O peoples of Africa are more varied, or more attractive in their variety, than those of the East-Central zone, nor is any part of the continent so physically interesting. The Great Rift Valley with its associated lakes, volcanic mountains and deep trenches supplies a certain geographical unity. The area remains rich in wild animal life which is now largely absent from West and Southern Africa. Sir Julian Huxley and Dr. L. S. B. Leakey of the Coryndon Museum, Nairobi, are foremost among Britons who have worked to conserve this wealth of nature and also the archaeological heritage. Others of Britain have done much during the past seventy years—forty-five in the case of Tanganyika—towards the exercise of responsible conservation, trusteeship and development. Isolated pockets of British settlers dot the zone alongside the more numerous immigrant peoples from India and Arabia. Most of what has been done by Britain will prove of lasting value to East-Central Africa; but whether it was done soon enough and in sufficient quantity to establish bridgeheads such as we have noted in Southern and West Africa is the question to which we must turn. Certainly there is no zone in which the uncompleted tasks of trusteeship are more numerous.

But before we consider the particular problems of the territories there is need to look at the overall composition and balance of the zone. For the reasons already stated Zambia (Northern Rhodesia) and Malawi (Nyasaland) have been grouped for the purpose of this essay with Uganda and Kenya, and Tanganyika and Zanzibar. Such a grouping, which treats the Zambesi as a southern border, is certainly in accord with contemporary African nationalist feeling. Though the Pan-African Freedom Movement for East, Central and South Africa (PAFMECSA) ranges farther south in its ultimate plans it acknowledges the reality of 1964, which saw Zambia and Malawi independent and hence all states to the north of the Zambesi autonomous.

Yet though the “freedom” element of the title be realized for PAFMECA, as distinct from PAFMECSA, the unity of the zone
must for some time remain a matter of aspiration, not achievement. It could hardly be otherwise since only late in 1964 did two of the states become independent, while the others have known self-government for very few years at the most. Kenya became independent in December 1963. The overthrow of the Sultan of Zanzibar, the army mutinies in Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya, and the various external threats which resulted in the rapid political unification of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, also indicate the unsettled nature of politics in the new states. But there are other reasons why unity will not easily be achieved. We must again examine the obstacles to national unity and development in the individual territories, because the longer-term total unity depends upon the strength of the constituent units; but it is specially necessary in the case of Eastern Africa to keep in mind some of the larger difficulties. The broad generalizations which may at least be attempted in the case of the British-West African and British-Southern African relationship cannot be offered for Britain and the six countries of East-Central Africa.

Political, cultural, economic and communications factors compel first attention in any consideration of the overall balance of the zone. We must take into account the possibility of a much more direct Ethiopian participation in the total entity, as well as the ties which exist between certain peoples of Zambia (Northern Rhodesia) and those of the Congo and Angola. There are traditional links also between some Africans of Malawi (Nyasaland) and some of Moçambique. The recent rapprochement between the Emperor Haile Selassie and Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya and the current rapid modernization of Ethiopia, coupled with the adoption of English as the second official language in place of French, may well result in changed centres of gravity in the north of the zone. Speculation as to tendencies in the southern sector are profitless until Dr. Kaunda is able to meet President Kasavubu, President Tshombe* and other leaders of the Congolese Republic on an equal footing, and with full power to bargain, but this influence on the south-western pole of the new axis cannot be overlooked.

Tanganyika's development and position in the future must obviously be of the greatest significance if the concept of Eastern Africa is to be fulfilled. If Tanganyika does not advance sufficiently

* President Tshombe has since become political head of the whole Congo (Leopoldville), and Dr Kaunda President of independent Zambia.
to serve as the centrepiece then it is easy to conceive the zone splitting into at least three portions: a northern comprising Uganda and Kenya; a southern made up of Zambia and Malawi; with a central portion made up of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, possibly together with Rwanda and Burundi. President Nyerere has supplied valuable leadership towards closer union in Eastern Africa, especially in that he has shown himself ready always to enter responsible negotiation with his neighbours, but his statesmanship must be backed by a strengthened economy. Tanganyika has the largest population (9½ million) of the six countries but it covers a vast area and is relatively poor. If it is to bear and balance the shifting weight of Uganda and Kenya against that of Zambia and Malawi, its own tensile strength must be adequate. Sisal, coffee, cotton and diamonds presently support the economy but production for both export and internal consumption must be increased.

The weight of the Zambian, or total Malawi–Zambian, economy is strikingly different in character from that of Kenya–Uganda. While the latter is primarily agricultural the former is substantially dependent upon mineral production. Uganda exported £3½ millions worth of copper in 1961 but its coffee and cotton exports were valued at £30½ millions. Kenya’s economy is based on coffee, tea, sisal and other agricultural products, agriculture providing about 85 per cent of the national income. Though Malawi’s economy also is overwhelmingly agricultural, the mainspring of the economy in the total Zambia–Malawi area is provided by copper and by the other minerals produced in Zambia. The tobacco, cotton, tung, maize and livestock output of the two territories is dwarfed in scale by copper, zinc, cobalt, lead and silver. Copper production in 1960 totalled over £121 millions.

In addition to their own significance the above facts and figures indicate one of the strong economic arguments which have been advanced for the early political unification of the countries of Eastern Africa—the need for the diversification of the total economy. The mineral wealth and industrial experience of Zambia could bring welcome strength and balance to the whole. But there is a formidable network of historical association to be loosened and many new pathways to be fashioned before this goal can be attained. In a zone where the precipitate catastrophe of the Tanganyika ground-nuts scheme is fresh in memory there may exist an undue tendency to caution which needs to be guarded against; but the task of altering established economic associations should never be
minimized. There are strong historic economic links between Zambia, Malawi and South Africa which have drawn and still draw the Zambesi territories into the economic orbit of Southern Africa.

The mining industry, with all its technical expertise and special labour requirements, has over the past eighty years built up a complex of interdependent relationships between the peoples of Central and South Africa. The miners' frontier is a reality which embraces Africans and Europeans together. The capital, costly capital equipment and high-level manpower may stem from Europe, North America and the local European populations, but from the day of its foundation in Kimberley, in the early 1870's, the large-scale, modern mining industry of South-Central Africa has incorporated African workers. Each decade has seen African mineworkers advance in technical accomplishment and increase their working partnership with European miners and artisans. The descent of any mineshaft on the Copper Belt or the Witwatersrand, and the exploration of any stope or gallery brings home at once the strength of the human relationship, especially the sense of mutual trust and confidence in an environment where these qualities are essential and where peril and heroism, without regard for race or colour, are commonplace. Though other aspects of the experience may be criticized the comradeship of the mineshaft and rockface has long been talked about around village fires in Nyasaland, Barotseland and the other areas of Central Africa to which migrant African workers have returned.

Europeans and Africans alike, therefore, have been bound together in the service of the mining industry. We have indicated in the earlier chapters the legal and conventional barriers and the obstructive devices of trade unions which have preserved the higher incomes and status of the European workers and so increasingly aroused the resentment of African mineworkers and the officials of their organizations. We have also pointed to the social ill-effects of the migratory labour system, especially on African family and village life, agriculture and animal husbandry. Our object here is to direct attention to the broader economic implications of the mining relationship between Southern and Central Africa. Tens of thousands of Africans from Central Africa have earned, and continue to earn, their money wages on the mines in the south, and their families have long depended on their remittances for the payment of taxes, the purchase of bicycles and other consumer goods, and contributions to educational expenses. The relatively stable
world price of gold has ensured regularity in labour recruitment and employment for and on the mines and in the associated manufacturing and other industries of South Africa.

Fluctuations in the world prices of copper and the other minerals of Zambia have, thus far, given less assured employment to both European and African mineworkers in Central Africa. Although they have enjoyed much better conditions of service the European mineworkers from the south have at times suffered also the disabilities of labour migration. During the early thirties, when there was a disastrous slump in the world demand for copper, thousands of Europeans were retrenched and there was a substantial exodus back to the south. There have been numerous other indications before and since of the reliance of Central Africa on the economic strength of South Africa. These facts of economics and primarily the importance of assured cash incomes to the peoples of Zambia and Malawi must be dwelt upon if there is to be realistic planning of future relationships within Eastern Africa and between Eastern and Southern Africa. In Kenya there is at present a mounting crisis of unemployment among Africans. The recession of the European planters' frontier is being accompanied by an expansion in African smallholdings but the former output of the European farms, which provided the greater part of the country's exports, has not yet been matched. The statutory requirement for employers to carry an extra quota of paid employees is affording only limited relief and can be counted but a temporary expedient.

