"No Standing Armies!"

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Published by Johns Hopkins University Press

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CHAPTER II

THE PETITION OF RIGHT OF 1628:
THE ANTIMILITARY SENTIMENT HARDENS

The general antipathy toward the professional soldier which was present in England at the turn of the seventeenth century was sharpened by events of the 1620s. The outbreak of the Thirty Years War in 1618 on the continent, and England's involvement in it under the leadership of the increasingly unpopular George Villiers, the first duke of Buckingham, created circumstances within which a domestic crisis developed. The army raised for the war had to be paid, housed, and disciplined. Failing to win the cooperation of Parliaments called in 1625, 1626, and 1627, Charles I fell back upon extra-legal expedients—forced loans and arbitrary imprisonment for refusers, quartering in private households, and martial law for soldiers and civilians associated with them—all implemented by the agency of the county lieutenancy or specially appointed commissions. Resentment of the government's policies and the army was expressed in protests from the counties, aired in parliamentary debate during the spring of 1628, and focused in the Petition of Right.¹ As it is well known, that Petition condemned the levying of taxes without the approval of Parliament, arbitrary imprisonment, billeting of soldiers on private householders, and the use of martial law. What has not been stressed in studies of the debates and the Petition is that the powers

¹The text of the Petition of Right may be found conveniently in Samuel R. Gardiner, The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution, 1625-1660 (Oxford, 1906), pp. 66-70.
of the lieutenancy, especially of the deputy-lieutenants, were also condemned. Thus, the antiarmy criticism that was expressed in 1628 was partly a protest against the intrusion into the affairs of the local county of an armed central government using the agency of the lieutenancy.

The circumstances of this first major protest against an army and the government's policies associated with the military require brief review. The Thirty Years War was only one of many reasons for the tension between king and Parliament. For philosophical, diplomatic, and economic reasons, King James I was reluctant to commit England to active support of the Protestant cause. By contrast, members of the Parliament of 1621 enthusiastically urged war to aid the Protestant cause, rescue the English princess (James's daughter, Elizabeth, who was queen of Bohemia), check the economic competition of Spain, win economic wealth, restore the nation's honor, and strengthen the country's character. But it was a naval war, not a war involving raising an army of foot soldiers that Parliament wanted. Considerations of a romantic and personal nature led James's son, Charles, who became king in 1625, and his favorite, the first duke of Buckingham, to favor an aggressive foreign policy. Despite parliamentary sentiment, an army was raised and sent off under Buckingham on a series of disastrous expeditions—against Cadiz in 1625, the Isle of Rhé in 1626, and Rochelle in 1627. From mid-1624 to the beginning of 1628, about fifty thousand men, or one percent of the population, were conscripted into the army. The soldiers were billeted in many parts of England, and over two and one-half years the outcry against them mounted.

In assessing the nature of the criticism, one should bear in mind the problems Charles I confronted in maintaining a military role in the Thirty Years War as well as the difficulties experienced by his subjects. Similar problems plagued all of the Stuart kings until the end of the century. In the absence of a system of barracks or army camps, the government had no alternative, if it was to keep the army embodied for future engagements, but to quarter the soldiers in public houses or inns and, as necessary, in private households. It was the responsibility of the local lieutenancy, in practice of the deputy-

