IX

Ambitions and Realities of Turkish Foreign Policy

TO MINGLE ALONG, AS ONE IN THE MIDST,
TO SEEM A PART, YET HOLD APART,
TO BUILD A SHIELD, WITH BEWILDERING ART,
TO OUTWIT, AND PERSIST.

—MELVILLE CANE, Strategy

Sabreden derviş muradına ermiş. (The persistent dervish attains his aim.)—Turkish proverb.

TURKEY IS ONE OF THE FEW COUNTRIES which, during the past half century, has pursued a continuous national policy. Although led by different governments and torn by a revolution, the primary political goal has not changed. This national purpose, the raising of Turkey to “the level of contemporary civilization,”1 has been a program to be implemented by domestic reforms and a prudent foreign policy.

Domestic transformation requires time and, most of all, peaceful conditions, so that all energies might be focused on internal development. Turkey’s peace and security, however, were not to be bought by territorial or economic concessions, “appeasement,” or humiliating surrender of national sovereignty (as had been the case during the 200 years of Ottoman decay), but by integrally maintaining the nation’s independence and freedom of action. Internationally, it was a status quo policy for the sake of a change in the internal status quo.

This overall policy was pursued throughout the first and second Turkish republics. During these 50 years, Turkey passed through different regimes: the authoritarian period of Atatürk, the one-party regime of the People’s Republican Party, two periods of multiparty government, and a

1 As Prime Minister Demirel expressed it: “Turkey’s objective is to attain the contemporary level of civilization in a world where peace prevails.” Cumhuriyet, March 17, 1969.
military dictatorship. But the course of the essential national policy line which was guided by expediency not ideology—was not altered because of domestic oscillations.

After the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish nation-state was established at the price of a ferocious war. Previously, the empire had been involved for centuries in a rarely interrupted series of armed conflicts. The nearly five decades of peace following the conclusion of the Lausanne Peace Treaty were a new experience for the war-weary people of Anatolia. Even if nothing else had been achieved by the foreign policy of the new Turkey, peace was preserved without the sacrifice of the national status quo, although this success was by no means easy. There were dangers other than the risk of war, but Turkey was able to avoid pitfalls which had trapped other countries in comparable geographical centers. In order to appreciate the present international position of the Turkish republic, it is pertinent to survey its past experience.

The abortive Peace Treaty of Sèvres was to accomplish the following purposes: first, to sever territories from the Ottoman Empire which were inhabited by non-Turks; and second, to amputate even Turkish areas of the empire and to make a Western dependency of the remaining trunk. Aware of this attack on her national existence, Turkey was anxious to prevent future encroachments on her sovereignty and was firmly resolved to attain a status equal to that of other independent states of Europe.

Between the two world wars, Turkey achieved two outstanding diplomatic successes, both of which were of prime importance for later developments. First, the Lausanne-established regime of the straits was eliminated. This regime had subjected these internationally prominent waterways and their surrounding territory to the control of an international commission and had prohibited military installations along this vitally important portion of Turkey. Second, Turkey succeeded in reincorporating the topographically significant area of Hatay, which enhanced Turkey’s geostrategical position in the eastern Mediterranean.

Turkey firmly and successfully followed her intended policy course in the critical wartime years: of entering the fighting only when attacked or in the face of mortal danger. She formed her alliance ties with the flexibility which least restricted her decision-making freedom and remained
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steadfast against Soviet blandishments and threats and against British and American pressures to join the hostilities without due preparatives and guarantees. She also remained immune to temptations to seize immediate advantages that were ephemeral and incompatible with her obligations.

If one compares the policy pursued by sultanic Turkey (which plunged her into the war in 1914) with Turkish diplomacy during World War II, the superiority of the latter over the former becomes strikingly evident. Whereas the earlier policy was hesitating, haphazard, and even irrational, the later diplomacy was characterized by singleness of purpose, cold calculation, and farsightedness.

Even after the pact with Germany had been concluded in 1914, a divided Turkish leadership offered simultaneous alliances to Great Britain, Russia, and France. The governing clique allowed themselves to be overly impressed by an emotional issue: the sequestration of their two warships by Britain and the arrival of the two German warships, the Goeben and the Breslau, which took refuge in Turkish waters and were then presented as a “gift” to the sultan. The Turks entered the war on the side of the Germans only after the latter had lost the Battle of the Marne—at a moment when the chance for a victory, or victory at all, was already gone.²

In contrast to Turkey’s imprudent and shortsighted attitude in 1914, the Turkey of 1939 carefully weighed her steps before departing from neutrality, as advised by Atatürk. She entered into an alliance with Britain and France only when she had no other choice. At that time Germany and Italy threatened to upset the peace of the Balkans and of the eastern Mediterranean area, while Russia, the greatest danger of all, was turning away from Turkey and returning to the tsarist policy of expansionism. Even so, the treaty with Britain and France contained loopholes, permitting Turkey to apply its provisions according to the demands of her national interest. Thus, she managed to wade through World War II without openly breaking her treaty commitments and without provoking the belligerents—while at the same time adjusting to the realities of the military and political situation.

Turkey foresaw the fate of the small nations of East and Central Europe in the event of a Soviet victory over the Germans. She thereby proved—and would prove again and again—that she was able to evaluate

² Erkin, Relations Turco-Soviétiques, pp. 51-52; this author calls this decision one of “national suicide.”
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Soviet intentions more accurately than the highly sophisticated statesmen of the West. She refused to incur the risk of being “liberated by the Russians” and becoming their satellite. With her exposed location between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, she sensed that any Soviet occupation of the straits was bound to become permanent and would presage the end of Turkish national independence.

Ankara met the Soviet threats of 1945–46 with an apparent sang-froid; Russian claims were bluntly rejected, though at that time she could not have been fully certain of American assistance. For the leaders of Turkey, this was a point at which negotiations were considered even more risky than a principled refusal. How right they were! Washington and London were ready to compromise on the issue of the straits, as is evident from the minutes of the Potsdam Conference. Had the Turks shown the slightest inclination to enter into bilateral talks with the Russians on the matter, full American and British support for the Turkish case would not have been available. Even so, only the clumsily menacing posture of Moscow and its exaggerated territorial claims saved Turkey from the necessity of accepting a revision of the Montreux convention that would have increased Russian influence over the vitally important waterways. In this instance, Turkey’s stubborn determination rather than the assistance of the West saved her from sharing the fate of nations like Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, or Hungary; she even escaped the dependency to which Finland was subjected by the USSR.

Because of her self-centered wartime policy, it was unavoidable that Turkey should be somewhat isolated from the powers that had waged war against Nazi Germany. Yet, the only permanent disadvantage that resulted from her postwar diplomatic handicap was the necessity of acquiescing without overt protest to the cession of Rhodes and the Dodecanese Islands to Greece. Her last-minute declaration of war on the Germans nonetheless secured her founding membership in the United Nations.

According to Turkey’s analysis of her postwar predicament, it was fully within her national interest to seek integral alignment with the Western powers; this was even more true of Ankara’s eagerness to gain the favor of the strongest Western power, the United States.

It has been noted earlier how everything—national preservation, security, economic advancement, and national purpose—predestined Turkey to want to be fully accepted in the political and military organi-
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izations of the West. Her Korean gambit was an act of astute diplomacy which contributed much to the opening of the gateways of the West to her.

Having been admitted to NATO and other European and Atlantic organizations, Ankara appeared to have relaxed her erstwhile watchfulness; she avoided examining foreign policy issues only in the light of Turkish national interest. She seemed to feel that what was good for NATO was good for Turkey—or rather what the United States wanted should not be questioned. Subsequent critics compared this attitude with the servility with which the Ottoman Empire reacted to the demands of European powers in some periods of its history.

Thus, the Turkish government failed to respond immediately to intimations that the Soviets would favor more relaxed relations—which might have been used to Ankara’s advantage in dealing with neutralist powers. Turkey’s Arab policy in the 1950’s was pursued under the guidance of Britain and the United States and without sufficient consideration for the state of mind prevailing in the Arab world. Turkey also plunged into the Cypriote quagmire without adequate diplomatic preparation and without the backing of interested powers.