Communications are of the greatest significance in the quest for regional unity. Though they are intimately related to economic considerations such as the location of mineral deposits and coastal outlets—and increasingly to local fuel resources of coal and electric power, refineries and factories—railways, roadways, airways and telecommunications in their alignment have all owed a good deal to politics, in particular to the historical colonial frontiers. The Kenya-Uganda railway runs inland from Mombasa through Nairobi to Kampala and on to the western frontier at Lake Edward. The German-built trunk railway across the middle of Tanganyika joins Dar-es-Salaam, the coastal capital, to Dodoma, Tabora and Kigoma, on Lake Tanganyika. Nyasaland's sole rail link joins Lake Nyasa to Beira, in Portuguese East Africa, and to the Rhodesia railway system. Zambia will continue to possess a long-established rail outlet through Katanga and Angola to the Atlantic, but her principal railway runs from the Copper Belt south across the Zambesi,
at the Victoria Falls, to join the elaborate rail network of Southern Africa near the extensive Wankie coalfields of Southern Rhodesia.

There is no railway connexion across Tanganyika to join the northern and southern sectors of the zone. General Smuts' First World War railway from Voi to Arusha provides one link between Kenya and north-eastern Tanganyika; the Lake Victoria steamer service joins Kenya and Uganda lakeside termini to Mwanza and thence to Tabora and Dar-es-Salaam, but it is a circuitous and slow connexion. There is in prospect a new railway to join the present line between Lusaka and Ndola in Zambia to the relatively short "ground-nuts line" inland from the good port of Mtwara in the south-eastern corner of Tanganyika.* Other plans include a direct Lusaka–Dar-es-Salaam line. But the immensely long route which must cross much difficult country will prove very costly.† Any route by rail and sea between Lusaka and Dar-es-Salaam, or Lusaka and Nairobi by way of Mombasa, would be circuitous, like the present rail–sea route between Addis Ababa and Nairobi through Jibuti.

If transport economists should find against a direct axial railway between Lusaka and Nairobi and in favour of a motorway as the unifying trunk communication link of Eastern Africa, it will provide an equal challenge, and opportunity to the outside world to supply the necessary aid. A motorway or railway of the desired quality will require immense capital outlay. Equally important will be assistance with maintenance costs until the domestic economies have greatly strengthened themselves. The crumbling of the once impressive Italian autostrada between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa, Mussolini's strada imperiale, and comparable highways in the former Italian empire of north-east Africa, leave no doubt as to the rapid decay of even the best-engineered roads if maintenance is neglected, and the necessary maintenance is a costly recurrent item of expenditure beyond the financial capacity of the new African states. It is also an expenditure item difficult to justify in terms of any local budget, especially when vast unproductive areas have to be traversed as in the case of the tsetse-infested or arid portions of Eastern Africa, including the northern province of Kenya, which adjoins the highlands of Ethiopia.

In Ethiopia the United States, operating through the Imperial

† The direct Lusaka–Dar-es-Salaam link is presently favoured.
Highway Authority, is constructing outwards from Addis Ababa an excellent radial network of trunk roads. In Tanganyika many young American engineer graduates of the Peace Corps are already assisting with the development of the roads essential for stimulating the national economy. But an imaginative venture, almost comparable in magnitude with the High Dam in Egypt, is required to give a unifying motorway system to Eastern Africa. It is perhaps a project the scale and cost of which might make it sufficiently worthy to be given a name such as the John F. Kennedy Memorial Highway in honour of a man who took a close, personal interest in the political and other advance of East-Central Africa.

Airways development merits a special word even though surface communications must provide the main basis for effective commercial and economic relations. Imperial Airways, South African Airways and Rhodesia and Nyasaland Airways (R.A.N.A.) pioneered the opening of the air routes in the 1930’s. Efficient airfields, radio communications and meteorological offices were created. In the post-war period all services were greatly expanded for the large jet aircraft of the major international airlines, including B.O.A.C., successor of Imperial Airways. At Nairobi, Dar-es-Salaam, Livingstone and Salisbury, and at Entebbe, Lusaka and Blantyre, great sums were expended on new runways, airport facilities and air navigation equipment to make the airport fully international.

Internal air communications were also extended. Both East African Airways and Central African Airways have built up efficient local networks in association with B.O.A.C., in addition to operating certain through international services of their own to London. The “Africanization” of air-crews was accelerated recently, but something might be learned from the work of the American airline Trans-World Airways (T.W.A.), which has achieved excellent results in training Ethiopian pilots and radio officers for the Ethiopian Airlines. Although the rough local airfields of Ethiopia away from Addis Ababa and Diredawa will require substantial further investment, they are meanwhile being exploited with skill and provide valuable training.

Telecommunications in Eastern Africa do not present the problem of West Africa, where the interspersing of Francophone, Anglophone and other territories has led to situations where it is necessary, or easier, to get into touch with a neighbouring territory through links in Paris, London, and other former metropolitan
centres rather than by any more direct local means. English, having
long been the principal official language of all territories of Eastern
Africa, has also facilitated the common reception of broadcasting,
television and other services. Although Kiswahili is widely used as
a lingua franca, increasingly in the parliament and Press of Tan-
ganyika and to some degree in Kenya, English-language news-
papers, journals and books continue to supply important media for
communication by means of print. By some peoples, as in parts of
Uganda, English is for local reasons of politics or prestige preferred
to Swahili.

But though urgent attention must be given now to all aspects of
communication between the territories if there is to be hope of
greater regional unity within a reasonable time, it is necessary to
remember that the overwhelming majority of peoples in Eastern
Africa gaze from afar at the aeroplanes overhead and at the trains,
lorries and motor-cars hurrying by. They are close-bound still to
their clan and tribal lands, to their slow-moving flocks and herds
of camels, cattle, sheep and goats, and operate within traditional
ties of kinship. Increasing numbers are gaining some access to radio
and television broadcasts but few have used a telephone and most,
being illiterate, are unable to read newspapers. The improvement
in the education, nutrition and health of such peoples is the prin-
cipal challenge of contemporary Eastern Africa and there can be
little prospect of durable unity within or between the countries until
such fundamental obstacles to progress have been overcome. How-
ever, before we take up the question of the unity of the African
peoples—an issue likely to prove of first importance in the inde-
pendent Eastern Africa of the future—it is helpful to review the
course of events in the several territories since 1945 and, in par-
cular, to observe the ending of United Kingdom rule and, with
that ending, the termination of the pre-eminence in local politics of
the European and other non-African minorities.

Kenya and Northern Rhodesia demand prior consideration.
Europeans, Asians and members of other non-African minorities
who have served as the auxiliaries of British rule are to be found
in each of the other territories, but there could be no question of
their retaining positions of power or special influence in the
“African states” of Uganda, Tanganyika and Nyasaland once
Britain had abandoned control in the countries where Europeans
were most numerous and where they, and their representatives in
the legislative and executive councils, had long enjoyed special
treatment as the co-trustees of the Imperial Government.

Of the two former "white men's countries" Kenya must be taken
first. It is the country which has tested every assumption and hope
of more recent colonial policy and practice, mainly that of the
twentieth century, in contrast with the older policies and longer
history of South and West Africa. It is also the country in which
the decisive event of the post-war period took place: the outbreak
of Mau Mau in 1952, with its continuation through the long years
until 1958 or, as some would suggest, until December 1963, when
the actual attainment of Kenya's independence brought the last of
the "Freedom Fighters" from their forest hide-outs. Without Mau
Mau the course of recent history could have been radically different.
The twin targets of "multi-racial government" in East Africa and
of "inter-racial partnership" in Central Africa would have been
given much more hope of achievement.

