Bridge across the Bosporus

Published by Johns Hopkins University Press

Bridge across the Bosporus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey.

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From Empire to Nation-State

Allah said to the Prophet: “I have a host which I have called ‘Turk’ and settled in the East; if any people shall arouse my wrath, I shall give them into the power of this host.”—KORANIC APOCRYPHA (Kashgari)

For centuries the Turks have been moving in the same direction. Always from the east to west. There are many countries but one civilization. National progress means participation in this civilization.—ATATÜRK

According to the Turkish tradition, the founders of the Ottoman Empire were, originally, nomad tribesmen who settled around Yenişehir in western Asia Minor in the first half of the thirteenth century. This area along the Byzantine borderland was given to them in fief by Ala-ed-Din, the Seljuk sultan of Konya (the ancient Iconium), and in return they were to protect the border against the infidels.

The Turks

Central Asian Turks began moving into the domains of the Abbasid caliphs of Baghdad in the tenth century; converted to Islam, they were assigned to extend the Daru’l-Islam (the World of the Faithful) and also to fight other enemies of the caliphate. As occurred with the Germanic mercenaries of Rome, however, the Turkish immigrants soon established independent principalities. Seljuk founded the dynasty that bears his name, and in 1071 his grandson, Alp Arslan, defeated the Byzantine Emperor Romanos IV at the famous battle of Manzikert (in Turkish: Malazgirt). Thereafter, most of Asia Minor passed under the control of the Seljukides. The Hellenized or partly Hellenized inhabitants of that part of

1 The Greeks called Asia Minor Anatolia. It is now Anadolu in Turkish.
the East Roman (Byzantine) Empire became, to a large extent, converted to Islam and were assimilated by the conquerors. Due to the Crusades, the “frontier” between Christendom and Islam oscillated during the next 100 years and eventually froze.

The particular group of “warriors of the faith” (Ghazi-s) who settled in the Islamic-Byzantine borderland was small—we are told that they numbered only 400 “tents.” This Ghazi principality, unlike similar border states, instilled a new ultimately global dynamism into Islam—a dynamism injected this time by a non-Arab people. It became the nucleus of a powerful new state which developed in the course of the next 100 years into a “world” empire.

It is hardly doubtful that the character of this people and the qualities of their leaders were responsible for a “miracle” second only to the Roman Empire’s growth from a Tiberian hamlet. The Osmanli or Ottoman Turks were so called after their first outstanding leader, Osman or Othman (1259–1326), the founder of a dynasty which continued to reign for the next 600 years. The military and political organization of this fledgling people was geared to permanent warfare, to conquest, and to domination over alien nations. This system proved to be most durable and served to distinguish the Ottoman Empire from other, more short-lived oriental empires, and from those of Alexander or Napoleon.

During its time of expansion and greatness, the source of Ottoman power was the person of the sultan (who had many titles, among them that of a Padishah). He subsequently assumed the rank of a caliph, the successor of the Prophet and “shadow of God on earth.” He was surrounded and assisted by a “slave family” of courtiers, administrators, and soldiers (the famous Janissary corps). The sultan’s household was re-

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2 Byzantine misrule, the dynamism of the Islamic advance, and the belief that God is on the side of the victors contributed to the expansion of the Muslim religion and the simultaneous “Turkification” of the Anatolian population.


4 Arnold J. Toynbee considers the Ottoman system the result of an adaptation of the nomad Steppe people to more sedentary conditions when they became “shepherds of men” and used slaves (as they formerly had used dogs) to keep order among and acquire more “human cattle.” A Study of History, abridgment of vols. I–VI (New York, 1956), pp. 173–74.
THE TURKS

cruited by force from Christian families\(^5\) whose sons were trained and educated in strict discipline to become fervent Muslims. According to their talent, they could become palace attendants or members of the bureaucracy or of the armed forces; the most successful ones among them rose to become Grand Vezirs, provincial governors, or great military leaders. All they possessed belonged to their master; in fact, they depended entirely on the whim of the sovereign whom they had to serve without murmur. Other contingents of the Ottoman armies consisted of feudal fief-holders serving as cavalrymen (sipahis); but the “slave system” essentially prevented the growth of a hereditary nobility or aristocracy. Offices of religious dignitaries (who also were the judges) were reserved, by tradition, to free Muslims.

Settled at the marches of the Islamic world, the state of Osman expanded, first toward the west but later toward the east. Orhan, the son of Osman, captured Bursa (Brussa) and made it the first Osmanli capital. Before his death, in or around 1355, the Turks crossed the Dardanelles and entered the European parts of the decaying Byzantine state. Soon, under the reign of Murad (1359–89), they annexed the major portion of the Balkan peninsula, leaving behind them the city and surroundings of Constantinople, which by then had become encircled by Ottoman territory. Simultaneously, the Ottoman sultanate expanded across Asia Minor, gradually incorporating all Seljuk Turk principalities in that area. The setback which the Osmanlis suffered after the Mongolian invasion of Timur Lenk (Tamerlane) in 1401 halted their advance only temporarily. After the body’s truncation, the head of the long-moribund East Roman Empire (the City of Constantinople, or Byzantium) was finally conquered by Sultan Mehmet II in 1453. The city, also known as “the Second Rome,” became the seat of his empire.

The stimulus of a political and ideological frontier sparked the expansion of the Osmanli Turks who, within 100 years, had created a colossal military and political power that territorially replaced the Roman Empire of the East. Indeed, the geographical configuration of the Ottoman state, as well as much of its ethnic composition, recalled its territorial predecessor. It covered the area in Europe, in Asia, and in Africa

\(^5\) The collection of a levy of boys was known as devşirme; it was not completely discontinued until the eighteenth century. See Léon Lamouche, Histoire de la Turquie depuis les origines jusqu’à nos jours (Paris, 1934), pp. 24–25; Basilike D. Papoulia, Ursprung und Wesen der “Knabenlese” im Osmanischen Reich (Munich, 1963).
that the Byzantine Empire covered in its heyday. But though the political purpose and missionary goal of Byzantium were the service of the Orthodox Christian faith, the universal state of the Ottomans was ostensibly dedicated to the cause of Islam. The Byzantines had superimposed a Graeco-Roman ethos on their numerous non-Hellenic subjects. Similarly, the Osmanlis were themselves impregnated by Arab-Muslim ideology while supplementing their system of government with many institutions adopted from their Byzantine predecessors. Much of the original Turkish substance of their culture was lost. While the Ottoman Empire flourished, a considerable proportion, perhaps more than one-half of its population, consisted of non-Muslim, Christian elements, and among the Muslims the Turks could hardly hold a majority. Thus, the empire was multinational, religiously almost evenly divided, and more Arab-Islamic than Turkish. In its usage as an official language, the original Turkish came under the influence of the more refined Arab and Persian languages. Only foreigners called the empire “Turkish”; inside the Muslim world, it was known as Memalik-i Osmaniye or, more recently, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu (Ottoman Empire). It was even considered insulting when a subject of the sultan was called “Turk,” for this word connoted a rather boorish Anatolian peasant. When the Romans conquered much of their known world, they exported the name of Rome to all the corners of their empire, but in building their realm, the Turks had, to a great extent, lost their identity within this Islamic Empire. It took many centuries before they were able to recover it.

**The Ottoman Past**

The Ottoman Empire was a theocratic state. The sultan, even before he assumed the title of caliph, combined religious and political authority. In fact, the original Islamic concept of state and society did not distinguish between religious and secular, or spiritual and temporal, duties. The sultan was high priest, hereditary ruler, and military leader. His authority was limited only by the precepts and traditional interpretation of the

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7 Sultan Selim I became guardian of the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina. The Caliph, “successor” of the Prophet Mohammed, was the chief Imam (priestly leader of the people) and “Commander of the Faithful”—that is, defender of Islam, so recognized only by the Sunni Muslims.
Koran. He was master of life and death not only over his “slave household” but also over all of his subjects.

Islam was more than a religion: it was a way of life, a philosophy, and a political and legal system. But its tenets could not, by definition, be made applicable to non-Muslims, except for the Koranic precept that submitting “peoples of the Book” (the Bible) should be spared and protected by their Muslim rulers. Thus, the Ottoman state failed to have—nor was it interested in having—legislative tools to regulate the internal life of non-Muslims. Accordingly, the non-Islamic religious communities of the Ottoman Empire were allowed to enjoy self-government in matters of culture, religion, and private legal relations between their members. This was the millet system. The leader of a millet, responsible to the sultan for the management of the affairs under his direction, was the highest ecclesiastical office-holder of the respective community. Chief among such leaders was the head of the Millet of Rum, the Greek Oecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople. All Orthodox Christians were deemed to belong to this group unless special millet status had been conferred on them. Despite this fragmentation, the Ottoman administration was highly centralized, and the millet system was not a source of weakness for centuries. It was not until the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries that religious and national minorities began to rebel against Ottoman authority.

Theocratic governments are, by their very nature, rigid; they are able to transform themselves in response to external stimuli only with great difficulty and frequently only by sacrificing theocracy itself. As we shall see, the Ottoman state was beset by major problems in its attempt to adapt to the requirements of modern, national, technological, and democratic statehood. But as long as Ottoman statecraft and military technol-

8 Millet is an Arabic-Turkish word meaning “people” but, due to the Islamic association, a people determined by its religious affiliation and not by ethnic or linguistic criteria.
9 The head of the millet was known as Millet Baștı in Turkish and Ethnarchos in Greek.
10 Rum is derived from “Romaios”—that is, Roman, as the Byzantines officially called themselves.
11 In the course of time, such status was given to the members of the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Vlach (Rumanian) Church, and finally to the adherents of the Bulgarian Exarchate. Other Christian millets were formed by the Gregorian Armenians, and also by various Catholic communities within the Empire. As late as 1850, a Protestant millet was also recognized mostly for Armenians who joined Protestantism. Jews, under the Grand Rabbi of Turkey, were also considered a separate millet.
EMPIRE TO NATION-STATE

ogy were equal to the forces of Christian Europe, the "monolithic" structure and dogmatic messianism, which would prove to be sources of weakness in the period of decline, secured for the empire a status of unparalleled excellence. Another source of strength of the Ottoman state was the continued rule of sultans of the House of Osman, a unique phenomenon which precluded the dynastic succession crises that prevailed among European ruling families.

