CHAPTER X

A ROYALIST GENERAL

As soon as he learned of John's death, William hastened from Gloucester to Worcester to meet his nephew and the other barons who were escorting the corpse of their royal master from Newark. There they were joined by the legate. After interring John with due ceremony in the church of St. Wulstan, William and Gualo summoned the chief men of the royal party to assemble in council at Gloucester. Thomas de Sanford was despatched to fetch young Henry Plantagenet from his retreat in the Wiltshire stronghold of Devizes. The earl himself rode out as far as Malmesbury to meet the lord of England. The boy, who had been well instructed in his part, greeted him warmly. "Sir, you are welcome. I give myself to God and to you. May God give you his grace so that you may guard me well." "Sire," answered William, "by my soul I shall do what I can to serve you in good faith and with all my powers." The sight of the attractive, helpless boy of nine who was the heir of the house of Anjou was too much for the old servants of his family. Breaking into tears, they continued their ride toward Gloucester.¹

As the nobles and prelates gathered at Gloucester their first care was to supply themselves with an excuse for existence as a royalist party. They had loyally served the king of England, but now there was no king.² One solution of the problem would have been to declare Louis of France John's successor and thus end the civil war. Such action would not have been unprecedented. King Stephen had disinherited his son in favor

¹ Hist., 15206-15286.
² The theory that the king never dies had not yet developed, and there was no king between the death of one and the coronation of his successor. Richard and John used the title Dominus Anglie in this interval.
of Henry II. It is rather remarkable that no one seems even to have suggested this course. Not only were the barons who had remained faithful to his father determined to maintain young Henry's rights, but that weather-cock of the civil war, Count William of Aumale, cheerfully rejoined the royal party. To guard against the possibility that Louis might take advantage of John's death to assume formally the English crown, the council decided to knight and consecrate Henry immediately without even waiting for the arrival of such belated members of their party as Ranulf of Chester. To William Marshal, who was considered the foremost knight of his age and who had already received one king into the order of chivalry, was accorded the honor of performing the first ceremony. When he had been duly dubbed a knight, Henry took the customary oath, did homage to Gualo as the representative of England's suzerain, the pope, and was solemnly crowned by the bishop of Winchester. This double ceremony restored the moral and legal foundations of the royal party—they had a king to serve.

A nine-year-old king might reign, but he could not rule, and some method had to be devised for carrying on the government until he came of age. A strong hand would be required for the task of driving out the invader and restoring order in the kingdom. According to the History John had commended his son to the care of William Marshal, and this statement is supported by another chronicle, but there is no evidence that their late master's wish carried any weight with the leaders of the loyal party. A half dozen of these leaders might with good reason have aspired to the regency—the legate, bishop Peter of Winchester, the justiciar, Hubert de Burg, and the earls of Pembroke, Chester, and Derby. The legate Gualo undoubtedly realized that he could be more effective in the background. As the pope's representative he would be distrusted by the baronage and he was no soldier who could command the operations against Louis. Peter des Roches, bishop of Winchester, was an

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able captain and an experienced administrator, but he was a Poitevin and was generally hated for his high-handed rule during John’s absence on the continent in 1214. While his high office of justiciar gave Hubert de Burg a strong claim to the regency, he was simply a faithful and capable royal official, an upstart whose elevation to so great a dignity would be sure to annoy the barons. Both Peter and Hubert suffered from the additional disadvantage of being too closely connected in the public mind with John’s misgovernment. The success of the new government would depend to a great extent on the ability of the regent to secure the wholehearted co-operation of the loyal barons and to win over the rebels. For this reason it was extremely desirable that he be himself a great feudal lord. Of the three earls who had actively supported John, one, William de Ferrars, earl of Derby, was a man of minor importance. The choice really lay between the two marcher earls, Ranulf of Chester and William of Pembroke. As palatine lords of vast domains both these men stood in the forefront of the English baronage in respect to rank, power, and prestige. Both of them enjoyed untarnished records of loyalty to the house of Anjou. Both were experienced soldiers who had taken part in the campaigns against Philip Augustus and in innumerable wars with the Welsh. As the younger of the two men, Earl Ranulf was the more able to bear the burdens of government, but he lacked the administrative experience which William had gained as associate justiciar during Richard’s crusade. The best argument for the choice of the earl of Pembroke lay in his personal qualities which were peculiarly suited to so eminent an office as the regency. His reputation for honesty and loyalty guaranteed him the admiration and confidence of both friends and enemies. His activities on the continent as knight-errant, warrior, and diplomat made him as well known in the French court as in the English. Four kings had valued his counsel because of his wisdom and discretion. After the coronation banquet the men of rank asked William Marshal to take charge of the king and kingdom, but he insisted on postponing the discussion until
after the arrival of the earl of Chester. To run the risk of offending the man who controlled the palatinate of Chester and the extensive honor of Brittany would have been nothing short of idiotic.

That evening the earl summoned to his quarters in Gloucester castle his three most intimate friends, John Marshal, John d’Erley, and Ralph Musard, sub-sheriff of Gloucstershire and constable of the castle. He asked their counsel as to what answer he should give to the request that he assume control of the kingdom. John Marshal and Ralph Musard advised him to accept. While the earl’s nephew stressed the honor to be gained, Ralph pointed out that William would be able to enrich all his friends. John d’Erley was less enthusiastic. The earl was old, the task was formidable, and the royal treasury was empty. The earl’s energies and his private resources would be drained to the dregs. In the face of these conflicting counsels, William took the only reasonable course—he went to bed.

When Earl Ranulf reached Gloucester, the men of rank gathered in council to discuss the all important question. Peter des Roches, who presided, asked the opinion of Alan Basset who replied that the choice lay between the earls of Pembroke and Chester. William insisted that he was too old and feeble for so onerous a charge and supported his argument by somewhat exaggerating his true age. Let them choose the earl of Chester, and he would support him to the best of his ability. But Ranulf concurred in the general opinion that William was the man for the position. “No, Marshal,” said he, “that cannot be. You are so good a knight, so fine a man, so feared, so loved, and so wise that you are considered one of the first knights in the world. I say to you in all loyalty that you must be chosen. I will serve you, and I will carry out to the best of my power all the tasks you may assign to me.” As everyone seemed in agreement, the legate saw no need for continuing the

* Hist., 15375-15400.

* Ibid., 15401-15464.

7 Ibid., 15510. William stated that he was over 80. He could not have been more than 72.
general discussion. Gualo, the bishop of Winchester, the two earls, and a few of the more important barons withdrew into another room. All urged William Marshal to accept the regency, but their arguments proved unavailing until the legate asked him to undertake it as a general penance for all his sins. This offer was too tempting to be refused, and William gave way. Was the earl’s resistance sincere or merely polite modesty? One is inclined to accept it at its face value. He was old, and the task facing him was so difficult as to be almost hopeless. In accounting for his change of mind one must not underestimate the weight of the legate’s offer. His was an age of faith, and the church owed much of its wealth to the desire of feudal lords to make sure of their place in heaven. Gualo held in his hands the keys to Heaven and he offered to use them in William’s behalf. For a man whose days were drawing to an end a plenary indulgence was the supreme reward.

