Every state must have two kinds of policy. One is the permanent policy, which is taken as a foundation of all its actions and activities; the other is a temporary policy, followed for a period, in accordance with the requirements of the time and circumstances. The permanent policy of the Empire is to prevent any increase in the strength of Russia and Austria, which by virtue of their position are its natural enemies, and to be allied with those states which might be able to break their power and are thus the natural friends of the Empire—From a Memorandum by Ahmed Atif, the Reis Efendi, presented to the divan, 1798, quoted in Bernard Lewis, The Middle East in International Affairs (Bloomington, Ind., 1964), p. 118.

During the expansive epoch of the Ottoman Empire, its foreign policy (essentially but not exclusively military) was ideologically motivated. Its Islamic universalist ideology determined its expansionist character, the main thrust of which was directed against the infidel West. Subsequently, when missionary zeal eroded and stagnation set in, the main foreign policy objective was the preservation of the status quo by both diplomatic and military means. When, finally, the Turkish nation-state was born out of the chrysalis of the Ottoman Empire, new vistas of foreign policy unfolded—vistas prompted partly by territorial shrinkage, partly because of novel and imposed ideological ambitions. Nonetheless, the Turkish nation-state could not totally dissociate itself, in both internal and external respects, from the Ottoman heritage. After all, new Turkey, the core of the former empire, possessed a geopolitical setting reminiscent of her territorial predecessor.

The international environment in which the new Turkish state was born was no longer identical with that which existed prior to World War I. After World War II, the environment changed again. Although the looming shadow of the Russian colossus was less threatening in its Soviet reincarnation, it regained the momentum it had lost in the interwar period. In the meantime, Western Europe had suffered a loss of military and economic potentials; German and Italian power disappeared, at least
temporarily. The ensuing power vacuum was filled by the American super-state when—like a *deus ex machina*—it extended its arm of assistance into the Mediterranean and the Near and Middle East.

Changes occurred within Turkey as well. Under the presidencies of Atatürk and İnönü, foreign policy-making had remained the almost exclusive privilege of a narrow leadership; the post-revolutionary period saw external politics turned into a topic for free discussion and criticism. Elite opinion scrutinized this domain, while democratization and the multiparty system exposed it to the influences of party rivalry. Although undertaken in a planned and systematic manner, the economic modernization and development of the nation also became an important subject of foreign policy considerations. Long-term foreign policy goals notwithstanding, more transient policy goals were by no means neglected; this was demonstrated by the series of Cypriote crises. Among the constant factors of external politics, however, those imposed by Turkey’s geopolitical setting remained outstanding.

**Geopolitical Foundations**

The features of Turkey’s topography most relevant to foreign policy are the straits connecting the Black Sea with the Aegean and the mountain-ringed Anatolian high plateau. These are routes from the Russian plains to the Mediterranean and to the Persian Gulf, as well as routes in the opposite direction. Although post-World War I Turkey was stripped of the peripheral burdens of the Ottoman Empire, she inherited the essentials of its geopolitical status.

The Republic of Turkey forms the central chunk of the *ci-devant* empire. Anatolia (Asia Minor), which makes up the major part of Turkey, reaches eastward to the mountains of Kurdistan and westward to the narrow waters dividing Europe and Asia. In the west is the nodal area of Istanbul which with the straits makes up a region extremely sensitive to external political stimuli. It should be noted here that the straits are composed of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, connected by the oblong Sea of Marmara. On the European side of the straits is eastern Thrace, the southeastern corner of the Balkan peninsula. With this territorial heritage, contemporary Turkey succeeded to many of the advantages and disadvantages of possession a highly strategical area, the defense of which coincides with her survival.
It has been said again and again that Turkey’s historical role and relative political importance rest, in large measure, on her incomparable geographical location. This importance can, in fact, be explained by the geographical realities, the character of the polity exercising control over the area, and the international influences on that area.¹ The history of the Ottoman Empire and Atatürk’s Turkey demonstrates the delicate interplay of political variables and geographical constants.

By taking possession of the center of a former empire, the Ottomans assumed a dominating stance from which they were able to exercise control in all directions, in the Balkans and Central Europe, the Black Sea region, the Aegean and Mediterranean, Mesopotamia and Arabia, Syria and North Africa. The Anatolian plateau looms over the critical straits area like a mountain stronghold over a rich riverside town. Whenever the straits region and the Anatolian heartland were under different political controls, the owner of the Anatolian hinterland eventually conquered the lowlands along the straits and the Sea of Marmara, including the city named after Constantine.² All of this may have been just coincidence. Nevertheless, it appears that an Anatolian state that did not control the “bridge toward Europe” would only be another “country of the Middle East”; united with this historic region, however, it is bound to play a more eminent role, either offensively or defensively.

During the prolonged valetudinarian period of the Ottoman Empire, possessing the straits area saved the Sublime Porte from annihilation; the Dardanelles were to be denied to any country other than the Sick Man of Europe. As we have seen (chapter I), neither Napoleon and Alexander I nor Hitler and Stalin could agree on how to divide this area between themselves, and none of them would relinquish this pièce unique to the other. Britain, and later Austria and Germany, intent on preserving the balance of power in the Balkans and the Near East, wished to prevent the Muscovite empire from opening the door to the Aegean and Mediterranean. Occasionally, however, moralistic considerations and less real-

¹ “The essence of geopolitical analysis is the relation of international political power to the geographical setting.” Saul B. Cohen, Geography and Politics in a World Divided (New York, 1963), p. 24.
² After the capture of Constantinople by the Latins in 1204, the ruler of the splinter state of Nicaea recaptured the city in 1261. The Ottomans, threatening Constantinople first from the east, then again from the west, conquered it. As well, the forces of the Ankara government under Mustafa Kemal were able to regain possession of the city after the defeat of the Greeks and the Armistice of Mudanya in 1923.
istic voices urged Britain to eject the Turks “one and all, bag and baggage” from Europe. The balancing posture of the tottering empire was well exploited by Ottoman diplomacy and contributed meaningfully to its preservation and nominal great power status. It was only under the lethal pressures of the German advance that Anglo-French diplomacy consented to the surrender of the invaluable treasure of the Turkish straits to Russia in 1915—an act which London and Paris were only too happy to see invalidated by the Bolshevik Revolution.

While Constantinople was the apple of discord among the great powers, the city and the straits were considered the heart and nerve-center of the Ottoman Empire.

Mustafa Kemal’s decision to transfer the capital of Turkey to Ankara, where his government was originally formed, was (as already noted in chapter I) both ideologically and geopolitically motivated. He wished to remove governmental power from a city still overshadowed by the memories of the sultanate and in many respects un-Turkish and cosmopolitan—a city where national minorities (predominantly Greeks, Armenians, and Jews) and nondescript Levantines, many of them alien subjects, dominated trade, industry, and the intellectual life. He also wanted to place the new capital in a genuine Turkish environment. Ankara is on the Anatolian plateau some 220 miles from the Bosporus and is thus strategically better protected than Istanbul. The former capital lies only 16 miles from the Black Sea and 80 to 100 miles from the Bulgarian border; its occupation by the Allies after World War I was well remembered.

The dethronement of Constantinople in no way diminished its geopolitical significance for Turkey; it remained the largest city, the most important harbor, and the economic and cultural center of the country. Even with Ankara as the capital, Turkey would not be what she is without Istanbul and the adjoining European corner. She has just as much vital interest in the straits region as before; the strategical value of the site of Byzantium, guarding the sea route between the Black Sea and the Aegean, cannot be overlooked except by “blind ones.”

3 From a speech by William E. Gladstone, then leader of the Opposition (later British prime minister) in the House of Commons on May 7, 1877.
4 A Department of State Memorandum placed before President Wilson for the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 suggested that Turkey, deprived of Constantinople and the straits, should choose the town of Konya as her new capital. See Hurewitz, Diplomacy, vol. II, p. 41.
5 According to Greek mythology, Byzas, the eponymous founder of Byzantium,
The old strategic axiom that points of strength are simultaneously points of weakness applies to the straits region. As guardian of the straits, Turkey can deny passage through these waterways and would do so if this were required for her safety in time of war, or by her status as a neutral. She would be ill-advised, of course, to do so in time of peace, for such an action would violate the international convention concerning the navigation of the straits. Rival powers, especially Russia, have in the past been interested in denying Turkey exclusive control over the straits and may be again in the future.6

European Turkey cannot be defended easily against superior land forces, even if only conventional weapons are used. Istanbul and the straits are also very vulnerable to air attack. Accordingly, possession of this strategic area conveys political and military advantages, while it simultaneously invites potential aggressors. The Anatolian part of Turkey, however, is a highly “strategical region” from the point of view of defense, and the capture of the straits would only be the beginning and not the end of a struggle.

In fact, Asian Turkey has natural boundaries and a fortress-like interior. From three sides it is surrounded by the sea: in the north by the Black Sea, in the west by the Aegean, and in the south by the Mediterranean. Eastern Turkey, protruding into the land mass of the Middle East, is protected by the mountains of Kurdistan and the Armenian highlands. The Soviet border, especially sensitive since the return of the Kars and Ardahan districts to Turkey, runs along the foot of high mountain ranges now inside Turkey. Only Hatay and the frontier along Syria are more open; the strategic Taurus and Anti-Taurus mountain walls are somewhat remote from Turkey’s political boundary.

