Lecture III

Time as ordinarily conceived is sundered into separate moments which are perpetually passing away. The past is forever dead and gone, the future is non-existent and uncertain, and the present seems, at most, a bare knife-edge of existence separating these two unrealities, itself scarcely born before it also lapses into nonentity. To many reflective minds in all ages time, so conceived, has seemed a baffling, unintelligible, incredible mode of being, undeserving of the eulogistic epithet of "real," or at all events, not the final and universal attribute of the nature of things. Like Aldous Huxley's Mr. Propter, thousands of weary souls have found time to be a "thing intrinsically nightmarish."¹ A great part of the history of Western, as of Eastern, philosophy, therefore, has been a persistent flight from the temporal to the eternal, the quest of an object on which the reason or the imagination might fix itself with the sense of having attained to something that is not merely perduring but immutable, because the very notions of "before"

¹ After Many a Summer Dies the Swan (1939), p. 117.
and "after" are inapplicable to it. And of this quest the theory of knowledge under consideration is, on one side, a phase—though, as we shall later see, on another side it is precisely the opposite. But these philosophers sought the object of the quest, like the Blue Bird, at home—not in the remote world of Platonic Ideas or Realm of Essence, nor in a transcendent Aristotelian God, nor—as Spenser does, in the *locus classicus* of this theme in English poetry, the cantos on Mutability with which *The Faerie Queene* ends—in a future eternal Sabbath to which we may aspire:

That time . . . when no more *Change* shall be
But stedfast rest of all things finally stayd
Upon the pillours of Eternity,
That is contrayr to *Mutabilitie*:
For all that moveth, doth in *Change* delight:
But henceforth all shall rest eternally
With Him that is the God of Sabbaoth hight:
O! that great Sabbaoth God, grant me that Sab-

Spenser's "eternity" differed profoundly—as was to be expected from a poet reared in the tradition of Christian philosophy—from the timelessness of

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2 *The Works of Edmund Spenser, Variorum Edition: The Faerie Queene, Books Six and Seven* (1938), p. 181. Spenser, being presumably ignorant of Hebrew, had, of course, confused the word meaning "hosts" or "armies" (*Numbers* 4, *passim*; *Romans* 9:29) with that meaning "rest."
Plato’s Idea or Aristotle’s God; the poet’s lines were the expression of a hope for the future attainment by individual human souls of a state of being exempt from mutability—which for him (as for Dante) probably meant a changeless beatific contemplation of the perfection—itself eternal—of the Supreme Being.

Eternity, on the contrary, the philosophers here in question often declare, is already within us; for the Self known directly in intuition is a pure unity, an existence in which there are no parts external to one another, as are—or seem to be—the successive instants of time. Thus Schelling writes:

Because the Ego is indivisible, it is likewise incapable of change. For it cannot be changed by anything external. But if it were self-changed, it would be necessary that one part of it should be determined by another, i.e., it would be divisible. The Ego, therefore, must be always the same, an absolute unity placed beyond the reach of all mutation. . . . One cannot say of it: it was, it will be; but only it is. . . . The form of the intellectual intuition of it is eternity.8

8 SW, 1 Abt., I, Vom Ich als Princip der Philosophie (1795), pp. 192–202. So in System des transc. Idealismus (SW, 1, III, 396): It is through self-consciousness that all limitation, and so also all time, arises; that original activity, therefore, cannot fall within time; the Ego as Ego is absolutely eternal; i.e., outside of time altogether (das Ich als ich ist absolut ewig, d. h. ausser aller Zeit).
At this point the Schellingian and the Kantian forms of the doctrine of two faculties of knowledge coincide, or at least overlap. For Kant's noumenal Ego—the reality of which, unknown to the theoretical Understanding, the Practical Reason reveals—belongs, as we have seen, to the "intelligible" world, in the Platonistic sense, and has as little to do with time as with space. But for Schelling this transcendence of temporal existence is neither a postulate nor merely a deduction from a metaphysical axiom; it is an experience. In its immediate awareness of itself the Ego knows eternity at first hand, and lives in the eternal. In setting forth the delights of this experience Schelling rises to a nebulous eloquence:

