had spent ten years working on issues of poverty at an inner-city college there before coming here, and I could use some of the respect people had for me to say, “Listen, I am there [UMBC] now because this is the place that cares about people of all races. What you need to do is just to watch what we do, and you will see it. You have to give us a chance. The program will grow, and we’ll be able to help more and more kids.”

The community leaders were willing to do that with the understanding that we would have regular sessions, we would show them what was going on and give them a chance to come to the campus and get a sense of it for themselves. Because the environment on campus is so different from their lives in Cherry Hill, which is one of the most impoverished parts of Baltimore, it helped to have them visit and see what we were doing. I mean they come out here, it’s a lovely 600 acres. The contrast with Cherry Hill is between night and day. So, the community gave us a chance, and we brought those children to our campus. And we have served more than 10,000 families over this past almost 30 years.

**B&C:** How did you go about building trust among such a disparate group?

**Hrabowski:** The key is that we started out developing trust and familiarity with community leaders, but we also worked hard with
the judicial system, the criminal justice system, particularly the juvenile part. We were able to build a partnership with the Department of Juvenile Services that allowed us to get a certain amount of money, I think it was $5,000 per child, to keep them in the program for a year with the understanding that if, at any point, we couldn't make progress and couldn't get the young people to do what we needed, they would then go to jail. That was the leverage we had all along; the alternative to our program was jail. We worked with the families too: grandmothers, mothers, and fathers (when we could get them to participate), getting the families to have conversations about their children with UMBC colleagues, including faculty and students from social work, psychology, and other areas.

Here's what surprises people. We took on the responsibility for making sure the kids got up and got to school. We brought them on campus several days a week. We even set up sites out in their community. We were working with them, literally, 24 hours a day, seven days a week. We still do that. We hire young people, usually in their early twenties, and pay them a little bit, around $20,000. We've actually had returning Peace Corps volunteers involved with the program. There are also lots of people who come here for graduate degrees, and we hire them as youth counselors or supervisors. We have UMBC students who are very involved in the tutoring and the counseling. These children are on campus seven days a week. They get a chance to play a little basketball, but they also have to do math and reading.

B&C: This program was probably a challenge for some of the faculty who were more accustomed to traditional college students. Any trust problems among university faculty and staff?

Hrabowski: The fact is we needed to build trust not only in the community, but trust on this campus. The first question that colleagues raised was what do you mean you're going to bring hundreds of criminals to the campus? From inner-city Baltimore? But I had the support of Adam, our president at the time, and our chancellor, Michael Hooker (wonderful guy, now deceased).

B&C: And what about the children and the UMBC students?
**Hrabowski:** I’m accustomed to working with inner-city children. I’m a mathematician and I do math problems with them. What always surprises people is I can always tell the children who have become very sophisticated in drug dealing. They have been accustomed to doing math in their work with drugs. They have been trained by the streets. This is very different from the middle-class, higher education world here or anywhere else. These are children who are watching you very carefully. They rarely smile, but when I give them a math problem, often they are the first ones to solve it. The challenge we face is to get them to understand there are better ways to keep them from the two outcomes that I always talk to the kids about: if you don’t stop with the drug dealing and all of that, you’re going to be either in jail or dead.

The first response that you hear from the boys will be, “Well, you don’t get the street cred until you go to jail. We know we’re not gonna live to be 30, so what are you talking about?” That’s in contrast to my middle-class and upper-middle-class kids on this campus of all races. Remember, we have students from 100 countries, and from the wealthiest parts of our state. One of our values says, “to those whom much is given, much is required.”

Many of our students decide to continue in their majors, but to focus on the issues of underprivileged people. Whether it’s in medicine, law, social work, or whatever. The program finally got a lot of support from the campus because people saw the results, the impact that it was having on not only the children, but on my students and on people involved in the program and its evaluation. In any of our initiatives, we always ask, “Are these children getting educations? Are they getting jobs?”

People ask if, when they finish the Choice Program, will they come to UMBC and enroll as college students. Usually, no. These are children at the bottom. We have been working to get them to read, we are working to get them through high school. We’re working to get them through community college, or their other options, including good jobs. We have started a number of partnerships with people in the region so that they can get jobs, get experience, and begin that education through a community college as we work to build the reading skills and the math skills.
B&c: It looks like you’ve identified a series of problems, getting buy-in, among other things. Are there other obstacles that proved equally difficult?