None of these omissions or inadequacies, however, put Turkey at a permanent disadvantage. Belatedly, but still successfully, she was able to normalize her relations with the Soviet Union and establish a modicum of cordial contacts without departing from her Western course. The transformation of the Baghdad alliance into a lower-keyed CENTO initiated a slow improvement in her relations with most of the Arab countries. Since the mid-sixties, the policy toward the Middle East has given proof of a subtle diplomacy. After the defeat of the Arabs in 1967, Ankara could easily afford to be pro-Arab while dealing in friendship with Israel “under the counter.”

Concerning Cyprus, it should be asked whether Turkey’s policy realistically stood as high in her hierarchy of interests as she proclaimed and her actions appeared to indicate. Were Atatürk alive, of course, one could question whether he would have considered his country’s attitude on Cyprus compatible with the status quo policy he had advocated. On the other hand, it can be justly maintained that the exchange of Greek sovereignty for British rule over the island signified such a change in Turkey’s geostrategical status quo that it demanded her opposition.

Assuming that Cyprus is a question vitally affecting Turkey’s national
interest, it should be asked whether she has been skillful in protecting these interests since the late 1950's. Originally, Turkey’s political and legal positions were weak; had the British not supported Turkey diplomatically, her political moves would have been abortive. Her legal position was even more tenuous; Cyprus was a British possession, formally ceded to London under the Lausanne Peace Treaty, and Ankara had no right to oppose a transfer of sovereignty over the island to Greece. In light of this situation, the Zurich–London agreement must be evaluated as a clear success for Turkish diplomacy, for that agreement granted Turkey an international legal *jus standi*—a right to participate in decisions concerning the affairs of Cyprus. The Cyprus policy, however, inevitably estranged Ankara from Greece, whose future is geopolitically intertwined with Turkey’s. *Enosis* was prevented at a price. As long as the Cyprus problem is not solved to the satisfaction of Ankara and Athens, as well as the Greek and Turkish communities of the island, no final judgment can be passed on the correctness of Turkish foreign policy on this issue.

In the post-World War II period, and particularly after 1960, Turkey’s foreign policy was aimed at obtaining the maximum possible assistance for economic development and modernization. The simultaneous progress of industrialization, the rise in the standard of living, and the modernization of her army would not have been feasible without the aid she received. It also should be noted that these changes are being implemented in an open society under a democratic form of government.

Ankara’s improved relationship with Moscow contributed little to the easing of the global East–West tension. For the time being at least, it simply removed Turkey from the center of continued rivalries and confrontations. American–Soviet crises, when they occur, would not necessarily extend automatically into the area of Turkish–Soviet contacts. The seismic effects of this rapprochement have been felt in Turkey’s relations with the Communist states of the Balkans and East and Central Europe. Even the traditional enmities with Turkey’s immediate Balkan neighbor, Bulgaria, have given way to a restrained cordiality.

The leadership of Turkey can hardly feel totally assured by the expressions of Soviet sympathy. The extension of Moscow’s long arm across the Turkish straits into the Mediterranean Sea has created forebodings in Ankara, for this move raises related problems of profound importance: (1) whether Turkey is thereby in danger of being encircled; and (2) whether she can counter deterioration of her strategical status that would
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accompany such an encirclement. The solutions depend on the intensity and stability of Soviet influence in the Arab Middle East. Soviet boasts that the USSR is a Mediterranean power seem to forecast a new wave of Russian unhappiness about the straits and to place Turkey before a new era of jeopardy.

This possible new phase of Turkey’s struggle to defend her territorial patrimony would demonstrate, as the history of the Turkish nation-state has demonstrated, that her interests, especially those stemming from her geopolitical location, are constant and that only the means and methods used to protect them might change. The continuity of Turkey’s foreign policy and the strategic requirements needed to bolster it also tend to discount the theory that a country’s foreign relations are only a by-product of its domestic policies. Nevertheless, in a multiparty political system, criticism of a government’s foreign policy is part of the all-out struggle for political control, and this criticism necessarily affects decision-making in the foreign policy field as well. The tastes of the electorate may bring about a change of government, and a new government might introduce a change in methods and style without changing the general direction of policy.

Accordingly, Turkish foreign policy cannot remain immune to the influences of party politics, and the domestic political climate is bound to have an impact on the conduct of international affairs.

THE WEIGHT OF DOMESTIC POLITICS

For most of the Turkish leaders, the national policy objective appears so obvious that any deviation from this salutary course is out of the question. Except for the Turkish Labor Party, the essentials of this objective—membership in the Atlantic community—support and promote this policy. Save for the extreme leftists, the political elite views the pursuit of this national policy as the only “national” policy; to oppose it is tantamount to being “unnational.” Of course, for those who oppose Western


4 The impact of internal political changes on foreign policy is frowned upon by Turkish leaders. “I do not believe that the domestic policy of Turkey has weight enough to affect her foreign policy,” said Foreign Minister Çağlayangil; Yeni Istanbul, June 30, 1969.
ties and the Western ways of development, this policy is “unnational,” and theirs is the truly “national” policy. It should be remembered, however, that the foreign policy elite which supports Western ties and the democratic form of government does not support the manner in which Turkey is going along with the West without serious reservations and objections. While the “unnational” left, vociferous as it may be, has little or no impact on the conduct of foreign relations, the critical pro-Westerners are to be found in all political parties, including the Justice Party.

This criticism is directed against the loyalty, admiration, or trust displayed toward any foreign nation. Any such attachment is considered harmful and something that could result in the neglect of genuine Turkish interests. This attitude, a strain of special Turkish xenophobia, stems from historical experience and is a reaction to the characteristic Turkish inclination to cherish idols. No “foreign nation idols” should henceforth stand in the way of the pursuance of strictly Turkish national objectives.

In the view of these governmental critics—who are by no means anti-Western—the Demirel government was pro-American to an excessive degree. This could harm Turkish national interests or, at best, lead to a disregard for them. Naturally, such warnings coming from circles near or inside the ruling “establishment” could not be cast aside. They have acted as a brake on governmental decision-making when Ankara has dealt with the Americans and, second, as an incentive to exhibit attitudes “independent” of American influences.

A corollary to infatuation with one foreign country is the obsessive feeling of hatred toward another. Clearly, those who display such an attitude against Russia rank among the admirers of the United States. In

5 “Today there are two fronts in Turkey, the national front and the ‘unnational’ front. The latter is the front of those who want to continue with the present imperialistic exploitation order. . . . The national front is running against domestic and external exploiters.” İlhan Selçuk in Cumburiyet, April 29, 1968.

6 “For a long time the Turkish people were admirers of the French. This was followed by attachments to the Germans. Admiration for the British appeared and died a few times. During the Second World War we tried to keep pace with Hitler’s goose steps, with American and British boots called the ‘Roosevelts’ and the ‘Churchills’ on our feet. Finally, an unparalleled admiration for the Americans appeared here to such an extent that we changed ‘Russian salad’ into ‘American salad.’ Now we see more self-respect, the revival of national feelings in the youth’s demonstrations in Istanbul.” Yeni Gazete, February 13, 1969.
this and many other respects, Turkish public opinion tends to be polarized. Fortunately, the foreign policy leadership is generally aloof from such extremist attitudes.

Respect for the opinions of other nations has been exploited for domestic political purposes in the past. The Menderes government often sought to impress its followers and the electorate by hinting that the Americans were giving an ear to its suggestions or wishes. The Turkish public, however, is extremely sensitive to what it might consider foreign “interferences” in domestic affairs. As interpreted in Turkey, such interference has a much broader meaning than in most other countries. Views expressed by foreigners in Turkey—not only by foreign diplomats—concerning the internal conditions or political problems may be condemned as undue interferences in domestic affairs which infringe upon the precepts of decent conduct and constitute an abuse of the hospitality offered by Turkey.