The Watson Commission which examined the Gold Coast dis­
turbances in 1948 sought their underlying as well as their more
proximate causes. They were right to draw the attention of the
Secretary of State to their views, and it is possible that only a much
earlier awareness of profound Kikuyu discontent and a readiness
to apply drastic remedies could have saved Kenya from its
terrible troubles, of true Irish proportions. At the time, however,
the Secretary of State and the United Kingdom Government were
understandably satisfied that the political situation in the less
developed dependencies of East and Central Africa was very
different from that in West Africa, and that priority must be given
to intensified economic and social development. The ground-nuts
scheme into which so many millions were poured by the United
Kingdom was but one venture in this direction. It was also an
accepted opinion of the 1940's that development could be greatly
assisted by closer regional co-ordination of services and production.
It was such thinking which led to the institution of the East Africa
High Commission in 1948 with its multi-racial Legislative
Assembly containing European, Asian and African representatives
from the constituent territories, and to the creation of the Central
African Council.

African opinion, especially Kikuyu opinion, was alert to the
trend of politics in West Africa as well as to the attainment of
independence by India, Pakistan and Ceylon. The presence of men
of Indian and Pakistani origin rejoicing in their midst could leave
them in no ignorance of the Asian constitutional advances. Among many educated Africans, especially those who could perceive the rationale of the Labour Government's plans to co-ordinate the territorial economies of East and Central Africa in the interests of all-round advancement, there was a readiness to co-operate with Britain. Among others, however, including some of the more politically forceful, or embittered, there was a suspicion that greater regional co-ordination would necessitate continued European leadership and a substantial prolongation of colonial rule. This suspicion flamed into hostility after the general election in Britain in October 1951 saw the substitution of a Conservative administration for the Labour Government, which had been severely criticized at times by its opponents for its "liquidation" of the Indian empire and its over-readiness to make concessions to Asian and African nationalism. The manner in which the new Conservative ministers took up in 1951 and early 1952 the proposals for Central African federation which had been initiated by the Labour Government in 1950-1 also alarmed African leaders. To them it appeared that European ascendancy was to be extended and entrenched north of the Zambesi. In mid-1952 the Kikuyu and their allies struck. The Kenya emergency was declared, British forces were called in, and the prospects throughout East-Central Africa were transformed.

Before we recall the constitutional developments between 1952 and 1963, which reflect the British Government's desire to unite in amity the diverse peoples of Kenya, we should look briefly at some of the hopes and aspirations of those in Britain who had long been specially concerned with policy towards and in Kenya and East Africa. There is only limited utility in labels but it might be helpful to refer to the "Christian imperialist" group, of whom Dr. J. H. Oldham, Miss Margery Perham and Professor Roland Oliver represent successive generations, and to the "economic imperialists" who firmly upheld the importance of European settlement, investment and trade. The missionary societies and journals and church papers provided a domestic forum for the former; the Joint East African Board and the journal *East Africa and Rhodesia* for the latter. In their worst moments they might be tempted to think of one another as "maudlin moralists" or "Machiavellian materialists", but at their best they were ready enough to concede the necessity for both morals and economics. They did not have the field to themselves in the London world of influence, the applied anthropology committee of the Royal Anthropological Institute contained people of the
calibre of Dr. Edwin Smith and Professors Radcliffe-Brown and Margaret Read, and there were others in education, government and international affairs who took a close and responsible interest in the affairs of East and Central Africa.

But the major battles over British policy were fought between the Christian and economic imperialists. Dr. Joseph Oldham was a foremost Christian campaigner. The key figure in British and international missionary organization, he was eternally vigilant and hard-hitting as is shown in his forthright criticisms of General Smuts's Oxford and other lectures of 1929, which were later published in one volume under the title *Africa and Some World Problems*. In addition to his own books* Oldham kept effective watch on the Colonial Office and maintained close liaison with its principal officers. He also served with distinction as a member of the Commission on Closer Union of the Dependencies in Eastern and Central Africa under the chairmanship of Sir Edward Hilton Young, later Lord Kennet. Every aspect of policy concerning African interests was mastered by Oldham, particular attention being devoted to the crucial question of land rights, which in Kenya was dealt with in 1933 by a commission led by Sir William Morris Carter, a judge from Tanganyika, who had in 1925 presided over the Southern Rhodesia Land Commission which provided the basis for that colony's Land Apportionment Act. The Kikuyu grievances over land in the Kenya highlands were a matter of special concern to international missionary circles where close consideration and study had been given to issues affecting Christianity and Kikuyu tribal rites.

The Kikuyu sense of suffering over past wrongs was never eradicated. A good insight into the thought and feeling of this most numerous and able tribe of Kenya is to be gained from reading Mr. Jomo Kenyatta's *Facing Mount Kenya*, first published in 1938, and from writings such as *Mau Mau and the Kikuyu* and *Defeating Mau Mau* by Dr. L. S. B. Leakey, himself a fluent Kikuyu linguist and an elder of the tribe. Though the Christian imperialist group in Britain fought for a maximum protection of Kikuyu and other African rights, and the economic imperialists for priority for more modern systems of land tenure and economic organization, both at times gaining concessions from successive colonial secretaries and

*White and Black in Africa* (London, 1930) contains the criticisms of the Smuts lectures. See also Dr. Oldham's *Christianity and the Race Problem* (S.C.M. Press, 1924).
governors, these conflicts, which were never completely reconciled, had only marginal interest for a talented and determined people confident in their own destiny. Mr. Kenyatta, a student of social anthropology at London University in the 1930's, has been followed in his educational achievements by many other Kikuyu who have seized every opportunity for secondary and higher education at centres like the Alliance High School, Makerere University College in Uganda and, more recently, the Royal College, Nairobi.

The future of Kenya today rests very much in the hands of Mr. Kenyatta, his Kikuyu people and their friends and colleagues such as Mr. Mboya, On their ability to provide an acceptable basis of life for the non-Kikuyu, and the non-African, peoples of Kenya the unity of the nation must now depend. The exact course which they will follow is difficult to discern and it is impossible to know whether the elaborate “regional” constitution of 1963 will survive any longer than the provisions for regional devolution in Ghana’s independence constitution of 1957. There is much to support the view of Mr. George Bennett as to why the many concessions to regionalism were made by Mr. Kenyatta and his Kenya African National Union (K.A.N.U.) to Mr. Ronald Ngala’s Kenya African Democratic Union (K.A.D.U.) at the constitutional conference in London on the eve of independence: “K.A.N.U. was prepared to act thus since independence was its objective; after the rapid constitutional changes of the past years they had little respect for constitutions, believing that they could be destroyed as easily as they were made.”*

Certainly Mr. Kenyatta and his Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Mr. Tom Mboya, who at Oxford and elsewhere has made a close study of political systems, incline very definitely to the view that the process of unification of Kenya’s very diverse peoples can and should be forced, and that this is best done by a policy of central control.† Such a structure would not be dissimilar from that erected by the former British colonial administration in Kenya. But whether a system which depended upon the external régime of Westminster and Whitehall will be accepted as readily from a locally composed government in control in Nairobi is the question. It is one which we have considered already in the case of Ghana, where the peoples of the Northern Territories and Ashanti were as strongly opposed to a unitary constitution as the Somali, the

† In November 1964 Kenya was proclaimed a one-party state.
Kalenjin, the Masai and other tribes and groups in Kenya, traditional competitors or enemies of the Kikuyu. In many cases the tensions are deep-seated ones between pastoralists and agriculturists.

But whatever the course which Kenya's new rulers adopt in the future they will be able to learn something from the efforts of the British constitution makers of the 1950's: Mr. Oliver Lyttelton (Lord Chandos), Mr. Lennox Boyd (Lord Boyd) and Sir Evelyn Baring (Lord Howick) who, though they accepted the principle that responsibility should still be exercised by Britain and representatives of the Britons resident in Kenya, strove to make a successful reality of multi-racial government. They built on the work of their post-war predecessors, most notably Arthur Creech Jones, but under the conditions of the emergency they were called upon to act more urgently to bring together representatives of all the peoples of Kenya in the executive, legislative and administrative branches. No man gave more devoted, distinguished and courageous service than Sir Evelyn Baring, who was called to the governorship of Kenya after the gauntlet had been thrown down by the leaders of Mau Mau. His wife, Lady Mary Baring, who on arrival in Nairobi at once settled to the study of the difficult Kikuyu language and to active welfare work among African women, deserves mention also, both for her own attainments and as an example of the British wives who have made important personal contributions to Britain in Africa through the generations.