In all of us there dwells a mysterious and wonderful power to withdraw ourselves from the changes of time into our innermost self, freed from all that comes to us from without, and to intuit the eternal in us under the form of immutability. This intuition is the most inward and the most individual of experiences, upon which alone depends all that we know and believe of a supersensible world.... This intellectual intuition appears, then, when we cease to be an object to ourselves; when, withdrawn into itself, the intuiting self is identical with the intuited. In this moment of intuition time and duration vanish for us; we are no longer in time but time is in us—or rather, not time, but pure, absolute eternity.
We are not in the intuition of the objective world, but that world is lost in our intuition. . . . This principle—of intuition and experience—alone can breathe the breath of life into the lifeless system [of things]; even the most abstract concepts with which our knowledge plays depends upon an experience *die auf Leben und Dasein geht*, which takes hold upon life and existence itself.  

Characteristic is the recurrence here of the blessed word “life” and the insistence that the intuition is a sort of heightening of the feeling of vitality; but this “life” is now identified, *not* with any process or activity in time, but is just—eternity.

We find Novalis similarly declaring that the self’s discovery of itself is also a discovery of that in which the parts of time are fused into a unity: “in ourselves, or nowhere, is eternity with its two worlds of past and future.”  

And from this consideration he gains the comforting assurance that, in all our endless temporal striving, we are in reality forever at the goal:

Since our nature, or the plenitude of our essential being (*Wesen*), is infinite, we consequently cannot

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4 *SW*, 1 Abt., I, *Philosophische Briefe über Dogmatismus und Kritizismus* (1795), pp. 318–19. The order of the sentences is in one instance altered in citation.

5 *Schriften* (1837), p. 4. Cf. a passage in *Die Lehrlinge zu Sais*, “Nothing is so noteworthy as the great simultaneity (*Zugleich*) of Nature. Everywhere Nature seems all present; it is, in the midst of time, past, present and future at once.”
reach this goal in time. But since we also exist in a sphere outside of time, we thereby necessarily do reach that goal in every moment. . . . In this the spirit can find rest; for an endless striving after the goal, without ever reaching it, seems intolerable.\textsuperscript{6}

Schleiermacher, in his first \textit{Monologue}, tells us that in order to attain through self-intuition to the consciousness of what we truly are we must cease to apply to ourselves, as men habitually do, the categories which are in reality made by us and are meant to be applied to other objects; and this means, above all, that we must not think of ourselves as living in a divisible time. All our divisions of time are artificial and arbitrary; when we seek ultimately to resolve time into “moments” we find that out of moments no time can be composed. The moments into which we sunder time “are no part of temporal life.” In the true Self, all is present at once.

The sensuous man is incapable of thinking of himself as aught but a multiplicity of transitory phenomena, each of which destroys and obliterates its predecessor; the complete picture of his own being is broken up into a thousand incongruous fragments. . . . But in the inner life all is one, every action is only the completion of another, each is contained

\textsuperscript{6} \textit{Fragmente}, in \textit{Schriften} (1901 ed.), II, 2, p. 622.
within every other. . . . There is no activity in me which I can rightly regard separately.

He who realizes these truths becomes free from time. "When I return within myself in order to gain the intuition of freedom, my eye is turned away from time's domain."7

The same assertion of the indivisibility, and consequently the timelessness and immutability, of that which is the real "essence" of each of us—i.e., "the Will"—is fundamental in Schopenhauer's Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung (in its first edition). "The multiplicity of things in space and time, which constitutes the objectification of the Will, does not affect the Will itself, which remains indivisible notwithstanding it." "The Will reveals itself as completely in one oak as in millions." Apart from its phenomenal forms, the true Will abides in an eternal Now, a nunc stans, which, however, embraces all that is absolutely real of what, in the language of the phenomenal world, we call past and future.