Turkey has an advantage over many other European and Asian states: her sea frontier is relatively long and much of her land boundaries run along sparsely inhabited and rugged mountainous terrain.7 Nevertheless, not all parts of the sea frontier are equally favorable for defense: the off-

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6 For more detailed discussion of the straits question, see chapter V below.
7 For Turkey’s frontiers, see Lewis V. Thomas and Richard N. Fry, The United States and Turkey and Iran (Cambridge, Mass., 1951), pp. 11–18. For further strategical-political considerations concerning Turkey’s defense, see chapter IV below.
shore islands of the Aegean Sea are mostly Greek controlled. The Greek archipelagoes in that sea, if under the domination of an enemy power, could easily prevent access to the straits and to Turkey’s two principal harbors, Istanbul and Izmir. In such a case, maritime traffic to Turkey would have to be directed to her harbors at the far eastern corner of the Mediterranean, Iskenderun and Mersin. Navigation to that region would be safe, however, only if the island of Cyprus, which blocks the eastern end of the Mediterranean, were controlled by a friendly government.  

The maritime borders of Turkey extend over 2,590 miles (Black Sea, 955 miles; Aegean and Mediterranean, 1,230 miles; and the coastline of European Turkey, 405 miles). Her land frontiers extend over 1,910 miles (Bulgaria, 125 miles; Greece, 125 miles; Syria, 835 miles; Iraq, 235 miles; Iran, 290 miles; and the USSR, 300 miles). Thus, the ratio between coastline and land border is approximately three to two, a ratio enjoyed only by a few continental countries. At the same time, the most potentially threatening frontiers—those with Bulgaria and the Soviet Union—are only 125 and 300 miles long, respectively. 

In the past, Turkey was caught between the conflicting interests of the great powers. The Ottoman Empire, at the time of its decline, was really a huge buffer state or crush zone. In the interwar period, new Turkey held a balancing position which became more difficult to maintain as the power structure shifted around her borders. The balancing operation came to an abrupt end when Soviet pressures pushed Turkey into the Western alliance system. It so developed that postwar Turkey became the exposed bastion of the southeastern end of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. A more tenuous shutterbelt protects Turkey’s eastern corner which protrudes between Soviet Transcaucasia and the Persian Gulf area. Here Turkey’s partners in the Northern Tier are Iran and Pakistan. 

Turkey’s guardianship of the straits and the provisions of the Montreux convention did not prevent, however, a concentration of Soviet maritime forces in the Mediterranean; nor could Turkey’s membership in NATO forestall the leapfrogging of Soviet influence into the Arab countries. In such relative isolation, her defensibility and native power potentials must be assessed in terms of her role as a member of the Western alliance system and—should Turkey one day decide to return to the

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8 The Cyprus problem is discussed in chapter VI below.  
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stance of a neutral—as a balancer between the Western and Soviet power blocs.

The geophysical element is not the only significant factor in Turkish foreign policy. The quality of the population is a correlated agent in the shaping of such policy.

ETHNIC FOUNDATIONS

The descent of the Turks into Asia Minor divided the members of the Indo-European language family, peoples who stretch from India across Iran into the Graeco-Slavic Balkan peninsula and further into Central and Western Europe. However, linguistically the Turks of Anatolia are not completely isolated. There is a sprinkling of Turkish-speaking people in the Balkans (in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Rumania, and in Greek western Thrace), on the northern shore of the Black Sea, on both sides of the Caspian Sea, in Iran and Afghanistan; furthermore, in Soviet central Asia, in western China, and in parts of Siberia, compact areas are inhabited by Turkic nations or tribes.

From the cultural-religious point of view, the Ottoman Turks formed the outstretched arm of Islam into Europe. As long as the Turks were inspired by a militant Islamic spirit, they could draw strength from their coreligionaries in the east, even though their linguistic-ethnic body, especially in the Balkans, was surrounded by ethnically and culturally different groups. Islamic Ottoman Turks fought their way into Europe; present-day Turkey has cut off many of her cultural ties with the Islamic east and wishes to lean on European-Western civilization. There is no other Turkish or Turkic independent nation.

11 This separation coincides with the satem or eastern, and the centum or western, divisions of the Indo-European linguistic family (with the exception of the Balto-Slavic group, which belongs to the former).

12 A traveler, driving from southern Bulgaria eastward into central China, would be able to speak and be understood in Turkish; C. L. Sulzberger, New York Times, August 11, 1968.

13 Turkish is only one of the Turkic languages. These languages belong to the Uralo-Altaic language family (together with Finno-Ugrian, Mongolian, and other linguistic groups) or, after a more recent theory, to a linguistic chain ranging from Indo-European, Uralic, to Turkic, and beyond to Mongolian and others. Linguistically, the Turkish spoken in present-day Turkey is part of the Oghuz sub-group, which includes the Azerbaijani and Turkoman dialects, as well as other dialects spoken by Turkic tribes in Iran. See the Introduction to J. Németh’s Turkish Grammar (The Hague, 1962), pp. 13-14.
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Unlike the Ottoman Empire, Turkey is a fairly homogeneous nation-state, with a fast-growing population of over 34 million (1969). It is expected that the population will reach 38 million by 1972, or 45 million by 1979, provided, of course, that there should be no war or other major event to prevent such an increase. It is, therefore, highly probable that by the end of the eighth decade of the current century Turkey will have a population equal to or even exceeding the current population of major West European nations such as France, Britain, or Italy.

The national and linguistic homogeneity of Turkey’s population is not, however, complete. The minorities within and around Istanbul are no longer of political significance, and there are Arabs in Hatay and in other parts along the Turkish-Syrian and Turkish-Iraq border. But the most numerous and potentially dangerous minority by far is the Kurds in eastern Turkey.

The Kurdish people are divided among four countries: Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, with sprinklings in the Trans-caucasian provinces of the Soviet Union. The exact number of Kurds living in Turkey is difficult to ascertain. According to the 1960 census, 1,848,000 declared their mother tongue to be Kurdish, and 712,000 registered Kurdish as their secondary language. If the second group (the bilinguals) is added to the first, the total number of Kurdish-speaking inhabitants of Turkey could be set at 2,560,000—that is, about 9 percent of her population. Other estimates

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14 According to the statement by Turgut Özal, Under Secretary of the State Planning Office; Yeni Gazette, October 3, 1967.
15 Statement by Prime Minister Demirel on December 31, 1967, in Mersin; Istanbul Bayram, January 1, 1968.
16 According to the 1960 census, 65,000 persons in Turkey declared their mother tongue as Greek, and 58,000 as their secondary language; 53,000 declared Armenian as their mother tongue, and 45,000 as their secondary language.
17 According to the 1960 census, Arabic was the mother tongue of 347,000 persons, and 137,000 considered Arabic as their secondary language.
19 See 1963 Türkiye Istatistik Yılığı (Turkish Statistical Yearbook; Ankara, 1963), p. 63.
20 There being no public schooling in the Kurdish language, it is assumed that many Kurds have become bilingual and, for various reasons, have found it expedient to declare Turkish as their principal language. It is less likely that Turks would acquire the use of the Kurdish language, except in mixed urban areas.
vary between 2 and 4 million; Kurdish nationalists claim even higher numbers.\(^{21}\)

The Kurdish language belongs to the Iranian branch of the Indo-European linguistic family and is thus related to the Persian. No uniform Kurdish literary language exists; among the Kurds in Turkey, one of the chief dialects, the *Kirmanji*, is mostly spoken; a smaller group speaks the more refined *Zaza* (also known as *Macho-Macho*).\(^{22}\)

Kurds have never been politically united and have always lived divided among different tribes. The tribal chiefs (feudal lords) bore the title *derebey* but more lately have been called *ağa-s*; when they are also religious leaders (heads of former dervish orders), they are called *sheiks*.\(^{23}\) The Ottoman sultans exercised control over the Kurds through their tribal leaders. Centralized state administration, secularization, and European attire, forcibly introduced by the Kemalist government, were even more incompatible with the accustomed life of the Kurds (who were mostly nomads or semi-nomads) than with that of other inhabitants of Turkey. Three revolts marked the Kurdish armed resistance to these measures, which were seen as threats not only to their tribal regime and traditional religious allegiances but to their social habits as well.

In 1925 Sheik Said of Palu, the hereditary head of the Nakhshbandi dervish sect, led a revolt against the republican government of Ankara in order to re-establish the traditional Islamic order. The uprising, which extended over a large area from the Dersim region to Lake Van, was suppressed within two months with the help of several Turkish divisions and was capped by the hanging of the ringleaders. In 1930 the Jelali tribe revolted on both sides of the Turkish-Iranian border; this uprising had more a nationalistic than religious character. Strategically, the Jelali wished to establish themselves on the slopes and heights of the Ararat Mountains; perhaps they hoped for assistance from Iran and from other Kurds. This rebellion was also suppressed. The last uprising occurred in 1937 in the Dersim region, in the west of the Kurdish-inhabited territory, under the

\(^{21}\) Kinnane’s estimate is 2.5 million (*Kurds and Kurdistan*, p. 2); the Soviet Encyclopaedia (1952) mentions 2 to 3 million; Ghassemlou suggests 4.6 million (*Kurdistan and the Kurds*, pp. 22–23); Bois speaks of “at least six millions” (*The Kurds*). A Kurdish nationalist leader, interviewed by this writer, set the number of Kurds in Turkey at 10 million.