Internationally, the Ottoman Empire expanded and exerted pressure in every direction until the end of the sixteenth century. Under Sultan Selim (1512–20) Syria and Egypt were conquered and the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina were placed under the protection of the Osmanli ruler. His successor, Suleyman the Magnificent, defeated the Hungarians at the battle of Mohács (1526), annexed the central part of Hungary, and threatened Vienna. During his reign, Baghdad was captured and the Ottomans became a naval power in the Mediterranean, controlling the North African shore to the border of Morocco. Under Suleyman the empire reached its peak of power, although it was still advancing in certain areas: in 1571 Cyprus and in 1664 Crete were taken. In 1683 the Sultan’s army besieged Vienna; a few years earlier, Podolia and parts of the Ukraine were seized from Poland. But the failure before Vienna marked the beginning of a constant military and territorial retreat. In the Treaty of Karlowitz, the Ottomans surrendered their Hungarian possessions (including Transylvania) and the newly conquered Polish lands; Morea was awarded to the Republic of Venice.

The Ottoman penetration into central Europe and into the Mediterranean (where even Spain felt its menace) caused fear and dismay in all lands adjacent to these areas. France used the Ottoman presence to balance the overwhelming power of the Hapsburgs in Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain. From the time of Francis I, the French monarchs sought support or even alliance in Constantinople in order to outflank their Hapsburg adversaries. In return, Viennese diplomacy tried to foment wars between the Ottoman Empire and Persia at the eastern flank of the sultan’s domains.

In view of the special position that France held at the Sublime Porte (as the Ottoman government was officially known), she was one of the

12 It was the first real peace treaty concluded by the Sublime Porte; up to that time, the *Jihad* (Holy War against the infidels) was interrupted only by limited armistices.
first powers whose citizens were given the rights known as capitulations.\textsuperscript{13} The capitulatory system originally stemmed from an Islamic unwillingness and incapability of handling the status and legal affairs of non-Muslims. Not unlike the millets, foreign residents (mostly businessmen and tradesmen) were permitted, under agreements concluded with Christian states, to manage their own communal and private affairs. Accordingly, foreign consuls were in charge of the legal and financial matters of their nationals, including criminal and civil jurisdiction. These privileges, originally less a favor than simply the result of the Ottoman system, were subsequently felt to be a derogation of the Ottoman state's sovereignty.

The internal decay of the Ottoman Empire began much earlier than its external decline. Yet, it is extremely difficult to demonstrate a reciprocal relationship between domestic defects and the loss of power in the foreign field.\textsuperscript{14} It is perhaps correct to say that the reverse in military fortune and power potential was due equally to two ascendant factors: first, the weakening of the internal Ottoman power; and second, the shifting of power relations between the European states and the Ottoman Empire to the obvious disadvantage of the latter.

DECLINE, REFORM, AND REVOLUTION

It is virtually impossible to determine the exact date of the beginning of the decline of Ottoman power.\textsuperscript{15} Even after the disastrous wars against the western coalition of the Holy Roman Empire (Austria) and Venice,

\textsuperscript{13} The name is derived from the low Latin word \textit{capitulum}, which meant "chapter." The treaties providing for these extra-territorial rights were divided into chapters and were first drafted in Latin. The Republic of Venice, having had important trading contacts with Byzantium, was the first to conclude such a treaty in 1521. The capitulation treaty with France was signed in 1535; see J. C. Hurewitz, \textit{Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East} (Princeton, 1956), vol. I, pp. 1–5. For the Capitulations see Nasim Sousa, \textit{The Capitulatory Regime of Turkey: Its History, Origin, and Nature} (Baltimore, 1933).

\textsuperscript{14} Even after the defeats suffered at the hands of the Holy Roman Empire armies, contemporary Ottoman leaders, though criticizing certain abuses, did not relate the military disasters to domestic defects. See the writings of (Sari) Mehmed Pasha, \textit{Otoman Statecraft: The Book of Counsel for Vezirs and Governors}, translated by Walter Livingston Wright, Jr. (Princeton, 1935).

\textsuperscript{15} Toynbee considered the Russian-Turkish Treaty of Kuchuk-Kaynarja (1774) as the beginning of Ottoman decline. This treaty gave the Tsar the right of protection over Orthodox Christians and ceded the northern littoral of the Black Sea (including the Crimea) to Russia; \textit{A Study of History}, p. 173. On the other hand, Lamouche sets the date for the year 1812, when the Treaty of Bucarest provided for the cession of Bessarabia to Russia and recognized the autonomy of Serbia; \textit{Histoire de la Turquie}, pp. 249–50.
which ended with the Treaties of Karlowitz (1699) and Passarowicz (1718), respectively, the Ottoman Empire remained a formidable power. For example, by the Treaty of Belgrade (1739), which concluded the war of 1737–39, the Ottomans regained the territories lost at Passarowicz, including Belgrade; the war of 1788–91 with Austria and Russia ended in a draw.

The emergence of Russia as a great power brought about a major shift in the balance of power, to the detriment of the Ottoman Empire. Peter the Great already had sought to eliminate Ottoman control from the northern shores of the Black Sea. When this plan was successfully completed under his successors, Russia appeared as a naval power in the Black Sea (which previously had been an internal Ottoman lake), the sultan had to abandon his vassal, the Tartar Khan of Crimea, and Russian armies invaded Moldavia and Wallachia, the so-called Danubian principalities. Empress Catherine the Great conceived the first of a number of plans for the partition of the Ottoman Empire among Russia, Austria, and Venice; her son, Constantine, was to take over a restored Byzantine state with Constantinople as its capital, thereby setting an example for subsequent Greek ambitions known as the “Megali Idea” (the grand idea or scheme).

But Austria was not proceeding in accordance with Russian expectations. The Tsars had advanced themselves as protectors of all the Slavic peoples, especially those professing the Eastern Orthodox faith. By the end of the eighteenth century, it was realized that Russian influence over the Balkan peninsula would contravene the vital interests of the Hapsburg Empire. Although France had been backing the Sublime Porte since the early sixteenth century, Britain did not appear on the stage until this point. In order to prevent the take-over of the Bosporus and Dardanelles (the Turkish straits) by Russia and the entry of Russian naval forces into the Mediterranean, Britain joined in the defense of the tottering Ottoman power.

Amid increasing power rivalries and threats to its independent existence, the Sublime Porte soon recognized that its survival depended on the skillful employment of a balancing diplomacy, built upon a central strategy of inhibiting the most dangerous and threatening power by

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16 See B. H. Summer, Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire (Oxford, 1949).
invoking the assistance of the others. Generally, but not exclusively, the empire of the tsar was considered the most immediate and formidable danger. The sultan’s advisers also realized that their greatest asset was the strategically invaluable possession of the straits (including the City of Constantinople); whereas other territories of the empire were divisible among the contending powers, the straits area was not.

Whereas Austria, after the end of the eighteenth century, regarded the integrity of the Ottoman Empire as an indispensable element of European equilibrium and of essential interest to her security, France and Britain occasionally shifted their policy against the Porte. During the French revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, Bonaparte’s Egyptian campaign was considered a hostile act against the integrity of the Ottomans. Later, when Napoleon fought Austria and Russia, he sought an Ottoman alliance against the latter (1805–7). Russia and Britain had previously supported the Sublime Porte against the French; now they both turned against the sultan. The sudden volte-face of Tilsit (similar to the reversal of policies under the Stalin-Hitler pact in 1939) exposed the Ottoman Empire to a danger of partition. In late 1807 and early 1808, secret negotiations took place between Napoleon and Tsar Alexander I about the disposal of the Ottoman state; only their inability to reach an accord concerning the straits and Constantinople prevented an agreement and, eventually, persuaded the French emperor to turn against Russia.18

The more enlightened Ottoman leaders wished to parry such external and internal dangers. Although none of the protective measures they took were fully successful, they did prolong the life of the empire until the end of World War I.

The antiquated Ottoman system proved to be the greatest hurdle for any attempt to rejuvenate and invigorate the state. Most of the sultans had ceased to be leaders and lived in the seclusion of the palace, exposed to intrigues and often threatened by their own courtiers and bodyguards. The millet system ceased to function reliably because of the nationalist or separatist ambitions of many of the national and religious groups. The capitulations created extraterritorial foreign colonies which monopolized and exploited economic resources.

The power potential of an empire may, in most cases, be equated

with its military power. The erstwhile organizational and technological superiority of Ottoman armies over those of the West had been reversed; now they were distressingly inferior. The suppression of the parasitic Janissary class, after several revolutionary changes involving bloody massacres and the deaths of two sultans, enabled Mahmud II to set up armed forces on the modern pattern in the 1820’s. During the Tanzimat period, which lasted for about 40 years from 1839, the Ottomans wished to convince the world that the empire had embarked on the road to Westernization and should be accepted as an equal in the European family of nations. Equality under the law for all Ottoman subjects irrespective of creed and nationality, economic modernization (Western institutions of customs, taxation, banks, and public works), modern methods of transportation and communications (railroads, telegraph), and a reformed administrative system (with consultative popular bodies) were the main features of this reorganization. An attempt was even made to provide a new ideological foundation for the empire based on “Ottomanism”—a dynastic national sentiment with a subdued Islamic content that was to embrace the Christian subjects of the sultan. Ottomanism, however, had little appeal to the Christians, for separatist movements continued to threaten the integrity of the state.

Among the Christian nations living under Ottoman rule, the Serbs revolted first (1817) and were followed by the Greeks (1821). The Rumanians in the Danubian principalities had always enjoyed limited self-government, yet they wished to be united and attain independence. Montenegro also constituted herself as a secular state. All of these nations were able to gain recognition as sovereign states during the nineteenth century. Bulgaria, in the center of the Balkan peninsula, also obtained statehood in 1878. Hellenic national feeling spread over the Greek-inhabited islands of the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean, especially Crete. But large areas of Asia Minor (Anatolia) were also populated by

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19 Other reforms included educational measures (attempts to teach French and to secularize teaching), European-type ministries, the fez and frock coat instead of turban and oriental robes.

20 Tanzimat—reorganization—began with the Imperial Edict of Gülhane (1839) and was followed in 1856 by the Hatt-i Humayun (illustrious rescript). The latter was to implement the principles announced in 1839 and for the first time contained no reference to the Koran.