After he had given his consent to the legate, William once more summoned the three friends whom he had consulted the previous evening. “Counsel me,” he said, “for by the faith that I owe you, I see myself entering a sea without bottom or bank. May God come to my aid. They have entrusted to me an almost hopeless task. The child has no money, and I am an aged man.” Overcome by his feelings the earl wept, and the others did likewise from sympathy. John d’Erley, however, knew how to cheer his lord. He pointed out to him the honor that was to be gained in so difficult a position. If all William’s followers passed over to Louis, if they surrendered all the castles they commanded, if he were driven from England and forced to take refuge in Ireland, still the brave resistance would bring him honor. If a failure could be so honorable, how much greater the glory if he should succeed. No man had ever acquired such honor as would be his. John had not misjudged his lord’s nature. While the great baron still hesitated on the brink of the “sea without bottom or bank,” the king-errant plunged joyfully in for the sake of the honor to be gained. “

the lance of God, that counsel is good. It goes so straight to my heart that if all should abandon the king except me do you know what I would do? I would carry him on my shoulders, now here, now there, from isle to isle, from land to land, and I would never fail him even if I were forced to beg my bread." The flower of chivalry was ready to embark on his last and greatest adventure.

Several extremely pressing problems confronted the newly appointed regent. As no king of England since the Conquest had come to the throne as a minor, there were no precedents to govern William's conduct. Every detail from the actual title to be borne by the regent to the forms to be used in issuing writs had to be worked out. Steps had to be taken to retain the loyalty of the barons who had remained faithful to John and to convince the rebels that the young king's government would avoid the late monarch's errors. As many as possible of the rebellious barons had to be won back to the allegiance of their rightful lord. When John died, he not only left an empty treasury, but he had failed to pay his mercenaries the wages due them at Michaelmas. If the war was to be carried to a successful conclusion these men must be satisfied and retained in Henry's service. With half the kingdom in the possession of the enemy and confusion reigning throughout, all the usual methods of raising money were out of the question and extraordinary ones had to be devised. Finally, the rebellion had to be put down and the invader driven from the realm.

During the first two weeks after his appointment as regent William styled himself justiciar, but that title did not accurately describe his position. The justiciar was a royal official appointed by letters patent to act as the king's deputy. His authority was purely delegated, and when he issued writs during the king's absence from the country, he did so in his own

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9 Ibid., 15624-15696.
10 Justiciarii nostri Anglie, Patent Rolls (Rolls Series), I, 2.
11 For letters appointing Peter des Roches justiciar in 1214, see Rot. Pat., p. 110.
name.  

William on the other hand had been chosen by Gualo, the representative of the overlord of England, and by the great men of the loyal party to govern the country in the king's name. With some self-imposed limitations his will was the king's—in short, he was a real regent as the term is used today. The question of his title was apparently settled at the council of loyal prelates and barons held at Bristol in the middle of November. As Louis by that time had raised the siege of Dover, Hubert de Burg was present, and he may well have objected to William's use of the title which he himself had received from John. Be that as it may, it was finally decided to designate William as *rector regis et regni Angliae*—a title which aptly described his position.  

Well established precedents existed for two methods of issuing writs in the absence of the king. They might be issued in the king's name under his seal and attested by the responsible official. This had been the practice of Walter de Coutance, archbishop of Rouen, when he ruled as justiciar during Richard's absence in Palestine.  

Or the justiciar might simply issue the writs in his own name under his own seal. This had been done by William de Longchamp during 1190 and 1191 and by Peter des Roches in 1214. As the young king had no seal, the first of these two methods could not be used. But writs issued in William's own name might lack the authority of those bearing the king's and would fail to express his full dignity as regent. Hence it was decided to issue the writs in the king's
name, but to have them authenticated by William's seal and attested by him as the person responsible for them. This was the practice followed during the first two years of Henry's reign. In special cases the seal of the legate or those of other members of the council were added to William's to give greater authority. A few writs which apparently bore the regent's seal were attested by others. During the first three months of the reign the forms *teste me ipso* and *teste Rege* were used occasionally, but as this obviously meant nothing more than the physical presence of the king, the practice was dropped after January 1217. In one case letters patent attested by the king himself were issued at Bristol under the seals of the legate and Peter des Roches at a time when the regent was at Gloucester. As the letters ordered the restoration to William of the service of Meiler fitz Henry which John had taken from him, this should simply be considered as an example of the regent's delicacy. In general the business of government followed the regent, and the writs were attested by him and authenticated by his seal.

While for most purposes of government William's will was the king's, he seems to have imposed certain restrictions on his own power. He refrained from attempting to remove any officials who held John's letters patent appointing them during the king's pleasure, and he probably doubted his right to do so. He realized, moreover, that he had no right to make perpetual grants which would bind the king and his successors. Such grants as he made were specifically limited to the period of

16 *et quoniam sigillum nondum habuimus, has litteras nostras patentes, sigillatas sigillo fidelis nostri W. Marescalli, comitis Penbrochie, rectoris nostri et regni nostri, vobis mittimus.*
18 Several writs were attested by Peter des Roches (*Rot. Claus.*, I, 361, 361b) and one by Martin de Pattishal (*ibid.*, p. 364).
Henry's minority. There are, however, several interesting exceptions to this rule. While the first charter of liberties issued by Henry was clearly provisional, that of 1217 definitely stated that it was binding on the king and his successors forever. In addition there are two grants made to ecclesiastical foundations which purport to be perpetual. Both are in the form of letters patent sealed and attested by William. These examples show the regent's wisdom in delaying for two years before making a new great seal. As no perpetual grant could be valid without the great seal, the documents mentioned above, whatever their wording might be, must be considered as provisional grants. When Henry's seal began to run in the autumn of 1218, grants in perpetuity made during the minority were definitely declared invalid. Thus William and his colleagues worked out each problem that arose in their unprecedented situation. The solutions arrived at bear strong witness to the regent's sound common sense.

On November 12th the adherents of Henry Plantagenet met in council at Bristol. As Louis had raised the siege of Dover, the justiciar, Hubert de Burg, had been able to join the other royalist leaders. The known members of the council include the legate, seven English and four Welsh bishops, the earls of Pembroke, Chester, and Ferrars, the count of Aumale, who had just joined the loyal party, and eighteen barons. After settling such minor matters as the actual title to be borne by the regent, the council authorized the issuance of a charter of liberties. This document was the Great Charter of 1215 with several important omissions and minor changes. Most of the omissions were explained by a clause of the charter itself. The prelates and barons who were present announced that certain questions covered by the Great Charter were so weighty that they should

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d 22 Patent Rolls, I, 123, 173.
23 Ibid., p. 177.
24 Roger of Wendover, II, 199.
26 For text of charter see ibid. For a complete discussion of Magna Carta and its reissues see McKechnie, Magna Carta.
only be decided after long consideration by a full council of the realm. These included the assessing of scutages and aids, the debts to the Jews, the freedom of entering and leaving the kingdom, regulations concerning forests, warrens, and river banks, and the farms of the counties. In addition to the sections of the Great Charter covered by this statement, the new issue omitted the clause governing the distribution of the estates of men who died intestate, that governing the character of men to be appointed to royal offices, the promise to dismiss all foreign mercenaries, and all the purely temporary provisions of John's charter such as the one providing for the return of hostages. As the government was issuing this charter of its own volition, there was naturally no sanction such as the committee of barons provided for in 1215. The minor changes made in a number of sections show very clearly William's wisdom and ability. Chapter three of the Great Charter was amended to forbid a lord to take the custody of a vassal's fief before he had received the homage of the heir. At the same time the age of majority was definitely fixed at twenty-one years. Chapter five was changed so that the rules governing lay wardships were extended to the custody of vacant abbeys and sees. The Great Charter permitted a widow to remain in her husband's house until her dowry was assigned to her. The new charter provided that if the house were a castle, the widow must move to another. Instead of forbidding the constable of a castle to take provisions without making immediate payment, he was allowed three weeks in which to pay for supplies taken from the ville in which the castle was situated. The Great Charter forbade royal officials to use a free man's carts without his consent, but the reissue simply provided that all carts should be paid for at regular rates. The explanation made by the prelates and barons of the omissions in this charter should be accepted as the truth, but not as the whole truth. No doubt the subjects enumerated seemed to William too serious and controversial for decision by what was after all but a small minority of the great men of

