BRITAIN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA

The British mode of Western civilization has its most powerful African bridgehead in Southern Africa. Success in preserving established bonds with West and Eastern Africa will turn in large part on the degree to which British influence in Southern Africa succeeds in assisting the present sharply conflicting racist-nationalisms to move decisively towards mutual tolerance and co-operation. A slow synthesis of traditional African, Afrikaner and British civilizations, the product of centuries of living together, supplies a hopeful groundswell but menacing upper currents and surface waves threaten the present and the immediate future. Many opportunities to exert constructive influence have been missed by Britain, primarily perhaps because it has proved impossible to give adequate attention to the complexities of Southern Africa, and also because there has been pragmatic contentment with important short-term economic, strategic and other gains.

Numerous opportunities remain open to Britain, however, and with the support of Western allies, notably the United States, they can be used to the benefit of the world, not least the African peoples who predominate and the Afrikaners who presently control the major part and resources of the zone. But success demands a new depth of analysis and understanding and a determination to sustain coherent action over time. Above all there must be an earlier perception of tendencies and trends so that policy and action may be better founded. Too frequently ill-founded and destructive pessimism has followed upon facile optimism.

Southern Africa in this chapter embraces the present Republic of South Africa, with South-West Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the three High Commission Territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland. As originally organized British Central Africa constituted a separate section, but since the decision was made to dissolve the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland it has been thought best to treat the lands south of the Zambesi as Southern
Africa and those north, including Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, as parts of Eastern Africa.

(i) South Africa

Given the experiences of fruitful British–South African partnership between 1939 and 1948 and the almost obsessationally optimistic regard for Smuts, it is not surprising that the United Kingdom was slow to awaken to the realities of Afrikaner-nationalist intentions after Dr. Malan’s electoral victory. For British Conservatives, shocked by the election of Labour in 1945, it was particularly easy to draw a false analogy between the defeat of Smuts and the rejection of Churchill. The restoration of Churchill in 1951 played its part in heightening the illusion. Few observers distinguished between the politics of a mature and united country and those of a youthful political union of divided peoples and provinces.

Those who, in 1946 and 1947, predicted that any change in South Africa’s government would lead to constitutional and political developments which would radically alter the pattern of life in South Africa were regarded as alarmist. The inertia of thought which underlay this attitude continued well into the new Afrikaner-Nationalist régime and played its part, for example, in encouraging a lack of sympathy in the United Kingdom for the new and large organization of South African ex-servicemen and women which sprang into being in 1951 to protest vigorously against the threat to the constitution, notably the method of enacting and enforcing the law to remove from the electoral rolls Coloured voters whose rights were supposedly protected by one of the entrenched clauses of the South Africa Act of 1909.

Complacency persisted in London until well after the re-election of the Nationalists in 1953. During the next decade it did alter, though only slowly, as the strength of Afrikaner-nationalist determination was borne in upon British observers. But it required Dr. Verwoerd’s withdrawal of South Africa from the Commonwealth and the establishment of the Republic to bring final conviction that a new era had been launched.

Boer and Briton in South Africa have tended to divide principally over the issues of Crown and colour. Many British South Africans, concerned to preserve their language and their established links
with their former homeland, were more keenly aware of the reluctance of the Crown and Commonwealth to their interests, than of their responsibility to Africans, Asians and Coloureds. Repeated emphasis by historians as well as Afrikaner-nationalist politicians upon the injustice of the Anglo-Boer War has also tended to encourage British South Africans not to question their secondary position in the national political life. Content to rely externally upon Britain and internally upon pro-British Afrikaner leaders like Smuts, most English-speaking white South Africans were unprepared for the vigorous and systematic stripping of British symbols and the fundamental underlying changes upon which the Nationalists embarked immediately after their return to power in 1948. Few had treated seriously the pre-war portents or the blueprint of an authoritarian republic which had become known in the early years of the war. Very few were prepared at the time to be more than wryly amused by the predictions of Arthur Keppel-Jones in *When Smuts Goes*, published in 1947. Not until mid-1951 did most British South Africans become alarmed and it was by then too late to challenge effectively the entrenched governing party.

The series of enactments which aroused strong opposition were carried out with increasing determination between 1948 and 1951 by Dr. Malan and his associates, who possessed the confidence of a disciplined group whose cohesion and plans had been forged with care over a long period of time. The war-criminals who had supported Germany and engaged in sabotage were released from prison and the uniforms and organization of the army were quickly reformed by Erasmus, Minister of Defence in succession to Smuts. Service dress was given a non-British appearance and new military decorations were substituted for the honours and awards hitherto prized by South African soldiers in common with other British and Commonwealth armed forces.

The control and training of the police, an important arm under the Defence Act of 1912, was also taken in hand at the centre and police relations with local university extra-mural and adult education courses were abruptly stopped. Discussions on race relations were henceforth to conform to *apartheid* doctrine. An atmosphere of police watchfulness and suspicion became general. Judges and

* Police, as Gunnar Myrdal observes in *An American Dilemma*, occupy a front-line position in race relations. Their training on race questions, and their race attitudes, can be decisive in any national or local community.
magistrates withstood the pressures from politicians and from over­zealous policemen of Nationalist persuasion, though the link with the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was severed by Dr. Dönges in 1950. The Civil Service Commission protested against irregularities in recruitment, most notably perhaps in the case of Professor Eiselen’s appointment as Secretary for Native Affairs in place of a recommended English-speaking candidate with a long and distinguished career in the service. The executive insisted on a convinced supporter for this key post and Professor Eiselen was a leading apartheid theorist and advocate.

The determined emphasis on the Afrikaans language in every branch of official policy was a hallmark of the new régime. The objective was to place the imprint of Afrikaner culture on every aspect of South African life. So far as it could be done, the process of Anglicization was to be reversed and all people, including Africans, were to be brought under Afrikaner influence. In short, the ghosts of Milner and Rhodes were to be exorcised by the Afrikaans-speaking whites, whose proportion of the white population had remained at about two-thirds, despite Milner’s determination to reverse the fractions. Every pressure was exerted on the non-nationalist Afrikaner to abandon his wider loyalties and to subscribe to the ethnic-national idea. Education was the principal means chosen, and from the earliest days of Malan’s administration official action was taken to separate Afrikaans from English-speaking white boys and girls in primary and secondary schools. The Transvaal Language Ordinance of 1949 was a provincial measure but it was in accord with the “Christian National Education” policy devised for the whole country. The dual-medium experiments of E. G. Malherbe, which had commanded the support of Smuts and which were increasingly proving their worth in removing language, educational and social barriers, were cast aside. The survival of the “Volk” demanded the abandonment of mutual tolerance and the mobilization of the Afrikaner youth, who outnumbered their English counterparts. To make full use of their political power the age of the electoral franchise was reduced to eighteen years.

