BRITAIN AND AFRICA 1914–39:
WAR AND TRUSTEESHIP

The First World War was a great historical divide in the story of Britain. In British Africa it was rather the Second World War which brought the end of an epoch. So far as international relations between Britain and the various African territories were concerned, no great or obvious hiatus resulted from the fact that Britain was substantially weakened in wealth and position by the Great War. Britain, relatively, remained rich and powerful, the African dependencies poor and weak. And despite critics like Leonard Woolf, there was sufficient confidence in the colonial mission at the end of the war to ensure support for the principles and practice of trusteeship as enunciated by leaders of the eminence of Milner, Smuts and Lugard.

(i) 1914–18

Although the effects on Africa were not so momentous as on Britain, Africa's experiences during 1914–18 were none the less very important, and sufficient to inaugurate a new phase in the overall relationship. The war drew the British territories of Africa together in a manner which had been unknown before. Soldiers from all parts served as comrades in different theatres. The personality of each territory was deepened by its co-operation with others as well as by its total response to the challenge of conflict. Individuals became aware of themselves as representatives and members of entities greater than their tribe or local area. War-time co-operation also compelled a new appreciation of the resources and problems of the African countries by Britain and by each of the British African territories themselves. Without this experience of the war the relative isolation of the separate countries would probably have persisted and the principal links would have continued to be essentially unilateral between each individual colony or zone and the United Kingdom. The whole tempo of internal social, economic
and political change would also have been slower without the spur of war.

All zones of British Africa were engaged directly in local land campaigns during the Great War. Each played its part also in the wider strategy by dealing with enemy installations or equipment which possessed a more than local importance: high-powered radio stations, long-range warships, strategic harbours, facilities for air operations.* The manpower and other resources of each zone were also called upon to make contributions to the principal theatres of conflict in Western Europe and the North Atlantic, and in the eastern and north-eastern Mediterranean.

It is difficult to evaluate the relative worth of the contribution of each zone. East Africa was fully engaged in the campaign against von Lettow from the outbreak of war until after the armistice. First Indians, then South Africans and later West Africans, notably Nigerians, fought in substantial numbers alongside askaris of the King's African Rifles, all being supported throughout by tens of thousands of African carriers during an arduous and costly campaign. From the viewpoint of the Empire of the day however South Africa's response was the most significant. Had the Union defected there would have been serious repercussions for Britain and the Empire in every sector of operations, quite apart from the longer-term political effects on Commonwealth and international relations.

In the event South Africa's overall contribution was substantial, though some 30,000 troops had to be employed until the turn of the year 1914–15 in suppressing the Afrikaner-nationalist rebellion, led among others by the Commander-in-Chief of the Union Defence Force, General Beyers, and Colonel Maritz. Louis Botha, Prime Minister and former Commandant-general of the Burgher forces during the Boer War, was able to leave at the end of January 1915 to conduct a skilful campaign which culminated in the capture of Windhoek in May and the defeat and impounding of the German forces in July. The conquest of German South-West Africa brought together into the field some 60,000. They comprised both English-speaking regiments of the Active Citizen Force and the many Afrikaans-speaking members of rifle commandos who remained loyal to Botha and Smuts. The occupation of Luderitzbucht,

* Military aircraft, used by Italy in the conquest of Libya in 1912, were employed to good effect by British forces in several parts of Africa during the 1914–18 war.
and the wider campaign, was undertaken at the request of a hard-pressed Britain.

After South-West Africa 25,000 South African soldiers were dispatched to France, and 50,000 to East Africa, where Smuts in March 1916 was given command in succession to Smith-Dorrien. South African troops were engaged in the advance on German East Africa from both Kenya and Nyasaland. In addition to participating with the Royal Navy and Royal Flying Corps in events such as the trapping of the ocean-raiding battle-cruiser Königsberg in the Rufiji River, they gave the closest co-operation to African and Indian soldiers during exacting operations which produced far heavier death rolls from malaria and dysentery than from battle casualties.

Although the gallant von Lettow Vorbeck remained elusive until after the end of the war, not surrendering until November 23, 1918, at Abercorn in Northern Rhodesia, the main operations in Tanganyika were completed in 1917. By that time, when Smuts was sent by Botha to join the Imperial War Cabinet in London, the principal towns and communications were in Allied hands. The majority of white and Indian soldiers were then withdrawn, as much to prevent further heavy losses from tropical disease as to deploy them elsewhere. Van Deventer, South African cavalryman, succeeded Smuts in overall command but the principal tasks remaining in German East Africa were undertaken by twenty-two battalions of the King's African Rifles and by Cunliffe's Nigerian Brigade.

South Africa's main military contributions elsewhere were in the Middle East and France. Apart from minor frontier operations in Egypt's Western Desert the Union Defence Force in the Middle East was engaged primarily in Palestine under Allenby. There were heavy casualties at Gaza, where the Cape Corps, composed of those South Africans of mixed race who are described as "Coloured", fought with notable gallantry. African and Coloured soldiers from South Africa served also in France. Many hundreds of Africans lost their lives when the troopship Mende was sunk off Southampton. The main fighting contributions in France were made by men of European descent, chiefly through the South African Infantry Brigade, though many individuals seconded to British formations gained distinction as airmen, sailors and soldiers. Always necessarily marginal, given the size of the great armies ranged against each other, South Africa's expeditionary force nevertheless made
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its mark on the Western Front. The Infantry Brigade in particular suffered severe casualties and won deserved praise for stubborn actions on the Somme and on the Lys at times when the Allied front was seriously threatened.