We must now, however, note a certain peculiarity of terminology, pertinent to this topic, which Schelling introduced. The immutable mode of being which belongs to the Ego, Schelling sometimes calls "time." For he distinguishes two kinds of time—that is, two

7 Monologen (1800), pp. 10–22, passim.
senses of the word. There is “absolute” or “pure”
time, which is “time in its complete independence of
space,” and the idea of time, in which it is associated
with the idea of space. In the former, “the Ego, in
the highest state of feeling, has its whole unbounded
activity concentrated, as it were, into a single point.”

“Pure time,” in short, consists of the moment. To
think of time—as we ordinarily do—as spread out,
as a sort of linear extended magnitude, is to intro­
duce into our thought of it the distinctive attribute
of space; for space (according to Schelling’s analysis
of the concept) is pure extensity, die absolute Ex­
tensität, its differentia is that its parts are all external
to one another; while the notion of time is that of
absolute “intensity” without extension. In space, which
is “the negation of all intensity”—that is, so to say,
of all focusing of content into a point—the Ego is “as
it were decomposed” (aufgelöst); whereas, “in an
absolute time nothing must be thought as auseinander,
as external to anything else (all in one point).” Thus
completely despatialized “time” could mean what
philosophy had usually meant by eternity.

But, as several passages already cited imply, the

8 System des transc. Idealismus; SW, 1, III, 467.
9 Ibid.
10 Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur (1797, 1803); SW, 1, II, 231.
temporally unextended or punctual character of the absolute moment in which the Ego experiences its true nature did not mean (at least in the phase of the doctrine which is now under consideration) that it is a moment with nothing in it. The content of the successive moments of time, in the ordinary sense, could not be left out of the intuition which transcends time—in that sense. All that the empirical self experiences, whether yesterday, today, or tomorrow, in some sense certainly exists; it is not just nothingness. Time and eternity could perhaps, in a Platonistic scheme of things, remain two contrasted, mutually external realms; but the two selves could not be admitted to be so unrelated and independent, since the one—the temporal or phenomenal self—exists for and through the other. In some manner that which has its being in time—that is, in mutually exclusive, successive moments—must be contained in the eternal self, in one indivisible moment; or, conversely, each moment of the succession must be eternal, must somehow be conceived as simultaneously comprehending all the reality there is in all the so-called other moments. Into each the entire life of the temporal Ego must be compacted. “Every moment, therefore,” says Schelling, in his Weltseele (1798), “every moment possesses the same eternity as the whole. For this reason, it is evident that the Zeitleben, the temporal life,
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considered in itself, is not different from the eternal, but is, rather, itself its eternal being. . . . In order to understand this, let us present it . . . in the form of a myth. Suppose time to have already run its course, and therefore to be now eternity; and suppose yourself to be now existing in this eternity. But the eternity which you are imagining as time that has run its course, *als abgelaufene Zeit*, already is"—that is, is embraced without succession in the present moment.  

"Since all time arises through the pure willing and activity of the mind, one can thereby understand also the co-instantaneousness of all things in the world."  

And this "being-all-at-once," *Zugleichsein*, of the content of the successive experiences of the temporal Ego—however difficult to frame in concepts or to express in words—is the essential nature of that mode of being which the intellectual intuition is (sometimes) declared to reveal. 

These ideas of Schelling's seem to have especially aroused the interest of Coleridge, and were reproduced and somewhat amplified by him—though without mention of their source. In the spring of 1801 he went through, as his biographers have usually recognized, a crisis in his mental history, of which he

11 *SW*, 1, III, 365.  
12 *SW*, 1, I, 397. In the sequel, a quite different turn is given to this conception, with which we shall deal later.
LECTURE III

... 

gives some account in a letter to his friend Thomas Poole. After a period "of the most intense study," he reports, he had attained three most important insights; and, first of all, had "completely extricated the notions of time and space," by which he appears to mean that he had completely distinguished the one concept from the other. He does not, in the letter, explain in what he conceived the distinction to consist; but the explanation is apparently to be found in passages of Biographia Literaria, long after:

The act of consciousness is indeed identical with time considered in its essence. I mean time per se, as contradistinguished from our notion of time; for this is always blended with the idea of space, which, as the opposite of time, is therefore its measure.