By means such as these the Afrikaner-nationalists progressively weakened the British tradition and the political and related powers of the English-speaking white South Africans who comprised their principal immediate adversaries. In the arena of colour, Malan, Strydom and Verwoerd in succession sought through apartheid a final solution to the problem of the African and Asian peoples and
those of mixed racial origin. Of the three apartheid prime ministers, Johannes Strydom expressed himself most crudely in making frequent use of the term baaskap, with its frank connotation of "master-race" and "domination", but there was among all three close harmony of thought.

Apartheid intellectuals are perhaps to be distinguished from the politicians. Men like Eiselen and Olivier, and practical administrators like De Wet Nel, hold a genuine conviction that the Indonesian adat principle of "like over like" is not only merciful but best in theory for culturally and racially mixed societies. Such intellectuals or idealists have been ready to accept the probable discomforts and material losses which would attend the honest implementation of apartheid. In this they have been supported on Christian ethical grounds by assemblies of leading Dutch Reformed Churchmen. But great harshness has attended the official implementation of apartheid. It has arisen mainly from the practical enforcement of the many new laws and administrative arrangements which comprise an intricate, interlocking structure of complex, detailed measures designed to regulate almost every aspect of human contact between peoples of the different ethnic groups. Only a people wedded to the legalism of the Roman-Dutch tradition would have embarked on such detail; only a people put on their mettle by the thrusts of pragmatic opposition critics would have acted so strenuously and ruthlessly to prove that it could be applied. The errors of history were to be amended, social and economic forces were to be withstood, policy trends in race relations reversed.

The Group Areas Act of 1950 typifies apartheid theory. Other acts affecting Africans, Asians, Coloured and Europeans were passed before it, many other racial laws have been introduced since, but the principle of racial and ethnic separation received perhaps its most emphatic expression in this statute which prescribes the separate ownership and occupation of land and property by the different racial groups as defined in the Act. The Group Areas Bill was given eloquent support in and out of Parliament and affirmed at length in explanatory official memoranda. The extent of established segregation was acknowledged but Cabinet Ministers declared that apartheid was to go far beyond anything known in the past.

Dogma insisted that social friction characterizes inter-racial and inter-cultural contacts; hence people must be physically separated. African–Indian riots in Durban in 1949 were seized upon to drive
home the point.* Natal was vulnerable on the Indian question and Nationalist propaganda played cleverly and insistently on "Indian penetration" in Durban and other "English" centres in order to weaken opposition. The widest powers of inquiry, decision and enforcement were given to the executive, and in many cases compensation for the loss of residential property was inadequate. Among Africans, already long subject to strict territorial segregation, new ethnic or tribal principles were enacted and given effect. The Bantu-speaking peoples, the majority racial group, were thus subdivided into Zulu, Sotho, Xhosa, Tswana and other groupings.

The Natives' Representative Council, set up under Hertzog's law of 1936, was abolished and a system of tribal, regional and territorial "Bantu authorities" was created to take the place of the earlier forms of modern African local council government, initiated by Cecil Rhodes in the Cape in 1894 and made permissible throughout the rest of South Africa by the Native Affairs Act of 1920. For Indians the same principle of closely controlled local government was mooted. To the distress of many individuals of all races, separation was imposed also upon the Coloured peoples who for over a century had shared franchise and other civic rights with Europeans in the Cape Colony and Province. The political rights of the Coloureds were not altered when the Cape African voters were separated by law in 1936. To Afrikaner-nationalists of Hertzog's persuasion it was in every way desirable, not least from the point of view of white security, that the substantial Coloured minority, people of part-European descent and of European culture, should continue to be associated with the white population. The termination of the traditional rights of the Coloured communities of the Cape and Natal served above all to underline the meaning of apartheid in contrast with past forms of segregation. From a purely electoral point of view the Afrikaner nationalists gained substantially by the removal from the rolls in several constituencies of the thousands of Coloured voters who traditionally voted against them. Apartheid apologists argue that the special representation which has been accorded to the Coloured population more than compensates for any loss but this view is difficult to accept in the face of the history of African franchise and representation.

* The report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Durban Riots is a remarkable document, revealing in its attitude towards Britain and British democracy as well as questions of race relations. The chairman was Mr. Justice van den Heever.
Apartheid has been enforced in every aspect of life in addition to politics. The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of 1950 is an outstanding example. This measure was scarcely required in view of the small number of inter-racial marriages which were contracted in any year. Its introduction brought hurt and anxiety to families, including missionary couples, who had married in the less race-conscious days of the earlier Cape and Natal. But the tolerance of inter-racial marriages was seen as an affront to exclusivist ideology. The absence of specific legal sanctions against extra-marital relations between "whites" and all "non-whites", Asians and Coloureds as well as Africans, was also regarded as dangerous. The Immorality Amendment Act, introduced to repair the latter omission, deserves special study for its revelation of the emotions underlying apartheid. These laws which seek to govern the most intimate personal relations are but two of a vast complex of new apartheid measures. The law to enforce separation in public places such as railway stations, passageways and foot-bridges might also be mentioned because nothing is more apparent in South Africa today than the obtrusive notice-boards whose prohibitions are enforced by alert officials and policemen.

No act of apartheid, however, was more significant and retrogressive than that which terminated the non-racialism of "open" universities. After enjoying, and exercising, the freedom to accept members of any race the Universities of Cape Town, Witwatersrand, Natal and Rhodes have been deprived of this right. The African, Asian, Coloured and European students who, over decades, had learned much from one another in libraries, lecture-rooms, laboratories and common-rooms have now been separated and a series of ethnic universities brought into being. At school level the principle of separation to which reference was made in the case of Afrikaans and English-speaking white children, has been extended to apply with equal force to language, tribal and racial groupings of African, Asian and Coloured pupils, for whom special curricula have been devised. There was a great deal to criticize in the provision made for African, Coloured and Indian education before the apartheid era, but the curricula and examinations were the same and held promise of equal opportunity in a common society. "Bantu education" has brought about a fundamental change.