Although South Africa’s response was specially significant, and though the Union Defence Force was encouraged by Britain to assume a role of leadership in several campaigns on the African continent, the contribution to the war effort by each of the other zones of British Africa was substantial. In West Africa the Gold Coast Regiment dealt promptly with Togoland, silencing the Kamina radio transmitter which was of special importance in the German network of Imperial communications. Mountainous, forested Kamerun offered more serious resistance. The valuable deep-water harbour of Douala fell to the Royal Navy in September 1914 but it took a further 1½ years hard campaigning by Nigerian, Gold Coast, Gambian, West Indian and Indian troops before the resourceful Colonel Zimmermann left the field to evade capture by seeking sanctuary, with his force, in the Spanish colony of Rio Muni. West African troops were thereupon freed to prepare for their new responsibilities in German East Africa.

African soldiers from all Britain’s Central and East African territories, including Northern Rhodesia, proved themselves in modern battle against the well-trained white soldiers and askaris of the German East African forces. The King’s African Rifles, from the 1st Battalion in Nyasaland to the other battalions in Kenya and Uganda, earned the prestige which, during the inter-war years, encouraged British officers to compete for secondment from leading United Kingdom regiments. General Hoskins, Inspector-General of the K.A.R. before his transfer to Palestine, was perhaps accorded insufficient recognition for his achievement in welding an effective force from so many diverse peoples and territories.

The good discipline and morale of his men was also highly prized subsequently by the civil administrations to whom many went on retirement as messengers and clerks. The loyalty and devotion of the carriers, properly symbolized in the askari war memorial in Nairobi, has been indicated already. Such African auxiliaries, both in support of the army and on the farms, greatly reduced demands on Imperial shipping and other resources and made possible the effective conduct of operations. Karen Blixen’s writings convey something of the atmosphere of Kenya’s first major war-time effort, an effort which was echoed again when Mussolini
threatened in 1939–45. She, together with other European women on their scattered farms in both Kenya and Rhodesia, were directly involved alongside their men, who displayed singular ability and courage as individual scouts or members of reconnaissance units.

Egypt’s manpower contribution was substantial. Tens of thousands of Egyptians were recruited to the British forces as soldiers and auxiliaries and Allenby, among others, wrote well of them. They were always subordinate, however, a fact which many resented then as during the Second World War. The immense strategic significance of the country ensured the presence throughout the war of a large standing British army. Seventy thousand British troops were available in Egypt at the beginning of 1915, one-third of a million later. Whether it would have been better to defend positions such as the “Kitchener Line”, ten miles to the east of the Canal, against Kress von Kressenstein and his Turks, rather than to embark on costly campaigns such as the advance on Jerusalem in 1917 is a question to be debated by the rival military historians. To them too must be left estimations of the relative military merits of the various African campaigns, and those of Gallipoli and Salonika, as against a concentration of all available manpower and resources on the Western Front. There is point, however, in emphasizing Egypt's historic role in providing a meeting-place for soldiers of the British Empire from every continent, a role which was repeated within twenty-five years.

The Great War confirmed in the minds of Britain's leaders the strategic importance of its bases in Egypt and South Africa and the value of being able to summon forces from the east of Suez, whether from South Africa up the western shores of the Indian Ocean or across from the Indian sub-continent itself. Aden, Mombasa and Durban acquired fresh significance in Imperial defence plans as a result of the use made of these harbours; Port Sudan, Berbera, East London and Port Elizabeth also. On the west coast between Simonstown and Portsmouth, Freetown remained important and the value of lesser harbours such as Walvis Bay and Luderitzbucht on a long and difficult coast was emphasized, especially after the decision to transfer Douala to the French. South Africa’s potential as an Imperial arsenal and source of supply was also made more apparent by the realities of war. Though Egypt was a base for stores, South Africa’s industrial and agricultural resources made possible a substantial expansion of secondary industry, especially the manufacture of arms and food. To Imperial leaders
there was no question but that Egypt must remain under British control even though a substantial military garrison might be required. In self-governing South Africa on the other hand Botha, Smuts, and co-operative Afrikaners as a whole, in company with British South Africans, plainly suggested themselves as the party for Britain to back against Hertzog and Malan.

Whether the remainder of Africa might better have been insulated from involvement in the war is an academic question. Lugard and others might speculate with misgiving on the possible consequences of employing Africans in campaigns where they “learned to kill white men”, but many Africans did participate as combatant soldiers and many others from the great heart of the continent were directly involved in modern warfare at home and abroad. In the event Lugard’s several particular fears, including the effect on Nigeria’s northern emirates of a war against the Islamic Turkish Empire, proved unfounded. For most indigenous Africans in colonial Africa the Great War served principally to compel them abruptly to take note of the reality of the new territorial divisions of their continent and to learn something of the nature of the metropolitan régimes to which they had so recently become subject. There were African leaders in each zone thinking in terms of national and international politics, and who were initiating wider political movements, but they were few and the experiences of the First War served chiefly to hasten the education of their future followers.

(ii) 1918–39: TRUSTEESHIP

There is a case for subdividing the inter-war years at about 1929 and treating separately the decades before and after the World Depression, Japan’s attack on Manchuria, Hitler’s rapid rise to power and alliance with Mussolini. These world events had their pronounced effect on Africa. In terms of purely domestic politics also the Labour Government, with Sidney Webb as Colonial Secretary, initiated certain new tendencies in British African policy. There is nevertheless sufficient unity about the period to warrant treating it as a whole. Throughout these twenty years the dominant attitude towards Africa among all non-African peoples favoured or accepted the continuance of colonial tutelage or rule. This was true of Arabs, Indians and Japanese as well as Europeans and Americans.