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13 Letters (1895 ed.), I, 348; italics in original. On this, see my "Coleridge and Kant's Two Worlds," Essays in the History of Ideas (1948). It is difficult to believe that this discovery, which Coleridge represents as his own, was not in fact derived from certain passages in the System des transcendentalen Idealismus, the work of Schelling's which he seems to have known best. But—as Sara Coleridge pointed out in defending him against the charge of conscious plagiarism—he was almost habitually unable to distinguish ideas which had come to him from others from those which he had himself excogitated.

14 Biogr. Lit. (ed. Shawcross), I, 187. The conception of space as the "measure" of time is also to be found in the Transcendental Idealism (SW, 1, III, 468) where Schelling explains in
Now what is "time per se," unblended with the idea of space? Coleridge, again characteristically is not at this point explicit; but since the whole passage is pure Schelling, there can be little doubt that he too meant that a completely despatialized time is not "extended," that the moments of it are not, as are the points of space, mutually external, but rather compresent and concentrated into one moment. And this, he tells us elsewhere in the same writing, we have empirical reasons to believe that they are, for the true "self" of the individual; if it were not for the material body (which, of course, is conditioned by spatiality) it is "probable" that we should simultaneously apprehend and possess all the experiences which seem separated as past and present; that

it would require only a different and appropriate organization—the body celestial instead of the body terrestrial—to bring before every human soul the collective experience of its whole past existence.

. . . Yea, in the very nature of a living spirit, it may be more possible that heaven and earth should pass away, than that a single act, a single thought, should be loosened or lost from that living chain of causes, with all the links of which, conscious or un-

what sense, and why, this can be said. The Schellingian original of the passage is recognized by Sara Coleridge in her note on it in the 1847 edition of Biographia Literaria.
conscious, the free will, our only absolute Self, is co-extensive and co-present.\textsuperscript{15}

Nor, indeed, need we wait to attain the “body celestial” to have evidence for this; for there are exceptional but “authenticated” cases of memory—when the subjects are in a “feverish state”—which at least go to show that “all thoughts are imperishable”; and since the physical state can be no more than a stimulus, these cases (such is Coleridge’s argument) indicate that, even in this life, to “our absolute Self” every “thought” (\textit{i.e.}, past content of consciousness) is at every moment present.

It is to be observed that, in all this way of thinking, time and eternity have a curious, not to say contradictory, threefold relation. When the Ego is experiencing itself as it truly is, it is asserted to be “outside of time,” that is, of divided and successive time; but also, time is in a sense in \textit{it}, inasmuch as all the reality contained in the divided and successive moments of ordinary temporal existence is indivisibly compresent in that instant of experience; and finally, that same experience, with all that it contains, is

\textsuperscript{15}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 180. The relation of this idea to Coleridge’s doctrine of freedom does not here concern us. It is discussed in the paper, cited in note 13 above, in my \textit{Essays in the History of Ideas} (1948). But it is pertinent at this point to recall that Coleridge’s “free will,” or “absolute self,” was supratemporal.
after all in time, since it is declared to be, or to be capable of being, an empirical event, occurring or not occurring at a given date in the succession of mutually external moments constituting the phenomenal life of an individual. As an inferred object of belief or contemplation, no doubt, the "deeper self" might consistently be said, by these philosophers, not to be in time, in this last sense. But as a concrete datum of immediate experience, it is; for the intuition of it is admittedly not constantly enjoyed, the "power to withdraw ourselves from the changes of time into our innermost self" is not at every moment exercised.