Simultaneously, whispering campaigns or press opinions, especially at election times, may give hints as to which political party is the favorite of the United States. Whether such intimations may or may not be useful to the party thus named remains to be seen. Before the general elections of 1969, some press organs reported that the Justice Party was no longer favored by the Americans and that Washington had concluded a “secret deal” with the moderates of the People’s Republican Party, whose victory it would welcome. But there were also suggestions that this innuendo originated in the Justice Party, which in this way wished to split its main opponent.7

Fortunately, the masses of the electorate seem little influenced by the pro- or anti-Americanism of political parties and their leaders. They vote for individuals whom they trust and whom they consider the repositories of honesty, prosperity, patriotism, and religion. In the rural areas, local interests play important roles in determining voting behavior. As long as Turkey continues to be ruled democratically, the chance of any major deviation from accepted foreign policy lines is minimal.

7 Kemal Bisalman wrote that the People’s Republican Party was spreading the news that the USA had turned its back on Süleyman Demirel, the Justice Party prime minister. He asked how, at the same time, the former party could accuse Demirel of being pro-American and the USA of “Süleymanism!” Milliyet, April 9, 1969. İsmet İnönü, leader of the People’s Party, expressed his disapproval over such machinations by saying: “To use relations with any foreign country in domestic politics is against the security, interests, and dignity of an independent Turkey.” Ulus, April 11, 1969.
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The concept of national sovereignty introduced by Atatürk has never been repudiated by any political group; however, the question of how national sovereignty is exercised still haunts many. As Prime Minister Demirel lately expressed it:

Today not even the basic concept of national sovereignty, which is the common denominator of the 1924 and 1961 constitutions, has obtained a common understanding among political organizations and organs and jurists outside their ranks.¹⁸

Thus, this great question has yet to receive a final answer: is popular democracy the agency for establishing national sovereignty, or are there certain segments of the population which, because of their status and education, are better equipped to represent and interpret the “national will”? In this respect, the role and meaning of the 1960 revolution remains a question of intense discussion. Former President Celal Bayar, himself deposed by this revolution, sentenced to death, and then pardoned, has staged a limited political comeback. He has also provided a new explanation of the concept of “national sovereignty” and of the dramatic events of 1960.⁹

The aged Bayar (born in 1884) considered the Ottoman state to have been ruled by a triad: the palace (the sultan and his advisers), the Medrese (the School—that is, the community of Koranic scholars), and the military (who succeeded the corps of Janissaries). Atatürk’s constitution of 1924, however, declared that national sovereignty “belonged unconditionally to the nation.” He thus wished to eliminate “middlemen”—that is, intermediaries for the expression of the national will.¹⁰ Although the partnership of the army and of the Medrese (now the universities and other intellectuals) in the affairs of state was ended, the tradition of a “thousand years” enabled these two institutions to survive latently. In 1960 it was the Army-Medrese cooperation which established their de facto authority by the revolution. While maintaining the principle of national sovereignty, the constitution of 1961 provided that the nation shall exercise its sov-

¹⁸ From a statement at a press conference; see Milliyet, July 6, 1969.
¹⁰ The former president omitted mentioning that under Atatürk (and İnönü) the People’s Republican Party acted as the “middleman” between the people and the Grand National Assembly.
ereignty “through the authorized agencies” as laid down in the constitution itself. The new constitution gave a role to the army by setting up the National Security Council, and to the intellectuals through such constitutional organs as the Constitutional Court, the State Planning Organization, and the nonelected members of the Senate. The constitution itself was drafted by a group of university professors and invested the president of the republic with powers “which call to mind the powers of the Sultan.”

If Bayar’s interpretation of developments should prove correct, national sovereignty may be again exercised at some future time by certain decision-makers who may pretend a better knowledge of what the national will is or what is good for the nation. This would end the democratic order in Turkey but would not necessarily alter the present foreign policy course. It has been noted that among those intellectuals who favor the liquidation of the democratic form of government as it exists at the time of this writing, four groups should be distinguished: those who sincerely believe that democracy and reform are incompatible; those who believe that Turkey can only develop under a left-wing military administration; those who believe that they can obtain power only outside a democratic order; and, finally, the Turkish Communists, who hope that a military coup would be the first stage for a Marxist–Leninist dictatorship.

In the wake of student unrest in the universities of the United States and of Western Europe, student riots erupted during 1968 and 1969 in Istanbul and Ankara, many of them with anti-American overtones and Marxist–Leninist orientations. Concern was felt among Turkish and foreign observers that, as in 1960, these disorders might tempt the army to intervene once again in politics. While, on the one hand, these demonstrations differed from those which prompted the military coup in 1960, it should be remembered, on the other, that the military take-over did not result in a change in foreign policy.

It is difficult to assess realistically the chances for future military intervention. The top leadership of the armed forces has stated that “the Turkish Armed Forces personnel are in the service of national defense,

11 Cited in Hürriyet, June 29, 1969.
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outside all political trends.” Nevertheless, both leftist and rightist extremists occasionally appeal to officers for assistance against the opposite type of extremism. How far the army may exercise pressure on the government in matters of domestic politics will depend on such contingencies as whether the government is to rule constitutionally; whether the attitudes or actions of government leaders will not endanger what the army leadership may consider national security; and, finally, whether the peril of extremism will jeopardize internal stability. Even if another military intervention were to take place, a drastic change in the foreign policy of Turkey can hardly be expected. The only—although improbable—exception to this forecast would be a leftist military coup which placed in power an extreme political party seeking to establish a strictly neutralist or pro-Soviet policy.

A radical volte-face in Turkey’s relations with the outside world and in her pro-Western political orientation may be realistically discounted. However, the influence of the political parties and segments of the intelligentsia should not be underrated on particular issues and on the pattern of the government’s foreign policy style and methods. In certain eventualities, the so-called 3 percent (that is, those who voted for the Turkish Labor Party) could be augmented by an unknown number of intellectuals expressing solidarity with the position held by the extremist group on a certain issue without sharing their other opinions. The government may not only be influenced in its particular decision, but the extremist left and its opportunist fellow-travelers may also create an exaggerated impression about their size and power.

14 Instruction issued by General Tural, chief of the general staff; Adalet, May 7, 1968.
15 “If the leftists get out of hand, the gallant Turkish Army will intervene and make short work of the Communists as was done in Greece,” said Selahattin Arikan, president of the Nationalist Teachers’ Federation; Terçuman, October 9, 1967. On the other hand, a declaration issued by the officers of the Naval War School spoke up against rightist tendencies; Cumhuriyet, November 3, 1968.
16 In the spring of 1969 a draft law providing for political rehabilitation to former Democratic Party deputies was dropped because of alleged opposition by the Armed Forces.
17 Metin Toker wrote that the extreme leftists hoped for a victory of the Justice Party in the 1969 elections which, in their view, will make a military coup inevitable. Next will come the “real revolution” staged by Marxist–Leninists. Milliyet, August 27, 1969.
18 Such an impression was given in April 1969, when the Nixon Administration recalled Robert W. Komer, American ambassador to Turkey. Soon after his arrival to his post, Komer became a target of left-wing student demonstrations and also attacks by
External events have far greater effect on foreign policy decisions in Turkey than the oscillations of domestic politics. The ideological cleavage which separates the masses of Turks may have a pervasive influence on the manner of handling public affairs, including external relations. Although Atatürk’s and İnönü’s strict secularism, and the cautious return to Islam under Menderes, affected the conduct of foreign policy little, if at all, the ideological affiliation of political leaders may still determine priorities or influence the methods or style of foreign policy. Options such as étatisme, free enterprise, rapprochement with Moscow, relations with the United States, attitudes on Cyprus, or the evaluation of the Arab–Israeli conflict cannot escape the impact of ideologies.

**The Weight of Ideology**

In addition to political and economic upheavals, the Turkish people have experienced a series of ideological revolutions during the past 50 years. The concept of the Turkish nation-state was a revolt against the idea of Ottoman universalism; the concept of a secular state and society militated against the accepted Islamic way of life; political democracy was the antithesis of previously practiced authoritarian rule.

