The student of the history of ideas must approach his historical sources certainly with an open but not with a passive mind. The profitable reading of a text which contains any but the simplest ideas is always a process of cross-examination—of putting relevant questions to the author; and the reader must therefore know in advance what questions need to be asked. To ask the right questions, the reader must first of all consider what distinctions—between concepts and therefore between terms—are pertinent and important in relation to the topics or issues with which the author is concerned. Many—most, I am inclined to think—of the terms which have historically been used in the expression of more or less abstract ideas have been ambiguous terms, and a great many of the propositions which have played influential parts in the history of thought have been equivocal propositions. For this reason, if you wish to know what an author means by his terms or propositions, it is desirable to have in mind in advance, as far as possible, what different things he might conceivably mean by the words he uses. You may then sometimes, by analysis and comparison of different passages, discover which of these distinguishable things he does mean; but if the precaution of making such distinctions beforehand is neglected, there is always a risk that you will impose a
wrong, or an oversimple, meaning on his words from the outset, and thus more or less completely misinterpret him.

Moreover, it frequently happens that an author, without being aware of it himself, uses the same words in different senses—slips insensibly from one meaning to another in the course of an exposition or argument. There is perhaps no more frequent source of error in interpretation than to assume that a given author always uses the same crucial term in the same sense—even though he may have himself offered, at the outset, a definition of the term. Such unconscious shifts of meaning can, of course, be detected only by a close scrutiny of the contexts—and especially of the inferences which the author draws from verbally identical or similar propositions at different points in his reasoning. If, in one place, he deduces from a proposition a consequence which patently would not follow if he were using the words in it in the same sense in which he has used them in another place, it is probable that, though the words are the same, the ideas present (less or more vaguely) to his consciousness in the two places are different ideas.

And, at least for the intellectual historian, the object of reading is, if possible, not simply to note what an author literally says in a given passage, but what, and how, he was thinking when he said it—what concepts were, dimly or otherwise, in his mind and by what processes of thought he actually passed from one proposition to another. This is often a difficult and delicate business. But one does not, in most cases, adequately understand an author—does not see what was going on in him as he wrote—unless one understands him better than he understood himself. And for this
purpose, again, it is highly desirable to bring to the reading of a writer's text, not only some previous reflection on the subject with which he is dealing, but, especially, as many distinctions of meaning potentially pertinent to it, and of issues involved in it, as possible. With the help of these, you may frequently discover which of your author's terms are equivocal and therefore of indeterminate meaning; or into what inexplicit, and therefore presumably unconscious, shifts of meaning he slips; and to what confusions of ideas he is subject; and what are the resultant illicit (though to him convincing) transitions in his reasoning.

The principal purpose of this preamble to the present lecture is to explain why it has seemed to me desirable to interpolate at this point what might otherwise appear to be an incomprehensible digression from the mainly historical subject of the course. The subsequent lectures will have to do chiefly with ideas widely current in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries about a certain group of human motives or desires, about their social consequences, and about their implications for the appraisal of human nature. The terminology the writers of the period used, however, was often confused and inconsistent. We shall therefore be better prepared to understand what those writers had to say about these matters if we make explicit to ourselves in advance a few simple distinctions, adopt convenient terms for expressing them, give a little thought beforehand and from our present point of view—or at any rate, from the lecturer's—to the nature and interrelations of those elements of our constitution with which these older analysts of it were especially preoccupied, and consider what there is about
them that makes them seem significant for the general theory of man. The present lecture, then, is an attempt to construct for ourselves some fragments of what in the seventeenth century would probably have been called a Traité des Passions.

1

It is not, however, with "passions" in the etymological sense, which the word sometimes retained in seventeenth and eighteenth century use—i.e., in the sense of passive states of sensation or emotion—that we shall be concerned in this lecture. It is with the question what affective states operate as the distinctive springs of action in man and how they so operate. We are more specifically to consider, first of all, the nature of what are commonly called desires and motives, and the ways in which they appear to determine more or less deliberate voluntary choices, decisions by human agents to act in one or another manner, when the thought of the act to be performed and of its alternative is—though it may be but dimly and momentarily—present to consciousness before the act takes place. We may begin by defining some pertinent terms. Implicit in these definitions are some postulates or factual assumptions, which, though familiar, are not universally accepted; but it will be more convenient to state the definitions and postulates first, and then consider the objections to them.

The primary phenomenon pertinent to deliberate voluntary action may be called "hedonic susceptibility in the ex-
periencing subject to the idea of a state-of-things.” A state-of-things may be anything whatever that can be conceived as capable of existing or occurring in the past, present, or future; thus an act of your own not yet performed would be included under the denotation of “state-of-things.” To the ideas of states-of-things pleasant or unpleasant feelings may be, and usually are, attached; that is to say, the presence of such ideas in consciousness is agreeable, satisfying, welcome, or the reverse. A specific hedonic susceptibility is the capacity of a subject or class of subjects to find pleasant or unpleasant the presence in consciousness of a particular idea or sensation. A desire occurs when the idea of a state-of-things not now realized, or, if now realized, capable of prolongation into the future, is present to consciousness, and the idea of its realization (or prolongation) is now found pleasant, and of its nonrealization or cessation, painful. Aversion is the opposite of this: when the idea of the realization of a state-of-things is now unpleasant. Desires and aversions may differ very widely in intensity, i.e., in the intensity of the pleasantness or unpleasantness attaching to the ideas. At least the more intense desires or aversions tend to be followed by actions conceived by the subject as capable of causing, or helping to cause, the realization of the state-of-things of which the idea of the realization is pleasant, or preventing the realization of that of which the idea of its realization is unpleasant—unless there is at the same time present to consciousness a contrary and still more intense desire or aversion. A motive is a specific desire or aversion, i.e., a pleasant or unpleasant idea of a realizable state-of-things, when it functions as the actual determinant of an
action. What at least ordinarily and normally determines choice, among alternative possible courses of action, is the relative intensity of the pleasantness or unpleasantness attaching, at the moment preceding choice, to the ideas of the two or more possible courses of action—not necessarily the anticipated pleasantness or unpleasantness of their future results. This pleasantness, or its opposite, may either attach to the idea of the action in itself, or may be derivative from the idea of the anticipated pleasantness or unpleasantness of the consequences of the action.

The first objection which some psychologists would raise to the foregoing definitions is that they seem to presuppose that mental states or mental "contents"—ideas, or the feelings associated with them—cause or determine bodily behavior, which, according to a metaphysical dogma accepted by these psychologists, is quite impossible. This objection, however, we need not here attempt to refute. It is not necessary, for our present purpose, to become involved in the old controversy over the so-called mind-body problem. With those who hold that the actual determinants of those movements of organic matter which we call human behavior are those other antecedent states or movements of matter and energy, or energy alone, which consist in patterns or motions of particles or energy-quanta in the brain and nervous system—with those who hold this view I shall not now quarrel. I think their view untenable, but the assumption of its untenability is not essential to our present analysis. It may be true not only that every nuance of feeling, every desire and every purpose, has its specific neurocerebral antecedent, but also that these physical events alone are
efficacious, while consciousness and all its content are a sort of *obbligato*—in Santayana's phrase, merely "a lyric cry in the midst of business." Even if this be true, it means only that two types of event, one conscious, the other unconscious, are uniformly associated. And of the two sides or "aspects" of the total event, the neurocerebral side is, for the most part, at the time of the occurrence of the event, quite inaccessible and unknown to us, and is also incapable of being directly acted upon. I know what it is to be angry, or happy, or proud; I do not know what particular neural or cortical patterns accompany anger or happiness or pride. I also know that I can be made angry or happy or proud by words addressed to me, if—but only if—I regard those words as expressing ideas, i.e., as having for those who use them certain meanings, and not as mere sounds, that is, motions in the atmosphere which impinge on my ear-drums and thence start further movements or energy-discharges in the auditory nerve which presently reach a certain region in my brain, and there cause a certain unknown rearrangement of the bits of matter or units of energy composing it. Some of these motions certainly are, all of them may be, indispensable to the production of the effect called feeling angry or feeling happy or feeling proud. But I never experience the immediate intracerebral counterpart of the anger, happiness, or pride; I do experience the fact that when I feel angry or happy or proud I am likely to speak and act in a specific manner. And I assume all this to be true of other organisms of my own species. We shall, therefore, limit our analysis to what we empirically know and, in some degree, know how to con-
trol—that is, to actually experienced feelings, desires, thought-content, purposes—and their observable consequences or sequels in the form of other conscious events or in physical behavior (including speech); and we shall leave special questions of brain-physiology and of the correlation of cortical with conscious states to the as yet rather difficult and tentative inquiries of the brain-physiologists.

Now the word "desire" seems to be somewhat going out of fashion among psychologists—partly, I venture to think, for good and partly for bad reasons—and is being replaced by such terms as "drive," "urge," "organic impulsion," or "bodily set." One of the good reasons is that recent psychologists have realized more clearly than some earlier ones that, if we are to find anything that can be called a causal explanation of the eventual adoption of one course of action rather than another, in the situation we are considering, it must consist in some element or factor—whether explicit in consciousness or not—that is prior to or simultaneous with the initiation of that course of action, something which may be—though this, like the word "drive," is pure metaphor—described as a push rather than a pull. But the term "desire," as ordinarily used, tends to suggest a pull. A desire presumably is directed upon a future object, and to speak of desires as determining action may suggest that it is some character of the future object that zieht uns hinan—an Aristotelian final cause. But, though final causes certainly have much to do with human action, they can be seriously supposed to determine it only when they are translated into the present tense—are connected with some already existing state or propension in the organism before it acts. And the primary
problem of the analysis of the phenomena commonly named desire and choice is to ascertain, if possible, of what sorts these antecedent states or propensions are. Another reason for the new fashion in terminology which is valid, up to a point, is a recognition of the fact that there are various specific chains or cycles of actions which, once started, tend, in animals in general, to run their course; one stage leads on automatically to the next, and the following of one upon the other is to be understood, at least in part, by a knowledge of the character of the total sequence and of the empirical law which describes its usual successive phases. This appears to be what is meant by a "drive." Even the word "motive" is translated by Woodworth into the expression "an activity in process"; the motive, if I may employ the term, of this translation is apparently a wish to simplify the whole problem by conceiving of all cases of choice after the analogy of a fixed row of blocks—the fall of the first block pushes the next one down, and so on; no conscious reference to the future is necessarily involved in the affair.

