The Making of Détente
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Published by Johns Hopkins University Press

Nelson, Keith L.

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NOTES

Introduction

4. Opinion about foreign policy among leaders, however, is much more divided than before the Vietnam War. On this, see Ole R. Holsti and James N. Rosenau, American Leadership in World Affairs: Vietnam and the Breakdown of Consensus (Boston, 1984), chaps. 5–7.
5. Those who assume that “normal” attitudes are sufficient to break through accumulated layers of distrust in major power relations should consider that previous détente-like collaborations have frequently occurred in the wake of frightening events, for example, the rise of Japanese and German militarism in 1931–33, the Nazi attack on Russia in 1941, and the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.
9. Some writers employ the term détente as if it were a policy; others use it in reference to a condition, a period, or a process; still others attempt to construe a meaning empirically, from the indicators of détente (e.g., cooperation, economic and technical interactions, human rights and contacts, security and disarmament).


For an attempt to measure the rise and fall of tension during the Cold War by means of a “détente index,” see Paul F. Herman Jr., *Thinking about Peace: The Conceptualization and Conduct of US-Soviet Détente* (Lanham, Md., 1987), chap. 2. See also Mike Bowker and Phil Williams, *Superpower Détente: A Reappraisal* (London, 1988), which describes the Cold War as a mix of conflict and cooperation and sees détente as “minimal” between 1963 and 1968 and “maximal” during the Nixon years.


Chapter 1. The Developing Confrontation


15. William Taubman, Stalin’s American Policy: From Entente to Détente to Cold War (New York, 1982), 74–75.


23. Taubman, Stalin’s American Policy, 166–82.


32. Stevenson, *Rise and Fall of Détente*, chap. 3.


35. Ibid., chap. 5; Breslauer, *Khrushchev and Brezhnev*, chaps. 5–7.


40. This was, in fact, a gigantic bluff, since he had chosen after the Sputnik achievement not to invest in a missile race. See Richter, *Khrushchev’s Double Bind*, chap. 5.


Chapter 2. The Breakdown of Old Arrangements


6. Ben J. Wattenberg, *The Real America: A Surprising Examination of the State of the Union* (Garden City, N.Y., 1974), 198–200. Another manifestation of falling confidence during this period was the shift in perspectives on institutions. To the question, In which of these social institutions are you able to place a “great deal of trust”?, the following answers were given (in percentages):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>1971</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medicine</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>−9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks and other financial institutions</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>−31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The military</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>−35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational institutions</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>−24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The scientific community</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>−24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organized religion</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>−28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major U.S. companies</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>−28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental health caregivers</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>−16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Supreme Court</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>−28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local retail stores</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>−24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>−23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The executive branch</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>−18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The press</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>−11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>−3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organized labor</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>−8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advertising</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>−8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. Ibid., 32-43.
11. Ibid., 204-5.
30. According to Fedor Burlatsky, *Khrushchev and the First Russian Spring*
(London, 1991), 220–21, Brezhnev was actually quite hostile to the Kosygin reforms, which he found complicated and irrelevant. For a helpful analysis of the bargaining among the oligarchs in the first post-Khrushchev years, see Richard D. Anderson Jr., _Public Politics in an Authoritarian State: Making Foreign Policy in the Brezhnev Years_ (Ithaca, N.Y., 1993), chap. 4.


32. Wolfe, _Soviet Power and Europe_, chap. 15.


41. Ibid., 12.


52. Wolfe, Soviet Power, 248–49.

53. Shatz, Soviet Dissent, chaps. 6, 7. For a participant’s perspective, see Ludmilla Alexeyeva and Paul Goldberg, The Thaw Generation: Coming of Age in the Post-Stalin Era (Boston, 1990), chaps. 5–10.


60. On the other hand, some argue that one of the reasons the Soviets crushed the Dubček regime in 1968 was the Politburo’s fear that Czechoslovak nationalism might excite the Ukrainians; Grey Hodnett and Peter J. Potichny, The Ukraine and the Czechoslovak Crisis (Canberra, 1970), 77–89.


62. Wolfe, Soviet Power, 428. Michael McCGwire argues that the new Soviet
emphasis on conventional capability and force projection was also a response to changes in Western military doctrine, especially NATO's espousal of "flexible response." McCGwire, *Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Washington, 1987), 22-35.


64. Morton Schwartz, *The Foreign Policy of the USSR: Domestic Factors* (Encino, Calif., 1975), chap. 2.


74. Brezhnev, in effect, had been able to take back for defense and agriculture what he earlier had lost to the "reformers." See Hahn, *Politics of Soviet Agriculture*, 189–99.