Turkism itself became accepted after the refusal to follow the tenets of another universalist idea—namely, Turanism. How far the Turks have been alienated from a consciousness of their own ethnicity by Islamic ideology is strikingly demonstrated by the fact that it was a non-Turk who first developed the idea of Turanism. After 1920, however, the vague and utopian pan-Turanism gave way to the more realistic Turkism that meant the formation of a national identity based on Turks living within the confines of the Turkish republic. Nevertheless, the idea of the

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10 After 1920, however, the vague and utopian pan-Turanism gave way to the more realistic Turkism that meant the formation of a national identity based on Turks living within the confines of the Turkish republic. Nevertheless, the idea of the...
nation-state encountered numerous and considerable obstacles which had

to be overcome: the allegiance to religion, the loyalty to tribe, and the

resistance of tradition had to be surmounted and absorbed into the all-
pervasive concept of Turkish nationalism. In fact, by the late 1920’s

nationalism had become the official ideology of the Turkish state.20

“Atatürkism”—the six principles of the Turkish republic—were all

anchored in the concept of nationalism.21 Even étatisme, as the method of
economic development, had its ideological source in the supreme will of

the nation-state.

By the late 1940’s, large segments of Turkey’s population were imbued

with Turkish national sentiment and the concept of a Turkish nation-

state no longer needed to be vindicated. Within the general fabric of a

nationalist Weltanschauung, other ideologies emerged which partly cor-

responded to the pluralistic division of Turkey’s social structure. Among

intellectuals the concept of a new secular and social republic gained ac-

ceptance at the same time conservative-traditionalists wished to promote

a return to Islam.22

The principal ideological positions are those held by the protagonists

of socialist-reformist ideas and the adherents of a democratic-constitu-
tional evolution, and by strict secularists and the supporters of various
types of Islamic revivalism. Followers of these differing schools of thought
are often, though not exclusively, partisans of different foreign policy
lines.

Moderate Socialist, not necessarily Marxist and reformist, ideas were
closely associated with the left-of-center program of the People’s Re-
publican Party. The “new order” which this party sought to establish,
though not quite clear in its content, may be considered a renewed
emphasis on étatisme and on the raising of living standards (particularly
for the rural population), coupled with radical modernization of the ad-
ministration and the elimination of bureaucracy. The future of this pro-
gram largely depended on the electoral success of İnönü’s party. Its
foreign policy implications were somewhat obscure: they were likely to
show less determination to go along with NATO and with the United
States but were to continue the trend toward Westernization. It was,
however, doubtful whether they would wish to enter the European Eco-

20 See Karpat, Political and Social Thought, pp. 297–99.
21 See chapter II, pp. 55–60.
22 Karpat, Political and Social Thought, pp. 304–5.
nomic Community with its clear commitment to the free market system.

Followers of a Marxist–Leninist ideology are anti-NATO and vehemently anti-American. As noted earlier, their chances of gaining governmental power are extremely slim. Communism remains and will continue to remain anathema to the overwhelming masses of Turks, if only because of its association with the Soviet–Russian peril.

The government controlled by the Justice Party stands for parliamentary democracy and for evolutionary development toward social justice. It has gambled its future on the achievement of economic self-sufficiency by the mid-1970’s. It believes that current social problems will be solved with the mounting success of economic development. As Prime Minister Demirel put it:

Sure, we have lots of problems, social problems—education, health. We have unemployment problems. We have poverty. But without economic expansion, how are you going to solve them?

Some say, solve these other problems first, then the expansion will come. But it’s not possible. It is possible to go from Ankara to Istanbul on your feet. Go ahead and do it. It will take you 15 days. But if you have money, it will take one hour by plane.\(^\text{23}\)

In this question of priorities, the parliamentary democrats have preferred to follow the example of the West rather than to accept the priorities of the East: prosperity will solve social problems, not socialist egalitarianism.

Unless policies of extremism are followed, there exists the possibility of reconciling these two ideologies. Undoubtedly, extreme statism and social revolution would estrange the West from Turkey and reduce its willingness to help. Such a state of affairs would unquestionably have a far-reaching foreign policy impact and slam the door on Turkey’s endeavors to become part of Europe. On the other hand, a continued effort to achieve development and modernization through a liberal economic policy and political democracy would secure Turkey, as they have in the past, the sympathies and assistance of Western Europe and of the United States.

Most adherents of moderate social reform and all supporters of extreme leftist ideas are secularists. On the other hand, followers of

liberal-democratic ideas may be either moderate secularists or prudent disciples of Islam. Except for those who are militant secularists or fanatical Muslims, the majority of the educated stratum of the society approaches religion as is customary in the West. Religion is not an affair of state but the concern of the private individual or family and of the community voluntarily formed by religious persons. The difficulty of such an approach, however, is that it deviates from the traditional role and purpose of historic Islam. For the strongly devoted traditional Muslim, a religious allegiance without temporal corollaries appears absurd or heretical.

Secularists often identify religious practices and those who participate in them with the fanatic Islamists. Because of the nature of Islam, it is difficult to draw a strict distinction between those who seek to depoliticize and spiritualize their loyalty toward the faith of their ancestors and those who wish to adhere strictly to the traditional public role of Islam. As Demirel declared:

I should state that the use of the constitutional right of religion and conscience, as provided by the Turkish Constitution and laws, can never be considered as "extreme rightist." There are some who regard as reactionary even the exercise of the right to religion and freedom of conscience. . . . The aim of the extreme right is to set up a state on theocratical principles. There may be supporters of this as there are for any movement. They are not more than a handful and they can do no harm to Turkey. Our nation is not faced with a choice today. It has made its choice. The Turkish State is a democratic, secular, social state. 24

The foreign policy impact of the secularist religious conflict is by no means less significant than the socialist-democratic-liberal controversy. The complexity of these ideological confrontations is increased by the doubts of some Islamic rigorists who believe that even democracy is incompatible with the principles of their religion. 25

The educated Turkish masses yearn for an ideology to satisfy their intellectual and emotional needs. Turkish nationalism alone is no substitute for religious belief; the search for a substitute has led many to find

24 Tercüman, May 12, 1968.
25 Nadir Nadi referred to Toynbee's views when raising the issue. He expressed hope that Toynbee will be wrong as far as Turkey is concerned; Cumhuriyet, March 28, 1969.
idols in “social justice,” socialism, the democratic ideal, or the basic or austere Islam. This is why an observer may be struck by what could be called “cultural confusion” in Turkey.26

So far Turks have not found a way “to reconcile a revival of Islamic faith with the social, political, and cultural reforms accomplished in the last century.”27 At the moment, it appears that culturally they are on the road to Europe but have not yet reached their destination. Yet, they are no longer Orientals. If one would try to define them for what they are, the only correct answer would be that they are something “special,” in a transitional stage, like the Franks, Goths, and other Germanic peoples must have been before they were finally assimilated into the Graeco-Roman-Christian world, or like the Magyars, an Oriental people, in their century of transition from a nomadic steppe-folk to European-Hungarians.

Any such analogy misses one important point: the Turkish transition faces a special difficulty. Unlike the heathen Germans or Hungarians, who were barbarians from the Graeco-Roman point of view, the Turks were for nearly a millennium part of a highly developed and refined Islamic civilization. In view of this, the question arises whether an abandonment of Islam would be required for them to become really “Europeanized.” This involves a step which hardly anybody in Turkey would dare advise. To give up Islam for what? In the Middle Ages European meant Christian; is this qualification still true today? Since the Renaissance, European nations have become “secularized” and, while Christianity is still a part, it is questionable whether it is an essential part, of their civilizational and cultural substance.

Suat Sinanoğlu, professor at the University of Ankara, has attempted to find a solution to the ideological yearning of his countrymen.28 He noted a grave intellectual crisis in Turkey, one which—in his view—the West overcame 400 to 600 years ago. Following Atatürk’s teachings, he considers Western civilization superior to all other civilizations and the one which Turks should embrace.

According to Sinanoğlu, European civilization is a secular civilization which has its basis in Graeco-Roman humanism. The mediating role of

Christianity was once important but has ceased to be so since the end of the Middle Ages. It is this humanism which should be absorbed by all mankind so as to end the "famous antinomy between East and West."\(^{29}\)

Sinanoğlu did not suggest a servile imitation of Western ideology by the Turks; he suggested, however, the adoption of the value-and-belief system of European Graeco–Roman civilization (such as political-legal equality, freedom of expression) creating thus what he calls "Turkish humanism."