Now there are, no doubt, modes of determination of human as of animal behavior which have this simple, automatic character; but they are assuredly not the only modes, nor, in man, the most distinctive. We do experience desires, in the sense previously defined—that is, we consciously refer to future states-of-things, whether in our own experience or not, and we find pleasurable the idea of their realization or painful the idea of their nonrealization; when one such idea is present and central in the field of consciousness, we normally tend to the course of action which we
conceive as likely to realize that future-but-now-represented state-of-things. This appears to me the merest commonplace; but since it is sometimes questioned or disregarded, I can only ask you to judge for yourself—to recall and analyze your own experience or, for example, the occasion when, after viewing those seductive pictures, in an illustrated weekly, of other human creatures riding in luxurious motor-cars, you found the desire to possess one of these vehicles irresistible. Equally open to every man’s retrospective introspection, presumably, is the case in which two such representations of future states-of-things were, before an action is initiated, compresent in consciousness, both pleasurable and therefore both evoking desire—until, somehow, the action believed to make for the realization of one rather than the other got chosen.

Ordinarily and normally, then, it is here assumed, pleasurable and unpleasurableness of the ideas of realizable states do determine choice; but this is not to say that they are the invariable determinants. There are, it may be urged, exceptional cases in which the unpleasant has an irresistible allurement—probing an aching tooth, for example, or obsessing moods of self-reproach or self-dissatisfaction. The universal connection of pleasantness or unpleasantness with desire or aversion need not be asserted, but only their usual connection. But it is important at this point to bear in mind a simple distinction, which is now, I suppose, fairly well realized, though the neglect of it has in the past caused much confusion and error, especially in the history of ethical theory.

Supposing pleasantness or unpleasantness to be normally
elements in the complex states called desires and aversions and to be factors in the determination of choice, to what do they attach—what, in particular, is the relative time to be assigned to them? According to what may be called the classic conception of desire and choice—a conception which, from the time of Socrates, was dominant in ethical theory, and is still current—what takes place in consciousness at the moment preceding choice is the presentation for awareness of the idea of an end or ends which might be realized through one's action, and a forecast of the future enjoyableness of one or another end. When the choice is made, it is supposed to be always determined by the anticipated eventual satisfyingness—the satisfyingness for the chooser or for somebody—of the end when it shall be reached, be the end a good dinner tomorrow, or the classless society, or the joys of the Moslem paradise, or the beatific vision of the divine perfection. All choice, in short, according to the thesis repeated in varying terms by a thousand moral philosophers, is sub specie bani; and these philosophers have therefore disputed chiefly de finibus bonorum et malorum—about the generic nature of the "real" or "highest" good, that is, the kind of state-of-things which will most completely and lastingly satisfy such a being as man is. Jonathan Edwards summed it up with precision:

The greatest good proposed [i.e., anticipated] and the greatest evil threatened, when equally believed and reflected on, is sufficient to engage the Will to choose the good and refuse the evil, and is that alone which doth move the Will to choose or to refuse. . . . [Hence], the determinations of the Will must evermore follow the
illumination, conviction and notice of the Understanding, with regard to the greatest good and evil proposed, reckoning both the degree of good and evil understood, and the degree of understanding, notice and conviction of that proposed good and evil; and . . . it is thus necessarily, and can be otherwise in no instance; because it implies a contradiction, to suppose it ever to be otherwise.¹

Similarly, the psychological hedonism of the Utilitarians of the nineteenth century usually assumed that choice is controlled by the preconceived future pleasurableness of the end, or desired state-of-things: in John Stuart Mill's famous thesis,² “desiring a thing and finding it pleasant are but different names for the same fact.” Even some recent and elaborate analyses of volition seem not wholly exempt from this assumption of the determination of choice by the foreseen (or imagined) satisfyingness of the consummation of the present desire or interest.

But this is, I believe, a simple psychological error—an error about the time at which pleasantness and unpleasantness is or are operative as determinants of voluntary choice.³ The future as such, as we have already remarked, is not the efficient cause of the present, and an “end,” a “good proposed,” or final cause, must somehow be repre-

¹ Freedom of the Will, p. 9, in Works, N. Y. 1881, p. 49.
² The passage here cited does not set forth the whole of Mill's ethical doctrines by any means; but it appears to express the psychological premise which he regarded as substantiating that doctrine.
³ There is, it is true, a form of hedonism which does not fall into this error. It is what Troland has named the “hedonism of the present.”
presented by a present surrogate if it is to be supposed to influence present choice or action. The affective determinant of deliberate desire is, then, the felt relative pleasantness or welcomeness of an idea of a future state-of-things at the moment of choice—the present valuedness of the idea, not the anticipated future value of the state-of-things.⁴

Now at such a moment there are two quite distinct kinds of ideas of future states-of-things which may be present for awareness (future in the sense of subsequent to that moment), namely, the idea of the end, or the state-of-things conceived as potentially resulting from the choice and the act, and the idea of the choice or the act itself, or of oneself conceived as choosing or acting in a certain manner. And (this is a crucial proposition in the present argument, the presupposition of a certain conclusion of which the importance will appear more fully later), the chooser’s idea of himself as possessing and manifesting in his contemplated act certain qualities or powers or characteristics which he can now at the moment of choice regard with pleasure (or at least without displeasure) can, and often does, have present value, i.e., is a determinant of desire. This desire has no necessary or fixed connection with the desire for ends, or termini of action, conceived as about-to-be-satisfying when attained. The wish to get or achieve something by one’s act, and the wish to be something in one’s act, are

⁴ There is, of course, nothing original in this thesis; and it would be disputed by some psychologists. But the above summary statement of it and of what seem to me good—and, indeed, obvious—reasons for accepting it, must, in the interest of brevity, suffice for the purpose of the present lecture.
radically different phenomena. We must therefore distinguish—and the distinction is, I think, a fundamental but much neglected one—between what we may call terminal values and adjectival values. Both have, or may have, present valuedness, may be objects of present desire.

How different these two types of desire are may be seen from the fact that the two may manifestly tend to opposite courses of action. Victims of the Inquisition who did not look forward to post-mortem rewards, had, obviously, no desire to be burned at the stake; nevertheless, they also presumably shrank from abjuring their actual beliefs and of thinking of themselves as renegades or cowards; the latter motive being the more powerful in them, they refused to recant their heresy. On the other hand, the same action may be prompted by either type of motive, or by one re-enforcing the other. The consideration—to descend to a less exalted example—that if I eat Welsh rabbit this evening, I shall much regret it tomorrow, may not suffice to deter me from the eating—if I like welsh-rabbit. But the addition of

5 Since the above was written I have, through the courtesy of Dr. John C. Whitehorn, formerly Director of the Department of Psychiatry in The Johns Hopkins Medical School, received a copy of a striking address delivered by him in 1951, in which he recognizes clearly the distinction between what I have called adjectival and terminal values, which he expressed by the terms "the desire for roles" and "the desire for goals." "Human beings set patterns for themselves, they formulate roles. . . . To perform skilled acts, to be a charming hostess, or a genial host, or a high-pressure salesman, or a scholar and a gentleman—such roles appear to outrank in value, to many, the attainment of the practical goals toward which such patterns appear to be directed. . . . Many psychiatrists . . . have become accustomed to
the consideration that those who obtain trivial present pleasure at the cost of future pain are gluttonous fools, or weak-minded, may suffice to turn the scale in favor of abstinence.

These two types of motivation, then—the desire for *ends of action* and the desire for *qualities or adjectives as agent*—are irreducible to one another, and are in constant interplay in the inner experience of man and in the determination of his voluntary acts. There is no reason to assume the latter is never the more powerful; on the contrary, there is much evidence to show that it is usually the more powerful.

With the preceding distinctions made explicit, it is now possible to state unambiguously the meaning of the further general question: How does self-consciousness affect desire and choice? That question, upon the assumptions which have been laid down, now means for us this: What ideas pertinent to the possible action of an individual have their pleasantness or unpleasantness conditioned for him by the fact that he is self-conscious?

