In the period since the Liberals returned to power in Quebec in 1960, the provincial government has asserted its jurisdictional rights most forcefully in the fields of social security and education. These are the areas in which the citizen comes most directly in contact with his government, and the Lesage regime maintained that a threat to the French-Canadian personality was increasingly evident in that direction. Federal intrusion into both services weakened the French cultural base with which the Quebecker identified himself and opened the way toward anglicization. Proponents of an increasingly omnipresent federal participation relied mostly on the cost argument. Though welfare and education were relatively minor municipal functions in 1867, today they are among the largest and most expensive tasks of all levels of government, and only the federal treasury is adequate to the demands. The provincial, or more specifically the Quebec, rebuttal is to deny federal responsibility and to demand access to the funds Ottawa has arrogated to itself.

Ex-Premier Lesage and his successor Daniel Johnson are on generally firm constitutional ground when they insist that Quebec must be permitted to maintain its own social assistance and social security programs. Except for unemployment insurance, which passed under the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal Parliament by constitutional amendment in 1940, and old age pensions, over which amendments in 1951 and 1964 gave Ottawa concurrent jurisdiction, social service is within the competence of the provinces. Nevertheless, for several reasons, including tardy recognition on the part of the provinces and specifically of Quebec that needs were expanding in this field, Ottawa instituted or assumed major responsibility for a number of social programs. In large part, this situation came about because the provinces were inclined to delegate to the federal government jurisdiction in fields of general concern. This attitude continues to prevail in the English-speaking
provinces; it is the basis for Lesage's argument that Quebec is achieving a special status in the Confederation because the other provinces are deliberately surrendering to Ottawa the prerogatives the Constitution accords them. Accurate as this statement may be, it nevertheless delineates an area of conflict which puts Quebec on one side and both the central government and the English-speaking provinces on the other.

The political confrontation which results on the federal-provincial level duplicates, in more serious proportions, the opposition apparent on an economic basis between established interests and the new social forces building up in Quebec. All of these, however, can be considered as only the surface manifestations of a fundamental problem stemming from the dependent or incomplete nature of the Quebec social structure. University of Montreal economist Maurice Bouchard postulates French Canada as a partial society trying to become a complete society.¹ A complete society has an economy, a polity, an integrative system, and other elements making up a distinct social system whose members participate in all aspects and at all levels.

This hypothesis can explain the process of adaption that is under way in Quebec. It is an expression of intent to reach an accommodation with the modern world, but not a surrender of basic cultural values. It is not a one-sided adaption that is envisaged, but an adjustment which will permit French Canada to draw full advantage from the benefits the modern world can offer. The prospect of friction arises because the proponents of change are determined to continue to live in a French-Canadian ambience. The adaptation that is being made is based on the recognition of a need to create competence both to forward the evolution of the French-speaking society and to assert economic influence in proportion to the numerical importance of the French-Canadian element of the national community. If adaptation is to give adequate recognition to the aspirations of all French Canadians, it implies complete social services in the hands of members of the French-speaking community. It implies maximum advantages for labor and agriculture as well as for management and the professions. In terms of today's anticipation of rapid change, this means not only a vast expansion of educational facilities for the normal gamut of school needs, but also an intensive retraining program. This is envisaged in short-range terms for readjustment of excess agricultural workers to industrial jobs. Over the longer term, however, it implies a continuing program to meet the needs

of an age of automation in which the average industrial worker might expect to change occupations several times in the course of his working life. All of these aspects are taken into account in the broad socio-economic program the Lesage regime began to develop as an integral part of Quebec's assertion of autonomy. The basic problem is common to most of North America; the language factor complicates it out of proportion in Quebec because the Canadien faces an uphill fight for recognition of his language in the labor market.

**MAITRES CHEZ NOUS**

When the Liberals acquired control in Quebec in 1960, an important part of their program was a demand that companies which exploit the natural resources of the province undertake to hire local technical and administrative personnel for all levels of their enterprises. This has long been the dream of French Canadians, who charge that they have been relegated, since 1760, to the role of hewers of wood and drawers of water in the land their ancestors settled. John Porter has documented the paucity of French-Canadian representation in the top echelons of Canadian business. He found that only fifty-one, or 6.7 per cent, of the most influential industrial and commercial leaders in Canada could be classified as French Canadians. One-third of these were lawyers; another fourth had important political affiliations. The rest qualified mainly on the basis of directorships in the two relatively small banks controlled by French Canadians: La Banque Canadienne Nationale and the Provincial Bank of Canada. No more than a handful, like the Simards of Sorel, could be classed as top-flight industrialists.\(^2\) There has been a definite increase in the number of French Canadians in important business posts since Porter's study was made, but there is some question as to the degree to which political or strategic considerations have had greater weight than formerly in such nominations.

French Canadians' concern about their modest role in the economic life of Canada antedates confederation. As early as 1840 a pioneer Canadian journalist, Étienne Parent, crusaded, to no avail, for the training of economists and a more active participation in the economic life of the country. Near the turn of the century Errol Bouchette pleaded with his fellows to aim at economic independence through the

creation of a system of technical and industrial schools and by investing in natural resources. Édouard Montpetit, the founder of the social science faculty at the University of Montreal, hammered away at the same theme between the wars. His successor, Esdras Minville, felt obliged in 1950 to reassure English Canadians that the campaign of economic propaganda in Quebec was not an indication of a hidden desire for separation. The economic aspirations of French Canadians were more precise and more ambitious than in former times, he said, but did not deviate from broadly human concerns for their culture.³

Periodic stocktaking has established fairly clearly where French Canadians exerted more or less direct control over their economic destiny. In 1936 Victor Barbeau made a detailed industry-by-industry study which listed strengths and weaknesses in specific fields.⁴ In the mid-1950s two shorter studies reviewed the same ground. They noted little change in heavy industry, where French Canadians were virtually excluded from ownership or control. Their position was good in building, cement, and lumber but insignificant in other durable goods. They had an excellent position in shoes and leather goods, bakeries, and soft drinks; good in furniture; modest in noncotton textiles and in men's clothing. In services they were relatively strong in banking and brokerage, road transportation, and hotels; particularly good progress had been made in the insurance field in the twenty-year period.⁵

In general terms, French-Canadian management has had highest representation in economic sectors where entry is easiest, technology not an important factor, and where the average enterprise is small. This has been particularly apparent in retail trade, agriculture, and forestry, where the French-speaking element has full proportional representation, and, to a lesser degree, in construction.

Since the war Laval sociologist Jean-Charles Falardeau has collected some figures which throw light on this situation. Of 9,304 students who graduated with a baccalaureate degree from Quebec's collèges classiques between 1939 and 1950, 37 per cent chose medicine, 11 per cent, engineering, 7 per cent, law, 5 per cent, commerce, and 4 per cent applied science. Of the 465 who went into business, only 39 per cent

aimed at jobs in industry. The rest were heading for a family enterprise or certified public accountancy.  

Everett C. Hughes, who pioneered sociological studies on French Canada, attributed the relative absence of French Canadians from important posts of big business to their reluctance to be cut off from their traditional environment. He pointed out that there was nothing unusual in the way industrialization was implemented in Quebec. It is the rule rather than an exception for industrialization to be brought into an underdeveloped area by outsiders. Very few of today's industrialized societies achieved that status through their own efforts. For example, in the United States, when industry moved into the Southern states, local leadership played no greater role in controlling it than did the inhabitants of any small Quebec city similarly introduced to industrialization. The important difference in the past, however, was that the sons of local professional people and businessmen in such situations in the United States quickly sought the technical training to make them useful employees of the invading industrialist. In Quebec, on the other hand, the sons of the local doctor or lawyer were not attracted to engineering or commerce. Hughes suggests that the major deterrent was the reluctance to undertake the semi-itinerant existence of the corporation junior executive, who is subject to frequent transfers to various parts of the country or of the continent. In pre-1960 Quebec a degree of semialienation was the lot of the French Canadian who opted for a career in any enterprise controlled by English-speaking interests.