We cannot refer to every act of the Nationalist régime during the sixteen years of its existence, nor have we space to detail the history of the opposition to it, whether by political parties and movements
or by Church, University and inter-racial organizations. What must be emphasized is the fact that resistance to narrow nationalism continues to be alive in South Africa even though the present régime has strengthened its immediate control by means of the harshest, authoritarian measures.* Faced with the fact of the appalling disregard of the rights and dignity of the African, Coloured and Asian peoples, some opponents of apartheid outside as well as inside South Africa have resigned themselves, albeit reluctantly at times, to working towards the revolutionary or forceful overthrow of the Afrikaner-nationalist Government by means of blockade, boycott or armed support for anti-government organizations. Others have chosen to concentrate upon ways and means whereby a more peaceful and less destructive change might be brought about, through educational support for and co-operation with those opposed to apartheid, and appeals to the Afrikaner conscience which will convince Afrikaner nationalists of the desirability of inter-racial partnership.

If the latter approach should prevail, and it is the one which a majority of Britons support, Britain as a nation will be faced with a task of the utmost difficulty. The constructive and acceptable aspect of Afrikaner national feeling will have to be shown sympathy. African nationalism at the same time will demand equal understanding and co-operation. The traditions of the important minorities of English-speaking whites, Indians and Coloureds must also be respected and safeguarded. Stated thus the challenge of South Africa might seem even more complicated than that of Cyprus and impossible of solution. There are grounds, however, for hoping for a change in Afrikaner outlook and the eventual acceptance throughout South Africa of a universalist, non-racial ethic.

In order to come to terms with Afrikaner nationalism, the reigning ideology, its prime elements must be understood. They comprise a determination both to avoid cultural or national extinction and to achieve and to preserve social and economic standards of the kind enjoyed in Western Europe and North America. Both aspirations are buttressed by Calvinist-derived political convictions. Many Afrikaners consider themselves an elect people possessed of a divine mission in Africa. The fear of cultural extinction, notably the obliteration of the Afrikaans language, derives chiefly from the history of British–Boer, not Boer–Bantu, relations. So far as Africans and Asians are concerned Afrikaners believe that their

* See Postscript.
tongue will prevail over the several Bantu and Indian languages spoken in South Africa. But the world position of English has allowed no such confidence in respect of the English language which is generally preferred by Africans and Asians. British and British South African attitudes towards Afrikaans have also been generally unfavourable. There has, it is true, been sympathy for Afrikaans on the part of a few Britons. Sir Thomas Holland of Edinburgh and Sir Fred Clarke of London, by their sympathetic understanding of Afrikaans and Afrikaner culture, have resembled Lord Dorchester in Quebec and President John Hyde of Eire, who gave support to French and Irish languages and traditions. In South Africa Alan Paton has long urged the study and use of Afrikaans on fellow-Anglicans of the Church of the Province of South Africa. More prevalent, however, for most of South Africa's history since unification, has been an attitude of imperious ethnocentrism stemming from Milner and his Anglicization policy in the schools of the conquered Boer republics. Milner's insistence upon English undermined the otherwise excellent work of his imported educational administrators and school-teachers, many of whom are remembered still with affection by Afrikaners of an older generation.

As a result of victory in the South African War and the English language policy of the reconstruction period, most British South Africans have been uninterested in the Afrikaans language movement, which was launched in the 1870's, and insensitive to Afrikaner feelings for their language. The mood of tolerance at the National Convention in 1908–9 encouraged the speedy acceptance of Dutch as one of the two official languages for the Union but there was less than enthusiasm for Hertzog's insistence in 1925 that the Constitution be amended to substitute Afrikaans for Dutch. The beauty of the Afrikaans translation of the Bible which appeared at the time was recognized but its appearance was marked also by wounding observations from Dutch- as well as English-speakers ignorant of the growth and structure of languages, including their own. Such observers could see little prospect of the "new" language serving as a worthy official medium.

Though Welsh is more ancient something of the feeling of Afrikaners for their language can be gained from discussions with Welsh nationalists. There is a real similarity between them and those Afrikaners who refer with passion to their "mother-tongue", and to the "soul of their people", their "language of prayer", their "language of poetry and love". Isolated far from Europe, Afri-
kaners feel more fiercely the need to preserve their pedigree. A Kruger Professorship of Afrikaans Language and Literature at Oxford might do something to reassure Afrikaners that their right to cultural freedom is respected. The more thorough-going acceptance of Afrikaans by English-speaking South Africans which is taking place could reinforce such initiative. Certainly developments of this kind are essential if Afrikaners are to be reassured about the future of their language and culture. And only when they are reassured are they likely to accept substantial political change.

"Poor Whiteism" has been a spectre among Afrikaners since the acceleration of South Africa's industrial revolution. There were many impoverished whites in the old pastoral republics and in the interior of the Cape Colony but they were preserved from extreme indigence by a close-meshed social safety net held beneath them by dominies and elders of the Dutch Reformed Churches, together with the more well-to-do farmers and their wives, who were conscious always of the obligations of kinship and the necessity of social cohesion on a frontier. During and after the 1914-18 war, when more efficient agricultural and industrial production were demanded, many landless and unskilled Afrikaners drifted increasingly to the cities and towns where they aggregated in distressing conditions not dissimilar from those of comparable groups of Africans. The world depression then accentuated an already bad situation which was documented in detail by the volumes published by the unofficial Carnegie Poor White Commission. These reports naturally received close attention from Afrikaner leaders though it is to be regretted that they gave wholly inadequate attention to the contemporary official "Native Economic Commission".