77. Dornberg, Brezhnev, 252–53.
79. Paul Cocks, “Science Policy and Soviet Development Strategy,” in Dallin,
The Twenty-fifth Congress of the CPSU, 40–42. The text is in Brezhnev, Ob
osnovnykh voprosakh, 1:502–12.
80. Herbert S. Levine, “Soviet Economic Development, Technological Transfer,
and Foreign Policy,” in Bialer, Domestic Context, 180–83.
82. Marshall I. Goldman, Détente and Dollars: Doing Business with the Soviets
(New York, 1975), 27–34. Philip Hanson, Trade and Technology in Soviet-
Western Relations (New York, 1981), 106–16, contends that Kosygin was a vigor-
ous advocate of importing Western technology as early as the Khrushchev years but
that Brezhnev became an advocate only gradually.
84. Wolfe, Soviet Power, 246–47.
85. A. D. Sakharov, V. F. Turchin, and R. A. Medvedev to Soviet leaders, March
computer hardware and software is demonstrated in detail by Martin Cave,
“Computer Technology,” in Ronald Amann, Julian Cooper, and R. W. Davis, eds.,
30, 1968.
87. Hanson, Trade and Technology, 94–97.
89. Paul Marer, “The Economics of Eastern Europe and Soviet Foreign Policy,”
in Bialer, Domestic Context. See also Michael Kaser, Comecon: Integration Pro-
90. Vladimir Sobel, The Red Market: Industrial Cooperation and Specialization
92. Richard Bolling and John Bowles, America’s Competitive Edge: How to
Get Our Country Moving Again (New York, 1982), chaps. 1, 2.
93. Ibid., 5, 41.
94. On the unforeseen consequences of continued Cold War spending, see, in
particular, Lloyd Dumas, The Overburdened Economy: Uncovering the Causes of
Chronic Unemployment, Inflation, and National Decline (Berkeley, 1986), chap.
11; and Robert Kuttner, The End of Laissez Faire: National Purpose and the
Global Economy after the Cold War (New York, 1991), chap. 2.
95. Bowling and Bowles, Competitive Edge, 42, cite statistics from the United
States Department of Commerce.
97. Michael Dertouzos, Richard Lester, and Robert Solow, Made in America:


115. Stans remembers that he asked Nixon several times in 1969 and 1970 to be allowed to travel to Russia for the purpose of discussing an expansion of trade; Maurice Stans, interviewed by the author, July 21, 1992.


Chapter 3. New Military Parity and the Decline of Bipolarity

18. Robert P. Berman and John C. Baker, *Soviet Strategic Forces: Requirements and Responses* (Washington, 1982), 45–50. Breslauer, *Khrushchev and Brezhnev*, 69–70, suggests that Khrushchev may also have been attempting to “marginally deescalate the arms race in order to improve the prospects of striking a deal with the USA.”
20. Raymond J. Swider, Jr., *Soviet Military Reform in the Twentieth Century: Three Case Studies* (Westport, Conn., 1992), 123–46; and Thomas M. Nichols,
24. Ball, Politics and Force Levels, chaps. 2–5; and Deborah Shapley, Promise and Power: The Life and Times of Robert McNamara (Boston, 1993), 104–11.
25. Ball, Politics and Force Levels, chaps. 6–9. Shapley, Promise and Power, 139–45, 190–95, emphasizes the extent to which the Cuban missile crisis was instrumental in pushing McNamara toward “assured destruction.” See also Nolan, Guardians, 77–85.
26. Under the impact of the new nuclear factor, Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership were rethinking their ideas about war during this period, abandoning notions of an inevitable military conflict with the capitalist powers. At the same time, they were loath to relinquish opportunities to exploit increasing Western difficulties with the Third World, particularly since the Chinese were using anti-Western militancy as a litmus test of loyalty to the Communist movement. Hence Khrushchev talked much of aiding “national liberation struggles,” but afraid of escalation and lacking the ability to project nonnuclear military power, he generally turned to arms sales and foreign aid as substitutes for intervention. On this, see McCGwire, Military Objectives, 22–42. Beschloss, Crisis Years, 60–65, argues that Khrushchev’s speech of January 6, 1961, promising to assist the “sacred” struggles of colonial peoples, was taken much too seriously by the new Kennedy administration.
28. The most detailed treatment of the October crisis is Beschloss, Crisis Years, 374–575; but see also James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse (New York, 1993).
31. Holloway, Soviet Union and the Arms Race, 43–44, 128.
32. Wolfe, Soviet Power, 434–41; and Lee and Staar, Soviet Military Policy, 66–70.
33. Nichols, Sacred Cause, 94–100. McCGwire, Military Objectives, 42–59, contends that in December 1966, in a decision of truly historic proportions, the Soviets altered their basic military strategy to accord with the object of keeping future wars limited and nonnuclear. Such a decision implied the need for a sus-
tained buildup in the number and quality of Soviet ground forces, navy personnel, and frontal aviation forces. At the same time (according to Franklyn Griffiths, “The Soviet Experience of Arms Control,” *International Journal* 44 [Spring 1989]: 304–64), “it made negotiated limitations on strategic intercontinental forces increasingly appropriate” (332).


44. See, for example, George F. Kennan, “Polycentrism and Western Policy,” *Foreign Affairs* 42 (Jan. 1964): 171–83.


52. Elliot R. Goodman, *The Fate of the Atlantic Community* (New York,
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61. Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe, 186–94; and Meissner, Ostpolitik, 161–63.