On the other hand, willingness to accept such conditions carried no assurance of equal access to top management levels. English-Canadian discrimination in excluding French-speaking compatriots from top managerial roles in big corporations is no longer seriously denied. It was dramatized in 1962 by an incident which pitted Canadian National Railway president Donald Gordon against French-Canadian nationalists complaining about the dearth of high-ranking railroad officials from the French-speaking part of the population. Gordon subsequently took energetic steps to correct the imbalance, but in the meantime President N. R. Crump of the Canadian Pacific inadvertently substantiated the charge of prejudice in an attempt to exonerate his colleague. Crump advanced the explanation that the classical education provided in the collèges classiques was not adequate preparation for a railroad executive. Thereupon an enterprising journalist published statistics on the educa-

tional background of the thirty-two top officials of both railroads. Less than a quarter of them met Crump's basic requirement of a university degree in engineering; 50 per cent of them, including Gordon, had no university training, and some had not even been to high school. Four had law degrees—the type of classical training Crump found wanting. The journalist concluded that the typical railroad vice-president was job-trained, and that many thousands of French Canadians who had started at the bottom had academic qualifications equal to or better than those of many who became vice-presidents.

Although French-Canadian management is still largely a function of ownership, the development of professional managers is under way. The managerial technique is expanding beyond the business field. The planning concept has been publicized more frequently in Quebec in relation to the national role adopted in France, but efficiency and co-ordinated control are increasingly recognized practices in public institutions as well as in business. The need for trained personnel in business and science is now widely accepted in Quebec, and French-speaking youth is preparing to fill the demand. In 1965 the majority of the students in the three French-language universities in the province were aiming at industry, commerce, administration, teaching, and research. At the University of Montreal, law, medicine, dentistry, and pharmacy had enrolled barely 10 per cent of the total student body.

By 1970 the French-language universities in Quebec will be producing more adequate numbers of engineers, technicians, and business administration majors to occupy many if not most of the openings English-speaking as well as government-operated concerns will consider priority positions for French Canadians. At least insofar as such openings will be expected to reflect a French-language milieu, they will help fill one of the gaps which have prevented the creation of a "complete society." Whether other requirements will be fully satisfied can be determined only after a lapse of time. Whether a real *modus vivendi* can be achieved to permit integration of a nationwide corporation into the environment Quebec nationalism now envisages may put more of a burden on the French Canadians directly concerned than is yet evident.

The general adaptation of French-Canadian-controlled enterprises to the expansionist mentality of the American business world will help ease nationalist pressures. The traditional performance pattern of Quebec business shows a definite lag in that regard. Some criticism could proba-

bly be validly generalized on a reluctance to innovate, to plan ahead, or to take risks. Perhaps more characteristic of the semiartisanal level of many Quebec firms in the past was an unwillingness to bring in capital or management from outside the family, or in general to look on a business concern as an institution in its own right rather than as a personal or family possession. Evidence of changing attitudes is growing, however, both in regard to individual resourcefulness and to group action. There are numerous small firms which are fully competitive, some of them strikingly successful. In the past the small number of French Canadians who managed to rival their English-speaking compatriots were themselves anglicized in large degree. The recent organization of mutual assistance funds among business groups in several parts of the province and the development of professional managerial associations may counter this tendency as well as encourage French-Canadian enterprise.

Publicly owned industries may serve as pilot plants, both by encouraging French Canadians’ interest in wide-scale enterprise and by integrating them into national organizations. The discrimination long practiced in the Canadian National was particularly flagrant because the company was nationally owned. Since the incident which focused public attention on its personnel practices, a considerable effort has been made to take French-Canadian sensibilities into account. More Quebeckers are moving into high-level positions in the St. Lawrence Region of the CNR, and their promotions no longer make them liable to transfer to other provinces. An accelerated program for French-Canadian aspirants to positions of higher responsibility has been put into effect, and free use of French on a par with English as the working language within the administrative framework of the railroad is the goal of management. The internal revolution such initiatives imply may be gauged from the fact that among the changes the new appreciation of French-Canadian rights brought into being is the first bilingual timetable in Canadian history.

An all-out effort to accommodate French Canadians can be launched by a nationalized organization, because political pressure can be exerted directly. It is far and away more of a problem with private enterprise, however, and ultimately the question of whether nationwide corpora-

tions can be reconciled with the concept of a “complete society” in French Canada may determine whether Quebec remains within the Confederation. René Lévesque’s running duel with the Noranda Mines Limited is typical, although Noranda’s attitude no longer typifies English-speaking management in Quebec. There was an implicit threat of nationalization in Lévesque’s statement in 1965 to a group of Noranda workers that their employers should take advantage of the time left to them to “become civilized.” He made clear that he felt a company operating in Quebec for forty years, and doing nearly half its business there, should adapt to the French-Canadian milieu. Social integration, he and the overwhelming majority of his fellow Quebeckers feel, is not forwarded by looking on the province merely as a source of raw materials and cheap labor. It includes the opportunity to work in French at all levels of management, and acceptance of unions as representatives of the employees.¹¹

An increasing number of business concerns in Quebec have been forthcoming in regard to French-language rights and a place in the administrative hierarchy for French-speaking personnel. How completely this can be achieved, however, may depend on psychological factors that transcend good will. There is no question but that the new business-oriented attitude which is becoming characteristic of a big segment of Quebec youth will give most provincial enterprises an opportunity to hire qualified French-Canadian candidates for high administrative posts. It is very much an open question, however, whether the adaptation to the dominant North American business climate can be made without destroying the cultural background these aspiring business leaders profess determination to maintain. The problem of integrating such applicants may involve a retraining program which will result in anglicization in mentality if not in language. A series of tests conducted by a well-known Canadian company to assess reasoning ability is enlightening in this regard.¹² Assuming the validity of the tests, which were understood to present no language barrier, a considerable difference between the English-Canadian and French-Canadian thought processes emerged. Extremely intelligent French-speaking university graduates failed the tests because they approached the problems from a humanistic rather than from a pragmatic point of view. How far the business enterprises interested in satisfying French-Canadian national-

ism will feel free to go in modifying their basic methods, if language is not the only change involved, can become a critical question.

SOCIAL SECURITY

Quebec’s new willingness to assert its responsibilities in the field of social security and assistance has brought it into direct confrontation with Ottawa on a number of specific issues in recent years, and more serious conflicts are in prospect. Both the Lesage and the Johnson regimes have insisted that Quebec take over the powers which will permit it to set up its own integrated program of social security to meet its own needs.

The British North America Act of 1867 did not provide for questions of social security, whose history began, as far as the Canadian state is concerned, with a public assistance law in 1921. This provided for the hospitalization of indigents and for their upkeep. Whereas the Privy Council in London recognized in 1937 the thesis of provincial responsibility, the Rowell-Sirois Commission on fiscal competence favored social security unity on a national scale. In 1940 a constitutional amendment gave the federal government jurisdiction over unemployment insurance, and the trend seemed firmly established. In 1944 the federal government’s role was further strengthened by the enactment of family allowance legislation. In 1951, however, both federal and provincial interests were recognized in a constitutional amendment which admitted the possibility of joint action by both or separate initiative on either level of government on old-age insurance.

The Lesage government undertook to clarify the jurisdictional question as quickly as possible and to oblige the federal government to withdraw from those areas where Quebec believes the provinces should have responsibility. Lesage insisted that his government had no objection if the other provinces wanted to delegate authority to Ottawa in the fields of responsibility in question, but he maintained that Quebec must retain its autonomy. By 1964 his government had committed itself to withdraw, before April, 1967, from twenty-nine of the forty-six joint programs it was supporting in conjunction with Ottawa. The most important of these are in social security, but they cover a wide range of fields, some involving much larger sums of money than others. Various public health services, professional training, and agricultural programs are being taken over exclusively by the province in the initial transition period. For some of the costlier programs, including hospitalization insurance and some social welfare arrangements, the deadline is 1970. In
all cases, Ottawa agrees to provide to Quebec access to the funds required to operate the programs.

Perhaps the most important item in this field, both from the point of view of substantive value and from its psychological impact on federal-provincial relations, is the universal portable pension plan which went into effect on January 1, 1966, simultaneously with a federally sponsored scheme for the rest of Canada. The two plans are almost identical because they are based on a proposal Quebec submitted in 1964 to a federal-provincial conference. Although Ottawa had its own draft for consideration by the conference, the merits of the Quebec scheme were recognized, and the initial federal proposal was scrapped in favor of one on the Quebec model. Each is universal, obligatory, and contributory, but a transfer clause permits the participants to move, without penalty, between Quebec and the other provinces. In addition to the psychological plus for Quebec in winning control of its own retirement system, the province has at its disposal, in the pension fund, a tool of tremendous importance to its economic expansion program.