\[\text{\textsuperscript{37}}\text{ It was provided, however, that ecclesiastical custodies were not to be sold.}\]
England, but there were undoubtedly other reasons for the omissions. With an empty treasury and a war to carry on, the regency could not afford to give up such valuable sources of revenue as the debts to the Jews, increments of the farms of counties, and the estates of intestates. A number of the changes made in various sections of the Great Charter were clearly due to the requirements of war. The constable of a castle had to get food for his garrison even if he had no money. In time of war a castle was no place for a widow. A royal official in need of carts could not consult the wishes of the owners—it was enough if he paid for them. The other changes were simply attempts to clarify and make more effective various provisions of the Great Charter. In this class belongs the amendment fixing the age of majority at twenty-one years and forbidding the minor to claim release from custody at an earlier age by getting himself knighted. The only puzzling omission of the new charter is that of the clause guaranteeing freedom of election to ecclesiastical positions. Probably this was considered a controversial issue and was settled by a private agreement between the regent and the legate. While the charter of 1216 carefully omitted the most important points of dispute between John and his barons, it guaranteed that practices which were generally recognized as abuses would not be revived. As a whole the document serves as a decided tribute to the statesmanship of its authors—the regent and the legate. Issued under their seals on November 12th, this document was a definite promise that the new king’s government would abjure John’s errors.

When John died at Newark, his treasury was empty, and William was faced with the necessity of finding money to pay the garrisons of the royal castles and the money fiefs granted by John to his soldiers. Michaelmas had come and gone, and the government was in arrears in all its payments. This desperate situation had weighed on William’s mind when he was debating whether or not to accept the regency and was John d’Erley’s main reason for counseling him to refuse it. In the solution

28 Hist., 15644-5, 15453-15457.
of this problem William showed admirably his energy and practical common sense. All the usual ways of raising money were out of the question, for the whole administration of the country was in hopeless confusion. William was obliged to look about him for extraordinary methods. The most obvious was to make use of the jewels and rich garments stored in the various royal castles. At Devizes Thomas de Sanford had in his custody a large collection of rings set with precious stones—eighteen with the finest emeralds, seventy-three with good emeralds, sixteen with ordinary ones, one hundred and eleven with sapphires, fifteen with diamonds, twenty-eight with rubies, and nine with garnets. Of these, seventy-three rings set with emeralds, twenty-three with sapphires, nine with garnets, and nineteen with rubies were given to Hubert de Burg to pay the garrison at Dover and buy supplies for the castle. The constables of Devizes and Windsor received six rings with rubies and seventeen with sapphires respectively for their garrisons. Other rings were given to the captains of mercenary troops to pay their men—for instance, to one twenty-three rings with sapphires and fifteen with diamonds to the value of five hundred and forty pounds. Then there lay in the royal castle of Corfe one hundred and nineteen garments of silk, twenty-nine of samite, and four rich baldekins from distant Bagdad. These were all used to make the Michaelmas payments on various money fiefs. Thus John Cretun and his brother Simon were accustomed to receive forty and twenty pounds respectively as money fiefs. The half of this sum, due at Michaelmas 1216, was paid by William by giving them thirteen silk garments. In this way all the store was distributed with the exception of one garment of silk and one of samite which were given to John Marshal who was to bear them to Worcester and there use them to cover John’s tomb. These collections of rings and rich garments were the reserve fund of the English crown, and William

\[\text{29} \quad \text{The exchequer had not sat since Michaelmas 1214. Naturally no regular taxes could be collected in the territory held by Louis, and in the rest of the country war had brought confusion.} \] 

used them unhesitatingly in the emergency with which he was faced.\textsuperscript{31}

As the sale of the royal treasure could not be expected to supply indefinitely the money needed by the government, the regent was forced to attempt to collect the ordinary and extraordinary revenues of the English crown. Considering the general confusion that reigned throughout the kingdom even in the districts not actually controlled by the enemy and the fact that Louis was in possession of the seat and records of the exchequer, this was no light undertaking. For the duration of the civil war the earl's wardrobe became for all practical purposes the royal exchequer.\textsuperscript{32} Whatever could be collected on the farms of counties, or fines made with King John, or on ransoms due from prisoners of war was paid to William directly and acknowledged by his receipt.\textsuperscript{33} Needless to say the resulting confusion between the earl's private revenues and those of the crown presented a nice problem for his executors. In the spring of 1217 the regent, probably after consultation with his colleagues, decided to attempt to raise money by taxation.\textsuperscript{34} Orders were issued for the collection of a hidage and carucage in all the counties south of the Humber which were not actually in Louis' possession.\textsuperscript{35} There is no evidence as to the success of this levy. In April William ordered Faulkes de Bréauté to give five hundred marks of the money collected in the counties which he controlled to Hubert de Burg for his garrison at Dover, but this may have represented merely a fond hope on the part of the regent.\textsuperscript{36} But whatever may have been the result of any single financial enterprise, the fact remains that William Marshal was able in the face of immense diffi-

\textsuperscript{31} This information is drawn from the accounts of William's executors entered on the Close Rolls. (\textit{Rot. Claus.}, I, 602-602b.)

\textsuperscript{32} in \textit{garderoba comitis W. Marescalli Patent Rolls}, I, 83.


\textsuperscript{35} \textit{Rot. Claus.}, I, 335b.

\textsuperscript{36} Patent Rolls, I, 56.
cultures to find enough money to bring the war to a successful conclusion. No better demonstration can be found of his resourcefulness, energy, and determination.

Scarcely less important than the raising of money was the winning back to their allegiance of Louis' English partisans. William undoubtedly hoped that the reissue of the charter and the knowledge that extremely generous treatment awaited repentant rebels would tempt many knights and barons from the enemy's camp. The regent used all his great personal influence to this end. He wrote to Reginald de Briouse, Hugh de Lacy, and other inveterate rebels begging them to return to the king's service and promising full restoration of their lands and privileges. He literally showered safe-conducts on all who showed any willingness to talk the question over with him in a personal interview. Agents were sent out with blanket letters of protection for all who would come to the king's peace through their influence. Unfortunately these measures had little effect. Military success appeared to be the only argument that had any weight with the French prince's partisans. From John's death to March 1217 only one baron of any importance, Warin fitz Gerold, deserted Louis. The successful campaign conducted by the regent in the latter month won over his son and Earl William of Salisbury. Despite his personal prestige and his generous offers, the regent could seduce Louis' supporters only by making his cause appear hopeless.

The success or failure of the regency depended primarily on its ability to crush the rebellion and to drive out the invader. In order to understand the plan of campaign by which William and his colleagues hoped to achieve this end, one must examine with some care the military situation at the time of John's death.