65. Brandt, People and Politics, 169–70. On East German efforts to discourage Soviet interest in improving relations with Bonn, see Michael J. Sodaro, Moscow, Germany, and the West from Khrushchev to Gorbachev (Ithaca, N.Y., 1990), 88–134.


68. Stent, Embargo to Ostpolitik, 158–60, 163–69; Arnulf Baring, Machtwechsel: Die Ära Brandt-Scheel (Stuttgart, 1982), 229–44.

70. The phrases are from Article I of the treaty. See Whetten, *Germany’s Ostpolitik*, 224.


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90. Barnett, China and the Major Powers, 48–49. See also, in general, David Mozingo, China’s Foreign Policy and the Cultural Revolution (Ithaca, N.Y., 1970).


Chapter 4. Seeking America’s Escape from Vietnam


5. Illustrative of such reactions is York, *Race to Oblivion*, 147–69.


11. Ibid., 464. The agreement was signed in November 1966.


17. Ibid., 414, 449–51.


27. Ibid., 152-53, 184, 189, 206-9; and Lester A. Sobel, ed., *Kissinger and Détente* (New York, 1975), 50-51.
31. On Nixon’s personality, see Barber, *Presidential Character*, 299-388. For a good indication of Nixon’s strong hierarchical tendencies (and First and Second World focus), see his “Memorandum to H. R. Haldeman, John Erlichman, and Henry Kissinger of March 2, 1970,” in which he writes that

in the future all that I want brought to my attention
[in the field of foreign policy] are the following items:

1. East-West relations.
2. Policy toward the Soviet Union.
4. Policy toward Eastern Europe, provided it really affects East-West relations at the highest level.
5. Policy toward Western Europe, but only where NATO ... and ... major countries are affected.

Staff Member and Office Files, Special Files, Nixon Papers.
37. Richard J. Whalen, *Catch the Falling Flag: A Republican’s Challenge to His

38. Seymour M. Hersh, *The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House* (New York, 1983), 51, 77–78. See also Allan E. Goodman, *The Lost Peace: America’s Search for a Negotiated Settlement of the Vietnam War* (Stanford, Calif., 1978), 78–99. An indication of Nixon’s optimism can be seen in his remarks to his cabinet on March 20, 1969, regarding Vietnam. The president “stated flatly that war will be over by next year, but that it must be understood that next four to five months will be very tough, because we have to take public position that outlook is tough, etc., while we negotiate in private.” H. R. Haldeman, *The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House* (New York, 1994), 42.

39. Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, *Kissinger* (Boston, 1974), 124–26. This is supposed to have occurred on January 23, 1969, although apparently the offer was not formally endorsed by the administration until April 1 in National Security Decision Memorandum 9. It was made public by Nixon on May 14, 1969, in his first presidential address on Vietnam.


41. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, 77–82; and Kissinger, *White House Years*, 138–47. Kissinger was still vigorously pushing this line as late as early July, when he met with Dobrynin on the eve of the latter’s departure for a stay in Moscow. Nixon, he assured Dobrynin, was prepared to ratify the status quo of a divided Berlin and Germany as well as “take into account the special interests of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe.” Interestingly, Dobrynin took it upon himself to practice “reverse linkage,” expressing “the hope that the Nixon government would act much more actively towards Bonn” in achieving the ratification of the non-proliferation treaty; “Anatoly Dobrynin to A. Gromyko, July 12, 1969,” *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* (Washington, Fall 1993), 63–67.

42. Ross Terrill, *800,000,000* (New York, 1972), 144–45.


54. Freedman, U.S. Intelligence, 101–17. Seaborg, Stemming the Tide, 437, notes that in the American draft treaty for SALT of 1968, “there were to be no numerical restrictions on MIRVs; the Joint Chiefs insisted on this.”


57. Laird’s testimony before Senate and House committees in the spring of 1969 is in reels 1 and 2 of “Public Statements by the Secretaries of Defense, Part 4: The Nixon and Ford Administrations,” Microform Collections. For Richard Helms’s more cautious point of view, which nearly cost him his job, see Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA (New York, 1979), 211–12. For a critical analysis, see Freedman, U.S. Intelligence, 137–52. Evidence of how very deeply Nixon was involved in the fight over the ABM is provided by “Haldeman’s Handwritten Notes, April 27, 1969.”


59. Nixon wrote on his “News Summary of May 31, 1969,” “I have decided to move ahead on MIRV testing regardless of Senatorial opposition. Inform all hands so that there will be one Administration line.” News Summaries, Box 30, President’s Office Files, Special Files, Nixon Papers. The Senate’s vote of the next year is discussed in Platt, U.S. Senate and Strategic Arms Policy, 13–14.

60. Kissinger, White House Years, 540; and Smith, Doubletalk, 161. Melvin Laird argues, in retrospect, that “MIRVs were the only feasible option available for response to an expanding Soviet threat, given the hostile attitude of many members of Congress toward defense spending.” Laird, “Strong Start,” 11.

61. Smith, Doubletalk, 154–78; and Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 158–61. This point was amplified by Gerard Smith, interviewed by the author, Apr. 12, 1983; and Raymond Garthoff, interviewed by author, Mar. 20, 1985.