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lieutenants, to make arrangements for the billeting of soldiers in their counties. According to regulations issued by the Privy Council, officers were to be billeted in the houses of well-to-do gentry, while ordinary soldiers were to be quartered with other householders of "competent ability," although soldiers themselves, who found their accommodations inadequate, and poor persons complained that houses of the indigent were used. Thus, persons from all social classes came into contact with the soldiers and had reason to regard them as a social and moral threat and an economic burden. It should be stressed that householders were theoretically not expected to house and feed the soldiers free of charge. On the contrary, they were supposed to be reimbursed for quartering at a rate fixed by the government, which was graduated upward from the soldier to the officer. Thus, a billet did not have to be a financial hardship and could be turned to profit. Lindsay Boynton's recent study of the question, limited just to the example of the Isle of Wight where many soldiers were posted, has shown that opposition to billeting did not become pronounced until the government fell behind in reimbursing the householders. Quartered free, billeted soldiers became, from the subjects' points of view, a tax or confiscation of property. As for the government, it would have willingly reimbursed householders for the billeted soldiers had funds been available. But, the court had few options. Either it got money from Parliament to pay for the billets or it got money indirectly from private householders who were obliged to take in soldiers. Charles regarded billeting soldiers as part of his prerogative. On a practical level, his secretary of state argued in the House of Commons, in April 1628, that unless a grant of money were immediately forthcoming, the government's hands were tied with respect to billeting. If the soldiers were to be "unbilleted" (as contemporaries put it), they had to "either be disbanded or employed; neither of which his majesty could effect without money."
The State Papers confirm that it was not until the spring of 1628 that billeting was seriously contested. Then, outside of Parliament, in several areas, bitter complaints were expressed. For example, in Hampshire and around Winchester, flat refusals to billet soldiers and removals of men from households where they had been assigned were reported. In Essex, thirty townsmen were wounded in a free-for-all involving a company of soldiers. Norwich reported "gross outages committed by the soldiers and their officers," while incidents on the Isle of Wight were described as "foul and insupportable." National prejudices surfaced in the complaints about the soldiers. The inhabitants of Kent regarded themselves as "miserably afflicted" by Irish soldiers who differed from them in all respects and besides had quite "unreasonable appetites." These complaints are worth noting, for the same arguments appeared in the petition against billeting which Parliament presented to the king on April 14. Throughout these months the king and his council tried urgently, but unsuccessfully, to deal with the crescendo of anger.

The army was an economic hardship to people in ways other than the cost of billeting. In 1626, Charles I, having failed to win either a grant from Parliament or a free gift from his subjects, resorted to the expedient of a forced loan to raise money for his army. Resistance to this device, the legality of which judges refused to affirm, was widespread among all classes. The most famous case involved John Hampden, Sir John Eliot, and Sir Thomas Wentworth, who were jailed for their refusal to pay. They were released in time to sit in the Parliament of 1628 and there became leaders in the effort that produced the Petition of Right which condemned forced loans. Forced loans were also exacted from many lesser gentlemen who refused to pay and suffered imprisonment. The exaction of the so-called "coat-and-conduct" money was another economic grievance associated with the soldiers. Coat-and-conduct money, as the term suggests, was a tax imposed on subjects to pay for the expenses of the levy, including the cost of outfitting soldiers and defraying their travel expenses. It was not new, but, in the past, had been regarded as a loan to the government, repayable from funds in the exchequer.

9In the C.S.P.D. for the years 1625-1626 and 1627-1628, there are no entries that concern billeting, but for 1628-1629 there are at least ninety entries.
11Ibid., pp. 25, 27, 62, 109; cf. p. 78.  
12Ibid., p. 49.
The deputy-lieutenants were responsible for collecting the money and the Privy Council urged, especially from 1626 through 1628, rigorous execution of this duty. Because coat-and-conduct money was levied by the authority of the king and not by act of Parliament, it came to be regarded as confiscatory and illegal. Although the government promised reimbursement and often arranged for it, delays and failures in the repayment provoked bitterness, especially against the lieutenancy. In the Short Parliament, the levying of “coat-and-conduct” money was cited as a grievance against the government. Later in the century, it was said that this tax was “one of the first things layd hold on to make . . . [Charles I] odious.”

The soldiers also had to be disciplined. The need was obvious; the Court as well as the subjects perceived that a system of disciplining was required. However, there were no generally accepted procedures to follow. In the medieval period, the crown had issued books of rules and orders before a war to discipline the armies that were to be formed; these military orders were known as martial law. Then, the Court of the Constable and Marshal had exercised jurisdiction over crimes connected with war both at home and abroad. But the powers of this medieval court had lapsed in 1521, and its authority had migrated to committees of army officers and to a newly created office of provost-marshal. The provost-marshal, established by the Tudors under the lord-lieutenant and empowered to use martial law against both soldiers and civilians, had become by the 1620s a kind of local police. In the absence of war in the early seventeenth century, there had been no need to regularize the discipline of the army. All during


this time, moreover, no real distinction had developed between "martial law"—the summary power exercised by a government over all its subjects, civilian and military, in time of an emergency—and "military law"—a canon of laws to regulate the army internally.