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87 Ibid., pp. 4, 34. Rot. Claus., I, 335.
89 Ibid., pp. 24-5.
40 Rot. Claus., I, 295.
41 Ibid., p. 299.
In doing this two distinct factors must be taken into account—the possession of fortresses, especially those of high strategic value, and the attitude of the feudal landholders. On the Kentish coast covering the shortest route from the continent stood the stronghold of Dover, the key to England. Under the command of the determined and capable Hubert de Burg, this castle had proved itself impregnable. Hubert's successful defence was materially assisted by a band of adventurers and peasants led by a certain William de Casingham who occupied the Weald of Kent and continually harassed the forces besieging Dover. The rest of the south-eastern counties were under Louis' domination. Not only did he hold most of the castles of Surrey, Sussex, and Hampshire with a western outpost at Marlborough in Wiltshire, but the great barons of the region, the earls of Salisbury, Arundel, and Warren, and Geoffrey de Say were his partisans. In the shires on the eastern coast between the Thames and the Tees the situation was more complicated. While the barons of these counties held the open country for Louis, the chief strongholds of East Anglia and Lincolnshire, Norwich, Orford, Colchester, Pleshy, Newark, Sleaford, and Lincoln, housed royalist garrisons. If the French prince could reduce these fortresses and gain possession of Dover, he would be master of the richest and most populous part of England.

Along the edge of the territory controlled by Louis lay a line of castles which blocked his advance toward the west. Corfe on the Dorset coast and Devizes in Wiltshire covered south-western England while Windsor guarded the valley of the Thames. The castles of the counties of Oxford, Buckingham, Bedford, Hertford, Cambridge, and Northampton were under

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43 For the castles see Histoire des ducs, pp. 181, 182, 189 and Hist., 15719-15743, 15889-16032. The names of the rebel barons can be found in the lists of reversis in the close rolls. The information as to their lands has been drawn from the records of the aid of 1217 supplemented by the inquests found in the Red Book of the Exchequer. For the former I am largely indebted to notes loaned me by Professor S. K. Mitchell. See also Petit-Dutaillis, Vie de Louis VIII, pp. 112-130 and Norgate, Minority of Henry III, pp. 17-18.
the command of that most capable of mercenary captains, Faulkes de Bréauté, and were defended by his castellans. Another staunch soldier of fortune, Philip Marc, held Nottingham. A large part of the feudal power of these counties was in rebellion. In the south, Dorsetshire and Wiltshire had followed the standard of their greatest magnate, Earl William of Salisbury. William Marshal had been unable to hold the loyalty of some of his own vassals of the honor of Striguil in this region. In the shires ruled by Faulkes lay vast fiefs pertaining to the baronies of David, earl of Huntingdon, and Earl Richard de Clare. Saher de Quency, earl of Winchester, held half the honor of Leicester with the castle of Mount Sorel. The real strength of the royal party lay in the west-central counties. Earl Ranulf of Chester completely dominated Staffordshire and Shropshire, while William de Ferrars controlled his own shire of Derby. Although Henry, earl of Warwick, gave little or no active support to Henry's cause, he remained formally loyal. In Herefordshire, Worcestershire, Gloucestershire, and the adjacent marches were the fiefs of such determined royalists as William Marshal, Walter de Lacy, Hugh and Robert de Mortimer, Walter de Clifford, and John of Monmouth. But even in this region the feudal landowners were not unanimously loyal. Although the nominal master of the honor of Gloucester, Richard de Clare, earl of Hertford, had probably not gained possession of it, many of its tenants were in the rebel ranks. Still more serious was the fact that this little strip of fairly loyal country was continually menaced by Louis' Welsh allies and the fiery Reginald de Briouse. As for the rest of England, the fortresses of the far north, Newcastle-on-Tyne and the castles of the see of Durham, were held for King Henry, but Alexander of Scotland had seized Carlisle. The south-western counties might be described as open-mindedly neutral. Robert de Courtenay, an important Devonshire baron, held Exeter castle

"See lists of conversis and reversis in Close Rolls. For instance John de St. Quintin and John Maltravers were rebels. (Rot. Claus., I, 300b). Both held of the honor of Striguil."
for Henry, but many of the magnates such as Henry fitz Count, a natural son of earl Reginald of Cornwall, were waiting to see what would happen.

The two great assets of the royal party were the possession of such strategic strongholds as Dover, Corfe, Windsor, and Lincoln and the military ability of its leaders. Under the able and determined command of castellans like Nichola de la Haye of Lincoln and Hubert de Burg of Dover these fortresses formed an almost insurmountable barrier to the conquest of England. Furthermore the loyal barons, though few in number, were almost to a man tried warriors. Ranulf of Chester and his fellow marchers had passed their lives fighting the Welsh. Faulkes de Bréauté, Philip Marc, and Engerrand de Cygony were experienced and capable mercenary captains. John Marshal and Philip d'Aubigni were among the hardiest of English barons. Peter des Roches, bishop of Winchester, was to prove himself skilful tactician. In the supreme command stood William Marshal. As far as experience was concerned, he outclassed all his subordinates. Born among the commotions of Stephen's reign, he had fought the French, the Welsh, the Irish, and probably the infidel. Except in his private wars with the Welsh and Irish about which we have no information, he had never had any opportunity to display strategic ability. His tactics were simple and direct—get at the enemy and hew him down. While his military reputation rested upon his personal prowess rather than upon his qualities as a general, his prestige was sufficient to insure the respect of his subordinates among whom were several excellent tacticians. In the campaign against Louis the regent was to prove himself a capable, though somewhat over cautious, strategist.

Despite the apparent strength of his position Louis of France was faced with serious obstacles the most important of which were the royal castles which continually threatened his communications and the utter incapacity of his English allies. The rebel barons had indicated their complete uselessness as soldiers by their hopeless inactivity in London before Louis' arrival—
they were to demonstrate it even more thoroughly at the battle of Lincoln. The French prince was forced to place all his reliance on his own knights and serjeants who were excellent soldiers but comparatively few in number. His plan of campaign was to secure his communications with France by capturing Dover and then turn his attention to the royal castles north of the Thames. He would consolidate his position in the eastern counties before attempting to advance toward the west. But Dover proved impregnable, and Louis was forced to conclude a local truce until Easter with Hubert de Burg. He was more successful in the second part of his plan. By the end of January he had taken Hertford, Berkhamstead, Cambridge, and all the castles of East Anglia. Some of these were reduced by siege operations, but others were surrendered as the price of short truces. Louis' control of eastern England from the channel to the Tees was impeded only by Dover and the Lincolnshire strongholds. At the close of his East Anglian campaign the French prince advanced on Lincoln. The city surrendered at once, but the castle under its hereditary castellan Dame Nichola de la Haye resisted all overtures. When he returned to London, Louis despatched Hugh, castellan of Arras, to assist Gilbert de Ghent, whom he had created earl of Lincoln, to reduce the chief fortress of his shire.

Meanwhile William had bided his time. The East Anglian castles, isolated in the very heart of the baronial rebellion, were of slight strategic value, and their garrisons could be used to better advantage elsewhere. As soon as Louis invested one of these fortresses, the regent would surrender it in exchange for a short truce. While the French prince amused himself in this manner, William concentrated his attention on securing the active support of the barons of Cornwall and Devon through successful negotiations with their leader, Henry fitz

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47 Histoire des ducs, p. 182.
48 For instance the men in Norwich and Orford were sent to Dover (Rot. Claus., I, 335b).
49 Hist., 15717-15746.
Count. Sometime early in February, Louis, who was anxious to go to France to confer with his father and to gather reinforcements, arranged with the regent for a suspension of hostilities until a month after Easter. This agreement was broken soon after it was made—in fact it seems doubtful whether William ever had any intention of observing it. The History asserts that the French were the first to violate the truce, and certainly the despatch of Hugh of Arras to besiege Lincoln was no peaceful manoeuvre, but the regent took advantage of the occasion to launch his first serious campaign. His plan seems to have been to cut Louis off from the sea and prevent his visit to France. He may even have hoped to effect the capture of the French prince on his way from London to the channel. Early in the second week of February Hubert de Burg and John Marshal were sent to support Philip d'Aubigni in his operations on the coasts of Sussex and Kent. Shortly before Louis reached Winchelsea on his way to the continent, Philip, supported by a fleet, captured Rye. Caught between the royalist forces holding the Weald and the army and fleet at Rye, Louis was in a desperate position. He was saved by the timely arrival of a French fleet and some of his knights who had hastened down from London. With these reinforcements the French prince recaptured Rye and on February 27th set sail for France. He left Engerand, lord of Coucy, in command of his French troops with orders to remain within the walls of London until his return.