Now there are two essentially different ways in which the object-self may be conceived by the subject-self—the "Me"...
by the "I." It may, namely, be conceived as (1) a potential enjoyer of satisfactions or avoider of dissatisfactions, or (2) as a desirer or chooser of ends or a potential performer of acts. It is upon the peculiar desires conditioned by the second form of self-consciousness that I chiefly wish to dwell; but something should be said about the former. In this, the satisfactions in question may be of any sort under heaven, or above it. Actions which are in fact directed towards some such satisfactions are, of course, not necessarily accompanied by any explicit self-reference; they may be simply "drives." Seeking food when hungry may be a wholly un-self-conscious act. It eventuates in a satisfactory future experience of the self, but it is the response to an organic urge which may, and in the lower animals presumably does, operate without the aid of any distinction between self and nonself—being in this respect entirely similar to those urges which do not terminate in future satisfactions, such as the self-destructive impulse of the lemmings or the impulse of the mother-bird to draw predatory animals away from the nest at the risk of her own life. But when the idea of self supervenes upon the original or

potent factor in behavior; (b) "roles" and "goals" does not sharply indicate the potentially different relations, both temporal and qualitative, of the two types of desire to the real determinant of choice at the moment of decision. A "role" may, it is true, also become a "goal," i.e., be anticipated as about to be pleasurable when carried out; but it need not be, and may be the opposite, e.g., the role of martyr or of leader of a forlorn hope in battle. Dr. Whitehorn's address, "Social Psychodynamics," has been published in *The Journal of Psychiatric Social Work*, vol. 21, p. 2 ff.
acquired outfit of impulses, it profoundly modifies their action and may completely suppress some of them; and the first way in which it does so is by giving a special potency to those impulses or desires which are recognized as tending to eventuate in a future satisfaction of the object-self, and diminishing or destroying the potency of those which do not so eventuate. In short, it makes man capable of what is called deliberate selfishness—that is, of valuing ends because it is his own objective-self that will be the possessor or enjoyer of them, and it tends to deprive other ends of subjective value, that is, of present appeal to the subject-self.

It has, it is true, been denied by some psychologists, and notably by William James, that the mere first personal pronoun or pronominal adjective has this power to give to ends a desirableness which they would not otherwise possess or to rob others of an appeal, a present pleasantness, which they otherwise would possess. The pronoun “Me,” it is said, is an abstraction. The “I” values things as good, “instinctively” or otherwise, and the things that it values it then, and therefore, calls “my” goods. But this view is, I think, contradicted by the evidence of experience. The first personal pronoun does have at times a strange value-enhancing or value-minimizing efficacy. For it is a notorious fact that in some persons it counteracts the most powerful primary impulses. I refer especially to those which, though biologically useful, that is, favorable to the preservation of the species, are known not to be conducive to the future satisfaction of the individual. Men do sometimes ask, with respect to propensions of this kind, “What after all do I get out of it?” And when they conclude that the object-self will
get nothing out of it, they often enough repress their so-called "natural" inclinations, i.e., those which would be natural if men were devoid of self-consciousness. I do not say that this always or even usually happens; and I do not here discuss whether or how far, it is good that it should happen. But nothing seems more obvious than that calculations of self-interest—of what will satisfy the object-self conceived as an enjoyer—occur, and are, as such, more or less effective in the determination of behavior; the entire history of hedonistic ethics is a part of the evidence on the issue. A crucial instance may be seen in the belief in reincarnation. The Hindu is apparently more concerned about the condition in which he will be reborn than about the future rebirths of others. Why—since there is not assumed by him to be any continuous awareness of personal identity from one birth to another? Solely, it would appear, because he has learned to call one among the innumerable beings who will be born in the future "Me." It is about the fate of this one that he is peculiarly interested simply because the first personal pronoun is supposed to be in some sense applicable to it, and not to the others.

Yet though the self-conscious animal, looking upon the "Me" as a possible experiencer of satisfactions, thereby becomes capable of egoism in a sense in which no other animal is, he by the same process acquires certain other peculiar potencies which have, or may have, a contrary tendency. For, in the first place, the concept "myself" is meaningless except in contrast with "not-myself"; it implies at least a potential "other." And in its genesis, according to a theory held by some, the consciousness of self was the
result of the prior discovery of an other. One form of this
time would make the awareness of self arise through the
shock of opposition. A creature which encountered no re-
sistance, which lived in a world where it had everything
its own way, would perhaps never have the antithesis of self
and not-self forced upon its attention. If this were sufficient
to generate self-consciousness, we should have to ascribe
that attribute to the animals; and it may be that, in this
sense, they have a rudimentary and passing awareness of
the antithesis, whenever they encounter obstacles, pain-
causing objects, or enemies. But this is plainly not sufficient
to account for the form which the contrast of self and not-
self takes in man. If we must have a theory of the genesis
of self-consciousness in him, the most plausible is that sug-
gested in variant forms by Clifford, Royce, Baldwin, and
others; that the infant becomes conscious of himself as a
definite object of reference by first becoming aware—per-
haps through imitation of their actions, and the discovery
of the inner “feel” of those actions—that there are other
beings who have feelings like his own, and then discovering
that he and his experiences are objects for them, that they
think of him—the so-called theory of the self as a “secondary
eject.” I cannot avoid some suspicion of a certain logical
circularity in this genetic explanation; some self-conscious-
ness seems to be already assumed in the very process by
which its origination is explained; and in any case, it is of
the nature of really genetic theories not to explain. If the
thing to be accounted for is truly something new, an “emer-
gent” or pure “mutation,” then, though the theory may
correctly describe the circumstances preceding or attending
its emergence, it cannot deduce the necessity of its emerging
from those circumstances. But at all events, it is patent that
in man the "other" which gives meaning by contrast to the
notion of the self does in fact consist chiefly of other
persons, conceived as similar to the "Me," and conceived
also as having the "Me"—what we may call "Me number
one"—as an object of their thought and feeling; and Hegel
does not greatly exaggerate when he writes in the Phenomen­
ology that "self-consciousness exists in itself and for itself,
in that, and by the fact that, it exists for another self-con­
sciousness."

The makeshift polar counterpart of "the Me," then, being
for man largely other selves, assumed to have the sort of
experiences that he has, *his* self-consciousness implies that
there are many other potential enjoyers of satisfactions. The
effects of this upon his emotions and desires are complex
and various; but in view of what has already been said of
the determination of desire, one effect is that he may desire,
i.e., take pleasure in the idea of, the enjoyment of satisfac­
tions by others; and it is, I suggest, a fact of universal ex­
perience that this frequently occurs. Eighteenth-century
moralists used to discuss at much length whether such de­
sires could be called "disinterested." The distinctions al­
ready indicated make the answer easy; it is usually, if not
always, the pleasantness of the idea of others' satisfaction
to the subject-self of the moment, the present interest of the
I, that determines the desire; but the pleasant idea in these
cases is not that of the satisfaction of the "Me"; and this
is disinterestedness in the only psychologically admissible
sense of the term.
Man, then, by virtue of the other-consciousness which is deeply interwoven with his self-consciousness, is an animal aware of the fact that there are others "having insides of their own," though like his own; and this, so far as we have any means of judging, is not true of any other animal. It is apparently one of the biological differentiae of his species, which certainly affects his desires and therefore his behavior, though with astonishing individual variations in the degree in which it does so, and on the whole much less than one might have expected and might wish that it did. That, on balance, the two associated affective consequences of self-consciousness which we have thus far noted make the concrete behavior of men more serviceable to the well-being of others of their own kind, and—aside from other factors—more favorable to the survival of the species, is at least extremely questionable.

2

It may, then, serve to clarify our historical survey if we indicate certain further distinctions. These, when expressed, may seem very obvious; nevertheless, both our seventeenth and eighteenth century analysts of human nature and, I think, some very recent psychologists, do not always keep them clearly in mind. Under certain common generic names many of the older writers tended to confuse several affective phenomena which, though they are certainly closely related and perhaps rarely present in isolation, are by no means identical. We need not, at this point, attempt any adequate
analysis of the nature and interconnections of the familiar types of experience which we are distinguishing. For the present, our main concern is to discriminate these types sufficiently for purposes of identification, when we encounter references to them in the texts; to provide them with convenient names; and to intimate, by way of prelude, some of the aspects of them which seem significant for the general theory of man.

i. First, then, is that peculiarity of man which consists in a susceptibility to pleasure in, or a desire for, the thought of oneself as an object of thoughts or feelings, of certain kinds, on the part of other persons. Of this, three varieties or degrees, at least, may be distinguished. There is (a) as the minimal form of it, the mere wish to be "noticed," to be at least an object of attention and interest on the part of others. There is (b) the desire for affective attitudes—sympathy, friendliness, affection, love—which are not conceived as necessarily equivalent to appraisals, to value-judgments about us, though such attitudes may or may not in fact, in the minds of the others, be conditioned by such judgments. Children, it is to be hoped, usually have an affection for their parents, however little they may approve of them. There is (c) the desire for some form or degree of what is called a "good opinion" of oneself on the part of other men. What is desired in this last case by A, the subject, is usually a state of feeling, but not simply a state of feeling, in B, the other fellow, about A. The thought that A wants B to have about him is a favorable judgment, and there is implicit in the desire, therefore, the notion of truth or falsity, since that is always implicit in the idea of a judgment. B's appraisal
of A, in short, may be true or false, either because B does not know the relevant facts about A or because he applies a wrong standard of valuation; we are all acquainted with people who complain that they have been "misjudged." The ways of thinking or feeling about us—about our qualities or acts or characters—which are desired on the part of others manifestly range through a scale of degrees which our common vocabulary roughly distinguishes: notice, interest, approval, respect, consideration, esteem, praise, admiration, applause, honor, veneration. These all, equally obviously, have their negative counterparts, running from mere indifference to contempt, which are correspondingly objects of aversion—supposed states of others' minds towards the self, the thought of which is to it, in differing degrees, unpleasant and repellent—though the negative counterpart of the least pleasurable of the positive series is, rather notoriously, usually the most unpleasant; to be in a society and not to be noticed at all, to feel oneself not to be the object of anyone's interest or attention, seems to be, to most human creatures, most intolerable of all—a peculiarity which some have thought that dogs appear to share with us.