When soldiers were raised in the 1620s, commissions for martial law, which failed to distinguish between "martial law" and "military law," were issued by the king "with the advice of the Council of War." The first was dated December 30, 1624 and was issued when James I was still alive to discipline soldiers in Kent who were waiting to embark. Many times thereafter, to 1628, commissions were issued to discipline soldiers who were billeted in various parts of the country. All of the commissions empowered the appointed commissioners (almost always the lieutenancy of the county, particularly the deputy-lieutenants,) to proceed "according to the justice of martial law," against soldiers and "other dissolute persons joining with them," that is, civilians. They were authorized to bring to trial and sentence to death persons involved in any "robberies, felonies, mutinies, or other outrages or misdemeanors." Boynton has pointed out that inclusion of the words "other outrages and misdemeanors" enabled the commissioners to extend their jurisdiction to disputes connected with billeting soldiers. Thus, many civilians were involved in the martial-law process.

The public reaction to these commissions is difficult to assess. There is almost no readily available evidence. The printed calendars for 1625 through 1628, which teem with petitions and comments protesting the billeting of soldiers, contain no specific references to the commissions for martial law. Boynton's study, based largely on Hampshire, has demonstrated that the commissioners for martial law there did not impose a bloody tyranny. In fact, he suggests that very few soldiers anywhere were tried and executed by martial law and that probably no civilians were executed.

Charles I called a Parliament for the spring of 1628. His purpose was to get a supply so that England might strengthen her defenses
at home, encourage her allies abroad, and help restrain the aggression of Catholic forces on the continent.\textsuperscript{24} Instead of granting a supply, members of this very full House introduced, on March 22, complaints from “all parts of the kingdom” for the House of Commons to investigate and reform.\textsuperscript{25} All of the major complaints were related in one way or another to the soldiers. For the purposes of this study, the complaints about forced loans and arbitrary imprisonment may be put aside. They were at the heart of the effort to protect the subject in his fundamental rights of person and property and were handled, at Sir Edward Coke’s suggestion, separately from other grievances. They have been, rightly so, the focus of studies on the Petition of Right.\textsuperscript{26} Less thoroughly examined by historians, but yet of near equal importance to members of the House, was the protest over billeting of soldiers. Directly related and the object of contention for other reasons, too, was the power of the local lieutenancies, especially that of the deputy-lieutenants. Grievances about martial law were not mentioned until April 8.\textsuperscript{27} Comments in debate, and the procedure followed in the appointment of committees\textsuperscript{28} to deal with the grievances show the importance in the minds of members of the complaints about billeting and the lieutenancy.

Parliament opened on March 17. On March 20 general committees were appointed, among them a committee for grievances. At the same time “petty committees” were also appointed, one of which was to examine some letters that William Coriton, M.P. for Cornwall, had brought to the House. These letters purported to show that the deputy-lieutenants of Cornwall had put pressure on him not to stand for election to Parliament because he had been a recusant to the forced loan. There were a “dozen at least” of such letters which demonstrated that the lieutenancies of other counties as well had tried to disrupt the normal election process.\textsuperscript{29} On March 22, the first debate about grievances was held. Forced loans, arbitrary imprisonment, billeting of soldiers and the local lieutenancies were vigorously

\textsuperscript{24}Cobbett, \textit{Parliamentary History} 2: 218-22.
\textsuperscript{25}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 238; for the large attendance, see Birch, \textit{The Court and Times of Charles I} 1: 331.
\textsuperscript{27}\textit{Journals of the House of Commons} 1: 880 (hereafter cited as \textit{C.J.}). In this detail, Boynton may be corrected.
\textsuperscript{28}A thorough study of the committees in this session is needed.
\textsuperscript{29}Birch, \textit{Court and Times of Charles I} 1: 332; \textit{C.J.} 1: 873.
criticized. As for billeting, the leading spokesman was Sir Francis Seymour. His point was that the House of Commons need not give the king a supply, if the king takes whatever he wants. “That this hath been done,” Seymour continued, “appeareth by the Billeting of Soldiers.” That is, billeting of soldiers is a violation of the right the subject has in his property. Seymour also criticized the forced loan and arbitrary imprisonment and urged that a committee take all three matters under consideration.\(^{30}\)