This general conception of the eternal yet all-embracing moment, as well as other aspects of the complex of ideas which we have already observed, finds its most eloquent American echo in Emerson's "The Over-Soul":

We live in succession, in division, in parts, in particles. Meantime within man is the soul of the whole; the wise silence; the universal beauty to which every part and particle is equally related; the eternal One. And this deep power in which we exist and whose beatitude is all accessible to us, is not only all-sufficing and perfect in every hour, but the act of seeing and the thing seen, the seer and the spectacle, the subject and the object, are one. We see the world piece by piece, as the sun, the moon, the animal, the tree; but the whole of which these are the shining parts is the Soul. . . . All goes
to show that the soul in man . . . is not a function, like the power of memory, of calculation, of comparison, but uses these as hands and feet; . . . is not the intellect or the will, but the master of the intellect and the will; is the background of our being, in which they lie—an immensity not possessed and that cannot be possessed. . . . The Soul . . . abolishes time and space. The influence of the senses has in most men overpowered the mind to that degree that the walls of time and space have come to look real and insurmountable. . . . Yet space and time are but inverse measures of the force of the Soul. The spirit sports with time,—

"Can crowd eternity into an hour,
Or stretch an hour to eternity."¹⁶

That Bergson's intuition of _le moi profond_ is conceived by him as a way of transcending time, in the ordinary sense of the word, is evident. He calls it, to be sure, the experience of "real duration"; but this is a duration not subject to the intellect's categories of quantity and number. It is "intensity" without extension; it is "indivisible though moving"; it is a "succession without distinction," a "solidarity"; its elements "interpenetrate" and have not _la moindre tendance à s'extérioriser les uns par rapport aux autres._¹⁷

"Considered in themselves, the deep-seated conscious

¹⁶ "The Over-Soul," _Essays_ (1st ser., 1903), p. 269. Much even of the phrasing is reminiscent of Schelling's _Von der Weltseele._

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states . . . intermingle in such a way that we cannot tell whether they are one or several, nor even examine them from this point of view without at once altering their nature.” In his *Introduction to Metaphysics* Bergson observes that there are different grades of the apprehension of duration, in some of which the fusion of moments is closer and more comprehensive than in others. As we ascend this series, “we approach a duration which *strains*, contracts, and intensifies itself more and more; at the limit would be eternity; not a conceptual eternity, which is an eternity of death, but an eternity of life—a living and therefore still moving eternity in which one’s own particular duration would be included: an eternity which would be the concentration of all duration, as materiality is its dispersion.” Even the idea of a certain *order* of succession in time, we are told, “involves the idea of space, and should not be used in the definition of time.” “A sufficiently powerful act of attention and one sufficiently detached from practical interests, would . . . embrace the entire past history of the conscious person”—though Bergson, it must be noted, apparently does not find it including the future history. Thus his *durée réelle* might, with the change of a single word, be described in the terms of Boethius’s famous definition of eternity: *vitae praeteritae tota simul ac perfecta possessio*. It is through the reading
of the attributes of space into those of time that this indivisible present, for our ordinary experience, gets broken up into mutually external moments. Space and spatialized time are necessary for the life of action—that is, for the activity of the body, which is the instrument of action. Our ordinary perception and our ordinary and fragmentary memory—in which also past time is apprehended as mutually exclusive moments of experience—provide, as it were, the field in which, and the intellectual tool through which, the body can act effectively in a material world. But, as we have seen, the material world is not the true reality revealed in intuition, and the life of action is not the road to metaphysical knowledge. “When we pass from pure perception to memory, we definitely abandon matter for spirit”; “pure spirit” is “pure memory”; and “on the plane of pure memory . . . our mind retains in all its details the picture of our past life.” This is approximated when, renouncing “the interests of effective action, we replace ourselves in the life of dream”; for “in certain dreams and somnambulistic states,” and “in cases of sudden suffocation in men drowned or hanged,” memories “which we believed abolished reappear with striking completeness.”