Afrikaner nationalists, always ready to be incensed by the relative economic prosperity and the better educational and social facilities of British South Africans, determined upon a more vigorous economic and social programme which would ensure for their people a position of comparable strength. Under political guidance a pyramidal plan of organizations of every kind was devised and brought increasingly into operation in the 1930's. Specifically Afrikaner trade unions, banks, insurance companies, savings clubs, chambers of commerce and welfare societies were created and interlocked with Afrikaner cultural and religious bodies. The Voortrekker Centenary celebrations in 1938 set the seal on a new militant, consciously corporative nationalism which developed under the leadership of Dr. Malan and other nationalists, all more
narrowly single-minded and fiercely ethnocentric than General Hertzog, whom they overthrew and who died a disappointed and disheartened man in 1941.

Today, after sixteen years of nationalist rule, Afrikaners enjoy an economic and social position which was unknown to them before. A new urban bourgeoisie is in being and international trade has brought to many men and women an increased association with London, Paris, Amsterdam, New York, Hamburg and Geneva. The leading newspaper, the long-established Die Burger, though determinedly nationalist, is nevertheless self-critical and mature. In its columns frank discussions of apartheid have taken place side by side with consideration of the directly related issues of capital investment, the optimum use of domestic manpower, location of industry, international trade. One of the regrettable aspects of traditional non-Afrikaner attitudes to Afrikaans language and culture is the virtual closing to themselves, notably by Britons and British South Africans, of Afrikaans newspapers, journals and broadcasts. Only in 1956, for example, did the Bodleian Library in Oxford begin to take Die Burger. Other libraries and archives are also deficient in the material essential for understanding. The news and comment on Afrikaners in even the best English newspapers and journals tend to be fragmentary and one-sided. Yet Afrikaners continue to value the opportunities in Britain for scientific, industrial, commercial and other training and through those who study in British, European and American universities, colleges and research institutes there can be more sustained and constructive dialogue than hitherto has been conceived or attempted.

The Calvinist-derived and theologically reinforced political convictions of Afrikaner nationalists are complementary to the cultural, economic and social objectives of their creed. No effective dialogue is therefore conceivable unless the theology of Afrikanerdom is mastered and the effects of history on doctrine are more fully grasped. Anglicans and other English churchmen thus far have been notably unsuccessful in their approaches to the Dutch Reformed Churches and the theological seminaries. The heavy weight of history is perhaps such that Christian initiatives are best left to individuals like Dr. Visser t’Hooft and to organizations like the World Council of Churches rather than to Anglican leaders and agencies. Yet such initiatives can and must continue to be accompanied and supported by South African Anglicans as well as by Presbyterians, Methodists, Congregationalists and members
of other churches of British origin represented in Southern Africa.

Important bridges have been built outwards from the Dutch Reformed Churches by several courageous Afrikaner Christians in recent years, in the face of fierce political hostility, as well as strong criticism from their fellow-churchmen; yet the depth and extent of religious belief among Afrikaners as a whole is such that these men represent perhaps the most hopeful of all tendencies in contemporary South Africa.* They have subjected dogmas of apartheid to close and reasoned analysis from within the framework of Calvinism and, despite feelings of strong sympathy with their fellow-Afrikaners they have been fearlessly explicit in their rejection of unacceptable ethical positions and ecclesiastical arguments of expediency which are adopted to bolster official racial policies. Churchmen based in Britain have seldom refrained from angry attacks on Afrikanerdom and apartheid. Such is human nature, including Christian human nature, that the acceptance of other approaches may be impossible, especially when so much of Afrikaner Christian thought and practice on racial matters is indefensible. But a more charitable approach by British Christians is very worthy of consideration. It would at least be guaranteed the effect of surprise and might even prove successful.

Viewing Afrikaner-nationalism as a whole, it is not suggested that an approach by way of persuasion to improve, rather than intermittent punishment to correct, will be easy to adopt. The brutalities and absurdities to which fear of cultural extinction and physical submergence have carried Afrikaner nationalism are impossible to condone. They are also very difficult to live with either in South Africa or in international association, even when the immediate object is one of therapy and change. There is also the supreme difficulty of seeming in African eyes to tolerate evil and abhorrent colour bars. It is in fact this last difficulty which has deterred many from attempting a more constructive approach to Afrikanerdom. This has been specially true since the Sharpeville shootings of March 1960. If, however, we look at the important point made by a discerning left-wing analyst that the African peoples do in fact enjoy a sense of confidence in the future which

* The point is often made in respect of the Sudan that the Muslim Arab conscience of the Northerners provides the best hope of improvement in the position of the African Southerners. The same point holds for the Christian Afrikaner conscience.
is unknown to the insecure white minorities, we are perhaps brought nearer to a position where it is possible to contemplate both the vigorous co-operation with the more hopeful aspects of Afrikaner nationalism and, pari passu, vigorous co-operation with similar elements of African nationalism.

Side by side with co-operation with Afrikaners Britain must therefore co-operate in every way with Africans. Education is a pre-eminent need of the African peoples of Southern Africa and it is open to Britain to make in the educational field a contribution of urgent and supreme worth. Emphasis on education in no way implies neglect of political co-operation with African leaders. That too is essential. But given the traditional Commonwealth Relations Office fear of anything but formal relations with the Government in office even educational aid has been grossly neglected. Scarcely any university scholarships for Africans from South Africa have been available since 1945 from either the United Kingdom Government or British foundations and trusts. It has been left largely to independent university initiative by means of voluntary subscriptions or personal endowment to bring to Oxford and other centres the few Africans who have gained admission to British universities. Little has been done for the High Commission Territories either until very recently, though the needs of these countries are also acute.

Political relations with African organizations and with Coloured and Indian bodies must be created and kept in good repair by Britain if she is to be true to her own traditions and if she is to strengthen her position in South Africa and her bridgeheads throughout Africa. The over-cautious Commonwealth Relations Office policy has not helped to strengthen the important concept of a loyal or non-revolutionary opposition—a British political institution of incalculable worth. Albert Luthuli and leaders of the African National Congress, together with many other extremely able and highly responsible African politicians and journalists, have through the years received comparatively little attention from representatives of the United Kingdom in South Africa. While individual officers have privately deplored the official restraints to which they have been subjected the outward reality as observed by Africans has been one of reserve and neglect.

