We seek to advance ideas about how people and organizations can achieve public values. What are public values? Concern with public values provides the motivation for this book, and we devote the entire next chapter to public values concepts, complexities, and disputes. But for now, it suffices to note that public values are the “big ones,” the ones that transcend particular people, groups, and organizations and relate to all citizens. Public values are the fundamental rights and benefits to which all citizens are entitled. They include such consensus-based values as liberty, health and life, security and public safety, opportunity, sustainability, and freedom of speech, among others (Bozeman 2019). One finds public values in places such as the Constitution, landmark court cases, and history books. They are not ephemeral.

Given their importance to society as a whole, agreeing on public values is often relatively easy, but achieving them is almost always difficult. In part this is because vast resources are required to achieve some public values (e.g., public health, security), but also because they sometimes conflict with one another, they may be at odds with private values and preferences, and people disagree about how to achieve them.
It requires some audacity to write a book about achieving public values, the very values that are by definition the most important ones in a society. But audacity is not the same as hubris. We appreciate the complexities of the topic, and we are in touch with the fact that we are jumping into a discourse and a set of arguments that are even older than the United States, the nation that is our primary (though not exclusive) focus.

We pay our respects to the complexities of public values by proffering no magic bullets or easy solutions. Instead, the book is intended as a dialogue with the reader. Our chief goal is to motivate the reader to ponder and actively criticize the ideas we present and, ultimately, to develop their own ideas about the best ways to achieve public values. True, in most cases we argue forcefully for our point of view, but not in an effort to preempt others’ views, but rather to give them clear targets to shoot at.

In many chapters we provide questions directed to the reader, questions designed to provoke the reader to think critically about public values. The book includes many prescriptions, some explicit, others a bit more subtle. However, these are not magisterial lessons burned into stone tablets. The prescriptions we provide exemplify both our unabashed commitment to saying what we think and, at the same time, our effort to provoke readers’ contemplation and discussion of their own values, thoughts, and perhaps alternative conclusions about lessons. We would be disappointed were the reader to examine all of our provisional lessons and conclude, “Okay! Now I understand and now I know just what to do.” Throughout the book, at various points and in various ways, we try to poke and prod the reader. We hope you will poke back.

Our book relies on three different types of knowledge, each having known strengths and weaknesses. First, we do, indeed, rely a good deal on our own direct experiences. As we note in the preface, one of the authors (Bozeman) has spent much of his career writing and conducting research about public values, and the other (Crow) in trying to achieve them, especially within the context of higher education institutions. However, we well understand that our experiences do not fit
to every circumstance and that others working to achieve public values may have different experiences, ones that are equally valid and, in some cases, more instructive. Thus, in addition to our own experiences and ideas, we present the ideas of people who are “public values leaders.” This august group (identified and discussed later in this chapter) includes a diverse set of people who have in common their success in achieving public values and their willingness to share insights and experiences with us.

As implied thus far, our book is more personal than most books about management and leadership, and we begin below with a personal experience case study that examines some of the difficulties of achieving public values, even when everyone agrees about the public values objectives to be achieved. The case deals with water resources, health, and public safety, issues that would likely find their way to almost anyone’s public values list.

The case below evokes all three of the working assumptions on which we base the book, ones we refer to as the premises of public values management. At this point let us simply list and identify them:

1. Core public value premise: It is possible and desirable for individuals and organizations to pursue and achieve public values.
2. Sector agnosticism premise: No sector “owns” public values; they may be achieved in the public, private, and nonprofit sectors and, often, by partnerships among organizations, often from different sectors.
3. Pragmatism premise: Public values achievement almost always requires pragmatic approaches, not ideologically centered approaches.

We elaborate on these points in chapter 3 and touch on them throughout the book, including the personal experience case below. The case below provides insights into each of these three premises, showing the interrelationships among them and how easily core public values—in this case provision of clean, healthy water to all citizens—can be thwarted even when most people agree on goals. The case is the antithesis of sector agnosticism, showing how deeply rooted market-based ideology
gives rise to a reflexive private-sector favoritism that can run roughshod over attempts to solve large-scale public values problems. In this case, and in so many others, the pragmatism that so many profess and that is America’s only original political philosophy (West 1989) is easily set aside when citizens are in the throes of unbending ideology.

The case illustrates why simple pragmatism so often proves difficult. The case also provides a good “origins story” about interest in public values research and theory, so it is longer and more elaborate than most of our personal experience cases. After presenting the case, we return briefly to its role in launching a public values research agenda.

A Quick Note on Cases and Illustrations

Throughout the book, we use several modalities to convey contextual material, so a few words on organization and nomenclature may help. We begin below with a “personal case,” a report of one or both of the authors’ personal experiences. A “mini-case” is brief, usually less than a page, and typically functions as an example or, sometimes, even counterexamples. “Deep cases” are more extensive, providing considerable detail, and sometimes conclude by asking readers to reflect on and possibly discuss (if they are reading the book with others, such as in a class) reactions to discussion questions. Finally, we present “comments,” mostly by public values managers and leaders, throughout the book. These modalities are labeled and presented in a somewhat different format than the other material in the book.