21 For Ottomanism (Osmanlılık, in Turkish) see Davison, Turkey, pp. 80–81.
Greeks, as well as Turks. Armenians, mainly settled in eastern Anatolia but also scattered over many parts of Asian Turkey and Constantinople, likewise started a long series of clandestine and later overt bids for autonomy or independence.

Secessionist endeavors were not restricted to Christians. Mehmet Ali, Pasha of Egypt, who had modernized his army before the Turks modernized theirs, established a de facto independent state, conquered Syria, and even marched into Anatolia (1832). He was supported by the French, whereas the sultan had to rely on the assistance of Britain and Russia. Russian troops landed on the Asian shore of the Bosporus, north of Constantinople, to protect the capital. By the Treaty of Hunkâr-Iskelesi (1833), the sultan signed a defense alliance with the tsar and promised to consult the Russian government on matters of “tranquillity and safety” and to close the Dardanelles to foreign warships. British, French, and Austrian pressures forced the Russians to withdraw, but the precedent of garrisoning the straits attracted the imagination of later Russian and Soviet chancelleries.

Twenty years later, Tsar Nicholas I attempted to solve the “Eastern Question” by placing the Sick Man of Europe under his control. This time both France and Britain, with the diplomatic support of Austria, stepped in to save the Ottoman Empire. Russia suffered defeat in the resulting Crimean campaign, and by the Treaty of Paris (1856), the territorial integrity of the empire was once more secured. In addition, Russia had to demilitarize her Black Sea shores. The treaty also formally admitted the Ottoman Empire into the European community, and her great-power status was thus recognized.

In 1877-78, Russia took her revenge: her troops penetrated deep into the Balkans and reached the outskirts of Constantinople. The Treaty of San Stefano, setting up a Great Bulgaria, did not win Britain’s approval; she had already sent her fleet to the defense of the Ottoman capital. The Congress of Berlin (1878), convened under Chancellor Bismarck of Germany, reduced the frontiers of the new Bulgarian state, placed Bosnia-Herzegovina under the occupation and administration of Austria-

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22 Russia, in 1828–29, intervened in favor of the revolting Greeks and, by the Peace Treaty of Adrianople (Edirne), obtained territorial concessions in Asia.


24 For the text of the Paris Peace Treaty, see ibid., pp. 153–56.
Hungary, and confirmed the cession of Batum, Kars, and Ardahan along the Asian border of Turkey to Russia.\textsuperscript{25} In return for British protection, the sultan had previously assigned the island of Cyprus "to be occupied and administered by England." Should Russia restore to Turkey Kars and other conquests of this war, it was agreed that "Cyprus will be evacuated by England."\textsuperscript{26}

The first Ottoman constitution was enacted under the reformist grand vezir, Midhat Pasha, prior to the war of 1877–78. It was partly inspired by the liberal Belgian constitution and partly by the conservative Prussian one which reserved ultimate authority for the monarch. Perhaps St. Petersburg's fear that the new constitution would strengthen and unify the empire prompted the outbreak of the war. After its frustrating end, Sultan Abdulhamid dissolved the parliament, which was not convoked again until 1908.

It was more or less realized by 1878 that Ottomanism was a failure; the Christians of the empire were unreliable and could never be assimilated. There was also widespread distrust of the Western powers, which at that time were extending their colonial empires in Africa and Asia, including some Ottoman territories. Thus, France annexed Tunisia as her protectorate in 1881, and the British occupied Egypt in 1882. Abdulhamid sought to canvass popular support from among the conservative Muslim population of his empire, which included Arabs, Kurds, and Albanians. He again placed emphasis on his office as caliph and favored Pan-Islamic movements. He found foreign support from Germany, whose emperor posed as the friend of the world's 300 million Muslims.

The sultan's personal rule, however, degenerated into an oriental despotism that raised European doubts about the viability of the Ottoman Empire. Fortunately for Turkey, Russia was involved in her Far Eastern expansion, and Britain and France refrained from outright hostile actions during most of Abdulhamid's reign. Austria-Hungary, on her part, wished to keep the Balkans quiet, while Germany extended diplomatic support to the Sick Man of the Bosporus.

Despotism and cultural stagnation created internal unrest, and Tur-

\textsuperscript{25} For the Treaty of Berlin of July 13, 1878, see \textit{ibid.}, pp. 189–91.
\textsuperscript{26} The Cyprus Conventions between Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire was concluded on June 4, 1878; \textit{ibid.}, pp. 187–89. Also Martens, \textit{Nouveau Recueil Général de Traités}, VI Série, 3, pp. 272–75.
key became a hotbed of plots and conspiracies. The most powerful group among Abdulhamid's Turkish opponents was the Young Turks (Committee of Union and Progress) who had many followers among officers of the army. Although some groups continued to profess Ottomanism, the Young Turks became convinced that rejuvenation had to be based on Turkish nationalism instead of Islamism, or on the unifying force of the house of Osman. Some of the young Turks cherished Pan-Turkism or Turanism, an aspiration to unify all Turkic peoples that was directed against Russia.

In July 1908, a revolution broke out in Macedonia, where Ottoman forces were stationed. Spreading like a forest fire, the revolutionary fervor overtook Muslims and Christians alike whose energies were directed toward the restoration of the constitution of 1876. The sultan submitted to the demand and a new parliament was convoked. Religious and reactionary groups attempted, however, to overthrow the constitutional government. This sparked a new revolutionary wave which swept the sultan away in 1909; he was exiled and replaced by his brother, Mehmet V.

The Young Turk government first ruled constitutionally, but popular elections did not favor the Turkish element of the empire. Not only were Turks outnumbered but non-Turkish Muslims, Arabs, Kurds, and Albanians began to develop their respective national sentiments. Renewed modernization efforts were thwarted by the rapid succession of events. In 1911 war with Italy over Tripolitania resulted in the loss of that province. In 1912 the four Balkan powers—Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro—invaded the Ottoman provinces of the Balkans. European Turkey became restricted to the area west of Constantinople. Russia supported her Orthodox brethren while France and Britain remained interested spectators. Only Germany and Austria-Hungary initiated diplomatic activity to save as much of the Ottoman Empire as possible.

After the Treaty of London (May 30, 1913), all that was left of Turkey in Europe was the area east of the Enos-Midyia Line. When the Second Balkan War broke out, because the victorious powers could not agree on how to divide the spoils, the Ottomans recovered the city of Adrianople (Edirne) from the Bulgarians. The islands of the Aegean Sea were divided between Greece and Turkey by a decision of the great powers on December 16, 1913: except for Imbros (Imroz) and Tenedos (Bozcaada), at the entrance of the Dardanelles, all islands were ceded to
Greece. The Italians, however, as a result of their war with Turkey over Tripolitania, still held Rhodes and the so-called Dodecanese islands.

The disastrous defeat, this time inflicted on the Ottomans by a coalition of small powers and not by Russia, left the country in a state of complete disorientation. Leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress exercised control over the sultan and the destinies of the empire. The country was economically exhausted and militarily disorganized. Decision-making depended on a few energetic individuals who lacked the experience of seasoned diplomats of the old school and were overly impressed by the one European power that they believed would be their real friend and supporter. This was the state of affairs in the summer of 1914 when, at the outbreak of World War I, Turkey cast her lot with Germany.

**World War I and the Rise of New Turkey**

Whether the Ottoman Empire could have stayed neutral during World War I must remain a matter of speculation. Participation in the hostilities, in view of the exhaustion of Ottoman resources, was certainly not in Turkey’s interest. Whether she could have been forced into entering the war by the entente powers appears unlikely. These belligerents were primarily interested in using Turkish waterways to supply Russia; such passage by commercial vessels through the straits would have been possible while Turkey remained outside the conflict. Turkey as an active ally was an asset to the Central Powers for two reasons: she barred the route from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea and kept busy a considerable number of enemy forces which might otherwise have been employed on the western and eastern fronts of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Otherwise, her offensive capabilities against Russia on the transcaucasian front and against the Suez Canal were of little consequence.

The reasons the Ottoman state entered the war on the side of Germany and Austria-Hungary were twofold: (1) German influence had gained ascendancy during the short period following the Balkan wars; the Turkish army was equipped and trained by the Germans, and an all-powerful German military mission resided in the capital; Enver Pasha, the most outstanding leader of the Young Turks and Minister of War, was a convinced Germanophile and cherished Pan-Turanistic dreams which could only be realized to the detriment of Russia; (2) although the major-
ity of the Turkish leaders sympathized with Britain and France, they could not point to any tangible help which could be expected from these powers. Furthermore, the Turkish elite was frustrated by the economic interference of these powers and their nationals in the affairs of the empire. (This was less true for the Germans who were late-comers to the Near and Middle East.) To get rid of the capitulatory system at last seemed to many a worthwhile reason for entering the war.27

It should also be remembered that on July 22, 1914, when the conflict was still restricted to Austria-Hungary and Serbia, it was Enver Pasha who suggested the signing of a treaty of alliance with Germany. On August 2, when German forces were already massing to invade Belgium, a secret treaty was signed committing the Ottoman Empire to join Germany should the latter be involved in the war.28 Nevertheless, the Sublime Porte at first declared its neutrality; but a further event precipitated the decision to fight. The British government had requisitioned two Turkish warships, one nearing completion in one of their shipyards, and another in England for repairs. By a grandiose gesture, the kaiser presented the Ottoman navy with two brand-new German warships which had taken refuge in the straits from the British.29 These vessels, still manned by their German crew, bombarded Russian targets along the Black Sea coast in late October; Russian, French, and British declarations of war on the empire followed forthwith.

Sultan Mehmed V, in his capacity as caliph, declared a *Jihad* (Holy War against infidels); however, this failed to impress Muslim soldiers fighting in the French and British ranks. Nor did it discourage Arabs from revolting against their Turkish masters.

The Ottoman Empire was immediately engaged in hostilities in eastern Anatolia against the Russians and in Mesopotamia, Arabia, and Palestine against the British and their allies. Furthermore, in March 1915, a formidable armada of British–French combined naval and land forces undertook to capture the Dardanelles in order to open up the shipping route to the Black Sea. The Ottoman army under German command suc-
cessfully repulsed the attack. It should be noted that a Turkish colonel, Mustafa Kemal, who later became the founder of modern Turkey, distinguished himself in combat on the Gallipoli peninsula.