As for the power of the lieutenancies, it was reported that the deputy-lieutenants were like “janizaries.”\(^{31}\) The most impassioned speaker, the irascible Sir Robert Phelips of Somerset (who, it must be noted, had personal reasons for his animus),\(^{32}\) stressed that the “strange, vast and unlimited power of our lieutenants and their deputies,” in billeting and taxing, was a gross violation of law. He declared that the deputy-lieutenants are “the most insupportable burdens that, at this present, afflict our poor country; and the most cruel oppression that ever yet the kingdom of England endured.” He was exasperated at the intrusion in local affairs of deputy-lieutenants who carried out the “violent and unlawful” policies of the court.\(^{33}\) The point was echoed by Sir Thomas Wentworth, who tried to shift the blame for billeting from the king to royal ministers and the local lieutenancies. It was they who extended the “prerogative of the king beyond its just limits.”\(^{34}\) Two days later, before anything was done about billeting, a special committee was appointed to bring in a bill for “regulating the power of the lieutenants and deputy-lieutenants.”\(^{35}\) This committee was composed of all the privy councillors who sat in the House of Commons and included Sir Edward Coke, Sir Dudley Digges, and John Selden.

On March 26, a “great complaint” was received about the insolence of soldiers in Surrey and the actions of a constable there respecting the billeting of soldiers.\(^{36}\) On March 28, interrogation of John Moulden, the constable in Surrey, revealed that he had billeted soldiers on householders who had refused to pay billeting money, and, aided by eighty to one hundred soldiers, he had extorted money from men on the threat of pulling down and firing their houses. His defense was a warrant from the earl of Nottingham. The deputy-lieutenants

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\(^{32}\)For Sir Robert Phelips, see Barnes, *Somerset*, pp. 36-39, 281-82, 286-87, 289-92 and *passim*.


\(^{34}\)Ibid., p. 236.

\(^{35}\)C.J. 1: 874-75.

\(^{36}\)Ibid., p. 875.
of the county denied that they had issued any warrant for billeting soldiers or paying money. After hearing all this, members appointed a committee of twenty-nine men to investigate the situation in Surrey. The committee was empowered to call for warrants, letters, and witnesses. No deputy-lieutenants were to sit on the committee, but they were to appear before it upon call. Nine of the members had, two days before, been appointed to the committee (already mentioned) to frame legislation for regulating the lieutenancies.

This “Surrey Committee” is of uncommon importance. It became the central committee for investigating all the complaints about billeting and the lieutenancy. On April 3, the House ordered that all complaints against the deputy-lieutenants about billeting “or any other Charges” should be referred to it. The knights and burgesses of the county from which the complaint came, except deputy-lieutenants, were “to have Voice in the Committee.” On April 9, the House showed its interest in the committee by ordering that it might itself set up subcommittees to look into “any particular Complaints.” All during April and May, members of this committee investigated complaints about the soldiers from such places as Taunton, Lincoln, and Chichester, reported to the House and surely took part in the debates in committee of the whole on this subject. Although there is no specific evidence, it seems likely that its members helped draw up the Petition on Billeting that was presented to the King on April 14. There is evidence that three of the six-man committee appointed to draft “heads” for the Speaker’s speech to accompany the Petition on Billeting were members of the Surrey Committee.

One question that these details pose is why was the responsibility for investigating complaints against the deputy-lieutenants referred to the Surrey Committee and not to the committee appointed on March 24 to frame legislation to regulate the lieutenancy? In the absence of direct evidence, one may speculate that members felt more comfortable attacking the lieutenancy through the issue of billeting and, as the days passed, through the issue of martial law (as Boynton has theorized) than criticizing it directly. The lieutenancy was so close to the crown that criticism of it was tantamount to criticism of the king. In effect, this is what Phelips did in the debate on March 22. It should be recalled that Wentworth, a more cautious critic of the king, sought then to blunt Phelips’s point by shifting

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the blame away from the king. Further, there were many deputy-lieutenants serving in the House of Commons. It is possible that these men did all they could to deflect the criticism from fellow deputy-lieutenants. Although all the grievances the Surrey Committee looked into concerned the deputy-lieutenants, the lieutenancies were not directly mentioned in the Petition on Billeting of April 14. By condemning the actions of the lieutenancy in billeting rather than by condemning the lieutenancy itself or by bringing in a bill to regulate the deputy-lieutenants, the House implied criticism of the lieutenancy without provoking so much animosity.