Here is an example of one of the modalities we employ, the personal case. This particular personal case is a touchstone for the book because it describes reasons behind the first glimmer of contemporary public value theory.

Personal Case (Bozeman). City of Atlanta Water Policy and Market Frameworks

My focus in this case is on issues related to choosing who should provide public values, a decision that more often than not also determines exactly what public values are served and for whom. This personal experience
case emphasizes the difficulty of making public values decisions when there has been so little progress in developing ways of talking about public values or tools for understanding and assessing public values. This case and all of the book's personal experience reports are presented in first person.

Enter the Three Men in Rubber Boots

Our story begins more than 20 years ago, when I was director of the Georgia Tech School of Public Policy. On a brisk October day in Atlanta, I had just settled into my office at the D. M. Smith Building when the landmark Georgia Tech factory whistle blew the first of its 11 hourly piercing alerts. That whistle marked the time as 7:55 a.m., the beginning of the workday. I was just recovering from the whistle's sonic blast when I noticed a call on the intercom. Rita Davis, the school's administrative assistant, who was in the anteroom to the director's office, let me know that there were three men outside my office, politely requesting a meeting.

School directors have plenty of meetings, but this one seemed strange. First, the men had no appointment and stated no business. Second, they obviously did not know me at all, or they would have never expected me to be at work so early. A 7:55 appearance was a rare event. Rita did not identify the men by name, again unusual, violating the usual protocols. I was curious, not least because of the surprise registered in the usually unflappable Rita's voice; I said, “Please, send them in.”

The three men who entered resembled one another in some respects. All looked to be between 40 and 50 years old, all were African American, and all were dressed in sturdy work clothes and rubber boots, not the attire of the usual student, faculty, or administrator clientele. After declining coffee or water, the three got right down to business.

“Dr. Bozeman, we’re from the municipal workers’ union, we work at the water department. We don't have a lot of time, we're already going to be late for work, but we read what you wrote in the paper yesterday and we would like to get your help.”

The day before meeting them, I had published an op-ed in the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, weighing in on Mayor Bill Campbell’s plan to privatize water and sewer operations in the city of Atlanta. Campbell
hoped to find some way to solve an infrastructure crisis that everyone agreed was reaching emergency levels. The chief source of the city’s water, the Chattahoochee River, was so polluted that swimming was banned at several points. The city had already been subjected to millions of dollars of fines from the US Environmental Protection Agency owing to runoff of raw sewerage into the water system. Atlanta’s water system was antiquated, and the sewer system still had some wooden ducts and no adequate capture of runoff water. Some of the pipes installed in 1875 remained in service, and many others had been fixed with a patchwork of materials, some haphazardly.

Many observers agreed that the city would need to invest millions of dollars to renovate the sewer and water systems, but tax dollars were already strained and bonding capacity stretched. Mayor Campbell was now campaigning forcefully for a sweeping solution. According to Campbell, as well as many greater Atlanta business leaders and some city officials and politicians, the only viable solution was to sell or privatize the system and take advantage of the efficiencies of private markets.

The op-ed I had written was not exactly radical, except perhaps in the context of metropolitan Atlanta’s dominant market ideologies. The gist of my op-ed was this: evidence shows that in some cases privatization of municipal services works very well, and in other cases privatization causes more problems than it solves. I argued (and had a good deal of research to support the idea) that privatization’s likelihood of success is not random but instead depends on a variety of situational factors, including political will, knowledge of contracting and contract management, and a close partnership with the contractor. That mixed review was the most skeptical opinion about water and sewer privatization that had yet appeared in print or on radio and television. Thus, the men from the municipal employees’ union were not exactly thinking of me as their knight in shining armor, but they did view me, quite correctly, as the rare Atlanta dweller who had not made up his or her mind on the topic.

“I can understand why you guys oppose this possible privatization; some of you would probably lose your jobs,” I said. “I understand that. I sympathize. But is there any other reason you oppose it?” The youngest
worker, who unexpectedly seemed to be the spokesperson for the group, replied, “There is nothing about this whole mess that’s our fault. Lots of people think that if they can just get rid of these lazy government workers everything will be okay. They don’t know us. We do our job and we serve the public. We like having a job. But we also think what we are doing is important and we want to keep doing it.”

The workers really had only one request. They asked me to contact one of the few members of the Atlanta City Council who seemed to be listening to them, Councilwoman Clair Muller. At the time Muller was an eight-year veteran of the City Council, and she would later be described in the local newspaper as “the city’s reigning technocrat, with an unparalleled knowledge of virtually every aspect of city operations.”

After a brief telephone conversation, Councilwoman Muller asked me to meet for lunch the next day at Mary Mac’s Tea Room, a fifty-year-old Midtown landmark, as well known for its relaxed atmosphere conducive to business as for its fried green tomatoes and chicken and dumplings. We got right down to business. While no enemy of privatization per se, Muller voiced a number of reservations about the Campbell privatization plan, particularly questioning the Campbell administration’s ability to manage what would surely be an enormous contract, in all likelihood far bigger than anything in the history of Atlanta.