18 Matter and Memory (Eng. tr.), pp. 313, 322, 199, 200 and passim. The similarity to the ideas of Coleridge outlined above is obvious.
Here, then, we seem to have once more, in a different terminology, the same notion of an experience of the Self in an indivisible present moment, wherein, none the less, all that is contained in the other moments, at least of "the time that has run its course," is in some manner immediately included. And upon the strange charm and the vitalizing potency of this experience Bergson, in his discourse on *L'intuition philosophique*, dilates in language interestingly similar to that of a passage of Schelling's already quoted.¹⁹

When we bring back our perception to its source, we shall have a knowledge of a new kind without needing to have recourse to new faculties. . . . Let us but resume possession of ourselves as we really are, in a present moment, rich and elastic in content, which we can dilate infinitely towards the past by removing the screen which hides us from ourselves; let us but grasp the external world as it is—not merely its surface, the present, but its depth, the immediate past which presses upon and gives its impulsion to the present; let us, in a word, but habituate ourselves to see all things *sub specie durationis*:—and then what was rigid in our galvanized perception becomes relaxed, what was sleeping wakes, what was dead becomes alive. The satisfaction which art can give only to those favored by nature and by fortune, and to them only at rare intervals, such satisfactions philosophy, so under-

¹⁹ P. 78 above.
stood, will furnish to all of us, at every moment, by breathing the breath of life into the phantoms which surround us, and by revivifying ourselves. 20

Certainly, the reader of these words, and of the corresponding passage in Schelling, cannot but assume that these utterances, strange and perplexing as they may sound, are attempts to report a kind of actual experience which these philosophers have had, and believe, therefore, that others may have; and, indeed, the claim to an essentially empirical basis which we have seen to be characteristic of this type of philosophy, implies that they are speaking of what they have directly experienced. Though both Schelling and Bergson defend their doctrines of the indivisibility of time in the deeper self by reasoning, it would be inconsistent with their principles to admit that it can be discovered or conclusively verified by reasoning. We must therefore attempt to determine, if possible, what is the specific nature of this state of consciousness—this "psychological eternity," in Aldous Huxley's phrase—of which those who profess to have enjoyed it usually write more rhapsodically than clearly—or at the least, to find analogues or approximations to it in experiences with which we are acquainted—and also, if we can, to make out what they find in it to evoke such rhapsodies.

Sometimes it appears to be identified by Bergson with what may be called the limiting instance of memory—instantaneous total recall of the individual's past experience. But other things said of it are difficult to reconcile with this interpretation. For the actual experiences in which such recall is said to be exemplified, or at any rate approximated, are not open to us "at every moment," but are admittedly conditioned by exceptional—and often by no means agreeable—physical states; the only specific examples of its possibility that are mentioned are "cases of sudden suffocation in men drowned or hanged," "feverish states," and certain (unspecified) types of dream and somnambulism. These, surely, can hardly be the gates to that initiation into the ultimate mystery of Being of which Bergson, like Schelling, writes so fervently. Supposing—what I take to be questionable in fact—that drowning men see all their past lives in a single moment, I doubt whether they find it so voluptuous an experience as these philosophers describe; and in any case, a philosopher who never had himself been drowned or hanged is not in a position to testify that it is so, from his own experience. It is observable, in fact, that, when they seem to identify their "intellectual" or "metaphysical intuition" with total recall, none of these philosophers assure us that they have themselves known such recall; they refer
us, for the evidence of it, to what is reported by or of other men. We have, in truth, no reason whatever for believing that either Bergson or anyone else has ever, even momentarily, been blest, or curst, with so remarkably good a memory. And even if there could be shown to be instances of correct, complete, and simultaneous remembrance, they would not satisfy the requirements of the description of the metaphysical intuition. For it is not our past experience in their own identity as acts or events that become present together in memory. What is present is a set of images or verbal symbols of them, and it is of the essence of the memory-experience that the events themselves are apprehended as having been “mutually external” and, with respect to their original or real existence, as external to the moment in which they are remembered. Upon this fact, indeed, Bergson himself on occasion insists. Past time is divided; nous divisons le déroulé, mais non pas le déroulement. “Time is not a line over which we can pass again. Certainly, once it has passed, we are justified in picturing the successive moments as external to one another and in thus thinking of a line traversing space; but it must be understood that this line does not symbolize the time which is passing, but the time which is past.”