This prevalent attitude found expression in many ways. President
Wilson's principle of immediate ethnic autonomy or self-rule for the constituent peoples of the Austro-Hungarian empire was not extended beyond Europe. Outside Africa the Philippines remained under colonial rule and, though Liberia preserved a nominal autonomy, its survival was frankly bolstered by the United States. The fate of Ethiopia in 1936 is also instructive. There was genuine regret but little more over the West’s desertion of Haile Selassie. Africa was regarded as being of subsidiary importance during the power confrontations of the mid-thirties, and a proper source of pawns in the politics of appeasement. There was, furthermore, at the time, as there is indeed still in historical literature of today, an unquestioning acceptance of the superiority of Western imperial rule even in this most ancient of Africa’s independent states.

The concept of a hierarchy of “races”, with the “Caucasoid” or “European” at the top, Asians and Arabs in between, and the “Negroid” or Africans at the bottom, was widespread among Western thinkers. This thought found particularly clear expression in the trusteeship provisions of the covenant of the League of Nations. The Arab peoples formerly subject to the Turkish empire were regarded as substantially more mature than those of sub-Saharan Africa. For them there could be a shorter period of tutelage by the “advanced” nations entrusted with mandates. But for the “backward” races of Lord Lugard, the “child” races of General Smuts or the “non-adult” races of Leonard Woolf a very much longer period would be required before they could hope to “stand on their own feet under the strenuous conditions of the modern world”. It is suggestive of the strength of social-evolutionist thought that a principal socialist critic of imperialism like Leonard Woolf should have accepted so completely the conception of a racial hierarchy.

So far as the Commonwealth was concerned, as a separate entity in international relations, the prevalent hierarchical thought of the victorious Western powers was also manifest. The Wilsonian emphases on autonomy or national and cultural freedom for Central Europe were proclaimed by Smuts in respect of the Afrikaners, French Canadians and Irish in his famous speech on the Commonwealth of Nations to a joint meeting of the House of Lords and House of Commons on April 15, 1917. These principles, however, were sounded neither by him, nor by other Imperial leaders, for the non-Western peoples, not even on behalf of India, though there was warm and widespread acknowledgement of the major Indian
contribution to the Empire war effort. Certainly there was an im-
mediate study of Indian constitutional reform which initiated the
series of commissions and political adjustments which characterized
British–Indian relations between the wars and culminated in the
Government of India Act of 1935. But India remained subject to
British over-rule throughout the period, a fact important for British
power in Africa, and significant also for the position of the Indian
minorities resident in British Eastern and Southern Africa.

For Britain's dependencies in Africa, as for the indigenous
African majority in South Africa, there was general acceptance of
the need for thorough-going paternalistic tutelage. Lugard and
Smuts* the two dominant influences on British African policy,
were at one in supporting the concepts of the “dual mandate” and
“trusteeship” which provided an ethical foundation for the Western
presence and supremacy throughout the continent. Africa must be
developed for the benefit of the world, Africa's peoples must be
advanced to participate in and to benefit from such development.

There were different views on particular methods of African
rule, on the organization of separate administrations, and on the
review and supervision of policy and practice. There were also at
times substantial criticisms of abuses such as the operation of par-
ticular colour bars or the neglect of the other protective duties of a
trustee. But even liberal Western critics did not foresee the possi-
bility of an immediate termination of their overall responsibility.
Members of the enlightened Hilton Young Commission which re-
ported on East and Central Africa in 1929 were in no sense unusual
in seeing no early prospect of any African, as distinct from a
missionary or other spokesman, entering the Legislative Council to
represent African interests. Such assumptions were noted and their
institutional expressions analysed in the masterly survey conducted
in the thirties by Lord Hailey, who joined Smuts and Lugard as a
foremost British authority on African affairs. Hailey's comparative
analysis, published in 1938, together with his subsequent separate
volumes on Native Administration, provide the most complete
picture of the areas of administration of British Africa and the
philosophy which governed their rule.

Trusteeship principles were extended also to the former German
possessions which were incorporated under the different categories
of mandate. In West Africa Britain received portions of Togo and
Kamerun, in East Africa Tanganyika. To South Africa was given

* See Hancock, W. K. Smuts for definitive biography.
South-West Africa as a "C" class mandate which might be administered as an integral part of the Union. South Africa's exercise of trusteeship was to be questioned sharply by India after 1945, and further attacks mounted as the United Nations acquired more Asian and African members, but during the inter-war years there was relatively little criticism. Apart from adding fresh areas of administration to British Africa the ex-German possessions were perhaps notable for providing at last an "all-red" route between the Cape and Cairo. Not until the mid-thirties was the Versailles parcelling out of German Africa between Britain, France, Belgium and South Africa threatened by Hitler, and only after Mussolini's Ethiopian conquest was the actual pattern of colonies disturbed. As a significant subsidiary thread in the new web of relationships brought about by the mandates, there is point in recalling Smuts's personal interest in Palestine and the contribution of South African Jews to the development of a Jewish national home.

Smuts's pre-eminence assured South Africa of a prominent place in British thought and a major, possibly a disproportionate, influence on African policy. South Africa's geographical position, material wealth and other attributes would have assured her always of real importance, but Smuts personally added a significant and, at times, a decisive dimension. His romantic past and his striking personality which impressed Lloyd George, Churchill, Amery and an extraordinary diverse cross-section of Britons, were coupled with a record of distinguished and efficient service within the United Kingdom itself, as well as in the "remoter marches of the Empire". His personal loyalty to Botha and his inheritance of Botha's political mantle on the latter's death in 1919, confirmed his already strong position in the councils of Britain and the Empire-Commonwealth.