Still trying to get up to speed with local politics, I asked many questions about the history of water and sewer infrastructures and also the political alignments related to this history. I told Muller about my interest and background in studying privatization of government services, the primary reason for my cautious outlook on the impending service delivery choices. I also told her that I had not made up my mind about this major policy problem and that I would need a lot more information before doing so. “Don’t put me in any advocacy camp,” I said, “at least not right now.” I thanked her and assumed that my involvement with the issue had essentially ended.

*The Atlanta Sewer and Water Privatization Advisory Committee*  
A couple of weeks after our initial meeting, Muller called me and asked if I would cochair a “blue ribbon” committee she was putting together to do
fact-finding and make recommendations to the City Council on the Atlanta sewer-water privatization issue (later sewer issues were to some extent set aside and the focus was on water). After hearing about the planned objectives and activities of the committee and its projected membership, including respected local businesspeople, other academics, and political leaders, I accepted the offer. Shortly thereafter, the committee began its business, most of which involved public testimony, chiefly by technical or professional experts but by many ordinary citizens as well.

During the more than six weeks of meeting and testimony, the committee heard from an amazingly diverse set of citizens, including construction company presidents, consultants, politicians, academic researchers, neighborhood organizers, and mothers and fathers worried about the health of their families. The majority of citizens, especially business representatives, the largest group of those appearing before the committee, were strongly in favor of privatization. Many of these witnesses provided opinions wrapped in the language of neoliberal, market failure economics. Some of the more sophisticated provided information about benefit-cost streams and discount rates on marginal utility; others referred to market failure arguments, opining that government should be involved only in cases of obvious market failure, and since in this case the failure seemed to be related more to governance than to the market, it was obviously time to take advantage of market competition and achieve an efficient and effective outcome. Many of these arguments were quite persuasive.

Interestingly, those who were not so keen on this particular privatization choice were not much different in their approach and arguments than were the people who were in favor of privatization. Thus, some argued that maybe there was some market failure here since previous vendors had not been forthcoming. Others argued that this was a case where the government needed some role, even if not an exclusive one, because there were obvious externalities in the provision of water and sewer services, a typical economic rationale for government to be involved. Most of those in favor of maintaining a government role said the same exact thing: “I feel it is in the public interest for government to provide such a basic public service.” Most did not offer much elaboration on that point.
Introduction

One of the most eloquent speakers was one of the men who had appeared in my office the previous October. The city worker described in detail the nature of his work, the work of his crew, their level of commitment to the job, and many instances where they had gone above and beyond their work requirements, mainly because they viewed themselves as “public servants working in the public interest.”

The committee concluded its business recommending that privatization might not be the answer given that there was no evidence that problems were due to government performance. While the committee identified major problems related to capital cost and revenue shortfalls, it was not clear that these problems were going to be resolved by contracting with the private sector, especially given the need to build into the contract a profit margin for the contractor.

Mayor Campbell dismissed the report as a political setup and gave his opinion that privatization would save more than $20 million over the life of the contract (Jørgensen and Bozeman 2002). The mayor, with the backing of a small majority of the City Council, proceeded to develop bidding rules for contractors. In November 1998, the city of Atlanta signed a contract with United Water Services for what was at the time the longest and most costly contract for water services in the history of the world. United Water was one of the largest such companies, operating 32 privatized water systems in cities on four different continents. The week the contract was signed, the local newspaper reported that the signing “caps a tumultuous year-long process characterized by political infighting among local officials, apprehension in the community among city employees and a bidding blitz from five corporate behemoths” (Hairston 1998, D1). There was a sigh of relief in most quarters, though not the City Water Department.

**Hopes Dashed**

The Atlanta water privatization case is now viewed by many as a public policy and political disaster of epic proportions. United Water, a well-established and reputable company, took over operations shortly after the contract was signed. Only a few months afterward, the new mayor, Shirley Franklin, issued a notice that the contractor was not in full compliance with the 20-year contract, noting problems related to
staffing, billing, meter installation, and system repairs. This grievance came at just about the same time as United Water was asking for an additional $80 million to perform services that the city insisted on but that the company claimed were not correctly specified in the contract. The city gave United Water 90 days to solve the problems. United Water, in turn, provided letters signed by Mayor Bill Campbell (who would soon be in prison for unrelated bribery charges) stating that the company would be paid an additional $80 million, off contract. This was contested by the city and by Mayor Franklin, who claimed that the letters of agreement were neither valid nor legal. United Water dropped its claim for an additional payment of $80 million.

Not long after the contract dispute, a fire swept through an Atlanta public housing project, destroying many homes, this despite the rapid response of the Atlanta Fire Department, which arrived on the scene only to find that the fire hydrants had not been inspected recently and had insufficient water pressure to drive water through a fire hose.

