THE THIRTEEN PRAGMATISMS *

Part I

In the present year of grace 1908 the term "pragmatism"—if not the doctrine—celebrates its tenth birthday. Before the controversy over the mode of philosophy designated by it enters upon a second decade, it is perhaps not too much to ask that contemporary philosophers should agree to attach some single and stable meaning to the term. There appears to be as yet no sufficiently clear and general recognition, among contributors to that controversy, of the fact that the pragmatist is not merely three but many gentlemen at once. Some recent papers by Perry set, as it seems to me, the right example in discriminating a number of separate pragmatistic propositions and discussing each of them by itself. But perhaps even these papers do not insist so emphatically, as it is worth-while to do, upon the utter disconnection and even incongruity that subsists between a number of these propositions; and there are one or two important ambiguities of meaning in certain of the pragmatists' formulas which do not seem to find a place in Perry's careful

LOVEJOY

equenumberation. A complete enumeration of the metamorphoses of so protean an entity is, indeed, perhaps too much to expect; but even after we leave out of the count certain casual expressions of pragmatist writers which they probably would not wish taken too seriously, and also certain mere commonplaces from which scarcely any contemporary philosopher would dissent, there remain at least thirteen pragmatisms: a baker's dozen of contentions which are separate not merely in the sense of being discriminable, but in the sense of being logically independent, so that you may without inconsistency accept any one and reject all the others, or refute one and leave the philosophical standing of the others unimpugned. All of these have generally or frequently been labeled with the one name and defended or attacked as if they constituted a single system of thought—sometimes even as if they were severally interchangeable.

I shall try to put down all the logical doctrines of importance that seem to have been improperly reduced to unity in current discussions; and I shall try to exhibit the fact of their reciprocal independence in as clear a light as possible. To contribute to the determination of the truth or falsity of any one of these doctrines is no part of the business of the present discussion; for I venture to think that the question of truth has sometimes been not very profitably dealt with during the past ten years, in the absence of a sufficiently considerate prior clearing up of the question of meaning. The pragmatist school itself seems, thus far, more distinguished for originality, inventiveness, and a keen vision for the motes in the eye of the intellectualist, than for patience in making distinctions or the habit of self-analysis.
And its critics, on the other hand, have occasionally made haste to take the utmost advantage of this unassorted commingling of doctrinal sheep and doctrinal goats in the ample fold of pragmatic theory and have made the apparently caprine character of some members of the flock a warrant for the wholesale condemnation of the entire multitude. In view of this situation, nothing seems more indicated than an attempt at clear differentiation of the separate pragmatist assertions and tendencies.

Certainly it is probable that the following list could be extended. I hope that it will be found to include all the genuinely independent contentions that are most frequently illicitly identified, and all the ambiguities of meaning that are so central and important as to call for serious consideration from both the defenders and the critics of the several opinions to which the one name has been applied.

1. Primarily, it is obvious, pragmatism—the pragmatism of Peirce, and of James's Berkeley address—was merely a doctrine concerning the meaning of propositions, concerning the way in which the really significant issue in any controversy could be determined. It maintained that one meaning of any proposition whatever is reducible to the future consequences in experience to which that proposition points, consequences which those who accept the proposition *ipso facto* anticipate as experiences that somebody is subsequently to have. Now, a theory about the meaning of propositions is not the same thing as a theory about the criterion of truth in propositions; a formula which professes to tell you how to ascertain precisely what a given assertion really signifies does not thereby profess to tell you whether or not that as-
sertion is true. James, at least, in his recent book and elsewhere, has clearly noted this distinction between pragmatism as a theory of meaning and pragmatism as a theory of truth: Schiller does not appear to do so, since he identifies the "principle of Peirce" with a view concerning the mark that "estabishes the real truth and validity" of a proposition.¹ But I do not think that even James has sufficiently insisted upon the logical disconnectedness of the two theories. Indeed, the whole topic of the relation of meaning and truth might advantageously receive more extended discussion than it has yet had. It may at first sight seem that a close logical relation can be made out between the two, in at least one direction. To know what a proposition exactly means may appear to involve a knowledge of just where to look for the evidence of its truth and for the test by which its claim to truth can be brought to proof. If a judgment means merely certain future experiences, it might appear that its truth could be known only through—and, therefore, only at the time of—the occurrence of the predicted experiences. But I can not see that this really follows. The assertion "God exists and mere materialism is false" may possibly mean only the anticipation of a cosmic future different in specific ways from that which the acceptance of the contrary proposition would lead one to expect; but the criterion of the truth of the assertion need not be correspondingly future. Its truth may conceivably be known now, through a mystical intuition or by a "necessity of thought"; or (and this is apparently good pragmatist doctrine about knowledge) it may be a