63. Burstein and Freudenberg, “Changing Public Policy.”

64. Kissinger, White House Years, 214. According to Laird, “Strong Start,” 9, the Nixon administration was attempting to pursue “major modernization programs for all three legs of the strategic Triad (land-based missiles, bombers, and submarines).”


66. Whetten, Germany’s Ostpolitik, 93–151. For added discussion and bibliography, see chap. 3.

68. The phrase is Kissinger's (ibid., 412). On American anxiety about Bonn's Ostpolitik, see ibid., 410–12; Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston, 1982), 143–48; 154–59; Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 125–27; and Brandt, People and Politics, 278–96. Kenneth Rush underlined the tension and even hostility involved when interviewed by the author, Mar. 28, 1985. Nixon's attitude is revealed in a marginal note he made on a news summary of December 30, 1970, reporting that George Ball had expressed fear of West Germany's new policy toward the Soviet Union: "Good for him!" "News Summary of December 30, 1970."

69. As Kissinger puts it, "The cumulative impact of all the bureaucratic indis­cipline, with media and Congressional pressures added, was that we had to abandon our attempt to use the opening of the SALT talks as a lever for other negotiations" (White House Years, 138). See also Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 146–52.

70. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 151. For Kissinger's analysis of Soviet stonewalling during the summer of 1969, see White House Years, 144–45, 159–62; and Hyland, Mortal Rivals, 41–42. As late as September, however, Kissinger was still attempting to link issues, warning Dobrynin that lack of help on Vietnam made progress on arms control unlikely. See Isaacson, Kissinger, 246–49.


73. Kissinger, White House Years, 149; and Smith, Doubletalk, 75–80.

74. Smith, Doubletalk, 80–88.


76. Kissinger, White House Years, 541. The directive was National Security Decision Memorandum 49. On the preparations, see Smith, Doubletalk, 116–20; and Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 154–59.

77. Kissinger, White House Years, 541–42.

78. Ibid., 543.

79. Ibid., 543–44.


83. Kissinger, White House Years, 549. The American proposal of Aug. 4 has also frequently been termed Option E.

84. Kissinger, White House Years, 550. "My preferred position," Kissinger writes, "was to maintain the deployment [of the ABMs] both sides were actually building" (548). He believes that the Russians assumed that, if they were patient, they could get the U.S. Congress to do their work for them (scuttling the American ABM) without having to give something up for it. The probability is, however, that
it was the administration's insistence on coupling an offensive and defensive agreement (without giving up MIRV) that led Moscow to go slow.


95. Ibid., 554-58; and Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, 198-204.


97. On the German negotiations, see Brandt, *People and Politics*, 323-65. On the American reaction, see Nixon, RN, 793-97; Kissinger, *White House Years*, 532-34; and Hyland, *Mortal Rivals*, 28-33. Always indefatigable, Nixon shortly after the autumn election was busy integrating his summit plans into a “new international game plan.” It “now fits with politics,” he observed. “Hold [the] summit until we want a big story and [until] it will be very big—with results.” “Haldeman Handwritten Notes, November 7, 1970.”


100. Nixon, RN, 497. Just how little confidence Nixon possessed about Rus-
sian intentions one can see from a memorandum he wrote to Henry Kissinger on November 30, 1970, part of which reads: "With regard to Soviet policy hardening... it may be that Harriman, and other Kremlinologists who talk rather freely with people in Washington who get the word back to Moscow... may be encouraging the Moscow leaders to wait out the '72 election on the theory that having any kind of détente between now and '72 would come up against a very tough bargainer and might help him get reelected, whereas waiting after '72 might reduce his chances of getting re-elected and thereby increase the chance for them to make a better deal after '72 than before." Box 229, Haldeman Chronological File, Special Files, Nixon Papers.

Chapter 5. Finding America's Way to Détente

1. Kissinger, White House Years, 798.
3. On Nixon's China policy during 1969 and 1970, see Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 242–53; and Kissinger, White House Years, 167–84. As for the rumors of nuclear war, the administration was in fact gravely concerned. By the summer of 1969, Nixon was convinced the Soviets were preparing for an all-out attack on China. John Robert Greene, The Limits of Power: The Nixon and Ford Administrations (Bloomington, Ind., 1992), 109. Not coincidentally, Moscow was watching American reactions carefully. See also chap. 6, n. 33; and Bundy, Danger and Survival, 532–35.
4. Sutter, China Watch, 96–99; and Kissinger, White House Years, 188–94.
5. Kissinger, White House Years, 697.
6. Ibid., 698–99.
7. Garver, China's Decision, chaps. 3, 4. See also Salisbury, New Emperors, 289–95.
10. Szulc, Illusion of Peace, 398–400; and Kissinger, White House Years, 712.
11. Kissinger, White House Years, 714.
14. Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries, 359, 368–69; and Kissinger, White House Years, 763–84. Note that Kissinger continued his practice of personally informing the Chinese of developments in Soviet-American relations even as late as his visits.

25. Ibid., 804, 807.
30. Ibid., 811–12.
39. Nixon was so eager to bring Connally into his administration that he asked Haldeman to tell him that he, Nixon, “feels urgently you are desperately needed
in this position now and another position [the presidency?] in [the] future."