Sinanoğlu's views demonstrate the importance that Turkish thinkers attribute to the intellectual problem of their nation. He did not suggest an abandonment of Islam; rather, he seemed to suggest that Islam might be made compatible with the classical humanism described as a secular belief-system and not a substitute for faith.

Indeed, Turkey's permanent and final alignment with the West—culturally and in the sphere of internal and external politics—would appear to depend on the reconciliation of the Islamic philosophy of life with the European system of values.\(^{30}\) The Turks, because of their advance toward Westernization and their disestablishment of Islam, are more likely than other Islamic nations to achieve a synthesis of modernism with the Muslim faith. It should not be forgotten that like Islam the Christianity of the Middle Ages was not only a religion but a way of life. Of course, it was easier to separate the secular and spiritual in Europe than it would be in the Islamic Orient because of the Graeco–Roman past of Europe and its impact on the Christian Church itself. A Turkish "reformation" of Islam is unlikely, but, as Professor Lewis suggested, a realistic Turkish genius might one day produce a Muslim Turkish "equivalent to the Anglican Church."\(^{31}\)

The Turkish determination to be part of Europe and of European civilization—and its corollary, the Western-oriented foreign policy of Turkey—cannot be a one-sided exercise. To be successful, it must find understanding and acceptance primarily by the Western world but also

\(^{29}\) Ibid., p. 126.


\(^{31}\) Lewis, "Turkey: Westernization," p. 327. In 1928 Atatürk appointed a committee under the chairmanship of Professor Fuat Köprülü (foreign minister from 1950 to 1956) for reforming religion. The committee made a number of recommendations concerning a modernized religious service and the use of the Turkish instead of the Arabic language. See Eren, Turkey Today, p. 91.
by other members of the family of nations. In other words, it must be harmonized with the international environment in which this great transformation is being performed.

**The Weight of International Factors**

Although Turkey wants to be accepted as a European nation, she often feels rejected by the community to which she professes to belong. It can hardly be doubted that there still is an invisible partition or wall between Turkey and the Western-Christian world; however, the wall appears to be maintained or reinforced by the attitudes on both sides. There is an Arab-Islamic saying that “all those who deny Islam are one nation,” which has two meanings: it may signify that for true Muslims all non-Muslims are equally condemnable; it may also signify that all non-Muslims always will oppose the true believers. Accordingly, when the Western nations are reluctant to recognize unequivocally the European-ness of Turks, this adds to the self-doubts of a naturally introverted and reserved nation.

The influence of these mutual inhibitions on the relations between nations of the West and the Turks is well substantiated, although their impact is often exaggerated. No doubt, the image of Turkey in the West, and particularly in the United States, as well as the image of the West in Turkey, often suffer major distortions. If each side could readjust its evaluation of the other, the mental boundary which divides them may be overcome. Furthermore, in view of the enormous intellectual and physical impediments which face the Turks in their effort to achieve their dearly cherished objective, it is suggested that the West might meet them more than halfway.

Because American-Turkish relations symbolize in large measure the contact which Turkey maintains with the West, this relationship offers the best standard for judging the difficulties encountered by both sides.

It can hardly be charged that American foreign policy is in any way biased against Turkey. On the contrary, the value of Turkish friendship is properly assessed in the Department of State and by all American experts. This may not be equally true as far as the American public at large is concerned. Although outspoken hostility or latent prejudice may still linger in the memories of those who have not forgotten Ottoman misrule or the fate of the Greeks and Armenians, the greatest stumbling
block is American indifference toward or sheer ignorance of the essential aspects of Turkish life.\textsuperscript{32}

Communication with Turkey in matters of military or economic assistance or in political business is not easy. Indeed, it would be well-nigh impossible if the Western negotiators did not realize that Turkey has never been a colony or administered from a European capital and that she is accustomed to administer her affairs according to her own concepts. She will consider “advice” but would never accept it as an implied instruction. Turkey rightly regards herself as an equal member of the Western alliance; yet, at the same time, she is a developing nation in need of foreign assistance on, as she is told, “concessionary terms.” This ambivalence is compounded by the Western attitude which expects Turkey to be a fully cooperating partner in NATO as well as in other Atlantic or European organizations, but simultaneously wishes to subject her to all the inquisitorial scrutiny and mortifying censures due to an underdeveloped country dependent on charitable donations from abroad. At one moment she is the bulwark of NATO’s southeast corner, the next she is pauper sustained by assistance.\textsuperscript{33}

Even those Americans and West Europeans who generally have a better comprehension of matters Turkish have difficulty realizing how complex and intricate the political, social, and psychological fabric of modern Turkey really is. She is in a state of transformation—politically, economically, and socially—and, therefore, she has many faces and contradictory habits and reactions. The paradox of Turkey has to be taken into account by all those in the West who wish her a safe berth within the confines of the European family of nations.

\textsuperscript{32} “The danger is that if the complacent detachment of the West—this isolation from profound Turkish things while professing friendship for the Turks all the while—might in some near or distant time contribute to wholly estranging Turk from the humanism of the West; that the West’s failure to comprehend as well as just help might frustrate the still unspoiled idealism of millions of modern, especially young, Turks.” Charles E. Adelsen in the \textit{Christian Science Monitor}, January 14, 1969.

\textsuperscript{33} See John White, \textit{Pledged to Development} (London, 1967), pp. 91–97. The author thus describes one aspect of the difficulties dealing with Turkey: “The difference in Turkey’s case—and this where the backlog of history really begins to wreak havoc—is that the aid-giving countries, through long association, have acquired sensitivities and blind spots which coincide with those of the Turks. The result is that the representatives of Turkey’s creditors insist on discussing Turkey’s performance, the representatives of Turkey insist on discussing Turkey’s aid requirements, and both sides assume, wrongly but with fierce conviction, that they are talking about two quite different things” (p. 95).
Just as Turkey cannot seek fulfillment of her dreams without the helpful cooperation of the West, so the West would lose its entire political and military posture in the Middle East without the collaboration of Turkey.\textsuperscript{34} The importance and usefulness of the Turkish alliance cannot be overemphasized; even her guardianship of the straits may have consequences more far-reaching than the military control of these waterways.\textsuperscript{35}

The Truman Doctrine, which officially extended United States involvement into Greece and Turkey and thus into the Middle East, must remain a basic premise of American foreign policy, unless Washington is willing to sacrifice the areas east of Italy. Turkey’s geopolitical location makes her a cornerstone of the Atlantic alliance, the overlapping link in the NATO–CENTO chain, and the bastion of the eastern Mediterranean. Her cooperation may be considered of equal, if not greater, importance than that of the nations of the central region of Europe. In defending Turkey, the United States would not be acting as “global policeman” but as a nation whose own interests are global and would be seriously endangered if Turkey faltered.\textsuperscript{36}

To seek to protect Turkey with the consent of Turkey herself cannot be construed as interference in Turkey’s internal affairs.\textsuperscript{37} To assure the best possible defense has required joint arrangements and joint installations. Thus a “special relationship” has evolved. Because the United States is the more powerful partner and because it provides military hardware and logistic knowledge, this relationship must resemble a “rabbit pie” composed of an American horse and a Turkish rabbit.\textsuperscript{38} Despite the disproportionate power-status, however, there is no need for a relationship of subordination and superordination.\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{34} “It is Turkey more than any other nation, which is needed for Middle East defense, both military and political. And it is Turkey which stands firmest against all threats and blandishments from the North. Whatever the efforts that may be necessary elsewhere in the Middle East, they should not divert us from recognition of this political fact, or from the measures required to assure its performance.” Campbell, \textit{Defense of the Middle East}, p. 349.

\textsuperscript{35} For instance, Soviet missiles destined for Cuba in 1962 were first sighted in the straits; \textit{The Times} (London), April 27, 1966.


\textsuperscript{37} “The claims that we interfere in Turkey’s internal affairs are untrue. The United States attaches great importance to Turkey’s friendship and relations with the USA on sound ground.” From an interview with Ambassador Parker Hart before his departure from Turkey; \textit{Milliyet}, October 3, 1968.

\textsuperscript{38} The simile was used by C. L. Sulzberger; \textit{New York Times}, January 29, 1969.