The Thirteen Pragmatisms

proposition that we are obliged and entitled proleptically to accept as a true acceptance of the postulate, because it satisfies a present (not a future) need. The experiences whose occurrence constitute the meaning of the judgment may have one date; the apprehension of the judgment’s validity, or legitimacy as a belief, may have quite another. According to one of the pragmatist theories of truth, a proposition is known as true (in the only sense of “true” which that theory regards as intelligible) at the moment at which it effectually operates to put an end to a felt inner discord or to open a way through a practical impasse; but the matter to which the proposition refers not only may be, but normally will be, subsequent to that moment of acceptance and mental relief. A “plan of action” presumably relates to the future; but the determination of its “truth,” or whatever kind of acceptability is pragmatically to pass for such, can not be postponed until the future to which it relates has been “verified” by becoming past; else all our “true” plans of action would, paradoxically, be retrospective, and we should have to say that the pragmatic man never is, but always is about to have been, blest with knowledge. If, then, the legitimacy of a belief is, upon pragmatist principles, to be known at one moment, while the experiences which it “means” may run on into later moments, it appears to follow that the fullest knowledge of the belief’s meaning may throw no light whatever upon the question of its legitimacy. That—until the belief has (presumably) lost all meaning by coming to refer purely to past experiences—still remains, from the standpoint of pragmatism as a theory of meaning, a separate and unsettled question; it is impossible to infer that the pragmatist theory of
validity is any more correct than another. The acceptance of either one of these theories, equally known as “pragmatism,” leaves you an entirely open option with respect to the acceptance of the other.

2. This pragmatic theory of meaning, as used by James, who has been its principal expounder and defender, seems designed to function chiefly as a quieter of controversy, a means for banishing from the philosophic lists those contestants between whose theories there appears, when this criterion is applied, to be no meaningful opposition, in whose differences there lies no issue that “makes a difference.” In this application, however, the criterion clearly exhibits a radical ambiguity. The “effects of a practical kind” which our conception of an object must (we are told) involve, the “future consequences in concrete experience, whether active or passive,” to which all significant propositions must point, may consist in either: (a) future experiences which the proposition (expressly or implicitly) predicts as about to occur, no matter whether it be believed true or not; or (b) future experiences which will occur only upon condition that the proposition be believed. The consequences of the truth of a proposition (in the sense of its correct prerepresentation of a subsequent experience to which its terms logically refer) and the consequences of belief in a proposition have been habitually confused in the discussion of the pragmatic theory of meaning. Taken in the one sense, the theory is equivalent to the assertion that only definitely predictive propositions—those which by their proper import foretell the appearance of specific sensations or situations in the “concrete” experience of some temporal consciousness—have
real meaning. Taken in the other sense, the theory does not require that propositions *refer* to the future at all; it is enough that, by being carried along into the future as beliefs in somebody's mind, they be capable of giving to that mind emotional or other experiences in some degree different from those which it would have in the absence of the beliefs.

No two doctrines could be “practically” more dissimilar than the pragmatic theory of meaning when construed in the first sense, and the same theory when construed in the second sense. If the formula includes only “future experiences” of the class (a), it has the effect of very narrowly limiting the range of meaningful judgments, and of excluding from the field of legitimate consideration a large number of issues in which a great part of mankind seems to have taken a lively interest; and it must assuredly be regarded as a highly paradoxical contention. But if it includes also future consequences of class (b), it is no paradox at all, but the mildest of truisms; for it then is so blandly catholic, tolerant, and inclusive a doctrine that it can deny real meaning to no proposition whatever which any human being has ever cared enough about to believe. In James's *Pragmatism* his criterion is applied to specific questions sometimes in one sense and sometimes in the other; and the results are correspondingly divergent. Using his formula in the first sense, he argues, for example, that the only “real” difference between a theistic and a materialistic view of the universe is that the former entitles us to predict a future in human experience that contains certain desirable elements for the expectation of which materialism gives no warrant. In other words, the whole “meaning” of theism is declared to be
reducible to the anticipation of a specific cosmic or personal future; and the only genuine issue between it and the opposing doctrine lies in the question of the legitimacy of this anticipation. “If no future detail of experience or conduct is to be deduced from our hypothesis, the debate between materialism and theism becomes quite idle and insignificant.” Supposing matter capable of giving us just the same world of experience as a God would give us, “wherein should we suffer loss if we dropped God as an hypothesis and made the matter alone responsible? Where would any special deadness, or crassness, come in? And how, experience being what is once for all, would God’s presence in it make it any more living or richer?” 2 “Treated as it often is” (i.e., treated nonpragmatically), “this question becomes little more than a conflict between esthetic preferences,” between different ways of talking about, imagining, or explaining the ancestry of precisely the one, identical, actual world of past, present, and future experiences; and such differences in esthetic preferences are treated by James as “abstract” things that really make no difference. In the spirit of this chapter of James’s book—which is the spirit of the Enlightenment at its narrowest, most utilitarian, least imaginative—one might go on to eliminate from consideration, as pragmatically meaningless, a large part of the issues over which metaphysicians and theologians have divided; one might show that (apart from the having of the beliefs themselves, which from the present point of view does not count) it makes no difference whether you believe or reject most of the dogmas of theology or the hypotheses of speculative philosophy. For