Two important precedents were set by the conference which laid the groundwork for the pension plans. By accepting the Quebec proposal, Pearson, for the first time in the history of the Confederation, recognized a special status for Quebec. For the first time also, Ottawa, usually self-assured of its administrative competence, dropped its own project in favor of Quebec's. Although this reflected to some degree Pearson's recognition of the political climate in the French-speaking province, it was largely an admission of the technical superiority of the Quebec proposal.

Lesage had been accused of pushing for a separate pension system more to get access to the investment potential of the fund than for humanitarian reasons. If it is true that he seemed to be more economic-than social-minded in the first half of the decade, his intention to devote more effort to social problems was, nevertheless, evident in late 1965 when he shifted two of the most dynamic members of his team to ministries in that field. The prospect of elections in 1966 was not foreign to that move, but the presence of René Lévesque at the head of the Ministry of the Family and Social Welfare and of Eric Kierans as health minister guaranteed new initiatives in both fields. It went without saying that further strains on federal-provincial relations were in prospect.

This was borne out in January, 1966, when Lévesque made his first public statement in his new capacity. He declared flatly that all social assistance measures should come under a single government and left no
doubt that he had in mind provincial control. He based his position on
the recommendations of the Boucher Report, produced in 1963 by a
provincial study committee on public assistance. It advised withdrawal
by Quebec from all joint social assistance programs. It is probably unfair
to Lévesque to suggest that his nationalistic attitude led him to be
swayed by this recommendation, but it certainly facilitated his willing­
ness to move to reduce further Quebec’s dependence on Ottawa in the
social security field. He seems to be genuinely appalled by the evidence
of poverty and ignorance in the province; he was determined to use the
power of the provincial government to better the situation, regardless of
the implications for Ottawa.

The unified social security program Lévesque’s ministry envisaged is
based on the family. Its aim was to take over and replace the financial
aid measures initiated by Ottawa, starting with the $180,000,000 family
allowance program. Public assistance, unemployment insurance, health
insurance, and housing allotments heretofore disbursed by Ottawa were
other targets. The family ministry’s brief at the January, 1966, federal­
provincial conference on the federal public assistance system explained
Quebec’s determination to develop and administer its own program. Since
social problems, it stated, affect the most fundamental fabric of
individual and community relations, the pan-Canadian system proposed
by the federal government is unacceptable to Quebec. Leaving aside the
question of administrative efficacy, which, it maintained, fully justified a
provincial program, the brief based its argument on the degree to which
the culture of a people is affected deeply and daily in this area. The
Quebec delegation left no doubt that the constitutional question would
be invoked to assure an autonomous organization.

Shortly after the Johnson regime took power, it reaffirmed Quebec’s
insistence on provincial rights in education, social security, and health.
On the occasion of Johnson’s initial appearance at a federal-provincial
conference on fiscal matters, the Quebec delegation presented a closely
reasoned exposition of the French-Canadian position. It specified Que­
bec’s intention to continue to maintain a separate sociocultural system
and to withdraw from joint programs or to establish its own where fu­
ture need became apparent. The document made clear that Ottawa was
going to be under extreme pressure to make funds available for Quebec
to use in these areas as the latter saw fit.

LABOR

The quiet revolution has been criticized as a middle-class phenome­
non because labor’s gains were relatively modest, especially in the early
1960s. Although the working class in Quebec shared in the general prosperity Canada has enjoyed in the postwar period, unemployment has continued above the national level, pockets of poverty have persisted, and social legislation lagged. Labor's participation was less whole-hearted than that of other segments of the population, because, particularly for the unskilled, the "complete society" theory had little meaning. Nevertheless, a more demanding spirit began to emerge as awareness of change penetrated deeper into the national consciousness.

Quebec labor has always been jealous of the wage differential which puts the mass of French-speaking workers at a disadvantage in comparison with Ontario. Increasing willingness to resort to strikes in the mid-1960s indicated greater confidence in the potential of organization. With more opportunity for specialization resulting from educational reform, a less quiescent labor force is in prospect. Some indication of conflict between the two language groups is apparent in union rivalry and in the illiberal line Lesage took on manpower mobility.

The Canadian Economic Council has long recommended a national manpower policy, but the federal government's first move to co-ordinate manpower services signaled a new controversy with Quebec. When Pearson announced the opening, at the end of 1965, of a national placement service, he stressed that it was meant for all Canadians. Both Lesage and his labor minister, Carrier Fortin, immediately challenged the theory that Canada forms a single labor market. Lesage argued that the application of labor mobility on a national basis would tend to rob Quebec of its specialized workmen without replacing them with bilingual workers from other provinces. Fortin insisted that the market for the French-language labor force was different from that for English Canadians, especially for nonskilled Quebec laborers. Since Quebec constitutes a distinct market because of its cultural characteristics, its problems should be assumed by the provincial government, he maintained. Though he did not deny the need to assure geographic mobility to bring unemployed labor to full-employment areas, he emphasized the desirability of greater professional mobility which placed demands on retraining facilities, a provincial responsibility in terms of educational jurisdiction.

If Quebec persists in implementing its own policy in this field, it can be in a more vulnerable position than in most of its other confrontations with Ottawa. The need for wide mobility for skilled workers is strongly backed by organized labor, and the provincial government will be hard put to find valid economic arguments to bolster its stand. The question is directly related to Lesage's commitment to pan-Canadianism, how-
ever, and can be exploited in connection with the general French-Canadian demand for educational and radio-TV facilities on a national scale. The Quebec press considers labor mobility a simple problem for the English-speaking Canadian; it is much more unsettling for the French Canadian, who becomes a nomad, a stranger, alienated from his culture in his own land. Federal minister Jean Marchand has sought to mollify Quebec by stating that normally mobility should be envisaged on a provincial level, although, as a national problem, it will be under the jurisdiction of the federal government.

Even though 1965 unemployment in Quebec was the lowest since 1956 (at 5.4 per cent), it was appreciably above the national figure of 3.5 per cent. The Quebec labor force was up 3.6 per cent in 1965, to over 2,000,000 (7,232,000 for Canada). Lack of skills rather than of opportunity was the major factor in unemployment. The government has tried to mitigate the situation by intensified recruitment campaigns in Europe. The shortage of skilled labor there has brought home to both governmental levels in Canada the need to intensify readaptation measures and to train new generations of technicians.

Ottawa's immigration policies have been a traditional sore point with Quebec, which looks on them as a dark plot to swamp French Canadians in a sea of "New Canadians" oriented toward the English-speaking element of the population. The birth rate in Quebec has been dropping, although it was still higher than the Ontario level in 1965. Nevertheless, immigration increased the Ontario population more rapidly. In the 10-year period beginning in 1954, Ontario received 741,000 immigrants as against 299,000 for Quebec. In 1965 the immigration total of 146,000 included 40,000 from the United Kingdom but only 5,000 from France. Although Quebec got 20 percent of all immigrants in 1965, most of those could be expected to tend toward English rather than French. On a national scale, ten times as many English-speaking as French-speaking new Canadians arrived in 1965. University of Montreal demographer Jacques Henripin estimates that by the end of the century the French-speaking percentage of the Canadian population will decrease from 29 per cent to perhaps as low as 17 per cent. Spurred by such predictions and by the growing need for skilled labor, the Quebec government is developing its own immigration policy. This represents a significant reversal of the situation that prevailed for well over a century. Quebec was a net exporter of manpower without interruption from 1830 to 1950. In some periods the exodus accounted for as high as 20 per cent of the working-age population.

Although this situation has been reversed since the 1950s, the labor
market has not been appreciably altered. In 1955 the working population in Quebec amounted to 35.1 per cent of the total, compared to 37.5 per cent in Ontario, and in 1965 the Quebec figure was still only 35.2 per cent. This helps explain why the average individual income in Quebec is lower than in Ontario. From 1926, when adequate statistics first made comparison possible, to 1960, Quebec has lagged by 27.5 per cent. In 1965 the per capita amounts were $1,608 in Quebec and $2,125 in Ontario. Quebec ranked sixth among the 10 provinces; the national average was $1,826.