I have distinguished the three species of this genus of hedonic susceptibilities chiefly for the purpose of preventing confusion of the second with the third, which is the one pertinent to the subject of these lectures. Since it will be convenient to have a single name for this trait of man, we may steal one from the vocabulary of the now nearly extinct phrenologists, and call it "approbativeness"—using the word as a generic name for the several varieties or degrees
of that desire which are listed in a "definition" of it in a phrenological text-book:

Love of praise; desire to excel and be esteemed; ambition; desire to display and show off; ... desire for a good name, for notoriety, fame . . . and to be well thought of, sensitiveness to the speeches of other people, and love of popularity. 

Two of the more obvious peculiarities of approbative-ness may be noted in passing. Since the pleasure by which the desire is gratified attaches to the subject's belief about the thoughts of others about himself, that belief is manifestly extremely liable to arise from error or delusion—and, indeed, the desire is likely to generate error and delusion in proportion to its intensity, as the theological assailants and literary satirists of man's "pride" in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were disagreeably given to pointing out at length. It has also frequently been pointed out in later observations of this craving that it is variable with respect to the groups of others whose esteem or approbation is most desired—children notoriously often being far more concerned about the favorable opinions of schoolmates than of teachers or parents, criminals about that of their fellow-gangsters than of dull, law-abiding citizens, scholars about the "judgment of their peers" than of the profanum vulgus. These variables are in turn often subject to variations and reversals in the same person in different social milieux; a desire to enjoy, or to believe that one enjoys, the esteem or

6 The Self-Instructor in Phrenology and Physiology, by O. S. and L. N. Fowler, reprint, 1899.
admiration of any company in which one at the moment happens to be, is apparently not uncommon, and since the criteria of the admirable in different milieus are highly various, the individual having such a desire may be protean, exhibiting, so to say, different colorings, a distinct "personality," in each group in which he finds himself.

Our familiarity with this trait of human nature—I mean "approbativeness" in general—tends to make us overlook its strangeness as a biological phenomenon. Regarded as such, it is so strange that some behavioristic psychologists and others in our time have denied its existence, or at least profess to be themselves devoid of it, while still behaving in ways which would be unintelligible if it were absent. They—and other men—they declare, care only about what other creatures overtly and physically do to them; a society of robots, recognized as such, is, we are told, as satisfying as any other, provided they are harmless and serviceable robots. There are indeed, philosophers living, and teaching in great universities, who have maintained that the very terms "others' thoughts" or "others' feelings"—including, therefore, others' thoughts or feelings about us—are but meaningless sounds; though these same philosophers continue to write books and articles apparently designed to be read and agreed with by others; and they seem incomprehensibly to exhibit symptoms of dissatisfaction when disparaging adjectives are applied by others to these works. Since those who profess these views are learned and distinguished persons—though, if what they say were true, the word "distinguished" itself would have no meaning—I ought perhaps to examine the grounds offered for such opinions; but there
is here no time for that, and—to speak in a way which
would be discourteous only if it were applied, as it here is
not, to those who admit that I am really thinking about them
—there appear to me to be heights of silliness sometimes
attained by philosophers which it is not very profitable to
take time to discuss.\footnote{I have, however, examined this one in “The Paradox of the
135-147.}

For the purpose of these lectures, at any rate, I shall
assume that “approbativeness” exists, and that it actuates
men’s behavior. But, as I have said, the tendency of some
contemporaries to deny its existence may serve to suggest
how great a biological anomaly it appears to be. An animal
which has an urgent desire for a thought \textit{of} a thought—and
of a thought not its own—and whose action is profoundly
affected by this type of desire, more profoundly and more
pervasively than by any other, as some contemporaries and
many of the older writers have held—that is man; and he
is therefore a singular member of the animal kingdom. We
shall find a number of the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
tury theories of human nature defining this as the differ-
entia of man \textit{par excellence}, on the side of his “passions,” or
springs of action, as distinguished from his degree of intelli-
gençe—the attribute that, for better or worse, sets him apart
from all other species—the great point, or one of the great
points, of discontinuity in nature, i.e., to put it in modern
phrasing, of discontinuity in the modes of determination of
the motion of matter—since a determinant of human be-
behavior is a determinant of the motion of those material aggregates called human bodies.

Approbativeness is a type of desire that is wholly indeterminate with respect to the modes of behavior that may result from it. For it manifestly presupposes approbations and disapprobations; it is a human trait which is conditioned by another human trait—the habit characteristic, probably, of all individuals of the species, of passing judgments of approval, admiration, etc., and their opposites, upon the qualities or acts of other individuals. If, then, there can be said to be any “laws” of approbativeness—any verifiable generalizations, at least statistical generalizations, about the ways in which it works—they will (subject to certain qualifications) be secondary to the laws of approbation and admiration. The nature of the acts which the approbative individual performs will be determined by what the people whose esteem or admiration he desires do in fact esteem and admire. The study of the one phenomenon, then, ought to be—though it frequently is not—correlated with the study of the other. Now, the phenomena of approbation are extremely diverse, and there are some interesting questions about them concerning which differing opinions have been held—in the period which we are to consider, and in our own time. Historically, the human traits or acts approved or admired obviously vary in different peoples and cultures, and in different periods of the same culture, and in different classes in the same period. It is, of course, one of the important tasks of the historian of ideas to record the sequence of changes in what may be called the approbata and admirata in a given society. These will coincide largely,
but by no means completely, with changes in the currently accepted moral codes, as embodied in the *mores*. The coincidence is incomplete, for one reason, among others, because admiration and simple approval do not differ merely in degree; they are often, possibly oftener than not, evoked by different objects. There are, I incline to think, instances of admiration which are spontaneous, essentially aesthetic responses in the individual to certain characteristics or modes of action in other men; and these responses may be out of accord with the ordinary moral criteria which the same individual accepts. Exceptional courage, strength of will, intellectual power, may evoke admiration independently of any moral approbation of the behavior in which they are manifested. The history of men's admirations would be largely a study of their heroes—the characters, actual or fictitious, who, in different periods, were in a high degree the objects of this feeling—with an attempt to determine what, in particular, in the heroes, aroused the feeling.

But to know the historical facts about men's approbations and admirations, and their changes, is the least difficult part of the business. There still remains the question of the causes or conditioning antecedents, of any given widely prevalent valuation of one type of human quality or character, and of the change from it to a quite different one. Why, under what influences, in connection with what other processes, did that valuation originate, and later give place, it may be, to its opposite?

It is, moreover, evident that approbation or admiration, and their opposites, are not primary, i.e., unanalyzable or irreducible, phenomena. For they, too, are attended by
pleasantness or unpleasantness. People take pleasure in approving, admiring, applauding, idolizing others; they also take pleasure—frequently, as is notorious, a more intense pleasure—in disapproving, censuring, dispraising. Any of these mental acts may therefore be manifestations of something lying deeper—the desire to enjoy the pleasure attaching to them. And any such desire, in turn, may be a manifestation of some more general and fundamental hedonic susceptibility. The pleasure of approving and expressing approval, or its opposite, may be (I am not saying that it always is) due to the satisfaction which it affords the self-esteem, the sense of importance, or the feeling of superiority, of the approver (motives which we shall shortly consider more particularly). To approve, and still more to disapprove, is to sit in judgment on your fellows; and the rôle of judge is naturally a gratifying one. Now the approver or disapprover is also an object of approbation or disapprobation on the part of others; there are approbations of approbations and, indeed, of the approbational attitude in general. And John’s approbation or disapprobation of James, qua approver or disapprover, may be determined by his conjecture or suspicion as to James’s underlying motive in mounting the judge’s bench. If he believes that—especially in disapproving or condemning—James is gratifying his vanity or self-esteem or wish to think himself better than others, John is likely to disapprove James’s attitude of disapprobation. But in doing so, he may be unconsciously actuated by fundamentally the same type of motive that he condemns in James. What are called censorious people, persons who disapprove too much, are not popular partly because it is sus-
pected that they must take a malicious pleasure in a state of mind in which they so frequently indulge, but which runs counter to the approbative desires of other men. If, then, John wishes to be approved by James—and everybody else—he will restrain his own dissapprobative propensities. Approbateness thus tends to impose checks on disapprobation—or at least on the manifestation of it—through disapprobation. Such are a few of the complex involutions arising from the fact that approbation or disapprobation may be directed on itself.

Approbation or disapprobation may likewise be directed upon approbateness. A man, or a people, may be approved for manifesting "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind." On the other hand, if James believes that John's act is prompted merely by a desire for approbation—especially for some of its more extreme forms, admiration or applause or fame—he may disapprove, or at least fail to admire, John and his motive, even though he may welcome the act resulting from that motive. This tendency to disapprove of approbateness is, however, very variable. It appears to be more characteristic of some peoples or cultures than others. Savages and some civilized peoples do not seem to think ill of a man for betraying the fact that he values and desires esteem, admiration, applause. Some among the ancient Greeks and Romans apparently regarded this desire as not only pardonable but laudable. Aristotle, for example, sets it down among the virtues, provided it be not exaggerated, that is, disproportionate to one's actual deserts. For what he calls μεγαλοψυχία (usually translated "greatness of soul" or "magnanimity") is expressly defined by him as "reaching out after esteem" or "honor"
"He who thinks esteem a small thing, will think everything else a small thing," for it is the principal reason why other desiderata are desired. This kind of pride "appears to be a sort of crown [or ornament, κόσμος] of the virtues; it enhances them and cannot come into existence without them."\(^8\) Aristotle, it is true, in his picture of the \(\mu\varepsilon\gamma\alpha\lambda\omicron\phi\nu\chi\omicron\) frequently confuses approbativeness with self-esteem, so that it is sometimes impossible to be sure to which he is referring; what is pertinent here is the fact that he is far from condemning the former—or, in fact, either. Neither modesty nor the concealment of one's good deeds or qualities seems to have been usually counted by the Greeks among the virtues. Other examples of this from classical writers might be cited.\(^9\)