2 William James, *Pragmatism* (1907), Lecture III, passim.
these largely refer to alleged permanent, unvarying factors of reality from which no specific contents of experience (beyond, once more, the experiences directly arising from the presence of those factors) can be clearly deduced. The trinitarian presumably does not necessarily anticipate "concrete future experiences" different from those anticipated by the unitarian; nor need the pantheist expect the cosmos to behave in a manner other than that expected by the pluralistic theist. Later in James's book, however, we find his criterion taken in the opposite sense; for example, while the author observes of the monistic doctrine of the absolute that "you can not redescend into the world of particulars by the Absolute's aid or deduce any necessary consequences of detail important for your life from your idea of his nature," just this nonpredictive doctrine is credited with genuine pragmatic meaning, because "emotional and spiritual" consequences flow from the belief in it (Pragmatism, pp. 273–74). And in this spirit, all beliefs with which human emotions have in any degree become entangled would have to be regarded by the pragmatist as ipso facto meaningful and serious. It would not even be necessary that the beliefs should, in the ordinary logical sense, have any intelligible import at all. There are some who feel pretty sure that those who adhere, for instance, to the nihilistic monism of the Vedanta, or to the Athanasian doctrine of the Trinity, never really conceive together the elements of the propositions that they affirm; but no one can deny that, out of the maintenance of the posture of belief toward these propositions, believers derive highly distinctive and vivid experiences which they could scarcely have in any other way. And for all
such beliefs our pragmatist—who, but a moment ago, seemed so narrow and ferocious an Aufklärer—would now be compelled to find a place among the significant issues.

This pragmatic theory of meaning thus breaks up into two possible doctrines that are not merely different, but incongruous. We seem to be justified in calling upon the pragmatist to make an election between them. If I may, for a moment, go beyond the province chosen for this paper, I venture to predict that neither choice will be found welcome; for I suspect that all the charm and impressiveness of the theory arises out of the confusion of its alternative interpretations. It gets its appearance of novelty and of practical serviceableness in the settlement of controversies from its one meaning; and it gets its plausibility entirely from the other. But (when the distinction is made) in the sense in which the theory might be logically functional, it seems hardly likely to appear plausible; and in the sense in which it is plausible, it appears destitute of any applicability or function in the distinguishing of “real” from meaningless issues.

3. But the pragmatic theory of meaning in its first sense—with its characteristic emphasis upon the ultimately predictive import of all judgments—leads to a theory concerning the way in which judgments are verified; in other words, to a theory about the meaning of truth. If all judgments must refer to specific future experiences, their verification consists in the getting of the experiences which they foretold. They are true, in short, if their prediction is realized; and they can, strictly speaking, be known to be true only through that realization, and concurrently with the occurrence of the series of experiences predicted. James presents this doctrine
with an apparent exception in favor of "necessary truths"; which, since they coerce the mind as soon as they are clearly presented to it, are (he seems to admit) verified "on the spot," without waiting for the presentation in experience of all empirical phenomena that may be referred to by them. But even this exception is not recognized entirely unequivocally; and in any case, for the great mass of our judgments, their truth consists in the correspondence of the anticipations properly evoked by them with subsequent items of experience; and the verification of their truth comes only when the whole series of such items which they foreshadowed has been completely experienced. "All true processes must lead to the face of directly verifying experiences somewhere, which somebody's ideas have copied." "Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events. Its verity is, in fact, an event, a process: the process, namely, of its verifying itself, its verification." 3