The Petition on Billeting rested on the assertion that "by the fundamental laws of this realm, every freeman hath a full and absolute property in his goods and estate." Billeting of soldiers on an unwilling householder was, therefore, illegal. No specific statute could be cited as a precedent, for there was none. However, a long list of inconveniences was recited. Among them were that religion was harmed (for people feared to leave their houses unprotected while they attended church), and local government and the normal processes of justice were interrupted. (This may have been a veiled reference to the powers exercised by the deputy-lieutenants.) Economic and social hardships which touched every class were mentioned. The soldiers were blamed for the decrease in rents for the gentry, idleness among husbandmen, neglect of markets, decay of trade, and innumerable crimes and outrages. The last part of the petition argued that billeting of soldiers endangered the government: Subjects were so impoverished that they were unable to meet the king’s financial needs. The poor were apt to join the soldiers in rebellion; "some such mischief will shortly ensue," it was warned. The soldiers were labeled a menace to the king’s government. Many were said to be Catholic. The loyalty of “popishly affected” commanders was impugned, and it was said that they would rather serve England’s enemies. The charge that the army was riddled with Catholics was to be repeated often after the Restoration.

Charles’s reply to the Petition on Billeting underscored what an impasse had been reached. He urged the House of Commons to give

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41 The precise number of deputy-lieutenants in this Parliament is not readily available; a study of the membership is desirable. But the word “many” is used advisedly. Twelve years later, in the Long Parliament, there were between seventy and eighty deputy-lieutenants; in the fall session of 1678 there were 241.
42 For example, C.J. 1: 898. 43 Cobbett, Parliamentary History 2: 283.
44 Ibid., p. 284.
him a supply and promised that he would answer their petition “in a convenient time.”

Plainly, the issue of billeting was not resolved by the petition of April 14. Indeed, on May 3, the duke of Buckingham, in the presence of the king, told the lord mayor and aldermen of London that if they did not lend Charles £15,000 six hundred soldiers would be billeted on the city. On May 5, in the debate on the king’s message urging the House to trust him, Sir Nathaniel Rich pointed out that laws continued to be violated, “by more frequent billeting of soldiers than ever.” Rich wanted to “hear the King say hee may not by lawe billet soldiers.” Such reassurance was not forthcoming. Throughout May, familiar complaints about the deputy-lieutenants and billeting continued to be presented to the House of Commons. Fear that Charles would dissolve Parliament moved members to add the grievance of billeting to the Petition of Right.

Along with the discussion of complaints about billeting and the deputy-lieutenants in Parliament, criticism was also leveled at the commissions for martial law. Martial law was first mentioned on April 8 and was debated on April 11 and four times thereafter during the month. The commissions were voted illegal on May 7, and on May 8 an article condemning martial law as exercised by the commissions was added to the Petition of Right. This chronology suggests that members of Parliament, alarmed by the complaints about the deputy-lieutenants in billeting soldiers, sought to discredit the lieutenantcy further by denouncing the commissions for martial law. As already noted, there is no evidence that complaints about the commissions were presented to Parliament. Further investigation of county records is needed before a firm conclusion may be drawn, but it seems true that the criticism of martial law voiced in Parliament in the spring of 1628 was largely manufactured for political reasons, as noted, and on theoretical legal grounds. A great legalist like Selden could find much to condemn in the commission for martial law. There was, indisputably, a potential danger to the individual, whether

46Birch, Court and Times of Charles I 1: 350.
47Ibid., p. 353.
48Quoted in Relf, The Petition of Right, p. 38.
50C.J. 1: 880, 893; Cobbett, Parliamentary History 2: 350. Rushworth, Historical Collections 1: 545 reported that the House in Grand Committee “spent most of its time” from April 14 to the end of the month on the issue.
civilian or military, in allowing the central government to use martial law without a strict definition of its jurisdiction and procedures. Selden said in one debate that the issue was "of the greatest consequence of any that we have yet meddled with, [because it] concerns our lives."\(^{51}\) This thought was echoed in a contemporary comment on the debates which explained that Parliament aimed to protect the subjects' "life and limb against lawless violence, especially in time of peace."\(^{52}\)