In the 1960's there have been most welcome signs of a change in British official attitudes and practice but a great deal remains to be done. Too often it has been left to diplomats of other Western nations to conduct relations with African, Coloured and Indian
individuals and organizations. Easy, matter-of-fact relations are undoubtedly difficult to establish with people who do not enjoy the franchise and other citizen rights and who are subject to numerous administrative disabilities, but it should long have been accepted and demonstrated that open diplomatic contact with the African majority was both essential and to be taken for granted. The exceptional success of the few United Kingdom officers who have ventured beyond the bounds of official caution indicates the rich possibilities of increased active co-operation with Africans. The sands of African goodwill to Britain must not be allowed to run out in South Africa. What has been said of Africans applies *mutatis mutandis* to the substantial Coloured and Asian minorities. They have been better prepared and able to invest in community education and other development projects, but their need of British understanding and co-operation is also great.

The lack of genuine contact with Africans, Coloureds and Asians—and with liberal whites, both Afrikaners and Britons—has led to these most hopeful elements of South Africa being ignored in their own country and represented as "dangerous", "subversive" or "irresponsible" in the United Kingdom press. Even a modicum of reasonable contact would have prevented the absurdity of there being any doubt about the integrity or worth of likeable, dedicated and in many ways essentially ordinary and respectable Englishwomen like Helen Joseph or Hannah Stanton. Certainly there are radical, left-wing whites in South Africa, and revolutionary Marxist or racist Indians, Coloureds and Africans, but sweeping misrepresentations of the South African opposition and the tendency towards mass condemnation has prevented Britain's most hopeful friends from being accurately identified.

Commonwealth Press scholarships and exchanges have done much to bring South African and British journalists together in study and working relationships. Such links must be preserved and extended under a different name now that South Africa has left the Commonwealth if South African society is to be adequately analysed and presented to Britain, United Kingdom society and British policy and public opinion must likewise be fully reported in South Africa in Afrikaans and African-language newspapers as well as in the long-established English-medium dailies and weeklies. British journalists with a proficiency in Afrikaans could contribute substantially to a better Afrikaner appreciation of the United Kingdom and Commonwealth. Informed, non-partisan articles
submitted in Afrikaans would be accepted with greater frequency than any requiring translation.

The Press in South Africa represents one of Britain's most worthy achievements. From the 1820's, when Pringle and Fairbairn, editors of the *South African Commercial Advertiser*, fought and won, with the aid of *The Times* and *Chronicle*, a notable battle for Press freedom against an autocratic Governor, there has been a consistent tradition of informed and frank comment. The English-medium publications preserve this tradition today and represent a standard which holds its own even against high-level international competition. The South African African, Indian and Coloured newspapers and journals have drawn on this common heritage which accounts, in part at least, for the fact that narrow national, religious or tribal partisanship is not normally found in them.

This reference to the Press, inadequate though it is, must serve as a principal reminder of the depth of the institutional and organizational bonds which exist between Britain and South Africa. Established large-scale financial, commercial and industrial organizations with interests in South Africa operate in the City of London, in Liverpool and Birmingham and other centres. The Stock Exchange, banks* and commercial concerns of South Africa, including Chambers of Commerce and Rotary Clubs, are immediately familiar to visiting Britons. Church and university organizations have built secure bridges during the past century and more. Strong Anglican, Methodist, Roman Catholic and other denominational networks exist. A separate Anglican bishopric of Cape Town was created in 1848 to consolidate growth during the previous half-century. The universities of South Africa,† both Afrikaans and English-medium, derive primarily from the university world of Great Britain, though

*The First Hundred Years of the Standard Bank* (Oxford University Press), published in London, 1963, supplies an excellent record of the history not only of this bank but of many aspects of the mutually beneficial commercial links between Britain and South Africa during the past century.

† In 1829, the South African College (Cape Town University) initiated higher education. Victoria College (Stellenbosch University) began in 1874. Other foundations include: Grahamstown—St. Andrew's College, 1855, and Rhodes University College, 1904; Bloemfontein—Grey College, 1855; Johannesburg—School of Mines, 1904, University of the Witwatersrand, 1922; Pretoria—Transvaal University College, 1908; Pietermaritzburg—Natal University College, 1909; Potchefstroom University College for Christian Higher Education, 1921; Fort Hare, 1923. Four medical schools exist at Cape Town, Johannesburg, Pretoria, Durban; the last is principally for African students.
the Afrikaans universities emphasize certain other West European, notably Dutch, characteristics. The law, in the structure, traditions and practices of the judiciary and the bar retain an essentially English cast even though Roman-Dutch law constitutes a foremost section of the civil law. The Civil Service at national, provincial and local government levels has not yet abandoned all its important British traditions.

An immense catalogue of organizations and practices might be compiled but the main point is made. What has been wrought organizationally and institutionally by Britain in South Africa during the past one and two-thirds centuries largely remains. In addition to the million and more people of direct British origin or descent there are many others who value the historical bonds with Britain and the Commonwealth. The South African Parliament has suffered serious erosion of its Westminster heritage but perhaps as much of parliamentary democracy remains to build on as elsewhere on the continent. Certainly it will be tragic for the whole of Africa if the resources of South Africa cannot be drawn upon freely for development and welfare throughout the continent.

Nowhere else in Africa, for example, is there to be found the wealth of modern scientific research or applied scientific and technical achievement, much of it of direct British origin, that exists in South Africa. Lord Hailey and other impartial British analysts have frequently directed attention to this fact and to the value of South African contributions in the work of the former inter-colonial Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa South of the Sahara (C.C.T.A.). Individual South African biologists, veterinary surgeons, agricultural and medical scientists have given notable service to Ghana and other independent states. The same is true of teachers, economists and statisticians. Their professional training and experience within an African environment has frequently given their work an immediate utility of a kind which has been appreciated by African Governments eager to command all available expertise in the interest of rapid development.

But to release to the continent the badly needed resources of South Africa the country must at all costs be spared the destruction and chaos of the Congo or the devastation of Algeria. At the same time there can be no toleration of a régime and an ideology which is deeply offensive to independent Africa. Every effort must be directed, therefore, towards guaranteeing internationally the legitimate cultural and other rights of the Afrikaners, who will
undoubtedly fight once more to the bitter end, as they did between 1899–1902, if such guarantees are not provided, while equal effort is directed towards bringing to Africans in South Africa political and other freedom.

