The Defense of Berlin

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ALLIED DISCUSSIONS ON POSTWAR GERMANY began in Moscow in mid-December, 1941. The occasion was hardly propitious. Hitler's invasion of Russia was then less than six months old, and the great German offensive which began on June 22 already had ground its way to within sight of the Kremlin. Only the week before it had been halted, and elements of the Fourth Army of Field Marshal von Kluge were still lodged in the city's western suburbs; foreign embassies and legations had been evacuated, and victory seemed within the Nazi grasp.¹

Elsewhere, the tide also was running against the Allies. In the North Atlantic, Hitler's submarines were taking a dreadful toll of Allied shipping. In Africa, El Alamein was almost a year ahead. In the Pacific, the wreckage of Pearl Harbor was less than two weeks old. American forces were in retreat in the Philippines, the garrisons at Guam and Wake Island were under sustained attack, the fall of Singapore and the invasion of the Dutch East Indies were imminent.

It was in this context—on December 16, 1941—that British Foreign
Secretary Anthony Eden arrived in Moscow to discuss future Allied co-operation. Much to his surprise, Eden quickly learned that the Soviet government had other considerations in mind. At his first meeting with Marshal Stalin on the afternoon of December 16, the Soviet Premier launched into a discussion of Russian territorial expectations once Germany was defeated. The question of whether Germany would be defeated, ironically seems not to have entered the Communist dictator's mind.

In particular, Stalin was interested in Russia's western boundary. The war, he advised Eden, already had cost Russia untold suffering for which she would have to be compensated. The future boundary between Poland and the Soviet Union, Stalin said, must be based on the old Curzon line of 1919, meaning that Russia would retain almost all of that part of eastern Poland overrun in 1939. The portion of Finland taken by Russia in 1940, the Baltic states, and the Rumanian province of Bessarabia also were to remain within the Soviet Union after the war. In addition, Stalin told his British guest that extraterritorial arrangements for Soviet military forces would have to be concluded with Finland and Rumania, and that East Prussia, at least as far as Koenigsberg, would be annexed directly. As subsequent events have made clear, Stalin's demands that bleak December day offer a surprisingly accurate forecast of the shape of things to come.

Eden reported Russian territorial desires to Prime Minister Churchill, who was then en route to Washington for a meeting with President Roosevelt. The American government, or at least the State Department, was also informed.

On December 20, Churchill replied to Eden from the Duke of York in mid-Atlantic. The Prime Minister's message indicates his feeling for the sensibilities of his American ally. Said Churchill:

* Mr. Llewellyn Thompson, then Second Secretary of the American Embassy in Moscow, had remained behind when the rest of the Embassy was evacuated. During the course of the Eden-Stalin discussions (December 16–28, 1941) he was kept informed of their general drift by the British Embassy. Eden's reports to London were also shown to American Ambassador John G. Winant. See U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States—Diplomatic Papers, 1941*, Vol. I (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1958), pp. 198–205.

** Washington had learned of the plans for Eden's visit to Moscow on December 4. When informed, Secretary of State Cordell Hull became concerned that Eden might be led into a commitment on Soviet territorial demands. Accordingly, on December 5, and with the approval of the President, he cabled Ambassador Winant in London to advise Eden that the United States felt it would be a mistake to con-
1. Naturally you will not be rough on Stalin. We are bound to the United States not to enter into secret and special pacts. To approach President Roosevelt with these proposals would be to court a blank refusal, and might cause lasting trouble on both sides.

2. The strategic security of Russia on her Western border will be one of the objects of the Peace Conference. . . . The separation of Prussia from South Germany, and the actual definition of Prussia itself, will be one of the greatest issues to be decided. But all of this lies in a future which is uncertain and probably remote. We have now to win the war by a hard and prolonged struggle. To raise such issues publicly now would only be to rally all Germans round Hitler.

3. Even to raise them informally with President Roosevelt at this time would, in my opinion, be inexpedient. This is the line I should take [with Stalin], thus avoiding any abrupt or final closing of interviews. . . .

There is no indication of whether President Roosevelt was informed of Stalin's demands. As Churchill's cable suggests, Mr. Roosevelt preferred to postpone postwar settlements until victory had been won. In this he was supported both by Secretary of State Hull and the military chiefs of staff.

For over a year following Eden's visit to Moscow the question of postwar Germany lay dormant. It was revived briefly by President Roosevelt at Casablanca in January, 1943, when he announced the doctrine of "Unconditional Surrender." But the phrase "unconditional surrender" was extremely vague as to future Allied aims and quite likely was announced by President Roosevelt deliberately to remove...
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the question of specific postwar demands from Allied discussions. The effect of this action was to conceal Allied differences regarding Germany for almost another year.4

Two months after Casablanca, Anthony Eden arrived in Washington for further consultations. In the series of conferences which followed, President Roosevelt advised Eden that American troops would remain in Germany after the war as part of an Allied occupation force. This marked the first time that the President actually had committed the United States to take part in Germany's occupation and Eden replied he was glad to hear it.5

Harry Hopkins' notes of Eden's visit include an entry dated March 17, 1943, reporting a tea attended by Eden, Secretary of State Hull, himself and the President, in the President's study. According to Hopkins:

We discussed, for some time, the question of precisely what our procedure in Germany during the first six months after the collapse of Germany should be.