Smuts's views on the organization of the Commonwealth prevailed against those of Curtis, a former member of Milner's kindergarten, and the Imperial Federationists, who sought above all a common policy for the whole association; his memoranda on the League of Nations and international trusteeship were largely accepted and supported by Britain, and during his recurrent visits to Britain he was invited by the universities and other eminent associations to pronounce upon central issues of world peace, democracy and government. The authority thus gained reinforced his observations on African policy, whether he was in office or in opposition to Hertzog and Malan. The book *Africa and Some World Problems* published in 1929 provides a convenient source
of his principal views. And it was Smuts who, in 1932, initiated Hailey's African Survey through the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

South Africa's relationship with the United Kingdom until 1939, and indeed until 1948, can therefore be seen very much in terms of the fortunes of one man. The territorial canvas can be stretched also to embrace Southern Rhodesia, for throughout this time her responsible Government leaders, most notably Sir Godfrey Huggins (Lord Malvern), were at one with Smuts on major issues.* The wisdom of Britain's over-reliance on one man has been questioned, especially since it clouded the perception, and prevented the understanding of Southern Africa's internal problems, but it is nevertheless essential to focus upon Smuts. His relations with Hertzog and the whole ebb and flow of politics between the overwhelmingly "European" or white political parties governed South Africa's destiny. Though urgent questions of "race relations" were ever-present, Africans, Asians and Coloureds were mainly excluded deliberately, and by the agreement of all politicians, from "the arena of party politics"—and power. Disputes over "Non-Europeans" between the parties turned primarily upon their administration, not their alliance.

South Africa's ties with Britain and her liabilities as a member of the Commonwealth, the position of white workers in the advancing industrial economy, and the response of the country to the great economic depression were the main issues in white politics between the wars. Inevitably these issues touched all peoples and communities and every aspect of national life but little attention was paid to the African, Coloured and Indian congresses and trade unions.

Smuts's support for "Crown and Commonwealth" supplied the main ground for Afrikaner-nationalist charges against him. His cool response to Lloyd George's exuberant appeal to South Africa—and to Canada, Australia and New Zealand—for armed support in the Middle East in 1922 weighed little against his emphatic personal advocacy of the Crown as the indispensable cohesive element of the Commonwealth. (Regular consultation on a basis of equality between the member nations was his second main principle.) Neither did his friendship with Quakers and other humanitarians in Britain who had upheld the Boer cause save him from

heated attack as the lackey of imperialism. When Smuts's government was overwhelmed in 1924 by a republican-socialist coalition comprising Hertzog–Malan Nationalists and Creswell–Madeley Labourites the way was open for Hertzog to press upon Britain his demands for the definition of "Dominion status" in such fashion as to make plain South Africa's independence and her right to be neutral in time of war.

To the resultant declaration of the Imperial Conference of 1926, which stated the principles of full autonomy and complete equality, there was added in 1931 the Statute of Westminster. Naturally neither document afforded the absolute assurance which Hertzog sought that South Africa would not again be drawn into Britain's wars. Nor could that aim be achieved by domestic laws and measures, such as the Status of the Union Act of 1934, which Hertzog felt impelled to enact at a time when Smuts was restored to the Government as his deputy in a fresh coalition. Hertzog's only effective course was to combat Smuts's pro-Commonwealth views at every point and to appoint to key ministries, such as Defence, individuals like Oswald Pirow who shared his sympathy for Germany and his desire for neutrality in European affairs.

The "civilized labour" policy of the Hertzog administration provided the principal basis for co-operation between the Afrikaner-nationalists and the predominantly British South African Labour Party. The Nationalists, dependent upon a rural electorate, were always conscious of the plight of the Afrikaans-speaking tenant-farmers and squatters known generally as the "poor whites". When their impoverishment drove them in increasing numbers to the towns their economic and social protection became an urgent concern of their politico-religious leaders. Special welfare measures, such as subsidized wages, housing and health services, were demanded for the poor whites and it was urged that they be given priority in employment over Africans, Asians and Coloureds. Although the English-speaking worker was traditionally better placed than the Afrikaner, through being skilled in the crafts, commerce and other predominantly urban pursuits, his fears had been aroused by the tendency of the mining corporations and other large-scale employers, during and immediately after the war, to introduce lower-paid African and Coloured workers into posts previously regarded as the province of Europeans. Resistant as they were to the lowering of craft standards and the dilution of their trade unions by the unskilled, newly urbanized Afrikaners, most English-speaking
workers were even more afraid of the African movement into the cities and towns.

Smuts's suppression of the industrial strike on the Witwatersrand in 1922, an action which included the use of troops and military aircraft against ex-servicemen workers, and the hanging of the white labour leaders Hull, Lewis and Long, provoked the deep and abiding bitterness which found political expression in the sweeping electoral successes of the South African Labour Party in coalition with Hertzog in 1924. Thereafter, until the 1929 “split” of the Labour Party and the economic collapse of the Western world, the South African parliament enacted a series of frankly discriminatory labour and welfare measures aimed at protecting the white workers. The Mines and Works Amendment Act of 1926, more generally known as the “Colour Bar” Act, is the most-quoted piece of discriminatory legislation of the period but it was only one such measure. Of particular significance to the British–South African relationship is the fact that the protection afforded by such laws and regulations was regarded by Afrikaner-nationalists and English-speaking workers as being against the British capitalist-imperialist supporters of Smuts as well as against their potential local competitors.