Alleging poor service, poor water quality, and fraudulent billing, Mayor Franklin demanded that United Water quit or be fired and that the contract be terminated. United Water resigned from the contract, after fulfilling four years of the 20-year agreement. The company paid $6 million to settle all legal claims with the city. The city hired 364 employees and reconstituted its water department. In short, the chief outcome of the privatization effort was the expenditure of a great deal of taxpayer money, only to return to essentially the same government-run system in place before the privatization.

Lesson: Public Values Leadership Requires Pragmatism

Some may conclude that the Atlanta water case is a government-is-good, business-is-bad morality tale. We feel that is the wrong conclusion. The case shows that there is plenty of “bad” to go around (corruption, poor contracting and oversight, performance and performance management problems, toxic politics)—no single sector or organization gets all the discredit. The case also shows that while blaming people is easy enough, carefully parsing culpability is more challenging.
Even today it is difficult to identify and carefully sort all of the ingredients in the seeming disaster of the Atlanta case. Some argue that the public-private partnership failed because the city did such a poor job of providing information about the woeful state of its infrastructure (that was the United Water argument, one that seems to have some validity). Others argue that political corruption is front and center in understanding what went wrong. Many of those who followed the case feel that, plain and simple, the company did not live up to what it promised, that it was just interested in making money, not in providing service. Others are less critical of United Water’s service, arguing that giving the system back to the city did not improve service and may have made it worse. Some dispassionate analytical types claim that neither government nor business was at fault, that most problems were a result of Atlanta’s gigantic growth spurt and the difficulty of responding as rapidly as needed to population-driven challenges. Most importantly for present purposes, the case does not tell us that privatization is good or that it is bad—which, I guess, is where the case started.

Discussion Questions

- Question 1: In the authors’ view, much about the Atlanta case related to the specific and long-standing political culture of Atlanta. Here is the thought experiment for the reader: Consider your own hometown. If it were to be embroiled in a vital but controversial public works (water, or whatever may be relevant to your region) policy choice about privatization versus government or possibly a public-private partnership provision of services, how might the distinctive political culture affect outcomes? Do you think that the hometown’s history and political culture would impede or perhaps facilitate decision-making, and in what ways?
- Question 2: As the case points out, those citizens who were interested in making a strong case for privatization often
effectively framed their arguments in economic terms, such as cost-efficiency or cost-benefit analysis, but those who thought that the city might be better off by continuing to have government as a provider of services tended to speak vaguely about “the public interest” or even cloaked their own arguments in business terms. If you had decided that public provision of water might lead to better outcomes, how might you frame your argument? Can you think of ways to make such a case with more compelling and precise arguments than “I think it is in the public interest”?

Out of the Shadow of Market Theory

The Atlanta water privatization case remains important today because the city’s water problems still remain, despite some progress. But it is also personally important for Bozeman and Crow because it stoked an interest in public values theory that has not receded and has, since the late 1990s, developed along multiple paths forged by multiple people.

The origin story’s motivations might be presumed to have been grounded in reaction to the hypercapitalist assumptions pervading a public values problem, but that was not a new experience, so not a new motivation. What was jarring to Bozeman were the ways in which those who were in favor of government provision of services, as well as those who were open-minded and pragmatic, nonetheless frequently articulated their ideas using (and sometimes misusing) economic reasoning and terminology. Disputants on every side of the issue spoke of market failure (though arriving at different judgments about it) and framed the issues in terms of economics-driven cost-benefit analysis concepts. The “public interest” was much alluded to, but never in any concrete or instrumental fashion.

During this experience, Bozeman concluded that existing public interest theory (more about that later) was not sufficiently precise to compete with the analytical precision of neoliberal microeconomics theory and measurement. In Bozeman’s view, economic values often supplant public interest values for no other reason than this analytical
mismatch. Worse, the mismatch often results in the supplanting of vital but conceptually murky public interest values with the more easily communicated and measured values central to economics.

The Atlanta case suggests the dangers of relying on dominant ideologies as opposed to reasoned pragmatism, and it shows how public values come to be held prisoner to ideology. The case shows that blind allegiance to ideology often gets in the way of public values objectives. Stereotypes about sectors and rigid ideas about sector roles get in the way of achieving public values. Somehow, we never learn from countless historical instances showing us that business, government, and nonprofit sectors all provide not only good solutions to social problems but also terrible ones, and all gradations of quality in between those extremes. In our view, achieving public values requires a focus on outcomes and approaches that work—pragmatism. Ideology makes sense in some realms, especially political persuasion, but in many instances public values can best be achieved with diverse policies, organizational designs, and institutional arrangements.

Public values theory, at least our version of it (Bozeman 2002, 2007), was created in an effort to rehabilitate venerable but often ambiguous public interest theory, to offer more precise premises, concepts, and perhaps even measures, so as to diminish the need to use theories developed for a very different purpose, namely, market efficiency, owing simply to the lack of any satisfactory alternative. Indeed, a central thrust of public values theory involves developing alternatives to the decision-making criteria included in market failure theory (e.g., spillovers and externalities, market monopolies), ones pertaining to values affecting the broad public rather than issues related to the technical efficiencies of prices for goods and services.