I said I thought there was no understanding between Great Britain, Russia and ourselves as to which armies would be where and what kind of administration should be developed. I said that unless we acted promptly and surely I believed one of two things would happen—either Germany would go Communist or an out and out anarchic state would set in. . . . I said I thought it required some kind of formal agreement and that the State Department should work out the plan with the British and the one agreed upon between us should then be discussed with the Russians. The President agreed that this procedure should be followed.6

Seven months after Eden's visit to Washington, the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Great Britain, and Russia convened in Moscow for their first meeting. In spite of Hopkins' suggestion, however, the American and British positions on postwar Germany still had not been co-ordinated. To a large extent, official Washington at this time shared President Roosevelt's opinion that postwar settlements should be postponed until later. Joint Anglo-American planning toward Germany therefore had been neglected in favor of the more pressing military matters then at hand. What few efforts had been made were largely directed toward the creation of ad hoc advisory committees and reflected little overall co-ordination.*

* At the time of America's entry into the war, an "interdivisional" policy committee on postwar problems was established within the Department of State. In
The Moscow Conference was designed as a preliminary to the first meeting of the Big Three, scheduled to be held in Tehran the following month, and may legitimately be said to mark the beginning of three-power planning toward Germany. On October 17, 1943, the day the Conference began, Secretary Hull gave a tentative draft of so-called Basic Principles Regarding Germany's Surrender to Russian Foreign Minister Molotov, saying: "This is not a formal United States proposal but something to show a slant of mind. It is just a personal suggestion you and I can talk about. Then, if you like, we can talk to Eden about it and see what he thinks. I can make the proposal mine, or you can make it yours." 7

For the most part, Hull's suggestions were exceedingly general. Germany was to be occupied by all three nations but no mention was made of how this was to take place. No zonal boundaries were proposed and no mention was made of Berlin. The question of Germany's postwar frontiers was touched on in one sentence: "This is a matter which should come within the purview of a general settlement." 8

The Moscow Conference made little effort to reach concrete agreement on Hull's recommendations. Eden told Hull he thought the proposals were well drawn but needed further analysis. For this purpose, he suggested the formation of a tripartite commission, known as the European Advisory Commission (EAC), to consider the problems of conquered enemy countries in greater detail. The Commission, as Eden proposed it, was to be primarily a negotiating body and its recommendations were to be presented to the Big Three for final decision. 9

Eden's suggestion was quickly agreed to and the European Advisory Commission began functioning shortly after it was approved at Tehran the following month. Although it later became the scene of a bitter jurisdictional dispute, it was in the EAC that the final zonal arrangement in Germany was actually drafted.

Following the Moscow Conference, planning for Germany took on a greater importance. On November 13, 1943, two weeks after the close

1942, President Roosevelt appointed a special public advisory committee on post-war problems under the sponsorship of the Council on Foreign Relations. Neither of these groups were favored with Administration interest, however, and their findings, at least until late 1943, seldom reached the upper levels of government. See especially Harley A. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation: 1939-1945, U.S. Department of State Publication 3580 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949).
of the Foreign Ministers' meeting, President Roosevelt embarked for Tehran from Hampton Roads, Virginia, on the battleship USS Iowa. In addition to Harry Hopkins and the President's personal staff, the Iowa's passengers included Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Ernest King, the President's personal Chief of Staff, Admiral William D. Leahy, General H. H. Arnold, then Chief of the Army Air Force, and sixty other military staff planners. Neither Secretary of State Hull nor any of the other State Department participants in the Moscow Conference were present.¹⁰

The long sea cruise across the Atlantic was intended to allow the President sufficient time to discuss the major issues of global strategy with his military staff prior to meeting the British and Russian delegations at Tehran.¹¹ Staff discussions were held daily throughout the trip, culminating in two meetings between President Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on November 15 and November 19, 1943. In the course of these two meetings, the subject of postwar Europe was discussed in detail. According to the official history of this period prepared by the Department of the Army, President Roosevelt gave the military leaders "the fullest guidance on politico-military issues he had given them since America's entry into the war." ¹²

During the November 19th meeting, the President was asked by his military advisers for information on the problem of Allied zones of occupation in Germany.¹³ Before them was a military paper prepared in London by the staff (COSSAC) which had been set up to prepare for the invasion of France. The occupation boundaries of the COSSAC plan were similar to the division of Germany today. This particular arrangement had been developed earlier in 1943 by a British Cabinet Committee working under the direction of Deputy Prime Minister Clement Attlee.¹⁴ It had no relation to the plan recommended by Secretary Hull in Moscow the previous month.¹⁵ Under the Attlee plan, the Soviet zone of occupation would include the provinces of Mecklenburg, Pomerania, Brandenburg, Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia, Saxony, Silesia

* COSSAC, i.e., Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (Designate). At this time, General Eisenhower had not yet been appointed Supreme Commander in Europe. Until such time as a commander was selected, however, a small staff group had been established in London to begin planning. This staff was given the code name COSSAC and became the nucleus around which General Eisenhower later built his headquarters.
and East Prussia. At its western terminus near the city of Eisenach, the proposed Soviet zone extended to a point less than one hundred kilometers from the Rhine. In all, it included a territory consisting of forty percent of Germany's 1937 land area, thirty-six percent of her population and thirty-three percent of her productive resources.\textsuperscript{16}

The American zone, which was to be located in southern Germany, included the provinces of Bavaria, Baden-Wuerttemberg, Hesse, the Rhinish Palatinate and possibly Austria. Great Britain itself would occupy the northwestern part of Germany, Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony, the Ruhr, North Rhine-Westphalia and the great centers of commerce and industry located there. The Attlee proposal also recommended that Berlin be jointly occupied by all three powers as a symbol of Allied unity although it did not delineate actual city boundaries. It made no mention of Western access to the German capital which, of course, was located well within the Russian zone.