The relations of the political parties were dramatically changed by the economic depression and the “gold standard” crisis. Unemployment affected all classes and races and the financial collapse brought ruin to many employers and professional families. The economic and commercial knowledge and skills of English-speaking South Africans and the established links with the “City” of London and comparable centres were essential to rapid recovery. Though Smuts's tolerance of the “republican principle” in the constitution of the new United South African National Party* offended many South Africans of British origin, Smuts did not hesitate to become deputy to Hertzog in the fight for economic survival. In the elections of 1933 and 1938 the new coalition party won overwhelming victories against the right-wing pro-Empire Dominion Party of Colonel Stallard and the right-wing pro-Republican party of Dr. Malan. Not until the fateful parliamentary division of September 6, 1939, was there a substantial political re-alignment.

The narrow majority by which South Africa entered the war alongside Britain was secured by the supporters of Smuts and Stallard together with the few surviving parliamentary representatives

* Known generally as the United Party.
of the South African Labour Party, notably Christie and Madeley, and the three "Cape Native Representatives". The latter of whom Dr. Margaret Ballinger is best known, were the first members elected under the Representation of Natives Act, 1936, which, together with a revised rural land law, and an amended urban areas Act, expressed Hertzog's policy towards Africans. A few minor compromises had been made during ten years of preparation but the legislation which was finally enacted embodied the substance of Hertzog's "Native Bills" of 1926.

Segregation between African and non-African in all possible spheres, notably ownership of property, residence, employment, the franchise and other civic rights, was the central objective. Although Smuts professed to set great store by the Natives Representative Council which he opened in 1937, it was purely an advisory body which met under the chairmanship of the senior civil servant responsible for "Native Affairs". And though the three representatives of Africans in the House of Assembly and the four in the Senate co-operated closely with the able African councillors and proved themselves exceptionally worthy they suffered always from the fact that the constitution required them to be persons of European descent, that is "white". Africans with modern education, including graduates from the "open" universities of the Witwatersrand and Cape Town, from Fort Hare and other African colleges, understandably felt that they had no voice in national policy. Despite minor administrative concessions they were grouped with their tribal fellows and untutored workers under the "Supreme Chief"—otherwise the Governor-General—in terms of authority deriving from the Native Administration Act of 1927. This measure, which also gave limited recognition to Native Law throughout South Africa, owed much to colonial precedent in Natal, though the growing prestige of Lugardism in British Colonial Africa, where the conditions were very different, was drawn upon to justify certain of its elements.

South Africa's Indian peoples and her Coloureds and Malays were likewise largely segregated from the main currents of political life. Those in the Cape continued to benefit from the non-racial traditions of the Province and preserved their common franchise rights when the Africans were transferred to a separate communal roll in 1936. There were also special efforts made by the Government to improve the lot of the Coloured people who filled an intermediary position in the economic and social structure. The
Indian people of Natal, however, were subjected to increasing disabilities. Unlike the Coloured people, for whom responsibility was acknowledged, Indians were regarded as "unassimilable aliens". Their local government franchise was removed and every pressure mounted to restrict within defined areas their ownership of property. Under the Malan–Sastri Agreement, signed at Cape Town between Hertzog's deputy and the Agent-General of the Government of India, an attempt was initiated to encourage and assist South Africa's Indian population to return to India. In the event very few individuals elected to be repatriated, or "expatriated", as Indians prefer, and increasing emphasis was placed by Indian Congress and other leaders on the "uplift clauses" of the Agreement, which stipulated that educational and other benefits were to accrue to the Indians who were, henceforth, to be treated as an integral part of the permanent population of South Africa.

Smuts was Britain's principal "internal trustee", and the Union the most significant area in British or Commonwealth Africa in which locally resident Europeans were responsible for governing not themselves only but substantial majorities of Africans also, together with important minorities of Indian and other peoples. But north of the Union there were Huggins and his associates in Southern Rhodesia and Delamere* and Cavendish-Bentinck and their associates in Kenya.

Both territories were set in vast areas of British Central and East Africa and in both there was a conscious aim to build up an "officer-class" of British settlers who would supply leadership in times of peace and war. No formal political unification of the East and Central African territories resulted, or of Central Africa alone, despite certain efforts in this direction in the late twenties and late thirties, but between Smuts, Huggins and Cavendish-Bentinck there developed a real understanding which was greatly facilitated by the growth of air services in the thirties. On major issues confronting Britain and the Commonwealth in Africa, leaders of opinion, including British High Commissioners, colonial Governors and other senior civil servants, could meet readily. In this way the Pretoria–Salisbury–Nairobi axis achieved a reality which, always important, proved of the utmost significance during times of international crisis such as Germany's demand for the restoration of her colonies, the conquest of Ethiopia, and the Second World War.

In their approach to administration there was an essential

* Lord Delamere died in 1931.
similarity in principle and method between Kenya, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. Given the common overall objective of developing countries for European settlement, as well as the historical links between the territories, it was to be expected that institutions and practices developed in the older south, notably in the Cape and Natal in the nineteenth century, would be adopted in the north. Areas for white farmers were alienated, reservations for Africans were demarcated. African chiefs, elders and other traditional authorities were given relatively limited recognition in these reserved areas and frank pressures and inducements continued to be applied to encourage Africans to supply labour to European farmers, miners and townsmen.