It was a remarkable feat for a governor whose reputed talents lay in the economic and civil spheres, to prove so successful during a prolonged period of insurrection and warfare. He was severely criticized at times, not least for "overloading" the various branches of government with too many ministers, parliamentarians and civil servants. Yet never in the history of Kenya, or of East Africa, was "multi-racialism" demonstrated more convincingly in the offices of government than during the difficult, at times desperate, days of the emergency. Additional portfolios, seats and desks may be questionable on grounds of financial cost but, in times of grave crisis in a multi-racial society, the benefits to be gained from securing a close working partnership between all peoples—Africans, Asians and Europeans—in the making and implementation of policy outweigh any disadvantage. Material as well as moral gain results from reduction of ethnic tension. The "training" aspect of such multi-racialism was of the utmost value.
During the time of the emergency there was concern for the extended application of multi-racialism outside Kenya as well. In Tanganyika the recommendations of Professor W. M. Mackenzie on franchise and representation were of particular importance. The commission of inquiry into the structure and conditions of service in the civil services of all East African countries, under the chairmanship of Sir David Lidbury,* placed a special emphasis on the need to remove or reduce all the racial and ethnic distinctions in recruitment, appointment and advancement, many of them the product of a long and complicated history in countries where differential practices had been welcomed at times in order to protect particular community interests. Outside government also the emergency years were remarkable for the rapidity with which entrenched patterns of social segregation were abandoned. The ministries of Kenya combed the statute book to weed out discriminatory laws and regulations; the public at large accepted, without fuss, "integration" in restaurants, theatres, sports clubs, cinemas and other places which formerly had been the preserve of one ethnic group, usually that of the Europeans.

Seldom have long-established social barriers gone down so quickly as in Kenya between 1953 and 1956. It is possible to attribute this phenomenon entirely to the shock of fear which was evoked by Mau Mau, but there was in the general response much to indicate that more worthy emotions were brought into play by the circumstances of the emergency. Shock there was certainly, and alarm for the future, but there was also a sharper recognition of the folly of ill-considered and out-of-date practices and unwarranted attitudes, together with a new appreciation of the necessity for active inter-racial co-operation. Those opposed to the evils of Mau Mau, Africans as well as Asians and Europeans, suffered together and together condemned acts of terrorism as they worked to preserve the essentials of community life.

There is little point in supplying details of the careful ethnic balance of the Executive Council and the Legislative Council which was worked out in the different constitutions introduced during the emergency. The membership of these bodies, together with the composition of new institutions such as the Council of State, a selected cross-section of senior statesmanlike members of the different communities, is to be found in the many books of

reference, not least the Colonial Annual Reports, the annual Colonial Office Lists and the other official publications on the Commonwealth and dependencies. Somali, Arab, Hindu, Sikh, Masai, Kikuyu, planter, townsman—a place was devised for the representation of each interest and group. In these councils the "best man" principle was always permissible since politics were not paramount. Thus the famous A. B. Patel came to be an acknowledged key figure in Kenya's Executive Council until his eventual unshakeable decision to retire from the power and influence of his office to the contemplative religious life in India which was dictated by his Hindu conscience.

There is understandably today, in the first enthusiasm of independence, little readiness to analyse with detachment the reasons which underlay the particular provisions of the constitutions of the post-war era, nor the wisdom which governed the selection of particular individuals for important office; but Kenya's leaders of the future in times of strife might well profit from such reflection. There is place in a land of many cultural and racial groups for institutions such as a representative Council of State to protect communities against harmful discrimination; and place also for that generosity towards minorities which characterizes the best in Westminster and Whitehall, where the Scots, Welsh and Irish hold a not ungenerous proportion of principal offices among the native English.

On the personal, as distinct from the official side of life in colonial Kenya, Karen Blixen performed the great service of depicting with skill and sensitive accuracy the diverse peoples and scenes and life of Kenya during the peak moments of the British ascendancy. Her book Out of Africa, published in 1937, provides a valuable series of observations and sketches of the Somali as individuals and as representatives of their culture, and of the Masai, the Kikuyu and the Asians. The Europeans of Kenya are revealed with the same honesty and compassion. Danish aristocrat and British settler widow, she has been criticized recently by some of her fellow-countrymen, among whom she died a few months ago near Copenhagen, for writing from the standpoint of her personal and social background. But much of the criticism is as unfair as it is unhistorical. There may be forgiving irony in her brief sketch of her neighbour, the fashionable doctor turned planter, who asked to be excused from further calls to attend African servants because he had formerly "practised to the élite of Bournemouth", but it is
wholly accurate in its evocation of one element in the settler population.

Karen Blixen's honesty led her to make plain that her Bournemouth neighbour had responded to her appeal and that it was his skill which saved the life both of her African servant in difficult child-birth and of her baby. Yet there were, and are, in Kenya the other British doctors who as government medical officers, private family practitioners and specialists, have through the decades borne impossible case-loads in remote rural clinics and dispensaries and in the large hospitals of the towns to relieve the sick and to promote the health of countless thousands of Africans. There were the working farmers too, British gentry and yeomen, and the Afrikaners of Eldoret. Karen Blixen's writings, like those of Elspeth Huxley, keep alive the Kenya of the colonial era.

Britons who served Kenya may serve again in the future, as many in fact are doing already; but it is the service of equals which they must bring, not that of the privileged. Mau Mau brought to Britain the full realization of her new position in Africa. Above all it emphasized with stark clarity the difference between earlier times, that is before India's independence in 1947, when she could summon to her aid the resources of the Indian empire, not least the Indian army, and the new era of the multi-racial Commonwealth, when a central support of her former power in Eastern Africa has been removed and replaced by independent India and Pakistan, alert to and critical of all aspects of colonialism. South Africa's resources also, in the age of apartheid after 1948, were beyond the call of Britain for aid in suppressing Mau Mau. The South African Air Force contribution was welcomed by the United Nations Force in Korea; but whereas it might have been possible for Britain to have accepted the help of Smuts, it was politically impossible in the new Commonwealth to seek aid from Malan and his associates. The military suppression of Mau Mau had to be borne by Britain alone, and most of the great cost of reconstruction and development. Appraisal of the experience of Mau Mau after 1958, and recognition of the strength of Kikuyu and African feeling, helped to lead Britain in 1960 to a decision in respect of African nationalism comparable to that of 1906 in respect of Afrikaner nationalism—political withdrawal and a transfer of power.

Northern Rhodesia's European population watched the course of the Mau Mau struggle with a deep sense of fellow-feeling for the "settlers". So also did the planters of Nyasaland. Sir Roy Welensky
was assured of emotional receptions whenever he spoke in Kenya to audiences such as those at the agricultural shows, and his speeches were applauded at home in Northern Rhodesia. The Europeans of the northern territories of Central Africa were for several years, however, lulled by Federation into an expectation that the British ascendancy was to be maintained and that they would continue to serve as the privileged co-trustees of the Imperial Government. As they were led to conceive the position, it was their role and duty to supply leadership towards independent statehood, a process which, it was generally assumed, would require generations rather than decades or years. Such estimates were not excessive in comparison with contemporary forecasts for Tanganyika and Uganda.

The decision by the United Kingdom Government in 1952–3 to impose Federation on the unwilling Africans of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland had its psychological effect on almost all the European residents in the two territories, including those many settlers who had long accepted that they were living in “Colonial Office” protectorates which were destined to become “African states”. Even convinced non-racialists among the Europeans, prominent in the inter-racial associations, explained to visitors that they were being obliged to readjust their outlook and behaviour to the new situation in which Europeans were cast in the explicit role of senior partners. Among several administrators of the colonial service, schooled in a tradition of the “paramountcy” of African interests, the abrupt termination of their assumptions and expectations had a traumatic effect, discernible in older and younger officers alike. Mr. Griff Jones’s Britain and Nyasaland* is an important book which analyses with scrupulous skill and care the story of the ten years of Federation through which he served Nyasaland, a decade which he sets against the wider political and historical background.