President Roosevelt told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he did not agree with the British arrangement. In particular, he did not agree with the provision that Great Britain, and not the United States, should occupy the northwestern part of Germany. The President was anxious to provide for American access to the sea. He was concerned both with the problem of supplying the occupation force and with the need to ship U.S. troops to the Far East when the war in Europe was over. For these reasons he wanted to control the ports of Hamburg and Bremen. Also, President Roosevelt is reported to have been concerned about the stability of the French government and did not want American supply lines in Germany dependent upon France, as they would be if the United States occupied the southern zone.

Interestingly, the President also discussed Berlin. To the military chiefs he predicted that there would "be a race for Berlin" and that regardless of the outcome "the United States should have Berlin." These statements are recorded in a memorandum of the meeting prepared by Major General Thomas T. Handy, Acting Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, from notes given him immediately afterward by General Marshall.\textsuperscript{17}

To set forth more clearly his ideas as to how the future zonal boundaries should be drawn, President Roosevelt penciled-in his proposed lines of demarcation on a National Geographic Society map. In the President's sketch, the United States would occupy a considerably
larger zone than the Attlee draft had suggested and it would be in northwestern Germany instead of the south; Great Britain would occupy the south, and Russia, a smaller zone in eastern Germany. Berlin, in Mr. Roosevelt's sketch, was not located within the Russian zone as the British plan had proposed but on the frontier between the American and Russian zones. The President anticipated that perhaps a million U.S. troops would remain in Germany "for at least one year and possibly two." *18

Significantly, no representatives of the State Department attended the meeting on the Iowa when President Roosevelt discussed occupation policy. To a large extent, this represented a deliberate effort on the part of the President to restrict the role of the State Department in Allied planning. It also reflected his feeling that occupation policy was primarily a concern of the military. Mr. Robert Sherwood, a close friend and confidant of the President, reports that the State Department had fallen from grace with Roosevelt. The ancient bureaucratic machinery of the Department was little suited for time of war and FDR felt that many of the senior career officers of the diplomatic service were hostile to the Administration. The prewar handling of Hitler and Mussolini by the State Department, and especially its overriding concern for diplomatic nicety, had upset him on numerous occasions.19

Secretary Hull at this time also had faded from a leading position in the Administration. Frequently he was by-passed by Mr. Roosevelt in his dealings with foreign governments. When the President embarked for Tehran, he therefore purposely left Hull in Washington.** Little effort was made to keep the State Department informed of what was happening, and planning for the occupation of Germany soon took off

* Of the discussions on board the Iowa, the Army documentary history states:

It is interesting to note that the President's idea of an American zone in postwar northwest Germany portended a U.S. occupation in force, to be conducted, like the American approach to the European war itself, with a minimum of time, expense, and political complications in European affairs.


** On August 17, 1944, Secretary Hull told Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., that he had "never been permitted to see the minutes of the Teheran Conference," that he was "not told what is going on," and that he had been informed that the planning of occupation policy toward Germany was a military affair. See John L. Snell, Dilemma in Germany (New Orleans: Hauser, 1959), p. 72.
in two separate directions; one pursued by the Department of State and one by the President and his military advisers.\textsuperscript{20}

The Tehran Conference convened on November 28, 1943. For the most part, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin limited themselves to military arrangements for continuing the war in Europe. In particular, planning centered on the establishment of a “Second Front” in Western Europe by the forces of the United States and Great Britain. Postwar Germany was discussed but briefly. As Prime Minister Churchill has stated:

At this time the subject seemed to be purely theoretical. No one could foresee when or how the end of the war would come. The German armies held immense areas of European Russia. A year was to pass before British or American troops set foot in Western Europe, and nearly two years before they entered Germany. . . .\textsuperscript{21}

Whether the Attlee proposals were discussed at Tehran is not clear. Certainly, they were not approved.\textsuperscript{22} There was merely a general understanding by the Big Three that Germany should be occupied by the three Allies, each in a separate zone, and that Berlin should be jointly controlled by all three.\textsuperscript{23} According to Harry Hopkins, who was present, the discussion on postwar Germany “ended up nowhere; it was decided that the subject should be considered further by the European Advisory Commission in London.”\textsuperscript{24}

The European Advisory Commission, it will be recalled, had been created at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers. In referring the question of postwar Germany to it, the Big Three were getting rid of a hot potato. As American representative to the EAC, President Roosevelt designated John G. Winant, the former Governor of New Hampshire who had succeeded Joseph P. Kennedy as American Ambassador to the Court of St. James. Mr. Winant was to serve on the Commission simultaneously with his other duties in London as Ambassador. Although he had been present at Tehran as an official observer, it is doubtful whether Winant was familiar with President Roosevelt’s ideas on occupation boundaries.\textsuperscript{25} The map which FDR had drawn on the Iowa was given to General Handy who subsequently returned it to Washington where it was kept in the records of the Army’s Operations Division (OPD) in the Pentagon.\textsuperscript{26}