40. Solomon, Monetary System, 185–87. See also chap. 2, above.


43. “Peter Peterson to Richard Nixon, July 7, 1971,” President’s Handwriting Files, President’s Office Files, Special Files, Nixon Papers. Peterson added that “more or less complete liberalization [of American trade with Eastern Europe] would add by 1975 about $1 billion to exports and something like $400 million to our balance of trade.”

44. Kissinger, White House Years, 840. This is verified in “Peter Peterson to [Congressman] Olin Teague, November 16, 1971,” Box 18, Trade Files, Central Files, Nixon Papers.


49. Freedman, U.S. Intelligence, 159–64. On the public pressure, see Kissinger, White House Years, 806, 812, 816.


51. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 171–73.

52. Smith, Doubletalk, 131, 211–18.


54. Wolfe, SALT Experience, 103–6.

55. Smith, Doubletalk, 228–29.

56. Kissinger, White House Years, 813–19.

57. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 179–82, 91. But see also Isaacson, Kissinger, 326–27.


60. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 212.

61. Sodaro, Moscow, Germany and the West, 207–10.

62. Catudal, Diplomacy, 166–71; and Brandt, People and Politics, 292–93.
63. Moreton, *East Germany and the Warsaw Alliance*, 188.
64. Nixon, RN, 524.
66. Ibid., 828.
67. Kenneth Rush, interviewed by the author, Mar. 28, 1985. Egon Bahr is more generous to Kissinger. “It was so crucial to give up all the talk about legal rights in Berlin—to let that lie—and to try to regulate practical matters. Henry saw this. He got the point. The other Americans were much slower to understand, and the French were very legalistic.” Egon Bahr, interviewed by the author, July 1, 1982.
68. McAdams, *East Germany and Détente*, 114–21. On Andrei Gromyko’s attitudes, see Shevchenko, *Breaking with Moscow*, 169; on Brezhnev’s, see Dornberg, *Brezhnev*, 213. Note also Georgi Arbatov’s remarks in an interview in 1989: “Kissinger thinks it was China that played the decisive role in getting us to feel the need to preserve our relationship with the U.S.A. But Berlin actually played a much bigger role, almost a decisive one. Having the East German situation settled was most important to us, and we did not want to jeopardize that.” Isaacson, *Kissinger*, 422–23.
69. “Briefing Book of March 2, 1971,” Box 166, Foreign Affairs Files, President’s Personal Files, Special Files, Nixon Papers.
71. Nixon, RN, 524.
78. Hersh, *Price of Power*, 346–48. Much, if not all, of the arrangement is spelled out in “Peter Flanigan to Richard Nixon, November 3, 1971,” Box 68, Charles Colson Files, Staff Member Files, Special Files, Nixon Papers. See also “John C. Whitaker to Richard Nixon, November 2, 1971,” Box 18, Trade Files, Central Files, Nixon Papers.
81. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, 105–6, 303. See also “Press Conference of Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz in Moscow, April 12, 1972,” Box 12, Peter Flanigan Files, Staff Member Files, Special Files, Nixon Papers.

84. Kissinger, White House Years, 848, 853.


86. The president’s pro-Pakistani bias had been made known to senior policy makers as early as July 1971, but the public did not become aware of it until December. See Van Hollen, “Tilt Policy Revisited,” 346–57.

87. Nixon, RN, 527; and Kissinger, White House Years, 900–901.

88. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 304–5. See also Zumwalt, On Watch, 360–69.

89. Nixon, RN, 529; and Kissinger, White House Years, 910.

90. Kissinger, White House Years, 912. Haldeman records (Dec. 15, 1971) that “there was some discussion [with Nixon] about the threat in [Kissinger’s] back­ grounder that we would call off the Soviet summit... The P[resident] told [Ron] Ziegler to cool that on the grounds that the issue hasn’t reached that point and that it might later if the Russians don’t act to stop the cannibalizing there.” Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries, 385.


92. Kissinger, White House Years, 897. See also Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries, 380–83.


94. Ambrose, Triumph, 488–91; and Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries, 387.


98. Ibid., 390–92; and Isaacson, Kissinger, 331–32. For the text of the May 31 proposal, see Kissinger, White House Years, 1488–89.


100. Goodman, America’s Search, 115–17. Thornton, Nixon-Kissinger Years, 99–100, 118–25, contends that, after Kissinger proposed a cease-fire in place in May 1971, the Soviet Union abandoned earlier restraint and actually connived with North Vietnam to facilitate a successful invasion from the North in the spring of 1972. The more probable explanation for the expansion of both Soviet and Chinese military and economic assistance to North Vietnam during 1971 and 1972 is that Moscow and Beijing were locked in competition with each other for influence in Hanoi; on this, see Hemen Ray, China’s Vietnam War (Kalkaji, India,
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102. Hersh, Price of Power, 480-88; and Nixon, RN, 584-86.

103. Hersh, Price of Power, 489-92.


111. Hersh, Price of Power, 503-10. See also Haldeman; Haldeman Diaries, 436-37.

112. Nixon, RN, 589.


115. Kissinger, White House Years, 1135-37, 1148, 1154-64.


117. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 183-86.