Attempts were made by certain senior European leaders to indicate to the Africans and Europeans, Asians and Coloureds, the scope and meaning of partnership. Sir Gilbert Rennie, Governor of Northern Rhodesia, who accepted the challenge of Federation and saw the benefits for all of intensified economic and social development, prepared at an early stage a comprehensive draft definition of partnership to serve as a basis for discussion. It is most unfortunate that his initiative was not at once followed up. Among European political leaders Sir John Moffat of Northern Rhodesia was also outstanding for his forthright presentation of the “Moffat

Resolutions" to the Legislative Council in 1954. He made plain what partnership must mean if there was to be hope of inter-racial co-operation. In Nyasaland, and Southern Rhodesia also, there were Europeans who saw the importance of coming to grips at once with the urgent task of securing maximum African goodwill if the Federation was to have any hope.

The majority of Europeans, however, in characteristic human fashion, were content to accept the new fact of Federation and to adjust their lives accordingly. In this they resembled the Italians who at much the same time were offending Somalis in the Somalia to which they had returned by sanction of the United Nations, after the termination of the British military administration. Though the mandate was for a specific period of ten years the returning Italians spoke and acted as if the period was indefinite and their pre-war régime had been restored.

The Africans of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland may have lacked a leader like Mr. Jomo Kenyatta, and a people like the Kikuyu, but they nevertheless deeply resented the manner in which their views on Federation and their fears were seemingly ignored by the United Kingdom Government and by the local administrators whom they had learned to trust. The new attitudes of the Europeans about them, and the seeming abandonment of the concept of paramountcy by the Colonial Service officers who had previously been protective in approach, at first dismayed but then spurred Africans into new political organization and resolve.

Although John Chilembwe* had shown his spirit of independence in Nyasaland during the 1914–18 war, the Africans of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were slow to organize effective political movements. Individuals from Central Africa, like Clements Kadalie, frequently played a leading part in trade unions and political bodies in South Africa alongside their friends from the Cape and Natal, but there was not the scope in their home societies for any major activity. Nyasaland from Sir Harry Johnston's time was a Crown protectorate in which missionaries and protective-minded administrators exercised the predominant influence, while Northern Rhodesia after 1924, when the Crown assumed responsibility from the British South Africa Company, increasingly placed an emphasis on the development of tribal government in accordance with the principles of "indirect administration". Chiefs and other

traditional authorities were thereby given fresh political importance.

When, in the last years of the 1939–45 war, attention was given to the development of African provincial councils and national representative bodies, it was natural for Britain to build a pyramidal structure based on the tribal authorities. In 1944 and 1945 African provincial councils were instituted in both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and in 1946 the African Representative Council in Northern Rhodesia and its counterpart, the African Protectorate Council in Nyasaland. In 1948 and 1949 the first Africans were appointed from these national consultative bodies to the respective Legislative Councils of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. These dates serve to indicate how recently Africans were drawn into political participation at national level. It was, again, only under the post-war Labour Government that trade union officers were appointed to assist in the development of the African Mineworkers’ Union, and other unions, although South African socialists had supported African labour organizations in the Copper Belt during the industrial troubles of the late 1930’s and early 1940’s.

Federation at once extended the horizons of all African political and organizational thought. The delegations to London to oppose federation, whether chiefs eager for audience of the Queen or African national congressmen and trade unionists eager to consult Michael Scott and Fenner Brockway, enlarged the scale of African discussion and activity. It confronted them directly with the significance of federation in a Pan-African, Commonwealth and world context and linked them inextricably with organizations based in London, New York and other international centres. After Federation was brought about in 1953, African leaders never lacked experienced outside consultants and advisers in Britain or the United States, most of whom were in active sympathy with African nationalism. In Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland African organization strengthened in every direction—executive, administrative and financial; political propaganda and recruitment acquired a new sophistication. In Britain Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda, who for many years had engaged in family medical practice in London, provided Nyasaland with a representative intimately acquainted with British life and thought, while Africans who came from Northern Rhodesia to act on behalf of their organizations rapidly learned the metropolitan techniques of political pressure.

The year 1957, which marked Ghana’s independence, was a critical year in the Britain–Central African relationship. The pro-
vision in the Federation (Constitution) Order in Council for review of the constitution after from seven to nine years may only have been inserted belatedly, but it provided nevertheless a constant stimulus to statesmanship which, if it had evoked the right response, might have saved the Federation. But politics, not statesmanship, prevailed. In place of a constructive response to the pressures of Afro-Asian politics in the immediate aftermath of Suez and Mau Mau there was in 1957 the agreement between the United Kingdom and Federal governments which strengthened the latters’ position and control. The London Announcement of April 27, 1957, a joint declaration by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the Prime Minister of the Federation, enhanced the status of the Federal government in a number of significant ways.

It was wholly understandable that Federal leaders, who were very conscious of Sir Godfrey Huggins’s (later Lord Malvern’s) attendance at meetings of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers since 1937, should feel sensitive about Ghana having overtaken Rhodesia in Commonwealth and international status, but little was to be gained by hasty ad hoc modifications to the relationship between Britain and the Federation. The Constitution Amendment Act of 1957 which changed the composition of the Federal Assembly was also resisted by African leaders who were very conscious of the few African voters on the federal electoral rolls, both general and special. At August 31, 1959, for example, there were on the general roll 64,622 Europeans from Southern Rhodesia, 18,851 from Northern Rhodesia, and 2,171 from Nyasaland as against 1,211, 639 and 9 Africans respectively. Africans on the special roll numbered 949 for Southern Rhodesia, 4,301 for Northern Rhodesia and 23 for Nyasaland. True, more Africans could have been enrolled had there not been powerful pressure to boycott registration, but that pressure itself called for understanding and remedial action.

The copper recession before the Southern Rhodesia and Federal elections of 1958, five years after the introduction of Federation, played its part in heightening the anxiety of the electors, mostly Europeans, including many new immigrants from the United Kingdom. Unemployment and other difficulties led them to support candidates who promised to give first attention to satisfying their immediate needs. British immigrants, accustomed to national health and educational services of the welfare state, were strongly critical
of Prime Minister Garfield Todd and of the outspoken non-racialism of Mr. Hardwicke Holderness and other leading members of the United Rhodesia Party in Southern Rhodesia, and there were comparable reactions among Europeans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Mr. Todd's party, with its active African members, gained not a single seat in the territorial elections of July 1958. Such internal economic and political setbacks added greatly to the stresses of partnership and paved the way for riots and disturbances in all three territories of the Federation.

We cannot supply details of the disturbances of 1959, but they were almost as decisive in their effects in Central Africa as Mau Mau had proved in East Africa. The report of the Devlin Commission on the emergency in Nyasaland is a key document. It supplied facts and recommendations which could not be ignored. It was only open to Britain thereafter, through the Monckton Commission, which was appointed in July 1959 to conduct the review of the Federal constitution, to recommend giant strides towards partnership by means of substantial increases in African participation in federal and territorial government. When the Monckton recommendations, which ran counter to many of the assumptions underlying the 1957 London agreement between the United Kingdom and Sir Roy Welensky's ministry, were not accepted by the Europeans of Central Africa the fate of the Federation was sealed.* It is significant that though the Monckton Report, which was tabled in October 1960, was considered excessively liberal by most Europeans the opposite view was taken by most Africans. A considered statement of such critical African opinion is contained in the minority report of Mr. Manoah Wellington Chirwa and Mr. H. G. Habanyama. These commissioners differed from their colleagues on two matters of principle. They were unable to accept the continued existence of a Federation not based on consent and which, in their view, had not proved to be of benefit to the majority of the inhabitants and they considered that the Majority Report had failed to deal effectively with the all-important question of constitutional advance in the Territories.

Although the dissolution of the Federation did not take formal effect until December 31, 1963, little is gained from a recitation of the events of the last years. The senior British cabinet minister, Mr. R. A. Butler, who was given a special office in respect of Central Africa, presided with dignity and skill over the difficult conference

* Sir Roy's assessment is in *Welensky's 4000 Days*, (Collins, 1964).
at the Victoria Falls in June-July 1963 which set about the abandonment of an experiment which many had entered with high hope only a short decade previously. The secession of Nyasaland, agreed to in 1962, occasioned comparatively little trouble. The small, densely populated territory with its perennial deficit had been pushed into the Federation at least as much by the Imperial Government as it had been pulled in by the white leaders of Rhodesia, several of whom had been frankly reluctant to be saddled with the financial burden. Northern Rhodesia on the other hand presented a problem akin to that of Kenya at the time of the Lancaster House conference of 1960. A way had quickly to be found from a state of European ascendancy, in existence since the 1890’s and reinforced in the 1950’s, to an African-controlled government.