From the beginning, American policy toward the European Advisory Commission was ambivalent. President Roosevelt and the military
ROOSEVELT'S CONCEPT OF POSTWAR OCCUPATION ZONES for Germany drawn in pencil by the President himself on a National Geographic Society map while en route to the Cairo conference.
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chiefs considered occupation boundaries primarily a military affair. The EAC was a diplomatic rather than a military creation and therefore soon found itself in the middle of the hiatus which had developed in Washington. The American delegation to the EAC received its instructions from the Department of State. Because of the split between Secretary Hull and the President, however, it seldom was informed of Administration policies.

In addition to Ambassador Winant, the American delegation to the European Advisory Commission included a full complement of political and economic advisers. Mr. George F. Kennan, recent United States Ambassador to Yugoslavia, author of the containment policy of the Truman Administration, and a postwar Ambassador to the Soviet Union, was appointed as Winant’s deputy. Kennan was later succeeded by Mr. Philip Mosely, now with the Council on Foreign Relations.

The Russian delegation to the EAC was headed by Fedor Tarasovich Gousev, then Soviet Ambassador to London. His Majesty’s representative was Sir William Strang, later Lord Strang, who at that time was the Permanent Under Secretary in the British Foreign Office.

The first formal meeting of the European Advisory Commission was held on January 14, 1944. At this meeting Sir William Strang introduced the Attlee committee proposals on zonal boundaries which President Roosevelt had rejected on the Iowa—the plan calling for the division of Germany into three separate zones with the United States...
zone located in the south and the boundary of the Soviet zone as it is today.

In January of 1944, the war in Europe was very much a Russian affair. The landings of American, British, and Canadian troops in France were still five months away. The great battles of Stalingrad, Leningrad and Moscow had been won and the Red Army already was at the prewar Russo-Polish frontier. Accordingly, the British government did not consider the Attlee proposals to be overly favorable to Russia. Indeed, there were many in London who considered them the very minimum that the Soviet Union would accept.

When the Attlee proposals were transmitted to the EAC, the dispute in Washington as to jurisdiction over occupation policy had come to the surface. In December, the Department of State set up a special committee known as the Working Security Committee (WSC) to transmit instructions to the American delegation. (The name “Working Security Committee” had been selected as a cover-name to veil the true purpose of the committee.) The War and Navy Departments agreed to furnish representatives to the Committee on an “informal basis.”

From the beginning, however, the Committee had been the scene of discord, unable to agree on what matters it should consider, and what matters should be forwarded to Mr. Winant. There were several reasons for this.

First, the Army representatives to the Committee insisted that occupation policy was a military consideration. They said it would be handled by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and not the European Advisory Commission. They said it was no concern of Ambassador Winant, or for that matter, of the WSC. Accordingly, they refused to discuss any question pertaining to occupation policy and declined to concur in any messages sent to Mr. Winant in which it was mentioned.

Second, the Committee was established at an extremely low level in the Washington bureaucracy. The Army permanent representative was a lieutenant colonel; the Navy representative a lieutenant. The representatives of the State Department, who were slightly higher in rank, changed frequently and were themselves usually in the dark as to Administration policy. Like the military, they were also extremely jealous of their prerogatives and were very hesitant in sharing what they believed to be their policy-making responsibilities. Differences between
the State Department and the military therefore were magnified, perhaps out of proportion, and compromise became impossible.\textsuperscript{31}

A third factor contributing to the difficulty was the extremely complicated procedure of the WSC. According to the War Department:

On questions pertaining to military affairs, the Working Security Committee had to get comments from the State, War, and Navy Departments, the JPWC [Joint Post-War Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff], the Civil Affairs Division, and any other interested Washington agency. It then prepared papers incorporating these and its own comments and circulated them either to the JPWC, in cases involving primarily military problems, or to the Civil Affairs Division, in cases involving civil affairs. These agencies could then prepare papers for the JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] and the JCS could refer those acceptable from a military view back to the State Department. The State Department then, if it wished, could give its final approval to such papers and send them to Ambassador Winant as a basis for negotiations in the European Advisory Commission.\textsuperscript{32}

As a result of the discord in the WSC, Ambassador Winant was left in London without instructions. Not even President Roosevelt’s feelings on occupation boundaries announced on the \textit{Iowa} were transmitted to him.

Throughout the months of December, January, and February, the deadlock in Washington continued. The War Department representatives to the WSC resolutely maintained that the question of occupation policy was a purely military affair.\textsuperscript{33} The anomaly of this position, of course, was that simultaneously in London, the subject of occupation boundaries was being considered in detail by Winant’s British and Russian colleagues.