Turkish resistance was less successful in other theaters of the war: Russians penetrated deep into eastern Anatolia; the British captured Baghdad and, with the help of Arab irregulars, entered Palestine and Syria. Only in Anatolia, and only after the outbreak of the revolution in Russia, were the Turks able to regain their lost territories. This was an area of mixed Armenian and Muslim population, and because the former assisted the Russian advance and committed atrocities against Muslims, the government of Constantinople had ordered in 1915 the deportation of all Armenians, except those in Constantinople. This measure, accompanied by widespread excesses, resulted in the tragic extermination of a considerable part of the Armenians.

With the collapse of the Central Powers, Turkish resistance came to an end, and an armistice was signed at Mudros on October 30, 1918, which, among other stipulations, permitted Allied forces to enter the straits and Constantinople. The armistice line followed roughly the northern borders of Syria and Mesopotamia, but the Allies were, in addition, allowed to occupy “any strategic points in the event of a situation arising which threatens the security of the Allies.”

During the war, the Allies had entered into a number of agreements for the partition of the Ottoman Empire. As a result of diplomatic notes exchanged between March 4 and April 10, 1915, Britain and France had reversed their century-old policy and agreed that “the question of Constantinople and the Straits would be definitely solved” by incorporating the area into the Russian empire. France was to receive Syria and Cilicia, and Great Britain was to be compensated by a larger sphere of influence in Persia. Under the so-called Sykes-Picot Agreement, Russia was further to receive most of eastern Anatolia (including the towns of Erzerum, Trabzon, Van, Bitlis, and Kurdistan), while the British were to have Palestine and Mesopotamia. Finally, French control over Syria and Cilicia

31 The City of Constantinople, the western bank of the Bosphorus, of the Sea of Marmara, and the Dardanelles, as well as southern Thrace to the Enos-Midya Line; also the area between the Bosphorus and the Sakarya River to a point in the Gulf of Izmit; the islands of the Sea of Marmara, and Imbros and Tenedos, at the entrance of the Dardanelles—were all to be annexed by Russia. Ibid., pp. 7–11.
was once more confirmed. Under the agreement of May 23, 1915, Italy was also to receive a share of the Ottoman Empire: in addition to the Dodecanese Islands, Antalya and its hinterland was to become an Italian sphere of interest. Under the Saint-Jean de Maurienne Agreement between Britain, France, and Italy, the latter was even promised the administration of Smyrna (Izmir) and Mersin. The Constantinople Agreement and other arrangements with Russia had, as a consequence of Russia’s withdrawal from the war, lapsed; but Britain, France, and Italy submitted to the Paris Peace Conference their respective demands based on the previous agreements.

After a century and a half of struggle for rejuvenation and survival, the Ottoman Empire lay prostrate; its Arab provinces had seceded; its capital was at the mercy of occupying forces; and even the heartland of Turkism, Anatolia, was threatened with dismemberment. It appeared that the Sick Man of Europe had passed away and that its severed limbs as well as its truncated body would no longer enjoy sovereign existence. The draft peace treaty handed to the representatives of Sultan Mehmed VI Vahideddin confirmed this appearance. It stipulated that Greece was to receive the remaining portion of European Turkey (eastern Thrace), except for a narrow piece of territory west of Constantinople; Izmir (Smyrna) and its hinterland in western Anatolia was to be under Greek administration. In addition to the abandonment by the Turks of all Arab lands (Syria, Mesopotamia, Hejaz), a sovereign Armenian state and a self-governing Kurdistan were to be formed in eastern Anatolia. Furthermore, France and Italy were to be entitled to carve out “spheres of economic influence” from the remaining Anatolian provinces. Capitulations, abolished during the war, were to be restored and the country placed under external financial control. The straits were to be governed

32 This agreement is based on an exchange of diplomatic notes dated from April 26 to October 23, 1916. The original details had been worked out by the experts of the Foreign Office and of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sir Mark Sykes and Charles François Georges-Picot. Ibid., pp. 18–22.

33 This agreement was negotiated at the time of Italy’s entry into the war against Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Turkey; ibid., pp. 11-12.

34 Italy was left out of the advantages foreseen under the Sykes-Picot Agreement. She therefore insisted on her share in the partition of Turkey, in addition to the agreement of May 23, 1915. This second agreement was concluded at Saint-Jean de Maurienne on April 19, 1917. Approval by the Russian government, because of the revolutionary situation in Russia, could not be obtained; ibid., pp. 23–25.

35 President Wilson’s Fourteen Points had, however, stated that the Turkish portions of the Ottoman Empire “should be assured a secure sovereignty.”
EMPIRE TO NATION-STATE

by an international regime. On August 10, 1920, the dictated Peace Treaty of Sèvres was signed by the subservient government of Constantinople.\(^{36}\)

The Young Turk ministers had fled after the conclusion of the armistice. One of the few leaders who wished neither to serve the occupying Allies nor to despair at the future of the Turkish nation was Mustafa Kemal Pasha (promoted to the rank of General after his bravery at Gallipoli). Throughout the war, he was a sharp critic of the ruling Young Turk circles: he was opposed to the German alliance and, although serving with outstanding success on various battlefronts, distrusted the strategy of Enver. He had asked for and received a commission as Inspector General over several army units in Anatolia, ostensibly to restore order but with the avowed aim of organizing resistance. He arrived in central Anatolia in May 1919, just a few days after the Greek landing at Smyrna—a maneuver taken as a great insult to Turkish national pride.\(^{37}\)

During the summer of 1919, Mustafa Kemal, with the assistance of his friends and associates, held several congresses, organized the Union for the Defense of Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia, and encouraged armed resistance, which was at first carried out by irregulars fighting Greeks, French, and Italians in western and southern Anatolia. In eastern Anatolia, a regular Turkish army under the command of Kazim Karabekir Pasha joined the Kemalist movement. Under the pressure of the nationalists, the sultan’s government called for parliamentary elections on November 7, 1919. The new parliament, consisting mostly of nationalist deputies, adopted the National Pact on January 28, 1920, a program which foresaw complete independence, the integrity of territory inside the armistice line inhabited by the Ottoman-Muslim majority, and opposition to restrictions of a political, juridical, or financial nature.\(^{38}\)

In the face of open resistance to the measures they had introduced,

\(^{36}\) After five years, the local parliament of the region of Smyrna (Izmir) might ask for the final incorporation of the area into Greece. Similarly, within one year, autonomous Kurdistan might ask the League of Nations for a confirmation of her status as an independent state. For the text of the Treaty of Sèvres see Hurewitz, Diplomacy, vol. II, pp. 81–89.


the Allies formally occupied Constantinople and arrested many deputies. The sultan dissolved the parliament. Kemal convoked a Grand National Assembly in Ankara which consisted partly of parliamentary deputies and partly of other representatives who came from all sections of Turkey. On April 23, 1920, the assembly passed a resolution establishing its own government; although the sultan’s office was still recognized, he was considered a prisoner of the Allies. The constitutional act of January 20, 1921, declared that “sovereignty belongs without reserve to the nation” and that the Turkish state “is administered by the Grand National Assembly and its Government.”

In return, the sultan’s government sentenced Mustafa Kemal to death in absentia, and its forces, the Army of the Caliphate, unsuccessfully tried to suppress what was considered a rebellion. Actually, the sultan’s authority was restricted to Constantinople and its surroundings. The Greek army, however, advanced into the interior of Anatolia and was stopped only at the two battles of Inönü.

In February 1921, the Allies invited both the Constantinople and Ankara governments to participate in a conference in London where a revision of the Sèvres treaty (still unratified) was offered. Nevertheless, the Ankara government refused to accept the proposals which were far from satisfying the requirements of the National Pact. The Greeks resumed their offensive and were repulsed only at the Sakarya River, 50 miles west of Ankara.

Kazim Karabekir’s forces had in the meantime moved into Armenia, and the Treaty of Alexandropol (later called Leninakan) of December 3, 1920, restored the Turkish border as it was before 1878 (reincorporating Kars and Ardahan), except for the port of Batum. On March 16, 1921, a Treaty of Friendship was concluded between Ankara and the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic which confirmed the border arrangements. Soviet logistic and diplomatic assistance strengthened the position of the Kemalist government against the Allies. At this point, the Allies began to fall apart. The first to go was France, which concluded a separate Agreement for the Promotion of Peace with Ankara. The

39 Smith, Turkey, pp. 157-58.
40 See Davison, Turkey, p. 123.
42 Ibid., pp. 97-100.
agreement provided for a withdrawal of French forces behind the Syrian border and for a special administrative regime in the district of Alexandretta (Iskenderun).\footnote{Ankara considered that the Sanjak of Alexandretta (Iskenderun) was inhabited by a majority of Turks and thus hoped to recover it.}

In August 1922, the reinforced Turkish army defeated the Greeks and expelled them from Anatolian territory within less than a month. Turkish and British troops thereupon confronted each other at Çanakkale, on the Dardanelles, until the Armistice of Mudanya (October 11, 1922) ended all hostilities. Under this agreement the Turks entered eastern Thrace as it was evacuated by the Greeks.

Kemalist Turkey thus won the war which she led not for the restoration of the Ottoman Empire but for the survival of the Turkish people as an independent nation. Now the leaders of new Turkey were challenged to win the peace. On November 1, 1922, the sultanate was abolished and Mehmet VI fled abroad. The caliphate was, however, to be held by another member of the house of Osman. This measure was intended only to appease Islamic sensitivity, both inside and outside Turkey; in 1924, even the caliphate was abolished and all members of the Osman dynasty were banished. Turkey then became a republic under Mustafa Kemal, its first president.

The Peace Conference of Lausanne was held from November 20, 1922, to February 4, 1923, and again from April 23 to July 24, 1923, when the peace treaty was signed. The Lausanne treaty essentially fulfilled the demands set by the National Pact; it also carried the distinction of being the instrument which gave international recognition to the present status of Turkey. Consequently, it is held in great respect. Except for the area of Alexandretta (Iskenderun), which was added in 1939 to the national territory, the territorial provisions of the treaty have remained valid to the present day. On Turkey’s European border, the Lausanne treaty restored to Turkey Edirne’s railroad station on the western bank of the Maritsa (Meriç). In the Aegean, Greece kept all of the islands, except Imbros (Imroz) and Tenedos (Bozcaada), although Mytilene, Chios, Samos, and Nikaria were to be demilitarized. The Dodecanese Islands and Rhodes were finally ceded to Italy, together with the small island of Castellorizzo (Meis).