Northern Rhodesia’s elaborate “multi-racial” constitutions introduced in 1959 and 1962 had much in common with those of contemporary Kenya. Whether their complicated arrangements for ensuring an ethnic balance in political representation provided the best machinery for moving towards African control of affairs may be questioned, but, as in the case of Kenya, there was undoubtedly a strong desire on the part of the governors and administrators to discover effective and peaceful means of preventing the suppression of the rights and interests of any community. Zambians of the future, like Kenyans, may find it rewarding to reflect on the practices or proposals of non-partisan British officials. Certainly the responsibility will be theirs now that Northern Rhodesia, under the name of Zambia, has become independent.*

Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, whose Zambia Shall be Free and the earlier Black Government? reflect his responsible approach to the problems of independence, will shortly occupy a position which is as important as that of any other leader of independent Africa. His management of the internal affairs and external relations of the wealthiest single territory of Eastern Africa must obviously exert wide influence. But equally significant will be his handling of his political opponents and the fears of the several minorities. The African National Congress (A.N.C.) has lost to Dr. Kaunda’s United National Independence Party (U.N.I.P.) in the crucial pre-independence struggle for power and it appears that Mr. Harry Nkumbula, who bore the early burdens of leading the African political struggle, must be content with leadership of the opposition.

* See Postscript.
† Written in association with the Rev. Colin Morris.
The Europeans, whose knowledge and skill are essential to the economic and social development of Zambia, and the Coloured and Asian minorities must likewise look to Dr. Kaunda for the protection of their persons and properties and the safeguarding of their cultural and community interests. It is to the credit of Dr. Kaunda that despite the lawlessness in the adjoining Congolese Republic he commands a wide personal confidence, including that of leading British settlers of the experience of Sir Stewart Gore-Browne.

The fact that there is a certain ethnic element in the African support for U.N.I.P. and the A.N.C. in Northern Rhodesia was not stressed in the foregoing paragraph but it is undoubtedly something which will require the closest attention when the first careless rapture of independence has run its course. There has been among U.N.I.P. officers the same, almost universal, colonial unwillingness to study seriously the long-term issues of national unity, such as policy in respect of official languages or the devolution of power to the provinces, lest such discussions defer independence. But it is desirable that sustained thought be given to such topics with a view to devising the best possible policies in the light of all available experience. Attention has been riveted on European–African relations during the past seven years, in which new statutory bodies concerned with the improvement of “race relations” have operated in Northern Rhodesia. But while substantial “tribes” such as the Bemba, Chewa, Tonga, Lunda, Luvale and Lozi, whose numbers exceed those of any non-African minority, are still conscious of their distinctiveness, it is very possible that Zambia in the future will be confronted with the problems of “tribalism” which have been examined in the past by Professor Clyde Mitchell and the late Professor Vincent Harlow.

In the new states of Eastern Africa which lie between the two former “white men’s countries” problems of tribalism may also arise in the future. Malawi could find herself facing internal divisions of an ethnic kind though her record suggests that this might be unlikely. The Nyasaland battalions of the King’s African Rifles were always noted for their lack of tribal consciousness, as were migrant Nyasa workers. In Tanganyika too the prospect of ethnic harmony is also comparatively good. Apart from the determination of President Nyerere to absorb into his single party—the Tanganyika African National Union (T.A.N.U.)—the energies of the Chagga and other proudly self-conscious peoples, his country has the advantage that it contains a great many African groupings of
modest size rather than one or more predominant peoples like the Kikuyu in Kenya.

Uganda is perhaps more precariously placed than any of the other countries of Eastern Africa in terms of internal African unity, especially if we exclude the Somali problem of Kenya whose solution might best be found within a wider regional context. Of the 75,000 persons who make up the non-African population of Uganda—as against the 6½ million Africans—over 63,000 are Indians, 6,000 Pakistanis and 3,000 Goans. There has in the past been serious conflict between Indians and Africans, stemming chiefly from economic differences. But each of the thirteen principal tribes into which the Government has classified the African population greatly exceeds the Indian population in number. The Baganda, totalling around a million and comprising approximately 17 per cent of the whole population, are the largest ethnic entity, but the Iteso, Basoga and Banyankole, who each constitute some 8–9 per cent of the total, are also numerous. There has at times been acute tension between the Baganda and Basoga, whose territories confront one another across the Nile below Lake Victoria, and it has not proved easy to secure co-operation even for much needed common economic development projects, such as those which have centred on the town of Jinja and the new industrial and commercial enterprises associated with the near-by Owen Falls dam and hydro-electric power station. Other neighbours of the Baganda, especially those proud of their own traditional rulers and sensitive to the historical growth of Baganda ascendancy, have experienced clashes with the people of the Kabaka. The Banyoro feel deep resentment at the fate of their “lost counties”, and at the United Kingdom’s failure to restore them before independence.*

The Baganda, entrenched behind their special agreements with the United Kingdom Government and located in the heart of Uganda around Kampala, the principal commercial city, Entebbe, the seat of the administration, and Makerere, adjoining Kampala, the site of the University, have always presented the most difficult problem to those concerned to devise a constitution for the whole country. It required a decade and more of intensive negotiation, sometimes a major clash of wills—as when the Kabaka was banished to Britain for the period December 1953–October 1955—before a formula was prepared. A federal-type system of

* The independent government of Uganda has acted recently to restore the “lost counties”.
government was agreed upon and Buganda was thereby assured of a substantial measure of autonomy. Whether the special position of the Baganda will be respected in the future is impossible to predict; but in the short period since Uganda became independent in October 1962 wisdom has characterized the treatment of the Kabaka and his kingdom by the Prime Minister, Mr. Milton Obote, of the Lango people from the Northern Province. True, Mr. Obote’s Uganda People’s Congress needed to add, by means of coalition, the 21 seats of the Kabaka Yekka Party to his own 37 in order to form a government, with the Democratic Party (24 seats) in opposition, but it is nevertheless important that he did install the Kabaka as first president of the whole of Uganda when a republican constitution was introduced in October 1963. It was as if Dr. Nkrumah had decided to appoint the Asantehene as a Ghanahene, or constitutional monarch, in the manner in which the sultans of Malaya have been incorporated into the modern political system. In the years ahead there will be need for many comparable acts if harmony is to obtain and if the several traditional rulers and peoples are to become fully reconciled to working together in the interests of a united Uganda.

Many have argued in recent years that the best hope of reducing inter-tribal and other ethnic friction in Eastern Africa lies in much larger political associations, preferably one which embraces not only all the present members but others, such as the Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia and those countries in the south and west which were mentioned earlier in this chapter. Only within an association of this kind, the argument holds, is it likely that the fears and hostilities which at present exist between immediate neighbours and competitors are likely to be overcome. Again, only by merging into a greater political society will people abandon their present reluctance to surrender any part of their “national” land, a potent source of national pride or prestige, if simply through its representation on a map. In a larger association, it is felt, the rights of minorities will be shown greater respect. There is force in this argument and the goal of a wider unity is obviously one which merits sympathy and support.

Yet, as in the case of West Africa, it would seem better for regional unification to proceed on the basis of the existing foundation than to be impelled from the outset towards a more ambitious objective. The Prime Minister of Uganda, with the backing of Ghana’s President, has thus far provided the major obstacle to the closer political unification of the East African territories. He
has assumed a more militant posture in respect of some of the major issues on which Pan-Africanism was, and is, agreed—the need for breaking up the Rhodesia-Nyasaland Federation and the need for strong action against apartheid in South Africa. The recent fusion of Zanzibar and Tanganyika, following the army mutinies which affected Uganda as well as the other countries of East Africa, may now encourage Uganda towards unity with Kenya and Tanganyika-Zanzibar (or Tanzania). Uganda's inhibitions over closer union are due in part to internal difficulties, but there is in part also a traditional sense of resentment about the priority of attention given to Kenya. It may not have been a tactful act on the part of those responsible for the Uganda Colonial Annual Report for 1956 to remind Ugandans of Labouchere's criticism of Uganda as a damnsa hereditas and the Uganda railway as a "gigantic folly" which "goes nowhere", even though their purpose was to highlight the westward extension of the railway.