There was little serious thought of African participation in politics. The principle of the common voters' roll, rather than communal representation, was given some theoretical approval in Southern Rhodesia, but on the clear understanding that only very slowly over the decades might small numbers of educated and carefully selected men of other races be added to the European electors. In Southern Rhodesia the Europeans were given effective control of affairs in 1923, after they had opted in 1922 for responsible self-government. In Kenya no formal transfer of political control was made but, until the war, and several years afterwards, very substantial power lay in the hands of the settled Europeans.

From Kenya into Tanganyika, and from the south across the Zambesi into Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, British "settler" influence extended and strengthened itself during the period under review. The distribution of Europeans was patchy, being confined to specific mining and farming areas in Tanganyika, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, as also in Swaziland and Bechuanaland, but settler influence was real, especially since it was to local Europeans that the home and local governments looked first for productive enterprises which would advance the territorial economies and improve imperial trade. After Ottawa, when "Empire preference" gained fresh stimulus, European producers in Africa acted in an atmosphere of strong approval for endeavours which promised to assist the recovery of Britain, the Commonwealth and the world from economic collapse. In the areas in which they were chiefly present—for example, along the line of rail, or in the new Copper Belt towns of Northern Rhodesia—the predominance of Europeans became as marked as it was in Kenya or Southern Rhodesia.

The Indian communities of British East and Central Africa pro-
vided successive Imperial governments with the same challenge that those in South Africa were offering to Smuts and Hertzog. What civic rights, economic opportunities and social benefits were to be granted to these useful, yet culturally exclusive, peoples whose main functions were seen as auxiliary to those of the Europeans and Africans? As in South Africa the Indians rejected a communal approach which would differentiate them in matters of franchise, property ownership and the like. They sought a genuine common electoral roll in Kenya and access to the "White Highlands", demands which alarmed the local Europeans who were outnumbered, but demands which it was difficult to refuse without giving affront to the Government and peoples of India. In the event escape was found in the formulae of trusteeship, notably in the principle of the "paramountcy" of the interests of the African wards for whom primary responsibility was acknowledged by the joint trustees—the United Kingdom and Britons in Africa. Special recognition might be afforded to Indians, Arabs, Coloureds, Goans, Somalis and other minorities in the "plural societies" but the principal groups in matters of policy and development were the Europeans and the Africans.

Most non-Africans were concentrated in or near the towns. In the vast areas of East and Central Africa away from the towns, mines and European farms the administration of the African peoples was brought increasingly into conformity with the principles of Lugardism. There were some educated Africans, graduates of Makerere and other Colleges, but far fewer than in South and West Africa, and the respective governments were not faced as yet with any major problem of reconciling the interests of African modernists and traditionalists. In rural Kenya among peoples like the Masai and Kikuyu it was difficult, quite apart from any settler influences, to devise a system of "indirect rule" on classical lines in the absence of "pyramidal" tribal political structures. Authority was diffused among elders and age-sets, not concentrated in chiefs and councillors.

Elsewhere, however, notably in Uganda and Tanganyika, Lugardism became more deeply entrenched as official doctrine. Uganda with its multiplicity of traditional monarchies provided a fertile field. Sir Donald Cameron, one of Lugard's lieutenants in Nigeria, developed Lugard's principles with enthusiasm when he was transferred as Governor to the mandated territory of Tanganyika, a move which could scarcely fail to win approval from the
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Permanent Mandates Commission on which Lugard served for so long as the expert British representative.

From Tanganyika southwards official doctrine radiated into Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, where it took root in the thirties and lapped over into Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland. At Oxford and other shrines colonial service officers on study leave from these territories were initiated into the mysteries of the trinity of executive, judicial and financial elements by high-priests of the cult. The science of anthropology was invoked in support of indirect rule, Rattray’s *Ashanti* and Edwin Smith’s *The Golden Stool* being widely quoted as texts.

It is a very real and important question whether more critical appraisals of indirect rule, especially the applicability of its precepts in different practical contexts, might not have encouraged greater realism and flexibility, and better overall preparation of the several British African territories for modern economic and political advancement and eventual self-government. As it was, throughout East and Central Africa, and in the Sudan as well as the High Commission Territories, forms of “tribalism” were given the powerful support of the United Kingdom Government and its various agents.

In contrast with Victorian liberal emphases on rights for the individual without regard for race, colour and creed, Lugardism placed value upon the ethnic collectivity, whether in restricted local area, province, region or state. One result was that Africans under “indirect rule” were schooled in administrative and political institutions very different from those of their fellows in areas where “direct rule” prevailed and they tended to develop a different set of political expectations. This point was not sufficiently appreciated by those in Britain and Africa who in the early 1950’s forced Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland into federal union with Southern Rhodesia.

In West Africa, where Lugardism was deeply embedded, the theory of indirect rule was increasingly subjected to fresh appraisal though little was done until after 1945. C. L. Temple, an early critic and one of Lugard’s senior lieutenants in Nigeria, received short shrift from his master, a reaction which was perhaps understandable in the immediate aftermath of acquisition. More trenchant, and more urgent, were the views of analysts of the late thirties such as W. M. MacMillan who, though sometimes insensitive to cultural factors, were eager to see modern economic advance. They were chiefly disturbed lest the bolstering of traditional rulers like the Asantehene in the Gold Coast and the Emirs
of Northern Nigeria might inhibit the development of the overall economies of the territories.

In Sierra Leone also, modernist critics of indirect rule backed the Creoles whom they regarded as those best endowed by education and experience to supply local leadership. But the warnings of men like MacMillan were largely unheeded. While, in the “plural societies” of East, Central and South Africa, trustees such as Smuts, failed to provide adequately for educated Africans, so too in West Africa Lugardism was seriously defective in its failure to combine in one system the values of progress with those of tradition. Several of Lugard’s observations on educated and enterprising Africans were as insensitive and harsh as were those on the “Babus” of India or on partially Westernized Asians and Africans elsewhere.