Hrabowski: Yeah, we have funding from the state, and state politics change. We go through Republican and Democratic governors, and usually the new governor who comes in doesn’t want to keep on with the programs of governors who came before. The idea of keeping a sustained effort going through Democratic and Republican governors is a challenge. Nobody is interested in programs that other people will get credit for, that other people started.

What saved us, and this is another value that we talk about a lot, was rigorous evaluation of whatever we were doing, and we actually publish a lot on evaluations. We’ve got a number of people who are working on rigorous evaluations of the Choice program. These evaluations prove that a child is much more likely not to go back into the system if they’d come through our program. The evaluations show that program participants finish high school and don’t go to jail.

Our evaluations go all the way back, to K through 12. We are always looking at trends. We are looking at what’s happening in more recent years with the violence in Baltimore after the Freddie Gray incident. We are looking at the proportion of kids from different zip codes who are getting into difficulty. We are looking at relationships between the police and the children, because we have developed strong relationships working on that through art, of all things, and restorative circles having police and children working together. It helps to have police officers who are of all races, but also who see juvenile offenders as children, not as thugs. As a police officer gets to know a child better, that child becomes more of a child, maybe more like the police officer’s son, not a thug. We are working to build those relationships.

Again, what makes this so strikingly visible here is you go from the campus to that Cherry Hill, and you see the significance of the growing inequality gap. We’ve had three-quarters of a billion dollars of construction on this campus in recent years. The only disruption we’ve had here is building and cranes. When the Freddie Gray stuff was
coming up, people were calling saying, “Are your students okay?” It was hard to explain how different it is within five miles.

We’ve had many conversations in the academic program about those differences, about inequality, but also about the use of analytics in understanding what we’re doing to make a difference in particular zip codes where children are the least advantaged. We do that through the Choice Program, but also through some very rigorous programs in reading and mathematics with Lincoln Elementary, for example. We are piloting efforts to substantially increase the number of children who actually can come up to the state’s average in math and verbal, 90% of whom are on the free lunch program. Unfortunately, in Baltimore, when you look at third and fourth graders, not even 20% will come up to proficiency on the Common Core tests right now. We are moving toward 50% in our schools. We are analyzing every step of the way. Not just test scores, but attitudes, involvement of the parents. These are Hispanic, black, and a few white kids, but they are 90% free lunch. This is what I want you to hear, and this is one of those values: I am always saying to my colleagues, it’s not enough to write books and do research. If you’re in education, we should all be out in the schools, understanding children and teachers and families’ outcomes and writing about those things.

It’s not enough to be smart. Most of the (Choice Program) kids we work with are smart, they’re just not well educated when they come to us. We have learned to stop talking about particular children as smart or not. Because when you say “that’s the smart group over here,” what are you saying to the other two-thirds? What the hell are you saying about the rest of the people? You tell people they’re not smart, and it’s like a self-fulfilling prophesy. It’s awful. What we do is say high achievement is about grit. It’s about perseverance, resilience, never, never, never giving up. We celebrate people who didn’t have all the benefits, didn’t have all the advantages, didn’t have SAT prep, or AP classes. We build on whatever they have when they come to us.

We are a hungry place. We have a saying: success is never final. We are always working to be better. We call UMBC the “House of Grit.” When they arrive, we say, “Welcome to the House of Grit.” Our mascot is a Chesapeake Bay retriever. The mascot’s name? True Grit.
Bozeman and Crow Comments

True grit would be an appropriate motto for those interested in achieving public values; determination is the one characteristic that all public values leaders have in common because it is perhaps the only unchanging prerequisite. But aside from excellent mottos, many elements of the Choice Program case speak to public values leadership. Trust is an important element of this story. True, engendering trust is a requirement of most public values efforts, but the difference here is the vast divides among parties. In the previous case, the Salvation Army’s Human Resources Campus, the mistrusting parties were ones often found in public values cases—the public values aspirants and the established business interests. The challenges in such cases are formidable, as the case shows, but pale in comparison to those of the Choice Program case, where trust must be developed among people of different educational backgrounds, different races, different ages, and in many cases within a surrounding atmosphere of well-earned distrust owing to mistreatment, neglect, and even hostility. But the Choice Program case shows that even extreme mistrust can be overcome with frequent interaction, empathy, focus on shared values, a let-us-show-not-just-talk approach, and a little bit of street cred.