The fundamental fact in this regard is the relative abundance of manpower in Quebec. Production has increased at the same rate in Quebec and in Ontario since confederation, but a more rapid population growth in Quebec has resulted in a less rapid increase in per capita income. At the same time, salaries in the manufacturing sector of the economy have lagged behind Ontario by 10 to 15 per cent since 1870. This is partly relative, however, because of the distribution of types of industry. Labor-intensive industries, with lower-paying jobs, have been more numerous in Quebec. Until the mid-1960s Quebec had practically no steel, automotive, or other industry paying high salaries. For comparable industries, Quebec wages are above the national average, except in railroading, where a single national standard had been in effect until recently, and subsequent changes have favored Quebec rail workers. The generally lower level of income in Quebec compared to Ontario is due in some degree also to the smaller size of individual plants and of the domestic market and to the technical skill and efficiency of the labor force and administration, all of which bear directly on productivity, as of course does the relative amount of capital per man in a given enterprise. The over-all per capita income in Quebec has been consistently higher than the figures for the Atlantic provinces, but it conceals wide variations within the province, particularly between Montreal and the Gaspé region.

Although the relative positions of Quebec and the Atlantic provinces indicate that more than cultural differences are at play, Quebec tended to explain its economic backwardness vis-à-vis Ontario in terms of discrimination. The French Canadians' inferiority complex was aggravated by the realization that the higher incomes of the English-speaking business community in Montreal helped conceal an even greater disparity between the earning power of the Quebec workingman and his Ontario counterpart. The higher level of unemployment in Quebec tended, however, to discourage labor militancy, which in any event would
probably have been directed more against French-speaking management than against management in general.

Business concerns controlled by French Canadians have traditionally had a generally low level of management-labor relations, largely because of undercapitalization. For years French-Canadian management had had the reputation of low wages and poor working conditions in both industry and commerce. This was one of the imponderables which made Quebec organized labor less amenable initially to the nationalistic appeals which swayed other segments of French-Canadian opinion. In recent years, however, an increasing note of national identification has become apparent, encouraged in large part by dissension within the trade union movement.

The dominant labor force in Canada is the Canadian Labor Congress, which groups affiliates of AFL-CIO organizations. In 1965 it controlled 1,300,000 of Canada’s 1,600,000 union members. Of its 110 member unions, 92, which account for over 85 per cent of membership, are branches of American Federations. Many of these affiliates are too small to give their members the advantages in organization, education, research, and information which are increasingly important services expected of a modern labor organization.

In addition to the need for structural reform, the CLC is facing growing pressure to seek a larger degree of autonomy from its U.S. affiliates. The necessity for negotiations on a continental basis in large industry, such as steel and automobiles, is recognized, but there is growing realization that adequate consideration is not given to the problems resulting from the existence of an independent Canadian political entity. The disparity between population and the geographic extent of Canada, the lag in its economic development vis-à-vis the United States, the diversity in its labor legislation from province to province, and, increasingly, the division into two language groups create special circumstances to which American labor leaders are not always responsive.

The Quebec counterpart of the CLC has been more alert to those problems than has the national headquarters for a number of reasons and has tended increasingly to use the ethnic divergence as a weapon to achieve structural reforms. Its efforts have been hampered considerably by its relationship to its member organizations. It is a loose affiliation of locals which tend to look more to their national and international headquarters for the services they desire.

The Quebec Labor Federation has been engaged for years in a bitter struggle with the Confederation of National Trade Unions, which,
Quebec confronts Canada despite its name, is confined almost entirely to the Province of Quebec. La Confédération des Syndicats Nationaux was originally a Catholic union, which began to admit non-Catholics to membership only in 1943. Traditionally paternalistic in concept, it was often the equivalent of a company union, with Church officials discouraging direct action. Militant lay leaders arose from the ranks, however, and through the prolonged Asbestos strike of 1949 it won self-respect and established a claim as a bona fide representative for labor in Quebec. The CSN took its current name in 1960, when it cut its formal ties with the Church. It has grown to close to 200,000 members, compared to something under 250,000 for the FTQ.

Both Quebec federations played key roles in winning a new provincial labor code in 1964. The code obliged employers to use the checkoff system, permitted professional people to organize, and, above all, gave public employees the right to strike. The CSN has been organizing so many civil servants that it is tending to become predominantly a white collar union, but it has been more aggressive in leadership than the FTQ, and many of the strikes which plagued the public services from 1964 through 1966 were CSN-initiated.

Although there is some confusion on the scope of the word "national" in the CSN title, its leaders maintain they are solidly committed to the Canadian Confederation. Their divergence of views with the FTQ leadership is not on ideological differences over labor objectives but over the "continental"—that is, international—aspect of North American union affiliations. Some Quebec unions linked to the FTQ—and, therefore, to the CLC—have been demanding CLC autonomy from the parent organizations in the United States. Though FTQ leaders are pan-Canadian in outlook, an increasing number of them have taken pains in recent years to express publicly their support for the two-nation basis of Canadian Confederation. Some of them profess to see a need for such a stance to stave off desertions to the CSN, which won over about 10,000 former FTQ adherents in 1964. FTQ supporters charge that the CSN organizers use nationalism as an argument to line up new members. Although both unions are frequently identified in the public eye by the common front they maintain on many questions, the problem of recognition for French Canadians as such is creating friction for the FTQ with the CLC.

This is apparent from the attitude of CLC president Claude Jodoin, himself a French Canadian. At the FTQ congress in 1965 he felt obliged to reiterate a stand he took initially at the 1962 CLC congress, when he maintained that Canada can and should remain a united
country in spite of its linguistic and cultural diversity. He saw the union movement as the image of the Canadian constitutional structure of a confederation with ten provinces. He admitted a particular problem existed in regard to Quebec, but he attempted to gloss over the difficulty as a reflection of the divisive existence of the rival labor organization. He took up this theme again at the CLC 1966 congress, denouncing the "regionalist spirit" as a menace to Canadian national unity.

Part of the FTQ stand on this question is an ambivalent attitude toward the CSN. At its 1965 congress there was considerable discussion of unity with the CSN. It was argued that the FTQ was in a better position to negotiate unity with the CSN than was the CLC, and the CLC congress a few months later conceded it greater freedom of action. The insistence with which the 1965 FTQ congress reiterated its demands for French-language rights was more than tactical, however. It called for French as a working language and as the vehicle of relations between labor and management and insisted that the provincial government take urgent legislative measures to further these objectives.

The significance of such demands is more apparent in the FTQ's efforts to win a special status within the CLC. They were blocked in 1966 on a technicality, but the question will come up again at the next biennial congress. A commission of inquiry was set up to review the structural reforms requested by the FTQ, including proposals for French-speaking co-directors for each of the CTC's primary services (education, research, political action, and international affairs). This means a commitment to study the national question and the place of French-speaking members from Quebec in the Canadian labor movement. The proposals resulted from the demands of FTQ leaders for concrete recognition of the "existence of two nations" in Canada and from a willingness to concede the French identity of Quebec workers. Some FTQ leaders are publicly committed to the idea of a special status for Quebec, and their spokesman complained that binationalism was not officially recognized in CLC statutes—as it is by the New Democratic Party, largely because of CLC pressure.