\(^{22}\) The other principal Kurdish dialect is the *Kurdi* (or *Sorani*), spoken in the southern Kurdistan, both in Iran and in Iraq.

\(^{23}\) Those sheiks who can claim descent from the Prophet use the name *Sayyid* (or Said).
leadership of Sheik Sayyid Reza. The revolt was directed against Turkish administrative measures such as the establishment of gendarmerie posts and the construction of roads and schools. The rebels were again defeated and their leaders executed. All of these rebellions were followed by attempts at detribalizing and resettling of unreliable elements in the western parts of Anatolia.24

Although the opening of eastern Turkey to technical progress has been much slower than in the central and western parts of the country, railroads and roads have now penetrated deep into the mountainous Kurd regions, urban centers have developed, and a system of state administration and schooling has been established. Nevertheless, these means of basic modernization have not yet reached into the remote villages and hamlets, into the high valleys and pastures where many of the Kurds still live, devoted to their nomadic habitat. Nor has their attachment to their religious traditions or their loyalty to their patriarchal-feudal lords, the ağa-s, completely eroded. The influence of the latter is still great in many areas. After the military coup of 1960, the revolutionary government found it necessary to deport more than 50 ağa-s and many of their retainers to western Anatolia. This unpopular move was followed by a flare-up of violence in the east: armed assaults and brigandage became widespread. It took the government time and energy to restore a relative safety in the more outlying Kurdish areas.

No doubt the restlessness of the Kurdish minority could affect Turkey’s power potentials; the overlap of the Kurdish-inhabited areas with three or four states creates special foreign policy questions.25 Kurdish nationalism, so much strengthened by the suggestion of the Treaty of Sèvres that an independent Kurdistan be created, remains a problem which Turkish policy-makers cannot ignore.

Yet, in Turkey, the Kurdish language, tribal sentiment, and other Kurdish values are gradually losing ground against the simultaneous pressures of modernization and Turkification. The undeveloped, archaic status of the average Kurds makes them particularly vulnerable; economic and technological development, compulsory military service, and education serve the purposes of both modernizing and merging them into the Turkish ethnic stream. This assimilation is particularly favored by the

25 See chapter VII below.
lack of religious barrier between Kurds and Turks; intermarriage is, therefore, easy and does not raise the insurmountable obstacle it does for Greeks, Armenians, and other non-Muslims in Turkey.\textsuperscript{26} As soon as a Kurd is linguistically and educationally adapted to be a Turk, he will be accepted as such, even if he harbors a clandestine attachment to “Kurd­

ism.” Even in school he will be told that he is a Turk, a “Mountain Turk”; no discrimination is likely to take place if he shows no resistance to being assimilated. Since 1960, however, the campaigns of some political parties in districts of mixed Turkish-Kurdish population have not re­

frained from exploiting ethnic differences in their favor.\textsuperscript{27}

Latent Kurdish separatism certainly impairs the otherwise well-nigh ethnic homogeneity of Turkey’s population. Ethnic Turks are Muslims (if we exclude the few Gagauz immigrants—Orthodox-Christian Turks from the northern Black Sea region); even those who are religiously in­

different would not deny this identification. But not all Turkish Muslims are Sunnites. An estimated two to three million Turks in central and eastern Anatolia belong to the \textit{Alevi} sect of Islam—that is, they are Shiites, like most of the Iranians.\textsuperscript{28} Among the Kurds, the Zaza-speaking are mostly \textit{Alevi}; otherwise, Kurds are also Sunnites.\textsuperscript{29}

More than 90 percent of Turkey’s population live in the Asian (Anatolian) part of the country. Anthropologically, they are of mixed descent: only a small proportion of them stem from the original Seljuks or subsequent Turric invaders of Anatolia. Basically, they descend from those peoples who have inhabited Asia Minor since prehistoric times: the Hittites and their contemporaries, and those who are known in the Graeco-Roman period as Bithynians, Lydians, Phrygians, Galatians, Cap-

\textsuperscript{26} Kurds have Muslim first names, as do the Turks; the surname which they had to adopt after 1934 is also Turkish. Only the language remains as an obvious criterion of differentiation between a Turk and a Kurd; as soon as they become bilingual, even this test fades away. Thus, often in the Turkish west people may be unaware whether their friends are of Kurdish descent. Hassan Arfa described in his book that Sharif Pasha, the former Ottoman minister at Stockholm, declared himself, after the end of World War I, to be a Kurd, a fact of which the family of the author was unaware, although Arfa senior was Iranian minister in Sweden and the two families were great friends; Arfa, \textit{The Kurds}, p. 31.

\textsuperscript{27} See chapter III, pp. 92–93, 98–99.

\textsuperscript{28} \textit{Alevi} Turks are also, half-contemptuously, referred to as \textit{Kızılbaşi} (red-heads).

\textsuperscript{29} It should be mentioned that Sunnite Kurds belong to the \textit{Shafai} rite, whereas Turks belong to the \textit{Hanafi} rite of Muslim theology. Ziya Gökalp wished to differentiate Turks from Kurds in Diyarbakır, his place of birth, not so much by the language they spoke as by whether they belonged to the \textit{Shafai} or \textit{Hanafi} followers; Ziya Gökalp, \textit{Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization} (New York, 1959), p. 44.
padocians, and others. The present Turkish population, no doubt, includes many assimilated Greeks and Armenians as well as descendants of deported, enslaved, or fugitive persons who were settled there during the heyday of Ottoman expansion. During the period of shrinkage of the empire, there was a considerable influx of refugees and resettlers from the Balkans, from Russian Black Sea regions, and from Mediterranean islands. Finally, the exchange of population after World War I caused half-a-million Muslims (many of them unable to speak Turkish) to settle in Turkey. Immigration from Bulgaria and Rumania also continued after World War II. All of these Muslim immigrants appear to have been easily absorbed.

Only a few Turks have central Asian or Mongolian features; physically, they are Caucasians and may claim to be Europeans, even though their language is not Indo-European but Ural-Altaic. It should not be forgotten that language is no test for differentiation between “Europeans” and “Asians.” Finns, Hungarians, and Estonians also speak a Ural-Altaic language, but nobody would deny their being Europeans. On the other hand, Iranians and most of the Indians speak Indo-European languages.

Nor can the Turkish ambition to be recognized as European be negated by referring to Turkey’s geographical location. The intercontinental boundary between Europe and Asia is artificial. One may rightly pose the question why the Ural Mountains or the Caucasus should be the dividing line between two continents? Toynbee points out that

the historian cannot lay his finger on any period at all in which there was any significant cultural diversity between the “Asiatic” and “European” occupants of the all but contiguous opposite banks of a Bosporus and a Hellespont that are no broader than the Hudson and not nearly so broad as the Amazon.30

The division of Europe and Asia along the Bosporus and the Dardanelles is the fruit of ancient Greek political and geographical imagination. Anatolia was known to the Romans as Asia Minor, that is, Little Asia. But the Roman geographer Strabo placed the boundary between the two continents at the Taurus Mountains near the present southeastern border of Turkey.31 Evidently, being European is neither a geographical nor a linguistic question; it relates rather to way of life, mores, philosophy of life—in other words, to ideology.

31 Cohen, Geography and Politics, p. 31.
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IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS

The Turkish national state established by Atatürk was placed on very definite ideological foundations which were opposed to the defunct but still latently operative ideas inherited from Ottoman times.\textsuperscript{32} The new nation-state was to be guided by principles whose acceptance and implementation were to prevent any relapse into the “old, sick, and senile”\textsuperscript{33} world of the past.

Kemalism, as the state philosophy of the new Turkish Republic can rightly be called, wished to shake off the spirit and policies of the Ottoman past. It wanted to turn over a totally “clean leaf” of Turkish history, one unfettered by the memories and encumbrances of bygone centuries. Atatürk’s ambition was also to present the international world with a Turkey that would distinctly differ from the political structure of the empire:

The Ottoman Empire, whose heirs we were, had no value, no merit, no authority in the eyes of the world. It was regarded as being beyond the pale of international right and was, as it were, under the tutelage and protection of somebody else.

We were not guilty of the neglect and errors of the past and, in reality, it was not ourselves from whom they ought to have demanded the settlement of accounts that had accumulated during past centuries. . . . I had no doubt that the whole world would finally recognize the principles which the Turkish nation had to adopt and realize at all cost for their existence, their independence and their sovereignty; because the foundations had actually and in reality already been laid by strength and merit.\textsuperscript{34}

Islam, in the past, had instilled a “religious arrogance” in the peoples converted to it and persuaded them to be ashamed of their past;\textsuperscript{35} Kemalist Turkey was told by her leaders to deplore the sacrifices made in pursuit of “fictitious aims” under the Ottoman rulers, who had endeavored to form “a gigantic empire by seizing Germany and West-Rome” and also by subjecting the Islamic world to their authority:

It is a generally accepted fact that among the peoples of the Orient the Turks were the element who bore the brunt and who gave evidence of the greatest


\textsuperscript{33} Gökalg, \textit{Turkish Nationalism}, p. 268.

\textsuperscript{34} A \textit{Speech Delivered by Ghazi Mustapha Kemal, President of the Turkish Republic, October 1927} (Leipzig, 1929), pp. 586–87.