\textsuperscript{39} “We want partners and not clients. I think that these are the directions in which
Servility and obsequiousness, on either side, do not promote a real partnership. Turkish leaders should not be expected to be “more pro-American than Americans,” and Americans should not try to appease demonstrating Turkish students or leftist press critics by unnecessary permissiveness. Attempts at appeasing anti-Americans are tantamount to exposing and betraying Turkish promoters of American friendship.

Doubtless, many Turks resent the presence of American forces and American bases in Turkey, but only a relative few really believe that Turkey’s security could dispense with them. Naturally, it would be more pleasing to Turkey’s self-esteem if she could be safe without NATO bases, or even without being a member of that alliance. But she has had to weigh carefully the pros and cons of disengagement and, undisputedly, has come to the conclusion that her essential interests demand not only continued membership in the Atlantic alliance but also the presence of American forces. Naturally, she is apprehensive, as European members of the alliance are, that Washington will use its nuclear arsenal only if American territory or American military dispositions are attacked. Therefore—so Turks believe—the American military presence serves as an incentive for American participation in case of an armed conflict.40 There is also a widespread belief in Turkey that Washington regards American bases as indispensable in six countries throughout the world, including Turkey.41

The question whether Turkey needs America more than whether the United States needs Turkey certainly troubles Turkish policymakers. Only a partial return to isolationism would be felt disastrous by Turkey. President Nixon’s new Asian policy is one under which the United States would not render military assistance unless the attacked country made a good initial stand alone. Such an interpretation of America’s pledge of military assistance would not be welcome in Ankara. Not that Turkey could not resist an aggression; she would do so better than many another ally of the United States. That Washington might not immediately and automatically proffer help would upset all of Turkey’s strategical and political expectations.

41 The other countries are Spain, West Germany, the Philippines, South Korea, and Japan; Yeni Gazete, April 15, 1969.
There are few, if any, Turks who advocate U.S. withdrawal from Europe and the establishment of an integrated European defense force in lieu of the present NATO arrangements, which created a de facto United States leadership. Nor is Turkey enthusiastic about a European security conference, as proposed by Moscow. Turkey’s nightmare, and that of other European powers, is a deal between Moscow and Washington that would supersede NATO. Spheres of influence, if formally drawn up and agreed upon by the superpowers, would not be to Turkey’s liking, even were she “assigned” to the American sphere, as one expects she would be. If the present Turkish leadership had a choice, it would prefer continued membership in NATO with flexible commitments toward the United States and American commitments to defend Turkey. The liberty of action she already enjoys in her contacts with the Soviet Union or the Arab states has conferred upon her practically all the advantages of an uncommitted nation, while she also enjoys the advantages of being protected by the nuclear umbrella of a superpower.

The key to Turkey’s approach toward a neutralist status is held by Moscow. The dismantling of American bases could be proposed by Turkey only if “all the clouds in these relations” have been dispelled. Despite the recent improvements in the Turkish–Soviet relationship, the confidence which existed during the interwar period has not been restored. A nonaggression pact, reserving NATO commitments, might be a practical step toward better understanding but would provide no realistic guarantee in view of Moscow’s poor record on such pacts. On the other hand, one has the feeling in Ankara that unfounded fears or suspicions might do more harm than good.

Turkey’s power status is critical: she is too important to play no role in international politics, but she is not strong enough to keep other powers in balance. She must therefore seek protection from that group of powers which does not constitute a threat to her security and independence.

Moscow clearly wants Ankara to move toward the status of an uncommitted nation. An open demand to Turkey to give up membership in

42 Mehmet Barlas, however, believes that the defense of Europe, without NATO, is possible; Cumhuriyet, February 25, 1969.
44 Milliyet (July 10, 1968) quoted Pravda after Çağlayangil’s meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko that, despite this contact, “the clouds have still not been dispelled.”
NATO, as submitted by Khrushchev in return for improved relations, has not been repeated recently. Instead, Soviet leadership wishes to use persuasion and indirect coercion. The anti-American campaign of indigenous Turkish origin, but discreetly encouraged by Moscow, is a windfall that could be exploited at a moment’s notice. Of course, anticommunism is so strong in Turkey that the relatively tiny segment of those who are genuinely anti-American can do very little. Events such as the invasion of Czechoslovakia act as counter-stimulants to any hostility against the United States. Nothing could have better strengthened Turkey’s determination to stick with NATO than the proclamation of the Brezhnev Doctrine; for the Turks this meant that a “Socialist state” must needs be a Russian satellite.

Although the effects of the Czechoslovak crisis might fade away (although in Turkey the memories of the Hungarian tragedy of 1956 are more keenly felt than anywhere else in the free world), the Soviet naval penetration into the eastern Mediterranean will remain a permanent reminder of a potential threat to Turkey’s security. The official Moscow announcement that the Soviet Union is a “Mediterranean power” was perceived by some leaders in Ankara as a claim that Turkey’s territory is a Soviet “security zone.” The various wartime and postwar calls by the Soviets for such a zone along their western and southern borders are well remembered by the Turks. If the eastern Mediterranean, as declared by Moscow, is an area over which the Soviet state wishes to exercise authority, the regions between that sea and Soviet territory proper—that is, all of Turkey—will also be seen by the Russians as a zone of influence. The danger that such claims for the control of the Turkish straits might be pressed, as they have been in the past, seems to Turkish leaders and other observers less remote than the present silence would indicate.

After the experiences with Moscow during and after World War II, bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union over basic security questions, and the status of the straits in particular, are considered distasteful and dangerous by the realistic and clear-sighted leadership in Ankara. Thus, U.S. and Western European participation in Turkey’s future negotiations with Russia over such questions is just as essential for her as the contractual guarantee by these powers to resist outright aggression.

Turkey realizes that she cannot enjoy the benefits of the Western alliance and, at the same time, profit from the unfettered freedom that
uncommitted nations enjoy in their relations with Moscow and with other neutralist countries. The protection of the United States and other NATO members increases Turkey’s defensive status. Being essentially a status quo power, the defense of her existing real estate and power status must be her primary concern. Such a position is not suitable for self-assertive actions. Thus, Turkey’s campaign for control over all or part of Cyprus was more impeded than assisted by her system of alliances. Arab and other uncommitted governments are inhibited in their relations with Ankara as long as Turkey is “tainted” by her exclusive ties with “imperialist” or “ex-colonial” powers.

Because of her central position in the confrontation between East and West, Turkey fears that she may be directly involved in any acute conflict between the two superpowers, even if the immediate topic of the controversy is outside her range of interest. The precedent of the Cuban missile crisis, when American missile sites on her territory became an object of bargaining and when she felt exposed to Soviet nuclear attack, is well remembered. Little, however, could be done in such a matter. Commitment to common defense is accompanied by the danger of being drawn into relatively distant conflicts. Because of Turkey’s forward position, she may actually be hit first. All she can do is avoid provoking the potential aggressor while contributing to peaceful developments—without, however, weakening her defense posture.

Politically, Turkey’s vital interests and long-term foreign policy objectives demand that she belong to the West. To belong to the East would be tantamount to losing her independence; moreover, she would be cut off from the West, where ideologically she feels she belongs. Economically, however, Turkey is part of the Third World of developing nations. As a modern and industrialized nation she is still in statu nascendi, much more vulnerable physically and psychically than other nations that have reached that level of development. At her present stage, she wants external peace and tranquility in order to accomplish the transition she desires. The primary criterion, then, for Turkish foreign-policy decision-makers is the prime goal of Westernization. The leaders of Turkey cannot approach this coveted goal without taking account of the realities of their country’s domestic situation and international posture.

REALITIES VERSUS AMBITIONS

After the end of the war of independence, Atatürk was able to carry out his reforms in an atmosphere of relative international calm and security. The Turkey of our day, however, seems to be condemned to continue and, it is hoped, complete her transformation process in an era of domestic turbulence and international controversy. The course which the Turkish ship of state has to follow leads through a narrow, dangerous channel. The task which she is determined to fulfill requires both unselfish idealism and an acute sense of the realities of life.