Now, I have already tried to show that such a theory of truth is neither identical with, nor properly deducible from, the original pragmatic theory of meaning—in either of its senses. I wish now to make more fully clear the precise import of this theory of truth, and to show its contrast with another type of theory of truth which also and, I think, more properly figures as pragmatism. Observe that the words quoted give us a theory of truth which is obviously not at the same time functionally serviceable as a theory of knowledge—which seems a strange trait in a pragmatist theory. According to this phase of pragmatism, judgments are not known to be true until they become true, and until they be-

3 James, op. cit., pp. 215, 201.
come true they have no use or importance (and, as I have suggested, they even ought to be said, on some "pragmatist principles," to have no meaning), for their reference is to the dead past. Our intellect is condemned, according to this doctrine, to subsist wholly by a system of deferred payments; it gets no cash down; and it is also a rule of this kind of finance that when the payments are finally made, they are always made in outlawed currency. Now, of course, what we practically want and, indeed, must have from a theory of knowledge is some means of telling what predictions are to be accepted as sound while they are still predictions. Hind-sight is doubtless a good deal more accurate than foresight, but it is less useful. No one is likely to deny that a valid proposition (in so far, at least, as it is predictive at all) must "lead us finally to the face of some directly verifying experience"; but I can conceive no observation which it can be more unprofitable to dwell upon than this one. If this were all that a pragmatic epistemology had to tell us, it would assuredly be giving us a stone where we had asked for bread.

But, of course, there is a form—or more than one form—of pragmatic epistemology that offers to meet the real needs of the situation in which the problem of knowledge arises, that seeks to tell us what predictive judgments ought, and what ought not, to be believed, before the "veri-fication" of those judgments in actually possessed experience makes the question concerning their truth as irrelevant and redundant a thing as a coroner's inquest on a corpse is—to the corpse. And these pragmatist theories about the criterion of truth—i.e., about the marks of the relative validity of propositions—which attempt to be really functional ought to be completely
distinguished from this sterile doctrine which insists that the only true proposition is a dead proposition.

Part II

The purpose of this paper, as indicated at the beginning of the former installment, is to discriminate all the more important doctrines going under the name of pragmatism which can be shown to be not only distinct, but also logically independent inter se. Three such divergent pragmatist contentions have thus far been noted. "Pragmatism" was primarily a theory concerning the "meaning" of propositions; but this theory, because of a latent ambiguity in its terms, breaks up into two: (1) The meaning of a proposition consists in the future consequences in experience which it (directly or indirectly) predicts as about to occur no matter whether it be believed or not; (2) The meaning of a proposition consists in the future consequences of believing it. The first of these was seen to suggest (though it by no means necessarily implies) the third variant of pragmatism, namely, a doctrine concerning the nature of truth; viz., that the truth of a proposition is identical with the occurrence of the series of experiences which it predicts and can be said to be known only after such series is completed. "Its truth is its verification." This contention, that judgments acquire truth only in the degree in which they lose predictive character and practi-
cal bearings, has been shown to be wholly barren and use­less, since its affords no answer to the real epistemological question concerning the criterion of the truth of propositions whose specific predictive implications have not yet been experienced.

4. It is, however, not difficult to see through what associa­tions of ideas some pragmatists have been led to emphasize this notion of the *ex post facto* character of all truth. Largely, it would appear, it derives its plausibility from its resemblance to the ordinary empirical doctrine that those general propositions are to be regarded as true which, so far as they have been applied, have been found to be realized in past experience. This latter doctrine, from which the former is often not clearly distinguished, may be set down as another of the things that pragmatism is frequently sup­posed to be. It is the doctrine sometimes sententiously ex­pressed by the observation that those propositions are true which “will work” or “which you can live by.” What the evolutionary empiricists who are fond of this observation almost always really mean by it is that those judgments are true which hitherto *have* worked; in other and more precise words, that I am, in advance of the actual realization or verification of the future experiences which may be predicted by a given judgment, entitled to regard it as true if it is similar to, or is a special application of, a general class of judgments which historical records or my own memory tell me have thus far had their implied predictions realized. But this is by no means identical with the principle previously mentioned and vigorously insisted upon by some pragmatists, that each individual judgment can *become* true only through,
and contemporaneously with, the presentation in consciousness of those specific subsequent experiences which it points to and prognosticates.