Two principal steps are therefore necessary if South Africa is to be changed in the manner suggested. Effective international action must be taken, and a political constitution acceptable to genuinely representative South Africans of all cultural and racial groups* must be devised and brought into operation. At international level it will be necessary for Britain to work actively within each of her major world associations as well as independently through her established unilateral links. The four international associations—European, Anglo-American, Commonwealth and United Nations—are discussed in the final chapter. Britain holds a foremost and respected position within each and her sustained pressure for democratic non-racialism in South Africa coupled with full recognition of the distinctive rights of the several cultural communities must exert wide influence.

As for the political constitution, it may well be that a new system of government, along the lines of the "racial-federalist" proposals of Arthur Keppel-Jones in his book *Friends or Foes*, will be decided upon. A substantial re-drawing of internal frontiers would then be required, however. An alternative version of federalism could be one based on the proposals originally made by W. P. Schreiner at the National Convention of 1908–9. Here power would be divided simply between the constituent provinces of the Cape, Transvaal, Natal and Orange Free State and delegated in defined matters to the central government. South African history since union suggests that such a dispersion of power might indeed have been wise. But it is not inconceivable that the original unitary constitution adopted under the South Africa Act of 1909 could suffice provided that African, Coloured and Asian voters are re-admitted freely and on fully equal terms to the Cape and Natal voters' rolls and admitted also on the same basis to the electoral rolls of the Transvaal and Orange Free State. Additional safeguards such as a "Bill of Rights" and suitable provision for the judicial

* In private discussion leading Afrikaner-nationalist editors, churchmen and politicians of independent mind make evident their acceptance of the urgent need for thorough-going consultation and negotiation between representatives of all peoples and parties. They deplore the insensitive authoritarianisms of the Verwoerd administration.
protection and enforcement of civic and cultural rights might be incorporated but the existing, familiar structure of government would remain.

From the viewpoint of most, possibly all, groups in South Africa, it is likely that British initiative in international discussions on South Africa will be increasingly welcome. Intelligent Afrikaner nationalists, even those most bitterly critical of Britain in the past, now appreciate the value of British moderation in international debate on South Africa and indicate a new readiness to listen to British suggestions. Africans, Coloureds and Asians with no wish to see their country become a battle-ground, as well as the Europeans in opposition to the Government, are strongly in favour of greater specifically British influence of an enlightened and progressive kind being exerted alongside Scandinavian and United Nations' efforts. In internal matters, including constitutional arrangements, Britain is also more likely to be looked to as honest broker than many Britons believe. The British origin of South Africa's main institutions is acknowledged, and there is a respect for British administrative and judicial experience. Britain's bridgehead in South Africa is strong and must not be neglected.

(ii) South-West Africa

One of the questions which is uppermost in the minds of students of African affairs at the present time is the likelihood of effective United Nations' intervention in South-West Africa, possibly by armed force, if the International Court of Justice at the Hague should rule that South Africa has defaulted in regard to her administration of the mandate of the League of Nations and her failure to place the territory under international trusteeship. Many who favour the enforcement of any such decisions by means of international police action see South-West Africa becoming a base for further United Nations' intervention throughout Southern Africa in order firstly to overthrow the Afrikaner-nationalist Government and apartheid in South Africa, secondly to remove Portuguese rule in Angola, and thirdly to transform the present system of government in Southern Rhodesia. It is assumed by this school of thought that apartheid and Portuguese and Southern Rhodesian rule will be deemed to constitute threats to international peace and security which will justify United Nations' action.
It is tempting to enlarge on this question in respect of South-West Africa, but it is one which has become increasingly a general international issue in which Britain's voice, though important, especially in the Security Council, is but one of many. For the historical reasons explained elsewhere in this essay, Britain has stronger and more direct links with the High Commission Territories, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa and it is through her bridgeheads in these countries that her constructive influence in Southern Africa may best be brought continually to bear. Since 1914, when Britain requested the Government of Botha and Smuts to undertake the military campaign against German South-West Africa as part of the Union's share in the total empire war effort, the United Kingdom has had little direct association with the country. Walvis Bay, the best harbour, which Britain annexed in 1878 and preserved intact from the encircling German annexations, has long since become and remains an integral portion of the Cape Province of South Africa. Like Simonstown, Walvis Bay has repeatedly proved beneficial to the Royal Navy, but the jurisdiction over both areas is and has been South African, not British.

Great Britain, nevertheless, by virtue of her historical association with South Africa and her sponsorship at Versailles of the South African mandate as well as by reason of her membership of the Security Council could have an important, possibly even a decisive, vote in the United Nations if the South-West African and apartheid questions are brought forward in the drastic form outlined above. Present indications, however, are that neither a Labour nor a Conservative administration would feel justified in going to the extent of full-scale armed action. Strong moral pressure will almost certainly be exerted upon South Africa by Britain to uphold any ruling of the International Court. But, given Britain's thoroughly justified exercise of the veto in the recent case of Southern Rhodesia, it is difficult to see any British Government being persuaded, save by the most convincing evidence, that international peace and security is sufficiently threatened to warrant experiment with the ultimate sanction. *

There is little point, therefore, in dwelling on facts such as South-West Africa's remoteness from South Africa in physical,  

* If logic and equity, not mere majority politics, are to govern the General Assembly, there are several other countries and situations in West, East, North and North-East Africa, not to mention the wider world, which constitute at least an equal threat to international peace and security.
geographical and tactical terms. There are vast, arid areas which separate South-West Africa from the principal centres of South Africa. Saying this does not mean that, even if there is no International Court decision and United Nations' action, Britain would be free from the duty of trying to persuade South Africa and the South-West African administration to reform the system of government. It was perhaps understandable that in the circumstances of the day, the original South-West Africa Affairs Act of 1925 should have made no provision for African representation and that this was acceptable to the Permanent Mandates Commission. Other aspects of the Union's interpretation of the League's mandate of 1919, notably Article 2, which gave to South Africa "full power of administration and legislation subject to the present mandate as an integral portion of the Union of South Africa" were also reasonable. But wholly different was the new Nationalist Government's speedy enactment in 1949, at a time when their majority in the Union Parliament was very slender, of an amendment to the South-West Africa Affairs Act which allowed them to strengthen their control over South-West Africa and to introduce from the mandated territory an excessive proportion of European members into the Senate and House of Assembly in Cape Town.