The underlying discontent between French- and English-speaking elements in the labor field has been developing on another level, which has far more serious implications for national unity. A decision of the national Labor Relations Board in early 1966 made nationalism and separatism burning problems for organized labor. The LRB rejected an accreditation request from the Television and Moving Picture Workers' General Union in the name of 664 employees of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's French network. This decision in effect denied to
Quebec employees of an enterprise extending beyond the provincial borders the right to determine, independently of the personnel of the rest of the enterprise, the character of its relations with the employer. It was based on a precedent which established the unity of negotiations for all branches of a company according to the will of the majority of the personnel. This action opened a serious conflict between the federal power, of which the LRB is an organ, and a major Quebec labor central on essentially the same dual majority claim Quebec leaders have been making on the political level. The CSN insists that the LRB must henceforth take account of the cultural factor in defining a negotiating unity. CSN president Marcel Pepin went on record to the effect that the conflict was serious enough to imperil the future of the Canadian Confederation.\(^\text{13}\)

This conflict could have as much influence on the evolution of Quebec as the strike of program directors for the CBC's French network in 1959. At that time the incomprehension of international union chiefs in Toronto, New York, and Chicago was an essential cause behind the strike of French-speaking unionists in Montreal, which sparked much of the nationalist sentiment that has since been rampant in Quebec. In the more recent instance, the FTQ aligned itself with the rebellions Radio Canada workers in opposition to the stand taken by its national headquarters. The FTQ president felt obliged to defend his continued affiliation with "international" unions by differentiating between them and those "American federations which do not satisfy the aspirations of their Canadian members."\(^\text{14}\)

Such incidents can eventually force a reassessment of Quebec labor's support for confederation. Separatists admit that the trade union movement has been free of any involvement in their efforts to encourage independence for Quebec. Nevertheless, this type of tension is likely to arise more and more frequently in the future. To the extent that it involves an agency of the federal government in conflicts which tend to divide labor on language lines, it is bound to accentuate French-Canadian dissatisfaction. Over the long run, the attitude of labor will be the determining factor for the continuing presence of Quebec in the Canadian Confederation. If organized labor's efforts to win from Ottawa and the national federations an acceptance of the French cultural presence in Canada fail, separatist subversion will find much more receptivity in labor circles in Quebec.

\(^{13}\) _La Presse_ (March 2, 1966), p. 1.

\(^{14}\) _Le Devoir_ (October 24, 1966), p. 9.
Labor leaders in Quebec base their opposition to separatism largely on the outlook for lower standards of living in an independent French-speaking state. In October, 1963, for example, the Montreal Labor Council (CLC) strongly condemned separatism, charging that it would result in the flight of capital, the imposition of an economic blockade, the emigration of competent technicians and administrators, and new tariff barriers. Later that year the FTQ convention condemned separatism in a resolution which stated that independence would lower living standards. It considered the Confederation the best organization for the French-Canadian people but expressed the desire to see the Constitution amended to give French-language rights more adequate legal safeguards. In response to such pressures English-speaking labor leaders have been showing a growing awareness of the need to accommodate demands for cultural equality. Nevertheless, their concern over the fragmentation of national bargaining efforts has tended to favor a sharper division of union organizations along ethnic lines.

Largely as a result of the squabble between the CLC and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's French-speaking authors and artists' group, several unions in related fields have switched to the CSN. These organizations are extremely suspicious of any pan-Canadian activities; in this regard they buttress the attitude of new unions of professional employees formed under CSN auspices. Though the CSN continues to resist pressure to adopt a political orientation, it cannot avoid taking positions on broad political issues. At its 1966 biennial congress it adopted a resolution affirming the right of "the French-Canadian nation" to self-determination. Pepin specified that this was not an option for independence. He pointed out that the choice could favor a revision of the Constitution, which the CSN, the FTQ, and the Quebec farmers' organization had formally proposed a short time before to the constitutional commission. He admitted, however, that it went beyond the joint proposal. In sum, the defense of French language rights has been pushing leaders of both labor organizations in Quebec into formal statements of position which imply less than a firm commitment to confederation.

AGRICULTURE

Whereas labor in Quebec has not yet attempted with any success to assert itself as a united political force, the rural vote has had the traditional disproportionate political influence. Recent redistricting

made some progress toward equilibrium, but the rural voter still carries considerably more weight than his city counterpart. Traditionally, the farmers' political voice is raised against the party in power; before 1960 it backed the Liberals and, since then, the Union Nationale. Radical political solutions have been more successful in massing support in rural areas than elsewhere. This is evidenced by the presence in Ottawa of Réal Caouette's Créditiste contingent.

Although farmer discontent has become increasingly strident in Quebec in recent years, the questions it raises are not unique to that province. The miserable condition of most farmers in Eastern Canada is a major preoccupation of the Maritime Provinces and parts of Ontario as well. To some extent it is a problem which was both delayed and aggravated by World War II. The war and its immediate aftermath turned farm production methods upside down. Particularly after the war, many farmers went heavily into debt for new equipment, soil improvement, herd selection, and similar modern farm needs. Before much of this had been amortized, agriculture in Europe—which had been the principal market in this brief period of prosperity—got back on its feet, and at the same time margarine began to take over the butter market. This was a serious blow to Quebec, where dairy farms account for 50 per cent of farm production.

Although Quebec still has some of the best farms in Canada, there are relatively few with gross incomes over $50,000. The 1961 census valued the average at $17,000, with a gross revenue of $5,400, including $800 in kind. With operating expenses of $3,450, this left a net of $1,950. How little this is can be more readily gauged when it is realized that increasingly specialization means that a large percentage of the family food must be bought. How much less is available for families at the bottom of the scale is apparent from a spot check in ten marginal zones in Quebec in 1964; that study revealed that 50 per cent of the farmers in those areas had incomes under $2,500. The farms produced only 54 per cent of that amount, however, social security, unemployment insurance, and government-financed work projects providing a large share of the remainder.

The exodus of farm workers, which had begun to accelerate in the war years, is apparent in the decrease in the number of farms. While the value of agricultural production per farm worker went up 90 per cent in less than 15 years, the number of farms decreased from 134,000 in 1951 to 95,000 in 1961, and the government estimate for 1965 was 75,000. Farm labor decreased from 7.7 percent to 5.8 per cent of the total work force, from 1960 to 1965.
Many of these farms were not paying because they were too small; consolidation may make them profitable. Others had soil too poor for cultivation or were badly situated either from the point of view of climate or market. Agricultural experts estimate that available productive land can provide a living for about 30,000 farmers. This is a drastic cut in percentage, but the numbers involved are relatively small, particularly when as recently as 1951 nearly 19 per cent of the Quebec population still lived on farms.

The provincial "White Book on Agriculture," issued in 1965, was hesitant and contradictory in its policy formulation. It recognized the elements of the problem but offered no real program to reduce the number of farms or orient farm workers to other occupations. Farm spokesmen insist that it is useless to dream of regrouping lands, production specialization, and reorientation of surplus farm labor without a wholesale reform program. Their main proposal is a policy of stable prices. They state that farm prices rose only 5 per cent from 1949 to 1963, while farmer costs—fertilizer, seed, equipment, and services—rose 47 per cent.

Some farm leaders attribute all their ills to the lack of unity among farm forces. Attempts at direct pressure were evident in the march of 18,000 farmers on the provincial parliament in the summer of 1964 and in a tractor parade that blocked highways in the Lac Saint-Jean region in 1965. Farmer spokesmen consider the Royal Commission on Agriculture appointed by the provincial government in September, 1965, little more than a smoke screen. In the 1966 elections the various parties attempted to capitalize on farm discontent, and the Lesage team was close to demagoguery in its efforts to woo the farm vote.

Farm spokesmen would not dismiss separatism if they could be convinced that independence would improve the lot of the farmer. At the 1966 congress of the Catholic Farmers' Union, the secretary-general denied that the brief on constitutional revision which the organization had presented to the provincial government in collaboration with the two major labor unions rejected independence. The brief did not rule out such an option, he said; it merely stated that no one could prove independence would not entail a marked drop, over the short term, in the standard of living of the working classes.\(^{16}\)

A major aspect in the government’s attempt to solve the farm problem will be education. The Catholic Farmers’ Union is seeking a special state pension for fifty-year-old farmers obliged to give up nonproductive

farms. The government may be reluctant to apply so drastic a measure generally, but it may be necessary for some whose learning capacity is limited. In the marginal areas of the province covered by a spot check in 1965, farmers in question averaged 5.9 years of schooling; their adult children had only 7.6 years. The vast educational program, now in its early stages, is a direct attack on this situation. If it is to be an effective deterrent to political demagoguery, it will have to be accompanied by commensurate investment in an industrial base to assure employment to the technically trained graduates it expects to produce.

**EDUCATION**

The increasing emphasis on education poses a difficult hurdle to smoother provincial-federal relations in Canada. In theory there is no basis for conflict in this field; the Constitution puts jurisdiction in educational matters unequivocally in the hands of the provincial governments. The federal government may act to protect the educational rights of either Protestant or Catholic minority, where a provincial government has restricted schools under such religious auspices. Except in the unlikely event of legal action against some aspects of recent recommendations to centralize administration in the Quebec school system, however, the restrictions on provincial autonomy in education are no longer of practical importance. Nevertheless, the general recognition of common needs for educational expansion on a nationwide scale, to adapt to modern requirements, has encouraged moves to develop federal programs in education. Any such attempts would be certain to draw violent opposition from Quebec, which regards educational autonomy as essential to the maintenance of a distinct cultural entity. They are particularly suspect in the highly charged atmosphere incident to Quebec's reassessment of its basic educational philosophy.