In our own code, however, the tendency to disapprove of manifestations of approbativeness is a conspicuous feature, though with curious variations. It is a paradoxical and, I think, (if I may express a disapprobation of my own) a rather unfortunate development in human nature. For James's approbation becomes effective as an influence upon John's behavior through John's approbativeness. In so far, then, as approbativeness is disapproved, approbation works against itself, tends to weaken the force through which it functions. It is probably incapable of greatly weakening the subjective desire; but it forces that desire to conceal

\(^8\) Nicomachean Ethics, II, 7; IV, 4.
\(^9\) E.g., Euripides, Medea, 543-5: Jason exclaims: "May there be no gold in my house, nor may I sing strains more sweet than those of Orpheus, if it be my lot not to be distinguished [or applauded]." What he is apparently saying is that he would find no value either in wealth or in the highest artistic achievement, if neither gained public recognition.
itself and so gives rise to a vast deal of insincerity; and it deprives that useful desire of some of its natural gratification. Disapprobation of approbativeins or of the candid manifestation of it, ought, I suggest, to be disapproved; for it springs from motives which, when recognized, are normally disapproved as unpleasing traits of human nature. It is possible and desirable to take pleasure in the innocent and unconcealed pleasure of another man in being praised. We do not, for example, tend to disapprove the aversion from, or fear of, disapprobation, but rather the desire of approbation. But also, disapproval of the latter varies with the nature of the acts or qualities for which approbation is desired. It is less usually applied to the desire for admiration and praise for the successful public performance of specific acts of skill; we do not condemn actors or opera-singers for seeking applause, and we take pleasure in giving it to them. It is the manifestation of a desire for approbation of what are usually distinguished as moral qualities or acts that most commonly arouses disapprobation; and though the motivation of this is certainly complex, it is clearly due largely to a feeling that such approbativeins itself is a morally unadmirable or even reprehensible motive. This feeling has been insistently inculcated by Christianity. "Take heed that ye do not your righteousness before men, to be seen of them. . . . When thou givest alms, let not thy left hand know what thy right doeth: that thine alms may be in secret."

As a spring of action—a desire seeking satisfaction—it is, in its more normal manifestations, not only obviously of the greatest social utility, but also usually the object of social
approbation and admiration. For, in so far as its satisfaction is conditioned upon actual achievement, it is a potent incentive to the maximum exercise of the energies of the individual; if no one ever cared about reaching the head of the class, it is probable that classes—whether in schools or in the activities of later life—would show a much lower level of performance than they do. And those who are actuated by this desire, at least in certain of its forms, are, if I am not mistaken, generally more highly esteemed than those who do not. The pass-man in a college is not, I suppose, commonly more highly thought of than the honors man.

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ii. It is, however, equally plainly characteristic of man that he likes not only to be well thought of but also to think well of himself; this trait—both the capacity for pleasure in, and the desire for, a pleasing idea of oneself—I shall call self-approbation, or the desire for self-esteem. In the older terminology, it is sometimes designated by the same names as approbation, the difference in the author's reference needing to be gathered from the context. The French _amour-propre_, and sometimes the English "self-love," and the now obsolete word "philauty" are also ambiguous; either may, in different writers or contexts, refer to the desire for individual pleasure or satisfaction of any kind, or to self-esteem exclusively.

In this type of experience the self as chooser or as actor
is conceived by itself as actually or potentially characterized in these capacities by certain adjectives or epithets—in other words, as possessing certain qualities—more or less irrespective of appraisals of it by others. It has, indeed, been questioned whether self-esteem is not a derivative from approbateness, and whether some dim sense of a potential external approver is not always present in it. But I shall assume it to be a fact that it can exist without an explicit reference to any actual thought of others about oneself, so that one finds a present satisfaction simply in thinking that one is—or is about to be—the proper subject of favorable adjectives, or a present dissatisfaction—which is usually, I think, in most men more intense and more potent as a determinant of behavior than the corresponding satisfaction—in thinking of oneself as characterizable by disparaging or condemnatory adjectives.

Men, in short, obviously, have a peculiarly intense hedonic susceptibility to self-esteem and are moved in their conduct by a desire or need of it; some modest measure of it, at least, is probably—as much evidence from psychopathology tends to show—indispensable to endurable existence for creatures constituted as we are. It is the need which, in its pathological forms, generates “compensations” and delusions of grandeur.

The question of the relations of self-esteem to approbateness is, however, not a simple one. They are manifestly closely related. Self-approbation is supported by the approbation of others; it is easier to feel satisfied with your qualities or your acts or performances if your fellows appear to think highly of them. On the other hand, self-
esteem may take the form of an indifference to or contempt for the opinion of other persons, or of some classes or types of other persons. The individual esteems himself the more because he is, or believes himself to be, unconcerned about the esteem of his neighbors; and those who give alms in secret perhaps gain more in enhanced self-approval than they lose through the repression of their approbativeness. And whereas it is obvious that approbativeness tends in the main to compliance with social, that is, external, requirements and standards, the desire for self-esteem—in certain though by no means in all forms—may manifest itself outwardly in bumptiousness, aggressiveness, defiance of social conventions and rules. It is, in short, sometimes a revolt of the individual against his own approbativeness, which he feels, puts him into a humiliating position of subjection to other men—that is, to their judgments or feelings about him. It is, in this form, an attainment which the Cynic and Stoic schools in antiquity conceived to be an essential part of moral excellence, exemplified best of all in the traditional pictures of Diogenes as a model of the supreme and godlike virtue of “self-sufficiency”; though, as Diogenes was also rather ostentatious about it, Plato and others, according to the familiar stories, intimated that his professed scorn of other men’s opinions of him was only a way of “showing off.”

To proclaim your freedom from approbativeness is plainly to manifest approbativeness—to make it evident that you wish to be admired by others for your indifference to

their admiration. I remember hearing an English public man, in a speech addressed to a group of Americans during World War I, boast that the English never boasted.

But though self-esteem—either the feeling of it or the desire for the feeling—may manifest itself in a disregard or defiance of socially current criteria of the approvable or admirable, it need not do so, and usually does not. The individual may, the average man does, accept those criteria, and find or seek to find his satisfaction in the belief that his qualities or performances conform to them in a sufficient, or in an unusual, degree—whatever others may think. When this is the case, the desire of self-esteem, not less than approbativeness, becomes a potent subjective enforcer of the mores. Or his self-esteem or disesteem may be not solely an echo of current valuations, but a return upon himself of his own spontaneous, quasi-aesthetic approbations or admirations of attributes which he has first observed in others, or of his spontaneous dislike or contempt of the opposite attributes, when he finds them in others. The desire to be like the persons one admires—or to be like them in that particular characteristic or potency which one admires in them—is certainly one of the most powerful springs of action, especially in the young.

For self-appraisal, whether favorable or unfavorable—and most of all, the appraisal, at the moment preceding choice, of alternative possible acts of one's own—is profoundly affected by the fact that every man is also an approver or disapprover of others. As he applies adjectives or epithets to them and their acts, so do they to him and his acts. And his need of some degree of self-esteem is thereby, as it
were, caught in a trap—or, to change the figure, his approbations or disapprobations of his fellows are converted into boomerangs. For it is difficult to approve in oneself qualities or acts which one condemns and berates in others. Thus the desire to think well or at any rate, not to think too badly of oneself is a motive making for conformity to something analogous to the categorical imperative; the standards of approbation or disapprobation which the individual applies to himself, or to the contemplated courses of action to which other motives incline him, tend to be the same as those which he would apply to all human beings under similar circumstances. It is not, to be sure, true that they invariably are. An individual's need for self-esteem also often begets great ingenuity in finding reasons for thinking his own case exceptional; and some people's serene unconsciousness of faults in themselves which they violently censure in their neighbors is one of the familiar themes of comedy. Yet in the main, I think, the working of this desire is controlled by a simple logic of consistency—by the rule of judging of yourself as you would judge of others. It is not that men, in general, consciously adopt such a rule as a moral imperative, but that they cannot wholly avoid acting in accordance with it; and when they fail to do so, their fellows are usually quick to point out the inconsistency. Thus, though the desire to have a favorable opinion of one's own behavior or performances is undeniably, in a sense an egoistic or self-regarding motive it is capable of counteracting all other self-regarding motives, and of introducing a kind of impersonality into the determination of the action of individuals. It is a sort of desire which
is inevitably entangled with the first ingredient of rationality or logicality—the formal principle of self-consistency. Nor, evidently, is it merely the form of reasonableness that naturally becomes associated with this desire; the specific content or criterion of self-appraisal also tends to become depersonalized. James, as approver or disapprover of John, is unlikely to approve of conduct by John which causes pain or injury to himself, James; and since he is also an approver or disapprover of himself, and since his self-judgments—or his judgments of future actions which he might perform—normally consist in applying to these the same adjectives which the same kinds of qualities or acts on John's part habitually evoke in him, it is—in so far as the desire of self-approbation is actually influencing his choice—difficult for him to think well of himself as causing pain to John. The difficulty, unhappily, is by no means an impossibility, partly because the self-approbative desire may be overcome by others, partly because self-esteem, once more, is fertile in suggesting sophistical reasons—in short, "rationalization"—for differentiating the case of John from his own case, and so for gratifying without self-reproach his inclination to actions which may be injurious to John. Nevertheless, the desire for self-esteem does—among its very diverse effects—exercise a pressure upon the individual towards conformity with the rule: Do unto others as ye would that they should do unto you. The question: "What would you think of me if I did to you the sort of thing that you are doing to me?" is always a hard challenge to meet; but it is an appeal which gets its potency from
the desire for self-approval of the person to whom it is addressed.