21 Durée et simultanéité, p. 63; italics mine.
is presented for awareness is an indivisible unity, without "numerical multiplicity"? Memory, in which the mind is preoccupied with the past, and therefore with the thought of "moments external to one another," should, for Bergson, be the worst possible example of the experience of "real duration."

We must, therefore, look further for the nature of the experience which may be supposed to lie behind the sort of language that we have found Bergson using about the time-transcending intuition. And there is in fact another mode of awareness to which Bergson, still following Schelling, quite explicitly points for the exemplification of "pure time" or "real duration"—i.e., of psychological eternity. Both find it in a feature of musical experience. In his essay On the Relation of the Real and the Ideal in Nature, Schelling attempts—in a manner a little different from that previously cited—what Coleridge called "the extrication of the notions of space and time."

Each of these is the "negation" of the essential attribute of the other. That of space is simultaneity and the mutual externality of its parts. "Time, on the contrary, takes away (aufhebt) mutual externality (das Auseinander) and posits the inner identity of things. But while thus negating the nullity (das Nicht-

22 Prefixed to Von der Weltseele, 1798; 2d ed., 1806; 3d ed., 1809.
ige) of space, it introduces a nullity of its own, namely, the successiveness in things, *das Nacheinander in den Dingen.* But there is a "principle" (we need not here inquire just what it is) which "penetrates through time, . . . foresees the future, brings the present into accord with the past, and completely takes away that loose connection with one another which things have in time," *i.e.*, in succession (*jene lose Verknüpfung der Dinge in der Zeit*). And we can, says Schelling, find instances of this in particular phenomena; such is "a Klang [probably in the sense of the sound of bells], which, though it belongs to time, nevertheless, because it is as it were organized *in* time, is a true totality," and exemplifies how "time, *as* time, is negated." Just how a single tone does so is not, indeed, made very clear; a musical phrase would seem an example more to Schelling's purpose. But we may with some probability gather what he had in mind from another writer. When Jean Paul, in his *Vorschule der Aesthetik* (1804, 1812) sought to define "the essence of the Romantic" he observed that music is a more "romantic" art than painting for the significant reason that in the former alone can there be a sort of fusion and interpenetration of the ele-

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23 SW, 1, II, 368-70. All this is interwoven with obscure notions, belonging to the Schellingian *Naturphilosophie*, about light and gravity, which are not pertinent to the present point.
ments of a temporal sequence; and, by the same criterion, he found some musical instruments to be more “romantic” than others.

No color is so romantic as a tone; for . . . a tone is never heard singly, but is always threefold, fusing the past and the future with the present, just as Romanticism does. Thus it is that the bell, among percussion instruments, evokes best the romantic spirit, because its tones live longest and die away most slowly. Next to it comes, among stroked instruments, the musical-glasses (harmonica), and next, among wind instruments, the French horn (Waldhorn) and the organ.24

These, however, are but arrows, pointing, indeed, to the sort of experience in time which is supposed to transcend the divisions of time, but not greatly illuminating it. Bergson has made a much more serious effort than (so far as I know or recall) any of his German precursors to elucidate the matter psychologically—one is tempted to say, to analyze introspectively the feature of musical experience in which he finds the nature of the indivisible durée réelle primarily and best exhibited. The results of this effort are intimated in some passages of his published writings, but perhaps even better in an unpublished letter. In reply to some criticisms of his doctrine concerning time

24Jean Pauls Werke (1841 ed.), IX, 355; italics mine.
which I had expressed—chiefly on the ground that it is self-contradictory—he was good enough, many years ago, to write me explaining more fully the empirical source and grounds of that doctrine, and also dealing directly with the charge of self-contradiction. Since, however, this explanation, together with the comments upon it which it seems to me worth while to offer, would make too long a digression from the primarily historical themes of these lectures, it is printed as an appendix.