We shall see in the next chapter that by the usual criteria we bring to assessing the precision and robustness of theories and the measures that flow from them, public values theory is still a work in progress. But at least it seems fair to say that it results in expanded discussion and gives some hope of moving analysis of public issues out of the long shadow cast by market failure reasoning. We are on a mission—to do all we can to support the discussion, the analysis, and, especially, the
application of public values—and we invite the reader to join us, with the attitude that the perfect (that is, perfect public values theory and measures) cannot be the enemy of the good (expanded public values deliberation and action). For the rest of the introduction, however, we set aside analytical cudgels.

The Atlanta case tells us much about ideological rigidity and dominance, political incompetence, corruption, and the squandering of vast sums to little good purpose. It is a depressing story of public values thwarted, made all the more depressing when we consider that most actors shared public values objectives. We counterbalance with an instance of public values achievement, albeit one with some bittersweet elements.

**Mini-case. The Public Value of Private Safety: The Safe Arrival of Kayla T.**

Public values–focused organizations and institutions come in many shapes, sizes, and sectors. Often groups of organizations, working together informally in networks or in formal alliances, serve public values. In doing so, they sometimes achieve great public values successes.

On a late October Saturday evening, just after sunset, Kayla T. (not her real name), a 17-year-old junior at McClintock High School in Tempe, Arizona, finishes her six-hour shift as a weekend worker at the Target store in the Tempe Marketplace Mall. She is tired after a day at the cash register, her fatigue exacerbated by sleep deprivation the night before. Kayla went to sleep much later than usual after attending a Friday night football game with her McClintock Chargers traveling to nearby Tempe High School for the season’s most important rivalry game. The Chargers suffered a dispiriting beatdown by the archrival Buffaloes, and Kayla stayed out late with friends, drowning their athletic sorrows at a nearby Zoyo ice cream and frozen yogurt shop. Now Kayla is bicycling home, hoping to get a quick nap before meeting up with a bunch of friends and heading back to the mall to see an old James Bond movie playing in the theater’s vintage film series.

Kayla lives with her parents near downtown Tempe, about two miles from the Target store. Tempe has extensive bicycle lanes, and Kayla looks
forward to a little exercise, especially now that the weather in Tempe has finally cooled off a bit. She unlocks her bike, one of those retro fat tire bikes that she and her friends prefer, hers in pink and purple with white tires; she puts on her helmet, turns on her bicycle light, and proceeds down Rio Salado Parkway, a busy winding road with too much traffic, but also with a well-demarcated bike lane. This is rush hour, but—important because of Kayla’s desperation for a nap—it is also the quickest route to her home. Kayla is a little nervous with so many cars whizzing by and with some more athletic superbikers on her tail, ones in fancy bike shirts on expensive ultralight carbon bikes, passing her on the left-hand side outside of the bike lane.

In a little more than 20 minutes Kayla is safely home; she puts up her bike, greets her mom and her little sister Samantha, heads to her room, and sets the alarm to ensure that she will meet her friends, and ten minutes later she is fast asleep.

The point of this story is that nothing melodramatic happens; it is a “day in the life” story. Kayla lives; she suffers no traffic accident; she doesn’t even have a flat tire. The story is a happy one, in part because of the work of public values–based individuals and organizations. To what can we attribute this happy if unexciting outcome of Kayla arriving safely at home? Sure, Kayla is a responsible commuter. But let us also consider that the Tempe City Council adopted a “traffic smoothing” strategy and worked with local bicycle shops and a Tempe nonprofit group advocating for bicycle safety to build and publicize new and expanded bike lanes so that people like Kayla, part of Tempe’s increasing bicycle commuter population, could be healthy, help curb pollution, and, most of all, do so safely.

Lesson: Good Things Happen Because Bad Things Don’t

Sometimes when we think of achieving public values, we imagine highly visible sets of actions consuming prodigious resources and resulting in splashy outcomes. But in many cases, public values come in small packages, and public values successes entail quietly avoiding public values failures. (In chapter 1 we discuss public values failure in detail, providing specific criteria for assessing public values.)
Deep Case. Public Values Controversy: Mothers Against Drunk Driving

Of necessity, we start this case with a real-life nightmare outcome. On May 3, 1980, 13-year-old Cari Lightner, a California girl, was walking with a friend, not riding, in a bike lane. Cari was hit from behind by an automobile and killed instantly. Rather than stopping, the driver accelerated and sped away. Soon the police arrested him. A few days later, the police told Cari’s mother, Candy Lightner, that the man who killed Cari by vehicular homicide had only two days before been released from jail on another drunk driving, hit-and-run case. On May 8, Candy Lightner assembled friends, and the group pledged to start an organization that would do something to combat drunk driving. One of the friends suggested the name Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD). The organization came to national prominence and has been credited by many for its role in putting drunk driving on the public policy agenda, affecting public opinion, and organizing public actions against drunk driving.