At the end of World War II the French-language educational system in Quebec adhered in large measure to the ideal of the Renaissance, particularly on the secondary level. It was devoted primarily to the formation of a tiny intellectual elite. The *collège classique* was the only road to the prestige faculties of the university: theology, medicine, and law. Even in the mid-1940s little more than half the elementary school population completed the seventh grade. Though a third received some additional education, less than 7 per cent completed secondary school; the same percentage received some technical training. Barely 4 per cent entered the university. According to the 1951 census only 4.4 per cent of the French-speaking population of Canada had completed more than
twelve years of schooling, compared to 9.2 per cent for all other Canadians. Of all Canadians who had undertaken college-level studies, only 16 per cent were of French origin. By 1961 the average number of years of schooling for Quebec was 8.8, compared to 9.25 for the whole country. Only Newfoundland, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island had poorer records. These figures masked wide ethnic regional differences. The 10.5-year average for English-speaking Quebeckers was almost 3 years above the French-Canadian average in Quebec. While 54 per cent of Quebec's active population had not gone beyond the elementary grades, in Abitibi it was 61 per cent and in the Gaspé, 68 per cent. More than 43 per cent of Quebec residents between twenty and twenty-four years of age were on the labor market in the mid-1960s with only an elementary education; in British Columbia the comparable figure was 16 per cent.

Although a direct relationship can be shown, in general, between the growth of school population and economic development, in the Quebec case it is a question of the chicken or the egg. Jacques Parizeau, an economist at the École des Hautes Études Commerciales, says that the lack of technicians of all kinds hampered the emergence of a modern industrial economy in Quebec as much as other factors. His fellow economist at the same school, François-Albert Angers, questions that interpretation of the relationship between the level of education and economic development. He believes that the influence of education is very general and not valid for particular cases. The reverse is true, he maintains; as the degree of economic development rises, the level of education has to rise to permit the population to perform new tasks. If technical education lagged in Quebec, he says, it was because investment didn't require it.

Whatever validity the argument for technical training may hold, it is more difficult to direct the charge of faulty education against the schooling given the elite. The collèges classiques concentrated on the humanities. Their graduates had a firm grounding in Greek, Latin, and philosophy, which differed little from the general cultural formation given to the British gentlemen of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, who distinguished themselves in commerce and industry as well as in the professions. Nevertheless, the collèges classiques were established primarily to assure the training of priests; they were essentially private institutions. Those graduates of the collèges classiques who did not opt for the

18. La Presse (January 12, 1966), p. 70.
priesthood were normally expected to turn to law or medicine. The old Department of Public Instruction had failed to organize an adequate secondary school system. The four or five years of post-elementary training it offered led only to commercial and industrial courses on the university level.

Until the École des Hautes Études Commerciales was established in 1907, there was no formal training in Quebec to challenge the ascendancy of the liberal professions in the French-speaking community. Its objective was to form men capable of taking over the economic life of the province. Aside from this, however, it was not until the postwar years that broad emphasis was placed on diverting the flow of talent away from the professions and into industry and commerce. In the early 1960s the Economic Expansion Council took a leading role in this regard by attempting to make youth aware of the province's industrial and economic problems.

At the same time the need for professional training for civil servants became more widely acknowledged. Public administration was not recognized at Laval University as a field of specialization until 1961. All the French-speaking universities began to prepare administrators in the early 1960s, when demand far exceeded the supply.

In 1963 a group of Laval professors published a "Cri d'alarme" over the shortage of scientists and research specialists and facilities. Between 1933 and 1962, they pointed out, French Canada produced only 224 Ph.Ds in science; 600 would have been required to keep up with accepted norms of progress (100 per million population). With almost 30 per cent of Canada's population, French Canadians produced only 8 per cent of the nation's scientists. In 1959–60 the French-language universities in Quebec had only 7.4 per cent of the 1,200 candidates for graduate degrees in science throughout Canada.

Laval's science faculty dates only from 1920 and Montreal's from 1937. Montreal's enrollment in the sciences increased less than 50 per cent from 1958 to 1964, when 918 students were enrolled; 1,300 were expected for 1965, however. The biggest handicap in developing scientific careers, the Laval professors judged, was the lack of specialists at the secondary school level.

The broad lines of Quebec's massive educational reform were laid down by the Parent Commission, a provincial royal inquiry body set up in 1961. Its findings and recommendations were made public in separate sections from 1963 to 1966. As a result, public control and government co-ordination of education were assured by creation of a Ministry of Education. Its predecessor, the Department of Public Instruction,
lacked authority over the Catholic and Protestant school commissions, whose separate educational systems provided the only public instruction in the province.

The Parent Report laid the basis for development on a regional level, which would combine the advantages of local control and some degree of centralization. A major aim was the creation of a complete range of public instruction on the secondary level. The traditional system had been based on private secondary schools. The emphasis has now been shifted from the formation of an elite to the intellectual development of the greatest number possible. At the same time, the insistence on a polyvalent system assures expansion in a wide range of fields. The aim is to meet the needs of a scientific and technical civilization without scrapping the humanities.

Critics object that the Parent Commission’s recommendations would substitute technology for culture. Proponents argue that both objectives can be achieved in a closely co-ordinated organization of the secondary school, in which students heading for different types of work can share as many facilities as possible.

The extensive renovation of the educational system, which got under way before all parts of the Parent Report had been turned over to the provincial government, provides for six years of elementary schooling, followed by five years of high school. In 1965–66, 88 per cent of all children in the twelve to sixteen age group were in school; in 1971–72, 96 per cent enrollment is anticipated. The program provides for the remaining 4 per cent to end formal instruction with the ninth grade. A system of “Institutes” at the junior college level is expected to provide technical training as well as preparation for the university. In 1965–66, 77,000, or 24 per cent of the seventeen to nineteen age group, were under instruction; for 1971–72, 33.6 per cent enrollment is envisaged. The most spectacular changes are in progress at the university level, where 48,000 were enrolled in 1965–66, compared to 18,000 in 1959–60. In 1971–72 there will be 80,000 university students, or 17.2 per cent of the age group from twenty to the mid-twenties.

One of the most important factors in the transformation of the educational system, particularly on the secondary and higher levels, was the attitude of the clergy. Extremists on both sides were highly critical of the role of the Church in the changing educational picture. One side demanded complete withdrawal of all religious influence; the other, by no means all of whom were members of the clergy, resisted any change. The most delicate aspect of the problem was the question of religious instruction in the elementary school. Under the traditional system, all
French-language schools supported by the state were Catholic by definition, and religion was an integral part of the curriculum. The Protestant schools took over instruction of Jews and French-speaking non-Catholics. A key recommendation of the Parent Commission was a recognition of broad religious diversity and a proposal for the establishment of nonconfessional schools for both language groups.

Laval political science professor Léon Dion, in a study entitled *Le Bill 60 et le public*, credits Archbishop Roy of Quebec with a key role in reconciling state and Church differences on the school question and on the legislation creating the Ministry of Education and the High Council of Education. Without his intervention, Dion believes, the struggle between the “partisans of the God-less school” and the “clerical integralists” could have been deadlocked. He feels that repeated interventions of the French-language Lay Movement and of the Quebec Socialist Party, and even of university student and professor associations, hurt rather than helped the cause of Bill 60, which was worked out in a three-year period extending into 1964.19

An important factor in the willingness of the Church to relinquish control was the growing cost of education, particularly at the higher levels. According to Michel Brunet, director of the University of Montreal history department, the Church, which organized higher education in Quebec, never had the requisite finances for such an undertaking. The lay-directed École Polytechnique and the École des Hautes Études Commerciales were able to meet the demands of the community because of state aid, but the clergy fought shy of any threat of state control. “French-Canadian Catholic institutions had entered into a permanent alliance with penury. Only their ecclesiastical leaders seemed to be unaware of it,” said Brunet.20 Between the wars the province granted $25,000 annually to each university. The University of Montreal ran an annual deficit, amounting in 1933–34 to 48 per cent of its $417,000 budget. McGill, with expenditures of $2,578,000 for that year, also received $25,000 from the province.