There is, moreover, as I indicated earlier,¹¹ a yet more essential relation between self-appraisiveness and morality —by which term I here mean, not good or desirable overt behavior, but a certain type of subjective experience, apparently peculiar to man. Though anyone is free, of course, to define the word “moral” as he likes, there is a sense—and, I think, the most appropriate and useful sense—of the word in which it may be said that it is by virtue of the desire for approbative—or nondisapprobative—adjectival values for his acts or qualities that man is a moral agent. For that type of experience which would generally be called “moral” (in the descriptive, not the eulogistic sense) certainly does not consist simply in being aware that the desire for one potentially realizable terminal value is stronger than the desire for another. The distinguishing fact about this sort of experience is that it requires a special verb for its expression—the verb “ought,” with the first personal pronoun for its subject. And those who use this expression obviously do not mean by it merely “I desire.”

It is to be noted that, like appraisiveness, the craving for self-esteem or aversion from self-disesteem seems a biological singularity. Though we have little, if any, real knowledge of the subjective life of other organisms, we have no reason to suppose that they are what men certainly are—desirers and fearers of adjectives. This desire, together

¹¹ In an article “Terminal and Adjectival Values” in The Journal of Philosophy, vol. XLVII, p. 593 ff., from which part of the above is taken.
with approbativeness, is the most conspicuous manifestation in our appetitive life of what is, to all appearance, the great chasm in the organic world—the chasm between simply conscious and self-conscious animals. But it is at least clear that between a creature which simply feels, perceives, acts, and one which has come to form an idea of *itself* as a distinct entity *that* feels, perceives, acts, there cannot but be a profound difference. For by virtue of his self-consciousness man is divided within and against himself; every man, in so far as he experiences this mode of consciousness, has in a sense—though not necessarily in the psychopathologist’s sense—a split personality. He has a complex mass of instincts, appetites, drives, desires, potentialities, feelings, emotions, attitudes, which make up what, at any given moment, he primarily is; but he is also capable, at least at other moments, of taking the attitude of external observer towards all of these, of looker-on at the very process of his own experience, and at himself as the experiencer or the doer of it all. He is in short, both actor and spectator, both performer and commentator on or critic of the performance. It is doubtless true, as some psychologists have insisted, that the spectator is never totally identical with the actor, at the same instant. His concrete momentary personality, when he is conscious of himself, includes components—e.g., certain feelings—of which he is not at the same time fully self-conscious. There is validity in the distinction between the subjective self of the moment, which is thinking, or *is* the thinking, and the objectified self which is being thought about—between (in William James’s terms) the I and the Me. Nevertheless, the very essence of the experience is a judgment of identifica-
tion of the two; the subject, or I, says to itself: this Me, this being that I am thinking about, is nevertheless in some sense and in some degree the same as the present, living, conscious I who am now thinking about it. The word “Me” is still simply the objective case of the first personal pronoun. Without this assumption of identity the emotions connected with self-consciousness would lose all their poignancy.

In any properly systematic theory of human nature man’s self-consciousness would be recognized as a pervasive factor with which all the rest should be correlated. The instincts and propensities which constitute our heritage from our animal ancestors, and all the primary emotive and appetitive states of consciousness and their combinations would, of course, be explored and discriminated; but the questions constantly asked would be: how do they interact with, how are they modified or transformed by, self-consciousness, and what emotions and desires are there in man which could not conceivably exist at all if he were not self-conscious? That self-consciousness is, so far as we can judge, the principle differentia of the species man, and is in any case the central fact which should control any well-ordered investigation of his nature and behavior, has not, so far as my reading goes, been at all generally realized by psychologists; but a growing appreciation of it is evident in the more recent literature on the subject. William James, who was not only a psychologist but also—what is by no means a synonymous expression—acquainted with human nature, was well aware of it; and it has been well emphasized by (among others) McDougall in his Social Psy-
chology, by Hocking in his *Human Nature and its Remaking*, and by Edman in his *Human Traits*. But books purporting to tell us about human nature, in which its fundamental generic peculiarity is not so much as mentioned, continue to be published and apparently to be eagerly purchased by the general public. Editions of *Hamlet* with Hamlet left out still flood the bookstores.

It must not, however, be supposed that self-consciousness as such accounts for the emotions and desires that are conditioned by it and associated with it—such as self-esteem and approbativeness. It is, no doubt, conceivable that man might have been a spectator of himself without being an applauding or a critical spectator—might have been simply a detached and disinterested looker-on at the spectacle of his own life; and it appears to have been the opinion of Mr. George Santayana that he can and should be. I may venture to add that diligent reading of nearly all of the philosophical writings of Santayana, who had an acute mind, has not left me with the impression that he was wholly unaware that he wrote in an original and brilliant style or that he took no pleasure in doing so, or that he did not intend or expect to affect the opinions and the physical behavior of others by the publication of his books—at least to cause the physical act of purchasing the books. But for the purposes of the student of man as he actually is, it is enough to accept the empirical fact that the self-conscious animal has certain unique emotional susceptibilities and desires and potentialities, and to note what these are, what their subspecies or derivatives are, and what sorts of external effects they produce. And, as it happens, it was in these
questions that the writers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with whom we shall later deal were especially interested. They were mainly exploring, or trying to explore, the realm of the desires of men qua self-conscious. They were not, it is true, always, or usually, aware that this was what they were doing. But the fact that they were doing it is what gives the preceding remarks their special relevance to the historical lectures that are to follow; for we shall now be able to have in mind the relation between the various particular reflections on men's motives which will be cited, and the general and distinguishing feature of the human constitution to which they are implicitly pertinent.

An individual's manifestation, in speech and manner, not of the desire for self-esteem but of the gratifying self-appraisal in which the desire finds its satisfaction, is, at least in our own mores, more generally and severely reprobated and repressed by one's fellows than are the manifestations of his approbativeness. Since his outward behavior is, nevertheless, powerfully influenced by his approbativeness, there is in him often a concealed conflict between the two desires—his approbativeness and his urge to give expression to his self-esteem or his pride in his qualities or achievements or possessions. This conflict seems to be especially acute in childhood and early adolescence, partly because one's fellows of that age are, especially in some cultures, even more zealous and severe in repressing the latter propensity than are parents and teachers. English schoolboys are ruthless in their treatment of any boy who seems to them to be given to "swank." In the end, i.e., in the adult, the de-
sire for social approbation, which can be obtained only by the suppression or the concealment of self-approbation or self-admiration, usually proves somewhat the stronger, though the degree of its preponderance varies widely with differences of early education, of the established rules of social intercourse in particular societies, and, within a society, of social classes. Whatever the means employed for repressing the outward manifestation of pride, and in spite of great variations and limitations of their potency, they manifestly have in a modern society considerable influence upon conduct. If you wish to conform to the accepted code, you must refer modestly, if at all, to yourself and your accomplishments and your belongings, and must deprecate the admiration and praise of these by others. "Ostentatious" is not a complimentary adjective. Yet, though the expression of pride, as of approbativeness, may be repressed, the inner feeling is not necessarily, or, it may be suspected, usually, thereby extinguished or even diminished; such, at least, as we shall see, was the opinion—or the confession—of some seventeenth- and eighteenth-century writers. In short, the effect of the conjunction in human nature of approbativeness with the propensity to self-esteem, and of the adverse impact of the former upon the manifestation of the latter, has been to produce a large amount of self-concealment and of insincerity in the average individual's intercourse with other members of his social group. He is expected to pay compliments to them, and often does so even though he may think the compliments excessive or unmerited; he is expected not to pay compliments to himself, even though he may think, and
perhaps justly think, that he deserves them. (In the Society of Friends, the former at least, I take it, is not expected or approved, since it is inconsistent with "plain speech.") Complete candor, in either respect, is hardly compatible with what is generally regarded as approvable social behavior. This may seem an unhappy consequence of the interplay of the two desires of self-conscious beings which we have been considering. But it is an actual and, human nature being what it is, perhaps not a wholly regrettable consequence. The two rules of the game (as we may call them) which I have just mentioned—praise others, don't praise yourself—probably serve to increase the total sum of pleasure enjoyed by the participants in social converse. The first rule does so obviously; the second, though it demands the repression of a strong natural propensity, may provide a compensation for this by a heightening of the individual's unexpressed self-esteem, arising from his sense of conforming to a generally approved requirement, which he himself approves when it is applied to others. Let me add that these latter observations must not be construed as implying a cynical view of all the motivations in ordinary social intercourse—though we shall find such a view expressed by some seventeenth- and eighteenth-century commentators on human nature. There certainly occur in man's emotional life (as I have already said) such things as genuine and intensely felt approbations and admirations of the qualities, motives, or actions of others, and there is a lively pleasure simply in giving such feelings expression—in bestowing praise. And there are some minds (not too numerous) who, without being oblivious of others' faults or
weaknesses, have a genius for discerning, in the very mixed complexes of qualities and motives that diversely characterize their fellows, the right things to praise. One could wish such minds more numerous. For it would appear that a social and self-conscious creature has an organic need of “appreciation” i.e., of praise, and would find existence almost insupportable without ever receiving any; but it also is necessary that praise be directed upon, and solely upon, what is (as Adam Smith would have said) in fact “praiseworthy.” But what this is I shall not here attempt to say; for that is a large question of ethics, and we are not in this lecture primarily concerned with ethics but with an inquiry into human nature—not what man ought to be but what he is.