The sharp decline in drunk driving in the United States between 1980 and the present relates not only to changing norms and policies but also to demographic factors. However, there seems little doubt that just a few determined people with a vision for a shared public value, public safety, managed to design an institution that ultimately had significant impacts in the realization of the value it pursued. Did Kayla make it safely home in October because of MADD? We cannot know. Social outcomes are remarkably complex and “overdetermined.” But there seems little doubt that MADD has contributed to public values and to the safety of citizens throughout the United States.

The history of MADD provides important lessons about achieving public values, about both the role of the individual and the role of concerted efforts by multiple institutions and organizations. It is not the archetypal case of public values–based institutional design, but that is only because there is no archetype, but rather many routes to public values–based institutions. In some cases, as with MADD, institutions begin with a charismatic leader with a strong emotional appeal, but other cases begin with no single leader and not even much charisma. In some cases, as with MADD, the institution has its beginnings in informal groups and grassroots movements; in others, a public values–based institution is developed from existing organizations coming together in
common purpose. In still other cases, public values–based institutions have political roots, either encouraged by or established in law and public policy. There is not one template, but, as we shall see here, one can identify patterns that cut across almost all efforts to design public values–based institutions.

As mentioned above, it is easy to identify the precipitating causes and the time of origin for MADD. However, MADD was not the first organization formed to fight drunk driving. This is important to note because there is no requirement that a public values–based institution be the first organization of its type or that it be innovative. The key is the ability to attain public values, whether or not the institution is the “first mover.” MADD was preceded by another citizen activist group, Remove Intoxicated Drivers (RID), established in New York State by Doris Aiken. The circumstances were similar. Aiken learned about the traffic deaths of Karen and Timothy Morris, who were killed by a drunk driver on December 4, 1977, siblings who were the only children in the Morris family. Several days later, Bonnie Morris, the victim’s mother, called Aiken to enlist her help in getting the district attorney to even return her phone calls. After a series of public meetings, some media coverage, and the attention of public officials, RID was launched. It continues today, with chapters or representatives in 42 states, and with Doris Aiken at its head until her death in 2017. However, RID, which started earlier and shares many characteristics with MADD, has for many years had a much smaller footprint than MADD. In comparing MADD and RID, one lesson is that there is no requirement to be first, and another is that public values–based institutions, even ones with quite similar origins, can evolve in very different ways.

It is not always easy to see just why some grassroots organizations take off and others do not. The success of MADD has attracted researchers’ interests (Weed 1987, 1993; Fell and Voas 2006; Hurley 2014), and the history of MADD often is viewed as a prime example of institution-building success. All seem to agree that the charismatic leadership of Candy Lightner proved important, but not more so than early linkages to mass media and to elected officials. One of Lightner’s early allies, Cindi Lamb, whose child was paralyzed by a drunk driver, was introduced to Lightner and her nascent organization by Sandy Golden, a Washington, DC,
television correspondent who was developing a story on drunk driving. The combination of a coast-to-coast alliance, likable spokespersons, and mass media coverage attracted the interest of members of Congress, initially Michael Barnes (D-MD). The more attention garnered, the more Lightner began to rise as a national spokesperson for the anti–drunk driving cause. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) began actively assisting, including helping Lightner and Lamb at press events, most importantly a national press conference in which the two activists joined Congressman Barnes, Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI), and Joan Claybrook, then head of the NHTSA.

Spurred by the publicity, in 1980 MADD was incorporated as a California corporation and had formed chapters in Maryland and California. In 1981, the organization was featured in stories in the *Los Angeles Times* and *Family Circle* and in guest appearances on *The Today Show* and *The Phil Donahue Show*. By this time MADD had ascended to national leadership in the anti–drunk driving cause (Fell and Voas 2006). Naturally, the publicity and the public awareness of MADD did not immediately or directly translate into social or political influence. It seems clear that one significant milestone was the establishment by President Reagan in 1982 of the Presidential Commission on Drunk Driving. MADD advocates were instrumental in urging the creation of the commission and were invited by the Reagan White House to attend ceremonies for its establishment. They were featured prominently at the meetings of the commission, complete with Candy Lightner photo ops with President Reagan. One result was the increased legitimacy of the organization as a public policy advocate.

In the early 1980s MADD formed a new set of alliances, this time with the scientific community working on issues of substance-based impairment and accidents. Because of work by this diverse coalition of advocates and researchers, federal legislation was developed establishing a national minimum drinking age of 21 (the National Minimum Drinking Age Act of 1984). MADD continued to partner with White House policy makers and the Office of the Surgeon General (including their sponsorship of the Workshop on Drunk Driving), bringing together a diverse coalition of advocates, policy makers, and scientists.
By its tenth anniversary in 1990, MADD, by this time one of the few “household name” advocacy organizations, had accomplished much in its legislative programs at both the federal and state levels and felt confident in establishing an ambitious goal: “20 by 2000,” aiming to reduce alcohol-related traffic deaths by 20% by the new millennium. The goal was met three years early. Not only were programs adopted throughout the nation, including most conspicuously a lowering of blood alcohol rates permissible for driving, but also the membership of MADD and the resources available to it continued to climb. Spin-off groups were developed, such as Students Against Drunk Driving. MADD played a significant role in the 1998 federal Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, which set a minimum one-year suspension of driver’s licenses for DUI second offense, as well as provisions for impoundment of vehicles.