The operations of Philip d'Aubigni were simply a part of William's plan of campaign. He probably hoped that Philip could keep Louis occupied until he himself could come up with the main royalist army. On February 17th the regent marched out of Gloucester at the head of all the troops he could muster and advanced through Oxford and Reading to Dorking. In a letter despatched from there to encourage the men of Rye he

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mentioned the presence in the host of the earls of Chester and Ferrars, the count of Aumale, Walter de Lacy and his fellow lords of the marches, the two mercenary captains Engerrand de Cygony and Faulkes de Bréauté, and a number of English barons. When this formidable array reached the coast, William learned that Rye had fallen and Louis escaped. His plan had failed, and he was forced to content himself with turning west into Hampshire and investing Louis’ castles in that county. During March and April the royalists gained possession of Chichester, Porchester, Southampton, Farnham, Winchester, and Marlborough.

On April 23rd Louis of France landed at Sandwich with a force of one hundred and forty knights. Three days later he was joined by the lord of Coucy with the main French army from London. The combined forces immediately set out to recover the ground lost during Louis' absence. William was in no position to dispute the enemy’s advance. As he had sent the earls of Chester and Ferrars, the count of Aumale, Robert de Vieuxpont, and Faulkes de Bréauté to support the castellans of Nottingham and Newark in an attack on the earl of Winchester’s castle of Mount Sorel, he had at his disposal only a part of the royalist field army. After dismantling all the captured castles except Marlborough and Farnham, the regent retired to Oxford. But despite its rather inglorious conclusion this spring campaign of William’s had not been utterly fruitless. Early in March as the regent marched from Shoreham to Farnham, he had been joined by two important members of Louis’ party—William Marshal the younger and Earl William of Salisbury. Although their conversion was secured at a high price in lands and privileges, it was decidedly worth the cost.

References:
67 Hist., 15873-15904.
69 Histoire des ducs, pp. 188-190.
70 Roger of Wendover, II, 208.
William Longsword was not only the king's uncle and a dominant figure in southern England, but he was practically the only man of military capacity among Louis' English allies. His return to Henry's allegiance added a valuable captain to the royal party and served as an excellent example to others. During the month of March over a hundred barons and knights, mostly from the counties of Wilts, Berks, Dorset, and Somerset, deserted the French prince's cause.

On April 28th as Louis lay before Farnham, Saher de Quency came to him to beg succor for his castle of Mount Sorel which was about to surrender to the earls of Chester and Ferrars. Louis gave him six hundred knights of which seventy were Frenchmen under the command of the count of Perche. The English knights who formed the bulk of the army were led by the earl of Winchester, Robert fitz Walter, and other rebel barons. As soon as Earl Ranulf learned of the approach of this relieving force, he raised the siege of Mount Sorel and retired to Nottingham. After reinforcing and provisioning the castle, Earl Saher and the count of Perche marched eastwards to join Hugh of Arras and Gilbert de Ghent who were besieging the citadel of Lincoln. Meanwhile, Prince Louis had concentrated his forces in Kent for a new attack upon Dover. He had brought over from France a great siege engine with which he hoped to reduce the stubborn "key to England."

The French prince had committed a serious strategic error. As his own army and that under the earl of Winchester were each perfectly able to cope with the royalist troops opposing them, the division of his forces was not in itself unsafe, but he should have watched William's movements instead of completely ignoring him. The regent on his side probably lacked definite information about his enemy's manoeuvres. He knew that a large force had gone north, but he was not certain

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**Ibid.,** pp. 299-304.

**Roger of Wendover, II, 209. Histoire des ducs, pp. 190-1.**


**Histoire des ducs, pp. 188, 192. Hist., 16085-16089.**
whether or not Louis was in command of it. In order to keep in
touch with the situation William left Oxford and advanced to
Northampton. With him were the young king, the legate, the
bishop of Winchester, young William Marshal, the earl of
Salisbury, John Marshal, Philip d'Aubigni, and a few other
loyal barons. Apparently Walter de Lacy and his fellow
marchers had returned home, possibly to watch the Welsh.
Although the regent's mobile force was probably very small,
he could in case of need draw on the garrisons of the royal
castles which dotted the surrounding shires.

At Northampton William learned of the relief of Mount
Sorel and the concentration of the enemy before Lincoln. He
also received positive information that Louis had divided his
forces and that he was not with the northern army. The
regent immediately saw the possibilities of the situation. The
earls of Chester and Ferrars with the loyal lords of the north
were at Nottingham. In many a royal castle around about were
hardy knights and serjeants. These scattered royalist bands
could be mustered near Lincoln before Louis could learn of his
friends' plight, much less go to their aid. On May 13th couriers
rode out of Northampton to summon King Henry's men to
assemble at Newark. Six days later the host was ready to take
the field. The History gives its strength as four hundred and
six knights and three hundred and seventeen crossbowmen. Roger of Wendover estimates the crossbowmen at two hun-
dred and fifty, but adds that the small number of knights was
compensated for by an unusually large complement of ser-
jeants. The chivalry of England was in the rebel camp, and the
royalist leaders were forced to fill its place with mercenary
soldiers.

The city of Lincoln occupied the crest and southern slope of a
hill rising to the north of the junction of the Foss Dyke and the

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A ROYALIST GENERAL

68 Rot. Claus, I, 308-308b.
69 These names were obtained by subtracting those known to have been with
the earl of Chester from the list in Roger of Wendover, II, 212.
70 Hist., 16115-16123. 71 Ibid., 16263-16270. Roger of Wendover, II, 212.
river Witham. It consisted of two fairly distinct parts—the old Roman camp on the summit and the lower town built on the hillside. The castle stood in the southwest angle of the Roman town and communicated with the open country on the west. The direct route from Newark approached Lincoln from the south, but to attempt to cross the Witham and climb the steep hill leading to the Roman town in the face of the enemy would have been a foolhardy venture. To avoid this William decided to make a detour to Torksey and approach the town from the west. Before the troops left Newark, the legate granted them plenary absolution and solemnly reiterated the excommunication of Louis and all his partisans, especially those who were in Lincoln. Gualo and the boy king then retired to the shelter of Nottingham castle, while the crusaders, for such they were in the eyes of Rome, set out for Torksey.  