118. Kissinger, White House Years, 1146-47.


120. Kissinger, White House Years, 1147.

121. Ibid., 1150.

122. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 179-83; Kissinger, White House Years, 1128-31, 1148-54; Smith, Doubletalk, 352-72; and Zumwalt, On Watch, 403-5.

123. John Newhouse, War and Peace in the Nuclear Age (New York, 1989), 231, 444. Laird’s intention, of course, had been to induce the Russians to agree to an SLBM limit. He did not know when he suggested the idea in January that the upper limit on Soviet SLBMs would be 950.


126. Hersh, Price of Power, 531-35; and Kissinger, White House Years, 1153-36.


128. Hersh, Price of Power, 514-19; and Kissinger, White House Years, 1158-64.

130. Szulc, Illusion of Peace, 547.

131. Kissinger, White House Years, 1169–76.

132. Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries, 450–55. Kissinger’s description of his role in this matter (White House Years, 1174–79) is rather misleading, implying that he first acquiesced in Nixon’s decision to cancel the summit and later opposed it. In truth, Nixon’s immediate reaction had been to cancel the summit (diary entry of May 3), but he quickly decided to put off the decision. Nixon, RN, 600–601.


134. Kissinger, White House Years, 1193–94.


136. Kissinger, White House Years, 1133.


138. Kissinger, White House Years, 1216–42 (the quotation is on 1230). See also Smith, Doubletalk, 407–40.

139. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 189–91, 196–97. As Robert Schulzinger notes, the fact of signing the SALT agreement was more important to Kissinger than the contents; see Robert D. Schulzinger, Henry Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy (New York, 1989), 65–66.


141. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 188–90; Kissinger, White House Years, 1235–41; and Smith, Doubletalk, 431–33. The relatively harmonious resolution of this matter should not obscure the fact that the Joint Chiefs and Secretary Laird were dismayed in April by Kissinger’s acceptance of high (and unequal) limits on submarine-launched ballistic missiles, i.e., what Admiral Elmo Zumwalt called “the appalling SLBM numbers” (On Watch, 403). The only way the Joint Chiefs could reconcile themselves to the Soviet limits (950 SLBMs plus modernization) was to insist that the Trident and other American strategic programs be further accelerated (they had already been accelerated in late 1971; see Newhouse, War and Peace, 228–31). Zumwalt (On Watch, 407) is severe in judging the end result: “it was the unconscionable [i.e., excessive] numbers in the SALT agreements . . . that virtually froze us into five more years of high spending on US strategic forces.” For Kissinger’s astonishing attempts to justify his figures, particularly in the period between his Moscow trip and the summit, see Hersh, Price of Power, 539–41; and Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 185–89.

142. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 194–95; Kissinger, White House Years, 1236–41; and Smith, Doubletalk, 413–17. Kissinger’s memoirs confuse the issue by suggesting that the American delegation in Helsinki had proposed a unilateral U.S. declaration on silo dimensions, when in actuality (and at Kissinger’s direction) it had proposed such a declaration only for missile volume. Kissinger is saying in effect that, by specifying a limit of 10–15% in the increase of silo dimen-
sions, he had obtained a Soviet commitment that the delegation could not obtain, but in truth the delegation (as Smith wired him) simply preferred the wording of the revised Russian draft, namely that “the size of land-based ICBM silo launchers will not be increased.”

143. Garthoff, *Détsente and Confrontation*, 191–94; Kissinger, *White House Years*, 1218–19, 1231, 1239, 1241; and Smith, *Doubletalk*, 413–23. The unfortunate aspect of their decision, of course, was that the unilateral definition of “light” and “heavy” missiles implied limitations on change that did not exist when American authorities already knew that the successor ICBM to the SS-11 would be larger than the SS-11. Kissinger himself was later tempted, in testifying before Congress, to suggest that such limitations on the Russians existed. See Garthoff, *Détsente and Confrontation*, 172–73.

Note that the reason the Americans did not fight harder for a general rule prohibiting increases in missile size was that such a limit might have impeded the modernization of Minuteman.


147. Ibíd., 1131–32, 1250, 1254; and Nixon, RN, 618. The quotations are from Kissinger’s postsummit (May 29) press conferences in Moscow and Kiev. Box 6, John Scali Files, Staff Member Files, Special Files, Nixon Papers.


153. See, for example, Kissinger, *White House Years*, 1133–34, 1269–73. In Kissinger’s press conference in Kiev on May 29, 1972, he is quoted as saying, “We never expected to get a trade agreement here. We never even attempted to negotiate a trade agreement here.” Box 6, Scali Files.