The political, legal and administrative disabilities of the Africans of South-West Africa are as bad as those of Africans in the Republic. Britain must on every occasion support moral pressure intended to improve their position in the mandated territory. That is an inescapable obligation. But if constructive influence on Southern Africa is to be sustained it can probably be applied more effectively by Britain in South Africa itself and through Southern Rhodesia and the High Commission Territories.

(iii) Southern Rhodesia and the High Commission Territories

If South Africa provides the strongest bridgehead in Africa still open to be won to Western democracy, Southern Rhodesia continues to represent an area of special significance within Southern Africa. Of the four British territories south of the Zambesi which were left out when the "big four"—the Cape, Transvaal, Natal and Orange Free State—were united in 1909–10, Southern Rhodesia is by far the largest in population, including a settled population of
European descent, and the richest in resources. Basutoland, a wholly African mountain enclave in the Drakensberg, Swaziland and Bechuanaland each possess a symbolic importance and offer a challenge to the free world to assist in economic development of the kind indicated in the Morse report, which will also help to ensure the maximum political autonomy and administrative efficiency.

But for an effective return towards Rhodes's goal of a strong, prosperous and non-racial federation of all eight territories of Southern Africa, Southern Rhodesia's role could be marginally decisive. This possibility has been recognized by several United Kingdom observers, and Southern Rhodesia, with its consciously patriotic British settlers, has been exploited towards this end since 1889, when a royal charter was awarded to the British South Africa Company, who were thereby enabled to prevail over Kruger. In the Jameson Raid, the Anglo-Boer War, South Africa's unification, and the two World Wars, Southern Rhodesia's patriotism proved of particular value in helping to evoke and reinforce support from south of the Limpopo, notably in Natal, the Witwatersrand and the Cape. Seen from within this context, it is a special misfortune that the well-intentioned Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was defective in certain constitutional arrangements, offensive to Africans in its negotiation, and inadequate in its thrust towards inter-racial partnership during the critical first five years.

Post-mortem argument over the Federation has revealed disagreement as to which of the three main causes was most instrumental in compelling dissolution. Those closely involved in constitution-making and the pre-Federation negotiations, have tended to blame Federal leaders like Sir Roy Welensky or his principal rivals for not achieving sufficient success soon enough to convince Africans of the value of a united Central Africa under a joint European-African partnership in which experienced Europeans exerted the major influence. It is, on the other hand, all too easy to point to the now universally acknowledged strong African opposition to Federation which existed throughout Central Africa, both at the time the Order in Council was imposed in 1953 and for decades before. Between 1951 and 1953, however, the fact of African opposition was either emphatically denied at the highest level by Ministers of the Crown responsible for Central Africa, or it was held by them to be of little or no account because Africans lacked understanding of the concept of "federation".

It was equally difficult between 1951 and 1953, in the face of a
solid front of senior authority, to direct attention to certain obvious weaknesses in the constitution. To anyone acquainted with political tendencies in plural societies, not least in the South African Union, it seemed necessary above all to give Africans a voice sufficient at least to block constitutional amendments or other principal draft laws which vitally affected their interests. Suggestions that African representation should comprise at least “one-third plus” in a legislature where a two-thirds majority was required for amendment were, however, brushed aside as unrealistic. There can as yet be no final assessment as to where the main culpability rests for the breakdown of the Federation but each cause has been important. Inadequate and clumsy negotiations prevented the winning of much wider African support and the limitation, and weaknesses of the constitution added their own substantial burden to those in authority who were faced with the virtually impossible task of changing long-established policies and expectations within a few short years.

There were moments in the history of the Federation when the balance inclined towards success, but such opportunities could have been seized and acted on only if there had been complete mutual understanding of objectives, notably of the meaning of “partnership” and the most vigorous co-operation between the Government of Great Britain and the Federal Government in Salisbury. More certain success would have followed acceptance of the reasonable requests of African leaders who asked, *inter alia*, that “partnership” be defined and agreed before Federation. The substitution of the method of patient persuasion for imperious haste would also have helped greatly. Today it seems obvious that they were more right who argued ten years ago that the Federation could never be brought to fruition if African views were ignored, if more courtesy was not forthcoming,* and if serious efforts were not made to meet the constitutional and other criticisms of students who had devoted the time and effort required to keep abreast of local affairs. The vice of looking to the eminent and pliable rather than to the informed and consistent was seldom more evident than during 1951–3, the years of decision.

The most fundamental error sprang from the failure to apply to British Central Africa elementary principles of understanding.

* The curt dismissal of the requests of delegations of chiefs and African political leaders to be allowed to present petitions to the Queen was a needless affront to those brought up in a tradition of personal loyalty and among whom were lively recollections of Queen Victoria and her successors.
derived from history and the analytical social studies. No one acquainted with the recent history of the British territories to the north and south of the Zambesi, and more particularly with the very different policies applied to Africans, could expect there to be any easy fusion. Some members of the Hilton Young Commission in their report of 1929 had aptly summarized the main reasons why the close association of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, on the one hand, with Southern Rhodesia on the other, could not succeed, whether under a federal or a unitary constitution. But the Hilton Young Report was wilfully swept aside as irrelevant to the 1950's by over-confident men of the Colonial Office, the Cabinet and Parliament.

The same lack of social and historical awareness to which Karl Mannheim directed attention in the post-war years also goes far to explain the irresolution which attended Central African policy once Federation was introduced. In the brief span of six to seven years between 1953 and 1959–60, Central African policy was subjected to the full force of contradictions which sprang from the United Kingdom's attempt to adapt strategically to the changing political circumstances of the world, notably the new Afro-Asian world after Bandung in 1955, and tactically to the internal needs and pressures of the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland under the system of government which had deliberately entrusted local Europeans with the greater substance of power.