Among her domestic difficulties, the commotion created by the small but noisy exponents of red and black fanaticism are the most conspicuous. The first group would wish to regiment the country into a new order of "social equality" and then strait-jacket it into economic development; the second wishes to turn back the course of history by re-establishing the political power of Islam and swaying Turkey away from Europe. While these are the two extremist trends, compromisers seeking unprincipled solutions might also easily steer the vessel aground.

The unhealthy stratification of Turkish society, the gap between the urban and rural populations, the paternalistic attitudes of the bureaucratic elite toward the governed, and the contrasts between the Turkish east and west—to mention only some of the outstanding issues—are all potential time bombs which the government will have to defuse before they explode. Any such explosion would irreparably damage Turkish national advancement and jeopardize Turkey’s international stature.

Turkey’s east-west problem is also complicated by the Kurdish issue, a domestic problem laden with definite international overtones. An improvement in the economic and social status of some 18 eastern provinces which have lagged behind the rest of the country and the integration of their inhabitants, including the Kurds, into national life, should be given first priority.

The country had been roused by the promise that it should look forward to greatness and prosperity. Impatience at the delay in achieving this goal is at the root of such discontent, including that displayed by the students. The urgency of specific demands makes the choice of priorities exceedingly difficult. It is only natural that the rulers seek first to appease the largest part of the electorate—namely, the peasantry, which,
according to Demirel, should be "saved from medieval conditions."\textsuperscript{48}

It would be a great mistake if Turkey succeeded in Westernizing only the urban superstructure and left the rural masses in their backward way of life. Peter the Great, the Russian reformist, and his successors created such a cleavage by depriving the Russian peasantry of civilizational advance, a task which only Communist rule strove to surmount.\textsuperscript{47} Until the Turkish case, Muslim reformists had all stopped short of extending their reforms into the villages or to the people at large. The Ottomans had concentrated mostly on modernizing their armed forces; in Egypt, Mehmed Ali and his successors restricted their reforms to the urban elite; other present-day reformists have limited themselves to economic development rather than the all-out Westernization which is the ambition of Turkey.

The Turkish government faces some of the gravest roadblocks in the field of development. The developmental process is so much the focus of interest that it distracts attention even from some crucial questions of world politics. The success of governmental policy, by its own declaration and in the vision of the public, is closely linked to economic development. Expectations and pressures of urgency are the greatest in this respect. The Turkish people, patiently enduring suffering and deprivation, are utterly impatient in their expectation of success and triumph. One of the principal arguments of those who advocate strict \textit{étatisme} and methods of regimentation for the sake of development \textit{à la} \textit{Soviet} refer to the short time Turkey has for the fulfillment of this task. But the Justice Party government wishes to abide by "the determination . . . to attain the level of contemporary civilization within a democratic system marked by freedom and justice."\textsuperscript{48}

It is realized by foreign and Turkish experts that the period of the second Five Year Plan, ending in 1972, constitutes "the most critical years for the Turkish nation in its efforts to attain economic self-sufficiency."\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{46} He also said on this occasion: "It is impossible to lay the foundations of a great and powerful Turkey when you forget or neglect the Turkish peasant. Villages which house twenty-four million, stretch from one end of the country to the other. Conditions are not modern, yet the Turkish peasant has not been defeated by hardships and difficulties. It is a must to take amenities of civilization to the Turkish peasant." \textit{Son Havaddis}, March 18, 1968.


\textsuperscript{48} From the Foreword to the \textit{Second Five-Year Development Plan} (Ankara, 1969), p. v.

\textsuperscript{49} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 5.
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Turkish and foreign sources already have issued warnings that the hoped-for self-sufficiency may be reached only in, or even after, 1975. Of course, even if independence from foreign aid could be attained, it is still no panacea for social and economic hardships. The success of the development plan appears to depend on so many contributive factors, the unforeseeable and the imponderable, that one can only hope “kismet” favors this grandiose venture.

Among the impediments which could thwart the fulfillment of the plan, one should list the uncertainties of the measure of foreign aid (a foreign policy problem *par excellence*), the question of economic growth and its proportion to the increase of population, the availability and magnitude of domestic sources of foreign exchange, the uncompetitive nature of Turkish industry, and the backlog of agricultural production (dependent also on weather conditions).

The “success story” of Turkey’s economic development could have a broad impact on international developmental policies in general. It could prove, in this instance, that the non-Communist model for development is superior to that offered by communism. It seems, therefore, very much in the interest of the United States to further as best it can the auspicious completion of Turkey’s national development project. It is desirable that American economic assistance be used to promote foreign policy goals and be allotted in amounts proportionate to the purpose for which it is assigned, taking into account the relative importance of the countries thus benefited.

The high rate of population growth has consumed a considerable amount of the resources needed for investment; also, humanitarian concern for the welfare of children induced the government to encourage voluntary family planning. However, such a policy is counterproductive to any expectations that there will be 50 million Turks in the 1980’s, as predicted by Prime Minister Demirel, nor does such a program assuage the fears of the general staff that the age groups eligible for military service

50 See the interview with Walt W. Rostow, who considered Turkey among the “success stories” of non-Communist development methods; *New York Times*, January 5, 1969.
51 “While the United States fiddles with the idea of cutting overseas commitments, the Soviet Union gives every sign of doing precisely the reverse.” C. L. Sulzberger in *New York Times*, July 4, 1969.
52 *Milliyet*, September 30, 1968. The *Second Five-Year Plan* estimated Turkey’s population at a high fertility rate increase to be 47,402 in 1980 (p. 60).
will be depleted.\textsuperscript{53} It is highly questionable whether in these times the power of a nation is calculated in manpower rather than in terms of economic production.\textsuperscript{54}

The most ambitious Turkish venture is no doubt her intent to be, after a transitional phrase, admitted to full membership in the European Economic Community. At present it seems highly questionable whether Turkey would be able to survive economically a customs and economic union with the highly industrialized countries of Western Europe at any time during the next two or three decades. The uncompetitiveness of Turkish industrial articles will be the greatest hurdle to be overcome; in any case, economic union will entail sacrifices and risks for the Turkish economy. Turkey’s decision to join the Common Market was political, and the political advantages of belonging to this “inner circle” of the European family were considered worth the risk.

According to a recent classification,\textsuperscript{55} Turkey is no longer regarded as a “traditional” but as a “transitional” society. This writer would add that she is the most advanced among transitional societies, one which not only has contact with Western civilization but is well on the road to embracing the civilizational values and methods of the West.

Notwithstanding Turkey’s desire to be European, her people have not completely broken their ties with the traditional Islamic culture and are not expected to disavow their ancestral faith. Turkey’s divesting herself of the nonreligious aspects of Mohammed’s all-embracing ideological tenets is unique in history. So far no Islamic people has voluntarily given up devotion to the teachings of the Prophet. In Spain, the Muslims who remained after the reconquest were forcibly Christianized by the Spanish; many Muslims in Russia were converted to Christian Orthodoxy under duress. Turkey, however, embarked upon a road which distinguishes between the faith which is prescribed by the Koran and its political, social, and legal principles. While discarding the latter, Turks are free to believe in the former and to practice religion accordingly.

\textsuperscript{53} General Cemal Tural, chief of the general staff, declared himself against family planning. He said that neighboring countries were constantly increasing their population and Turkey should put an end to birth control. \textit{Milliyet}, March 1, 1968.

\textsuperscript{54} The same General Tural said on another occasion: “We are not a nation that can be expressed in calculations and statistics.” Andrew Mango, \textit{Turkey} (London, 1968), p. 169.

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History has not yet had the last word about this unmatched experiment. It is still premature to forecast either the success or failure of a venture which could revolutionize the entire Daru’l Islam. Realities in the lives of millions are juxtaposed with the aspirations of those who want to weave Western philosophy and Western ways into the social fabric of all Turks while leaving their faith in Allah unimpaired. The intangibles of this transformation, if successful, are bound to influence all tangible aspects of Turkey’s social and political development.