5. If, now, we are to set down this evolutionary empiricist criterion of truth as one expression of pragmatism—at least as that is popularly understood—it is necessary to add that this formula, too, suffers from ambiguity, and therefore breaks up into two quite distinct criteria. The ambiguity is analogous to that already pointed out in the pragmatist's theory of meaning. A belief may "work" in two very different senses, either by having its actual predictions fulfilled, or by contributing to increase the energies or efficiency or chance of survival of those who believe it. The Jews, for example, believed persistently for many centuries that a national Messiah would come in the next generation to restore the independence and establish the supremacy of Israel. In one sense, this belief did not work; for the events which it predicted did not occur. But biologically considered it worked wonderfully well; for it assuredly did much to produce the extraordinary persistency of the Jewish racial character, and the exceptional energy, self-confidence, and tenacity of purpose of the individual Jew. Many beliefs involving false predictions are biologically unfavorable, namely, if they lead to physical conduct ill-adapted to the conditions of the believer's physical environment. You cannot "live by" the belief that fire will not burn. But, also, some false or never-realized predictions, and many beliefs having apparently no predictive character—and no capacity for empirical verification—have shown themselves to be excellent things to live by. And if we are to take the doctrine that
the true is the "livable" in its second and more unquestionably pragmatistic sense—if we are to identify the validity of beliefs with their biological serviceableness—we should apparently have to classify as "true" many judgments which predict nothing, and many which confessedly predict what is not going to occur.

6. Partly, however, what I have called the theory of the *ex post facto* nature of truth is a somewhat blurred reflection of a certain metaphysical doctrine which, although not always very explicitly put forward, appears to me to have a rather fundamental place in the characteristic mode of thought of most representatives of pragmatism. This is the doctrine of the "open-ness" of the future, and of the determinative or "creative" efficacy of each "present" moment in the ever-transient process of conscious judgment, choice, and action. The two parts of the doctrine obviously enough go together: if the process truly brings into being at each new moment a genuinely new and unique increment of reality, then, so long as any moment's increment has not yet been brought forth, it can not yet be called in any intelligible sense real; and if, similarly, the thing that is to be is a sheer nonentity until it enters into actual, temporal experience, the moment in which it becomes an experience must be credited with the creation *ex nihilo* of a new item of being. This doctrine of what M. Bergson calls a *devenir réel*, and of the creative function of consciousness, which is the pregnant ontological preconception from which a great variety of confused pragmatistic ideas have proceeded, unquestionably has certain epistemological implications. Such a metaphysics ap-
The Thirteen Pragmatisms

pears to imply the partial contingency and (from the standpoint of any "present" knowledge) indeterminateness of the future content of reality. But these implications are not synonymous with the *ex post facto* theory of truth in the generality with which that has usually been expressed. The future may be—and by the same pragmatists, when they adumbrane this sort of metaphysics, apparently is—regarded as presenting to our understanding only a narrow margin of the unpredictable; its general character and the greater mass of its content may be supposed, without departing from the conception in question, to be predetermined by the accumulated and crystallized results of reality up to date, of which any possible future and novel increment of being must be the child, and to which it must be capable of accommodation. And at all events, there is nothing in this sort of thoroughgoing metaphysical temporalism which justifies the denial of the possibility of the making of "true" judgments about contemporaneous or past (but not yet consciously verified) realities.

7. It is a frequently repeated observation of pragmatists, in moments when they are more mindful of the psychological than of the metaphysical antecedents of their diversely descended conceptions, that the true, in its more generalized character, is "the satisfactory"; it is, says James, that which "gives the maximal combination of satisfactions." Or, in Perry's careful formulation—with an amendment which we have recently been told, upon good authority, would make it entirely acceptable to a pragmatist—"the criterion of the truth of knowledge is the satisfying character of the practical
transition from cognitive expectation to fulfillment, or the resolution of doubt into practical immediacy.” 4 Now this doctrine which identifies the truth with the satisfactoriness of a given judgment may mean any one of three things. It may, in the first place, be a simple psychological observation—from which, I fancy, few would dissent—indicating the genus of feelings of which the “emotion of conviction” is a species. To doubt, to inquire, or to have before the mind certain potential material of judgment that is not yet accepted as true is, of course, to experience dissatisfaction; a specific sense of discomfort and of nonfulfillment is the emotional concomitant of the doubting or the deliberative moment, and is doubtless the principal spring which prompts men’s search for truth. And to believe, to hold true, whatever more it may be, is always at least to be satisfied in some degree with one’s mental content of the moment, to find it good, or at all events not so bad as some contrary judgment which, for its sin of insufficient satisfyingness, has been shut away into the outer darkness of nonacceptance.