On February 18, 1944, while the impasse in Washington continued, Soviet Ambassador Gousev announced to the European Advisory Commission that Russia was prepared to accept the zonal boundaries proposed in the Attlee report.\textsuperscript{34} Gousev also spelled out the detailed arrangements that the Soviet Union proposed for Berlin.\textsuperscript{*} In effect, the

\textsuperscript{*} The Soviet reply of February 18, 1944, was the first time the problem of Berlin had been discussed in detail. “There shall be established around Berlin,” it stated, “a 10 to 15 kilometer zone which shall be occupied jointly by the armed forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.” The draft then went on to delineate actual city boundaries. It contained no mention of Western access.
Soviet Union had accepted without bargaining the entire package on zonal boundaries which the British government had prepared! American participation in the proceedings thus far had been minimal, and there is little to indicate how Winant himself felt at this time. If he objected to the boundaries of the Attlee plan, he did not communicate his objections to Washington.

Further talks between the British and Soviet delegations soon resulted in a draft protocol on zonal boundaries which was drawn up and presented to the Commission. As a result, the United States was confronted with an agreement on zones of occupation in which two of the three member governments already concurred. By having refused earlier to forward any instructions on occupation boundaries to London, the War Department had become an unwilling accomplice to an agreement to which it objected.

In Washington, the deadlock in the WSC between the representatives of the State Department and the War Department continued until late February—almost two weeks after Soviet acceptance of the British proposals had been announced. At this point the War Department reversed its position and presented to the WSC a military plan for the drawing of occupation boundaries. Under this plan the three Allied zones of occupation would meet in Berlin and radiate outward like spokes of a wheel. The representatives of the State Department on the WSC were hostile to the plan and dispatched it to London ten days later without recommendation.*

When Ambassador Winant received the plan in London he declined to present it. Instead, he cabled the State Department requesting further instructions, but none were forthcoming. When he asked for a supporting memorandum, none was provided, and the WSC was again deadlocked. The War Department insisted, and perhaps properly, that it was a State Department function to prepare such documents. The State Department, not in sympathy with the draft in the first place,

* Mr. Philip Mosely, later Winant's deputy, reports that the sketch was represented by the military as being in accordance with President Roosevelt's ideas on occupation policy. Colonel Edgar P. Allen, the War Department representative who carried the document to the WSC is on record as saying that he did not recall mentioning the President's name but "thinks that all papers of this nature from the Joint Chiefs went through the White House." Cf. Mosely, op. cit., p. 591; and Albert L. Warner, "Our Secret Deal Over Germany," *Saturday Evening Post*, August 2, 1952, p. 66.
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claimed that the War Department should provide them since it was a military proposal.\textsuperscript{36}

Throughout March, while the British and Russian drafts on occupation boundaries were being reconciled, Winant declined to present the American proposal. Among other things, Winant and his advisers contended that the Soviets would never agree to it. The size of the Russian zone was greatly reduced from that of the Attlee proposal. The Army’s plan also disregarded the normal political and administrative boundaries within Germany. The fact that the Russians had already announced their approval of the earlier British plan was cited as an additional reason for not confusing the issue with a new Western proposal.\textsuperscript{37}

Having delayed action throughout the entire month of March, at the beginning of April Winant sent his deputy, George Kennan, back to Washington to place the issue before the President. With the State Department’s approval, Kennan met with Mr. Roosevelt on April 3, 1944. He advised the President of events in London, of the earlier British proposal which the Soviet Union had accepted, and of the American delegation’s opinion that the Soviets would most certainly reject the sketch prepared by the War Department. Following Mr. Kennan’s presentation, the President gave in and stated that he had no objection to accepting the boundaries of the Soviet zone, since the others had already agreed.\textsuperscript{38}

For all practical purposes, this settled the boundary of the Soviet zone and the location of Berlin one hundred and ten miles within it. Had the War Department’s sketch been presented earlier, had Winant been informed of the President’s policy views immediately after Tehran, had the friction in Washington over occupation boundaries not existed, the division of Germany today might be different.

Presumably, the mission of George Kennan to Washington in April was not so much to seek instructions as to convince the President to accept the British proposals. As it was, Mr. Roosevelt only partly gave in, and even after indicating to Kennan his willingness to go along with the boundaries of the Soviet zone, continued to insist that the United States occupy the northwestern zone rather than the southwestern one which the British had proposed.

Following Kennan’s meeting with President Roosevelt on April 3,
the Attlee proposals once more were referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This time, the American military added their approval providing that the United States occupy the area of northwestern Germany. On May 1, the State Department advised Ambassador Winant in London that the United States was prepared to accept the boundaries of the Soviet zone as provided in the Attlee draft. Unwillingly, the United States had become a party to an agreement to which the responsible Administration at that time was opposed. If the governmental machinery had been able to translate this opposition into effective action in London, that agreement would not have been reached. If the State Department had proven itself capable of following Administration direction in the years before the war, the situation probably would not have arisen in the first place.89

In all of this, nothing had been said about Western access to Berlin. The original Attlee draft made no mention of it. The Soviet reply of February 18, ignored it. The American approval transmitted on May 1, was similarly silent. The problem was not raised, in fact, until later in May when Ambassador Winant returned to Washington. During the course of his visit, Winant went to the Pentagon to discuss occupation policy with the military authorities. According to Major General John H. Hilldring, Chief of the Army's Civil Affairs Division and later Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas, the discussions with Winant resulted in agreement that access to Berlin should be provided for.