Turkey renounced her rights to all Arab lands and to Cyprus; the
Mesopotamian border remained undecided until the Mosul area was finally allotted to British-mandated Iraq.\(^4\) The Western powers agreed to the complete abolition of the capitulations.

The status of the large Greek minority in Anatolia had become intolerable because of the murderous war between the two nations, and the atrocities committed by both sides. The Lausanne conference resorted to a drastic remedy: the Greeks (Orthodox Christians) in Turkey were to be exchanged for the Turks (Muslims) in Greece.\(^5\) Only those Greeks who settled in Constantinople and the surrounding area (including the islands of Imbros and Tenedos) before October 30, 1918, and the Turks of western Thrace were expressly exempted from this compulsory exchange. Within the next few years, about one and one-third million Greeks left Anatolia, and more than one-half million Muslims were settled in Turkey.\(^6\)

A Convention on the Regime of the Straits was signed by the participants in the Lausanne conference as well as by the Soviet Union. The principle of free navigation for all ships was confirmed, and detailed regulations were set for the transit of various types of craft. An international commission was to supervise the navigation. Turkey undertook to demilitarize the straits area, and the League of Nations was entrusted with the task of protecting the waterways against aggression.\(^7\)

As soon as the international status of Turkey was settled, President Mustafa Kemal began his far-reaching internal reforms. He proved to be a much more radical Westernizer than any earlier Ottoman statesman. His aim was to turn Turkey into a European state and the Turkish people into a European nation because he believed that there was only one type

\(^4\) The Lausanne treaty referred the Mosul question to the Council of the League of Nations. The Council received the report of a commission which made investigations in the area, asked for an advisory opinion from the Permanent Court of International Justice as to its own competence, and finally passed a resolution in favor of Britain (Iraq). Turkey refused to recognize the competence of the Council to arbitrate, instead of mediate, the question.

\(^5\) The determination of persons to be exchanged was to be on the basis of religion. Thus the Karamanli Greeks, speaking Turkish, had to leave Turkey because they were of the Greek Orthodox faith. On the other hand, many Muslims (Turks) of Crete and Epirus, speaking only Greek, were also subject to the exchange.


\(^7\) For the text of the Peace Treaty of Lausanne and the straits convention, see Hurewitz, *Diplomacy*, vol. II, pp. 119–27. For further details of the Regime of the Straits, see chapter V below.
of real civilization: the Western one. Never before or since has such a drastic attempt been made to convert an Islamic people—or a people without a tradition anchored in the Roman–Christian culture and belief-system—into a European nation. Despite rumors to the contrary, Kemal had no intention of converting his people to Christianity. But he did want them to adopt Western European principles and attitudes which had become secularized following the Middle Ages. Although he showed little interest in Islam (having earlier paid lip-service to it for opportunistic reasons), he did not wish the Turks to abandon the faith of their fathers. He thought that the religious content of Islam could be divorced from political, social, and cultural institutions.48

Accordingly, his reforms were political, social, and cultural. The state was founded on a strictly secular basis. The new constitution, passed by the Grand National Assembly on April 20, 1924, declared that “the Turkish State is a Republic” and “Sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the nation.” Although the 1924 version of the constitution still stated that “the religion of the Turkish State is Islam,” this provision was repealed in 1928.49 The religious courts were abolished, and the entire educational system was placed under the supervision of the Ministry of Education. Western legislation was introduced in all matters, including family affairs; thus, the Shariat (sacred Muslim law) no longer remained applicable.

Ankara became the constitutional capital of the new Turkish state. To deprive Constantinople, henceforth officially Istanbul, of its character after 16 centuries as the capital of an empire was motivated by various reasons. The occupation of the city after World War I showed its vulnerability; furthermore, Turkey’s government was to be removed from the implications and influence of the city on the Golden Horn where a cosmopolitan atmosphere, the memories of the sultan-caliph, and big business in the hands of foreigners or non-Turks might militate against the new order.

Discriminations against the female sex were to be abandoned: the

48 During the War of Independence, when Greeks and other non-Muslims fought, religious motivations proved more effective than national sentiment. Also when the Army of the Caliphate, operating under the fetva of the Şeyhiislam (religious opinion issued by the highest interpreter of the Koran) had to be opposed, Islamic incentives were used by Mustafa Kemal.

49 For the English text of the Constitution of 1924, see Donald E. Webster, The Turkey of Atatürk (Philadelphia, 1939), pp. 297–306.
new civil and criminal codes banned polygamy, and women were to be admitted to all professions and schools.

The wearing of the fez, traditional Turkish headgear since Sultan Mahmut II, was forbidden, and the use of European hats was introduced.50 The dervish orders were dissolved and priests of all denominations were prohibited from wearing religious vestments unless performing ecclesiastical functions. The Gregorian, instead of the Muslim, calendar was adopted; Sunday, instead of Friday, the Islamic holy day, was declared a weekly day of rest.

The introduction of Western codes of law and the disestablishment of Islam and of other denominations put an automatic end to the remnants of the millet system. Thus, the administration of the country became secularized and centralized. Equality before the law, for Muslims and non-Muslims alike, became the rule. Although the cultural and educational rights of national minorities were respected, the elimination of “communities” (millet) and the restriction of religious groups to mere brotherhoods of worship rendered members of national religious minorities more vulnerable to public pressures.

The de-Islamization and Europeanization reforms soon extended to script and language. In 1928 the Arabic alphabet was dropped and replaced by Latin characters.51 A sweeping language reform sought to do away with Arabic and Persian grammatical forms and to substitute ancient or living Turkic for Arabic and Persian words. In addition, new words were artificially constructed from Turkish roots. In 1932 all prayers, including the call from the minaret, were ordered to be made in the Turkish language and not in Arabic, the language of the Koran.

In 1934 a law was passed which required everyone to adopt a surname in place of the occasional adjectives often attached to names.52 Mustafa Kemal himself gave family names to members of his entourage: his chief lieutenant, Ismet Pasha, twice victor over the Greeks at the village

50 The Turkish word for European headgear is “şapka,” which had a deprecatory meaning. The expression “şapka giymek” (to put on a hat) meant “turning into an infidel, a traitor.” With the European hat (having a vizor) one could not touch the ground with the head when performing a prayer; thus, the introduction of the hat contained anti-Islamic connotations.

51 In fact, Latin characters suited the Turkish language better than the Arabic script which was geared to the Arabic language. Thus, Turkish was to be written phonetically, and this helped fight illiteracy.

52 Such as the “long Ahmed” or “Mehmet from Bursa.” A few Turkish families, mostly those of a higher social standing, used surnames already.
of İnönü, received “İnönü” as a surname. Mustafa Kemal was officially endowed by the National Assembly with the surname Atatürk (Father-Turk), with which he has entered the pages of history.

The radical reforms of the Kemalist regime, especially those which were or could be interpreted as anti-Islamic, provoked widespread opposition and often overt revolts. Attempts were made on Atatürk’s life. In the east, where traditional ways of life were more deep seated and where the Kurdish tribal system prevailed, religious tribal leaders (sheyks) fomented rebellions. All of these attempts to impede or retard modernization were ruthlessly suppressed, and prison and death sentences were meted out to the opponents of the regime.

During the Lausanne negotiations, Kemal organized the People’s Party, which, after the formal establishment of the republic, became the Republican People’s Party. It remained the only political party throughout Atatürk’s lifetime and even after, although there were two attempts to set up “loyal” opposition parties. Atatürk’s supreme leader certainly intended to expose his country to real democracy, but he was not sure whether his countrymen would be willing or able to implement all of the reforms which he considered indispensable. He therefore practiced a kind of “benevolent autocracy” which should not be identified with leftist or rightist dictatorships. He distrusted both communism (he had the Communist Party suppressed) and Fascism–Nazism and wished to save his country from their contagion. Although he often acted as a despot (in the manner in which Turks were accustomed to be handled before his time), there is reason to believe that he considered his one-party or one-man rule transitional until a rejuvenated modern and democratic Turkey could stand on her own feet.

Foreign relations of Atatürk’s Turkey were dominated by the concern to assert his country’s genuine independence and sovereignty, qualities sorely lacking during the last century of Ottoman administration. Certain mementoes weighed heavily on the foreign policy line of Turkey—

53 These were the Progressive Republican Party in 1924, which was suppressed due to the Kurdish revolt of 1925, and the Free Republican Party in 1930, which had to be dissolved because it proved to be too popular.
54 Kemal showed tolerance toward Communists, whereas the Kemalist movement depended on Soviet assistance but never allowed agents of Moscow to take over leadership. Eventually, in 1925 all Communist activity was forbidden. See George S. Harris, *The Origins of Communism in Turkey* (Stanford, Calif., 1967).
mementoes of foreign intervention in the affairs of Turkey, of economic dependence (partly the result of the capitulatory system, partly of the chronic bankruptcy of the Ottoman treasury), of a lack of jurisdiction over alien or foreign-protected citizens (also due to the capitulations). Strong memories also remained of the recurrent need for foreign military assistance which culminated in the German overlordship during World War I and of the occupation of Istanbul by the Allies. The peaceful international period following the Lausanne Peace Treaty greatly helped the implementation of a constructive diplomacy.

Turkey, alone among Germany's allies, was not a defeated country, although she did lose much real estate. She was not a territorially dissatisfied state and had no "irredenta," although there were Turks in the Alexandretta district. Thus, Atatürk's foreign policy direction, "Peace at home, peace abroad," could easily be obeyed.

During the war of independence, the Ankara government sought cooperative help from Moscow. After the Turkish disappointment over Mosul, a Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality was ostentatiously concluded with the Soviet government on December 17, 1925. Despite this seemingly anti-British move, Turkey mended her fences with Britain by entering six months later into a treaty with that country which settled the border issue.