In the 1950s the Duplessis regime refused to allow the federal government to extend financial aid to the Quebec universities. When his successor opened the way for acceptance of federal funds, the question of the provincial government's role was assuming growing importance. The tremendous expansion of higher-educational facilities has been a

common burden for every modern nation, but in many respects the problem for Quebec had more parallels with the underdeveloped areas than with other Western countries. The rapid expansion of the social science faculty at the University of Montreal, for example, might not be duplicated in the United States, but the difference is one of degree; its student body increased fivefold in six years. Of another order, however, is the problem of providing library facilities or of creating laboratories in fields which had been given only token consideration for years. The University of Montreal library has only one-fifth of the 1,500,000 volumes it needs for the programs of study it offers.

When the University physics department was launched in 1946, it had a budget of $5,000. In 1965–66 it spent $700,000. The school year 1966–67 inaugurated the use of the biggest university nuclear physics laboratory in Canada. The National Research Council and the Atomic Energy Corporation of Canada have each contributed about $1,000,000 to this project, and the former will finance its operation. Forty-two students were doing graduate work in physics at the University in 1965–66. Eight hundred physicists, including 300 Ph.D.s in science would have to be turned out in the next decade, however, to catch up with English Canada, and double that to match the United States.

A considerable evolution is apparent in the expenditures of the universities in the province since 1961. The total budgets of the six universities has gone up from $36,000,000 for 1961–62 to $90,000,000 for 1965–66. The provincial government provided $18,200,000 for operating expenses in 1961–62 and $35,300,000 in 1965–66. This 95 per cent hike accompanied a 46 per cent increase in the number of students, from 23,000 to 33,700. The University of Montreal’s share advanced 172 per cent, while its student body went from 3,819 to 6,596, an increase of 73 per cent. In five years universities and classical colleges combined invested $304,000,000, 67 per cent of which was provided by the provincial government.

The Parent Report envisages a further outlay of $382,000,000 through 1982 for equipment at the university level. This will represent 18 per cent of outfitting expenditures; of the $2,100,000,000 in question, 50 per cent will go toward the construction of secondary schools and 25 per cent to the new junior college level preuniversity construction. In addition, operating expenses for all levels are expected to rise from the 1966–67 budgetary figures of $868,000,000 to $3,800,000,000 in 1981–82.

In order to protect the universities from direct state influence, federal grants for higher education are handled by the association of
universities and colleges in all the provinces except Quebec. An abatement on corporate income taxes equivalent to the amount due Quebec is accorded that province, in addition to a cash payment to bring Quebec's share up to that of the other provinces. The federal government has officially justified the exception made for Quebec on the grounds that its educational system differs considerably from that of the other provinces.

The tenuous nature of such camouflage was particularly evident in 1966, when a grant of $17,000,000 to Quebec was announced. The provincial government maintains that Ottawa had no right to earmark such subsidies for specific purposes, and the press proclaimed that a precedent had been set. Prime Minister Pearson denied that the procedure differed from that followed by his predecessor and refused to say flatly that Quebec would have to use it for the universities. If Quebec can get such tacit acceptance of its claims to unconditional federal compensation when it declines to participate in federally controlled programs, it will have clearly established its claim to a special status in the Confederation.

The opposing positions of Quebec and the rest of Canada on the question of education are vividly outlined in the reactions to the Bladen Report, which was published in the middle of the 1965 federal electoral campaign. The Bladen Commission was a nongovernmental body created by the Canadian Universities Foundation, but its Report had the force of an official document. It recommended a considerable strengthening of the federal government's role in financing higher education and in encouraging research. In addition to substantial hikes in federal outlays to the universities for current expenses and for increased research, it proposed the creation of a federal ministry to co-ordinate the assistance various agencies of the national government provide to the universities. Foreseeing quadrupled expenses for the universities by 1975, it recommended increasing both federal and provincial outlays at an even higher rate, to attain $1,700,000,000 by that date. As a first step, it proposed federal grants of $330,000,000 for 1966, compared to the $80,000,000 the budget envisaged.

The Bladen Report received a generally favorable welcome everywhere in Canada, except in Quebec, and Ottawa responded by announcing its intention to increase per capita aid to the universities. Statements of approval were forthcoming not only from English-Canadian universities over the government's decision to augment the annual allotment, but also from the head of one of the bilingual universities in Ontario. Father Roger Guindon, rector of the University of Ottawa, pointed out
that even though higher education remained a provincial responsibility, it represented also an essential national investment.²¹

The University of Montreal Professors' Association took a violently critical attitude toward the Bladen Report, however, arguing that it did not take sufficient account of the existence of Quebec. Jacques-Yvan Morin, vice-president of the Association, charged that the recommendations could be conceived in terms of a unitary state, but hardly for a confederation whose bilingual character could no longer be contested. "They undermine the foundations of Quebec's autonomy," he told the press. He expressed astonishment that the Report recommended joint federal-provincial responsibility for expanding higher education, pointing out that the Constitution gives the provinces exclusive jurisdiction in this field. He felt that the Commission's caution against any federal encroachment on the rights of the provinces in this matter was only a gesture, because one would have to be quite naïve to believe that the power to subsidize education and research would not entail a right of control and direction in regard to these vital aspects of any modern society. The Professors' Association recommended to the Quebec government to assume entirely its exclusive responsibilities in the field of higher education and scientific research, and to avail itself of the right to opt out "if the Report is applied, demanding the fiscal means with no conditions on the use of such funds."²²

The Quebec Students' Union was even more caustic, challenging both the basis of the Commission's existence and the legality of the federal government's decision to act on its recommendations, as if it were a royal commission. Since its recommendations are not applicable in Quebec, the UCEQ said, it would be more forthright to use them frankly to unify educational administration in the rest of the country. This would recognize the two-nations theory, it stated, and would satisfy the aspirations of Quebec on the one hand and the residents of the other provinces on the other.²³

The attitude of Quebec is the major obstacle to broad federal participation in education. For most of English Canada, education and health are typical areas of national concern and should therefore be taken in hand by Ottawa. Both professional and political organizations have been pressing for governmental action in these fields. In 1966, for example, the Canadian Teachers' Federation voted in favor of a federal bureau of education. The Federation has been pressing such a motion

for over forty years; in 1962 it had appealed to Ottawa for assistance to elementary and secondary education. The basis of the Federation’s action is the desire to offer equal opportunity to all Canadian children. The same concern was behind a resolution passed by the Liberal Party Congress later in 1966, calling for universal accessibility to all levels of instruction. The Congress ignored the warning of Quebec delegates and prominent English-speaking Liberals, who are sensitive to French-Canadian fears in this area, that such a motion was a threat to national unity.

Quebec premier Johnson responded immediately to the Liberal Party resolution. “Quebec will never let Ottawa meddle with education,” he said. “This is a question of life and death for the French-Canadian nation,” he added. Nevertheless, Quebec is as eager as any of the English-speaking provinces to avail itself of federal funds for educational purposes. Johnson’s predecessor, Jean Lesage, had committed himself to increasing considerably the sums allotted to higher education and to research. At the same time, he had insisted that Quebec would not participate in federal projects to help finance higher education.

Prime Minister Pearson acknowledges provincial jurisdiction in educational matters, but he insists that the federal government’s responsibility for economic development obliges Ottawa to take the initiative to assure training of a productive labor force. He proposes to provide all the funds for professional training. How such funds would be made available to the provinces, and how much freedom the provinces would have in administering them were the occasion of a series of meetings in 1966 between the federal and provincial premiers and finance ministers.

The federal government undertook to make more funds available to the provinces in the general field of education, but Quebec attacked Ottawa’s proposals on three levels. A brief prepared by the provincial delegation to the federal-provincial sessions charged that Ottawa’s plan to finance adult education was unacceptable because it implied a right of inspection and, therefore, interference in the administration of university and professional training in Quebec. The second area in dispute is the field of research. Quebec insists that the close tie between research and education gives the provinces responsibility in this domain.