When Winant returned to London, however, he made no effort to raise the matter of access to Berlin in the EAC. Mr. Robert Murphy, who subsequently became Under Secretary of State, is reported by General Clay to have mentioned the question to Winant later in 1944. At the time, Murphy was stationed in London as political adviser to General Eisenhower. Afterwards, he went to Berlin with General Clay. According to Clay's account,

* Philip Mosely, who was not present at the discussions in the Pentagon, gives a different account. According to Mosely, Ambassador Winant raised the question of access only to be told that it was a "military matter" which would be decided "at the military level." In view of the fact that the War Department had already acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the EAC over occupation boundaries, however, it would appear that General Hilldring's version is substantially correct. Cf. Mosely, op. cit., pp. 593-94.
Ambassador Winant believed that the right to be in Berlin carried with it right of access and that it would only confuse the issue to raise it in connection with the agreement. He felt strongly that it would arouse Soviet suspicion and make mutual understanding more difficult to attain. He believed it possible to develop a mutual friendly understanding in which differences would disappear.\textsuperscript{40}

In any event, Mr. Winant did not raise the question of Western access to Berlin during the proceedings in London.\textsuperscript{*} During June and July, 1944, the European Advisory Commission went forward with the detailed negotiations regarding the Allied sectors in Berlin.\textsuperscript{0} Since this was an extended and laborious process, it is probable that the question of access to the German capital presented itself to the members of the American delegation.\textsuperscript{41} Sir William Strang, the British delegate to the EAC, has stated, however, that at that time “it was not our expectation that the zones would be sealed off from one another. This was a Soviet conception which only became apparent in the late summer of 1945 when the occupation was an accomplished fact.”\textsuperscript{42}

Because of the Western hesitancy to mention the matter of access, the draft protocol on zones of occupation finally concluded by the EAC made no reference to it. Under the protocol, Germany was divided according to the original Attlee proposals with the boundary of the Soviet zone as it is today. Berlin also was divided into three sectors, although again, as in the question of the Western zones, the assignment of the particular Western sectors awaited final determination.

On September 12, 1944, the first “Protocol on Zones of Occupation” was signed in London by Winant, Gousev, and Strang. It simply left blank the name of the particular Western power occupying each of the Western zones. In spite of the fact that it contained no provision for access, this Protocol is basic to the present four-power status of

\textsuperscript{*} In later correspondence, Mr. Robert Murphy has stated that Winant did not raise the issue of access to Berlin in the EAC because he thought that “once established in Berlin, our ingress and egress would be a natural corollary.” See Warner, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 68.

\textsuperscript{0} In referring to “zones” and “sectors,” normal postwar usage has restricted “zone” to mean the divisions of the prewar state of Germany. The term “sector” is reserved for the division within the city of Berlin itself. Hence, the Soviet zone and the Soviet sector are two separate entities.
As has been indicated, it was based largely on an initial British proposal but secured early and complete Soviet acceptance. According to the Protocol:

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have reached the following agreement . . .

1. Germany, within her frontiers as they were on the 31st December, 1937, will, for the purposes of occupation, be divided into three zones, one of which will be allotted to each of the three Powers, and a special Berlin area, which will be under joint occupation by the three Powers.

2. The Boundaries of the three zones and of the Berlin area, and the allocation of three zones as between the U.S.A., the U.K. and the U.S.S.R. will be as follows:

* * *

The Berlin area (by which expression is understood the territory of “Greater Berlin” as defined by the Law of the 27th April, 1920) will be jointly occupied by armed forces of the U.S.A., U.K., and U.S.S.R., assigned by the respective Commanders-in-Chief. For this purpose the territory of ‘Greater Berlin’ will be divided into the following three parts:—[Italics added.]

North-Eastern part of “Greater Berlin” (districts of Pankow, Prenzlauerberg, Mitte, Weissensee, Friedrichshain, Lichtenberg, Treptow, Köpenick) will be occupied by the forces of the U.S.S.R.:

North-Western part of “Greater Berlin” (districts of Reinickendorf, Wedding, Tiergarten, Charlottenburg, Spandau, Wilmersdorf) will be occupied by the forces of ________:

Southern part of “Greater Berlin” (districts of Zehlendorf, Steglitz, Schöneberg, Kreuzberg, Tempelhof, Neukölln) will be occupied by the forces of ________________________:

* * *

5. An Inter-Allied Governing Authority (Komandatura) consisting of three Commandants, appointed by their respective Commanders-in-Chief, will be established to direct jointly the administration of the ‘Greater Berlin’ Area.\(^{43}\)

* * *

* France was added later as an occupying power. See infra.
When the draft Protocol was signed, Ambassador Winant took it immediately to Quebec where President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill were conferring. The purpose for doing so was to settle British-American differences over the two Western zones.

The Quebec Conference had been arranged largely at the insistence of Prime Minister Churchill. With the war in Europe drawing to a close, with France liberated and Allied forces knocking at the German frontiers, the British government strongly desired to review the final phases of European strategy. Among other things to be discussed were the role of Great Britain in the Pacific, the continuation of American Lend-Lease assistance to Britain after the war, and the course of Allied occupation policy toward Germany.