Atatürk's advisers urged him to lead Turkey into an alliance with one of the great powers, but the president chose to make friends with all Turkey's neighbors as well as with other powers—to pursue a "neutralist attitude" in the modern sense. For the ten years after 1923, the country was not threatened. The arch-enemy, Russia, still suffered under the convulsion of her own transformation. It was more difficult to establish friendly relations with Greece in view of the life-and-death struggle in which Turkey so recently had been involved. Nevertheless, by 1930 a Treaty of Friendship was concluded with Greece, and four years later the Hellenic kingdom became an ally.

Turkey professed great respect for international law and international treaties; the idea of collective security under the League of Nations also appealed to her. She looked, however, with suspicion upon Mussolini's

57 Frontier treaty between the United Kingdom and Iraq, and Turkey of June 6, 1926; ibid., pp. 143–46.
58 In 1932 Turkey became a member of the League of Nations.
Italy, even before the invasion of Ethiopia; the menacing proximity of the Dodecanese islands to the Anatolian mainland was viewed with much distrust in Ankara, especially the heavily fortified island of Leros. Hitler’s rise to power gave Turkey the impetus to seek defensive alliances with her western neighbors. On February 9, 1934, the Balkan Entente Pact was concluded by Turkey, Greece, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. A treaty of mutual defense primarily directed against Bulgaria, the pact held that, should a non-Balkan power attack any of the signatories and be assisted by a Balkan power, the other signatories would also be obliged to go to war against the aggressors. Turkey and Greece, however, were exempted from such an obligation should it involve them in hostilities against the Soviet Union or Italy, respectively.\(^59\)

The failure to stop Italy’s Ethiopian aggression revealed the ineffectiveness of the League’s collective security system. Thereupon, in the spring of 1936 the Turkish government asked for a revision of the regime governing the straits as laid down by the Lausanne Treaty. A conference for this purpose assembled in Montreux, and on July 20, 1936, a Convention on the Regime of the Turkish Straits was signed by Turkey, Britain, France, Japan, the USSR, Australia, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Yugoslavia; after some reluctance, Italy acceded to the convention in 1937. Two most important changes were brought about by the Montreux convention for Turkey: first, the international regime was abolished; second, Turkey was made the “guardian” of these waterways and was authorized to establish fortifications along their course. A compromise was reached between conflicting British and Soviet proposals concerning the use of the straits by warships in time of peace and war.\(^60\)

The contractual revision of the straits regime, at the time of such unilateral actions as the occupation of the Rhineland by Hitler, was a notable triumph of Turkish moderation and diplomacy. Another peaceful change obtained by Turkey concerned the long-coveted Sanjak of Alexandretta (Iskenderun), a region called Hatay by the Turks. This area was already given a special status within the French-mandated Syria under the Franco-Turkish Agreement of October 20, 1921.\(^61\) In 1936 France


\(^{60}\) For the text of the Montreux convention, see Hurewitz, *Diplomacy*, vol. II, pp. 197–203. For detailed description, see chapter V below.

undertook to grant independence to Syria, whereupon Turkey first broached the question before the council of the League and subsequently opened direct negotiations with France. Early in 1937 an agreement was reached which established Hatay as a separate political entity loosely bound to Syria (which was to handle Hatay's foreign affairs) but where Turkish and Arabic would both serve as official languages. Later, owing to disturbances in the area and following Turkish pressures, France agreed that an election be held in July 1938 in the presence of Turkish troops.

Atatürk, however, did not see the successful end of the Hatay affair. On November 10, 1938, on the eve of World War II, he died. His personal role in creating modern Turkey almost effaces the contribution of those who assisted him and the part played by the people of Turkey. The ideas which guided, and still guide Turkey, are mostly his ideas. Turkish statesmen, politicians, professors, and even common people still quote him and profess, rightly or wrongly, to follow his directions.

In foreign policy, Atatürk displayed the greatest asset of a successful national leader: moderation. He was not carried away by his unprecedented and even unexpected success in the war of independence. Although he refused to compromise on issues which he considered vital for the survival of the Turkish nation, he settled on a status quo policy as soon as these goals were attained. He said, "Turkey does not desire an inch of foreign territory, but will not give up an inch of what she holds." He made friends with the former enemies of his country: with Greece, the erstwhile bitter foe, and with Britain, which stood behind the Byzantine dream of King Constantine. He did not hesitate to accept help from Moscow while consciously retaining his Western orientation.

The basic philosophy of national life and national success which he outlined for his people may have appeared overly ambitious or unrealistic to his contemporaries; it appears much less unrealistic now. Turkey may have survived the ordeal of World War I, but without Atatürk she would not be the Turkey of today. For those who are skeptical about the role individuals play in shaping national destinies, the example of the Father of the Turks, despite all his personal weaknesses, would provide an adequate and positive answer.

62 Kinross, Atatürk, p. 521.
The “gathering storm” found Turkey, just as many other states, un­prepared for the struggle that lay ahead, a struggle that might have en­gulfed the country of Atatürk had it not been for skillful diplomacy and a stroke of luck. Since the late twenties, Ankara had considered Fascist Italy her potential aggressor, and Mussolini’s invasion of Albania in April 1939 persuaded the Turkish government to abandon nonalignment in the approaching clash between the Axis powers and Western democracies.

Following the German entry into Prague and Italy’s invasion of Al­bania, Britain sought alliance among East European countries. She ex­tended guarantees to Poland and, subsequently, to Rumania and Greece. Turkey was invited to join in these moves which were intended to for­stall World War II and to protect the countries threatened by German and Italian aggressiveness. France already possessed alliances with Yugoslavia and Rumania.

On May 12, 1939, an Anglo-Turkish declaration was issued to ensure security in the Mediterranean area and in the Balkans; the declaration was to be replaced by a formal treaty of alliance in which France also was to participate. A similar declaration with France was delayed because she was reluctant to cede Hatay to Turkey. By June 20, however, the French government was ready to agree to this cession, and a declaration identical to the British declaration was drawn between Paris and Ankara on June 23, 1939.

When contemplating entry into an alliance with the two Western powers, Turkey acted in the belief that the Soviet government also would soon join Britain and France in an agreement for military cooperation to oppose the Axis powers. In fact, during that summer (1939), British and French diplomacy was feverishly engaged in harmonizing their commit­ments with Soviet participation and, to this end, was simultaneously con­ducting military talks with Moscow.

The unexpected Hitler–Stalin pact, signed in Moscow on August 23, 1939, created an entirely new situation and took Ankara, as well as other capitals, by surprise. Throughout her negotiations with Britain and France, Turkey had made it clear that (as with the Balkan Entente undertakings) she would assume no obligations which would involve her in hos­tilities with the Soviet Union. Soviet complicity in the invasion of Poland followed the signing of the Hitler-Stalin pact and created uncertainties as
to Moscow’s ultimate intentions. Turkish Foreign Minister Saracoğlu journeyed to the Soviet capital on September 26, 1939, before final decisions were made concerning the formal treaty of alliance to be concluded with Britain and France.

Saracoğlu spent three weeks in Moscow in fruitless negotiations with Soviet Foreign Commissar Molotov, who tried to induce Turkey to adopt an attitude of complete neutrality and to close the straits to the “Western imperialists.” Turkey, on the other hand, asked for an agreement that would guarantee Soviet assistance should she be attacked. Molotov, however, would only discuss such an agreement if it would exclude aggression by Germany and suggested common defense of the straits. But the Turkish foreign minister refused to be drawn into an agreement that would be incompatible with Turkey’s already existing commitments and with the international convention concerning the straits. Eventually he returned empty-handed to Ankara where, on October 19, 1939, a Mutual Assistance Treaty was signed by Britain, France, and Turkey. Under Article 1 of this treaty, the two Western Powers agreed that,

in the event of Turkey being involved in hostilities with a European Power in consequence of aggression by that Power against Turkey, France and the United Kingdom will co-operate effectively with Turkey and will lend her all aid and assistance in their power.

Turkey, on the other hand, promised in Article 2 (1):

In the event of an act of aggression by a European Power leading to war in the Mediterranean area in which France and the United Kingdom are involved, Turkey will collaborate effectively with France and the United Kingdom, and will lend them all aid and assistance in her power.

The Western powers also committed themselves to assist Turkey should she be involved in a war in the Mediterranean area because of her commitments under the Balkan Entente. Protocol No. 2, attached to the treaty, exempted Turkey from any action in the case of an armed conflict between her allies and the Soviet Union. By another agreement signed on the same day, Britain and France granted Turkey financial benefits for the purchase of war material and for the support of her exports, which had suffered under German acts of discrimination.63

63 For the text of the treaty, see Hurewitz, Diplomacy, vol. II, pp. 226–28; for the Anglo-French-Turkish negotiations preceding the treaty and Saracoğlu’s visit to
The Soviet government expressed displeasure over the treaty and prophesied that Turkey would regret it; Germany and Italy threatened Turkey with all kinds of economic and other reprisals. At that time Ankara was even under the impression that Germany had expressed disinterest in the territories of southern Europe, even as far as Constantinople and the straits. It should be recalled that Hitler, in like manner, abandoned interest in the Baltic countries which were first occupied by and then incorporated into the Soviet Union; this was also true of Finland, attacked in November, 1939, and Bessarabia, seized from Rumania in 1940.

Until Italy's entry into World War II in June 1940, the Mediterranean area remained peaceful. During that period, Turkish diplomacy tried to transform the Balkan Entente into a more effective instrument. At the annual conference of Balkan states in February 1940, Saracoğlu submitted a plan for collective self-defense against the aggression of any non-Balkan country, with the exclusion of the Soviet Union. But the more exposed members, Yugoslavia and Rumania, were unwilling to join. Bulgaria continued to press for a revision of the frontiers.