8. But this psychological truism, that to pass from doubt to belief is to pass from dissatisfaction to a relative satisfaction, is quite a different thing from the first of the pragmatist epistemological contentions that appear to be based upon it. This asserts that the way to determine whether a proposition is true is to apply the test of “satisfyingness”; and to apply it directly and simpliciter. There is, according to this version of the nature of truth, to be no attempt to determine the differentia which distinguishes the species “conviction” from the genus “satisfaction,” or the subspecies “highest dis-

coverable type of certitude" from "conviction" in general; and there is to be no arranging of satisfactions in a hierarchy and no pretension to define the conditions under which a maker of rational judgments ought to be satisfied. From many expressions of pragmatist writers it would appear that while the term "satisfaction" is "many dimensional" one dimension is as good as another; and that the final and decisive warrant for belief—the mark of the valid judgment—is the capacity of the judgment to yield the maximum bulk of satisfaction, measured indifferently in any of its dimensions. But since the dimensions are many, it may manifestly turn out that the greatest total volume may not give the potential maximum of any given dimension taken singly. The liking for luminosity of meaning, or for conceptual consistency, or for completeness of empirical verification may fail to get full satisfaction in a judgment; but the judgment may, it would seem, still be "true," if it compensates for these limitations by a preponderant satisfactoriness with reference to other desires or interests: by its congruency with our habitual ways of belief, or its charm for the imagination, or its tendency to beget a cheerful frame of mind in those who accept it.

I think it possible that some pragmatists may at this point protest that they know of no one who seriously holds this view; certainly, it appears to me to be a curious view to hold. But I think one is justified in calling upon all of the name who reject this doctrine to take (and faithfully observe) an oath to abstain from a fashion of language which they have much affected; to refrain from identifying the true with the satisfactory simpliciter, to cease speaking of satisfaction as a
"criterion" of validity, and to confine their assimilation of the two concepts to the much more qualified and common-place thesis which follows.

9. This is pragmatism number seven plus a more or less explicit admission that our "theoretic" satisfactions have a special character and special epistemological pretensions; that our "intellectual" demands—for clear meanings, for consistency, for evidence—are not, and can not be, satisfied, unless their peculiar claim to precedence in the determination of belief is recognized; and that this claim is a legitimate one to which men should (though they often do not) subordinate their impulse to accept any conclusions that have any other kind of satisfactoriness. According to this view, "satisfaction" is still insisted upon as an essential mark of the apprehension of "truth"; but it is precisely a satisfaction which is not to be had except upon condition that other possible satisfactions be ignored or, in many cases, flatly rejected. Between this and the preceding (eighth) doctrine some pragmatist writers seem to waver. James, for example, often uses expressions (some of which have been quoted in the two foregoing paragraphs) implying the doctrine of the commensurability and equivalence of all satisfactions. But he elsewhere (e.g., in a controversy with Joseph in Mind, 1905) expressly distinguishes the "theoretic" from the "collateral" satisfactions connected with the processes of judging thought; and he does not appear to deny that the former may conflict with the latter, or that, in the event of such conflict, they ought to be preferred. To the objection offered by his critic, that if such admissions be made the pragmatist's criterion of validity is not practically distinguishable from the
intellectualist's, James opposes nothing more relevant than a sketch of the genesis and evolution of the demand of the human mind for consistency. This sketch purports to show—if I understand it—that the desire (more characteristic of some minds than of others) to avoid self-contradiction is historically engendered through the crystallization of repeated experiences of uniformity in "things" into fixed subjective habits of expecting specific uniformities—habits so fixed that when such an expectation is disappointed "our mental machinery refuses to run smoothly." How the transition from the idea of uniformity to that of consistency is accomplished here remains obscure to me; but even supposing the evolution of the one into the other to be completely and convincingly traced, these interesting historical speculations do not show, they do not even tend to suggest, that the demand for consistency in our judgments as we now find it—playing its captious and domineering role among our mental cravings—is not quite distinct from all its fellows and their rightful, though their often flouted, overlord. In the present sense, then, the pragmatist's criterion of truth, whether right or wrong, seems entirely destitute of any distinctive character; it is simply the old, intellectualist criterion supplemented by the psychologically undisputable, but the logically functionless, remark that, after all, a "theoretic" satisfaction is a kind of satisfaction.