Much of the conference, as it turned out, was devoted to the question of the coming occupation of Germany. To Mr. Churchill's surprise, the President had brought with him to Quebec Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr. "I had been surprised when I arrived at Quebec," Mr. Churchill has written, "that the President was accompanied by Mr. Morgenthau, the Secretary of the United States Treasury, though neither the Secretary of State nor Harry Hopkins was present. But I was glad to see Morgenthau, as we were anxious to discuss financial arrangements between our two countries for the period between the conquest of Germany and the defeat of the Japanese. The President and his Secretary of the Treasury were however much more concerned about the treatment of Germany after the war." 44

In the ensuing discussions the President and Morgenthau pressed on Mr. Churchill what has since become known as the "Morgenthau Plan"—a plan calling for the destruction of German industry after the war and for the turning of Germany into an agricultural "pastoral" nation. The Morgenthau Plan had been drafted by Harry Dexter White, Morgenthau's Special Assistant in the Treasury Department. 45 Although he at first opposed it, Churchill finally accepted the plan after he had been promised substantial American financial assistance during the postwar period. According to the Prime Minister, "At first I violently opposed this idea. But the President, with Mr. Morgen-

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thau—from whom we had so much to ask—were so insistent that in the end we agreed to consider it."  

Following Mr. Churchill's ostensible acceptance of the "Morgenthau Plan" (he later rejected it), President Roosevelt agreed to accept the southern zone in Germany for the United States. While there may have been other considerations, it seems fair to say that the President's sudden reversal of position was in large part determined by Churchill's decision.  

Before finally accepting the southern zone, however, President Roosevelt insisted that the port cities of Bremen and Bremerhaven (which were located in north Germany) be included under American jurisdiction as separate enclaves. The American Joint Chiefs of Staff also demanded iron-clad agreements from the British guaranteeing American access through the British zone. These requirements were incorporated into the final report of the Quebec Conference prepared by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.  

Paradoxically, the military chiefs did not demand the same rights from the Russians. When the overall zonal structure in Germany was reviewed at Quebec by the Combined Chiefs, the right of Allied access to the German capital was not questioned. As for the Soviet boundaries, Quebec merely ratified the earlier accord reached by the European Advisory Commission in London.  

The Quebec Conference thus settled the relative location of the American and British zones. This agreement was embodied in a November 14th amendment to the original Protocol on Zones of Occupation. Likewise, it was signed in London by Winant, Gousev, and Strang. In it, Great Britain also accepted the northwestern sector of Berlin, and the United States the southern sector. The Russian sector in Berlin and the Russian zone in Germany remained unchanged.  

In light of the earlier Allied failure to raise the question of access to Berlin, the insistence of the American military on transit rights through the British zone is the most significant portion of the November 14th amendment. Specifically, it stated:  

For the purpose of facilitating communications between the South-Western Zone and the sea, the Commander-in-Chief of the United States forces in the South-Western Zone will  

(a) exercise such control of the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven and the necessary staging areas in the vicinity thereof as
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may be agreed hereafter by the United Kingdom and United States military authorities to be necessary to meet his requirements:

(b) enjoy such transit facilities through the North-Western Zone as may be agreed hereafter by the United Kingdom and United States military authorities to be necessary to meet his requirements.\textsuperscript{48}

Shortly after Quebec, President Roosevelt acted to curtail the role of the European Advisory Commission in occupation planning. In a memorandum to Secretary Hull on September 29, 1944, he specifically prohibited the EAC from considering the problem of postwar economic policy toward Germany.\textsuperscript{49} This was followed on October 20, by a second Presidential memorandum in which Mr. Roosevelt took the Commission to task for its earlier activities. Five days later a third note from the President put a complete stop to the postwar planning for Germany then being pursued by the American delegation in London. According to Philip Mosely, the decision by the President "cut the ground completely from under the EAC and from under the policy . . . of Mr. Winant."\textsuperscript{50} One may well speculate what might have happened had this decision been taken six months earlier. Probably, the occupation boundaries in Germany would have been negotiated by the military authorities and a zonal arrangement much closer to that which President Roosevelt initially proposed would have resulted.\textsuperscript{*}

As a result of the President's action, the responsibility for planning occupation policy was returned to the military. By this time, however, the damage had been done and the boundary of the Soviet zone as it exists today had been agreed to. On February 1, 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff met with their British counterparts at Malta. The meeting was preparatory to the final Big Three Conference of Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin which was to take place shortly afterwards at

\textsuperscript{*} Later, at Yalta, President Roosevelt once more indicated his distaste for the European Advisory Commission. According to the then Secretary of State, Edward R. Stettinius, the President "made it clear that he felt the European Advisory Commission, established by the Moscow Pacts of 1943, had not been a success. . . ." When Ambassador Winant cabled Mr. Roosevelt expressing regret that he had not been invited to Yalta, "The President, on receipt of Winant's message, remarked that it was not necessary for the Ambassador to Great Britain to be present." Edward R. Stettinius, \textit{Roosevelt and the Russians—The Yalta Conference} (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1949), pp. 88, 289.
Yalta. Although the question of the occupation of Germany was discussed, no mention was made of Berlin, or of the necessity to provide for access to it. And when the plans were reviewed during a similar pre-Yalta policy meeting—this time at Marrakech, French Morocco—Secretary of State Stettinius and his key advisers from the State Department agreed that the question of Western access to Berlin was one which should be left to the military authorities.