On Saturday morning, May 20th, the army was drawn up for its final march on Lincoln. The regent in a long harangue impressed on his men the advantage of their position. They could not lose. If they fell in battle, they were assured of places in paradise. If they gained the victory, they won glory for themselves and their descendants. The enemy was excommunicate—their dead were certainly doomed to hell's fires. With this pious exhortation ringing in their ears, the troops moved towards Lincoln, joyfully as if to a tourney. The exact order of march is not quite clear. Apparently there was an advance guard of crossbowmen and mounted sergeants probably led by Faulkes de Breaute. The rest of the army formed four divisions under the respective commands of the earl of Chester, the regent, William of Salisbury, and Peter des Roches. As William expected the enemy to sally out and

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72 Ibid., p. 213. Hist., 16225-16237.  
73 Ibid., 16239-16242.  
74 Ibid., 16277-16310.  
75 Ibid., 16311-16330. Roger of Wendover, II, 213-4. In lines 16314-16316 the History asserts that Peter des Roches led the crossbowmen, but in lines 16259-16261 it places him in command of the fourth division of the army. Faulkkes led the crossbowmen in the actual battle (Roger of Wendover, II, 215).  
76 Hist., 16243-16261.
attack him in the open country, probably as the army mounted the hill on which Lincoln stood, he issued his orders accordingly. At the appearance of the enemy the crossbowmen were to deploy and shoot down their horses. The two hundred mounted serjeants of the vanguard were to slay their own horses to form a barrier against the charge of the hostile cavalry. The regent realized that if the enemy issued from the city and occupied the high ground to the west of the castle, they would have an immense advantage. Charging down the hill with their superior number of knights, they would have every chance for victory. William's only hope would rest in breaking up their advance before they reached his main divisions.

As the royal army approached Lincoln along the road which followed the Foss Dyke, the earl of Winchester and Robert fitz Walter rode out to reconnoitre. They reported to the count of Perche that while the enemy were drawn up in excellent battle array, they were far inferior in numbers to the combined French and baronial forces. They advised the course which William was expecting—a battle in the open field as the royalists climbed toward the castle. But the French commander was unwilling to rely on the accuracy of this report, and he himself went out to view the advancing host. According to Roger of Wendover the count was deceived by the fact that each English baron had two banners—one with his troops and another with his baggage. Be that as it may, he decided against an encounter in the open. By remaining within the city walls he hoped to be able to reduce the castle before the relieving army could lend it effective aid. So certain was he that William would not dare to assault the walls that he practically ignored the advancing host. Stationing a few men to guard the city gates, he concentrated the rest of his force against the castle. This decision of the count of Perche really settled the result of the battle—it was a fatal blunder. Even if William failed to pierce the city ramparts, he could easily reinforce the

garrison of the castle. If he did succeed in carrying the walls, the battle would be fought in the narrow streets of the town where the count could make no effective use of his superior number of knights.

The regent did not fail to use the apparent cowardice of the enemy to encourage his own men. "Lords, your sworn foes have placed themselves behind their walls. That is according to God’s plan. This day He gives us great glory. It is a preliminary victory for us that the French, who always have been the first at a tournament, hide from us. Let us do the right, for God wills it." This use of the crusaders’ war cry to hearten the men who were marching against the excommunicate disturbers of England’s peace was a magnificent gesture. In fact William’s delightful confidence in the efficacy of God’s favor seemed highly justified. Nothing but the Divine Will could really explain the tactics of the count of Perche.

As soon as the regent was certain that the enemy did not intend to sally from the city, he sent John Marshal ahead to converse with the garrison of the castle. After talking with the deputy constable and assuring himself that troops could be sent into the castle through its postern gate, he returned to report to his uncle. By that time the whole army was drawn up on the high ground to the west and northwest of the Roman town. Bishop Peter of Winchester at the head of a body of crossbowmen approached the castle wall and leaving his men outside, entered by the postern. After conversing with Dame Nichola and her deputy, he surveyed the situation from the walls of the fortress which gave him a clear view of the upper town and the disposition of the enemy’s forces. Either while on his way to the castle or while he looked down from the ramparts, he noticed the old west gate of Lincoln which lay just to the north of the castle and had been loosely blocked with masonry. Slipping out of the fortress by a postern on the northern side, the bishop examined this gate and found that it could be easily opened. He then returned to report to his commander.

79 Ibid., 16381-16400. 80 Ibid., 16413-16466. 81 Ibid., 16467-16534.
Bishop Peter advised the regent to send a force into the castle to keep the enemy occupied by a sally from its main portal while the rest of the army forced its way into the town through the unguarded west gate. This mission was entrusted to Faulkes de Bréauté with the knights of his household and all the crossbowmen. Meanwhile, the first division of the army, which was commanded by the headstrong earl of Chester, had grown tired of waiting and had attacked the north gate of the city. This manoeuvre disgusted Bishop Peter. "They have not found the unguarded gate which I told you of," said he to the regent, "There is a breach that the enemy does not know of; come, I will lead you to it." The old earl's patience was exhausted. Ranulf of Chester was hammering at the north gate, and Faulkes was sallying out of the castle while he stood inactive. "By the lance of God! My helm," he cried. Peter calmed his fervor and persuaded him to go forward with ten knights to reconnoitre the breach before advancing with his whole division. The bishop wished to be certain that the men whom he had ordered to open the west gate had completed their task. As William rode toward the walls, some of Faulkes' men, whose sally from the castle had been severely repulsed, rushed out through the recently unblocked gate with the enemy in hot pursuit. The earl promptly forgot that he was reconnoitring. "Charge! they will soon be conquered. Shame to him who delays longer," he cried to his little group of knights. Again Peter counselled patience—he should wait for his whole division. William refused to listen to him. He was about to spur forward into the breach when a squire reminded him that he had not yet donned his helmet. After putting this finishing touch to his armament, the old knight dashed through the breach into the ranks of the enemy while the bishop rode at his shoulder shouting, "Ca! Dieu aide au Maréchal!" Behind

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82 Roger of Wendover, II, 215.
83 Ibid., 216.
86 Ibid., 16556-16566. 87 Ibid., 16577-16628.
their leader pressed the knights and serjeants of the second, third, and fourth divisions of the royal army.\textsuperscript{88}

The battle of Lincoln was a grand tourney fought up and down the narrow streets of the city. The troops who occupied the upper town were caught between three fires. While Faulkes' crossbowmen raked their ranks from the castle ramparts, William and his followers poured through the breach, and Ranulf of Chester forced his way in by the north gate.\textsuperscript{89}

After a series of jousts in the streets in which the French were consistently worsted, the count of Perche rallied the remnant of his knights in the open place by the cathedral. Holding the summit of a small mound, he managed to keep his enemies at a distance. Finally William himself led a charge against the count's position. While the regent seized the bridle of his horse, Reginald Croc, a knight of Faulkes' household, ran his lance neatly through the eyehole of his helmet. The count of Perche was mortally wounded, but before he fell he launched three terrific blows at William's helm with such force that they left permanent dents. The loss of their leader discouraged the French. They retreated down the hill into the lower town where they rallied once more and attempted to recapture the Roman city. This effort was a complete failure, and driven back in confusion, the French and rebels were forced to make their escape as best they could through the southern gates of the city.\textsuperscript{90}

The battle of Lincoln was a decisive and almost bloodless

\textsuperscript{88} The author of the History avows his confusion as to the details of the battle of Lincoln (Hist., 16401-16412). Modern historians are equally uncertain. Oman, The Art of War in the Middle Ages, I, 412, 418. Norgate, Minority of Henry III, pp. 37-45; Tout, The Fair of Lincoln, in the English Historical Review (April, 1903). Any consistent account of the battle must be based partially at least on presumptions.

\textsuperscript{89} It is not certain that the army attacked the walls at two points. Roger of Wendover describes the assault on the north gate (II, 216). The bishop seems to have led William to an undefended breach in the walls (Hist., 16542-16553). These two accounts may describe the same operation, but this seems improbable.