Another public values conundrum illustrated in the case is the problem of sustained effort. The Choice Program has survived for a long time and, most importantly, thrived during periods of partisan and political change. As Hrabowski observes, it is second nature for politicians to want to have their own policy victories rather than embrace those of the previous incumbent. But the Choice Program has managed to adapt to political change. To some degree this has been accomplished by “evidence-based public values.” Perhaps because of his background as a mathematician, Hrabowski has insisted on careful measurement of the program and its accomplishments, making sure that the resultant evidence is provided, in the most palatable manner possible, to political decision makers. To be sure, evidence is typically not sufficient to carry the day by itself. Politicians are known for being able to turn a blind eye to evidence that contrasts with their own strongly held be-
liefs or their perceived political self-interest. But evidence, when combined with a strong and consensus-based public values problem and, not least, a master salesman such as Hrabowski, can help counter the tendency to disown other peoples’ policy children.

Public Values Leadership—Conclusions

One good reason to develop and analyze case studies is to identify points of commonality among the cases, but historians know that idiosyncrasy and unique elements of cases are often just as edifying as generalizations. Thus, for example, the Choice Program may not have thrived except for particular characteristics of President Hrabowski, many of them unique to him. Likewise, the Bush family history of attending to issues pertaining to mental and physical disabilities was a distinctive resource Governor Bush was able to bring to his work.

Considering these cases together, we see strong elements of both commonality and uniqueness. However, it is easier and, in some ways, more fruitful to conclude with tentative generalizations, in part because the unique elements are manifest in reading of the cases. One point these cases have in common is the idea of mutable leadership or, related, mutable leadership teams. While these are stories of strong leaders, none is the heroic leader of myth and legend. In each case it was vital to interest others in the mission and to encourage them to contribute, to have them buy into the vision.

Related to the team-building aspects of leadership, each of the cases suggests that developing trust is a prerequisite for many public value leadership endeavors. Trust was vital to Freeman Hrabowski’s effort to bring together persons unacquainted and in some ways hostile to one another, as well as to Governor Bush’s efforts to galvanize support among families and the disabled persons who had been poorly served by the state system. Brian and Kelly Swette had a very different sort of trust challenge—gaining the trust of consumers, consumers bombarded with marketing and advertising from larger food purveyors and consumers who had understandable difficulties working through the maze of claims about “natural,” “organic,” “healthy,” and
“sustainable” foods. Developing nontraditional suppliers also required mutual trust.

Both Ed Zuercher and Steve Zabilski faced distrust between skeptical businesspersons and public values advocates. Ed Zuercher had to bring people together to work on light-rail, despite the political and historical complexities and the very different views in different neighborhoods. Likewise, Steve Zabilski’s effort to locate a major homeless facility right in the middle of downtown Phoenix required not only negotiation among parties with different interests but also trust and the ability to see and to respect diverse views.

This particular set of cases underscores a lesson that pervades this book: that no single sector owns public values. Here we have cases involving universities, nonprofits, government, and a business firm, each contributing to public values, usually in partnership with other sectors. The requirements for public values attainment may vary somewhat by sector, but the possibilities for achieving public values are there for those willing to pursue them.

**Query for Readers**

We did not choose the cases on the basis of the sector or background of the leaders, but, as you see, it turns out that they are quite diverse and include an elected politician, two from industry, the head of a nonprofit, a college president, and a city manager. It would not have been possible to develop a much more diverse set even if we had set out to do so. Here is a difficult question for the reader, one that will perhaps draw from your own experience: to what extent do you think that these particular job sectors require distinctive leadership skills, and to what extent do you think that leadership skills are similar from one sector to another? Yes, this is a classic question in the leadership literature (e.g., Hooijberg and Choi 2001; Hamlin 2004; Schimmoeller 2010; Vogel and Masal 2015), but one that remains controversial. You and your speculation and insight, especially if experience based, will be just as relevant as those of the people who have studied this question in systematic research.