\textsuperscript{35} See Burkhardt, \textit{On History and Historians}, p. 52.
strength. . . . But in every offensive we must always be prepared for a counter-attack. . . . The continuous counterattacks from the West, the discontent and insurrections in the Mohammedan world, as well as dissensions between the various elements which this policy had artificially brought together within certain limits, had the ultimate result of burying the Ottoman Empire, in the same way as many others, under the pall of history.36

From the ruins of the empire, the “oppressed nation of the Orient, the innocent Turkish nation,” emerged to demonstrate by deeds its worthiness to occupy its position among nations. Accordingly, the establishment of the republic “meant the creation of a new State standing on new foundations.”

The primordial tenets of Kemalist foreign policy were simple: “Friendship with every nation”; “Peace at home, peace abroad”; “Turkey has no perpetual enemies”; and

the State should pursue an exclusively national policy and . . . this policy should be in perfect agreement with our internal organization and based on it. When I speak of national policy, I mean it in this sense: To work within our national boundaries for the real happiness and welfare of our nation and the country by, above all, relying on our own strength in order to retain our existence. (Italics added.)

This was to be a policy based on national interest, a status quo policy, with “no lust of conquest.” At the same time, it was not to be an internationalist foreign policy, wishing to “embrace all mankind in perfect equality and brotherhood,” for “no greater mistake could be made than that of being utopian.”

 Atatürk clearly envisioned the relationship that was to govern the internal organization and external foreign policy of the new republic. He said: “What particularly interests foreign policy and upon which it is founded is the internal organization of the State. Thus it is necessary that the foreign policy should agree with the internal organization.” He also realized that, over and above the change in the system of government, a change was required in the mental disposition of the Turkish people.

Ideological guidance was to be derived from the principles embodied in the “Six Arrows.” These principles, adopted by the Republican People’s Party in 1931 and endorsed in 1937 by the constitution, were: nationalism, secularism, republicanism, populism, statism, and revolu-

36 This and the following statements are from A Speech Delivered by Ghazi Mustapha Kemal, pp. 377, 378–79, and 657.
Nationalism was synonymous with Turkism and stood for a Turkish nation-state in place of Ottomanist and pan-Turkist or pan-Turanist ambitions. Secularism was the antithesis to Islam and suggested Western orientations. Republicanism was directed against the re-establishment of the sultanate and caliphate. Populism referred to the equality of citizens, irrespective of race, creed, language, or class origin. It was also suggestive of the democratic form of government—another step toward Westernization. Statism meant the concentration of the economy in the hands of the government (without, necessarily, nationalizing domestic or foreign property); it also suggested development—that is, economic and technological assimilation with the West. Revolutionism or reformism stood for the dynamic process of the transformation of the Turkish state and society; since this transformation was directed toward the modernization of Turkey after the Western ideal, it also implicitly carried a Western political orientation.

The underlying motivation for these principles and for the policy of Westernization was the goal of assimilating the Turkish people into the nations of developed Europe. In the eyes of Atatürk and his followers, there was only one civilization, the Western one, and they would join it “in spite of the West.” This doctrine distinguished between “civilization” and “culture”; the latter was to be the revived culture of the Turks, much subdued or perverted by Islamic-Arab influences.

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37 Kinross, Atatürk, p. 518.
38 “The new Turkish State will not be a world conquering state. The new Turkish State will be an economic state,” said Kemal; Richard D. Robinson, The First Turkish Republic (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), p. 104.
39 The original Turkish term inikilapçilik has the meaning of both revolutionism and reformism. Subsequently, the word was substituted by the non-Arab term Devrimcilik, which indicates “transformation,” violent or peaceful.
41 This differentiation stemmed from Ziya Gökalp who wrote: “Culture is composed of the integrated system of religious, moral, legal, intellectual, aesthetic, linguistic, economic, and technological spheres of life of a certain nation. Civilization, on the other hand, is the sum total of social institutions shared in common by several nations that have attained the same level of development. Western civilization, for example, is a civilization shared by the European nations living on the continents of Europe and America. Within this civilization, however, there are English, German, French, etc., cultures, which are different and independent of each other.” Gökalp, Turkish Nationalism, p. 104. See also Kemal H. Karpat, Turkey’s Politics: The Transition to a Multi-
The original Kemalist principles underwent various new interpretations, especially under the multiparty system of the post-World War II period. While Atatürk’s dicta continued to be considered indisputable dogma, conflicting interpretations were often attributed to them. Some, however, preferred to ignore these dicta and even to challenge their validity under the changed circumstances of the Second Turkish Republic.

Indeed, the constitution of 1961 presented a modified version of the six Kemalist principles by declaring in Article 2: “The Turkish Republic is a nationalistic, democratic, secular, and social State governed by the rule of law based on human rights and the fundamental tenets set forth in the Preamble.” The Preamble gave renewed credit to the Kemalist achievements and ideology by expressing “full dedication to the principle of ‘peace at home, peace in the world’ and . . . to the spirit of national independence, and sovereignty and to the reforms of Atatürk.”

Accordingly, the rather vague principle of populism was replaced by the qualification of the republic as “democratic.” It denoted a departure from the one-party system practiced during the presidential terms of Atatürk and İnönü, as well as a condemnation of the abuse of power committed in the Menderes era—abuses which finally sparked the revolution of May 27, 1960.

The principle of republicanism was maintained by the constitutional provision which forbade any amendment that would challenge the republican form of government (Article 9). Although the principle of Statism was dropped, Article 129 of the constitution set up the State Planning Organization to prepare plans for economic, social, and cultural development. The principle of reformism (revolutionism) was recognized in Article 153, which endorsed the “Reform Laws which aim at raising the Turkish society to the level of contemporary civilization and at safeguarding the secular character of the Republic.”

The period subsequent to the revolution of 1960 was marked both by a genuine democratic multi-party system and by a freedom of expression which allowed an unprecedented range of discussion and criticism con-

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cerning the ideological foundations of Turkey’s national, social, political, and cultural identity. We must restrict ourselves, however, to an examination of those basic concepts which have a direct or implicit bearing on the foreign relations of the Turkish state.

Ideological questions, with foreign policy overtones, centered on the following main areas: (1) the nature of Turkish nationalism and its relation to Ottoman-Islamic traditions; (2) the secular character of the Turkish state; (3) the meaning of democracy; and (4) “social” or “socialist” concepts in politics. It should be remembered that many of the arguments exchanged in the Second Turkish Republic were rooted in conceptual controversies dating back even to Ottoman times or to the period of the First Republic. The drive toward Europeanization was generally not challenged except by a few Islamic fanatics. But the meaning of Europeanization or modernization was given different interpretations by the promoters of the “Western Ideal” than by those who were more inclined to favor the “Eastern Ideal.”

Nationalism

The nature of Turkish nationalism, or Turkism, had been moot even before the evolution of the Turkish national state. Nationalism in Western Europe mostly developed indigenously and spontaneously and was, in a way, discovered after its birth. By contrast, Turkish nationalism was a topic of discussion in Ottoman times before a broad Turkish national consciousness developed. Ottoman political innovators experienced difficulties even when trying to find a proper word to express the concept of “nation” or “nationalism” in Turkish.

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43 Garp Mefkuresi (Western Ideal) and Şark Mefkuresi (Eastern Ideal) were originally opposed under the early Kemalist regime when some advisers believed that the Soviet form of government should be adopted; Smith, Turkey, p. 45.

44 Ziya Gökalp thus described the search for Turkish nationalism: “The ideal of nationalism appeared [in the Ottoman Empire] first among the non-Muslims, then among the Albanians and Arabs, and finally among the Turks. The fact that it appeared last among the Turks was not accidental: the Ottoman state was formed by the Turks themselves. The state is a nation already established (nation de fait), whereas the nation of nationalism meant the nucleus of a nationality based on will (nation de volonté). With intuitive cautiousness, the Turks were reluctant, in the beginning, to endanger a reality for the sake of an ideal.” Gökalp, Turkish Nationalism, pp. 73–74. The article, quoted above, was first published in 1913.

45 Millet (see chapter I) originally had the meaning of “religious community” or “community based on religion.” The Muslims (whether Turks, Arabs, Albanians, or
A common heritage of past experiences and shared traditions is one element in the forming of a nation. But for the Kemalists, who wanted to speed the development of Turkish national sentiment, eliminating the Ottoman past, or rather degrading it in the minds of the Turkish people, was the primary endeavor. Turkish youth were to be divorced from the Ottoman historic and cultural heritage. Their interest was to be focused on pre-Islamic Turkish precedents and on a language cleansed of non-Turkic grammatical forms, as evidence of Turkish national identity. School children learned of the legendary Turkish kingdom along the Orkhon River in central Asia but very little about the conquests of Ottoman sultans in three continents. For them, Turkish history began with the arrival of Mustafa Kemal to Samsun in 1919. To ignore, however, long historical heritage proved in the long run to be inconsistent with the idea of genuine nationalism.

Since 1946 the possible traditional-historical contributions to national consciousness have become more acceptable, although the evaluation of the Ottoman past remains a controversial question between the strict Kemalist positivists and the conservative traditionalists. After the revolution of 1960, the controversy became even more exacerbated when linked with a foreign policy orientation.

The “Atatürkists” cultivated a self-centered nationalism based on the solidarity of Turks living within the confines of the Turkish state. Members of the Turkish nation were to be those who spoke Turkish and considered themselves Turks, irrespective of origin, religion, or race. They refused affiliations with other peoples—Islamic or Turkic—and thought of themselves as members of the European community of civilized nations.