154. “Peter Flanigan to Richard Nixon, March 7, 1972,” Box 10, Peter Flanigan Files. This package was being developed in response to National Security Decision Memorandum 151, “Next Steps with Respect to US-Soviet Trading Relationships,” issued on February 15, 1972, over the joint signatures of Henry

155. Flanigan wrote: “The meeting of union leaders on which implementation of a maritime agreement depends is scheduled for Thursday [May 25] in the U.S. Negotiation of outstanding differences with the Soviets is scheduled for Thursday and Friday in Moscow. If a satisfactory solution is reached, the exchange of notes can be announced on Saturday [May 27] as an element of the commercial package.” “Peter Flanigan to Richard Nixon, May 23, 1972,” Box 66, Trip Files, Subject Files, Central Files, Nixon Papers. On May 25, Haldeman recorded his expectation that the “Ag[ricultural] deal and Lend-Lease [agreement would be signed on] Sat[urday].” “Haldeman Handwritten Notes.” Yet on May 27 in Moscow, Kissinger told William Safire, “There’ll be a grain deal when [Peter] Peterson gets here [in July]. The maritime deal was screwed up by the unions, and that must be handled first before we can conclude the grain deal.” Safire, Before the Fall, 454. What Kissinger was really saying was that the union leaders had refused to go along with his plan to abandon the requirement that half of all exports to the Soviets be carried in American-flagged ships. Isaacson, Kissinger, 428. Thus the Nixon administration was having trouble with the unions much later than Seymour Hersh suggests. Hersh, Price of Power, 346–48.

156. “Peter Flanigan to Richard Nixon, May 23, 1972.” Flanigan disclosed that Nikolai Patolichev (Soviet minister of foreign trade) had informed the Americans on May 23 that “he [Patolichev] had reported with approval our proposal that the USSR buy $750 million of grain over 3 years with CCC financing but had gotten no instructions from ‘the top.’ . . . You [Nixon] might wish to stimulate . . . [acceptance] in your discussions with Secretary Brezhnev. The announcement of the grain purchase agreement would be on Saturday.” See also Kissinger, White House Years, 1269.

157. See the detailed attachments, “Flanigan to Nixon, March 7, 1972.”


159. The president’s “Briefing Book of June 9, 1972.”

160. Goldman, Détente and Dollars, 204–5. The text of the agreement is in Timberlake, Détente, 53–56.

161. Kissinger, White House Years, 1271.

162. The texts of the commercial agreements and a helpful White House press release are in Timberlake, Détente, 48–71.
163. Sobel, *Kissinger and Détente*, 141–43. The second and fourth of these agreements are in Timberlake, *Détente*, 37–39, 43–47.


Chapter 6. Brezhnev and Squaring the Circle


This passage does not appear in the English version (Arbatov, *The System*).

19. Ibid., 134; and Burlatsky, *Khrushchev*, 210–29. See also Jerry Hough, “The Brezhnev Era: The Man and the System,” *Problems of Communism* 25 (Mar.–Apr. 1976): 1–17. Brezhnev had high regard for scientific judgment, and indeed it was during his tenure that the think tanks of the Academy of Science were given the resources to flourish. According to Oleg Bykov of the Institute for the Study of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Brezhnev on occasion during group discussions would turn to Nikolai Inozemtzev, director of IMEMO, with the question, “Well, comrade, what does science say?” Oleg Bykov, interviewed by the author, Oct. 23, 1990.


33. Richard Wich, *Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics: A Study of Political Change and Communication* (Cambridge, Mass., 1980), 97–192. According to Shevchenko, *Breaking with Moscow*, 165–66, the Politburo even put out informal feelers in Washington to see if the United States would endorse punitive military action against China. He believes it was Ambassador Dobrynin’s discovery of the Nixon administration’s hostility to the idea that dissuaded the Politburo from approving an attack. See chap. 5, n. 3, above.
39. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, 73, 132. Kissinger, *White House Years*, 145, contends that the Soviets were awaiting the end of the Senate’s ABM debate. There is also the possibility that they were waiting for Chinese agreement to take up bilateral talks.
41. Ibid., 138, 144. Dobrynin, interviewed by author.
47. Egon Bahr, interviewed by the author, July 1, 1982.
49. Arbatov, interviewed by author. According to Anderson, *Public Politics*, 204–10, Brezhnev was placing himself in a median position between the grand strategies of his rivals. He designed his East-West program to be more acceptable to Podgorny and Suslov than was Kosygin's by giving somewhat higher priority to security goals than did Kosygin.
53. Stent, *Embargo to Ostpolitik*, 166–69; and Sodaro, *Moscow, Germany, and the West*, 146–49, 169–74. This agreement, with the Thyssen Pipe Works, had been under discussion since the previous May.
63. See chap. 2, n. 85, above.
67. Ibid., 560–75, 593. For a persuasive argument that Soviet policy vis-à-vis Egypt should be seen as more benign than Nixon and Kissinger believed at the time, see George W. Breslauer, *Soviet Strategy in the Middle East* (Boston, 1990), 23–60.
71. Hersh, *Price of Power*, chaps. 19, 20; and Kissinger, *White House Years*,


85. Paul A. Smith, Jr., "Brezhnev and Dissent: Implications of the 24th Party Congress," in Dodge, *24th Party Congress*. Anderson, *Public Politics*, 200-201, notes that another way in which Brezhnev reassured the conservatives in this speech was with a cautious statement regarding arms control. Sodaro, *Moscow, Germany, and the West*, 204-7; points out that the theme of intercapitalist contradictions (i.e., conflicts between Western Europe and the United States that could be exploited) was still very much in evidence.