This serious defect apart, much was achieved by the administrations in British West Africa during the inter-war years. There was no dramatic progress, constitutionally, economically or socially. Nor could there be, given the assumptions of the day concerning the colonial relationship. Lord Passfield initiated a Colonial Development Fund in 1929 but it was essentially a token for the future. There were on the other hand no disturbances or political movements on a scale sufficient to alarm the authorities. Anti-Lebanese riots occurred in Freetown in the aftermath of the 1914-18 war, the Aba Tax riots in Nigeria took place in 1929, and there were from time to time until the mid-thirties uneasy relations with the Asantehene and his supporters in Ashanti. Perhaps the most significant portent was the “Cocoa Hold-up” of 1938 in which the Gold Coast producers demonstrated a marked capacity for combined action, against the advice of the Administration and the opposition of the wholesale companies. But this impressive act took place on the eve of war and it was not until 1948 that the Accra riots and disturbances inaugurated a wholly new approach on the part of the Imperial Government.

Politically the “Guggisberg constitution”, introduced into the Gold Coast in 1925, reflected the thought of an enlightened West African Governor. The elective principle was introduced for the first time. Nine of fourteen African unofficials in a legislature of twenty-nine were elected: one from each of the coastal towns, Accra, Cape Coast, Sekondi; the other six from the newly established Provincial Councils, comprising the Chiefs of the “Colony” or the southern region. But no Africans from Ashanti and none from the north were included. Senior British commissioners for
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these regions were associated with the Governor in his councils but there were no effective political exchanges between elected representatives. Only in 1946 was Ashanti united to the south within the framework of the Legislative Council, only in 1951 the Northern Territories. Essentially the same principles of organization and similar regional divisions characterized the other West African territories. Much the same timing applied also, for only after the war were significant steps taken to bring together the separate “colonies”, “protectorates”, or regions.

Contact and exchanges there were, nevertheless, principally in market and work places and in the secondary schools and colleges. The vigorous West African Press also played its part in helping to extend awareness beyond the confines of the powerful “Native Administrations”. A penchant for the independent liberal professions of law and medicine brought West Africans to the Inns of Court in London and to professional schools elsewhere in Britain and the United States. Increasingly during the inter-war years such professional men, notably the lawyers, gave depth to discussions on the colonial relationship. Several became prominent in the political organizations which were formed, chiefly in the thirties. The tone of such bodies, however, was generally moderate, liberal or gradualist in contrast with the more radical, militant and revolutionary movements which came into being after 1945. The prevailing mood was one which placed value on education and in which individuals found outlet through their school, college and professional careers. Fraser and Aggrey of Achimota were leading educationists and with their colleagues at Fourah Bay, the missionary Colleges of Lagos and other centres, enjoyed the sustained support of influential bodies in Britain and the United States, support which received an important impetus from the Phelps-Stokes Education Commissions of the 1920’s.

In the Anglo-Egyptian part of the Sudan, across from Northern Nigeria, on the Pilgrims’ route to Mecca, the inter-war years of administration were characterized by much the same thought and actions as were found in the other parts of British Africa south of the Sahara. Britain had come to terms with Islam in her West African territories, the Nigerian Emirs were among the best paid of Africa’s rulers and they were insulated in their exercise of power, including their control of Islamic courts administering the Maliki code. In the Sudan too there was a similar emphasis on traditional Islamic authorities. Ordinances were promulgated in the late
twenties giving powers to Sheikhs in the urban as well as the rural areas. The conservative tendency was also made evident in the formulation of policy for the southern, non-Islamic areas. Though no actual merging of the south with Uganda was attempted it was largely isolated from the north, and increasing attention was devoted to the structure of authority among the several different peoples and tribes and to a study of the functioning of their little-known social systems. Professor Evans-Pritchard’s books on the Nuer and the Azande were notable contributions.

The major activities of government in the Sudan took place in the technological and economic spheres. Communications were improved and surveyors and hydrologists provided the data required for fundamental economic planning. The Gezira cotton scheme benefited especially from scientific research and by 1925 it was fully established as the mainspring of the economy. Typical of the Britons who gave whole-hearted loyalty and service to the Sudan was Arthur Gaitskell.* The world economic depression struck a severe blow but the sound social and economic foundations of the Gezira project ensured its rapid contribution to the revival. In the educational and medical spheres also much work of enduring value was accomplished. Gordon College, despite the rejection of Currie’s enlightened conceptions and the substitution of a narrow, restrictive system which alienated educated Sudanese, continued as the principal educational centre. Some important teacher-training ventures were launched. In the south Christian missions continued to bear the main responsibilities for education and medical care and steadily expanded their work.

But although there were resemblances to Nigeria and West Africa, and though much of great and lasting merit was achieved by British administrators, the overall situation of the Sudan differed significantly from that of Nigeria. Senior British policy makers and local officials might share with Lugard a recollection of rule through princes in India and a desire for a similar system throughout Africa, but the political milieu in North Africa—as indeed in South Africa—allowed no more than a partial implementation in the Sudan of the principles of Lugardism. Political pressures, notably those of nationalism, operated more forcefully in countries fronting on the Mediterranean and Arabia than in those facing the Gulf of Guinea. Conservative Muslim rulers in British West Africa might welcome

British over-rule but the Muslims of the Nile Valley, rulers and followers, aspired to an early independence.