10. Another pragmatism, and one that undoubtedly has real epistemological bearings, is the doctrine of radical empiricism conjoined with the doctrine of the necessity and legitimacy of postulation; the doctrine, in other words, that

*Mind, N.S., XIV., p. 196.*
"axioms are postulates" and that postulates are as valid as any human judgment ever can be, provided they be the expression of a genuine "practical" need. This may look like our eighth kind of pragmatism over again, expressed in other terms; but in certain important particulars it is really a distinct theory. It contains, in the first place, a special negative contention: namely, that there are no strictly compulsive or "necessary" general truths, no universal propositions that can force themselves upon the mind's acceptance apart from an uncoerced act of voluntary choice. And on its positive side, it identifies the true, not with those judgments which slip so easily into the mind that they afford a present emotional state of satisfaction, but with those that man's active nature requires as working presuppositions to be followed in its reaction upon present experience and its instinctive endeavor to shape future experience. This doctrine seems to me to be quite unequivocally expressed by Schiller in a well-known essay in *Personal Idealism*. "The 'necessity' of a postulate," we are told, "is simply an indication of our need. We want it, and so must have it, as a means to our ends. Thus its necessity is that of intelligent, purposive volition, not of psychical, and still less of physical, mechanism." "Behind the 'can't' there always lurks a 'won't'; the mind can not stultify itself, because it will not renounce conceptions it needs to order its experiences. The feeling of necessity, therefore, is at bottom an emotional accompaniment of the purposive search for means to realize our ends." 6

11. A kindred but a much less thoroughgoing doctrine

seems to constitute one of the pragmatisms of James. The author of *The Will to Believe* would, I suppose, still vigorously deny the possibility of reaching "necessary" conclusions with respect to many issues, including some of the greatest importance in relation both to the purely utilitarian requirements of our living and to our higher interests; and he would, clearly, still maintain the propriety and the practical inevitableness of voluntary postulation in such cases. But that there are *some* truly coercive and indubitable truths, some items of a priori knowledge inhering in the native constitution of a rational mind, James pretty fully and frankly declares in his recently published volume of lectures. "Our ready-made ideal framework for all sorts of possible objects follows from the very structure of our thinking. We can no more play fast and loose with these abstract relations than we can with our sense experiences. They coerce us; we must treat them consistently, whether or not we like the results." 7

This, obviously, is no doctrine that axioms are postulates or that behind every "can't" there lies a "won't"; it is the doctrine that axioms are necessities and that the action of voluntary choice in belief is always limited by a permanent system of a priori principles of possibility and impossibility inhering in the nature of intellect, at least as intellect is now evolved. It is compatible, at most, with the opinion that there are not so numerous, nor so useful, axioms as some dogmatic philosophers have supposed, and that, when axioms fail us, postulates must in many cases be resorted to.

12. A point of pragmatist doctrine separable from (though not inconsistent with) either of the two last mentioned is the

7 James, *op. cit.*, p. 211.
assertion of the equal legitimacy of those postulates (such as the uniformity of causal connection, the general "reliability" of nature, and the like) which appear indispensable as presuppositions for effective dealing with the world of our physical experience, and of those which, though lacking this sort of "physical" necessity as completely as they do the logical sort, yet seem demanded in order to give meaning to, or encouragement in, men's moral strivings, or to satisfy the emotional or esthetic cravings of our complex nature. It is conceivable enough that some pragmatists should refuse to recognize the equal standing of these two classes of postulates and should accept the first while rejecting the second; and it is a fact that not all who find a place for both agree as to the number and range of the second sort. The more extremely liberal forms of the doctrine of the right to postulate freely and to treat postulates as truths tend to lapse into identity with the eighth variety of pragmatism which identifies the true with the "maximally satisfying"; but in its more cautious and critical forms, the argument from the practical inevitableness of certain scientific to the legitimacy of certain ethicoreligious postulates must be regarded as a distinct type of pragmatist epistemology, and perhaps the one which—if pragmatist epistemology, and perhaps the one which—if pragmatism ought to have practical bearings—best deserves the name.

13. Lastly, there remains a second pragmatist theory of the meaning of concepts or judgments—which brings us back to the topic, though by no means to precisely the doctrine, with which our enumeration began. It may be expressed thus: an essential part of our idea of any object or fact con-
sists in an apprehension of its relation to some purpose or subjective interest on our part; so that no object of thought whatever could be just what, for our thought, it is, except through the mediation of some idea of purpose or some plan of action. The language of some pragmatist writers might lead one to suppose that they consider the whole meaning to be reducible to this teleological reference; but such a view does not seem to me intelligible, and it does not appear certain that any one really intends to maintain it. But it is evident that there are several logicians who think it both true and important to declare that a relation to a purpose constitutes an intrinsic and a determinative element in the connotation of any notion. It is, I suppose, such a principle that Moore intended to illustrate in recently pointing out that, however objective the virtues of a given candidate for office may be, he could neither be "clean" nor a candidate were there not present in the mind of every one so representing him the idea of possible voting to be done. And I suppose the same view is, in part at least, what Schiller has sought to enforce in insisting that nobody can be "lost" except with the aid of the existence in the universe of some purpose in some mind, requiring the presence of the "lost" person (or of the persons from whom he is lost) in some place or relation from which he is (or they are) excluded by virtue of his "lostness." Schiller appears to me to have entangled this theory of meaning in a confusing and illegitimate manner with questions about "truth" and "reality"; but to pursue this distinction would involve a somewhat long

and complicated analysis which may not here be undertaken.