Among the realities of Turkey’s political status, her geopolitical location requires the closest consideration. It has been noted earlier that this geostrategical phenomenon is obviously double-edged: it raises Turkey’s value as a confederate and attracts potential aggressors. Turkey, as an independent state, cannot subsist without her straits; but with the straits under her control she lives a perilous life.\(^{56}\)

Germany sought an alliance with Turkey in World War I because she held the keys to the Black Sea and could prevent the supplying of Russia; for the same reason a breakthrough across the Dardanelles was attempted by the Entente. In World War II, Turkey managed, though with considerable risk, to avoid active belligerency because her neutrality happened to be in the interests of the Western powers, Russia, and Germany during the critical period of the war.

In a possible future military confrontation between the superpowers, Turkey could hardly hope to remain aloof, even should she assume the posture of an uncommitted country. Regardless of whether the conflagration will be restricted to conventional weapons, or Turkey has nuclear missiles on her territory, geography has placed her in the area between the Soviet Union and the Mediterranean, and neither belligerent can avoid passing over her territory by air, by sea, or by land. Nor could Moscow tolerate that her Mediterranean navy or the Arab states, which these forces undertake to protect, be physically cut off by the closure of the straits. Turkey can only hope that she will be spared nuclear devastation.

\(^{56}\) According to Yeni Istanbul (April 17, 1969), Turkey is indispensable to the United States because of her geopolitical location; inasmuch as Turkey is useful to the United States, she becomes, to the same degree, a source of danger to the Soviet Union. Consequently, a cold or hot war between the United States and the Soviet Union without Turkey’s involvement is unimaginable. Turkey would become one of Moscow’s first targets in a conventional as well as in a nuclear war. The Soviets would attack Turkey without any warning for reasons of self-defense and to prevent Turkish territory from being used to destroy their own land.
and that her territory will be protected from enemy invasion. These two expectations may be better realized if Turkey remains attached to the Atlantic alliance. A wish to return to a status of neutrality in the present troubled conditions of the world, even if this status were regarded as ideally best suited to Turkey, would be highly unrealistic. Although he advocated Turkey’s neutralism during the first fifteen years of the republic, even Atatürk sought alliances for his country when another world war seemed to approach.\footnote{\textit{“Turkey has been in alliances to protect her independence in every period of her history. This is a requirement of her geopolitical situation. This reality was also valid during Atatürk’s time. Atatürk himself made the Balkan Pact and the Saadabad Pact which he described as a joint work for the ideal of peace. He himself prepared the Turkish–British–French tripartite alliance shortly before World War II.” Foreign Minister Çağlayangil in answering questions by journalists; \textit{Ankara Bayram}, March 1, 1969. (Italics added.)}}

To a greater extent than that of most medium powers, Turkey’s independence depends on the global balance of power that has been struck between the United States and the Soviet Union. Turkey can do very little to ensure that this global power balance is maintained. Like the rest of humanity, Turkey has to rely on the wisdom, foresight, and moderation of the principal nuclear powers so that the relative stability between them will not be overturned by some irrational behavior or unjustified grievance. There is no absolute security for any state in our time; a country with Turkey’s exposed geographical location is particularly vulnerable.

Turkey’s safety may also be threatened by other factors. She is surrounded by a number of countries that confront her or confront one another. A local balance of power exists between Turkey and Greece; a local balance system is operative in the Balkans, in which Turkey participates; a particular state of equilibrium governs the military confrontation between Israel and her Arab neighbors; another balance has to be maintained among the Arab states themselves, as well as between Turkey and her Arab neighbors. In respect to these regional balancing situations, Turkey, as a leading power in the Near and Middle East, has increased responsibilities and an important task to fulfill. In dealing with these historical and sensitive relationships, much depends on her wisdom and vision, on her moderation and firmness. She must be conscious of the realities she has to face and must restrain her aspirations in the face of these realities. She will never obtain all she wants, but with cautious and
skillful diplomacy, she might avoid losing what she already possesses and yet make gradual gains.

No one wants Turkey to sacrifice herself for NATO or to defend Europe or the United States. She can only be expected to defend her interests as long as they are in harmony with the interests of the alliance. Of course, one has to distinguish between immediate and more distant interests. The latter may also be called questions of principle. If Turkey refused to act if Berlin or Norway were threatened or attacked, she could not count on the help of her allies should she suffer invasion. To decide what to do at the critical moment and not to be overly impressed by ephemeral advantages is the test of genuine statesmanship.

In the Turkish–American relationship, an artificially heated atmosphere has been created by a vocal minority which fails to assess the realities of this relationship. Turkey is right in insisting on equal partnership. There is no reason to believe that Washington has or ever had any intention of treating her differently. If inequalities have arisen, they are partly the result of international power realities for which neither Turkey nor America can be made responsible, partly the outcome of permissiveness on behalf of Turkish negotiators, or a lack of restraint or understanding on the American side. All of these problems can be easily remedied. For the rest, the anti-American campaign is either directed by ulterior political motives, prompted by an ultra-nationalist need to find a target to hate, or is the result of an incompatibility of national temperaments. Turks should know, and their responsible leaders do know, that America cannot be taken for granted either.

Despite the artificially labored anti-Americanism of a few, it is well understood that today’s Turkey stands closer than ever before to the United States and Western Europe. Demonstrating youth are allowed to indulge in such exploits only because Western liberalism, the political ideal of the West, and the idea of freedom of expression have finally been adopted in Turkey. Nowhere in the Middle East or Eastern Europe, including the empire of the Soviets, would such an exhibition of discontent be tolerated. No progressive Turk can feel genuine affinity with systems repressive to human freedom. Anti-Americanism is a fashion—and Turks like to appear fashionable; such fashions die out when there is no fuel to keep the fires burning.

It would be a fatal mistake if the Turkish leadership allowed themselves to be guided by emotional motives instead of cool reason. Unlike
the Ottoman Empire at the time of its final collapse, the Turkish republic has committed no major mistake in its foreign policy. On the contrary, it set out a course for the Turkish nation that promises to turn it, in the words of Sıleyman Demirel, into “a powerful member of the Western community.”

Contemporary Turkey is like a huge human laboratory. While the processes of industrialization, modernization, advances in education, and acculturation to the Western ideal carry their own momentum, experiments are being conducted to find the methods most conducive to these ends. For the promotion of internal transformation, the foreign policy has set into motion initiatives to cement friendships and preserve peace. It is an ambitious and a dynamic policy—one might even say overly ambitious—but it is certainly not adventurous. In almost every respect, modern Turkey has turned completely away from the policies of the declining Ottoman Empire. If the latter was forced to use inadequate resources in its last stand against total collapse, present-day Turkey’s dynamism is directed toward progress and the generation of a new nation. Only the future will tell whether her resources are adequate to attain this lofty goal.

Ottoman Turkey fought for time to survive; Atatürk’s Turkey also needs time, another generation or more, to become a modern European power. Will she succeed? So far she has achieved what few would have foreseen half a century ago. In 1914, at the outset of the World War I, Winston Churchill asked himself: “What was to happen to scandalous, crumbling, decrepit, and penniless Turkey in this earthquake?”

Some 50 years ago, the Treaty of Sèvres, expressing the judgment of the victorious powers over the prostrate body of the defunct empire, sentenced it to death. A few years later, phoenix-like, a new Turkey emerged. Nobody in the West would now repeat Lord Salisbury’s remark recalling the Anglo-Turkish alliance during the Crimean War: “We have put our money on the wrong horse.” In the present critical period, when Turkey has a good chance of gaining economic self-sufficiency, it would be ill-advised to consider her a “wrong horse.”

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59 Quoted after Çağlayan who said: “Turkey’s foreign policy had taken on a dynamic nature. . . . But this dynamism was never adventurous.” Son Havadis, July 31, 1969.
Inside and outside Turkey, there are voices of skepticism concerning the ultimate success of her economic, ideological, and foreign policy exploits. Others, both within Turkey and abroad, express optimism. The rise of Turkey from the ruins of empire seems to inspire confidence; however, the enormous task of transforming and readapting an entire nation, as well as economically revitalizing it, appear to be gigantic in the face of the realities Turkey still must encounter. It is customary to speak of “economic miracles” when a country unexpectedly recovers its economic strength. Should Turkey achieve its national purpose, one could characterize this feat with greater justification as the “Turkish miracle.”