The form of Sudan independence, whether it was to be in association with or separate from Egypt, was the central point of dispute between the Sudanese nationalists. It bore upon all questions of tactics and timing in relations with Britain and with local British administrations. Support for the alternatives naturally varied also according to local and international events. There were times when the tide flowed strongly in favour of independence for a united Nile Valley. Ali Abd Al-Latif's White Flag League, founded in 1924, accepted the need for co-operation with Egyptian nationalism if British rule was to be overthrown. But significant ebbs occurred in such feeling, especially when Egypt accepted Sudanese exclusion from Anglo-Egyptian negotiations over matters of common vital interest. Sudanese were incensed when they were not involved in the Nile Waters Agreement of 1929. Quite as strong, and even more sophisticated, were reactions when Sudanese representatives were not consulted before the signing of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. Ismail Al-Azhari was able in February 1938 to establish the famous "Graduates General Congress" as a new and potentially formidable local political force. Relatively few Sudanese had been able, like Al-Azhari, to study at the American University of Beirut but there was cohesion and determination among all Gordon College men.

The Sudan Defence Force proved a much more effective military instrument for Britain than the Egyptian army in the 1939-45 war. Sudanese soldiers were determined and hard-hitting in actions against Mussolini's forces in Eritrea and Ethiopia. It was from Khartoum that the Emperor Haile Selassie set out to play his part in the restoration of his empire. In contrast with the Egyptian army the excellent morale and fighting-spirit of the Sudanese was painfully evident, a fact which was not lost upon Egyptian officers of the calibre of General Neguib and Colonel Nasser.

Some of the reasons for the apathy and reluctance of Egyptians are not difficult to suggest. So far as the army and civil service are concerned, it is just possible that Egyptian service morale might have been higher if Egyptian officers had continued to be employed in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan between 1924 and 1939. But after the murder in Cairo in 1924 of Sir Lee Stack, Sirdar of the Sudan as well as Commander-in-Chief of Egypt's forces, Egyptians were summarily swept from the service of the condominium. Sudanese
officers might be obliged to swear allegiance to the King of Egypt, and the flag of Egypt fly beside the Union Jack, but there was little substance underlying such ritual and symbol. British pre-eminence in the Sudan was a constant affront to Egyptian susceptibilities.

In Egypt itself British dominance likewise continued almost unabated until 1939; the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 was signed too close to the war to permit the growth of any substantial sense of independence. Zaghloul, like South Africa's Hertzog, had appealed at Versailles for recognition of the independent nationalhood of his country, a status accorded to the Hedjaz, Ethiopia and Liberia, but Egypt was deemed too important to Britain, the British Empire and the Dominions to be allowed anything more than the strictly qualified independence which she was granted in terms of the British Declaration of 1922, and by the complementary Egyptian constitution of the following year. Thus though the Wafd secured in 1924 an electoral victory which was as complete as that of Hertzog's nationalists in South Africa in the same year, the powers of the Egyptian parliament were limited and there was for Egypt no question of equality or autonomy of the kind defined in the 1926 Declaration of Dominion status.

In Egypt there was no Smuts, nor any forceful man approximating to Smuts in stature to give the country a decisive lead. Zaghloul, incensed by the brusque authoritarianism of military occupation in time of war, bore some resemblance to Hertzog, but there was no man of comparable eminence committed to a pro-British position in the manner of Smuts. The "loyal Dutch" of the Cape and Natal had few if any counterparts on the lower Nile. Egypt was nevertheless deeply divided politically between those who supported the King and his associates, and those who favoured the nationalists in parliament. The triangle of forces in Egyptian politics embraced the royalists and the parliamentarians, with Britain occupying the apex position as the occupying power.

The royalists might have been more effective had the people been happier with Fuad, first Sultan to become king. But he was viewed always as an alien and it was not until the seventeen-year-old Farouk came to the throne in 1936 that Egyptians felt that they had a king of their own. Though popular with the people, however, Farouk achieved little harmony of understanding with Nahas Pasha and the other leaders of the Wafd who took over after Zaghloul's death in 1927. The Muslim Brotherhood, similar in many respects
to the Afrikaner *Broederbond*, played their part in affairs from behind the scenes.

The uneasy relations between Britain and Egypt were eased in some degree after the outbreak of the Ethiopian War in 1935. The importance of Egyptian goodwill became as apparent as the need to preserve the Suez Canal in friendly hands. Britain sponsored Egypt's membership of the League of Nations in 1937 and though the rejection of Haile Selassie's pleas for effective international action had done nothing to give confidence in the organization, Egyptians were nevertheless pleased by their admission. By the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and the Montreux Convention of 1937 Britain undertook to end the system of capitulations which protected the special privileges of foreigners. Rights of commerce and property in the Sudan were also guaranteed to Egyptians and it was agreed that the Sudan civil service should be opened to Egyptians whenever Sudanese were not available. The Treaty also proclaimed the formal ending of the British military occupation.

The military clauses of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty were nevertheless decisive. The Imperial Government received the right to station troops in the Canal Zone and to make use of army training areas. Fly-over rights were guaranteed to the Royal Air Force. Given the menace of Mussolini in the Mediterranean and Red Sea, the strengthening of the Fascist empire in Ethiopia and Libya, and Farouk's tendency to friendship with Italy, Britain's rights under the Treaty were of the utmost significance. When world war came again it was to Egypt that men and arms flowed from Britain, British Africa, India, and the wider Commonwealth for the important campaigns in North Africa between 1940 and 1943.