The traditionalist view of nationalism covered a broad spectrum of opinions, and its followers entered into heated polemics with their adversaries. Traditionalists extolled the glories of the Ottoman past and stressed the historical link between present-day Turkey and the empire

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Kurds did not form any millet; they were all members of the ümmet, the religious community of Muslims. Subsequently, the meaning of millet was transformed into that of “nation” and was also applied to the Turkish nation. See Berkes, Development of Secularism, pp. 317–19.


of the sultans. Moderates among them were followers of Ziya Gökalp and accepted secular Turkish nationalism together with religious allegiance to Islam and membership in Western civilization.\textsuperscript{48} Others, like Ali Fuad Başgil, wished to implement positivist nationalism with the transcendental religious thought of Islam.\textsuperscript{49} There were also representatives among this group of militant Turkism or pan-Turanism with racial overtones.\textsuperscript{50} The ideological differences between Anatolians and Rumelians were also emphasized by some writers.\textsuperscript{51} Traditional nationalists were all strongly anti-Communist and, therefore, to a greater or lesser degree, pro-American. But some of them sought to promote greater or almost exclusive orientations toward other Islamic countries.\textsuperscript{52}

The protagonists of the revolution of 1960 thought in terms of positivist nationalism; the constitution of 1961 was couched in a language which carefully avoided any reference to traditional nationalist sentiment.\textsuperscript{53} This may also be considered a response to the reactionary tendencies of the Democratic Party under Menderes. In the Second Republic, the Republican People's Party together with the Turkish Labor Party operated on the ideological basis of positivist nationalism; the Justice Party inclined toward traditionalist views, moderate or more pronounced. The splinter parties also represented more or less traditional ideologies.\textsuperscript{54}

\textbf{Secularism}

Secularist or antisecularist spokesmen mostly, but not exclusively, coincide with positivist or traditionalist supporters of nationalism. Their

\textsuperscript{48} It was stated that a faction of the Justice Party claimed to be Ziya Gökalp's follower: \textit{Cumhuriyet}, October 13, 1967.

\textsuperscript{49} Ali Fuad Başgil, professor of law at the University of Istanbul, expanded his ideas relative to national sentiment in his book, \textit{Din ve Lâïlık} (Religion and Secularism) (Istanbul, 1953).

\textsuperscript{50} Most prominent among them is retired Colonel Alparslan Türkeş, leader of the Nationalist Action Party; he is an ardent Kemalist but combines his admiration for Atatürk with traditionalism and Pan-Turanist leanings. See Weiker, \textit{The Turkish Revolution}, pp. 127-28.

\textsuperscript{51} Rumelians are those whose birthplaces were, like Atatürk's, in European Turkey (Rumelia); Anatolian "supremacists" occasionally deny the ethnic Turkish origin of Rumelians; see Karpat, "Ideology in Turkey," p. 88.

\textsuperscript{52} Traditionalists are more tolerant toward Kurdist (Kurdish nationalism or separatism).

\textsuperscript{53} See Preamble (with a positivist definition of Turkish nationalism).

\textsuperscript{54} For attitudes of political parties concerning foreign policy, see chapter III, pp. 80-99.
purpose, however, is not identical. The protagonists of secularism in Kemalist Turkey intended to free the Turkish state and society from the pervasive influences of Islam insofar as they interfered with or even prevented the formation of Turkish nationhood and the modernization of the country. While fighting the political and social grip of Islam, Kemalism developed anticlerical, rationalist, and antitraditionalist characteristics but not necessarily atheistic ideas. It contributed, nevertheless, to widespread indifference to religion in the urban centers but left Muslim devotions essentially unchanged in smaller towns and rural areas. Religious indifference, however, never went to the extent of dissuading even highly educated Turks from the observance of some Muslim rituals. In fact, despite the official secularist creed, only the progeny of a Muslim family were socially accepted as genuine Turks.\footnote{While the Turkish government welcomed Muslim immigrants from the Balkans (even if they failed to speak Turkish), there was reluctance to accept the Gagauz, Orthodox Christian Turks, speaking Turkish, who live along the Black Sea Coast (Bessarabia and Dobrudja); Karpat, \textit{Turkey's Politics}, pp. 62–63.}

With the post-1950 Democratic Party, religious devotion lost much, though not all, of its stigma as being backward or old-fashioned. The revolution of 1960 was definitely secularist, but with the Justice Party in power, the rivalry between secularist and religious forces continued to attract attention. However, the original chasm between the two national sectors considerably narrowed; it now appears that the majority of the politically conscious elite exhibit moderate or synthetizing attitudes.\footnote{Since 1949, the teaching of religion has been introduced in elementary and secondary schools, and a Faculty of Divinity created within the University of Ankara. Private schools continued and new ones have been opened for the training of \textit{imam-s} ("men-of-religion"; that is, persons who are qualified to lead the community in prayer). After 1950 it was again permitted to read the \textit{ezan} (call to prayer) in Arabic. All these changes were strongly opposed by secularist intellectuals. See \textit{ibid.}, pp. 271–92.}

The constitution of the Second Republic endorsed freedom of conscience and of religion; it further stated that "no person shall be reproached for his religious faith and belief." But it forbade the exploitation or abuse of religion in order to affect the social, economic, political, or legal foundations of the state, or to secure personal or political advantages (Article 19). The contemporary debate seems to concentrate on the issue of what can be considered "exploitation" or "abuse" of religion.

The polemics concerning the role and scope of religion affect the homogeneity of Turkey's population and raise questions of international concern and interest. For instance, the open manifestations of Islamic de-
votion revived animosities between the Sunni and Alevi believers in parts of eastern Turkey. Leftist leaders were accused by the Justice Party of fomenting the Sunni-Alevi struggle in the interest of their party; the Republican People’s Party adduced that one reason for this renewed rift has been the alleged governmental toleration of exploiting religion for political purposes.

The visit of Pope Paul VI to Istanbul and Ephesus in July 1967 evoked different reactions among secularists, believers, and Islamic fanatics. His prayer in the St. Sophia (Aya Sofya) Cathedral in particular evoked contradictory, but highly characteristic, comments.

The government has imposed strict controls on extremist movements like that of the Nur-ists and, especially, on the secret Hizb-ut Tahrir Society, which apparently attracted only the lunatic fringe of society.

The struggle continues between the two more extreme attitudes toward Islamic faith. The extreme secularists still regard Islam as an obstacle to Europeanization and economic development; the Muslim fanatics consider the secular state an enemy of Islam and incompatible

57 During the Ottoman period, Alevis were frequently persecuted and discriminated against. Apparently, after several decades of tolerance during the First Republic, riots between Sunnis and Alevis have occasionally broken out in a disquieting manner. Concerning fights in the towns of Maraş and Elbistan, see Cumhuriyet, June 30, 1967.

58 Ismet Inönü, chairman of the Republican People’s Party, berated the revival of the artificial rift between Sunni and Alevi; Ulus, June 30, 1968.

59 “The prayers pronounced aloud by the Pope in Aya Sofya caused a reaction within the Turkish people who are 99 percent Muslims. . . . He has made a great mistake and put the Demirel Government in a difficult position. It was an attitude inconsistent with our secularism.” Akşam, July 27, 1967.

60 The Nur-ists (Nurcular, in Turkish) are the disciples of Said-i Nursi Bediuzzaman, who died in Urfa on March 23, 1960. He advocated Islamic asceticism. His followers are also militant nationalists.

61 The Hizb-ut Tahrir (freely translated: Partisans of Freedom) Society aimed at setting up a theocratic state in Turkey and demanded that all relations with the “infidels” be severed. The activities of the group were allegedly directed from Beirut. Its members have been threatened with arrest and imprisonment. The president of the Ankara Court of Appeal, İmran Oktem, characterized the Hizb-ut Tahrir as “a handful of the mentally sick who want to set up an Islamic state in Turkey.” Milliyet, September 7, 1968. See also Cumhuriyet, September 8, 1967; Ulus, August 22, 1967.
with its tenets. The official acceptance of either of these two postulates would reverse the present national objectives and radically alter the international status of Turkey. Radical secularization, aiming at the complete eradication of Islamic traditions, would sever all ties between Turkey and the Islamic Middle East and would, ideologically, place Turkish society in a spiritual vacuum. A victory for the religious extremist would turn Turkey into an Islamic state, an essentially non-European country, and cut short the present modernizing trends. It is highly unlikely that any of these extremist tendencies will gain the upper hand; the government, supported by the majority of the ruling and opposition parties, attempts to pursue a middle-of-the-road policy.

This policy strives to produce a working synthesis between the demand for a secular state and the spiritual needs of the people. The aim of this policy is to demonstrate that Islam as a creed is not incompatible with modernization and Europeanization. Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel expressed this moderate view when he said:

The Turkish citizen has full freedom in his religious faith and convictions. . . . Along with this principle which requires noninterference by the State in religious faith and conviction, it is also prohibited to place religion above the State, and to exploit religious feelings. Thus the principle of secularism means a balance between respect for freedom of conscience and the freedom of the State from all sorts of religious interferences and exploitation. It is wrong to consider secularism as a kind of atheism.\(^62\)

To achieve the hoped-for synthesis between the requirements of Westernization and the tenets of Islam is a challenge which has not been met successfully in any Muslim country. The Turkish experiment is, therefore, of an importance which surpasses the borders of Turkey. To reconcile secularization with the Islamic faith is a task Turks can accomplish easier than Arabs, whose culture and ethos are almost inseparably welded to the creed of the Prophet.