Tanganyika also has had frequent occasion to question Kenya's presumption, especially Nairobi's repeated assumption of the role of regional capital. It was perhaps natural, given the fact that Tanganyika was only entrusted to the United Kingdom in 1919-20, that the northern, and central, territory and its principal city should have acquired seniority, but Tanganyika's and Uganda's British governors as well as their African leaders have not always viewed the arrangement with pleasure. A new Brasilia-type capital might ease such feeling. If Eastern Africa is enlarged to incorporate Zambia and Malawi it could well be deemed a necessity.

But wherever the headquarters of a more unified East Africa might be located and whatever the form of political constitution it must be emphasized that a network of most valuable common services has been built already by Britain, in company with East Africa's leaders, during the past fifty years. The conquest of Tanganyika made closer association possible and the whole process was given impetus by the Hilton Young Commission. Its 1929 report* placed major emphasis on the need for careful, comparative study, especially within the region, and the closest inter-territorial cooperation. The Governors' conferences of the 1930's, and the further experience of co-operation in war-time between 1939 and 1945, led naturally to the East Africa High Commission in 1948.

The achievements of the East Africa High Commission were impressive in their quality, extent and variety. It is important for

the whole of the zone, and for the wider Africa, that in December 1961 the High Commission was replaced by the East African Common Services Organization, still with headquarters in Nairobi, to administer the inter-territorial services. The United Kingdom Government withdrew completely from the new organization, leaving it to the local administrations and their successors to carry forward the work. Ministers and other representatives from each constituent territory are together responsible for the formulation of policy. From a long list it is possible to select only a few services but the mention of the Desert Locust Survey and the Trypanosomiasis Research Organization, in addition to the more familiar railways, harbours, telecommunications, veterinary, medical, agricultural, meteorological and other services, reminds one of some of the specific challenges of the whole zone. Only discussions in their laboratories, or encounters in remote places with officers of the Desert Locust or other departments, bring home the full meaning of the nature and importance of their work. It would be tragic if national politics were to bring any disruption to such fundamental services.

The extent of the social and economic needs of Eastern Africa need not be laboured. They were documented in detail in the report of the East Africa Royal Commission 1953–55, which included, in a chapter entitled “The Basic Poverty of East Africa”, facts such as a comparison of the net cash product per head in selected African countries. From about £100 per head in South Africa the figure ranged to £47 in the Rhodesias, £34 in Ghana, about £16 in Uganda and £14 in Kenya. The economists on the Commission were realistic in their appraisal but they were in no sense pessimistic. To them the overall East African economy resembled that of South Africa some forty years previously, that is before the inter-war advance in manufacturing industry in the Union. Whether the total resources of the zone would permit a comparable rate of industrial and agricultural development could not be forecast with any accuracy, but the commissioners in their survey pin-pointed the major initial obstacles to be overcome and made many valuable recommendations as to how this conquest might be accomplished.

The implications of some of the recommendations of the Commission were far-reaching. Their advocacy of inter-territorial economic and administrative involvement in large-scale projects such as that of a Lake Victoria Basin Development Authority inevitably aroused suggestions of closer political union between Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika. We have referred already to the
emphatic resistance of the Africans of East Africa to any initiative towards federation on the part of the United Kingdom Government which had brought about the recent Central African Federation. Even a hint in this direction from a visiting Secretary of State in Nairobi provoked an explosive reaction. But, whether or not the present Common Services Organization will in the future evolve into an African-sponsored federation, the Royal Commission was right to emphasize the advantages of the closest inter-territorial cooperation in tackling some of the more fundamental economic and social obstacles which are to be found in each country.

The lack of trained manpower and the urgent need for education is made very plain in the report. Only one chapter could be devoted primarily to the subject, and the technicalities of providing universities and advanced colleges were left to the Inter-University Council for Higher Education Overseas. But even the barest figures of the primary, secondary and technical schools led the commissioners to speak strongly on the inadequacy of facilities and the high rates of wastage. One comparison shows that whereas in England and Wales in 1953 some 550,000 children had continued to the fourth class of primary education from an original entry of 584,000, only 104,000 children in East Africa were still at primary school four years after 1949, when 255,000 of them had entered. The Lidbury Commission on the Civil Services of the East African Territories and the East Africa High Commission in 1953–4, which conducted its inquiries at the same time as the Royal Commission, were concerned to discover the likelihood of increased local recruitment. It is not surprising from the figures which follow that they were forced to conclude that “the East African territories are not yet in sight of being able to staff their public services entirely from their own resources”. School Certificate passes in the four countries of East Africa in 1953 together amounted to a total of 1,219; the number of Higher School Certificates which were gained was 53. Of the 420 African boys who gained the School Certificate, 186 did so in Uganda, 139 in Kenya, 94 in Tanganyika and 1 in Zanzibar. Only 14 African girls—all from the three mainland territories—received the School Certificate. No Africans appear to have passed the Higher School Certificate in 1953: the list shows only 23 European girls, 21 European boys and 9 Asian boys.

The last ten years have witnessed determined efforts by Mr. Tom Mboya, President Nyerere and other African leaders to accelerate the education and training of their people. The United Kingdom has
co-operated, and each year has seen significant advances. In addition to the more usual courses of study Africans from East Africa have entered Sandhurst and other military, and police, colleges. The Africanization of the commissioned ranks of the armed forces and the police only began very belatedly, as was made clear during the recent mutinies, but the urgent need of trained officers is now generally acknowledged by Britain, the United States and the Commonwealth countries of West Africa in a position to offer some help.

The "investment in education" philosophy which inspired the Ashby Commission in its approach to Nigeria's economic and social needs has extended also to Eastern Africa. New schools, teacher-training and technical colleges have been built and new universities established. Makerere, the pioneer university college in Uganda, was followed by the transformation into a university college of the Royal College in Nairobi, and Dar-es-Salaam has now its own promising university college. These three university colleges were incorporated recently as constituent colleges of the University of East Africa. The Kivukoni Adult Education College near Dar-es-Salaam deserves mention as a special venture which seeks in its own way to meet certain of the trained manpower needs of an independent state by preparing trade unionists and community workers for more informed leadership.

There is little to be gained from listing too many figures, significant though each might be and vitally so to each of the countries concerned. It may be of interest, however, to indicate something of the position in regard to higher education. There were, in 1960, 399 students from Kenya studying at Makerere in Uganda, 201 at the Royal College in Nairobi and 1,158 Kenya students taking courses of higher education in the United Kingdom. The majority of the latter were Asian and European, only 126 being African. Uganda supplied 279, mostly African men and women, of Makerere's 912 students, and there were 509 Uganda students overseas, of whom 334 were African. The United Kingdom received the majority of the overseas students from Kenya and Uganda, though India and the United States also took significant numbers. Tanganyika's position has been somewhat behind Kenya and Uganda in respect of higher education, but determined efforts are being made to increase the few hundreds who have been able each year to make use of the facilities at Makerere and Nairobi and those available overseas in the United Kingdom, the United States and India.

In Central Africa the educational need of Africans is also most
urgent. Singularly few Africans have had the opportunity of secondary education and very few have been able to qualify for university entrance. There was in both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland a substantial increase in secondary enrolments during the 1950’s, but in 1958 there were still only 1,890 secondary pupils in the former and 1,189 in the latter territory as compared with Southern Rhodesia, where the number of Africans in secondary schools was about equal to that of both northern territories together. The sixth-form position has been much the same. The Munali School, near Lusaka, is a remarkably good school, but it has had for too long to try alone to meet the whole of the advanced secondary education requirements of Africans in Northern Rhodesia. Dedza, in Nyasaland, developed its sixth-form work very much later. Against this background it is not surprising to discover that up to June 1959 a total of 35 Northern Rhodesia Africans, 34 men and one woman, had completed courses of higher education. Twenty had secured degrees in arts, eleven in science, and one had graduated in each of engineering, fine art, domestic science and law. At that time a further 26 were reading for degrees. Nyasaland statistics reveal, at June 1959, a total of 28 who had graduated from universities or comparable institutions since 1891, with 14 enrolled as undergraduates in 1959.