\textsuperscript{90} Hist., 16629-16828. Roger of Wendover, II, 215-216.
victory. The count of Perche, an unknown serjeant, and the English knight Reginald Croc were the only men killed in actual combat, though many of the fleeing infantry were slaughtered by the people of the countryside.\textsuperscript{91} Forty-six rebel barons and three hundred knights were captured. Among the prisoners were the earls of Winchester and Hereford, Gilbert de Ghent, Robert fitz Walter, Richard de Muntfichet, William de Mowbrai, and William de Beauchamp.\textsuperscript{92} Only two Englishmen of rank made good their escape, William de Mandeville, earl of Essex, and John de Lacy, constable of Chester. Three French barons made their way to London.\textsuperscript{93} The whole affair must have been eminently satisfactory to William. The battle itself had been of a kind to gladden his knightly heart. In a day filled with jousts and gallant deeds of prowess few good men had lost their lives. Louis' cause was irreparably injured. God had favored his chosen warriors. But a fair share of the credit must be given to the regent. While his success was primarily due to the mistakes of Louis and the count of Perche, he knew how to make the most of their errors. He had recognized his opportunity, laid his plan, and carried it out with skill and determination. He may not have displayed any signs of military genius, but he completely justified his reputation as a competent commander and a brave knight.

When Louis learned of the defeat of his forces at Lincoln, he raised the siege of Dover and retired to London.\textsuperscript{94} William on his side was prompt to follow up his victory. Before he left Lincoln, he ordered his army to reassemble at Chertsey in two weeks time in the hope that a show of force would persuade Louis to come to terms.\textsuperscript{95} His hopes were not in vain. The French prince sent the counts of Brittany and Nevers to Chertsey to open negotiations with the regent.\textsuperscript{96} On June 12th four members of Louis' council met four members of Henry's be-

\textsuperscript{91} Ibid., pp. 215, 219.
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid., p. 217. See Norgate, Minority of Henry III, p. 44.
\textsuperscript{93} Histoire des dues, p. 195. 
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid. 
\textsuperscript{95} Hist., 17059-17062. 
\textsuperscript{96} Patent Rolls, I, 68.
between Brentford and Hounslow. These negotiators succeeded in drawing up a treaty which was satisfactory to everyone except the legate. He was unwilling to allow Louis' ecclesiastical partisans to share the general amnesty provided for by the proposed treaty. As Louis refused to desert his supporters among the English clergy, the negotiations came to nothing. Gualo wished to attack London immediately, but the laymen were unwilling to follow his advice. The city was strong and Louis' troops though few in number were the pick of the chivalry of France. Besides, time was working in favor of the royalists. Discouraged by the battle of Lincoln, the earls of Arundel and Warren, Reginald de Briouse, and over a hundred and fifty other knights and barons returned to King Henry's allegiance during the months of June and July. Louis' only chance for an eventual victory rested in the arrival of reinforcements from France. Although Philip Augustus had too much respect for the power of Rome to aid his son openly, he allowed his daughter-in-law, the indomitable Blanche of Castille, to raise what forces she could to send to her husband. Blanche finally mustered at Calais a picked body of knights and serjeants which included a prince of Capetian blood, Robert de Courtenay, and the illustrious warrior William des Barres the younger. The authorities differ greatly as to the total strength of Blanche's levy. The estimate of one hundred knights furnished by the Histoire des Ducs de Normandie is most acceptable. A hundred noble cavalry with their serjeants would go a long way towards replacing the men lost at Lincoln.

When William learned of the imminent arrival of this new

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97 Ibid., p. 69.
99 Ibid., p. 199.
100 Rot. Claus., I, 310-317b.
101 Histoire des ducs, pp. 198, 200-1.
102 Ibid., p. 198. This is consistent with the same authority's statement that thirty-six knights were in the flag-ship of the fleet, and that there were three other ship-loads of knights (ibid., pp. 200-1).
103 six ships full of serjeants (ibid.).
army, he was profoundly disturbed. His anxiety was increased by the fact that he was probably ignorant of its numbers. One is tempted to believe that Roger of Wendover's estimate of three hundred knights represents the regent's apprehension.\footnote{Roger of Wendover, II, 221.}

If Louis was to be brought to terms, his reinforcements must be intercepted. Three hundred knights might enable him to conquer England—one hundred would allow him to prolong the war indefinitely. On August 24th William mustered his army and fleet at Sandwich.\footnote{Hist., 17167-17196; 17262-17280. Rot. Claus., I, 320.} This in itself was a decided triumph, for the mariners of the Cinque Ports had suffered much from John's tyranny and had no great desire to risk their lives and property in the service of his son. Only the regent's assurance that they would be indemnified for their losses persuaded them to answer the summons to the host. The morning was so clear that the English could easily discern the approaching French fleet, led by the flagship under the command of that master pirate, Eustace the Monk.\footnote{Hist., 17281-17291.} When the mariners, who were at best far from enthusiastic, saw the enemy's formidable array, they fled from their ships in terror, but William finally persuaded them to return.\footnote{Ibid., 17232-17252. Roger of Wendover, II, 221.} The regent was anxious to take command of the knights and serjeants who were to do the actual fighting once the mariners had brought them alongside the enemy. The other leaders dissuaded him from his purpose—his life was too valuable to risk in so hazardous a combat.\footnote{Hist., 17197-17210; 17253-17261. Chronica Maiora, III, 28.} Matthew Paris' implication that William stayed ashore because he believed that a ship was no decent place for a knight is almost certainly unjust. Matthew was simply engaged in increasing the fame of Hubert de Burg who was in command of the fleet during the battle. The old earl would naturally scorn a combat at sea because it gave no opportunity for demonstrations of knightly prowess, but his whole record shows that
in his opinion any battle was better than none. Standing on the shore, William encouraged the mariners and soldiers in the ships. God had just given them a great victory on land, but He has, on the sea as well as on the land, the power to aid the virtuous. Once more He would assist his own. They would triumph over the enemies of God.\footnote{Hist., 17313-17328.}

The battle was a decisive victory for the English.\footnote{See H. L. Cannon in English Historical Review XXVII (1912), 649-670. Norgate, Minority of Henry III, pp. 49-54. Petit-Dutaillis, Vie de Louis VIII, pp. 166-168.} All but fifteen of the French vessels were taken or destroyed and thirty-two men of rank were made prisoners. The less important members of the French force were pitilessly slaughtered by the mariners and serjeants.\footnote{Hist., 17573-4. Roger of Wendover, II, 222.} After sending his prisoners to Dover castle, the regent superintended the division of the spoils of battle. A part of the plunder was set aside to endow a hospital dedicated to St. Bartholomew, patron saint of the day of battle, and the remainder was divided among the mariners.\footnote{Hist., 17527-17576.}

The news of the destruction of his reinforcements reached Louis at London on August 26. As he fully realized that this disaster meant the end of his hopes of conquering England, he sent Count Robert of Dreux to learn if the regent would consider making peace. Holding Robert of Dreux as a hostage, William sent Robert de Courtenay, who had been captured at Sandwich, to bear his answer to Louis. Apparently the reply was favorable, for the French prince promptly requested a personal interview with the regent.\footnote{Hist., 17535-17576.} There was a difference of opinion in the royal camp as to the best course to pursue. Some were unwilling to negotiate with Louis and wished to lay siege to London in the hope of capturing his entire army. Others urged William to hasten the departure of the French even if he had to resort to bribery.\footnote{Histoire de ducs, p. 202.} The regent seems to have hesitated between these opposing views. On September 1st he

\footnote{Hist., 17635-17670.}
ordered the barons of the Cinque Ports to concentrate their ships in the Thames. This manoeuvre may have been intended as a sop to the belligerent party or as a threat to force the enemy to terms. At any rate, William and Hubert de Burg conferred with Louis near London, and the latter expressed his willingness to accept any terms that were consistent with his honor. By Monday, September 11th, the royalist leaders had prepared a draft of the proposed treaty.