For a number of years Quebec spokesmen for various branches of knowledge have expressed alarm over the low estate of scientific research in the province. Laval and Montreal universities have been receiving only 8 per cent of the funds distributed by the National Research

Council. Proponents of a broader research role for the provinces argue that the federal government has been usurping provincial responsibilities but has been negligent in advancing the necessary funds. They point out that Canada as a whole is devoting only 1.1 per cent of the Gross National Product to research, compared to 3 per cent for the United States. In response to such pressure the provincial government introduced one bill early in 1966 to create a Scientific Research Council and a second to provide for an Industrial Research Center for Quebec. The Council would finance research in various sciences; the Center would be empowered to set up its own laboratories for research in applied science. Since the federal government has been the source of three-quarters of the funds devoted to research throughout Canada, Quebec's initiatives in this field open the way for further federal-provincial bickering.

The third point raised by the Quebec memorandum disputes the more amorphous area of cultural responsibility. Ottawa distinguishes between education and culture, maintaining that culture as such should be the concern of all governments and the monopoly of none. Daniel Johnson insists that Quebec alone should be responsible for the cultural orientation of its population. A rigid application of Johnson's thesis could have adverse repercussions on the situation of the French-language minorities in the other provinces and might also create new difficulties for French-speaking federal civil servants.

All these areas are basically a threat to a federal-provincial accommodation only to the extent that no understanding is reached on the underlying issue of fiscal responsibilities. They provide the emotional framework, however, to expand a dispute on the source and use of funds into a serious threat to national unity.

**IMPLICATIONS**

If the fiscal aspect could be disposed of to the satisfaction of both sides, a federal-provincial accommodation would be more readily attainable on social matters than on other levels where Quebec is asserting provincial rights. A large degree of autonomy has already been achieved in social security and education, where a firm constitutional guarantee shores up provincial claims. Ottawa could agree to a special status for Quebec on most facets of the outstanding problems in the social domain without disturbing unduly the everyday lives of residents of the other provinces. Nevertheless, many of the changes in progress or in prospect have implications which the rest of Canada may find difficult to live with.
The control of manpower mobility is an example of the type of problem in which provincial rights may affect wide areas outside provincial jurisdiction. Investment in human resources becomes increasingly important as industrialization or, more exactly, automation advances. As a corollary to its rejection of a federal role in education and health, the Quebec government has indicated its intention to adopt an independent policy on the utilization of manpower. This is an intrusion into an economic field where Quebec governments were notoriously reluctant to venture until the postwar period. It is a new departure which is readily understandable in the context of the wave of nationalism which has characterized the 1960s in Quebec. There is more than a hint of irony, however, in the situation which has given major impetus to this move. The traditional Quebec devotion to cultural uniqueness had led provincial leaders to shy away from technical innovations. Yet it is as a by-product of the technological progress Quebec has been experiencing that a new sense of pride in its Frenchness has blossomed. This came about, if not in spite of the attitude of the old elite of the province, at least without a conscious governmental policy to encourage it. In retrospect, the significance of this development is more readily apparent than it was when the initial impact of industrialization became evident in Quebec.

In 1962, 31 per cent of the students in the French-speaking universities of the province came from a working-class background—one of the highest ratios in the world. Philippe Garigue, University of Montreal sociologist, explains that the combination of accelerated social mobility, the development of new professional elites, and a more intense degree of demands gives a special aspect to French-Canadian nationalism today, leading it to more and more radical expressions.\(^25\)

The insistence on French as a working language is more readily understandable in this context. Unlike the earlier elite, the new middle class did not have the advantage of learning good English at an early age. Where it has been thrown into contact with English-speaking management on roughly the same administrative and social level, it has felt at a disadvantage because of the language difference. Partly because of the increasingly large number of French-speaking individuals in this category, there is less willingness to adapt to an English-speaking environment. As a result, pressure for more use of French on an official basis builds up.

It is certainly ironic that the anticipations of the old English-
Canadian leaders and the fears of their French-Canadian counterparts may both be dissipated by the new social force resulting from broader educational opportunities for the French-speaking Quebeckers. Self-satisfied English Canadians had long been confident that a broader expansion of education in Quebec, and particularly an orientation of education toward more material goals, would quickly lead to the anglicization of the French-speaking individuals concerned. Such views were not foreign to the thinking of French-Canadian proponents of a rural-oriented civilization, who decried the industrial and commercial pursuits of the city. If the results of the first stages of the development are any criterion, the implications for the future of French culture in Canada are diametrically different from earlier fears and anticipations. The basis for a reassessment of French-English relationships within the Confederation stems directly from this new situation. The full force of the new educational emphasis will not be felt until the youth whose formative years benefited from the relaxed atmosphere of the post-Duplessis period finish their university training.

More serious implications for the future of the Canadian Confederation stem from the tendency of the new Quebec middle class to identify its ambitions with the aspirations of the French-Canadian community. Jacques-Yvan Morin, who has devoted much thought to the constitutional aspects of Quebec autonomy, proclaims the need to "domesticate" and plan the economy "for the benefit of the people." Without a radical social policy, he says, economic autonomy runs the risk of serving only those in possession. Unless the Quebec state is made into an agent of progress—that is, a servant of the collectivity as well as one of its driving forces—it will continue to be simply a preserve of the privileged classes. He admits that nationalists and socialists link the national problem and the social question, so that they say it is difficult to conceive of the solution of one without settlement of the other.26

The alliance between nationalists and socialists is a consequence of the antagonism between the old and the new middle class in Quebec, in the view of Albert Breton, former University of Montreal economist. Both are in conflict with the old middle class, but since the old middle class in Quebec is English Canadian it is never clear if it is accused of being old middle class or English-speaking. The alliance between socialists and nationalists feeds on this confusion.

Breton takes an extremely jaundiced view of the Quebec govern-

ment's decision to nationalize the electric industry and to invest public funds in other industrial enterprises. Nationalism and government ownership are forms of public works for the middle class at the expense of the working class, he argues. Such resources could have been put to better use to increase the social income of the community rather than to buy high-income jobs for a few. "Investment in nationality" implies a transfer of resources from one class to the other, he insists. It is possible without confiscation only when the working class is relatively well off and espouses the aspirations of the middle class. Confiscation is the only way nationalist policies can redistribute income from one national group to another.27

The rapid expansion of education in Quebec may aggravate this situation beyond the breaking point. Some English-Canadian businessmen who view with sympathy the new dynamism in French-Canadian youth are confident that the nationalist pressure will ease once a representative proportion of French-speaking professional, technical, and managerial personnel is in place. There is no guarantee, however, that a proportional sharing in economic decision-making will be a sufficient safety valve. It is readily conceivable that the demand for high-paying jobs in industry controlled by English Canadians may push beyond the point of acceptability—short of confiscation. The aggressive drive of the evolving middle class is not readily measurable, and the new willingness to separate religious and national values introduces an element of uncertainty. In the past, French-Canadian nationalism was tempered by its subordination to religious belief. The Church no longer maintains that fidelity to the French language assures retention of the faith, and pluralism is proclaimed by most organs of French-Canadian nationalism. This change in outlook increases the possibility that nationalism will become an end in itself, the rallying point for a pluralistic society within a French-speaking milieu and excluding other cultures.

The main hope that French-Canadian dynamism can be steered into broader channels lies in the promise of educational reform. Philippe Garigue believes that the economic future of French Canadians depends on the effectiveness of their contribution to scientific research and economic innovation. Only in the recent past have French-Canadian schools started to prepare their students for other than the traditional occupations; since these were already beginning to be superseded by new lines of endeavor, French Canadians were continually trying to catch

up. It is not, he explains, because a limited number of French Canadians will occupy command positions in certain industries that the economic future of the French element in the province will be assured. It is by the importance of the contribution they will bring to economic innovation and economic development in general that they will be able to fight the current. 28

In effect, however, such arguments make an implicit obeisance to nationalism. They are essentially a reformulation of the “complete society” thesis. Even when they are advanced on the all-Canadian level vis-à-vis the United States, they embrace a promise of socioeconomic autonomy for Quebec. As the case is stated in this context, techniques rather than raw materials will be the most important source of economic wealth and of progress. Japan and Switzerland are cited as the classic examples. This implies, however, the essential requirement of control over the national economy and, for Quebec, its use for the social welfare of the whole community. 29