The Bittersweet Part
Notwithstanding its considerable influence and success, MADD, like nearly any public values-based institution, has had to withstand threats to its success and very survival. First, there was the nasty empirical reality that drunk driving fatalities, which had trended downward for so long, stopped doing so, despite the best efforts of advocates. From 1982 to 1993 alcohol-related traffic fatalities decreased steadily from more than 26,000 to a low of 17,732. But declines were not sustained and for the next decade ranged from the high 16,000s to the mid-17,000s.

More specific to MADD, Candy Lightner resigned as CEO, partly because of a conflict with the board of directors. By the early 1980s, MADD had transitioned into a more traditional business-like approach, focusing on resources and strategic planning and less on advocacy. According to some observers, it was this major transition, this proliferation of the organization’s formal bureaucracy, that ultimately sustained it, but these changes were accompanied by considerable internal conflict (McCarthy and Wolfson 1996).

What has been the specific role of MADD in improving traffic safety? It not possible to give an exact accounting of the full impact of an organization operating for a relatively long time on a public value issue that has involved a great many other organizations, including ones often working in partnership.
It is possible to point to tens of thousands of lives saved from reductions in alcohol-related traffic deaths from the beginning of MADD until today, and there is a long list of public programs, at state, federal, and sometimes municipal levels of government, that have been created coincident with aggressive MADD advocacy. In short, there seems little doubt that MADD has contributed to achieving the public values it set out to achieve, but the magnitude of its effectiveness is not so easily gauged.

Since MADD has received some scholarly attention, there are various views about its success. As mentioned above, some feel that the ability of the organization to develop from a loose coalition into a formal bureaucratic structure has been a source of strength. However, critics point to the fact that almost half of its $45 million annual income goes toward salaries, a high number for a nonprofit organization. Some attribute MADD’s seeming success to the fact that the organization emerged at a time in which the policy agenda was ripe, especially in touch with the moralistic tone set by the Reagan administration. While almost everyone credits MADD founder Lightner with much of the early success of MADD, it seems clear that the ability to quickly and effectively partner with other organizations has been instrumental at all points of MADD’s history. Sometimes the partners are not “obvious” ones. Another point of criticism: at one point the hospitality industry played an important part in MADD support and funding, chiefly because they wished to distinguish between the social drinker and the “problem drinker” (McCarthy and Wolfson 1996). But MADD has many partnerships, including with researchers, government agencies, and mass media.

As we write this, MADD has evolved and adapted a good deal. One of their most important programmatic changes has been a strong emphasis on victim services, programs that have helped with recruitment and with expanding advocacy.

Lesson: The Power of the Few
As is so often the case with a protracted effort to achieve public values, the MADD case is a complex one where different people draw different lessons. Here are ours. Lesson One: the MADD case shows
that it is possible to begin with humble resources and go on to contribute greatly to public values, especially when working closely with many different people in different organizations, people who bring their own resources and energy.

Lesson: Fraught Public Values Heroism
Lesson Two: if one is looking for credit, it is best to believe in heavenly rewards in the afterlife. This is, we think, not an overly cynical conclusion. Even when society does anoint public values heroes, the acclaim often is fleeting or symbolic. Symbols of accomplishment have their place, but achieving public values usually requires more than one or two heroes.

What’s in the Rest of the Book
While it is conventional at this point to go over the content of a book, chapter by chapter, we have trust in the readers’ ability to look at the table of contents and, just on that basis, determine which chapters appeal. So, instead, we review below some of the more unusual features of the book, including one we are especially pleased with—the inclusion of views, based on interviews, of several people we consider public values leaders.

Lessons from Public Values Leaders
While much of this book is the gospel according to Crow and Bozeman, we include perspectives of many others who cooperated with us in putting together this book. We refer to them as “public values leaders” because, in our view, that is exactly what they are. Of course, that is not all they are. Some are politicians, some are lifelong public servants, some work in industry, and others are leaders in nonprofit organizations or institutions of higher education. Despite diverse backgrounds, these leaders do have some things in common that we feel unite them as public values leaders. We do not expect that a public value
leader focuses only on public values, we do not expect that public values leaders are saints and never make mistakes, and we certainly do not expect that public values leaders will necessarily play the role of the charismatic hero leader. Often leadership is about stamina, patience, and the ability to work with others. What these people have in common is this: much of their work has been guided by a desire to achieve the most fundamental rights and benefits to which all citizens should be able to lay claim, but which are sometimes denied. The people we interviewed for this book have worked for human rights, education and social development, health and well-being—in short, the public values about which most of us agree. Each has accomplished great things, sometimes through highly visible public values attainment, and other times in a cloak of near anonymity.