4.

iii. There is a further type of desire—a variant form of the two thus far mentioned—which had a conspicuous place in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century theories of human nature and is receiving a good deal of attention in our own time—what is called the desire for superiority, or for the feeling of superiority; we shall name it, for the sake of brevity, emulativeness. Its negative counterpart, the aversion from the gnawing feeling of inferiority, plays a dominating part in the psychology and psychopathology of Alfred Adler and his school, whose ideas have been taken up by numerous biographers, historians, and novelists, and have become a part of the current popular psychology. Let
us first note some of the diverse effects of this subjective ingredient of human nature.

The nature of those effects will, of course, depend upon the nature of the quality or power or status in which the subject finds pleasure in believing himself superior to others. Attitudes and behavior the reverse of aggressive may be associated with, and even be motivated by, this feeling. The Stoic philosopher, the saint, or the Quaker, who submit to persecution without resistance, may—it is sometimes evident from their utterances that they do—feel themselves superior to their persecutors precisely because they do not resist; the Indian followers of Gandhi, it may plausibly be conjectured, had at least a gentle scorn for the spiritual crudity of the Western barbarians to whose physical power they outwardly submitted. The analysts of human motives who like to dwell especially upon this trait have been wont to point out that pride in one's pacific spirit, as in one's modesty or humility, may sometimes be the last refuge, and one of the more intense forms, of the sense of superiority.

Nor is the emulative desire for individual distinction among one's fellows inevitably or usually an exacting one. Hobbes, indeed, thought otherwise; "glory," he wrote, "consisteth in comparison and precelence," and therefore "if all men have it, no man hath it"—an observation wittily versified by W. S. Gilbert in the song in *The Gondoliers* which relates the disappointing experience of the too kind-hearted king who, aware of the universality of this passion,

To the top of every tree
Promoted everybody,
only to discover that he had rather diminished than increased the happiness of his subjects, since

When everybody’s somebody,
Then no one’s anybody.

The difficulty of generally gratifying this desire is not, however, really so great as this implies. Though not everyone can occupy the top of every tree, there are, in fact, many trees, and the emulativeness of the average man seems fairly satisfied if he can promote himself, at all events in his own mind, to the top of one, or a few, and those not necessarily the highest; the most essential thing—so far as this appetency is concerned—apparently is, not that there shall be none higher but, at any rate, some lower, “with whom comparing” (in Hobbes’s phrase) “the mind may find somewhat wherein to triumph and vaunt itself.” What are its relations to approbativeness and self-esteem? The term “desire for superiority” appears to cover several complex psychic states which need to be distinguished, primarily with reference to the nature of the desired objects or states-of-things. It may designate simply the comparative modes of approbativeness or of self-esteem. Both of these desires naturally tend to take that form because social approbations are so largely comparative. We are forever engaged in ranking people: “Mr. Jones is a more public-spirited citizen than Mr. Smith,” “Shakespeare is a greater dramatist than Ben Jonson.” The desire to be well thought of, or to think well of oneself, thus passes over into the desire to be thought, or to think oneself, better than somebody else, in some respect or other. But the desire for,
or the agreeable feeling of, superiority, in this sense, may exist without any unfriendly emotion or aggressive attitude towards others. A temperate man who pleasurably regards himself as superior to his too bibulous neighbor does not usually proceed to injure the drunkard, towards whom he may have the kindliest feeling. Simple emulation has nothing necessarily antisocial about it, but is obviously, on the contrary, of high social utility. When directed upon actual superiority in qualities or performances that are socially valued, and especially when it at the same time takes the form of a settled conviction of superiority, or of membership in a superior class, it may produce, not merely conformity to the accepted mores, but behavior excelling in disinterestedness and in social utility their ordinary requirements—"action above and beyond the call of duty," as the Army terms it. The individual becomes incapable of thinking of himself as acting in ways in which the generality of men act without social reprobation. The cultivation of esprit de corps consists largely in generating in individuals a sense of belonging to a class of persons for whom the common levels of excellence—in whatever kind of activity the group may be distinctively concerned—are insufficient to justify self-respect: "La Garde meurt, mais ne se rend pas"—not, be it noted, "doit mourir."

Undeniably, however, emulation takes on much less innocuous or useful forms. The desire to feel oneself superior finds its easiest gratification, not in the achievement of some superiority in fact, but in the disparagement of the qualities or achievements of others, which forms so large and agreeable a part of social conversation, sometimes even
in academic circles. And it tends to ally itself with various other and more primitive elements of human nature—with the sadistic strain from which few men are completely free, though in most it is, happily, repressed or sublimated, with acquisitiveness, with pugnacity. In one of its modes it is akin to approbativeness, that is, is another species of the same genus—a desire for the thought of a thought in the consciousness of others. And approbativeness, though itself a hedonic susceptibility making chiefly for compliance and amicable social relations, may by degrees shade off into the most antisocial form of emulation. For the pleasant idea of being highly thought of, or admired, by others, is not extremely remote from the idea of being feared by them—fear being a recognition of a kind of superiority, and sometimes having an element of reluctant admiration in it. The aggressive behavior of individuals, or of nations, may therefore be prompted, at least in part, by a desire to extort from others a recognition of the superior excellence which the individual or nation imputes to itself. This transformation of emulative approbativeness, _plus_ unsatisfied self-esteem, seems to me to have had at least as great a part in producing the present condition of mankind as the class of factors usually called economic—that is, the desires for a particular sort of terminal values.

The reason for recalling such familiar facts about human nature as these is that the _diversity_ of the propensities and modes of behavior springing, under differing conditions, from a common root has not always been recognized. Some writers—Hobbes, for example—have been curiously oblivious of the more desirable effects which the emulative “pas-
sion of glory” can produce; for him it was merely a “cause of quarrel” amongst men. Others, oversimplifying in the opposite way, have dwelt almost exclusively upon its happier manifestations. And not many have given much consideration to the question, under what conditions emulation assumes one form or the other, or to the question as to its interactions with approbativeness and with what I have called the boomerang-effect of approbation or disapprobation acting upon self-esteem. In a fairly close and homogeneous society, these last two forces operate very potently to diminish or repress the antisocial, or generally disliked, methods of gratifying the emulative form of self-esteem. But that desire is too intense and persistent to be wholly extirpated.

iv. However much comparative self-esteem—the feeling of superiority—and the sort of behavior in which it manifests itself, may be repressed and frustrated in the individual in his relations with other individuals of his immediate social group, it can, and often does, reassert itself in a collective form—in what the late A. Clutton-Brock aptly called “pooled self-esteem”12—above all, as this is exhibited in the behavior of nations towards other nations. When we observe it in a people not our own we call it chauvinism.

12 In an essay by that title first published in The Atlantic Monthly, December, 1921.
You will *not* be approved by most of your countrymen if you publicly express the opinion that your, and their, national group—its qualities and institutions and ways of living and type of culture—are inferior to those of most, or even of some, other countries; and national anthems (so far as I am acquainted with them) are usually uninhibited outbursts of collective self-glorification. However, the pooled form of the feeling of superiority, though it obviously must usually be irrational and absurd, would be relatively harmless if its expression were confined to speech and song at home. But it is not so confined; and it always tends to produce international ill feeling, and frequently—given the hope of military success—the launching of an international war.

In particular, pooled self-esteem is the trait in human nature which has played the greatest and most disastrous part in the history of mankind in the first half of the twentieth century. But Clutton-Brock's essay of 1921 was (so far as I have noted) the first, and is, I think, a partially successful attempt to analyze and explain it. Since the essay is apparently not well known, I am tempted to incorporate the greater part of it in this lecture. That, however, is not possible. But I cannot forebear to summarize the principal observations contained in it, partly in my own, partly in its author's words. He not unjustly, I think, reproached contemporary psychology for its failure to study adequately, or for the most part, even seriously, this phenomenon—the desire of men to think highly of themselves, Hobbes's "passion of glory," even aside from its "pooled" form. The reproach was more justified when he wrote than it is now; but it
can still be laid against much pretentiously “scientific” psychology. The immense rôle which this type of motivation plays in all provinces of behavior is still insufficiently recognized and investigated by the general psychologists, though the psychopathologists, being, by the nature of their profession, compelled to face the facts more fully and directly, have been duly mindful of it. “What a vast part of us,” Clutton-Brock wrote, “is just vanity—far vaster than the part that is instinct and appetite.” This last clause, in particular—though it is probably, for most psychologists, heterodox—seems to me to be only a little exaggerated.

But it was with the special form which this motive took in men as members of those organized social groups called nations that Clutton-Brock was chiefly concerned. What he pointed out was that the sort of disapprobation by others which plays the largest part in repressing the propensities in human nature potentially dangerous to social order and harmony is usually impotent in individuals when conceiving of themselves as citizens of a State; and—a fact more pregnant and more disquieting still—that, in that phase of the self-consciousness of the average individual, these same propensities not only find a new haven, but show an intensification arising from their very repression in other parts of his life. Dr. Jonson’s definition of patriotism needs amendment. Patriotism is not necessarily or usually “the last refuge of a scoundrel”; but much that goes by the name is the last refuge of the scoundrel—strains in the minds of millions of men most of whom, in the other relations of life, are probably not scoundrels—the strains of unsatisfied vanity, the desire to brag and “show off,” the pleasure
of thinking ill of other men, envy, the lust to dominate, and those latent destructive and sadistic tendencies which are usually repressed or sublimated to relatively harmless forms within the group. All these impulses are much too tenacious ingredients of that strange complex which we call human nature to be readily or completely extirpated. Prevented from expressing themselves in one way, they seek another. And they most easily find it when the individual thinks of himself as a citizen of a state vis-à-vis other states. It is also the strain in the average man’s make-up of which the ambitious demagogue, seeking political prestige and power for himself, most easily and effectively can, and usually does, take advantage.