Consistent with the restraint with which the question of royal prerogative was handled throughout the debates,\(^{53}\) Selden admitted that the king had power to use martial law.\(^{54}\) His objection was thus not to the principle of martial law but to the manner in which it was being executed; that is, through commissions issued by the king and his council to deputy-lieutenants who "were not soldiers or lawyers."\(^{55}\) Selden argued that the jurisdiction and authority of the commissioners for martial law could not extend beyond that exercised by the Court of the Constable and Marshal.\(^{56}\) Furthermore, martial law could not apply in time of peace, except for certain crimes.\(^{57}\) According to Selden, the sitting of the courts at Westminster were a "badge of peace," and further, any place where the "sheriff in the county may execute the king's writ" should be regarded as a place of peace. In time of war, martial law was "known to the common law," and "that kind of commission is confirmed by act of parliament."\(^{58}\) Implicit was the thought that Parliament should have a role in imposing martial law.\(^{59}\) It was further argued by Selden and others that the commissions for martial law violated the terms of specific statutes, for example Magna Charta, 28 Edward III. c.3 (which held that no one should be adjudged of life and limb except by the laws of the land), and laws guaranteeing the right of an Englishman to trial by jury. In the final Petition of Right, these specific statutes were cited in support of the contention that the commissions of martial law were illegal.

^{52}Birch, *The Court and Times of Charles I* 1: 341.  
^{53}For the whole question of the way in which the king's prerogative was handled, see the excellent discussion in Margaret Judson, *The Crisis of the Constitution: An Essay in Constitutional and Political Thought in England, 1603-1645* (New Brunswick, N. J., 1949), especially pp. 236-37, 239, 253-63.  
^{55}Ibid., p. 1986.  
^{57}Ibid., p. 1987.  
^{58}Ibid., p. 1990.  
The House of Lords did not immediately accept the article on martial law that the House of Commons sent up on May 8. On May 10, the Lords amended the section to allow the use of martial law over soldiers and mariners in peacetime but not over civilians. On May 19, the House of Commons rejected the Lord’s changes, arguing that unless the article stood as they had framed it, martial law might be extended to the Trained Bands. The House of Lords were persuaded, and on May 26, agreed to the entire Petition of Right, including the clause declaring the commissions of martial law illegal.

The deputy-lieutenants were not singled out for comment in a separate article in the Petition of Right, but they were cited in connection with forced loans and arbitrary imprisonment in Article 1 and with the illegality of the commissions of martial law in Article 4. Curiously, they were not mentioned in the section about billeting, but as previously discussed, no member of Parliament who attended the meetings in the spring of 1628 could have been unaware of the charges against the lieutenancy investigated by the Surrey Committee and reported to the House. That both Houses took the matter very seriously is underscored by the fact that, in signifying the Lords’ assent to the Petition of Right on May 26, the Lord Keeper moved that the House of Commons prepare a bill respecting the power of the lieutenancy over mustering and assessing rates.

The response to the first sizable army raised in England in the early-seventeenth century was vigorous protest. The criticism of the soldiers and the government’s military policies reflected not only the dislike of the army, but also the deepening estrangement between Charles I and his politically conscious subjects. If the king had been trusted and his policies in other areas approved, it is possible that the burden of the soldiers might have been tolerated. But the parliamentary gentry did not trust Charles. They also had little understanding of the problems the central government confronted in pursuing an aggressive foreign policy, which they themselves had recommended, but the cost of which they were unwilling to bear. Their criticism of the army revealed parochial, elitist, isolationist, and self-interested considerations. But there was more than self-interest in their insistence upon a confirmation of the subjects’ rights.

\textsuperscript{60} Journal of the House of Lords 3: 788 (hereafter cited as L.J.).
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., pp. 803, 813.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., p. 824
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid.; Rushworth, Historical Collections 1: 576.
They were also concerned to protect the law from what they regarded as a revolutionary violation by the central government and its agents. Underlying their criticism was alarm over the intrusive authority of the central government through the agency of the deputy-lieutenants, whose arbitrary actions were implicitly (sometimes explicitly) backed by soldiers. If the provisions in the Petition of Right had been implemented, the practical effect would have been a diminution of the royal prerogative in military affairs: the king could not have raised an army without Parliament's consent. The Petition made it illegal for him to billet soldiers on unwilling subjects and to discipline the army in peacetime by martial law. Charles I, however, did not take the Petition of Right seriously and continued in the 1630s to exercise the military prerogatives which the crown had always assumed. The Petition of Right, however, served as a precedent throughout the century in criticism of the army.

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64 Angry concern was expressed in 1629 that the Petition had been violated. See, for example, Wallace Notestein and F. H. Relf, eds., Commons Debates for 1629 (Minneapolis, 1921), pp. 4, 5, 6, 245.