Thus, when the Yalta Conference convened, most of the plans about the future zones of occupation in Germany had been completed. The Soviet Union had accepted its zone of occupation almost one year before. At Quebec, four and a half months before Yalta, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill had agreed on the respective location of the American and British zones. Formal acceptance by the Big Three of the protocols prepared by the European Advisory Commission was therefore a foregone conclusion. What little debate there was at Yalta regarding zones of occupation did not concern Berlin or the Soviet zone but developed over Western proposals to include France as an equal partner in Germany’s occupation.

The military situation when the Yalta Conference convened was again favorable to the Soviet Union. The Red Army had just reached the banks of the Oder River on a thirty-five mile front less than fifty miles from Berlin. The great Soviet winter offensive of 1944–45 was still in progress. In the West, the Allies had not finished restoring the positions in the Ardennes which Field Marshal von Rundstedt had overrun during the Battle of the Bulge. The Rhine had not been breached. Every factor indicated that the armies of General Eisenhower faced another several months of heavy fighting. In this situation the Western leaders were little disposed to question anew the proposed boundaries of the Soviet zone or the location of Berlin within it. Accordingly, the previously drafted protocols of the European Advisory Commission on zones of occupation were quickly approved.

The zonal boundaries in Germany were also reviewed at Yalta by the American Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved on February 7, with the following statement: “... there are no reasons from a military viewpoint why the Draft Protocol of the European Advisory Commission relative to zones of occupation in Germany and Administration of Greater Berlin should not be approved.”

In considering the question of access to Berlin, the American Joint
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Staff (a staff group working under the Joint Chiefs of Staff) prepared the following memorandum:

The U.S. Forces in Berlin and certain other areas will be isolated from the main areas of U.S. occupation by territory occupied by other than U.S. forces. There will be need for regular transit by road, air, and rail across this intervening territory. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff propose that the general principle be accepted of freedom of transit by each nation concerned between the main occupied area and the forces occupying Berlin and similar isolated areas. They further propose that the details be worked out by the local commanders.55

When the question was raised by the Joint Chiefs with their British and Russian counterparts, however, the Russians proved reluctant to discuss it and the matter was dropped. No further action was taken and apparently no significance was attached to the Russian reluctance.56

The decision of the Yalta Conference to admit France to the military occupation of Germany came only after the Western Allies had agreed that whatever zone France might occupy would be taken from the area already allotted to the Western powers. As a result, the United States and Great Britain began the task of creating a third Western zone. The province of Baden-Wuerttemberg in the American zone was split giving the French the southwestern portion which was adjacent to France. The Saar and the Rhinish-Palatinate from the British zone also were ceded to France, forming a barely contiguous zone of about half the size of the other three.

In the division of Baden-Wuerttemberg, the Joint Chiefs of Staff demonstrated once more their concern for securing the right of American access. In this case they insisted that the Munich-Karlsruhe-Frankfurt autobahn, and the main trunk railway from Frankfurt to Munich, be kept solely in American hands. This led to the splitting of Baden-Wuerttemberg along purely logistical lines and was opposed by the State Department on the grounds that such a split would only further complicate the administration of the territories affected.57

With the location of the French zone agreed to, the occupation boundaries in Germany were complete. From their inception, these boundaries had been opposed by the responsible Administration in Washington. Their subsequent acceptance by the United States had
been reluctant and hesitant. The differences between the State Department, and the President and his military advisers, had been present throughout the entire process. When the boundaries of the Soviet zone were first proposed, the conflict in Washington prevented President Roosevelt’s ideas from being transmitted to London. When the Administration position later was forwarded, the opinion of the London delegation prevented it from being introduced into the proceedings.

The fact that President Roosevelt later ordered the American delegation to the European Advisory Commission to cease planning for the occupation of Germany and transferred the matter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff is indicative that the activity of Ambassador Winant and his associates was not approved in Washington. Once the planning of occupation policy was returned to the military, the Joint Chiefs did not neglect to provide for American access through both the British and French zones in the agreements which were subsequently concluded.* Their failure to secure similar guarantees from the Russians can only be attributed to a desire to avoid raising any subject which might weaken Soviet desires to contribute to the overall Allied effort. The war with Japan loomed ominously on the horizon and the American Chiefs were more than anxious to obtain prompt Soviet intervention.

The wartime agreements regarding the occupation of Germany set the stage for the drama in Berlin which has since developed. In retrospect, it is clear that many of these agreements were ill-considered. It is hardly worth while, however, to resurrect these decisions, or the processes through which they were made, with the intent of finding scapegoats for the present crisis. At the time the decisions were made, there were few in the West who would have suggested that America’s emphasis on winning the war might have been better placed on securing the peace.

If any one factor may be singled out above all others as contributing to the unhappy outcome of the wartime negotiations, it would have to be the lack of overall coordination which then existed in Washington. The total inability to translate the policy announcements of Presi-

* The November 14th Amendment in which the right of access through the British zone was guaranteed was approved at Malta on February 1, 1945.
dent Roosevelt on the *Iowa* into effective action at the scene of the negotiations in London exposes a weakness in our governmental process which recent events have shown to be a luxury we can hardly afford.