In late spring of 1940, Hitler's forces invaded the Low Countries and France, expelled the British Expeditionary Army from the continent, and entered Paris; Italy declared war on Britain and France on June 10, 1940, thus making the alliance with Turkey operative. Nevertheless, İnönü, who had succeeded Atatürk in 1938 as president, refused, with the approval of the British foreign secretary, to enter the war by invoking Protocol No. 2 of the alliance treaty (that such action could involve her in hostilities with the Soviet Union). Many observers may have considered this a weak excuse, but the armistice soon concluded by a defeated France provided an even stronger argument for Turkey to stay out of the war at that time. It was, however, never alleged by Ankara that the treaty had lapsed, only that action under it had been withheld.\textsuperscript{64}

Indeed, the greatest danger to Turkey's independent existence, after

\textsuperscript{64} For the argument whether Turkey violated her treaty obligation, see Kılıç, \textit{Turkey and the World}, pp. 82–83; Ataöv, \textit{Turkish Foreign Policy, 1939–1945} (Ankara, 1965), pp. 73–75; Metin Takoğlu, "Turkey's Quest for Security Through Defensive Alliances," \textit{The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations} (1961): pp. 9–14.
the fall of France and during Britain's struggle for survival, was an agreement between Berlin and Moscow directed at partitioning the region of the Near East between themselves. The situation was reminiscent of the short-lived cooperation between Napoleon and Tsar Alexander I in 1807 and 1808, when they discussed the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. At this juncture, however, Hitler was unwilling (as Napoleon had been before him) to abandon the straits to the Moscovite power. After the campaign against France, Hitler had already made up his mind to solve the “Eastern Question” by attacking and defeating Russia.

Soviet proposals for spheres of influence in the Near and Middle East coincided with the Italian attack on Greece in October 1940. Under the Balkan Entente Treaty, Turkey was not obliged to intervene as long as Bulgaria remained neutral. Facing only the Italians, the Greeks resisted successfully until April 1941, when the Germans, penetrating across the Balkans into Bulgaria, invaded both Yugoslavia and Greece. The defeat of Greece brought German armies to the Turkish border in Thrace and on the Greek islands of Mytilene, Chios, and Samos. At the same time, German success in North Africa threatened to cut off Turkey’s vital supply lines across the Mediterranean and possibly even the Suez Canal. To compound these calamities, a pro-Axis revolt in Iraq became a menace to Turkey’s eastern flank.

Hitler’s decision to march against the Soviet Union instead of Turkey (as was feared in Ankara) saved the latter from the devastations of the war. The gigantic battles in the vastnesses of Russia reduced the Near East for the time being to an area of secondary interest. On June 18, 1941, four days before Germany’s invasion of Russia, the Turkish government signed a Treaty of Territorial Integrity and Friendship with Berlin. London was fully informed of this move and showed understanding.

Under a Soviet memorandum submitted in November 1940 to Germany, Moscow claimed that “the security of the Soviet Union in the Straits is assured by a conclusion of a mutual assistance pact between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, which geographically is situated inside the security zone of the Black Sea boundaries of the Soviet Union, and by establishment of a base for land and naval forces of the USSR within the range of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles by means of a long-term lease.” Moscow also asked for a retrocession of Kars and Ardahan and that “the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf be recognized as the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union.” Hurewitz, Diplomacy, vol. II, pp. 228–30. Italics are added.


The murderous struggle between Germans and Russians temporarily gave Ankara a sense of security. During this fighting, Soviet attitudes toward Turkey oscillated according to the fortunes of war. First, while German armies penetrated deep into the plains of Russia, Stalin praised Ankara for its steadfast and scrupulous neutrality. However, after the victory of Stalingrad and once Soviet armies began to roll back the Germans, Moscow gradually changed its mood toward Turkey.

From mid-1941 until mid-1943, all belligerents felt that the neutrality of Turkey was in their interest. Only after Italy was knocked out of the war and the Mediterranean was cleared of the enemy did the leaders of the Grand Alliance question Turkey's neutrality. Churchill's various plans to strike at the "soft belly" of the Axis included the participation of Turkey. While the Turkish government was, in principle, ready to comply with her commitment as an ally of Britain, she viewed Russia with alarm and did not wish to jeopardize her strength. As President İnönü told Churchill, Turkey did not wish to be occupied by Germany and then "liberated" by the Soviet Union.68

Talks to persuade the Turkish government to reconsider its neutral position opened with Churchill's visit to Adana in January 1943, and culminated with the visit of the Turkish president to Cairo, where conversations were held with President Roosevelt and Churchill after the Teheran summit conference in November-December 1943. The Turkish view was that, should Turkey declare war or the Allied forces enter Turkey, only an adequately equipped Turkish army and air force could successfully risk the expected onslaught of the still-powerful German armies in the Balkans.69 It was believed that without sufficient air cover no operations should be undertaken against the German-held islands in the Aegean Sea; it was feared that Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir might share the fate of Coventry or Rotterdam should a poorly armed Turkey join the Allies.70

Turkish reluctance to enter the war with the Allies created some ani-

69 The British wished to impress Ankara by occupying, shortly after the Italian surrender, the islands of Kos and Leros of the Dodecanese Archipelago, just off the coast of Turkey. These British forces were, however, soon evicted by the Germans. See Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: Closing the Ring (Boston, 1951), pp. 203-25.
70 See Knatchbull-Hugessen, Diplomat in Peace and War, pp. 191-204.
mosity among Anglo-American political circles and gave rise to renewed sharp propagandistic attacks from Moscow. Turkey's every step was closely watched; for instance, the passage of twelve German vessels through the straits was strongly condemned by Britain and later exploited by the Soviets. The ships were formerly used as auxiliary war vessels, and the question was whether they should have been refused passage under the convention of Montreux.  

As Germany's military posture deteriorated, Turkey slowly shifted her attitude from complete neutrality to sympathetic nonbelligerence favoring the Allies.  

Although in Teheran Stalin had supported the Anglo-American demand that Turkey should be induced to enter the war, by late 1944 Moscow preferred that Ankara stay out of hostilities; in the postwar period, they planned to exploit Turkish aloofness during the war. Pressed by the United States and Britain, however, the Turkish government broke off diplomatic relations with Germany on August 2, 1944, and interned German citizens.  

At Yalta in February 1945, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin discussed the revision of the Montreux convention, and the Soviet view gained support. It was agreed that the question would be taken up by the three foreign ministers at a later meeting. The Yalta conference also resolved that only those powers which had fought the Axis or had declared war on Germany by March 1, 1945, should be invited to the forthcoming San Francisco conference to set up the United Nations. Thereupon, on February 23, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey passed a resolution declaring a state of war with Germany. At that time German forces were far away from the borders of Turkey. Eleven weeks later, World War II ended in Europe. The Turkish government was invited to San Francisco and became a founding member of the United Nations.  

A comparison of Turkey's position during World War II with that of the Ottoman Empire in World War I is informative. In 1914 the Young Turk government allowed their country, exhausted from the Balkan wars, to be dragged into the conflict, although it had not been attacked nor was otherwise vitally involved. The position of Ankara during the critical years of 1939–44 was most delicate. For reasons of self-preserva-
tion, the Anglo-French Alliance had to be concluded; however, France’s collapse, the danger of Soviet-German collaboration against Turkey, and Germany’s advance into the Balkans and the Aegean required an ability to adapt to the shifting power positions of the belligerents. Turkish diplomacy succeeded in preserving confidence in the country without provoking either Hitler or the Soviet Union and, ultimately, in staying out of hostilities. But Turkey’s caution in respecting Soviet susceptibilities proved of no avail once Moscow thought the time ripe to turn against Ankara.

The Soviet campaign against Turkey gathered full steam after Yalta, while Soviet forces were occupying Bulgaria. Moscow refused to extend the Turkish-Soviet Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression signed in 1925. According to a Soviet note submitted on March 19, 1945, this treaty was no longer in accord with the new situation and needed serious improvement. Turkey was ready to discuss the details of a new treaty, but in June Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov set two conditions: a revision of the Turco-Soviet border (that is, return of the Kars-Ardahan districts handed back to Turkey in 1921) and an agreement to establish Soviet bases in the straits. The Turkish point of view, throughout these diplomatic exchanges, was that the straits convention could be revised only in agreement with other signatory powers and that Turkish territory was inviolable. Not for a moment did Ankara let itself be seduced by Moscow’s offer of a strip of northern Syria, including the city of Aleppo, in return for the areas she coveted.

At the Potsdam summit conference during the summer of 1945, the question of the Turkish straits was once more discussed. It was agreed that the problem of how to revise the Montreux convention was to be treated first between the three Potsdam powers and Turkey. Consequently, both the United States and Britain submitted proposals to Ankara; these were accepted by Turkey as a basis for discussion at an upcoming conference of the signatories.74

By 1946 Soviet pressures and threats had increased. Now claims were raised which included an even larger slice of eastern Anatolia.75

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74 For a detailed discussion of these changes, see chapter V below.
75 On December 20, 1945, an article was published in the Pravda, Izvestia, and the Red Star by two members of the Academy of the Georgian Soviet Republic claiming “historic rights” to areas beyond Kars and Ardahan including a considerable portion of the Turkish Black Sea coast; Kiliç, Turkey and the World, pp. 125–26.
nist insurgents threatened to take over Greece, and along Turkey’s eastern borders, Kurdish and Azerbaijani puppet governments were established on Iranian territory under the protection of Soviet forces. On August 7, 1946, Moscow sent notes to Turkey and to the Anglo-Saxon powers containing its formal proposals concerning the replacement of the Montreux regime by one more pleasing to the Soviets. The draft provided for only “Black Sea Powers” to pass warships through the straits and suggested that Turkey and the Soviet Union should “organize joint means of defense of the Straits.” It was not so much these proposals as their obvious implications which were alarming to Turkey, but her reply remained adamantly negative. At this point, the government of Ankara received diplomatic support from the United States, British, and French governments.76

The attitude of the West and especially of the United States had changed; the Cold War was already a fact of life. Washington realized that Soviet designs were clearly directed toward subverting Turkish resistance and that their ulterior aim was to extend Communist control over the Near and Middle East. On March 12, 1947, at a joint session of Congress, President Truman asked for and obtained assistance for Greece and Turkey on the basis of the so-called Truman Doctrine. Under this doctrine, the United States pledged to provide military and economic aid to these two countries and others in the area when threatened by communism.77

After Turkey’s diplomatic rope-dancing during World War II, she could have reverted (even by upholding the Franco-British Alliance of 1939) to the neutralist attitude practiced under Atatürk. It was the Soviet threat, more menacing in its modern Stalinist form than the Tsarist pressures experienced in the past, that compelled Ankara to seek close political and military ties with the West. How to avoid the embrace of the Moscovite giant, whose victims in Eastern and Central Europe provided tragic precedents, was rightly conceived as a question of life and death. The threatening shadow of Moscow determined Turkey’s basic policy lines during the decade following 1946 and, with a reduced emphasis, still determines it at present.