These thirteen pragmatisms have been set down, not in a topical order, but according to the leading of those associations of ideas through which the ambiguities of the several doctrines, and the transitions from one to another, become relatively intelligible. But it may be useful to arrange them here in a more logical manner, while still retaining the original numbering. Those forms of theory, the separate enumeration of which results from distinctions made by this paper, but overlooked by pragmatist writers themselves—in other words, the doctrines formulated by pragmatists in more or less equivocal terms—are indicated by the sign (a); each group of doctrines hitherto improperly treated as single and univocal has a common superior number:

I. **Pragmatist Theories of Meaning.**

1. The “meaning” of any judgment consists wholly in the future experiences, active or passive, predicted by it.

2. The meaning of any judgment consists in the future consequences of believing it (a1).

13. The meaning of any idea or judgment always consists in part in the apprehension of the relation of some object to a conscious purpose (a1).

II. **Pragmatism as an Epistemologically Functionless Theory concerning the “Nature” of Truth.**

3. The truth of a judgment “consists in” the complete realization of the experience (or series of experiences) to which the judgment had antecedently pointed; propositions are not, but only become, true (a2).
III. Pragmatist Theories of Knowledge, i.e., of the Criterion of the Validity of a Judgment.

4. Those general propositions are true which so far, in past experience, have had their implied predictions realized; and there is no other criterion of the truth of a judgment (a²).

5. Those general propositions are true which have in past experience proved biologically serviceable to those who have lived by them; and this "livableness" is the ultimate criterion of the truth of a judgment (a²).

7. All apprehension of truth is a species of "satisfaction"; the true judgment meets some need, and all transition from doubt to conviction is a passage from a state of at least partial dissatisfaction to a state of relative satisfaction and harmony (a³). This is strictly only a psychological observation, not an epistemological one; it becomes the latter by illicit interpretation into one of the two following.

8. The criterion of the truth of a judgment is its satisfactoriness, as such; satisfaction is "many dimensional," but all the dimensions are of commensurable epistemological value, and the maximum bulk of satisfaction in a judgment is the mark of its validity (a³).

9. The criterion of the truth of a judgment is the degree in which it meets the "theoretic" demands of our nature; these demands are special and distinctive, but their realization is none the less a kind of "satisfaction" (a³).

10. The sole criterion of the truth of a judgment is its practical serviceableness as a postulate; there is no
general truth except postulated truth, resulting from some motivated determination of the will; "necessary" truths do not exist.

11. There are some necessary truths, but these are neither many nor practically adequate; and beyond them the resort to postulates is needful and legitimate.

12. Among the postulates which it is legitimate to take as the equivalent of truth, those which subserve the activities and enrich the content of the moral, esthetic, and religious life have a co-ordinate place with those which are presupposed by common sense and physical science as the basis of the activities of the physical life.

IV. Pragmatism as an Ontological Theory.

6. Temporal becoming is a fundamental character of reality; in this becoming the processes of consciousness have their essential and creative part. The future is strictly nonreal and its character is partly indeterminate, dependent upon movements of consciousness the nature and direction of which can be wholly known only at the moments in which they become real in experience. (Sometimes more or less confused with 3.)

Each pragmatism of the thirteen should manifestly be given a name of its own if confusion in future discussions is to be avoided. The present writer has neither the necessary

* It is impossible to bring out the nature, motives, and reciprocal relations of dependence or incompatibility of these theories in any such condensed formulas. I hope no reader will attempt to take the above recapitulation as a substitute for the analytical discussion contained in the preceding paragraphs.
The Thirteen Pragmatisms

ingenuity nor the ambition to devise a nomenclature so extensive. But however the several theories be designated, the fact of their difference, and of the incompatibility of some of them with some others, can hardly, just now, be too much insisted upon—in the interest of pragmatism itself. What the movement commonly so named most needs is a clarification of its formulas and a discrimination of certain sound and important ideas lying behind it from certain other ideas that are sound but not important, and certain that would be important if only they were not unsound. The present attempt to list the chief varieties and to clear up the hidden ambiguities of a doctrine nominally one and indivisible is accordingly offered as a species of Prolegomena zu einem jeden künftigen Pragmatismus.