There is no political or ideological litmus test for public leaders (remember—pragmatism and agnosticism about sector). People of many different political persuasions can and do contribute to public values achievement. We shall see that all public values leaders are not from the same mold. One of the refreshing elements of these interviews is a clear indication that there are many different valid and effective approaches to leadership and many different routes to achieving public values. The list includes not only people who are well known to most of the general public but also people who have a regional or local reputation for achievement. One also finds people from all sectors—business, politics and public administration, and nonprofit organizations.

In addition to sharing our only criterion, having contributed to significant public values achievements, about the only other thing the leaders all have in common is that one or both of the authors (but usually Crow) have long been acquainted with them. That explains the fact that they are not geographically representative. Many are from Arizona or from Washington; the two authors spend the majority of their time in those two locales and meet more people from these two places than, say, Alaska or Nebraska. But it will not surprise you to know that we feel there are good, strong public values leaders in every state in the United States and, indeed, throughout the world.
Despite the geographic bias, the list is in other ways diverse, including people from different sectors, different political leanings, and different genders, races, and ethnicities. Their respective contributions to this book are enormous, and we are enormously grateful for their generosity in granting time for in-depth interviews. You will find the public values leaders’ contributions used in a variety of ways. Most conspicuously, our chapter 6, “Case Studies in Public Values Leadership,” features five extended cases, what we call here “deep cases” so as to distinguish them from the many other illustrations, comments, and briefer cases employed. We feature these public values leaders not because their accomplishments exceed others but because our interviews with them focused more on one particular case, rather than several smaller episodes, ones that are more amenable to extended treatment. We also chose these leaders because they represent different sectors, including nonprofit, higher education, city management, business, and gubernatorial politics.

In addition to the deep cases, we also feature public values leaders in mini-cases and sometimes just in brief comments or observations, ones we feel edify the particular points we are making (or, in some cases, contrasting points or perspectives). The names and affiliations of the public values leaders are given in table 1, but, of course, we provide more information about them and their activities in other places in the book. We invite you to do a little research on your own and find out more about these extraordinary people.

Lessons from History, Assorted Personal Experiences, Arizona State University, Participant Observation, and Even Scholarly Sources

In writing this book, we grabbed about anything that we felt would help us make useful points about public values management and leadership, including even some theory and research from academic publications, including research on exactly what we mean by “public values.” Extended historical accounts include such diverse elements as the origins
of food safety policies, the eradication of smallpox, the fight against drunk driving, and many others. Some of the history is personal history, including everything from Bozeman’s work on a citizen’s advisory commission on water and sewer privatization to Crow’s work developing the Starbucks-ASU Alliance for education. There are extended sections based on Crow’s experiences managing the largest university in the United States. While we are not bashful about drawing from our own experiences and warned at the beginning that this is a more personal book than most, we can say in our defense that we certainly

<table>
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<th>Public Values Leaders</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
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| Jeb Bush              | Former Governor of Florida  
Jeb Bush and Associates, LLC.  
Biographical information: https://www.britannica.com/biography/Jeb-Bush |
| Antonia Hernández     | President and CEO, California Community Foundation  
Biographical Information: https://www.calfund.org/about-ccf/ccstaff/presidents-office/ |
| Freeman Hrabowski     | President, University of Maryland at Baltimore County  
Biographical information: https://president.umbc.edu |
| Linda Hunt            | CEO, Dignity Health  
Biographical information: https://www.dignityhealth.org/arizona/about-us EXECUTIVE LEADERSHIP/linda-hunt |
| Tony Penn             | President and CEO, United Way of Tucson and Southern Arizona  
Biographical information: https://www.unitedwaytucson.org/our_board |
| Anne-Marie Slaughter  | President and CEO of New America  
Biographical information: https://www.newamerica.org/our_people/anne-marie-slaughter/ |
| Brian and Kelly Swette| President and CEO, Sweet Earth Incorporated  
Biographical information: https://www.sweetearthfoods.com/who-we-are#mission |
| Deborah Wince-Smith   | President, Council on Competitiveness  
Biographical information: https://www.compete.org/about/senior-staff/3182 |
| Steven Zabilski       | Executive Director, St. Vincent de Paul  
Biographical information: https://www.catholicsun.org/2017/01/22/steve-zabilski-20-years-of-serving-the-common-man-at-st-vincent-de-paul/ |
| Ed Zuercher           | Phoenix City Manager  
do not view our experiences as definitive or unique, and we invite the reader to not only reflect on them but also argue with the lessons we draw from them.

Perhaps most unconventional, but certainly in keeping with the personalistic tone of the book, our concluding chapter presents a conversation between the authors, a conversation reflecting on and extending the public values, management, and leadership topics explored in the book. In the unconventional final chapter please accept our invitation to engage in a “conversation” with the authors, though necessarily at some remove.

For readers more at home with the conventional, the next chapter comes closest. In chapter 1 we dig into the nature of public interest theory, its relation to public values, and its contrasts with market failure theory.