87. Smith, *Doubletalk*, 222-32. Anderson, *Public Politics*, 198-204, argues, however, that Soviet arms control policy now became a second area (in addition to general East-West relations) in which Brezhnev differentiated himself from Kosygin and increased his appeal to the more fearful Suslov and Podgorny. He did this by insisting on replacing Kosygin's principle of "no unilateral advantages" with an emphasis on "equal security," thereby creating a rationale for a variety of one-sided
U.S. concessions to compensate for alleged U.S. strategic advantages. The ultimate results of this policy, of course, were the agreements of May 1972 that conceded the U.S.S.R. higher limits on SLBMs and ICBMs than those assigned the United States.


92. Ibid., 173. Brezhnev’s speech is reprinted in *Neues Deutschland*, June 17, 1971.


94. Kissinger, *White House Years*, 830. Note, however, that Kissinger did not release Rush to finish the negotiations until Aug. 9.


97. Ibid., 354–55. Anatoly Dobrynin recalls that “we never needed the China factor to be attracted by a deal with West Germany.” Dobrynin, interviewed by the author.


99. Ibid., 837.

100. Smith, *Doubletalk*, 280–97. The quotation is on 295.


104. Ibid., 124; and Boris Meissner, “Die Sowjetunion zwischen den XXIV und XXV Parteikongress der KPdSU,” *Osteuropa* 11 (Nov. 1975): 899–915; quotation is on 900. According to Anderson, *Public Politics*, 217–34, Brezhnev won over Suslov to his policies by a combination of threat (allowing junior Politburo members to intrude into Suslov’s specialty of relations with European Communists) and reward (agreeing in the fall of 1971 to allow Suslov to formulate a policy to diminish ethnic autonomy within the Soviet Union). With Podgorny, Brezhnev employed a reverse tack, offering first the reward (approval in May 1971 of Podgorny’s desire for a less pro-American line in Vietnam and for building an Arab coalition around Egypt) and later the threat (using tension with Sadat in Dec. 1971 to reclaim control of Middle Eastern policy and to free Sadat for a more aggressive policy toward Israel). Brezhnev and Kosygin would presumably have preferred negotiating a Middle Eastern peace settlement with the United States but were precluded from that possibility by Kissinger’s unwillingness to include them.


111. L. I. Brezhnev, Selected Speeches and Writings on Foreign Affairs (Oxford, Eng., 1979), 259. We know from Brezhnev’s behavior at subsequent summits with Nixon that he did worry deeply about the possibility that the United States might enter into secret military arrangements with China; on this, see Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 374, 478.


113. Brezhnev, Selected Speeches, 260. See also Anderson, Public Politics, 211–22.

114. Kissinger, White House Years, 1099–1108.


118. Arbatov, The System, 183–85; and Isaacson, Kissinger, 422.


120. Arbatov, The System, 184. The close interconnection between the summit and events in Germany is underlined by the fact that during the Central Committee meeting on May 19 (called because “I do not want to take all the blame [for the Politburo decision of May 16],” as Brezhnev told Georgi Arbatov) Brezhnev requested a recess so that participants could learn of the results of the vote in the West German Bundesrat. “If things had gone the other way in Bonn,” Arbatov asserts, “Brezhnev and the Central Committee would have decided to cancel the summit.” Isaacson, Kissinger, 422–23. See also Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow, 211–13.

121. Stent, Embargo to Ostpolitik, 186–90.


124. Hersh, Price of Power, 518.

125. Kissinger, White House Years, 1133.
126. Ibid., 1126–27, 1131–32. According to Garthoff, *Déten­te and Confron­tation*, 326–35, a great deal of Moscow’s preparatory work for the negotiations was done by the Foreign Ministry, whose new Department for Planning Foreign Policy Measures (UPVM) authored seven of the ten basic Soviet position papers.


128. Ibid., 1124.


139. The Soviet–West German treaty was ratified by the Bundestag on May 17, 1972, by a vote of 248 to 10, with 238 abstentions; it was ratified by the Bundesrat two days later. It came into force on May 24. The Berlin agreement was put into effect on June 3, 1972, after travel regulations had been worked out by the two German states. According to Sodaro, *Moscow, Germany, and the West*, 225–26, Kremlin policy makers borrowed elements from both the Europeanist and Ameri­canist orientations of their advisers and opted decisively for linking détente in Europe with détente with the United States.


Epilogue: From Détente to the Gorbachev Revolution

1. Nixon subsequently argued that “we should think of détente as a complement to containment rather than as a substitute for it. Containment, the task of resisting Russian expansionism, must remain the sine qua non of US foreign policy.” Nixon, The Real War, 286.


7. The (Senator Adlai [D-Ill.]) Stevenson Amendment limited the amount of credit the Soviet Union could receive to $300 million over four years.


11. Herspring, Soviet High Command, chaps. 4, 5.

12. The information about Brezhnev’s health is from Georgi Arbatov, interviewed by the author, May 19, 1991.


16. Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton, 1994).