Under the present democratic form of government in Turkey, the transformation of Islam into a spiritual dispensation severed from political, social, and economic implications is, one would hope, being achieved by the people themselves and not by the dicta of an autocratic ruler. If a synthesis is attained under such circumstances, it will be culturally absorbed and likely to last.

\(^{62}\) Cumhuriyet, January 17, 1968. (Italics added.)
Democracy

The decision to transform Turkey into a democracy was prompted partly by foreign policy motivations. The timing was exclusively due to the international scene following World War II. There also existed general discontent in Turkey against the high-handed authoritarian rule of the Republican People’s Party during the war, but as it appears, the immediate resolution was taken simultaneously with Ankara’s entry into the United Nations in 1945. In the past the Ottoman Empire had to endure numerous interventions by foreign powers which forced it to introduce liberal reforms; this time, the decision to liberalize was taken spontaneously.

It should be remembered that Turkey’s vacillating wartime policy created misgivings among the Allies and was exploited by the Soviet Union. Ankara had a feeling of isolation, of being regarded as undemocratic or “fascist” in a world which, under the Charter of the United Nations, paid lip service to democracy and human rights. At the same time, Turkey was threatened by Moscow, which then enjoyed popularity as the foremost warrior against Hitlerism, a claim which made many forget its totalitarian and terroristic methods of government.

For all of these reasons, Ankara considered it vitally important to “join the Democratic Club.” The foreign policy reasons for becoming democratic were, however compelling, only one of many motivations. Did not Atatürk himself endeavor to align his country, in every respect, with the West? And did not only the hostility of the Turkish masses to his reform prevent his ruling in a democratic manner? Under the existing constitution of 1924, did not sovereignty belong to the people? It was now timely to implement “constitutional reality.”

American diplomatic, military, and economic assistance, proffered from 1947 onward, was a further impetus to liberalization. In 1950, under the new electoral law, the Democratic Party won a sweeping victory that ended the ruling monopoly of the Republican People’s Party. During the next ten years, however, power corrupted the new ruling

63 See Karpat, Turkey’s Politics, pp. 137–43. See also the declaration by President İnönü on May 19, 1945, during the San Francisco conference, promising to develop Turkey “in the direction of democracy.” Gotthard Jäschke, Die Türkei in den Jahren 1942–1951 (Wiesbaden, 1955), p. 45.
64 See chapter I above.
group: they used highly undemocratic methods, stifled freedom of expression, and appeared to jeopardize Kemalist reforms. The military coup of May 27, 1960, created an interregnum lasting 18 months.

The National Unity Committee (the junta) pledged to restore democracy by arranging “just and free elections as soon as possible under the supervision and arbitration of nonpartisan and impartial administration” and to hand over the administration to whichever party won the elections. Committees of university professors worked for many months until a draft could be submitted to a constituent assembly which convened on January 6, 1961. The constitution of the Second Turkish Republic was adopted by the assembly on May 27, the anniversary of the revolution, and approved by 62 percent of the voters on July 9 in a national referendum. The new constitutional-parliamentary period opened with the elections of October 15, 1961. After that event, the National Unity Committee handed over the government to a coalition of the two major parties: the Republican People’s Party (whose chairman, Ismet İnönü, became the prime minister) and the Justice Party. The chairman of the military junta, General Cemal Gürsel, was elected president of the republic.

The return to normalcy and democracy in Turkey was received with much satisfaction by her Western Allies who had at first feared that the military regime would remain in power indefinitely, according to the pattern experienced elsewhere. Throughout the process of redemocratization, the Turkish leaders had one eye on their Western friends, for one of the reasons why most, if not all, members of the military junta were reluctant to stay in power was their concern for Turkey’s prestige and international status. It was also recognized abroad that the revolution was achieved without bloodshed and that its aftermath was relatively immune to severe oppression or cruel vengeance.

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65 Weiker, The Turkish Revolution, pp. 20–21.
67 For the internal debates and confrontations within the National Unity Committee, see Weiker, The Turkish Revolution, pp. 116–53; Ergun Özbudun, The Role of the Military in Recent Turkish Politics (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), pp. 30–39.
68 As recalled in chapter I, the leaders of the Democratic Party were tried on the island of Yassiada. Former Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and two other former ministers were sentenced to death and executed; other death sentences were commuted to prison terms. Many other prison sentences were passed. In the years following the Yassiada trial, the prisoners were pardoned but their rehabilitation was delayed. The condemnation of Menderes to death (he was considered a martyr by large segments of
There were two attempted military coups following the surrender of power to the civilians: the first on February 22, 1962; the second on May 20–21, 1963. The first was averted by the intervention of reliable army units; the second was easily defeated and the ringleader, Colonel Talat Aydemir, was sentenced to death and shot. The insurgents evidently wished to re-establish a military dictatorship.

The parliamentary democracy operated after 1961 according to constitutional rules and usages. The uncertain coalition of the Republican People’s Party and the Justice Party (considered to be the heir to the outlawed Democratic Party) did not last long; in 1962, Prime Minister İnönü had to renew his cabinet and form a new coalition with some of the smaller parties. Even so, the government was overthrown by a vote of no-confidence in the Grand National Assembly, and early in 1965, the Justice Party combined its parliamentary strength with minor political parties. The prime minister of this new coalition was Suat Hayri Ürgüplü, the nonpartisan president of the Senate, while Süleyman Demirel, the leader of the Justice Party, accepted the post of vice prime minister.

In October 1965, general elections were held, and the Justice Party was returned with an absolute majority in the assembly. Demirel now formed his cabinet from among the members of his party. In March 1966, Cemal Gürsel was succeeded as president of the republic by another military man, the former chief of the general staff, Cevdet Sunay.

After the expiration of the constitutional term of the national assembly, general elections were again held on October 12, 1969. Once more, the Justice Party obtained a majority, and Süleyman Demirel continued to function as prime minister.

Social Justice

The Kemalist principle of statism was a kind of state capitalism. Because its purpose was to strengthen the economic power of the state, its aims were only indirectly social.

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the people) remained a controversial issue. For details of the Yassiada proceedings, see Weiker, *The Turkish Revolution*, pp. 25–47.

In the post-World War II period, the idea of democratization prevailed over all other domestic concerns; foreign aid was required, first of all, to enable Turkey to withstand Soviet aggression. Like all Western ideas, however, the concepts of social progress and social justice have taken root among the leading intellectuals, and the protagonists of the revolution of 1960 were inspired by them.

Within the National Unity Committee, members of the younger element (the “colonels”) were in favor of drastic legislation to promote welfare and economic equality among the people; they particularly demanded measures to raise the standard of living of the peasantry. The constitution adopted provisions which can be considered as having placed Turkey in the category of a “welfare state.”

The conservative hostility to anything “social” stems from the opposition to socialism, largely identified with communism. It has been recalled how Mustafa Kemal used Machiavellian tactics against Communist infiltration at a time when friendship with Soviet Russia was of vital importance for nascent nationalist Turkey. Even during the halcyon years of Turkish-Soviet relations, Communist or Socialist parties and movements remained strictly banned in Turkey.

The Soviet menace, particularly after 1945, elicited anew the traditional Turkish Russophobia, which was now combined with anti-communism. The understandable but often near-pathological suspicion and fear of Russian communism made it difficult for an average Turk to distinguish between Socialist and Communist, especially because the Soviets used both adjectives to characterize their regime.

The animosity was motivated not only by the fear of Russia; this movement was also identified with atheism, anathema to any Muslim believer. On the other hand, the idea of “social justice” is deeply anchored in Islam, and attempts have been made in Turkey to connect Socialist thought with its Islamic pattern. Before the 1961 revolution and after, writers, periodicals, and institutions began to popularize social and So-

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70 In addition to declaring Turkey a “social” state (Art 2), chapter three of the constitution is devoted to “Social and Economic Rights and Duties.” This chapter provides for the protection of the family, agricultural reform, for fair labor conditions, collective contracts and strikes, social security, compulsory education, measures to assure nourishment of the people, etc.
71 See chapter I, p. 19.
cialist ideas and doctrines and to support economic development and social change.\textsuperscript{73}

The foreign policy implications of Turkey’s ideological attitudes were obvious: the protagonists of Socialist thought were, to a greater or lesser extent, anti-American or anti-NATO, whereas their adversaries were more or less committed to the official Western orientation. Simultaneously, the pro-Socialist group was more lenient or directly sympathetic toward the Soviet Union and what it stood for, whereas their opponents were either vehemently anti-Soviet and anti-Communist or at least highly suspicious of the Soviets. These ideological attitudes greatly influenced the postures of political parties but did not very significantly affect the basic foreign policy line of the government either before or after the revolution of 1960.

\textbf{Governmental Foreign Policy}

The official foreign policy of the Turkish republic is frequently regarded as essentially unchanging, consistent, resolute, and popularly supported.\textsuperscript{74} For a correct understanding of the matter, it is important to distinguish between the fundamental goals of Turkish national policy and long- or short-range foreign policy objectives.