After Atatürk’s rise to power and his victory in the War of Indepen-

77 Ibid., pp. 273–75.
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dence, the ideological orientation of his Turkey was clearly directed
toward the European West. The foreign policy of Ankara, however, was
designed to establish friendly relations in every direction, including Mos­
cow. The postwar development, nevertheless, induced Turkey to seek
exclusive orientation toward the West, not only ideologically but also in
foreign and military policies. In the next years, Ankara’s diplomatic ef­
forts would be devoted to attaining full participation in the complicated
political, military, and economic system of Atlantic and European inte­
gregation. Her ambition was not only to safeguard her national security but
also to develop her socioeconomic status to match that of Western Euro­
pean nations.

In 1950 Turkey succeeded in obtaining admission to the Council of
Europe (although her geographical location may have raised doubts about
her being a “European state,” as required by the statute of that organiza­
tion). Earlier, as a member of the Organization for European Economic
Cooperation, she had profited from Marshall Plan aid. She joined the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development when it re­
placed the Marshall Plan system in 1960. Turkey experienced many dif­
ficulties, however, and had to exert herself to obtain admission to the
most important of all alliances: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

When the NATO treaty was concluded on April 4, 1948, Turkey (and
also Greece) was denied membership. The reasons for this negative atti­
tude varied according to the powers concerned: the United States was
reluctant to enter into commitments stretching into the Middle East, a
region which it refused to consider “Atlantic”; Britain and France, already
members of a dormant alliance with Turkey, considered another treaty
superfluous; the Scandinavian members of NATO feared to get involved
in a conflict in the remote areas of Asia Minor over which they had no
control. But Turkey, with a clear vision of what she desired, refused to
accept any substitute, such as associate membership in NATO or mem­
bership in a future Middle Eastern Defense Alliance. She wished to have
direct-assistance agreements with the giant of the Western world, the
United States. Other devices to obtain that much-cherished relationship,
either a bilateral defense treaty with Washington or America’s entry into
the Franco–British–Turkish Treaty of Mutual Assistance, were unaccept­
able to the United States.78

The Korean War gave Turkey an excellent opportunity to demonstrate her solidarity with the forces of collective security. On June 27, 1950, the Security Council invited members of the United Nations to repel the armed attack against the Republic of Korea by North Korea, aided and abetted by the Soviet Union. The United Nations command was established under the leadership of the United States, and Turkey offered to send a mixed brigade (4,500 men). This was the third largest contingent, after the American and South Korean forces, to participate in the struggle. The Turkish contingent particularly distinguished itself in combat and earned much praise. In September 1951, both the United States and Britain were ready to sponsor the accession of Turkey and Greece to NATO. The protocol of accession entered into force on February 18, 1952, and thus Turkey achieved its prime objective.

During the 1950's, Turkey entered into two more defensive alliances, in addition to NATO, all of which will be discussed in the later chapters of this study. The Balkan Defense Treaty was concluded with Yugoslavia and Greece in 1953; in 1955, a Pact of Mutual Cooperation was signed with Iraq, the so-called Baghdad Pact, which was joined in the same year by Britain, Pakistan, and Iran. With Iraq's defection in 1958, the alliance was renamed the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).

Turkey wished to impress the world not only with her prudent foreign policy but also with her allegiance to the West and Western political institutions. The attestation means used to achieve this was a voluntary process of democratization. In 1946 the government under President Ismet Inönü, leader of the Republican People's Party, decided to abandon the one-party system and to replace it by genuine methods of popular democracy. The Democratic Party, formed in early 1946, participated in the general elections of June 1946 and, despite pressures and abuses, managed to obtain 62 of 458 assembly seats.

In the face of the difficult international situation and violent internal

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79 To send a Turkish contingent (transportation and logistics were a U.S. responsibility) to the Far East may be compared with the politically motivated gesture of the Kingdom of Sardinia to participate in the Crimean War alongside Britain and France; this move secured for Sardinia a seat at the Paris Peace Conference of 1856 and prepared the unification of Italy under her leadership.

80 Accession of Turkey to NATO required an amendment of the original Article 6 of the treaty which provided a definition of the territories guaranteed under the alliance. Since the original text mentioned only the "territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America," "the territory of Turkey" had to be added. With Greece no such problem arose.
criticism, President İnönü and the moderate leaders of his party sought to placate the opposition. The president himself gave up his chairmanship of the Republican People's Party to become the nonpartisan leader of the nation. A new electoral law was to secure order and legality. The next general elections were held in May 1950.

The first really free elections in Turkey gave 434 seats to the Democratic Party and 51 seats to the Republican People's Party. A peaceful transfer of power, almost unprecedented under an authoritarian regime, was carried out as a result of the popular ballot. Celâl Bayar became the new president of the republic and Adnan Menderes, the new Prime Minister. 81

As one writer put it, the first five years of the Menderes administration made up the “honeymoon” period of the United States-Turkish relationship. 82 It was this administration that resolved to participate in the Korean War, and it was due to the endeavors of this regime that Turkey was finally admitted into NATO. Until the revolution of 1960, a web of agreements gradually tied Turkey, militarily, politically, economically, and culturally, to the United States and the countries of Western Europe. The foreign policy line pursued under İnönü was essentially continued. The ties binding Turkey to the West became stronger and relations with the United States were intensified beyond the proportions of rapport with other countries. Because of American preponderance in NATO and due to the economic assistance Turkey received from America, the influence of the United States became strongly felt in almost every field of state activity, outdistancing earlier French, British, and German influences.

Relations with the Greek neighbor were excellent until the Cyprus question introduced recurrent spells of estrangement and even of open hostility between Turkey and her partner in NATO. After the death of Stalin, the Turco-Soviet confrontation lost some of its acrimony, but a rapprochement did not occur before the 1960’s. 83

Turkey’s domestic, political, and economic situation underwent drastic changes from 1950 to 1960. The general elections of 1954 yielded more seats in the Grand National Assembly to the Democratic Party. But after

81 The Democratic victory is well described by Ahmed Emin Yalman, *Turkey in My Time* (Norman, Okla., 1956), pp. 239–51.
83 Turco-Greek relations and the Cyprus problem, and contacts with the Soviet Union, will be discussed in chapters V and VI, respectively.
an initial spurt, the economy began to flounder. The new establishment began to display authoritarian tendencies while it was open to the violent criticism of the opposition parties. In turn, this criticism infuriated the government and persuaded it to resort to methods of repression.

The Menderes government leaned heavily on the rural population representing about 70 percent of Turkey’s population—a stratum less affected by the secularization of public and private life under Atatürk and his successor. The Republican People’s Party and intellectual leaders claimed that the government wished to revert to theocracy and that Atatürk’s reforms were being endangered by the regime.

In the 1957 elections, despite alleged malpractices, the ruling party failed to receive a popular majority of votes, although it still retained an impressive majority of assembly seats. The political battle between the government and the opposition became even more acrimonious, and the regime used even more drastic measures to silence its opponents. Police action against demonstrators and opposition leaders, including the venerable İsmet İnönü, created utmost indignation, especially among the students, the intellectuals, and the military.

The bloodless military coup of May 27, 1960, overthrew the government, including President Celâl Bayar, and effected the dissolution of the Democratic Party. A Committee of National Union, composed of officers, took over the government. Ministers of the Menderes cabinet and President Bayar were arrested together with other leading members of the Democratic Party. Many were tried by special courts; Menderes and two of his colleagues were executed, although President Bayar’s death sentence was commuted and he was later released.

The Turkish revolution of 1960 did not, however, follow the usual pattern of military dictatorships: the ruling junta not only promised to return the administration of the country to democratic rule but managed to fulfill this promise within 17 months. By January 1961, a freely elected constituent assembly was convoked to draft a new constitution, which was approved by popular referendum on July 9, 1961. On October 15, 1961, elections were held and the Committee of National Unity gave way to a government supported by a majority in the Grand National Assembly.84

Officially, the foreign policy line of Turkey throughout the revolutionary period and thereafter remained unchanged. The message issued by the revolutionary military leaders on May 27, 1960, contained the following sentences:

We are addressing ourselves to our Allies, friends, neighbors and the entire world: Our aim is to remain completely loyal to the United Nations Charter and to the principles of human rights; the principle of peace at home and in the world set by the great Atatürk is our flag.
We are loyal to all our alliances and undertakings. We believe in NATO and CENTO and we are faithful to them.
We repeat: our ideal is peace at home, peace in the world.85

Nevertheless, as the 1960 revolution inaugurated a new phase in Turkish domestic politics, it also opened a new chapter in the foreign policies of Turkey. The character of the Turkish nation-state underwent further transformations under the impact of these events. The political upheavals on the domestic Turkish scene, the new democracy, and new political parties which were formed in the wake of the revolution did not fail to affect the handling of foreign relations.

Foreign politics under Atatürk and Ismet İnönü were determined by a leader and a small circle of advisers; even under Menderes, the opposition had little opportunity to express views on these subjects. Besides, the imminence of Soviet threat in the postwar period gave no room for options other than those chosen by the government. It could thus be said that the official policy represented the unanimous will of the nation. But the easing of the pressure from the north and the exposure of Turkey to new international problems as well as to new patterns of political alignment required a more flexible, pluralistic approach to foreign policy to replace the “monorail” approach practiced hitherto.

After 1960, principles of national ideology became liable to conflicting interpretations and doubts. This occurred not only with the Kemalist principles of domestic politics but also with other fundamentals of national policy. There was an attendant impact on foreign-policy attitudes, and the foreign policy of the government became subject to questioning, criticism, and attacks by political parties in parliament and by publicists and journalists in the press. Foreign affairs thus became a topic of public debate—an event unimaginable earlier—and this discussion could not fail

85 Weiker, The Turkish Revolution, p. 21.
to influence policy-making. The end result was a movement of these concerns to the forefront of public attention.

The Turkish state and nation, although heir to many problems that burdened the Ottoman Empire, is a new member of the family of nations and, due to the peculiarities of its location and of its national substance and character, is still engaged in a search to establish its real identity. In this grand national debate, the interaction of domestic and foreign politics continues unabated.