The South African schools, colleges and universities which have traditionally played an important part in providing education for Africans from Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia continue, or continued until very recently, to draw their quotas from the two northern territories. Fort Hare, the Durban Medical School and other centres still receive students from north of the Zambesi. But with the establishment of the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia, men and women from the north turned more to the nearer university, though some were obliged to go to Makerere in order to pursue particular studies not available in Salisbury. Bristol University and other British universities have in recent years taken more Northern Rhodesian and Nyasaland Africans but the number is still desperately low. Every possible university place must be seized, and it is for this reason that the politics which have recently affected the Salisbury University College are to be regretted. Salisbury must continue to serve its neighbours even though new universities are being established in Malawi and Zambia (where the copper-mining companies are not only giving generous support to the university project but are also
engaged in supplying new higher technical education facilities for the Africans of Zambia).

Although astringent when viewed from the standpoint of the needs of an independent modern state, the educational and economic facts and figures given above are not meant to support an indictment of neglect against the former British colonial administration or to imply the superiority of a cash over a subsistence economy, or of Western education over traditional ideas and methods of instruction. But because more modern economic and educational institutions aid the efficiency of larger-scale organization, and are at the same time actively sought by the leaders of independent Africa, such indices of preparedness for full self-government do possess a certain importance. The Makerere Medical School has made substantial contributions but there is a serious shortage of medical practitioners throughout Eastern Africa and a critical situation would arise if there were to be a precipitate withdrawal of British and other "expatriate" doctors. An even graver crisis could occur in the administration of justice, as the recent report of Lord Justice Denning on legal education in East Africa made clear. Lord Kilmuir established important personal links with courts in East Africa during his tenure of the Lord Chancellorship, but for long-term value such liaison requires to be underpinned by a strong body of African barristers and solicitors. The new law school at Dar-es-Salaam will in course of time do much to supply this deficiency, but time and energetic effort are required.

The problems of rapid and harmonious modernization which are common to all the territories of Eastern Africa extend also to Ethiopia. The cultural riches of this ancient kingdom and empire—the stele at Axum, the rock-hewn churches of Lalibela, and the illuminated Amharic manuscripts—are an important heritage of the whole eastern side of the continent, fully equal to the Benin bronzes and artefacts of West Africa; but Ethiopia's present intensive development must be continued apace if she is to serve as a headquarters worthy both of a large zone and of independent Africa as a whole. The adoption of English as an official language and the strengthening of relations with the United States of America as well as Britain have placed Ethiopia in a good position to work closely with her neighbours on matters of more local concern, in addition to the links which emerge from her general role as the base of United Nations' Economic Commission for Africa and other specialized international agencies.
BRITAIN AND EASTERN AFRICA

But whether or not they are linked with Ethiopia or are included with other East African territories which have been mooted for possible inclusion in a wider confederation, those countries upon which we have been concentrating in this chapter have had thrust upon them already some challenging responsibilities, which both threaten them and hold the promise of developing their individual and collective maturity.

Somali irredentism is an issue which affects the whole of North-Eastern Africa as well as the new state of Kenya. It is an issue which must continue to arouse special distress in the United Kingdom, in view of its historical friendship with Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya, until some workable solution is agreed by them. All parties are resolutely uncompromising at present and each enlists aid in the dispute from outside the continent. The best opportunity for a more rational adjustment of frontiers which could have gone far to satisfy the deep-felt desire for “Greater Somalia” occurred during the early years of the British military administration, after Mussolini’s fascists had been cleared from the whole of North-East Africa in 1941. It is understandable that war-time preoccupations distracted Cabinet attention, but it is regrettable that determined action was not taken subsequently to draw the parties into realistic dialogue and decision before the transfer of power was imminent and before considerations of prestige became paramount. Britain’s cession of Jubaland to Somalia after the 1914–18 war was a notable contribution to the economy of a country poorly endowed with natural resources and Britain’s ready support for the recent fusion of the Somaliland Protectorate into Somalia is also to be commended. But the last-minute attention given to the Somali question in the Northern Frontier Province of Kenya could accomplish little and two ill-prepared countries have inherited a serious threat to their peace and security.

Apart from the Somali question there has been constant challenge to supply shelter and aid to the thousands of refugees who have fled from the Sudan and Rwanda into Uganda and Tanganyika. Sophisticated political refugees have escaped from South Africa to Tanganyika and recently Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) has been called upon to accommodate less educated men and women fleeing northwards from apartheid. The prolonged tragedy of the Congo has confronted each African leader of Eastern Africa with a major threat as well as an example of the supreme value of law and order within a united country. The Zanzibar coup d'état and the attempts
from within as well as from outside East Africa to exploit the revolutionary situation have also supplied severe tests to the five principal African leaders and their ministerial colleagues.

It is greatly to the credit of the Commonwealth countries of Eastern Africa that they have responded so ably to the threatening situations which have arisen. Their balance and their determination not to lapse into arbitrary counter-action promise to confound the predictions of those who have forecast at best a century and a half of Latin American revolution and counter-revolution, at worst chaos and barbarism. The police of the territories have displayed a particularly valuable discipline and poise which reflect credit on themselves and their tutors. The soldiers, too, have remained loyal and disciplined despite the appalling example of the Congo and the disaffection of some of their comrades in each territory who not only saw, but for a time successfully exploited, the naked power which weapons, equipment and organization can confer on lawless military men.

It would be wrong to give undue emphasis to one state when all are important, and wrong to single out one political leader, when co-operation between all on a basis of frank equality in council is essential. But for the reasons emphasized in the early part of this chapter Tanganyika does occupy a central and key position. Her political stability and effective leadership is therefore of supreme importance if there is to be hope of wider regional unity and a constructive example for the Congolese Republic and other African neighbours. Fortunately these two necessities have obtained since Tanganyika became independent in December 1961, even though both have been either threatened or questioned. Recurrent doubts about the political stability of the country have arisen from reports of serious division within the cabinet. Dissension soon after independence was attributed to trade union endeavours to wield directly the power of the workers. There were rumours of differences in the executive and party at the time of the Moshi conference when international communism was represented in strength. More recently, the military mutiny which followed the dispatch of Tanganyika policemen to Zanzibar aroused rumours of disloyalty at the highest level and of the planned overthrow of President Nyerere, as he had come to be styled when Tanganyika's republican constitution was introduced in December 1962.

The conjectures and assertions of political commentators are often well founded, and it would be wrong as well as possibly misleading to dismiss out of hand all reports to the effect that President
Nyerere is not secure in office. Yet there may well be danger that those who refer to such insecurity, and those who couple with it allegations of personal weakness on the part of the President, are failing to perceive undemonstrative strength because of their expectations of flamboyant display. President Nyerere possesses the capacity for firm decision as well as the gift of quiet determination, and he has the inner confidence of a man of genuine modesty who is convinced of the rightness of his cause. He has distinguished qualities of intellect as well as character. He was impressive, not weak, when within two months of independence he handed over the premiership to a colleague for a year while he set about improving the organization of his party, the Tanganyika Africa National Union, T.A.N.U. His capacity for judging the time for withdrawal appears to be as successful in terms of avoiding civil strife as is his flair for recognizing swift action. The dispatch of a well-trained police contingent to Zanzibar and the rapid negotiation of the Tanganyika–Zanzibar Union were highly responsible actions. Whether these actions can withstand the threat of serious Communist penetration remains to be seen.*

We could multiply the instances of personal leadership on the part of Tanganyika’s President, not least in preserving the whole structure of the East African inter-territorial services which Britain had built up since the 1920’s, but he would himself insist that leadership within his partner-nations is in every way as essential as it is within his own Tanganyika. He has also emphasized repeatedly the importance of a close continuing partnership in development between the relatively ill-prepared countries of Eastern Africa and Britain and other nations in a position to help. Certain of the social and economic needs of Eastern Africa have been indicated, and we must in the next chapter consider some of the more general aspects of the hasty transfer of power and its consequences. But no matter how formidable the needs and problems of Eastern Africa, the zone is presently blessed with many leaders and followers who value cooperation with Britain and the West, and many young people who welcome the opportunities afforded by membership of the Commonwealth as well as the United Nations. If there is appropriate response from Britain the assumptions and hopes of those who looked to Eastern Africa to show that the “dual mandate” could be made an enduring reality can be fulfilled.

* See Postscript.