The fundamental goals of national policy, as determined under Atatürk, have not changed, although they have become better defined and updated to meet the more exacting requirements of the world today. Policies for the promotion of these goals have been modified, and from this narrower point of view, it may be rightly stated that the foreign policy of Turkey has undergone considerable change since the death of the founder of new Turkey. All of her foreign policy moves must be appraised in terms of the national interest; but the evaluation of what is in the interest of the nation is often controversial and so beset with nuances that decision-making is rendered highly individual.

\textsuperscript{73} Among the periodicals which deal with problems of economic development or social and socialist ideas, the most prominent ones were \textit{Forum}, \textit{Yön}, \textit{Devrim}, \textit{Türk Solu}, \textit{Ant}; none of them was affiliated with any of the political parties.

To attain national goals, in general, both domestic and foreign policies have to be employed. In the case of Turkey, in view of her far-reaching national goal, greater reliance was placed on foreign policy devices than in the case of many other nations. The fundamental national goals of modern Turkey may thus be summarized.

1. Turkey shares with all independent nations the security aim of preserving national territory, national wealth, and sovereign independence. Because of her exposed geographical location, past historical experiences, and cultural “isolation,” she is more conscious of independence than most other nations—that is, more sensitive to any real or implied encroachment on her sovereignty. Atatürk believed that an uncommitted posture would best suit Turkey’s security needs, but the Soviet threat, which arose in the post-World War II period, persuaded Ankara to seek politico-military alliances.

2. The republic of Turkey, unlike her Ottoman predecessor, is neither expansionist nor otherwise an imperialist power. Nor is she a static, complacent, self-satisfied country. She seeks internal power: economic-industrial, scientific, and intellectual strength, as well as military impregnability. In other words, she seeks to acquire the technological-economic strength of Western great powers such as France, Britain, or, at least, Italy. Accordingly, her economic development is not only a social need; it is primarily a source to strengthen the power of the nation as such. In this respect her paragon is Japan, and she may rightly recall the motto of the Meiji era: “Rich country for a strong army.”

3. There is, however, a basic difference between the successful Japanese venture toward technological equality with the West and the Turkish ambition to modernize. The Turks, in addition to technological equality, wish to be recognized as Europeans, to be assimilated into European civilization. The superiority of the West not only in its technology but also in the form of its civilization had been acknowledged by Atatürk. It even has been alleged that merger into the European West had been sought much earlier.75 This aspiration is now to be accomplished, as expressed by President Sunay:

75 Turkish writers maintain that the Ottoman sultans sought close association with the West at the time of Mehmet II, the conqueror of Constantinople and of Suleyman the Magnificent, in the 15th and 16th centuries. “The fallacies are so well established that it would perhaps be difficult to convince the average Westerner that to become a part of the West has always been the driving force in Turkish history.” Kiliç, Turkey and the World, p. 200.
The Turkish nation has acquired the **quality of becoming a western community of its own will and option**. . . . The Turkish community will attain the **contemporary civilization level** which it desires and deserves only through the path of wisdom and science. The Turkish nation will perpetuate Kemalism, its own ideology, with full confidence and enthusiasm and will definitely realize its aims. To think or do otherwise is to deny Turkdom and the history of reforms.\(^{76}\)

Accordingly, the national policy goal of Turkey is to be, or to become, a member of the European community of nations and an equal in status, civilization, and prestige.\(^{77}\) Europe, in this respect, means the Europe west of the Baltic-Adriatic line; thus, Turkey will remain separated geographically from what she considers Europe. But she will have to overcome hurdles other than those imposed by geography; historic, economic, and social-civilizational differences may, in fact, prove more problematic than geographical isolation. The goal is ambitious, perhaps over-ambitious, but Turkish commentators like to point to Russia, which has grown from semi-feudal status into a technological superpower. Furthermore, official Turkey, unlike Russia, recognized that she would be unable to achieve this grandiose purpose without Western assistance. Hence, her diplomacy is directed toward realizing these fundamental policy goals without, however, neglecting the fundamental goal of preserving national security and independence.\(^{78}\)

The overextended Ottoman Empire, at the time of its decline, had to meet commitments beyond its available domestic resources. Today, it is being realized that Turkey’s commitments again are overextended.\(^{79}\) To comply with the commitments she has imposed upon herself, she is compelled to pursue a prudent, expedient foreign policy in which long- and short-range objectives must be subordinated to the fundamental national purpose. Hence, the primacy of foreign affairs in Turkey’s politics.

The same fundamental goals of national policy were supported by

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\(^{76}\) *Son Havadis*, August 31, 1968. (Italics added.)

\(^{77}\) “Our target is to raise our nation to the level of contemporary civilization. *This target includes everything.*” Demirel before the General Executive Board of the Justice Party on November 28, 1968; *Milliyet*, November 29, 1968. (Italics added.)

\(^{78}\) Foreign Minister Çağlayangil expressed this idea before the Mixed Budget Committee of parliament on January 6, 1969, in the following manner: “Turkish foreign policy has three major principles: to serve world peace; to secure national security; to assist her economic development efforts with external aid.” *Cumhuriyet*, January 7, 1969.

the policy decision-makers throughout the history of the First and Second Turkish Republics; it was only that the range of foreign policy-makers widened considerably in the period of democratization. During World War II, the paramount concern for security overshadowed other objectives, for it was only through skillful balancing diplomacy that Turkey avoided entering a war which involved considerable risk. Because of the Soviet menace after the war, she had to throw in her lot with the West. A community of interest among the United States, the other NATO powers, and Turkey demanded the creation of a strong Turkey. Ties with the Western powers, principally the United States, also served the purpose of speeding Turkey’s modernization and European acculturation.

The integral alignment with the United States and NATO, prompted by the fear of Soviet aggression and by the immense advantages of the partnership, created a somewhat shortsighted and unrealistic identification of Turkey’s national interests with those of her partners; it also created an illusory belief that America would support any Turkish policy objective.

The traumatic effect of the revolution of 1960 induced the Turkish leadership to look more closely into the various questions of Turkish foreign policy in the light of the country’s Western involvement. This disillusionment sparked by the lack of Western support in the Cyprus crisis served as another inducement to emancipate Turkey’s international relations from the previous one-way policies. A partial return to the Kemalist foreign policy which recommended friendship with all neighbors was effected; this included resumption of more normal relations with the Soviet Union and closer ties with a number of Middle Eastern nations.

In the post-revolutionary coalition period after 1960, the former taboo concerning debate on foreign affairs was lifted. There followed a heated discussion between leftist and rightist groups, including publicists and academies, which concentrated on the usefulness or harmfulness of NATO membership and the special relationship with the United States. The official policy line continuously pursued by the governments of İnönü and Ürgüplü did not deviate essentially from the earlier course. Supported by almost all political parties, it remained basically pro-Western. But apart from the rapprochement with Moscow, it refused to follow the advice freely given by the Turkish Labor Party and some intellectuals who wished to promote a return to neutralism.

After the 1965 elections, the government of the Justice Party under
Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel did not allow Turkish ties with the West to suffer. It barred, however, any dogmatic approach and vowed to examine foreign policy issues empirically in the light of Turkey’s national interest.

On the whole, it may be said that foreign affairs were conducted in Ankara in a spirit of realism and with no ideological bias; the government tried to avoid giving the impression either of chauvinistic narrow-mindedness or egotistic shortsightedness. This more flexible foreign policy was acclaimed by the critics of the government. They pointed out that it was wrong to adjust every step to the American line, a policy which led to the isolation of Turkey demonstrated during the Cyprus debates in the United Nations. Of course, the government spokesmen were anxious to deny that Turkey is, or ever was, an American satellite.

The official foreign policy continued to be carefully scrutinized by the parliamentary opposition and by the foreign policy elite outside parliament. An often heated discussion appeared to create a split between the opposition and the government. The Turkish public-at-large should yet learn to distinguish between an exchange of opinions and a hostile break between opposing debaters. A prolonged discussion carried on within the Grand National Assembly and in the press over whether Turkey should stay in NATO resulted in a consensus that she should (only extreme leftists continued to oppose this view). Similarly, the almost permanent debate over Cyprus produced much acrimonious criticism but never a clear condemnation of governmental policy.

Once the coalition regimes came to an end, it became customary for the prime minister or minister of foreign affairs to inform and consult opposition party leaders on essential national questions (except for the leader of the Turkish Labor Party, suspected of doubtful loyalty). The

80 “We will be always aware of our national interests and remember that we can never sacrifice them to our sentiments. We will be guided by our conscience and by the national interests based on reality and a rationalism and not by sentimental ideas.” President Sunay’s message dated August 30, 1968; Son Havadis, August 31, 1968.

81 For instance, Abdi Ipekçi, writing in Milliyet, observed that Turkey pursued a mistaken foreign policy after World War II by abandoning a “policy of personality”; she fell into the status of a satellite and consequently lost her prestige in international politics; Milliyet, April 3, 1968. On the other hand, Demirel pointed out earlier: “In her foreign policy Turkey has traditionally acted with dignity and pride. Turkey’s foreign policy is not mortgaged. It is out of the question to mortgage Turkey’s foreign policy.” Milliyet, September 30, 1967.
advice of Ismet İnönü, the experienced elder statesman, was often sought and highly valued by Prime Minister Demirel and his foreign minister. When İnönü declared himself in favor of Turkey's continued participation in NATO, it appeared to everybody that the case was decided: Roma locuta, causa finita. It is, therefore, possible to consider Turkey's foreign policy as a bipartisan and, in many respects, a multi-party policy. This, however, did not exclude major debates and heated attacks on governmental actions or attitudes in international affairs. Since the electoral campaign of 1969, because of the ensuing embitterment of the domestic political climate, foreign policy bipartisanship has also suffered.