The terms offered Louis differed in only one important particular from those which had been agreed upon during the negotiations in June—the French prince's ecclesiastical partisans were excepted from the general amnesty and abandoned to the gentle mercies of the legate. Louis was to release his English supporters from their oaths of allegiance to him. When the rebels had given security in the form of oaths and charters to Henry III for their future behavior, they were to receive their lands as they had held them before the war and were to enjoy all the liberties guaranteed by the charter of 1216. All prisoners taken by either side since Louis' first landing in England were to be freed. Those captured before that date were to be released if three men chosen from Louis' council by the royalist leaders swore that they were in the prince's service when they were made prisoners. The money paid for ransoms was to be retained. If a prisoner had arranged to pay his ransom in installments, he was to make good all arrears, but future payments were cancelled. The debts due to Louis were to be paid. The French prince was to direct his allies, the king of Scotland and the Welsh, to surrender the lands, castles, and prisoners which they had taken in the course of the war. Louis and such of his vassals as Henry's council should designate were to guarantee their observance of the treaty by oaths and charters. Louis

116 Patent Rolls, I, 89.
would do his best to obtain papal confirmation of the agreement. In short the French would leave England, and conditions there would be restored to the status quo ante bellum. The rebel barons who had stood by Louis to the end would be accorded the same treatment as those who had deserted his cause earlier. The treaty was a generous and statesmanlike document.

In addition to the treaty itself there were a number of supplementary agreements. The provision for the release of Louis and his partisans from their sentence of excommunication was a natural part of the peace treaty and probably owed its omission from the official draft solely to the fact that it was considered a private arrangement with the legate. But William apparently hoped to do more than merely liquidate the baronial revolt and the French invasion. He aspired to establish formal peace between the French and English kings by settling the most important point at issue between them. With this end in view he induced Louis to promise that he would do his best to persuade his father to give Henry the lands which he had taken from John. The regent seems to have believed that Philip might actually surrender the continental possessions of the house of Anjou. Soon after the conclusion of peace he showed his own good faith by giving a number of Normans their English fiefs, but within a month he grew discouraged and ordered that no Norman should receive his lands in England until the English obtained theirs in Normandy. Whether or not he ever had any serious intention of fulfilling his promise, Louis recognized it as an integral part of his agreement with the English government. When he ascended the throne of France in 1223, he felt obliged to justify his retention of the Angevin fiefs by claiming that the English had themselves failed to observe the treaty of 1217. Although it was destined to have no effect, the securing of this promise from the French

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120 Roger of Wendover, II, 224.
121 *Rot. Claus.*, I, 329.
prince was a decided diplomatic triumph for William. Unfortunately he was forced to buy the concession at a high price. The regency agreed to pay Louis ten thousand marks to indemnify him for the expenses which he had incurred in his invasion of England.\textsuperscript{123} A merchant of St. Omer, Florence the Rich, advanced three-fifths of this sum, and William pledged his lands in Normandy as security for the loan.\textsuperscript{124} While the paying of an indemnity to a defeated enemy at a time when the financial situation of the government was almost desperate seems of very doubtful wisdom, the regent undoubtedly believed that it was a fair price for Louis' promise in regard to the English lands on the continent. The mistake of the English government lay in the fact that the indemnity was actually paid.\textsuperscript{125} William had exchanged hard cash for promises.

The regent had treated the defeated invader with extreme generosity. The next generation was to misinterpret his motives and accuse him of treason. In 1241 Henry III told Walter Marshal that it was known that his father had acted as a traitor in neglecting to capture Louis.\textsuperscript{126} Matthew Paris voices the same charge in one of his additions to the chronicle of Roger of Wendover. When Philip Augustus heard of the battle of Lincoln, he asked the messenger, "Does William Marshal still live?" "Yes." "Then I do not fear for my son," replied the king. For this reason, says Matthew, William was thereafter known as a traitor.\textsuperscript{127} The History gives a far different account of Philip's opinion of the regent. When the French king learned of the battle of Lincoln, he asked if John was dead. "Yes," replied the messenger, "his son is already crowned, and the Marshal is devoted to his defence." "Then we have nothing to gain in England. The land is lost to Louis, and after a while he and his partisans will be driven out since the Marshal


\textsuperscript{124} Patent Rolls, I, 114-5.

\textsuperscript{125} Ibid., p. 168. Rot. Clau., I, 381b, 388b, 415.

\textsuperscript{126} Matthew Paris, Chronica Maiora, IV, 157.

\textsuperscript{127} Ibid., III, 25-6.
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has taken the matter in hand." 128 This supposed conversation is evidently misplaced. John died eight months before the battle of Lincoln, and Louis visited France in the interval. The author either knew or chose to invent Philip’s comment when he heard of John’s death. One cannot but wonder whether he did not place it after the battle of Lincoln in order to combat some such rumor as the one to which Paris gave credence. The History also reports the words of Philip when he heard of the naval battle. "Lords, have I not said that if the Marshal mixed in this affair, Louis and his cause would be ruined." 129 Of course none of these conversations can be taken very seriously by the historian. Matthew Paris, who wrote after 1235, was obviously making use of a current rumor. The author of the History might possibly have known what Philip actually said. In 1219 Richard Marshal was at the French court and he may have transmitted to the author the current reports as to Philip’s words on these two occasions. 130 Be that as it may, the remarks of Matthew Paris prove that William’s generosity to Louis had left a stain on his reputation.

While this rumor of William’s treason was undoubtedly untrue, one can understand how it came into being. As far back as 1205 Hubert Walter had suspected William Marshal of being overly friendly to Philip Augustus. This idea had rankled in John’s mind for several years and was the basic cause of his quarrel with the earl. When Louis had been bottled up in London and his reinforcements destroyed, the regent had chosen to negotiate instead of besieging the city and capturing the French prince with all his men. Finally he had given ten thousand marks for a rather chimerical hope of recovering the English fiefs on the continent. But the most that the impartial observer can charge against William is excess of caution and error of judgement. Louis had in London a strong force of picked knights, the flower of the chivalry of France. The citizens were devoted to his cause. A siege would have taken much time and cost many men. Considering the state of England, one can

128 Hist., 17085-17108.  129 Ibid., 17609-17616.  130 Ibid., 19120.
easily understand William's decision to make peace at once. Possibly the regent was too ambitious in his scheme to regain Normandy by diplomacy, but if he had succeeded it would have been the fairest star in his crown. On the whole the treaty of 1217 reflects nothing but credit on William's statesmanship.

Louis of France had withdrawn from England, and the rebel barons had submitted to their rightful monarch—the most arduous part of William's task was completed. The decision to issue a charter of liberties and its actual contents showed that the regent possessed definite qualities of statesmanship. The energetic and effective measures by which he raised sufficient money to pay his troops and carry on the war demonstrated his administrative ability. His conduct of the campaign against Louis confirmed his reputation as a brave soldier and a thoroughly competent captain. His generous terms to the defeated rebels displayed his ripe wisdom. But these were merely the outward manifestations of his real achievement. He had secured the co-operation and obedience of haughty and turbulent barons such as Ranulf of Chester and Walter de Lacy, of ambitious officials such as Peter des Roches and Hubert de Burg, and of ruthless mercenary captains like Faulkes de Bréauté and Philip Marc. This triumph of pure force of personality is probably William Marshal's greatest claim to fame.