Clutton-Brock apparently believed the conversion of self-esteem and the desire for a sense of superiority into a pooled form to be especially characteristic of our own age, as a result of the development of machine-production. The average wage-earner spends his days in the endless repetition of simple, uninteresting, mechanical tasks, from which he can gain no gratifying sense of personal achievement. “In all industrial societies, the vast majority never find a scope for the full exercise of their faculties, and are aware of their inferiority to the successful few.” But emphasis upon this as a major causal factor seems to me an error. Pooled self-esteem flourished long before the Industrial Revolution, though it had less ruinous effects because weapons were less destructive; and in our own time it has not been the industrial working-classes who have most conspicuously manifested the pathological symptoms of it—e.g., in Germany in the decades from 1872 to 1914.
The workers were mainly preoccupied with the pursuit of terminal values of their own—higher wages, better housing, better working conditions. There are, however, two other reasons recognized by Clutton-Brock why self-esteem and emulation tend—doubtless, in some degree, in nearly all classes of a national group—to be pooled. One is that vanity in its individual form is not usually encouraged but frustrated by the other members of the group; the other is that, in its pooled form, it is encouraged, because it is shared, by them. As Clutton-Brock observes,

it becomes impossible for me to believe that I am such a wonder as I should like to think myself, in the face of surrounding incredulity; so I seek for something, seeming to be not myself, that I can believe to be a wonder, without arousing criticism and incredulity; in fact, something which others also believe to be a wonder, because it seems to them not to be themselves. There are many such things, but the largest, the most convincing, and the most generally believed in is Our Country. . . . What we need, and what we get, is a something which at the same time distinguishes us from a great part of the human race, and yet is shared by nearly all those with whom we come in contact. That we find in our country; and in our country we do most successfully and unconsciously pool our self-esteem. So no league of nations, no polite speeches of kings and presidents, . . . will keep us from hating each other and feeling good when we do so, unless we can attain to enough self-knowledge to understand why it is that we hate each other, and to see that this mutual hate and boasting are but a suppressed and far more danger-
ous form of that vanity which we have learned, at least, not to betray in our personal relations.\textsuperscript{13}

Clutton-Brock wrote this shortly after the end of World War I, and the chief evidence for his diagnosis he found in the recent history of one great European nation; but, as you will note, he did not make the naive mistake of representing the pooled sense of superiority as a disease peculiar to Germans. He saw in it a generic—though he faintly hoped it might be a curable—disorder of human nature; and he predicted that "we shall have another world war unless we discover and prevent the causes of war in our own minds." His prediction came true in less than two decades—and this second war's duration and vast extent were due not solely to the persistence of the same cause in the minds of Germans, whose self-esteem had been wounded and inflamed by their previous defeat; for another highly gifted people, on another continent, entered the conflict, animated largely by an even more extravagant sense of superiority and a not less exorbitant demand for its recognition by others. In both cases, the outcome showed how exceedingly unfavorable a variation, in the biologist's sense, may be this propensity which the species man has developed in the course of its evolution. For the pooled sense of superiority, even more than the individual variety, is likely to be a fertile breeder of illusory estimates of one's own powers and of a dangerous belittling of those of others.

There were, then, I think, some sound and important insights in Clutton-Brock's diagnosis of the underlying factor

\textsuperscript{13} In \textit{op. cit.}, \textit{The Atlantic Monthly}, 1921.
in the particular pathological phenomena—the first two world wars—which he was seeking to understand. And in insisting that the problem was fundamentally a psychological one he was certainly right. But there were also some oversights and some exaggerations in his analysis. In the first place, he seemed to imply that “pooled self-esteem” always makes for overt conflicts—wars, hot or cold. It assuredly makes for group-rivalries; and rivalries often pass over (in the case of groups more frequently than of individuals) into mutual animosities, which in turn tend in time to eventuate in overt conflicts. But they do so only under a certain condition, namely, a belief in the probability of success. And, in spite of the illusion-breeding potency of pooled self-esteem, such a belief does not arise in the case of small and weak nations. They may, in desperation, resist when attacked, but they do not start wars against more powerful neighbors, even when convinced of their own cultural, political, or moral superiority. It is only what are called Great Powers that now are at all likely to initiate great wars. In 1914 there were at least five such powers; there are now only two, the Soviet Union and the United States, though both of these have formed coalitions—more or less solid and dependable—of other nations, which together embrace the greater part of the population of the planet. The principal motive for adherence to these coalitions on one, perhaps on both sides, is not national self-esteem, but fear. It is not, however, simply fear of the destruction that in the atomic age would result from another great war, immeasurable though that would be. If that were the sole motive, the fear could obviously be dispelled simply
by a determination on the part of all nations which desire to live in peace to submit to any demands which a preponderant Great Power might make; there would be no coalition to resist aggression, and all other nations would passively accept the unrestricted domination of one. There are some persons, e.g., Lord Russell, who appear willing to accept this as the only means by which the destruction of most of the human race can now be averted; but they are probably not numerous. In most men, of whatever nationality, there is a vigorous psychological resistance to such submission. In this, one element, unquestionably, is usually a form of both individual and pooled self-esteem—not, here, in the sense of a feeling of superiority but of self-respect, an intense aversion from thinking of themselves and their countrymen as abject cowards. But more powerful, probably, than this, is a deep emotional attachment to their own "way of life"—to their customs, their cultures, their faiths, their pieties (not simply in the religious sense), their traditions—and, above all, their freedom to decide these matters for themselves. It is the fear of losing these that mainly motivates the readiness of many men and nations to join with others (whose customs and pieties may be in many respects different from their own) to resist together any Great Power or Coalition threatening to dominate them all and by force to impose its ideology and its way of life upon all of them alike. The personal motivations of the leaders of the governments seeking world-domination I shall not attempt to analyze; what is obvious is that their ambitious designs could not even have been launched unless their subjects had been motivated by pooled self-esteem.
One final comment on Clutton-Brock’s essay. He seems to have believed, or at least hoped, that human nature could be purged of this desire or propensity, both in its individual and its pooled forms; and it was in the general elimination of it from our minds that he saw the remedy—the necessary and only possible remedy—for the disorders and the unhappiness which it seemed to him inevitably to generate. In his own words:

The remedy is a society in which faculties will be no longer suppressed, [and] in which men will cure themselves of their self-esteem, not by pooling it, but by caring for something not themselves more than for themselves. . . . Suppression, good manners, discipline, will never rid us of [it]; still it will find a vent in some collective, and more dangerous, form, unless we can . . . sublimate it into a passion for something not ourselves.

But this prescription was regrettably obscure. It seemed to contain two ingredients. One of them apparently was a social order—including a system of economic production—in which “men are no longer thwarted in the exercise of their highest faculties.” “So long as the mass of men are set by division of labor to tasks in which they cannot satisfy the higher demands of the self, any demagogue may tempt them to destroy all that you value. Until they also enjoy and so value it, it is not secure for you and the world.” The other ingredient seems to be complete disinterestedness and self-forgetfulness, the exclusion from consciousness, and thereby from human motivation, of any reference to the self and of
any desire for values, whether terminal or adjectival, which involve such reference.

But the first of these components of Clutton-Brock's "remedy" could not possibly be realized if economic goods are to be produced in the volume and diversity now demanded by our vast modern civilized societies. Machine-production, with the "division of labor" indispensable for it, is the first prerequisite for the existence of such societies.

The other component of Clutton-Brock's "remedy" seems to call for a more radical transformation of human nature than we have any reason to expect in any foreseeable future—namely, the extirpation of all the motives arising from self-esteem (individual or "poled") and from emulation, as well as the individual's desire for such terminal values as material goods and normal pleasurable experiences for himself. If there is any truth in what has been said in the present lecture, susceptibility to these desires and motives is inherent in the very constitution of man as a self-conscious animal. The proposal to extirpate these elements and motives in man's constitution is somewhat analogous to a proposal, in physical therapeutics, of total excision of the heart or the liver. Both these organs are subject to, their presence in the body makes possible, the occurrence of certain grave and sometimes fatal disorders. But since their normal functioning is indispensable for the survival of the patient, physicians and surgeons, while now able to prevent or correct some of the disorders, do not recommend the elimination of those organs. Similarly, self-consciousness cannot be eliminated from man's psychical constitution—so long as he remains human; nor is it probable that the affective
components made possible by and associated with this—i.e., approbatively and the desire for at least some degree of self-esteem and the aversion from its opposite, and the propensity to emulation—can be eliminated. They too, as we know, make possible the occurrence of grave disorders of feeling and behavior. If it were at all feasible to eliminate the underlying affective and appetitive components, and if in doing so we should not at the same time be eliminating the psychic sources of much that is generally regarded as most valuable in human experience and behavior, then the radical program of complete extirpation of those components would be the right program. But such extirpation is not feasible, and, if it were, would destroy the springs of action in man which differentiate him from the creatures below him in the scale of being, give rise to his most admirable achievements, and are the conditions of the possibility of civilized social life. Some reasons for so describing them we shall find suggested in the next two lectures by some of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century writers whose reflections on human nature we shall there review. The "remedy," in short, is to find ways of correcting the worst of the psychic diseases which arise from, and are made possible but not permanently inevitable by, the same constituents of man's make-up by which his happier and distinctively human functioning is made possible; it is not to demand that he shall cease to be human. The needed therapy will doubtless be a long and slow process; we can only hope that the diseases will not destroy the patient before the treatment can be applied.