Turkey was earnestly endeavoring to improve her image in the international community; in other words, she cared for “international public opinion,” whatever this expression may signify. Being extremely realistic and power-conscious, however, she placed little faith in the United Nations; she considered the United Nations' role in Cyprus constructive, though not decisive, and she often felt frustrated by the Security Council’s inaction when she regarded herself in the right.

Turkey is also intent on scrupulously carrying out her international commitments. In fact, her foreign policy attitude toward international questions is often too legalistic, perhaps the heritage of Ottoman times when reliance on international agreements was—for lack of physical or economic force—the defensive weapon of its diplomacy.

In Turkey, as in other parliamentary regimes, the Council of Ministers, headed by the prime minister and advised by the minister of foreign affairs, is the chief decision-making organ in foreign affairs. Under prevailing practice, whenever a question of major national interest is discussed, the president of the republic participates and presides. In such cases, the chief of the general staff also attends the meeting. Naturally, the cabinet must enjoy the confidence of the two chambers of the Grand National Assembly—the National Assembly and the Senate—for votes of confidence are required. The parliamentary debate on the annual bud-

82 Metin Toker (son-in-law of İnönü) wrote in Milliyet: “It is impossible not to see that the foreign policy today is İnönü’s policy in all respects. This is the best proof that the policy is a national policy.” Milliyet, September 20, 1967. (Italics added.)

83 “Although the United Nations Organization has not yet attained its objectives and has met with difficulties, this should not discourage us.” Foreign Minister Çağlayangil on the twenty-second anniversary of the United Nations: Milliyet, October 25, 1967.
get of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs always provides an opportunity to raise questions of international concern.\textsuperscript{84}

International agreements must be submitted to the legislature; agreements on economic, commercial, or technical subjects with a duration of less than one calendar year must be reported to the assembly, although they do not require legislative approval. “Executive agreements” may also be concluded by the executive power.\textsuperscript{85}

Although basic policy formulations are made in the cabinet, the minister of foreign affairs and his ministry are responsible for day-to-day operational functions. These are not, however, mere routine exercises; they also involve decision-making, analysis, and faithful reporting. In fact, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its minister are in the position of exercising independent authority in matters of political detail and are able to influence the higher level decision-making process.

The office of the minister of foreign affairs is a political appointment, although the incumbents often are former diplomats. Thus, Selim Sarper, the foreign minister of the revolutionary junta, had served as Turkey’s permanent representative to the United Nations, as ambassador to NATO, and as secretary general of the foreign ministry. His successor, Feridun Cemal Erkin, had been ambassador in Madrid and later in Paris. Prime Minister Ürgüplü chose Hasan İşik, the Turkish ambassador to the Soviet Union, as his foreign minister. When Süleyman Demirel formed his cabinet on October 27, 1965, he departed from custom by entrusting the portfolio of foreign affairs to İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, formerly a provincial governor and member of the Democratic Party who had been arrested at the time of the 1960 revolution.\textsuperscript{86}

Çağlayangil’s background was first considered inadequate for the post of foreign minister; the career personnel of his ministry looked upon him with suspicion, and the opposition raised a hue and cry. The new foreign minister, however, who has a good command of French, developed the best qualities of a cautious and astute statesman and diplomat. He is an indefatigable worker and the staff of his ministry has “adopted” him. He has placed emphasis on personal contacts with foreign diplomats accredited to the Turkish government, as well as with national leaders all over the world. He either received foreign visitors in Ankara—mostly his

\textsuperscript{84} See Eren, “Foreign Policy of Turkey,” pp. 312–13.
\textsuperscript{85} Article 65 of the constitution.
\textsuperscript{86} New York Times, October 29, 1965.
colleague foreign ministers from other countries—or traveled himself to foreign capitals. He called himself another “Evlìya Çelebi,” the famous medieval Turkish traveller who is known as the Turkish Marco Polo.87

The career officers of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs alternate between assignments abroad and service in Ankara. The continuity of Turkish diplomacy was hardly interrupted by the rise of the republic; scions of families, many of whose male members served under the Ottoman regime, continued their service for the new Turkey. The traditions of intelligence, loyalty, education, proficiency in French and English, and bureaucratic efficiency remained the hallmark of Turkish foreign service personnel. They constituted the highest level of Turkish civil service and possessed an international outlook and Western acculturation. The Turkish foreign service has not produced stars like Nicolas Politis of Greece, Paul Henri Spaak of Belgium, Charles Malik of Lebanon, or Dag Hammarskjöld of Sweden, but its ministers are trusted collaborators, keen observers, and well-informed, patient listeners. In the past they were generalists; nowadays, the Foreign Relations Academy provides a more novel, specialized training and offers languages other than English and French in the curricula.

The career personnel of the Turkish foreign ministry feel more than anyone else the compelling urge to proceed toward the fundamental goals of national policy; they are fully dedicated to this ideal, but they experience, perhaps more than those who have less contact with the outside world, the enormous difficulties facing their nation in the achievement of such a Herculean task. They are essentially Western oriented but advocate a flexible foreign policy that would keep open the avenues of rapprochement in every direction. They are fully aware of the usefulness of NATO membership and of American friendship but wish to reserve for their country a freedom of action within the limits of existing treaty obligations. They do not share the view that Western ties have turned Turkey into a satellite. They understand fully the basic differences between the character of the Atlantic alliance and the ties of bondage established between Moscow and its so-called allies. Since many of them had served at one time or another in Communist capitals, they appreciate better than some of their countrymen the advantages of a free society.

The foreign service officers of Turkey, having had experience abroad,

87 Cumhuriyet, August 8, 1967.
are less afraid than the staff of other ministries of criticism on policy issues by opposition parties or of the interest of the general public in such affairs. They consider this a healthy development, one inevitable in the course of democratization, and wish to be adaptable in every respect to the changes inside their country and to the evolution of the international scene. They recognize, for instance, the particular importance of Cyprus for Turkey because it is an issue which, in addition to foreign policy and strategical considerations, has attracted emotional interest among the public at large.

The foreign ministry was originally organized after the model of the Quai d'Orsay and partly reorganized after World War II under the impact of international requirements and American influences. The minister is advised by the secretary general who, in turn, is aided by four assistant secretary generals for political, commercial, NATO, and administrative affairs. Political affairs are mainly handled by the five diplomatic affairs departments which represent both a geographical and functional distribution (relations with Europe and the United States; with Asia, Africa, and CENTO; with the United Nations and other international bodies; cultural relations; and protection of Turkish minorities and Turkish citizens abroad). Other departments deal with economic and trade affairs, with press and information services, and with personnel and administrative questions. There is also a Protocol Department, a Political Planning Board, and the Office of the Legal Adviser.

Turkey extended diplomatic representation to countries on all the five continents. She maintains between 60 and 70 embassies or permanent delegations and over 37 consulates or consulates general. Lately, a number of new embassies were opened in Africa and consulates in many parts of the world. The relative importance of the neutralist Third World has now been fully recognized, and Turkish presence in every area is considered useful. Turkey maintained diplomatic relations only with those parts of divided countries (Germany, China, Korea, Vietnam) which the United States recognized and did not follow the British and French initiatives in establishing direct diplomatic contacts with Peking.

To decide on basic questions of national security, Turkey, like the

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89 Cumhuriyet, December 27, 1967; report to the Mixed Budget Committee on the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
United States, maintains a National Security Council which is presided over by the president of the republic and includes, among others, the prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs, the chief of the general staff, and the commanders of the land, naval, and air forces.90

Lately, Turkey also has undertaken a reorganization of her Central Intelligence Organization, the Merkezi Istihbarat Teşkilâti (MIT), which operates both within and outside the country. It acts under the supervision of the prime minister’s office but maintains ties with the foreign ministry and with the Turkish missions abroad.91

The Turkish foreign service has managed to stay outside domestic political squabbles. In view of the cleavage between opposing views on foreign policy, this has not always been an easy task. It has been made possible by recruitment and promotion systems based on the official’s ability and specialization and not on the pressures of party politics.

Turkish foreign policy ultimately depends, as does her domestic policy, upon the will of the electorate. It is being realized that “national policy” is what the popularly supported government is following. As Çağlayangil told the Labor Party deputy, Behice Boran, during the budget debate:

Behice Boran called for a national policy. What is meant by a national policy? If it means a policy in keeping with national interests we are already following such a policy. If it is a question of a policy on which all political parties agree it is impossible, because the views of Behice Boran are common knowledge.92

Behind the façade of a quasi-consensus on national policy aims (something not necessarily endorsed by the Turkish Labor Party), there exists, however, a pluralism officially represented by the various political parties and relevant to the understanding of Turkey’s relations with the outside world.

91 The traditions of the Turkish intelligence service date back into Ottoman times. During and after World War II, Naci Perkel, who retired in 1953, headed the intelligence activities in a brilliant manner. Turkey allowed British and French intelligence agents to work in Turkey but under the constant surveillance of the Turkish services and in such a manner that the Soviets could never raise justified complaints. See Perkel’s statement in Milliyet, April 8, 1968. For the MIT, see Cumbüriyet, August 13, 1968; Son Havadis, January 4, 1969.
92 Milliyet, January 8, 1969.