Increasingly Britain's relative weakness in the modern world was emphasized by certain British scholars as well as by politicians who pointed repeatedly to the anti-Mau Mau campaign as an example of the severe draining of resources and energy which might be expected to recur in Central Africa. The Nyasaland disturbances of 1959 were both a consequence of such irresolution and in part a cause of the eventual policy which was announced in the "wind of change" speech in February 1960. Only a confident Britain determined to see Federation through to the fulfilment of partnership over the space of from two to three decades could have made the 1953 constitution work. If the task of persuading the Northern Africans to abandon the expectations built up in them by decades of Colonial Office policy was formidable, so also was the task of effecting a rapid change in outlook among the hitherto completely dominant white minority of Southern Rhodesia, many of whom were confirmed in their trustee or paternalist attitudes by Britain's action in 1953.
Given Britain’s inability or unreadiness to control and co-ordinate the progressive advance of the three territories and their diverse peoples to partnership, it is specially unfortunate that Southern Rhodesia’s potential role as a liberal lever on South Africa was dissipated by Federation. Seen in contrast with developments in the “African States” of British Africa, to which Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland looked naturally for precedent, Southern Rhodesia appeared reactionary or illiberal. Within the context of Southern Africa, her appropriate historical framework, however, Southern Rhodesia, with her traditional commitment to common franchise and other rights as well as to the English language and traditions, had a more liberal image. Now that the follies of Federation are acknowledged and the political framework has been dismantled, it is to be hoped that Southern Rhodesia may be allowed to regain something of her former position.

Current pan-Africanist and international pressures are directed towards the complete overthrow of the system of government which has existed since 1923, or earlier if part of the Company period is included, and towards the incorporation of Southern Rhodesia, or “Zimbabwe”, into the body of African states to the north of the Zambesi. But if the non-violent transformation of South Africa, together with the relatively undamaged preservation of her resources and services is aimed at, then the present grossly exaggerated condemnations of Southern Rhodesia must be halted and the country given every support to move as smoothly and rapidly as possible towards a genuine non-racialism acceptable to Africans, Europeans and others. Contemporary inter-racial participation in government in Southern Rhodesia is at present in advance of South Africa. Despite South African example the African parliamentary representation which was brought about in 1963 is likely to be preserved.* There is therefore a basis for further adjustments within the foreseeable future to the point where Africans will have an effective share of power.

One of the undoubted advantages of Federation was that it thrust Southern Rhodesia more rapidly towards the acceptance of a wider African political franchise and African membership of parliament than was otherwise likely to have occurred. Although several of the country’s leaders were mindful of the non-racial franchise tradition of the parent Cape and critical of apartheid, they were nevertheless

* See Postscript.
dangerously slow in encouraging greater African participation in the processes and responsibilities of democratic government. The presence of African members of the Federal Assembly in Salisbury greatly facilitated the admission of Africans to the territorial legislature. Given the history of Southern Africa it was a substantial step forward when African members of parliament joined men of the calibre of Sir Edgar Whitehead in opposition to a right-wing Southern Rhodesia Government.

Another major contribution was made during the years of the Federation by the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in Salisbury. The 1952 commission under the chairmanship of Sir Alexander Carr-Saunders,* Director of the London School of Economics and head of the Inter-University Council for Higher Education Overseas, prepared the ground well and laid a strong foundation for the new University, which opened its doors in March 1957. High standards and a thorough-going non-racialism were emphasized. The relationship with the University of London has proved of special benefit. Although the tensions of the surrounding political society of the Federation have made themselves felt, sometimes acutely, the University College has a substantial credit balance of genuine achievement which must prove of durable worth to both Southern and Eastern Africa. Africa has need of every centre of higher education. A soundly established and well-equipped university, incorporating new medical and law schools, in one of the important borderlands of Africa promises to be called upon increasingly and to meet wider demands in the future. The teaching and student body is multi-racial, and Africans and Europeans live together in the halls of residence. Few activities at the University College have been more fundamentally fruitful than the Leverhulme inter-African university conferences. The 1964 Conference of University librarians drew representatives from every part of the continent, as well as from Britain.

Southern Africa has never been and can never be isolated or insulated from the rest of Africa. Southern Rhodesia and Bechuanaland, and to a lesser degree, Swaziland, have borders with states other than South Africa and there is frequent and regular traffic across the borders. In the case of Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia there is a common railway system, the Rhodesia Railways, and a common major source of electric power and water in the

Kariba Dam. The acceptance of the break-up of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland for the organization of this chapter is in no sense, therefore, meant to suggest either that the established traffic will diminish or that it is in any way desirable that it should do so. It is rather hoped that both newly self-governing Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi) on the one hand and Southern Rhodesia (Rhodesia or Zimbabwe) on the other will increase and strengthen their many ties. In trade, employment, education and sport there are numerous rewarding links already and others can be added.

The Zambesi nevertheless is an historical and policy frontier within British Africa. We need not use André Siegfried’s emotive and not wholly applicable conception of a “Mason-Dixon line”,* but for the reasons given in the earlier chapters there is good cause to think of Southern Africa as an entity. And in addition to the numerous close commercial, administrative, legal and educational bonds, there is substance in some comparison with America from the race relations point of view because the common history of close association between Africans and Europeans through several generations has made Southern Africa more akin to the United States than any other part of Africa. The Africans of Southern Africa are in many respects more “Westernized” and accustomed to modern industrial society and are therefore more like American Negroes than Africans elsewhere. Like American Negroes, the political, economic and social objectives of educated Africans have centred upon equal rights within an overall common society rather than upon separate “African states”. These broad objectives are likely to remain despite the creation of Bantustans like the Transkei and other Afrikaner-nationalist endeavours to strengthen tribal and ethnic associations.

Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland through their close involvement in the South African economy, notably their dependence upon financial relations such as the customs quota and wage remittances, also form integral portions of Southern Africa. They have throughout their history been largely dependent on South Africa for most social and other services and the new, non-sectarian University College in Basutoland, which is being developed from the small Roman Catholic college at Roma, will retain close relations with South African universities, archives,

* In his *African Journey* (London 1950), Siegfried asked whether the Zambesi or the Limpopo would constitute Africa’s Mason-Dixon line.
libraries and research institutes. The advance of each of the High Commission Territories to genuine self-government within the immediate future will however be of real significance. With the Basutoland Government wholly African in composition, those of Bechuanaland and Swaziland predominantly so, together with a multi-racial Southern Rhodesian administration there will open the prospect of direct contacts and negotiations on a basis of governmental equality with South Africa which might well assist all eight units of Southern Africa, perhaps with South-West Africa as a ninth, to work out a new and more rewarding and hopeful *modus vivendi*, possibly even in the long term a great federal state.